MR. BARON: Mr. Dorsen, could I just suggest a break now?

MR. DORSEN: Sure, okay.

(A short recess was taken.)

MR. DORSEN: Back on the record.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Plaintiff's Exhibit 77 is a copy of a letter from you to your wife dated 11 May '67. Just so we have the time, that's a week after the previous letter. And it says:

"General McChristian was back today. Got in just before 7 o'clock and got a cable signed. He seems to have a lot else on his mind. Guess he's figmo -- f-i-g-m-o -- at this stage."

Do you know what the reference to cable was?

A Let me look at this. 11 May '67. This was his last month there. I don't recall what this cable was that I got signed. It could have been something important or just a normal thing. You don't want me to spell out what "figmo" means, do you?

Q No.

A Okay.

Q It has to do with being short --
A. Short of time.

Q. Okay, the next one is Plaintiff's Exhibit 78, 12 May '67. On page 2: "I'm going to try to catch General McChristian at 6:40 in the A. M. with some cables he should read. Don't know that I'll have any luck."

Does that mean anything to you?

A. Looking back at the date again, this again is in May?

Q. That's correct.

A. No, sir, I don't recall about these cables. Again, it could have been something just routine or important. A lot of these letters, you know, you're filling the page. You know you've got to write to your wife something to make her think that you're working hard.

Q. Okay, Plaintiff's Exhibit 79, a letter dated 17 May '67. "Admiral Sharp is due in next week. General McChristian doesn't have to brief him. Think General McChristian is stacking arms, anyway. I'm ready to do a little stacking myself, except that I'm still four months off."

Again, I show you the exhibit and ask you if you can comment on that; if that refreshes your recollection.

A. No, it does not. Admiral Sharp is obviously a reference to Admiral Sharp from CINCPAC coming in for a conference
of some sort. I don't know whether I would have been involved in that or not. I don't recall whether it was or not. Again, that just seems to be filler.

Q. What kind of things would you use as filler?

A. It was very difficult. You know, at this time you'd been in Saigon for -- since February of 1966 to May of 1967. You can't talk about classified information. And you just fill in with, "Well, we had a visitor come by, something, something, somebody of importance come through, or I saw Old So-and-So today."

But you do the same things. Your routine is the same thing day in and day out. I mean this is a seven-day week. You are beginning early in the morning and you are going until late at night, and it's just difficult to find anything to say if you are writing frequently.

Q. Did you try to make it sound interesting in your letters?

A. Yes, but it's difficult.

Q. And you sometimes used colorful language?

A. Yes, you sometimes use colorful language. You throw in, mainly, you know, if there is a personality she might recognize, or you say, "Well, we had a special briefing," or something
like that, you know. But anything; it was really very difficult
to fill up a page and a half or two pages of a letter on a
frequent basis. But the letters were simply a means of
communicating: "I'm here, you're there, and, you know, everything's
all right with me."

Q Okay, now, on May 22, 1967, from Plaintiff's Exhibit
80 -- and this is five days after your preceding letter: "If
Col. Godding buys my concept on this briefing for COMUS, MACV
will be working late again tomorrow night probably. Will give
it to COMUS Saturday morning. Sure hope it sells all the way.
Hope to -- it's the last wrangle on strength change justification
I'll get into. That's too much to expect, though. Seems I've
spent my tour explaining to Chairman JCS and SEC DEF why we're
changing such-and-such. That's progress, though."

You can look at that.

A Do you see the date of this thing? The 22nd of May.
This must refer to the irregulars and the political OB. It
would have been in that time frame of the 22nd of May. It
wouldn't spell out the precise date, because I don't know whether
that would have been approved, and I'd have to go back and do it
another time or not.

Q That reference, you believe, is to the first briefing?
A. It appears to me. It appears to me that that is a reference to the irregulars and the political OB, but I'm not sure about that.

Q. What is the reference "It seems I've spent my tour explaining to Chairman JCS and Sec. Def. why we're changing such and such"?

A. This would be any of the order of battle figures. If this is a reference to this one, this would be a very significant change in the figures. It would raise them considerably.

Q. But it says, as I understand it, the past tense: "seems I spent by tour explain why were changing such and such."

A. Well, I had. Any changes of strength. Any time in writing cables -- this would not refer simply to briefings, but writing cables. There was constant work to be done.

Q. Plaintiff's Exhibit 81, dated 24 May '67: "Colonel Godding bought the paper but General McChristian isn't available until in the morning. Hope we get to run it by him before giving it to General Westmoreland."

MR. BARON: Which date is that?

THE WITNESS: 24 May.

A. This, again, sounds like it referred to that updating
of the estimate of guerrilla strength.

Q. Does it refresh your recollection in any way as to what happened?

A. It sounds like it refers to that briefing. This was in the time frame, as being the 24th of May. The latter part of May.

Q. Now, the next exhibit is Plaintiff's Exhibit 82, 25 May. "Brigadier General Davidson arrived today. I haven't seen him yet. I'm supposed to brief him on Sunday. That's also the day I'm supposed to give COMUSMACV a briefing. Took my paper, letter from General Westmoreland to General Wheeler, Chairman JCS, around today for concurrences. Didn't get finished at J3 and have to go back at eight o'clock tomorrow morning."

A. This, again, is a continuation in the time frame. I'm talking about a briefing, and it would indicate it was briefing. Now, what the letter from General Westmoreland to General Wheeler, Chairman JCS, was I don't know. I don't remember what was in that letter; whether it had anything to do with that or was some other problem.

Q. Now, the next exhibit is 83, dated 27 May '67, which is two days later. "Saw General McChristian briefly at quitting time. There's a party tonight for the new J2, I think, and he
was in a rush to get away. Got his signature."

Do you know what that refers to?

A. No, sir. I don't remember what his signature was.

Ah, that probably was the Order of Battle Summary, the monthly Order of Battle Summary, that we would have had prepared for sending out. I think that was the last one he signed off on.

I'm not sure, but could have been it. Whether it was or not, I don't -- let me read it again.

(Witness reads document.)

A. Yeah, that is what it would seem to be; the monthly Order of Battle Summary.

Q. The next one is 29 May '67, Monday night, Plaintiff's Exhibit 84. "Gave the briefing to General Westmoreland yesterday morning and have a lot of things to do this week."

Would that have been the briefing?

A. This must have been the briefing. This must have been the briefing. This is dated 29 May and was written on Monday night. Let's see -- "Gave the briefing to General Westmoreland... that would have been on a Sunday. That's the time frame. It would have been -- Sunday would have been, of course, the 28th of May. That must have been the briefing, the time of the
briefing.

Q. Is there anything in this letter to indicate that you were unhappy in any way about that briefing?

A. Let's see -- The statement here, "I gave the briefing to General Westmoreland yesterday morning and have a lot of things to do this week." That indicates, as I testified earlier, that I was going to have to do some revisions to that study; that he said it was not approved, not accepted, and I had to do a lot of work on it.

Q. Again, the question is --

A. I'm glad you pinned down the date of that thing because I never even thought to look at my letters to see what the date was. That pretty well pins down the date that I must have given this briefing to General Westmoreland.

Q. I'd like to read the next sentence. "General McChristian presented the Legion of Merit this a.m. at the briefing."

A. Yes, sir. That was the Legion of Merit presented to me.

Q. Does that indicate that General McChristian was at the briefing?

A. It indicates -- yes, it indicates that he was at that briefing, which I had thought all along.
Q. And General McChristian did not think all along?
A. He did not remember being at the briefing.
Q. How could he not remember that briefing?
A. I don't know. I don't know why he didn't. You'll have to ask him about that.

I told him on the phone, "General, I'm trying to remember the best I can, and you just remember the best you can. But whether we disagree on things, I can't help that. I'm trying to dredge it out of my memory."

Q. And I think you testified, Colonel Hawkins, that you believed that this was the only time that you can recall that you did not have an estimate or briefing approved by General Westmoreland that you gave?
A. Yes. That's right. I don't see anything here though that would indicate that he was -- he must -- he would have been aware of it. I don't think I could have briefed anything to General Westmoreland that he wasn't aware of. You just didn't do things like that, you know.

But it was a briefing directly for General Westmoreland. This is what I testified to. And you asked me about a decision briefing and I testified I considered it a decision briefing.
That is, that General Westmoreland would approve it or he would
not approve it or take no action.

Q. Could it be that General McChristian interpreted the briefing in a different way than you?

A. Could be. You'd have to ask him about that.

Q. But again, just a question that I think I started with the letter, is there anything in this letter to indicate that you were unhappy about what occurred at the briefing?

A. No. I said nothing in there to indicate my displeasure.

Q. Now, the next letter is 30 May 1967, Plaintiff's Exhibit 85, which is, again, the next day.

"Briefed a Mr. Zorthian today. He's head of the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office. Had a rather pleasant afternoon. We've got a rather sensitive strength change and everyone's concerned about the 'credibility gap' business. Guess I'll be hustling on this project for several weeks to come."

Let me show you the letter.

(Witness reads document.)

A. I don't recall what the subject matter I gave to Mr. Zorthian was. At this particular time the guerrillas and the politicaIs were the hottest item we were concerned with.

Q. Does it say that everyone is concerned about the credibility gap business?
A. Yes. "Credibility gap" was a phrase that was used continuously.

Q. What did it mean to you at that time?

A. Whether or not the validity -- a question of the validity of various statements that were made in estimates; whether or not you believed or didn't believe.

You know, there was a lot of criticism in the press.

Q. Was one of the components of the credibility gap, in quotes, the body count?

A. Body count, there was always a credibility gap as far as body count was concerned.

Q. Was there also part of the credibility gap, as you understood the term, a believe that the military was overstating the size of the enemy?

A. I'd have to narrow that down. The credibility gap in conjunction with the body count was that I think people believed that the body counts were inflated to indicate a degree of success in casualties that we were inflicting on the enemy which were just not being inflicted. That's about the best I can do with it.

Q. Do you recall whether there was any feeling that there was a credibility gap because the military was accused
of overstating the size of the enemy?

A. I'm sure that some people felt that the military was overstating the size of the enemy.

Q. During that period?

A. During the entire period that I was over there. Some people thought we were overstating it and some people thought we were understating it.

Q. At that time, do you recall whether General Westmoreland was seeking additional troops?

A. No, sir, I don't. I don't know about that.

Q. Do you know whether you would have given the same briefing to Mr. Zorthian as you gave to General Westmoreland?

A. No, sir. I don't think -- I don't know. I don't know whether I gave the same briefing. I just don't know what briefing I gave to Mr. Zorthian.

I'd say that it probably had something to do with the guerrillas and the political, but whether it would have been the same identical briefing, I don't know.

Q. Now, Plaintiff's Exhibit 86 is the 31 May '67, the following day.

"General McChristian left about seven o'clock tonight --

A. What was the date on that now?
Q. 31 May 1967.

"General McChristian left about seven o'clock tonight. I got his signature on the monthly OB Summary before he left and I think he appreciated it. Probably was the last thing he signed at MACV."

A. That was as I recall it. In the previous letter I was looking for his signature, and it seemed to me it would have been the monthly OB Summary. It just verified my statement earlier.

Q. Why did you think General McChristian would have appreciated signing the May OB?

A. It was his baby. That was one of his last -- his concern was order of battle. Yes, to have him sign it before he left, he's signing off on this document. He put a lot of pressure on us to put out a good Order of Battle Summary. A lot of his suggestions had been carried out in the format and the preparation of that thing. It was just a natural thing. I would assume, and I did assume at that time, that I had gotten that thing to him to sign as one of his last acts because of his concern with order of battle matters.

Q. Plaintiff's Exhibit 87. This is June 10, 1967, approximately ten days later.
"Briefed General Davidson today for the first time. He was very nice. He never had time to get around for his branch organization and mission briefings. I have a real problem on strength, enemy, that is, and the Chairman JCS and the Sec. Def. are due to hear it soon. Hope we can ride out the storm which most likely will break."

MR. BARON: I would just note you omitted the word "hot." "I have a real hot problem on strength ...."

MR. DORSEN: That's true. I did leave that out.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. Why don't you take a look at this, Colonel Hawkins?

(Witness reads document.)

A. This statement here, "I have a real hot problem on strength," that was a problem. We had raised that figure on strength and it was a real hot problem.

Q. Would you have discussed this problem with General Davidson.

A. Well, what it says there. What does it say here?

"I briefed General Davidson today for the first time." I must have discussed it with him.

Q. Do you remember what you said to him?

A. No. I don't remember. I briefed him on the study.
I don't know whether -- let's see -- this was -- well, this would probably have been a very general briefing.

Q. And introduction?

A. Yes. Of the order of battle shop. I don't know what all I would have discussed; whether I would have discussed the irregular strength or what. It could have been nothing more than briefing him on the structure of the order of battle; who the people were in it and what were the various problems we had.

That really doesn't tell much about -- it -- I can't remember what I briefed General Davidson on at that time. The extent of the briefing.

Q. Does this paragraph indicate to you whether or not General Davidson was at the prior briefing?

A. No, sir, it doesn't. It doesn't pin that down at all.

Q. He may have been even though you said that you briefed General Davidson today for the first time?

A. No, sir. "For the first time." That wouldn't have indicated that he wasn't at the briefing because I considered I was briefing General Westmoreland. This would have been a briefing to General Davidson in his office or in my office.

I think I said he never did get around coming to the
branch, so it must -- Did I say he didn't get a chance to come around to the branch?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes. He never had time to get around to his branch organizations and missions, so I don't know what I briefed General Davidson on. But that has no tie-in, as I can see, with whether he was present or not present at that briefing for General Westmoreland.

Q. Does this help you recall whether he was at the briefing?

A. No, sir, it does not.

Q. You still don't know?

A. I still don't know whether General Davidson was present or not.

Q. Now, the next is Plaintiff's Exhibit 88, 13 June '67, and the last line is "Have to brief General Westmoreland tomorrow afternoon; better go to bed."

And I'm asking you whether that indicates that might have been the second briefing?

A. This indicates to me that this probably was the second briefing. This date was on the 13th of June, and tomorrow, see, would have -- yeah. Yes, sir. That indicates that it was the
The next exhibit, 89, is quite a bit later. It's 28 August '67.

"We're still in limbo on the new estimate. General Westmoreland is very much concerned over the figure CIA wants to publish. Apparently, Godding let things get out of hand when he stayed behind to watch out for MACV interests. Anyway, General Westmoreland has recommended to General Wheeler that a team from Washington come out here. General Davidson sent word down today he wants me to stay on an additional 14 days. I don't really have much choice in view of the high level interest and concern."

A. Right. This was apparently just before the conference there in Saigon, which I have testified to earlier. I was put on administrative hold.

I think I said before 10 days or two weeks, and it says here 14 days.

Let's see, "Apparently, Godding let things get out of hand when he stayed behind...." I think this confirms my earlier testimony that we had reduced these figures; that we were holding to a ceiling, and that Colonel Godding might have made some concessions that would go beyond the guidelines so
far as the total enemy strength was concerned.

Q. Was it your understanding that the total was above what you understood it should be at?

A. I don't know the specifics here, but obviously there was concern back there that the MACV position was being challenged, had been weakened somewhat by some action that Colonel 'Godding at that time might have taken.

Q. We're going to add one more letter, which we'll have marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 91, a copy of a letter dated June 14, 1967.

(The document referred to was marked Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 91 for identification.)

Q. Now, to go back, Colonel Hawkins, this letter was one day after the June 13th letter which refers to briefing General Westmoreland tomorrow afternoon.

And it reads on Page 2: "The days pass slowly, but I stay busy. Am glad I'm getting out from under the new regime. I'm just too tired to adjust."

That is the only reference -- well, could you look at that, and I'll withdraw the prior statement.

(Witness reads document.)
A. "The days pass slowly, but I stay busy. Am glad I'm getting out from under the new regime. I'm just too tired to adjust." That indicates my displeasure. That's the only thing I recall in my correspondence that I ever gave any indication of my displeasure.

Q. Well, does that indicate displeasure?

A. Yes. I think it's obvious that it does.

Q. "Too tired to adjust"?

A. It means I was about worn out from it. I'm glad I'm getting out from under the new regime. That indicates very plainly that I was very much dissatisfied.

Q. Let me ask you this, Colonel Hawkins, do you recall -- let me rephrase that.

Was there a rivalry between General McChristian and General Davidson over the years?

A. The only knowledge I have of the rivalry is that I had heard of it from other people. I'd heard officers talk about it. Friends of mine had talked about it. They didn't talk about it so much in -- I don't think really you'd classify it so much as a rivalry.

General Davidson -- and I had heard General Davidson at times make critical remarks of General McChristian. I had
never heard General McChristian make any critical remarks in
my presence of any officer of his rank or higher rank. He just
didn't operate that way.

I never paid too much attention to it. It was just --
you know, there's rivalries in civilian life and there are
people in civilian life who just don't seem to get along together;
they don't like one another. But I never heard General McChristian
say a word to indicate that he didn't like Davidson or anything.

General McChristian was very circumspect in not
discussing politics or personalities with his subordinate
officers.

I say, I did hear General Davidson make some remarks
that were critical, but I never paid too much attention to this.

Q. Was it your understanding that General Davidson, on
a number of occasions, followed General McChristian in assignments?

A. Yes, sir. General Davidson followed General
McChristian to USARPAC and he followed him to Saigon. That's
it. Those two occasions that I recall.

Q. And did General Davidson tend to operate differently
from General McChristian?

A. Yes. For the short time that I was there under him --
that was a matter of what? June through September? There was
a difference in the way that they operated.

Q. Was it a difference in style or was it something else?
A. It's very hard to describe. I don't think -- I'd have to sit down and study it out very carefully to describe what the difference was. But I believe primarily there was a difference in personalities. I think --

Q. Do you know whether -- I'm sorry.
A. Excuse me. Let me -- But General McChristian seemed to have relied a great deal more on his judgment. He was very insistent and persistent in getting things done.

It's just very difficult to off the top of my head, extemporaneously, describe the differences in the two generals.

I worked for General McChristian so long. I worked for General Davidson for just a short period of time.

Q. Didn't General Davidson tend to reorganize the structure of an organization after he followed General McChristian in?
A. I'm not sure how much reorganization took place. Of course, different people were coming in, but so far as the organization, I don't remember what changes he made in the organizational structure of the J2 shop.

Usually when a new general officer comes in, he does make changes. That's just the way the military operates, or the
Army operated. They make some changes to suit their own mode of operation. And they usually bring in new people.

General Davidson brought some new people, but I don't know whether it just coincided with transfers or not. But there were a number of new people that came in with General Davidson.

That would refer back to my letter referring to a team. See?

Q. Would this be hard to adjust to? A different mode of operation and different personalities?

A. It depends on the circumstances. I had been adjusting throughout my life in the Army to different situations.

Q. Sometimes is it difficult?

A. Sometimes it's more difficult than others. It depends on the situation and the people involved.

MR. DORSEN: We'll make a copy of this -- why don't we make a copy of this now?

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. DORSEN: On the record.

Could we have marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 92 a letter dated 10 April '67?

(The document referred to was
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit
Number 92 for identification.)

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. On Page 2, the last paragraph, it says: "D. G. Davidson from USARPAC arrives in May. General McChristian goes in June. I dread the changeover. General D. does not like General McChristian and will try to change everything he's set up."

Did that reflect your view at the time?

A. Yes. That reflected my view at the time. This was in April before General Davidson arrived there. And as I testified before, I had heard that there was -- you know, that General Davidson did not like General McChristian. It was open. It was sort of an open thing. I think everybody talked -- it was one of the things that the subordinates, the junior officers, talked about.

Q. Colonel Hawkins, you had been working very hard, had you not, in Vietnam?

A. Yes, sir. It was hard work. day in and day out.

Q. And you were anxious to get home?

A. Yes, sir. I was anxious to get home. Everybody was anxious to get home, I think.
Q. And --
A. But there was still a job to do.

Q. Now, Colonel Hawkins, what is your view as to what
the military results of Tet were? The Tet Offensive, I mean.

A. The immediate military results of Tet were -- what
I could learn of it; I wasn't there at the time. I was getting
my information from reading the newspapers. In my view, the
U. S. military forces inflicted a great many casualties on the
Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army troops, but the thing,
it was sort of a surprise, and it was treated by the press in
such a way that there was the Vietnamese communists credited
with a great victory, a great military victory, which I did not
consider a military victory because they were turned around and
suffered many casualties.

I think they gained a tremendous psychological and
propaganda victory from the Tet Offensive.

Q. But not a military victory?

A. But not a military victory, no, sir. I don't think
in any way you could consider it to have been a military
victory, but a psychological and propaganda victory.

Q. Was that, in your opinion, because of the way it was
portrayed in the press?
A. Partially because of the way it was portrayed in the press, and partially because I don't think the public was prepared for an offensive of this nature. I don't think the public was aware of the strength or ability of the Vietnamese communists at that time.

Both factors. I think there was a great deal of surprise on the part of the public. This, of course, contributed to the propaganda and the psychological victory.

Q. Colonel Hawkins, did you tell Hodding Carter that you "cooked the books"?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you use that expression?

A. Yes, sir. I used the expression I "cooked the books."

That's a slang expression.

Q. Is that an accurate statement to Mr. Carter?

A. Well, yes, it's an accurate statement. I reduced, I arbitrarily reduced figures to meet the Command position not to exceed a certain number of troops at the bottom line.

Q. Did you also tell Mr. Carter that you did not believe that there was a conspiracy?

A. Yes. I probably did. Do you want to read that statement? Read my words in there because I've been shying
off from this conspiracy word ever since it was used because
I don't really know what conspiracy means.

I considered that I had participated in a coverup,
and I had done it in conjunction with other people; people that
I worked for were fully aware of what I was doing and how I
was doing it. And to me, it was a coverup.

Now, whether this constitutes a conspiracy, I don't know.

I didn't want to point a finger at the Commander and
Chief of MACV, a four-star general, and say this is a conspiracy.

But what constitutes a conspiracy? Maybe you can define it
for me. I've been avoiding the word.

Q. You would not have used it?

A. I've never subscribed to it because I'm afraid of the word. To me, I interpreted what I was doing as covering up.

Q. Well, let me ask you this. Do you know from your own knowledge what General Westmoreland knew about the coverup you described?

A. No, sir, I don't know. The only thing I know is what I have testified up to this point.

Q. And when you say your superiors, when you referred to
your superiors, who are you referring to?

A. I'm talking about General Davidson and Colonel Morris because I worked in concert with them. I never made any bones about how I was doing things. I subscribed to them, okay, I'll provide what you want, you know. If this is what you want, I will give it to you. And I went along all the way with them on what was needed there. Probably might have gone overboard. But that's what I did.

Q. Did you ever tell them that you didn't believe in what you were doing?

A. Not in words to that effect. I tried to drag my feet in some cases, but I knew the handwriting was on the wall and this was what was going to be done. And there was always in the back of my mind, if I don't give in these areas, I might have to give in the areas of the main forces, which I considered inviolable, and I did not want any pressure in that area because I didn't know what my reaction would be.

I think I told Hodding Carter that I never got any pressure to reduce them. But in the back of my mind, there was always the fear that I might have to.

Something had to give, and I went along very willingly as long as we could cut in the areas of the irregular and the
political. Because I felt that that would do less damage, even though it did not show the true magnitude of the enemy as I believed it to be.

Q. Can you think of anything you said, specifically said, to General Davidson or Colonel Morris that would have led them to believe to any extent that you did not agree with the numbers?

A. No. I can't think of anything special that I did, but they were aware of what I was doing.

Q. Now, did you have any dealings on the order of battle with Colonel Graham? Daniel Graham?

A. I don't remember any associations with Colonel Graham. My association with him must have been very limited because I don't remember any contact with Colonel Graham.

My contacts were primarily with Colonel Morris and with General Davidson himself.

Q. You said that General Davidson and Colonel Morris were aware of what you were doing. Is that your impression or something else?

A. That's my impression.

Q. Now, in the broadcast, "The Uncounted Enemy," Mr. Wallace referred to a conspiracy. Do you remember that?

A. Yes, sir, I remember that.
Q. Whom did you understand that Mr. Wallace was referring to?

A. Well, it's all pretty much vague to me. I think the conspiracy would point at General Westmoreland and his staff officers.

Q. Did Mr. --

A. General Westmoreland, of course, was the man -- you know, he's the man at the top.

Q. Did Mr. Crile or Mr. Adams ever ask you whether you thought there was a conspiracy?

A. I don't think Mr. Adams ever asked me that. You could look at the transcript to see whether Mr. Crile asked me that or not.

Q. If it's not in the transcript he wouldn't have asked you?

A. If it's not in the transcript of that -- it's been my understanding -- I don't know. I don't -- we have talked about the conspiracy theory. I've talked about it with Sam and made pretty much the same remarks that I have made to you in this statement this morning; that I had avoided the use of the word "conspiracy" because I considered it a coverup and I don't know what a conspiracy amounts to. I don't know what the legal
definition of a conspiracy is.

Q. Now, to your knowledge, what contact did Sam Adams have with General Westmoreland or General Abrams?

A. I don't know of what contact he would have had with them.

Q. Do you know of any basis that Mr. Adams would have had in 1967 or 1968 for seeking the court-martial or disciplining of General Westmoreland or General Abrams?

A. I'm not even aware of that, and I wouldn't be aware of the reason for it.

Q. What would you think if you had heard that Mr. Adams was thinking of seeking the court-martial of General Westmoreland?

A. I would have thought, well, Sam must be on to something here.

Q. But you don't know what it was?

A. I don't know what it was. No, sir, I don't know what it was.

Q. Nothing you know would warrant the bringing up of charges against General Westmoreland or General Abrams?

A. I don't know what Sam Adams had in mind.

MR. DORSEN: I don't have any further questions at this time.
Let's take a short break and take stock of where we are.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock, noon, the deposition of Gains B. Hawkins was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 o'clock, p.m., the same day.)