(There was a brief recess.)

Q. Colonel Hawkins, I'd like to direct your attention to a couple of acronyms and ask if you recall them from 1967. One is ICEX and the other is CORDS. Were you familiar with those in 1967?

A. Yes. ICEX.

Q. What was ICEX?

A. Had. It had something something to do with an evaluation system. I can't recover the words to fit the acronym, but I think it was an evaluation of population under control.

Q. What was CORDS?

A. CORDS was something on the revolution redevelopment. I paid very little attention to them at the time. They were not under my purview.

Q. Did those programs or whatever they were have anything to do with the political infrastructure or political order of battle?

A. As I recall, Kelley Robinson and Mike Dilley would be more able to remember all of these details, but I believe that there was a basis for their typical structure business where they got figures on ICEX for whether it was classified "under total VC control," "partially under VC
control. " Then they used this pattern analysis. That was all many years ago and they'd be much more competent to answer. It all made a lot of sense back then.

Q. Do you recall whether Ambassador Komer had a staff under him?
A. I know nothing about Komer's staff. I'm sure he had a very large staff, but I know nothing about his organization or the people on his staff.

Q. Do you recall whether there was any work that Robert Komer or his staff did in connection with evaluating or analyzing the size, composition or function of the political infrastructure?
A. I know about that only vaguely, and my information possibly comes from after I had left Vietnam. I do recall being in General Davidson's office one day and General Davidson was talking to another officer on the staff.

It wasn't my business. I was standing there, waiting to talk to him about something else, and General Davidson was exercised about losing lieutenants and captains, people on his staff -- they had actually been pulled over
there by General McChristian -- and losing people on his staff to Mr. Komer.

There was a big fight going on about Mr. Komer taking away personnel assets from the J2 office. Of course that's a big thing because you lose your people, how can you do your job?

I stood there in the office a few minutes listening to General Davidson. He was very much agitated about losing personnel assets to Mr. Komer.

Q. Let me ask you to think back and see if you recall anything more about that, including when this occurred -- the conversation or anything else you may have known about it?

A. No, sir. I can't pinpoint the date at all.

Q. Can you pinpoint it whether it was before you went to Langley or after you went to Langley?

A. Possibly before I went to Langley.

Q. Probably before, would you say?

A. I would say possibly.

Q. You understand the distinction I'm making?

A. Yes. That's the best I can play with
this that I was there when some sort of a
conversation took place. It wasn't my business.
I didn't horn in. I also made it a point, "Hawkins,
keep your nose out of other things." General
McChristian had sort of drilled that in me, too.

Q. Do you know what, if anything,
Ambassador Komer was reporting concerning the size
or composition of enemy political infrastructure?

A. No, sir. I did not see Mr. Komer's
reports.

Q. General McChristian has testified
concerning a report that he saw, either the last
day or the next to the last day, concerning ICEX
or matters relating to Ambassador Komer. Do you
have any recollection of any report of
reorganization or controversy or discussion
relating to ICEX or any reorganization on or
around June 1, 1967?

A. No, sir. I have no knowledge of that.

General McChristian never brought me into other
things, the things that didn't concern me, other
than order of battle. Let me put it this way. I
don't recall any conversations with General
McChristian about this.

Q. Other than what you've testified to,
Colonel Hawkins --

A. Excuse me. This was in June? He was
gone in June.

Q. I think it was like May 29th or May
30th that he testified he saw some report.

MR. BARON: I'm going to object to
your characterizing his testimony unless you put
it in front of the witness.

Q. Let me make it clear, Colonel Hawkins.
I'm giving you my recollection of his testimony,
and Mr. Baron is correct that it would be
preferable for you to see it. I just don't happen
to have it here.

But the question is do you remember
about hearing any controversy between General
McChristian, General Dickenson and Ambassador
Komer concerning ICEX or these matters?

A. I have seen, sir, a deposition
affidavit by General McChristian in which he did
mention that he went to Mr. Komer's office.
That's about -- that's all I know about it.

Q. That would have been in the last year
or two?

A. That would have about in the last few
months.
Q. And was that the first you heard of it?
A. Best to my knowledge, that's the first I ever heard it.
Q. Do you recall anything else about what Robert Komer was doing in the period June, July, August and early September 1967, other than what you've testified to?
A. None that I can recall at this time.
No.
Q. I'll change the subject again, Colonel Hawkins.
Am I correct that there was a special intelligence capability in MACV intelligence while you were there. Is that correct?
A. There was a source of information from the National Security Agency which we referred to as Special Intelligence, also as Intelligence, and I don't think it loses anything to say communications intelligence. Any analyst in any country in the world who is a sophisticated competent intelligence analyst knows communications intelligence.
Q. Now, in 1967, did you have an opinion as to how long it would take an analyst who did
not have access to communications intelligence to study and utilize communications intelligence in the estimating enemy infiltration?

A. It depends on the capabilities of individual, and they usually didn't put people in that business unless they were very capable. I mean, the person was examined thoroughly before he went in, and it didn't -- I wouldn't say it would take all that long.

Q. Could you give an estimate of an amount of time?

A. No, sir. I couldn't give an estimate of the amount of time, but days and weeks. It wouldn't stretch into many weeks before he would grasp this thing. These people that were being programed in this business that I saw were all very smart people, and they were quick to grasp.

Q. Which people are you referring to?

A. Any of the people that worked with the communications intelligence.

Q. Were they in a particular branch or unit of MACV Intelligence?

A. There were some people in the Combined Intelligence Center that were cleared for communications intelligence. Are we talking about
which headquarters now?

    Just before I left there -- this is what confused me during my deposition with you before. You kept asking me about the tank, and I kept giving you a blank stare.

Q. Yes.

A. The thing called -- this word tank came into being after we moved into the Pentagon East to Pentagon West. I wasn't there long enough to adopt that into my lexicon, and that's why I was looking at you like I was a bit stupid, and I recalled it a few days after you left West Point. My God, he's talking about the new headquarters.

Q. Do you remember when you moved into the new headquarters?

A. Oh, God, I believe they moved when I was at Langley because, when I left Saigon, we were in the old headquarters and when we -- I wasn't there for the physical move of the furniture and all of that. I believe the boys -- the young men in my shop took care of moving of the headquarters. That's the best I recall.

Q. That would have been August of 1967?

A. Sometime mid-summer. That's the best of my recollection. I was not there for some
reason for the actual move from the old whorehouse
on Pasteur Street to the Pentagon East or West
where they had the tank and all the fancy
arrangements and all. I'll tell you about that
later on.

Q. You're recollection is that that move
took place while you were not in Saigon?

A. Yes, sir. That's the best of my
recollection.

Q. Colonel Hawkins, you referred I
believe on a couple of occasions to cuts being
made in enemy strength in the period after your
briefing of General Westmoreland. Do you remember
that testimony in general?

A. Yes. I briefed General Westmoreland
in late May and then I briefed him again in early
June, about two weeks later. Is that the period
you're talking about, and then after that?

Q. What I'd like you to do is think back
and describe, as best as you can recall, each cut
you recall making or being aware of during that
period until you left Vietnam; and be as specific
as you can.

By that I mean, if you can remember
anything about the nature of units cut, the
magnitude of the cut, the timing of cut, your best
recollection on all of those.

A. The best recollection is going to be --

MR. BARON: Objection to the form.

A. Shall I go ahead?

Q. Yes, please.

A. I can recall this only in general
terms at this particular time. I would receive
figures that were from Colonel Morris that this
particular category, we've got to bring this down
to such and such a level; and then I would go out
and effect the cut.

The only one specific one would have
been the very first one, and I don't recall the
time frame on this. But it had to have been
before the Langley Conference because those the
reduced figures are what I took over.

I took the figures that Johnny Morris
gave me and the took them to Kelly Robinson and
stood at his desk and told him what this was as
high as the command was going to go in this
political order of battle strength, and I sat down
at his desk and we figured out how to bring about
the cuts.

There were others. You skip from
that to the last days of the conference which Morris handed me a piece of paper with all of the categories on them. "This is as much as we're going to do in this one, this one and this one."

I vaguely remember going out and taking numbers off of a big board that they had at the Combined Intelligence Center where they had the Guerilla figures on them and administrative services I know I reduced. I had someone reduce the administrative services figures, but I don't recall any specifics.

I do know that a couple of times I have been asked questions about a David Morgan who was supposed to have been my deputy or executive officer who has said that I had him reduce local forces. I didn't have even remember David Morgan. I had several deputies; and I'm sure that when David Morgan testified to this, he must have been talking about administrative services.

Q. Let me go back.

MR. BARON: If you're going to ask a question like that --

MR. DORSEN: I am not leaving this thing. I just want it to be done in an orderly fashion. I'd be delighted if Colonel Hawkins
could speak about it for another half hour.

MR. BARON: Objection.

Q. On the subject of political order of battle or political infrastructure, do you remember anything else other than what you've testified to about any cuts that may have been made during the period from the first briefing of General Westmoreland to the time that you left Vietnam in mid-September 1967?

A. That's just about --

MR. BARON: Objection.

MR. DORSEN: Do you want to set the grounds?

MR. BARON: Yes. You first asked him to describe any kind of reduction made in enemy strength figures in any category between one date and another date. You then -- he had gone through a series of categories for you. You then went back and, rather than asking him to describe the cadre cuts specifically, you went back and said is there anything else, which requires him to not only remember everything but then to remember everything he's testified to. That's why I objected in the first place your approach.
MR. DORSEN: It's sort of funny because all through this Defendants' attorneys have been saying, other than as you have testified, I will adopt for this purpose.

MR. BARON: You didn't ask him to except as you've already testified. You asked --

MR. DORSEN: -- anything else.

MR. BARON: When you ask a question like that, you're asking him to remember a five, 10 minute answer.

MR. DORSEN: Okay.

Q. Tell me, Colonel Hawkins, everything that you can recall about any cuts in political order of battle from the briefing of General Westmoreland to the time you left Vietnam.

A. And political order of battle strength?

Q. That's correct.

A. I think I've just described that.

Q. Can you be any more specific?

A. In substance, that's it in general terms.

Q. Could you be any more specific?

A. I don't know that I can be any more specific than that.
Q. All we're talking about is your best recollection, and you say you've given us that?

A. I have given you my best recollection.

Q. On the subject of irregulars, including sub-categories of irregulars, could you tell us in as much detail as you can about any and all cuts that you say may have been made between the briefing of General Westmoreland and the time you left Vietnam in mid-September 1967?

A. I can't be more specify about cutting the Guerillas, which were one component of the irregulars, than what I have been. I remember taking figures out of there, but the very specifics of it, I cannot. I reduced -- I made cuts in the figures or had them done by officers within the Combined Center.

Q. Can you give us any more detail on when these cuts took place?

A. No. Except before we went to Langley.

Q. Anything more specific that than?

A. No, sir. It was no more specific than that.

Q. Can you give us any recollection you have concerning the magnitude of the cuts you made on irregulars; or, any component of irregulars,
A. No, sir. As I've told you any times, sir, I've never been very good at remembering these intermediate figures. The only figures -- the bottom line figure and the May briefing would have been 500,000 or a little bit more than that, and when we got to Langley -- you know the slides which you showed me and which I read that I briefed there that a command structure had gone back to a median figure of just under 300,000.

Somewhere along the line, 200,000 fell out. I know some of those were the self-defense, because they were not -- there was a MACV position at that time not to accept self-defense and secret self-defense. They accounted for a huge block.

Q. Let me ask you this, Colonel Hawkins. And I may have asked you this. Do you recall anything about the magnitude of the cuts in the political infrastructure or political order of battle?

A. Political infrastructure and political order of battle?.

Q. Order of -- I am using those terms interchangably.
A. I cannot recall the magnitude, and I can only recall the magnitude -- no, I cannot because the administrative services had to be used in that, too; and I know that cuts were made in the administrative services to bring this total down and that the self-defense and the secret self-defense had to be dropped out, whatever that magnitude was, to get it back down to 300,000.

Q. Please state for the record everything that you recall about any cuts that may have been made in administrative services strength estimates from the time you briefed General Westmoreland until you left Vietnam in mid-September 1967?

A. I can state for the record, Mr. Dorsen, that I made substantive cuts in the figure that we had. I don't recall what total figure we had or what it was. It was all a balance. We were juggling figures so much there to reach that figure of 300,000, that to say how many we had for administrative service, how many we had for the Guerillas, how many we had for the political order of battle, I can't remember.

There are people who know that. The young officers who worked with those various
categories are available to provide figures on them.

Q. Do you remember anyone by name?

A. I can remember Kelly Robinson by name and the young man who worked for him. Mike Dilley. But, in the administrative services, the only name I can recall is one that's been thrown back to me on these questions. This was Lieutenant Colonel David Morgan. I'm sure he was talking about administrative services and not local forces.

But among the irregulars, the only officer I recall is this General McArthur, who has testified. Figures -- I know as I said, Mr. Dorsen, I know what the figure was in May and I know what it was when we got to Langley.

Q. I think this is been covered, but I just want to make sure. Do you remember anything about administrative service cuts that may have been made as to the dates of the cuts or who participated in them? Anything else that you can recall?

A. I've told you the substance of what I know.

Q. Were there any cuts, to your knowledge, of local forces, including combat
support?

A. Combat support. I was trying to protect combat support. Let's put it this way. Let me get my categories straightened out. The combat category included the maneuvers. These were the infantry troops, the sappers, the reconnaissance troops and so forth.

The combat support was the artillery force, and antiaircraft units, the people that provided fire power above and beyond the fire pour normally carried by the infantry soldier. All right.

I did my best to protect those. I was under pressure to -- the magic word was attrite. I did my best to protect the strength of these troops. Also the local forces. Local forces were organized as battalions. They were organized as companies and platoons. I did my best to protect the integrity of those.

When I was faced with this situation here, this dilemma in June of 1967 that something had to give to bring these figures back to the 300,000 because of the concern about the press and the Congress and the President of the United States, I was determined to do everything I could
to protect these combat troops, including the
local forces.

I was sort of in a position, sir, of
the mother who got off the train at Auschwitz and
she had four children and she was going to have
three of them taken away from her regardless and
she could keep one. And she looked around and she
put her arms around the shoulders of her first
born and said, "I'll keep this one."

It was that kind of damned dilemma
with me, and it doesn't excuse me for going out
there and cutting these others because they were
all an integral force. They were an integral
force. The combat, the administrative service,
the the Guerillas, including the self-defense and
the political order of battle.

They supported one another just like
you lock your hands together, and they ran the war.
If they had not had that kind of organization over
there, they could not have conducted this
protracted war of attrition where they could call
the shots and run the war at their own pace.

We, with all of our fire power, were
bogged down with them. Excuse me for getting off
on a sermon there, but I think the the whole thing
has to be put out there. The fact that I did try to protect the main force is what I'm getting at. It doesn't absolve me of my damn guilt for taking these figures that Johnny Morris had given me and cutting hell out of rest of these things.

I'm sorry. I can't give you the specifics, but I start with 500 and I go down to 300. Okay?

Q. Colonel Hawkins, for the record, I'm going to move to strike the answer, but everything you said will be there as well as my motion to strike the answer.

Now, have you seen any documents at any time which indicates when Colonel Morgan says what he did took place with respect to reducing enemy strength figures?

A. The only thing I've seen -- let's see, I was asked that by George Crile during my interview and I believe you asked me about it during the deposition.

Q. Do you have any present understanding as to when Colonel Morgan says he participated in any reduction of enemy strength?

A. I can't recall seeing any documents. I haven't discussed it with Colonel Morgan.
Q. Do you know or recall whether any of the cuts that you have been describing or referring to in your testimony took place after the Langley conference?

A. That was during the Saigon conference. I have testified that I did receive instructions from Johnny Morris to adjust the figures in various categories.

Q. Other than that -- excuse me. You're right. Other than that particular matter that you've described relating to Colonel Morris, do you recall whether any of the instances that you have described or alluded to related to possible cutting after the Langley conference?

A. I cannot recall any specific instance between the Langley conference and the Saigon conference.

Q. Could you testify as fully as you can to the best of your recollection, concerning events that took place between the time you arrived back in Saigon, after the Langley conference, and say the start of the Saigon conference in September, 1967?

A. No, sir. I have no calendar of events for that. I got back there, and then I
learned that there was going to be a follow-up conference, and I said to myself, "Oh, my God." I thought it was all over, and then I learned to my chagrin that I was going to be placed on 14 days' leave to carry on the fight again.

Q. Colonel Hawkins, do you remember anything else, other than what you've just described, of that period?

A. That's just about it in total.

Q. Do you remember anything concerning the circumstance under which you were kept on for an additional 14 days?

A. None, other than I was notified by a superior officer -- I don't remember who the superior officer was -- that I was being placed on administrative hold and I could not go home until after the Saigon conference had been resolved. At least until the issue had been resolved.

Q. Okay. I'm sorry to be repetitive and, if you've answered it, tell me; but I think you said you've testified to everything you can remember; is that correct?

MR. BARON: Objection.

Q. About that period.

A. If I'm shown something else, maybe I
can remember something else.

Q. But you don't remember anything else?

A. I covered it in a nutshell what I can bring off the top of my mind without being shown some document of some sort that would open up something in my mind.

Q. You've testified to everything that you can recall?

MR. BARON: Objection.

A. Well, I have testified as to every particular moment that I can tell you about. I might have said things earlier that might be shown me and, well, I did -- but, at this particular moment in time, I think I've just about covered it. I might walk out of this room -- you see where that puts me when you ask me a question like that?

Q. I understand that, and I'm just asking that, if you remember anything today, you'll tell us about it today.

A. I'm being utterly honest and candid with you as of this moment.

Q. Why don't we take a couple of minutes break?

(There was a brief recess.)
(George Croner joined the proceedings.)

Q. Colonel Hawkins, in your discussions with Mr. Baron or Mr. Mastro or Mr. Adams, have you discussed any areas, subject matters of testimony, other than whatever has been covered in your depositions that you can recall?

A. That's a pretty broad question.

MR. BARON: Objection to form.

A. To bring back to mind everything that I talked to them about over a period of -- how long has it been? Two years?

Q. I recognize it is a broad question, and what I'm asking you is, sitting here, recognizing the questions is very broad, is there anything that comes to mind that you discussed with Mr. Adams or Mr. Baron or Mr. Mastro, anything that comes to your mind sitting here that was not covered in the depositions?

MR. BARON: Objection to form.

A. Good Lord, Mr. Dorsen, you'd have to give me time to sit down over a period of an hour or so with a list of what we have discussed already and compare that with what else. To bring this to mind just off the top of my head on a
session like this, is just utterly beyond me.

I must have discussed other things with them over that time. This brief period we have spent this morning would not possibly cover everything that we have discussed over the period of what? Two years has it been? The deposition was September of 1983. This is 1985.

Q. I understand that. All I'm asking for, and I recognize --

MR. BARON: I object.

MR. DORSEY: You can object.

A.A. All I'm asking for is, if you want to take a couple of minutes to think about it, and I understand all the qualifications that you've stated -- if you want to take a couple of minutes to think about it, anything that may be of sufficient importance in your mind that you would recall it; and, if not, state that you can't recall. Whenever way you want to express it.

A. I think I would just have to caveat this and qualify this by saying at this particular time I can't recall the other things that I did discuss which I'm very sure that I discussed many, many different aspects of this case with them.

Q. Do you recall in the summer of 1967
how many officers and how many enlisted men were in the political order of battle section?

A. In the political order of battle section at the Combined Intelligence Center?

Q. Yes.

A. I have no recollection of the exact number. I would say that there were probably four or five, in that sort of ballpark figure. I dealt primary with Kelly Robinson, and I know he had several officers to back him up. He had to have to do all this research.

Q. When you said four or five, is that officers or total?

A. That's the best I can give you at this time is that I really don't know. I do know that he had a staff under him which was of several people who were going through documents and processing them and cataloging the information; but just how many people he had, I have no recollection of that.

I never did hear him complain about not having enough, even though most analysts never think that they have enough people to do the job as well as they'd like to do it.

Q. In the spring of 1967, were you at
Louis Pasteur address?

A. Spring of 1967?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. And was all the MACV intelligence there, other than CICV?

A. Let me think about whether or not there was any so far as the production -- the order of battle branch at MACV, J2, of which I was chief, was part of the production division; and I do not recall any other part of the production division being in any other building.

But I am certain that other parts of J2 must have been scattered around the various buildings throughout the town.

Q. Was Kelly Robinson and the people working under him in the same building you were in the spring of 1967?

A. No, sir. I'm not even aware of the date that Kelly Robinson came there. I became aware of Kelly Robinson during the summer in this pressure over the briefing, the order of battle figures that he would have to have been there in May. But the month that Kelly Robinson came is -- I'm sure he must have come in the spring.
Q. Do you remember who Kelly Robinson's predecessor was?

A. No. I do not recall. There was a Sandman back there and I think there was a Price. I'm not sure that Price worked with the order of battle. But my consciousness of who the man in charge was came in the spring period when we were preparing to go for our final -- when we got things really rolling and I began to work very closely with Kelly Robinson. There were other people before him, of course, whose names just escape my memory.

Q. Well, were the people who were working on political order of battle that were not in the same building as your office was?

A. The people who were working on the political order of battle were at the Combined Intelligence Center.

Q. That's in the hanger that you mentioned?

A. They were in the hanger in the building, and then general McChristian had a new building built for them, and they were working in this new building after that. I think they entered the new building in late 1966. November
seems to ring a bell with me. November of 1966.

Q. What percentage of your time, roughly, would you spend at CICV and what percentage of your time did you spend roughly at the MACV J2 Headquarters?

A. I have to think a while on that one and divide up the time. Let's see. I was coming to my office in the morning, look over what was early in the morning, look over what was on my desk and go to the briefing in the secure area.

Then I would talk with the analysts up there. Whatever problems they had that they needed some back up support from the Combined Center, and then I would make a trip out to Combined Center to run down the problems and to check with the other analysts there. Then I would come back to my desk, and I would read and then I would go to the secure area again.

I was popping in and out of there, and then I would stay at my office late at night or out at the Combined Center at night. I would say approximately from -- looking back over that, this is strictly a ballpark area -- approximately one third of my time was spent at the Combined Center working with the analysts out there.
It's kind of a very, very difficult thing to reach back and break it down.

Q. You referred to analysts at MACV J2 Headquarters. To whom were you referring?

A. These were officers that were under my direct control. I had so many things to do that it was quite impossible for me to do it all, and I had to delegate certain tasks to these officers. I must have had four or five young officers there or maybe more than that at one time, half a dozen, that I would delegate jobs because I haven't got time to do this.

"You go to the Combined Intelligence Center." "You check on this," or "You go up to the secure area and you check on this." Or "You've got to go somewhere." I would give them projects which General McChristian would lay on me because I had various projects and studies to do, and I would delegate these to -- you supervise this and bring it to me. Things of that nature. It was a typical staff operation.

Q. Where was your office in relation to General McChristian's office?

A. General McChristian's office, let's see. The MACV compound. It fronted on Pasteur
Street; and, as you came inside the compound, I'm not sure about the points of the compass now, but you come in the compound and you would turn left and then you would go up into this maze of offices which had the secure area and had General McChristian's office and a lot of other staff offices there.

Then, as you came to the back of the compound there, there was a long series of rooms with a central bathroom which I guess had been bedrooms back in the days when this thing was supposedly a hotel of sorts.

Then, over to the side, there was another big room there which I guess must have been dining room and stuff like that. It had the appearance of a former hotel of considerable size, and this office where I was looked very much like a small cheap motel thing with a string of rooms here on a two story basis, except that there was a central bathroom which made it very inconvenient for so many people there. The French didn't seem to mind those sort of things.

Q. That's where your office was?
A. Yes, sir. I would say I was a couple of hundred feet from General McChristian's office.
No more than that. Might be overestimating it.

Q. Was General McChristian's office in the secure area?

A. No, sir. No one's offices were in the secure area except the Current Intelligence and Indications Branch.

Q. How far was General McChristian's office from the secure area?

A. I'd say just a matter of maybe 50 or 75 feet. Something like that. He only had to get out of his office, turn the corner and walk down the hall. Maybe climb some steps. I couldn't, by any means, sit down and draw you a diagram. It would have to be a rough thing. We had an open space there, a plaza I guess you would call that, and then there was another building here and some other offices.

Q. When you were still using the old facility, was there a briefing room in the secure area?

A. Yes, sir, there was a briefing room in the secure area.

Q. And was that where the daily and weekly commanders' briefings were held?

A. This is where any information
including NSA material was normally briefed. I know there might have been some exceptions to this, but they would have been very few and far between because this had to be entirely secure for NSA material to be briefed.

I don't recall really any information concerning any NSA material that was briefed outside of this particular area. As I say, there might have been exceptions because I wasn't aware of every briefing that went on. Normally we went to the secure area to brief information that contained NSA material.

MR. DORSEN: I have no further questions. Thank you.

(The proceedings adjourned at 10:40 a.m.)