AFTERNOON SESSION

Whereupon,

GAINS B. HAWKINS

the witness at the time of recess, having been previously duly sworn, was examined further and testified further as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

BY MR. BARON:

Q. Colonel, in the last hour, I believe that you were examining Plaintiff's Exhibit 91, which is your letter to your wife of 14 June 1967. Could I have that exhibit? Could I have the letters? (Documents given to Defendant's Counsel by Plaintiff's Counsel.)

Q. I would like to ask you to look at the next to last paragraph, which I believe is the paragraph that Mr. Dorsen read to you. Could you read that into the record once more for clarity? On the second page?

A. "The days pass slowly, but I stay busy. Am glad I'm getting out from under the new regime. I'm just too tired to adjust."

Q. Now, do you recall telling Mr. Dorsen that you believed that letter indicated your displeasure and that you were very
dissatisfied?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you explain why you were displeased or dissatisfied?

A. I was dissatisfied with the results of the briefing on this new estimate of strength concerning the irregulars and political order of battle. It was my opinion that this was a significant improvement over our intelligence holdings and represented a valid estimate of the enemy force that existed in Vietnam at that time.

It seemed to me that political considerations -- I would classify them as political considerations; that is, to be specific, the reaction of the public, the reaction of the press, were given consideration above and beyond the strength figures.

This was a disappointment and a source of displeasure for me at the time.

Q. Do you recall testifying very shortly before Mr. Dorsen concluded his examination that you believed that you had participated in a coverup, or words to that effect?

A. Yes. I believe I used the word "coverup."

Q. Do you believe that you participated in a coverup?
A. Yes, sir. I certainly believe that I participated in a cover-up. I took figures out of these new estimates and I reduced figures arbitrarily, and I consider this to have been a cover-up. This is what fits my understanding of the word "cover-up."

Q. Do you recall testifying that you participated in this cover-up in conjunction with other people?

A. I worked in conjunction with Colonel Morris and General Davidson, yes, primarily, and with the officers subordinate to them, but I tried to keep the officers subordinate to me from getting involved in the area of responsibility. I tried to make it very clear that the actions -- that I was responsible for the actions I was advising them or ordering them or directing them to take and that they were relieved of responsibility.

Q. Can you identify anyone else who you believe was involved in that cover-up which you spoke of?

A. I always did believe Special Ambassador Comber was well aware of what was going on. I believe that. I could assume that every officer in the headquarters, J2, knew what was going on. That's my assumption.

Of course there was not any -- this was what was happening and there was usually a degree of awareness on the
on their part as to what was going on.

Q. Would you include General Davidson among those?

MR. DORSEN: Object to the form of the question.

A. I think I said earlier I worked in conjunction with General Davidson. I worked with General Davidson and Colonel Morris. I believe, and I believe I had good reason to believe, that they were aware of the actions that I was taking and the reason I was taking them and how I was going about this.

General Godding, of course, was aware, too. I think his name has come up before. He was the chief MACV-J2 delegate to this conference and he was actually my immediate superior. Of course, he's bound to have known everything that was going on.

Q. Are there any other intelligence officers whom you can identify particularly as having been involved in this cover-up?

A. I don't know of any. That's what comes to mind right now. Those are the ones that I worked most closely with.

Q. Colonel, do you know which MACV intelligence officers were cleared for access to communications intelligence after you left Saigon in September, 1967?

A. Which officers now?
Q: MACV intelligence officers.
A: No, sir, I don't know who was cleared for special and communications intelligence?

Q: Do you know which CICV intelligence officers were cleared?
A: No, sir. I believe I testified earlier that the Chief of the CICV OB Branch was cleared and the Chief of CICV, and I understood that several other officers were cleared. But I don't think there was a great number who were cleared. I think officers in special assignments were cleared for access, but I couldn't identify them.

Q: Do you have specific knowledge as to which particular officers were cleared for access to special intelligence after you left Saigon? And I'm referring here to CICV officer?
A: No, sir. I don't recall anything about this.

Q: I believe you testified yesterday about something called a WIEU or W-I-E-U briefing. Do you recall that?
A: Yes, sir. That's the weekly intelligence update.

Q: Who would customarily attend the WIEU briefing?
A: Well, General Westmoreland would attend it; the J2 would attend it; I was there; visiting general officers sometimes from the subordinate units; visitors from outside the Command
would be there. The chiefs of the various divisions: Collection
Division and Production Division, would be there.

I believe that the Chief of CICV was there. The
commanding officer out at CICV was there.

Q. Do you know what level of security clearance was
required for an officer to be able to attend the WIEU briefing?

A. He had to have a special communications intelligence
clearance, which the code word for the clearance itself was
classified. But it was a special clearance for access to that
type of information and to that secure area.

Q. So, if an officer was present at the WIEU briefing,
would it be fair to conclude that he must have had a special
intelligence clearance?

MR. DORSEN: Object to the form of the question.

A. There is no way that an officer would have been admitted
to that briefing, to my knowledge, unless he had the proper
clearance. You just didn't get behind the door unless you had
the clearance.

Q. Do you consider yourself to be knowledgeable about
order of battle matters, Colonel?

A. Yes, sir. I consider myself to have been very
knowledgeable at one time. I cannot remember a great deal about
figures at this time. I remember primarily methodology and procedures. But figures I do not recall.

Even when I was actively engaged in the production of order of battle intelligence, I did not trust my memory too much to give off-the-skull, as we called it, figures. I would always insist, "Let me look and see what we're showing right now."

Q. Based on your knowledge, sir -- and I'm asking you here for your opinion -- do you believe it would have been a desirable practice to assess enemy casualty figures -- and by that I'm referring to communist KIA statistics -- against enemy strength figures carried in the Order of Battle?

A. I did not believe this should be done. We did not follow this practice in the assessment and continuing updating of strengths of enemy regiments and battalions.

Q. Could you explain why you didn't follow that practice?

A. These figures were of a general nature and you simply couldn't break them out and assess them to individual units unless you have an identification of that particular unit to go along with those casualties.

Sometimes units who were contacted on the field of battle were not even identified until sometime later, and you
simply could not take those day-by-day head counts and assess them to the unit unless you knew what unit it was.

Later on, if you somehow or another obtained an identification of that particular unit which had been contacted, and you could get a valid assessment of how many losses, sometimes you would later on capture documents which would give some indication of what the strength was.

We tried to deal with individual units as they were identified and assess the casualties that had occurred. A lot of this was done retroactively because that was the only way we could be certain of which unit had been identified.

You could go back to reports of battlefield casualties if you identified the unit at a later date. Of course, if the enemy was identified at the time that your casualties occurred, at the time of a body count, you had to study those figures to determine how much validity that particular head count had.

What I'm trying to get across is we simply did not use head count figures, body count figures, directly in all cases to apply to enemy strength.

I think that's about the extent that I can answer that question, unless you want to ask me something more specific. That's the best I can describe it.
Q. Do you recall yesterday testifying to the effect that --
and I'm trying to quote you here, but correct me, please, if this
doesn't conform with your recollection -- "you couldn't fit:
anymore in the can," and "the auditorium was full."

A. Well, that's a slang term which refers to the ceiling
that was imposed upon us. We had a ceiling in the neighborhood
of 300,000, which corresponded closely with the figure we had
at the end of May, and that whatever category you put into it
the bottom line, when you added up all the various categories,
that figure could not exceed the total that we'd been carrying
in the Order of Battle previously. Up to that date of late May
or early June.

Q. Could you explain as precisely as you can what
exactly you meant when you said you couldn't fit anymore in the
can?

A. Well, we had our figures up to that point, up to the
top figure, and we couldn't put anymore in that was going to
bring that up to any extent.

Q. Why couldn't you?

A. Well, they were just not going to be acceptable at the
Command. That was the Command policy at the time.

Q. When you refer to the Command, to whom are you referring?
A. Well, I'm referring to General Davidson -- well, actually, you have to refer back to General Westmoreland.

Q. Do you recall yesterday that Mr. Dorsen asked you whether in July, 1967 you might have said that evidence on the self-defense militia was inconclusive?

A. Yes. I remember something like that.

Q. Do you recall saying in response words to the effect that you could have said that because you were "backtracking"?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you explain what you meant by the term "backtracking"?

A. Reducing figures, I believe is what I had in mind there.

Q. I'd like to, if I may, give you a copy of what I believe has been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 66.

I'm referring to Colonel Hawkins' affidavit, if you could correct me if I'm wrong in identifying it as Plaintiff's Exhibit 66.

I'd like to ask you to look that affidavit over, read it over; take as much time as you'd like.

(Witness reads document.)

Q. Have you read it?
Q. Now, you've been shown a number of documents over the course of this deposition, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I'd like to ask you whether in the light of the questioning that you've been subjected to over the last three days, and the documents that you've seen in the last three days, whether you have any reservations about any statement contained in this affidavit?
MR. DORSEN: Object to the form of the question.
A. No, sir. I can't see anything after re-reading it that I really object to in it.
Q. At the time you signed this affidavit, did it accurately reflect your views?
A. Yes, sir, it did.
Q. Does it continue to accurately reflect your views?
MR. DORSEN: Object to the form of the question.
A. Yes, it does, sir.
Q. Now, I believe you testified earlier that you had agreed to be interviewed by George Crile, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know at that time that that interview would be used in the preparation of the CBS documentary?
A. I assumed that portions of it would be used.

Q. Did you ask to get involved in the preparation of the CBS documentary?

A. Did I ask?

Q. Yes.

A. No, sir. I was called.

Q. Did you agree generally to be involved?

A. Yes. I agreed voluntarily to participate; to be interviewed.

Q. Why did you agree, Colonel?

A. Well, I'd finally decided to come out and say what I could best remember about it because I thought it was important to say it. The war was over; it couldn't harm our posture in the war because the war was over; several years had gone, and I thought it was sort of like looking back, a sort of lessons learned; what did we learn? how did we do thing? and it could make a contribution, a substantive contribution, to our knowledge of the Korean War, what we did, what we did right and what we did wrong. You know, you could break it out in those categories.

Q. You said Korean War.

A. No. Vietnam War. I'm sorry. I'm tired.

Q. I think we all are.
Q. Do you believe that lessons were learned by this experience?
A. Yes, sir. I believe very important intelligence lessons were learned.
Q. Could you tell us what those lessons were?
A. Well, I think we learned how to cope with measuring the strength of the enemy in insurgency situations such as this when you had troops that were not conventionally organized strictly along conventional lines in all instances, and the importance of information and how to process this. Also, how to deal with the American public in wars of this nature.

I thought that maybe we were not sufficiently candid at times during the Vietnam War, and I think it probably would have been better if we had been a little bit more candid about what we could see of the enemy.

This might even be valuable in the events in Central America and South America and in the Middle East that we are confronted with at the present time.

I don't know that I related it at that time to Central America because I don't recall just the time frame of this, when this thing became such a hot issue. But in any situation, any future situation, we should examine how we did things and
determine, oh, well, we could do better by doing it a different way.

That's about it.

Q. How do you believe we could have done it better in Vietnam?

A. I think we could have done better by going ahead and being more candid about the enemy strength. I think our figures were valid for this increase in enemy strength. I think it would have brought home to us and to the Congress and to everybody concerned the magnitude of the war over there. It might have affected some decisions that were made and how we were going about the conduct of this war.

MR. BARON: Off the record a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. BARON: Back on the record.

THE WITNESS: I would add one more statement to that. I think the question of political concerns and intelligence, valid intelligence, I think we could learn that political concerns should not overweigh the development of intelligence, and I think it did affect this from the summer of 1967, the period that I was in Vietnam. I'm not sure how much it affect it after I left there because I'm not familiar with the situation.
But I think this is one thing that would come to light, and if we could look at this and say, well, how do we weigh this? What are the consequences?

BY MR. BARON: (Resuming)

Q. I'd like to show you the draft that you wrote on the enemy order of battle, and if you'll give me a moment I'll try to determine which Plaintiff's exhibit that is from my notes.

But I'd like you, while I'm doing that, to read over the bottom of Page 51 and the top of Page 52, the portion beginning below the parenthetical "(need more data from files)", starting at "About mid-1966...."

A. You want me to read this aloud here?

Q. No. Just read it to yourself.

(Witness reads document.)

MR. DORSEN: I believe that's Exhibit 71.

MR. BARON: For the record, the Colonel is reviewing Pages 51 and 52 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 71.

THE WITNESS: I've read that paragraph now.

BY MR. BARON: (Resuming)

Q. Now, I believe the penultimate sentence of that paragraph -- I'll read it. In the draft it says, "A major US-
ARVN military operation called 'Operation Ervin' in the area of -- and then there's a blank -- "1966 had demonstrated the presence of a large -- and then it goes into what appears to be a new sentence which is -- "as U. S. forces bowled over the enemy opposition they began to report hundreds of prisoners."

Could you explain what --

A. (Interrupting) I believe that was an operation that occurred in Binh Dinh Province, and Operation Ervin, we began to get reports into MACV of hundreds and hundreds of prisoners that had been captured. And it became obvious -- MACV was elated at this time because it appeared we had overcome a major military force and made a large haul of enemy prisoners.

But as the days passed, it became obvious that a mistake had been made; the prisoners just weren't there. And as the days went on, I think the number of actual prisoners that were counted that were actually identified as bone fide prisoners of war were reduced from several hundreds to a score or more.

There was a problem of identifying, you know. It appeared they'd simply wrapped up a lot of civilians and that these civilians were put in jails. One officer explained it to me: they went in the front door and out the back door.
It was a -- it turned into a terrific flap and a source of embarrassment, the problem of identifying bone fide prisoners of war. Who was a soldier and who was not a soldier and who you're fighting out here.

I was sent to the -- I believe it was the 1st Field Force Command from Saigon to talk to the J2 about this thing about a day or so after we began to realize that we didn't have all these prisoners that were reported, and I talked to the G2 Officer, the man who was the G2 or S2, the chief intelligence officer at the 1st Field Forces, and he was very much confused himself. And I didn't learn a whole lot from him because he was on his way to go out into the area and try to develop more information.

And I came back. I had other work to do. And the J2 assigned, I believe it was a major, to this thing to follow this thing up, and they worked on it for days, and perhaps weeks, to resolve it.

Well, you know, what did we have here? And I don't think it was ever resolved. Cables were going back and forth from MACV to Washington and so forth. It was a tremendous flap.

Q. Do you recall in the latter portion of Mr. Dorsen's questioning this morning his asking you about your statement to
Hodding Carter with respect to the use of the word "conspiracy"?

A. Yes, sir. We talked about that. And I believe my reply was I don't really know what a conspiracy consists of and I'd like to have a definition. I'm still looking for a definition of "conspiracy."

I used the term "coverup," in which several people were involved and I believe knowledgeably involved in what they were doing.

MR. DORSEN: Object. I move to strike the answer as non-responsive.

Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Dorsen that you did not have a definition of the word? Didn't know what the word meant?

A. Yes, sir. I said I do not know what the word means.

Q. Do you recall inviting Mr. Dorsen to give you a definition of the word?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Dorsen supplied a definition for the word?

A. There was no definition supplied that I can recall.

Q. If you were to use the definition of the word "conspiracy" that the word means "concerted action to deceive," would you believe then that was an appropriate to describe the
events in the summer of 1967 with respect to the enemy order of battle?

MR. DORSEN: Object to the form of the question.

A. Can I ask you to repeat it?

MR. DORSEN: Absolutely, Colonel.

Q. I can either -- do you want the definition repeated or --

A. Just repeat the definition.

Q. The definition I am commending to your consideration is that "conspiracy" means "concerted action to deceive."

A. Well, that sounds like a reasonable definition. I didn't know what conspiracy consists of. That sounds reasonable.

Q. If one were to use that definition, sir, then would you think that the term "conspiracy" was an appropriate term to describe the events of May through September, 1967 with respect to the enemy order of battle in Vietnam?

MR. DORSEN: Object to the form of the question.

A. A concerted action, or attempt or action, to deceive -- certainly there was a deception there, and certainly there were several people involved. Yes, I suppose -- yes, I believe it would have to fit the definition; the definition you have stated there.
Q. Now, you stated earlier, I believe, that you had participated in a coverup, is that correct?

A. Yes. Coverup is the word I used. It has the connotation, is synonymous with, deception.

Q. What I want to ask you, sir, is whether you initiated that coverup in which you participated?

A. No, sir. I did not initiate the coverup.

Q. Who, in your view, initiated what you have called the coverup in which you participated?

A. I'll tell you what happened, the figures were not accepted for reasons which I have testified to, and I knew after a period of time that they would never be accepted, and then I set about to carry out the wishes of the Command, to provide and defend whatever figure was acceptable to the Command.

Who initiated it? Always you've got to go back up to the top. When the figures were not -- when the new figures were not accepted by General Westmoreland, he's the man -- he's the officer that has to approve this for it to become official, and it was my understanding that this was his wish, that the figure would not exceed the already established levels of enemy strength.

So, if you take it from that standpoint, I guess it
has to go back to the top man, who was General Westmoreland.

MR. BARON: I have nothing else.

MR. DORSEN: Why don't we go off the record for a second?

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. DORSEN: On the record.

MR. BARON: Mr. Dorsen has stated that he has forgotten to raise certain subject areas with Colonel Hawkins. I'm willing to permit the questions to go forward, and I would ask that he grant me a standing objection to questions which relate to subject areas that he didn't raise during direct examination of the witness.

MR. DORSEN: I would certainly have that noted for the record, and I will indicate that I inadvertently failed to ask the Colonel two questions.

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF

BY MR. DORSEN:

Q. Colonel Hawkins, do you recall in June of 1982, some months after the broadcast, writing a letter to the president of CBS News?

A. Yes, sir, I recall that. The --

Q. Did someone -- excuse me.
A. Yes. Mr. Van Gordon Sauter.

Q. Did someone suggest to you that you write that letter?

A. Yes, sir. Mr. George Crile asked if I would write a letter to the president of CBS expressing my views on the Vietnam situation.

Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Crile what the letter might say?

A. I don't recall what -- he probably asked me if I could address certain areas. He certainly didn't tell me what to say.

As I recall, he suggested that these are certain areas that you might give your attention to or you might address, if you feel that you can address them, is the best of my knowledge.

I think there was a suggestion there as to areas that should be -- that I should address or to put into it whatever I thought.

But certainly no words were placed in my mouth. The letters that I wrote to Mr. Sauter were my words, my beliefs, at the time. And still are, to the best of my knowledge. I'd have to look at the letter again, but I believe I can still stand by it.

Q. Now, in the beginning of your interview with Mr. Crile,
which took place in March, 1981, on Page 10635, it says -- the first words are: "All right, Colonel Hawkins, I -- we've been -- obviously we've been through a lot together." Do you know what Mr. Crile was referring to?

A. I don't know what he could have meant, "We've been through a lot together."

Q. You don't know what that means?

A. No. I don't know what he's talking about there, or what he was talking about at the time: "We've been through a lot together."

Q. Had you been through a lot together?

A. George Crile and I hadn't been through a lot together. I had just met him, I guess, the day before, and I hadn't talked to him very many times on the telephone. We talked about travel arrangements and this, that and the other.

Q. So, you don't know what he means?

A. I don't know what means by "We've been through a lot together."

Q. Colonel Hawkins, you testified about the possible lessons to be learned from the events of the summer of 1967. Do you have any personal knowledge of the consequences or effect of the events during the summer of 1967 on United States
policy, the conduct of the war, or anything else of that nature?

  MR. BARON: Object to the form of the question.
  A. I have no personal knowledge.
  Q. How, Colonel Hawkins, you indicated there were errors in the transcription of the interview with Hodding Carter, is that correct?
  A. Yes.
  Q. Would you be prepared to request a copy of an audio tape or video tape from Mr. Carter if the expenses would be paid for?
  A. Yes.
  Q. If we sent you a letter?
  A. Fine. Fine. I would go along with that request.
  Q. Thank you.
  A. I would like to see a better version of this myself.
  Q. Now, whom did you have lunch with today?
  A. I had lunch with Mr. Baron and Mr. Adams.
  Q. Did you discuss the subject matter of this lawsuit?
  A. Not in any detail. I think I mentioned the fact that the letters, my personal letters, was brought out and I didn't see what came out of them of any great substantive value.
  And, let's see -- was there any other thing that I
might have mentioned?

I don't recall now. That was primarily it. It was just the thing that came up. I didn't see what came out of the letters this morning except the statement there that I was unhappy right after that second briefing.

I do say -- tell them -- that I had not noticed in the letters that -- that I couldn't pin down the dates of the briefings, which I could have done if I had studied the letters, but I was not looking for information of this sort. I simply glanced over them; I didn't see anything of great substance in them.

Q. Well, do you consider fixing the date of your conference or briefing as significant?

A. It was significant, as it finally turns out. But I never even noticed it before when I had read the letters.

Q. Now, whom did you have dinner with last night, Colonel Hawkins?

A. Last night I had dinner with Mr. Crile and --

Q. Mr. Crile?

A. Not Mr. Crile. I'm sorry about that, Bob. With Mr. Baron and Mr. Adams and my wife.

MR. BARON: I might say something if we were off the
Q. Whom did you have lunch with yesterday, Colonel Hawkins?
A. I had lunch with the two gentlemen, Mr. Baron and Mr. Adams.
Q. And whom did you have dinner with on Tuesday night, the first night of the deposition?
A. The same two gentlemen.
Q. And whom did you have lunch with that day?
A. We've had our meals together just about every day that they have been here. I didn't think there was anything unethical about it.
Q. I'm not suggesting anything, Colonel Hawkins.
A. I didn't know I was supposed to avoid them.
Q. I'm not suggesting anything, Colonel Hawkins; I'm just asking questions.
Did you discuss the subject matter of the lawsuit or the events in the summer of 1967 on those occasions?
A. On those occasions, it was briefly mentioned. As I said before at one time, Sam Adams and I can't get together for five minutes without talking order of battle, and it would have crossed over into the areas of discussion here.
But not in any great substance. I think Mr. Baron
was trying to avoid any substantive discussion.

Q. Was he successful?

A. I believe he was. I wasn't going to push it. I thought that we shouldn't be discussing it in any great detail. You know, it's just about impossible to sit down and have a meal without saying something about what went on.

Q. Colonel Hawkins, do you consider yourself a friend of Sam Adams?

A. Yes, sir, I do consider myself a friend of Sam Adams.

Q. You know, do you not, that he is being sued, along with other people, by General Westmoreland?

A. Yes. It is my understanding that he is a defendant in the lawsuit.

Q. Would you like to see him win that lawsuit?

A. I would like to see -- well, as a friend, I hope Sam comes out all right in the lawsuit. Yes. I think it would be fair. It would be honest for me to say I hope he wins. I think I just have to give you an honest answer on that, and I'm trying to give you one.

MR. DORSEN: No further questions.

MR. BARON: I have a few recross questions to ask you, Colonel Hawkins, and I'll try to keep them to a very brief few.
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

BY MR. BARON:

Q. Colonel --

A. Could I amplify my answer to that last question? Is it too late for that?

Q. I will ask you, do you have anything to add to your answer to Mr. Dorsen's last question, which, for clarity -- and Mr. Dorsen, please correct me if I'm misrepresenting the question was whether you were anxious or whether you hoped that Sam Adams would prevail in this litigation.

MR. DORSEN: That states it reasonably accurately.

A. I can answer it?

MR. DORSEN: You were asked a question by Mr. Adams' lawyer, so you can answer it.

A. I would not lie for Sam Adams. Knowledgeably.

I would not lie for Sam Adams.

That's all.
MR. BARON: I have no further questions.

MR. DORSEN: No further questions.

(Whereupon, at 1:52 o'clock, p.m., deponent further saith not.)

Signature of the Witness

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be before me this _____________ day of ________________, 19____.

My Commission expires _________________.

NOTARY PUBLIC
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER AND NOTARY

I, Kenneth W. Price, the officer before whom the
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that
the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony was taken by me by
Stenomas and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or
under my direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to,
or employed by any of the parties to the action in which
this deposition was taken; and further, that I am not a relative
or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties
there to, nor financially or otherwise interested in the
outcome of the action.

[Signature]

Notary Public in and for the
State of Alabama at Large