Q Did you and Sam reach your estimates independently of one another; your guerilla estimates?

A I reached my estimate based on what I had in my drawer, and I guess what I had in my head. We didn't sit down together. We traded documents, we talked about documents, but when I wrote my papers, I wrote them independent of Sam. That doesn't mean I didn't go to him and say, "Hey, what do you think about this?"

I mean, obviously, I did. I thought he was an expert in the area, somebody that I certainly ought to get his thoughts and opinions.

Q During the fall and winter of 1967, did you and Mr. Adams reach similar estimates on total enemy guerilla strengths countrywide?

A Similar, yes.

Q How similar?

A Well, I would guess -- well, jeez. My best recollection, we didn't always agree, but we were probably within 10,000 on the guerilla strength estimate, and the other thing you've got to remember, was that there were a number of ways to come up with these numbers and so what you had to do is take everything you had and analyze it in every different direction and then, based on just the fact that you had studied it so much, try and work out the best number in between. That was one of the reasons for our ranges. It wasn't that we were
off 20, 30, 40,000, but ten, 15, 20,000, so that, therefore, we would come up with a range of 110, 120, because one method would show a higher number of 120 and another method would show a lower number of 110. So Sam and I were generally in the same range but I specifically recall at one point that we had a different number.

MR. MASTRO: This might be a good time to break, so why don't we break for lunch.

(Noon recess from 12:05 until 12:57 p.m.)

(Continued on next page.)
EXAMINATION (continued)

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. Mr. Parry, you testified this morning that young boys or women were in Self-Defense militia in addition to draft-age males, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Based on your experiences and research, do you have an opinion as to whether the Self-Defense militia functioned effectively with this composition?

A. My opinion, based on the documents that we read, is that the Self-Defense militia very efficiently fulfilled the purpose and function which the Communist apparatus had it to perform.

Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether women, young boys and older men posed a military threat?

A. Are we referring to militia?

Q. In the Self-Defense militia.
A. If you're asking for the basis of my opinion --
Q. Why do you have that opinion?
A. It's because the purpose which they had was to
open dud shells, to make mines --
MS. McGINN: What was that first thing?
THE WITNESS: Open dud shells, to set mines, to
dig trenches, to plant booby traps of all kinds, which I've
mentioned before, to set mines. It didn't take an 13-year-old
male in the best physical condition to do it. It didn't really
matter whether the mine was set by a 12-year-old boy, a 50-year-
old man or an 13-year-old boy, it was just effective when an
American stepped on it.
So the makeup of the militia force was certainly
sufficient to perform the function which the VC had for it to
perform,
Q. Mr. Perry, you also said during the morning
session that your estimates of guerilla strength and Mr. Adams'
estimates of guerilla strength were similar but not always
the same, is that correct?
A. Yes, I recall that testimony.
Q. Do you recall any instance when your estimates
and Mr. Adams' estimates were not the same?
A. Well, I can recall one particular time, and it was
somewhere in the fall of '67 towards TET when, in discussing
with Sam my estimates, although we agreed on the range, he tended
to think that there wasn't enough support for the higher end of
the range and favored the low end of the range. But our estimates
were both within the range and that's what I was referring to,
and I do recall that time.

Q. While you worked at the Central Intelligence
Agency, did you come to know Mr. Adams and his work very well?
A. Well, it's a compound question.

Q. Did you come to know Mr. Adams very well while
you were working at the Central Intelligence Agency?
A. In an analyst relationship, yes.

Q. Did you come to know his work, Mr. Adams' work
while you were working at the Central Intelligence Agency?
A. I knew what he had to base his estimates on. I
knew what his estimates were and we had long discussions as to
how he arrived at the numbers. So if that answers your
question -- I mean, those are the things that I knew about him.

Q. Based on your experiences as an analyst at the
Central Intelligence Agency, did you have an opinion as to
Mr. Adams' capabilities as an analyst?
A. Yes, I had an opinion.

Q. What is that opinion?
A. I thought he was a very good analyst. He kept
very good records, basically, the captured documents that I
kept -- I don't really want to compare him to me, but he kept
good basic documents—in our discussions that we had over what
the numbers would be, and these were not just countrywide
estimates. Sam and I were getting together on provinces,
villages. We would discuss the meaning of documents. He always
based his comments to me on documents which he had.

He could show me why he had this estimate or why
he was of that opinion, and it was based on evidence which he
always had.

Q. Do you recall anything about Mr. Adams' approach
to his analysis work?

A. Yes.

MS. MCGINN: Object to the question.

Q. (By Mr. Mastro) Do you recall how Mr. Adams went
about doing his analysis work?

A. Well, only from our discussions as to when he would
try to explain to me what his position was and why.

Q. What are your recollections about Mr. Adams'
analysis work?

A. Basically, what I just explained, is that his
analysis was based on captured documents, it was based on the
evidence which I had seen, and there were obviously documents
that you had to throw out now and then. In my opinion, he had
very good reasons for throwing out this or that document. What
I mean by "throwing out," is that you don't rely heavily on it.

Q. You testified yesterday that you read all
captured enemy documents in going about your analysis work, is
that correct?

MS. McGINN: Object to the form of the question.

I think you're mischaracterizing in your question what the witness testified to yesterday.

MR. MASTRO: I think the witness can say if I mischaracterized his testimony.

THE WITNESS: Let me have the question again.

(Question read.)

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure what that testimony is that you're referring to. I did state that all of the CDEC reports which came through, I read without letting someone else segregate them for me or characterize for me. Those were translation reports, they weren't captured enemy documents, and they were only the ones that came through the office.

Q. Were you aware of anyone else at the Agency who also read all of these CDEC documents?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was that?

A. To my knowledge, Sam read them all.

Q. By Sam, you mean Sam Adams?

A. Sam Adams.

Q. In the fall of 1967, how was Mr. Adams generally perceived in the Central Intelligence Agency?

MS. McGINN: Object to the question.

THE WITNESS: Are you asking for his reputation?
Q. (By Mr. Mastro) In the fall of 1967, what was Sam Adams' reputation in the Central Intelligence Agency?

A. As an analyst?

Q. As an analyst.

A. Everyone that I talked to said that Sam was the most knowledgeable on VC based CB and that he would be the one that I should talk to. His reputation was that of being a good analyst, an accurate analyst.

Q. Was Mr. Adams a careful analyst?

A. In my opinion, he was.

Q. Was Mr. Adams an analyst who collected support before he reached a conclusion?

A. All I can base that on is our discussions, and when we had discussions Mr. Adams always had documents to back up his position. But you've got to understand, we didn't really disagree that much. I mean, if we found a document, we didn't sit down and argue over it. If he would find a document, like the Long An province that we saw yesterday, one of us would show it to the other and we would discuss what it meant, what each of us thought it meant.

Q. But did you always agree about what every document meant?

A. Oh, no.

Q. Do you recall how the CIA estimates were developed for the Order of Battle Conferences in August 1967 and September
1967?

A. I'm not sure how they were developed. They were developed out of SAVA.

Q. Did you develop any of those estimates?

A. No. I didn't get involved at that level until after the Saigon Conference.

Q. Who at SAVA developed those estimates?

A. My understanding, based on the representations made to me, were that they were developed by Sam Adams. I knew he went to Saigon to present them because he was the one most knowledgeable on them.

Q. Do you know whether Mr. Adams' estimates were used at those conferences?

A. It was my understanding it was his estimates of the CB irregular strength that were -- well, more than irregular, but the VC Order of Battle were his estimates. Those are the ones that we presented in Saigon.

Q. As CIA's position?

A. As CIA's position, that's my understanding.

Q. Do you know who presented the official CIA position on enemy Order of Battle at those conferences?

A. Again, it's just my understanding that it was -- that was Sam's purpose in going to Saigon, was to present them.

Q. Do you have any recollections of about how hard Mr. Adams worked as a Vietnam analyst?
Q. (By Mr. Mastro) Do you have any recollections about Mr. Adams' work habits at the CIA?

MS. McGINN: Object to the form of the question.

Q. (By Mr. Mastro) Do you have any recollections about Mr. Adams' work habits at the CIA?

MS. McGINN: Object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: Let me just answer the question.

Except that he did a lot of thinking walking up and down the halls. I really don't know how hard he worked. I mean, I don't know if he worked until 10:00 at night or -- I just really don't know. All I can tell you is from the finished product.

Q. (By Mr. Mastro) And from the finished product, what can you tell me?

A. I thought he was pretty darn good. Off the record.

(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was had.)

THE WITNESS: Back on the record.

Q. (By Mr. Mastro) Did other Vietnam analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency ever tell you that they agreed with Sam's strength estimates in the fall --

MS. McGINN: Object to the form.

Q. (By Mr. Mastro) -- of 1967? You may answer.

A. Okay. In my discussions with George Carver -- excuse me, George Allen, after the Saigon Conference, and I can only recall generally, but he was agreeing to the same numbers which Sam had at that time. I mean, not only was he
agreeing to them at that time, but those were also the numbers which -- the estimates for that time.

Q. In your analysis work, did you receive intelligence data relating to enemy recruitment?

A. Oh, yes, through reading the captured enemy documents. I was also doing a study on that during the fall of '67.

Q. Based on your studies and the data you reviewed, did you formulate an opinion on the rate or an estimate on the rate of enemy recruitment in the fall and winter of 1967?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that estimate?

A. I have to explain it. During the fall and winter, fall of '67 going into the winter of '67-'68, there was a great increase in recruitment activity. Recruitment reached 7,300 a month into the guerilla ranks during that time period. That was because, based on the documents, they were getting ready for TET. The documents indicated that there was going to be a big push, that they had to get their troop strength up by TET, and also indicated that after TET they could go home. Therefore, their recruitment was very successful.

(Continued on next page.)
Q. On what was that statement based?
A. On captured enemy documents, on ID cards taken off KIA's.

Q. I am now going to introduce into the record a cable from the deputy, passive, White House. The date on that cable is October 7th, 1967.

MS. McGINN: Could I make a correction on this before we proceed?

I believe that the document states that it was from the American Embassy, Saigon. I'm not sure that DEPT PASS means deputy passive. It's from the American Embassy to the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. DEPT PASS, that means State Department Passed to White House, is what that means.

MR. MASTRO: Thanks for that clarification.

Q. (By Mr. Mastro) Mr. Parry, would you please turn to Page 4 of this document and look at the last sentence?

MR. MASTRO: This will be Defendants' Exhibit 77.

(Deputation Exhibit D-77 marked for identification.)

Q. (By Mr. Mastro) Would you please turn to Page 4 of this document and read the last sentence into the record?
A. I don't know where the last sentence starts. Well, as far as I can tell, "We now believe --"

Q. Would you please read the last sentence of that document into the record?
A. "We estimated that 7,000 VC a month were being recruited in early 1966, but that this has declined to 3-4,000 now. The number of troops infiltrated and recruited by the enemy over the last six months has not been as great as his deaths, desertions, and other losses."

Q. Is the date on that cable October 7th, 1967?
A. Yes. October '67.

Q. Based on your research and estimates on enemy recruitment, do you have an opinion -- let me rephrase that. Have you ever seen this document? Did you see this document -- let me rephrase that again. Did you see this document while you were working at the Central Intelligence Agency?
A. I don't recall. My best guess is I didn't but --

Q. Did you see documents reporting similar drops in recruitment during this period while you were at the Central Intelligence Agency?
A. I have seen estimates made by MACV during this time period which would have been in the 3,500 range.

Q. Based on your research and estimates on enemy recruiting during the fall and winter of 1965, do you have an opinion as to the accuracy made in this cable that the recruitment dropped to 3,000 to 4,000 VC a month by October 1967?
A. My best estimate at the time was that it was up around 7,000 or 7,500 at that time.
Q. So was it your recollection from your estimates that recruitment was authorized?

MS. McGINN: Object to the form of the question.

Q. (By Mr. Mastro) Do you recall whether there was any trend in enemy recruitment in the fall and winter of 1967?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your opinion?

A. My opinion was that recruiting was increasing during the fall-winter 1967.

Q. And therefore is it your opinion that the estimate in this document -- let me rephrase that.

What is your opinion concerning the estimate in this document, this document being 77, the cable from the American Embassy in Saigon to the Secretary of State in Washington, D. C., reporting a drop in recruiting rates by October 1967 to a range of 3,000 to 4,000 a month?

A. My opinion is that that number is low, and it should be about double that.

Q. In your analysis work for the Central Intelligence Agency, did you review intelligence data relating to enemy infiltration.

A. Yes.

Q. What type of data did you review on enemy infiltration?

A. Captured enemy documents.
Q. Why did you review infiltration information?

A. Well, there were two reasons. One, I was reading all the documents so, therefore, you got intelligence, you got infiltration information.

Two, infiltration had an effect on the size of the VC guerilla forces, therefore, you needed to know what was going on.

Q. How did it affect the size of the VC forces?

(Continued on next page.)
A: It depended on the need for upgrading. It also -- I mean it didn't depend. Had an effect on the need for upgrading. Also had an effect for the need for guerillas themselves, because they assisted in the infiltration. That was basically it. The need for upgrading.

Q: Based on your review of Intelligence data relating to enemy infiltration, did you have an opinion as to the rate of enemy infiltration into South Vietnam in the fall and winter of 1967?

A: I had an opinion.

Q: What was that opinion?

A: That the rate of infiltration was somewhere around 20,000 a month. That was my opinion, 20,000 to 30,000 a month.

Q: On what did you base that opinion?

A: Again, it was basically on captured enemy documents. It was also based a lot on my conversations with other analysts. Infiltration was not my primary area of responsibility, so I did not conduct infiltration studies. I needed to know it because it affected the guerillas, but I didn't spend the time of doing a lot of research on it. So what I read, I supplemented that with what I found out from other analysts.

Q: Do you know what is meant by the term cross-over point?

A: I know how the term cross-over point has been used in conjunction with winning the war in Vietnam.
6/2-2 2

Q  What does that term mean to you?
A  I understand that term to mean as it was used by
people engaged in analyzing enemy strength, is there would come
a time when more of the enemy would be killed than were being
recruited. Then it was just a question of how soon they would
run out of men.

Q  Based on your research and analysis do you have
an opinion as to whether a cross-over point was ever reached
in the summer, fall or winter of 1967?
A  Yes, I have an opinion.

Q  What is that opinion?
A  That it was never reached.

MR. MASTRO: Can we go off the record for a
second?

(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was
held.)

Q  (By Mr. Mastro) Mr. Parry, I'm now going to
show you Defendants' Exhibit No. 29. This is a newspaper
article from the Washington Times, dated Saturday, November 18,
1967. The title of the article is "General Westmoreland: The
Enemy is Running Out of Men."

It's a Jim Lucas exclusive.


Thank you.
Q (By Mr. Mastro) Would you please read the title of that article and the first paragraph into the record, please.

A "Westy says the enemy is running out of men.

General William C. Westmoreland of the U.S. Forces in Vietnam today said the enemy is running out of men, and the only sensible course of action for the United States and its allies to follow is to keep up unrelenting pressure."

The unrelenting pressure is in quotes.

Q While you were working at the Central Intelligence Agency, did you ever see that article?

A No.

Q Based on your research and analysis at the Central Intelligence Agency, do you have an opinion on the quotation attributed to General Westmoreland in that article that the enemy is running out of men? In quotes, the enemy is running out of men.

MS. McGINN: Object to the form.

MR. MASTRO: I have quoted from the article.

MS. McGINN: Opinion about what?

Q (By Mr. Mastro) Do you have an opinion as to the accuracy of the statement contained in the article that "the enemy is running out of men"?

A Well, my opinion --

Q Do you have an opinion on that question?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Yes.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>What is your opinion?</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>My opinion, based on the documents which we had, and also based on the little bit of research which I initially did on North Vietnam, the first part of the task force, I didn't see that we were going to win the war because the enemy was running out of men. It was just too large of a manpower pool. Let me back up. You asked me the question before that, and said have I ever seen the article. I may have. I just don't recall ever reading it before.</td>
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<td>Q</td>
<td>Did you believe at the time that the enemy was running out of men?</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>What is the date of that?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>November, '67.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Certainly not in November of '67. As I mentioned before, that's when recruiting is at a real high.</td>
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MR. MASTRO: Can we take a break for just a second?

(Whereupon a recess was taken.)

**

MR. MASTRO: That concludes my direct examination of Mr. Parry.

MS. McGINN: Let me go off the record for a
(Whenceupon, an off-the-record discussion was held.)

EXAMINATION

BY MS. MCGINN:

Q Mr. Parry, earlier in your testimony you indicated that at the time of the November, 1967 Jim Lucas article where he alleged that General Westmoreland indicated that the enemy was running out of men, that your opinion was the enemy was not running out of men; is that correct?

A That's correct.

MR. MASTRO: Object to the form.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Did there ever come to be a time when you thought that the enemy was running out of men?

A No, because after that the enemy expanded its population base tremendously, plus they -- I'm talking about total. As I understood the question it included the total base, which includes North Vietnam.

Q What do you mean by population base?

A Well, to run out of men they have got to use up all of the men in the population that they control. So their population base was the population which was controlled by the VC or the North Vietnam. That's the way I understood the question. That's the way I answered the question.

MS. MCGINN: Okay. That's all for right now.
Let me have ten minutes.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

(Continued on next page.)
Q Mr. Parry, you testified earlier today that in the fall of 1967, you were doing a study on recruitment of guerrillas in South Vietnam, is that correct?

A That's correct, I did testify to that.

Q Why were you doing a study on recruitment of guerrillas?

A Why was I doing a study on recruitment of guerrillas?

Q Yes.

A Two reasons. If I wanted to know guerrilla strength I had to know how the recruiting was going and, two, I was told to do that.

Q Who gave you that assignment?

A Ron Smith. I was doing four at that time.

Q What were those four studies?

A Self-Defense militia, guerrillas, recruitment and Assault Youth.

Q You testified earlier today that during the fall of 1967, the recruitment of guerrillas was approximately 7,000 to 7,500 per month, is that accurate?

A Yes. That it reached that during that time period, yes.

Q What months are you talking about that the recruitment was that level?

MR. MASTRO: I believe Mr. Parry testified in the fall and the winter of 1967 recruitment was at that rate.
MS. McGINN: I just asked him that, thank you.

THE WITNESS: I was referring to the time period beginning in September, probably October, and running through the end of January. Now, I did not mean to testify that every month they were exactly within that range, but during that time period the average was in that range.

Q (By Ms. Mcinn) Do you know what the average recruitment rate for guerillas was for the months prior to September, 1967?

A Lower than that.

Q Do you know how much lower?

A My best estimate now -- I mean, my recollection now as to what the estimate was then would have been in the neighborhood of 4,000 to 5,500 following the spring-summer offensive.

Q Of 1967?

A Of 1967. Let me give you a little bit of an explanation. There was heavy recruitment prior to an offensive. Immediately after an offensive, recruitment went down a little to start with just because people were relaxing, and then they would immediately start back and get ready for the next offensive. So there was a time prior to the beginning of that campaign at the end of the spring one when recruitment would have dropped. That's just the way they did things.

Q So for the five months from September, 1967, through...
January of 1963, there was an average recruitment of 7,000 to 7,500 per month?

A  Lighter in September-October. November, December and January, very heavy.

Q  Would that have resulted in an approximate net increase of guerrillas of 35,000?

A  No.

Q  Would you explain why not?

A  One, there was attrition, killed in action. Two, there was a lot of upgrading.

Q  On the issue of attrition and killed in action.

Mr. Parry, can you tell me what your estimate was of those figures for guerrillas in South Vietnam for the month of September, 1967 through January of 1968?

A  No, I can't do that. The reason being is that --

I had to base mine on what the unit was and the trends in the directions that they were going. Killed in action would be important for a specific area, if there were an operation going on right then. There were no big VC operations going on at the time, to my recollection, it was obviously American, South Korean and Government of Vietnam operations going on, they were going on all the time. What I was trying to do was get an idea of what the recruitment -- what I was trying to find out was whether recruitment could compensate for what they said was going on as to their strength, the guerilla strengths. It was
Q. How did your recruitment study fit into the study that you did on estimate of guerilla strengths for those months?

A. It was a separate independent study. It gave me knowledge as to what the trends were, which I could use in the guerilla OB.

Q. So you would not take this 35,000, approximately 35,000 figure that you got from your recruitment study and some how fit it into your guerilla estimate?

A. No.

MR. MASTRO: Objection to the form.

THE WITNESS: The answer is no. I knew that there was heavy upgrading, I knew that there was killed in action. If the strengths are going to stay up -- if you notice, my estimate did come down a bit during that time -- but if the strengths were going to stay up, there had to be heavy recruiting and the recruitment studies showed that there was heavy recruiting. Therefore, I believed the documents would suggest that they were maintaining their strengths in certain provinces and things like that were accurate. If recruiting was way down and there was heavy upgrading, then I would look at a document that says, "Our guerilla force has gone up tenfold", and say it's a propaganda speech. I probably said that anyway, you know, if there was a document like that. But that's the way.
the recruitment study fit into this thing. We wanted to find out if they were having trouble recruiting. We wanted to know how they were recruiting, what terrorist methods they were using in recruiting, that type of thing. That was really the focus of that research, but it obviously, as I've explained, related to the overall guerilla strengths.

Q What do you mean by the term "upgrading"?
A Upgrading is where they move a member of one unit to a different unit. We called it upgrading. If it went from Self-Defense militia to Hamlet Guerilla, although -- or to Village Guerilla or to Main force units, that was upgrading. You are moving them up in the quality of the offensive capacity of the force.

Q What do you mean when you say that the upgrading affected your numbers in your recruitment study?
A Each one of these different units that I referred to, and let's just use militia, Hamlet Guerillas, Village Guerilla and VC Main force units, had a manpower pool function for the unit right above it. Therefore, if there were not enough Village Guerillas or if there was an order that came out of COSVN or the military region saying, "You will have 20 guerillas armed with 20 such and such and by such and such a day", they had two ways to get them. They could either recruit them or they could reach down into the Hamlet and say, "Send us four guerillas." It was this manpower pool that was moving
people up. My problem was, after they left the Village Guerrilla
and moved into the Main force units, they were no longer guerillas
and so I couldn't count them in my OB. So I had to find out if
there were enough people coming in at the bottom to make up for
people going out the top.

Q During the months of September, 1967, through
January, 1968, do you have any idea how many guerrillas were
being lost to Main forces, Local forces by upgrading?

(Continued on next page.)
A: There wasn't much during that time period.

Upgrading really got started later on in the period when it got closer to TET, when the directive really came down that "You're to have this force ready on such and such a date." Then there was more upgrading.

Q: So you mean December of 1968?
A: December, January of 1968. I mean, it's always going on.

Q: For the upgrading of the guerillas to which you refer, where were these upgraded guerillas coming from?
A: They were coming out of the Hamlet Guerillas, the Self-Defense militia ranks. They were coming out of all ranks. They were coming out of Assault Youth ranks. Those were organized manpower pools. That was one of the functions of the Self-Defense militia, was to organize a manpower pool so they could tap it by the time they needed it. That was one of their functions.

Q: The way the upgraded function was to go was from the Self-Defense militia, the Hamlet Guerillas to the Village Guerillas or to the Main force, Local force, or was it that organized?
A: It was that organized, but it always wasn't that channeled. I mean, the Main force units, they may have wanted to increase their Main force unit and they would go to a village and say, "We need so many guerillas." The village commander
then had a couple of options. He had the authority to get them from the Hamlet Guerillas or he could say, "I'm going to give you ten Hamlet or ten of my Self-Defense or ten of my Village." Lots of times they moved one step at a time, but that wasn't always the case from what we could read in the documents.

Q You indicated in your testimony earlier today, Mr. Parry, that COSVN documents which you studied during your recruitment study indicated that there was to be a push at TET and that the guerillas could then go home?

A Okay.

Q Is that accurate?

A No. It wasn't a COSVN level document.

Q What kind of document was it?

A There were area documents. One in particular that I'm referring to, that you're referring to, there was going to be a push at TET and we can go home, was a document taken off, I think it was a KIA, but it could have been a document taken off of just a prisoner. He was in Long An province, and it's a letter written to his mother. He said, to the effect, "We will be in Saigon at TET and then we can all come home." That was captured sometime early January.

Q How reliable was that concept that they could then go home after TET?

A When I read the document, my impression was they believed they were going to win the TET and the war would be
over. That may not have been. It may have been that they wanted to encourage people to enlist and so they said, "Hey, this is the big push. All you've got to do is come down for a couple of weeks of military activity and you can all go home."

But it indicated that there was going to be a big push at TET, and at least he believed that it meant for him the war would be over. That's my analysis of that document.

(Continued on next page.)
Q. Did you see any other indications that the concept that they could go home after TET was used as a recruitment technique?

A. There were other documents which indicated that the term of this recruitment would be short. Nothing as specific as this one, though.

Q. And did these upgraded guerillas go home after TET or did they stay in the guerilla forces?

A. The upgraded guerillas?

Q. Yes.

A. Some of them were downgraded and an awful lot of them were killed. You mean the ones that entered into the Main force units?

Q. Let me rephrase the question then. We're talking about the guerilla forces.

A. Once they were upgraded from Hamlet to Village?

Q. Yes.

A. Between TET and the spring offensive, which was in May, I don't know of any downgrading. I don't know of anybody who went home unless they were seriously injured. I didn't ready any documents where they were letting troops loose. The May offensive was as bad as the TET offensive. We were just prepared for it.

Q. What do you mean by "bad"?

A. It was as much a holocaust. It was almost as
concerted an attack on the countryside and engaged as many VC units.

Q. Were the guerrillas that were recruited with the idea that they could go home after TET also there after TET, or did they go home?

A. I have no idea which ones of those guerrillas but there had the idea that they could go home after TET. Reading the documents, I didn't see any document saying, "We're happy to have our boys back home." I didn't see anybody going home after TET.

Q. Do you know what the desertion rate was for guerrillas in the three months after TET?

A. I can't recall it. That was something which was in the captured documents. They would list their strength, they would also say, "Deserted, injured, sick." When you got down to the Hamlet units they were pretty specific about where every one of their boys and women were.

Q. Were the Communists successful at the May offensive?

A. In the May offensive?

Q. Yes.

MR. MASTRO: Object to the form of the question. It's ambiguous as to what you mean by "successful."

Q. (By Ms. McGinn) Did they achieve a military success?

A. Yes. I think they achieved a military success.
because they certainly achieved a political success.

Q. Mr. Parry, do you think a military success is the equivalent of a political success?

A. I think a political success certainly makes a difference militarily. They were successful politically because the documents then coming in were talking about how that little group -- you know, "We are strong enough to fight and beat the Americans." The documents after that talked about the great victories, this village unit or that unit had against the "Big Americans." People, from the documents, anyway, were certainly more -- felt a lot better than going to fight for the Viet Cong, I mean they thought -- it seems psychologically they thought they could win.

Q. This is after the May 1968 offensive?

A. This was from after the Tet offensive and after the May offensive. As you recall, I left in August of '68, so I was there three or four months after the May offensive, but that's all, and back in '69.

Q. Did you see any increase in the guerrilla strengths during the months from May through August 1968?

A. No. My recollection was that around the time of the May offensive, based on the evidence which I had, that was about the strongest they were. It wasn't that they were dropping off, but there was not another big push that I saw by the time I left, is my recollection. I also left by the first
of August. My best estimate is is that May was a high --

Q. What is your best estimate of guerrilla strength in
May of 1968?

A. 120,000. We carried, I think, a hundred to 120,
90 to 120.

Q. What was your best estimate of the Self-Defense
militia in May of 1968?

A. In May of 1968?

Q. Yes.

A. My best estimate of the Self-Defense militia --
well, let me back up. After the Tet offensive I did not spend
much time on the Self-Defense militia because that was going to
be handled by George Allen. So I looked at it, obviously, to
know about the upgrading, that type of thing, but I wasn't doing
monthly estimates on the Self-Defense militia. If you want me,
based on what I knew then, I can give you an estimate.

Q. Did you have any opinion, based on what you knew
at the time, on what the estimate for the Self-Defense militia
was in May 1968?

A. Yes.

Q. The CIA's estimate?

A. Well, I knew what the CIA's estimate was because

of George Carver's paper, which statement --

MR. MASTRO: Do you mean George Allen?

THE WITNESS: Excuse me, George Allen's paper,
which was delivered in April, which was the estimate of -- in
depended on how you used the HES evaluation. It was between
two nine eight and three hundred some-odd militia. That was the
CIA -- do we have it?

MR. MASTRO: This is the document.

THE WITNESS: Yes, that's the one. Well, let me
show you. Well, do you recall Exhibit 6? In that George Allen
sets forth three possible scenarios and then concludes at the
end that the best estimate was the one the CIA had at that time,
and it was 100,000 Self-Defense militia.

Q. (By Ms. McGinn) That was the best estimate as of
April 1968, is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Did that estimate change from May 1968?

A. After May 1968?

Q. Well, for May 1963, first.

A. Had it changed?

Q. Did it change?

A. From ever?

Q. Did it change from the April 1968 estimate?

A. For May, no, it was approximately the same.

Q. Did it change after the May offensive 1968?

A. Based on -- well, based on what I knew, no. They
maintained their militia force strengths. What they were doing
after the May offensive was maintaining their strengths. That's
what the documents said. That's what appeared to be happening.

MR. MASTRO: I object to any further questions on

Self-Defense militia estimates in this time frame because they
were not covered on direct examination, this time frame being --
as I recall, on direct examination the only time we talked
about Self-Defense was up to April, so any time after April was
not covered on direct examination.

MS. MCGINN: Your objection is noted.

Q. (By Ms. McGinn) Do you know, Mr. Parry, how many
members of the Self-Defense militia were killed in the May 1943
offensive?

A. No. MACV never did body count them.

Q. Why didn't MACV body count on that, do you know?

A. On militia?

Q. Yes.

A. I can only assume. They didn't carry them in the
Order of Battle so I would, therefore, assume that's why they
didn't count them.

Q. Do you know if MACV ever counted the bodies of the
Self-Defense militia in their body count?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes, you know, or yes, they did?

A. Yes, I know. That was the question.

Q. Did they?

A. Yes.
When did they count the bodies of the Self-Defense militia?

A. Throughout the war.

Q. How do you know that they didn't in May of 1968?

A. They didn't -- as I understood your question, did they break down and say, "This many Self-Defense militia were killed at that time"? That's the way I understood the question. I would say no because they never broke down the Self-Defense militia. So what I'm saying is since they didn't even recognize them as a force, they didn't count their bodies and say there were so many guerrillas, so many Self-Defense militia, so many VC Main force units and so many NVA killed. They had a total category called KIA, which was supposedly a body count. I know that Self-Defense militia were getting killed because of all the documents. I know that they were getting killed in documents where the Americans were doing KIA's.

Q. How do you know that?

A. Just by knowing where the operation was and reading the documents. Therefore, you would assume if they were counting the KIA's that they would also be counting the bodies of the militia, who the militia leaders were killed at that time.

(Continued on next page.)