Q. Mr. Farley, when did you start work for the task force?

A. Task force, my best recollection is that it was late spring or early summer of 1967. April, May, June. I think it was May or June, my best recollection.

Q. At that time the task force was a task force focused on South Vietnam?

A. No, it wasn't focused on South Vietnam. It was focused on Vietnam.

Q. I believe you testified yesterday, Mr. Farley, that it was a task force designated to evaluate counterinsurgencies; is that correct?

A. That's what Ron Smith told me when he called me up to recruit me.

Q. Did you ever evaluate any counterinsurgencies?

A. The only insurgency which we evaluated was the action in South Vietnam and the supply or support from North Vietnam, and the damage on the war in North Vietnam.

Q. Do you know why you didn't study counterinsurgencies?

A. I was told that because Vietnam had become so large and so important that we would spend our time on Vietnam until it was over, and at that point in time the task force would go back to being a task force. It never happened in my lifetime with the CIA. We stayed with Vietnam.

Q. Do you know why the task force then focused on
Vietnam when there was already an Office for Special Assistance for Vietnamese Affairs, which also focused on Vietnam?

A. I don't know that. No one ever told me.

Q. Do you know whose decision that was to establish the task force?

A. It was done before I was there. No one ever told me, so the answer to your question is no.

Q. What were your responsibilities when you began work with the task force in the spring of 1967?

A. When I first began work for the task force it was bomb damage assessment, and I don't know how exactly to explain it, but the potential efficacy of proposed bombing activities on North Vietnam. We did a study on what it would do to the economy to knock out the Daumier Bridge, what it would do to the economy to blow up the refineries along Hai Phong. What it would do to the economy to mine the Hai Phong harbor. We did that type of thing.

Q. How long did you do that?

A. My best recollection is that it was -- you have got to remember I was a beginner at the time. I was no super analyst. I probably did that while I was easing into the guerilla thing, because there was an overlap for about two months.

Q. When did you begin easing into the guerilla analysis?
A. It was within a week or my being there. That was taken up to SAVA. A week, maybe two. That was an ease-in. It wasn't a quiet doing all this other stuff, just concentrate on guerillas. It was here is something we want you to look at, too, but we had these reports that had to be done, and so I was helping on that. Helping.

Q. What was your assignment with the special guerilla analysis?

A. In the beginning?

Q. Yes.

A. In the beginning it was explained to me I was to become the Agency expert on guerillas in South Vietnam.

Q. Who gave you the assignment?

A. Ron Smith.

Q. By the Agency expert on guerillas in South Vietnam, did you take that to mean on the force structure?

A. Everything. I looked at every picture in the beginning of the guerilla forces. I looked at all their weapons. I went to a guerilla -- Ft. Bragg. I can't remember if it was Ft. Bragg or which one, to look at the guerilla training down there. I was to know everything there was to know about a guerilla.

Q. What were the scope of your responsibilities in this capacity as analyst of the guerillas?

A. Find out everything there was to know about the
guerillas.

Q. Did you go to Vietnam in the course of your --

A. No.

Q. Did you speak Vietnamese?

A. Nope.

Q. What kind of training did you receive about guerillas when you began working on the guerilla analysis in the task force?

A. What type of training in the task force?

Q. Yes.

A. None.

Q. Did you receive any kind of training outside of the task force?

A. What I have mentioned. I wish I could recall where that guerilla warfare training was. I can't recall the base or fort it was at. I went there and did that. I read everything I could get my hands on that was written by Ho Chi Minh or Vo Nguyen Giap, or Anh Son, or -- I can't recall their other one. There was a theorist in North Vietnam who was the Mao on guerilla warfare in North Vietnam. No one in the South Vietnamese Branch or the task force knew anything about guerillas at the time. I went to SAVA and talked to them as much as I could, and read --

Q. How long was this seminar or lecture that you attended at Ft. Bragg?
I don't think it was Ft. Bragg, but I just can't recall. It was only a day or maybe two days.

Q. What was the nature of that training?
A. Show me how they were training American soldiers in the guerrilla warfare. They showed me pungi sticks, showed me trenches. They had built what American soldiers would run into in Vietnam.

Q. When you say "they," are you referring to the Army?
A. United States military.

Q. Mr. Parry, did you have any kind of lectures or attend any kind of seminars about analyzing translations of captured enemy documents?
A. Specifically analyzing translations of enemy documents?

Q. Specifically answered.
A. Nope.

Q. Was that covered in any of your other learning activities for guerrilla analysis?
A. I don't understand your question but I think it takes a certain degree of intelligence and a certain degree of analytical ability. Hopefully I have learned some of that in school, but for someone to sit down and say, "Now, when you read an enemy document you have got to look at it like this," the only people who did that would have been George Allen and Sam Adams. They were the most experienced with enemy documents.
Mr. Parry, did you prepare any periodic reports on your guerilla analyses?

Reports were concluded periodically.

How periodically?

When there was a need. Obviously in the fall of '67 we were looking again for January, close to Tet. Then when the Saigon Conference -- excuse me. The CIA Conference in the spring. Those were specific dates that I had to have something done. Other than that, like I mentioned before in my draft guerilla paper, that was something that I was constantly updating. It was used by whomever wanted to at the time they took the latest draft.

You didn't have to do any kind of weekly reports?

No.

How about oral reports to Mr. Smith about what you were working on?

Ron Smith and I discussed it probably a minimum of once a week, a formal discussion where we would sit down and talk about it.

In the fall of 1967 during the negotiations over the NIE, I met with Mr. Walsh. It became almost on a regular basis.

Did those draft working papers that you prepared on the guerillas go to other people in the CIA while they were
in the draft state?

A. They went to Walsh whenever he asked for one.

I'm sure that I would give a copy to Sam Adams and SAVA whenever one was completed. Whether Walsh routed them any place else, I don't know. I didn't have a routing function. He did.

Q. Smith had a routing function?

A. Up, Petrasek and Walsh, that's it.

Q. In other words, he couldn't have routed them to other persons in the Office of Economic Research?

A. I don't know if he could have or not. My best knowledge is that he could not. There were not people in the Office of Economic Research that were engaged in guerrilla research.

Q. Do you know if any of your draft working papers went to the Office of National Estimates?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Why was the task force under the Office of Economic Research?

A. It was explained to me that we were there because then they would be entitled to one grade higher. That's a GS -- it's like a GS rating, but the CIA did not have a GS rating. It would be one grade higher than we would be if we were in any other area in the Agency. That meant more pay, more seniority, that type of thing.

Q. Do you know what the function of the Office of
Economic Research was at that period of time?

A. To do economic research. Like the bomb damage assessment in North Vietnam.

Q. Did the bomb damage assessment analysis go to the Office of Research after it left the task force?

A. I don't know that for sure, but I would assume because of Walsh's presence in the office on many occasions that he also saw a copy of it. We were also performing that function for McNamara.

Q. On the chain of authority, Mr. Ron Smith was your boss?

A. He was my immediate supervisor, yes.

Q. And his supervisor was Frank Pettasek?

A. Yes.

Q. And his supervisor was Paul Walsh?

A. Paul Walsh.

Q. Was Mr. Walsh the head of the Office of Economic Research?

A. I was trying to figure that out. We are getting about up there, but I don't think he was.

Q. Mr. Parry, when you joined the task force in the spring of 1968, who else was on that task force?

A. There was a Robert Cole, Ron Smith. I think a person by the name of Joe Stumpf was there at the time, and then there were two other analysts who left with the split and went...
in the North Vietnamese section. One was a woman and the other
was a man and, darn it, I can't recall their names.

Q. Do you recall Robert Cole's responsibilities in
the task force?
A. Infiltration of supplies.
A. And in addition to being supervisor, did Mr. Smith
have any other responsibility in the task force?
A. My recollection is he did not have a specific
area of research.
Q. Do you recall what Joe Stumpf's responsibilities
were in the task force?
A. Joe Stumpf did some work on recruitment. Not back
at that time, though. That was later. Nine months later or
so. Getting into the beginning of '63, may have gotten it a
little before that when I went full time into guerillas.
He had another one, but I just don't recall.

In the beginning most of the functions were divided
up in North Vietnam. I did not have a specific North Vietnamese
function. I would help whomever needed help when I first got
there.

Q. Did Mr. Stumpf assume the responsibilities for
recruitment from you?
A. No. I don't think that's really the way you
could characterize it.
Q. He initiated his own study on recruitment?
MR. MASTRO: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: He was working on something else.

In the fall of '67, heading into the beginning of '68, I was spending an awfully lot of time on the guerilla forces. At that time it was decided that there ought to be a study done on recruitment, and he had been working on it. I was doing the guerillas. It was decided that he would then write the recruitment paper. My recollection is that was the paper that he delivered at the CIA Conference in April. I think it was recruitment.

MR. MASTRO: By CIA Conference, you are talking about the Order of Battle Conference from the CIA MACV April 1968?

THE WITNESS: Yes, that's my recollection that's what he did.

(BY Ms. McCinn) During the time that you were at the task force, what other analysts worked there, other than these you just mentioned?

A. I can't remember exactly when we ended the name task force officially and began South Vietnamese Branch, but in that same time period there was an individual who could have come about the same time I did. I don't remember them in the early days. His name was Duane Gatterdan. There was another one whose name was David Shields. I think I mentioned him before. I may not have mentioned him by name. My best recollection is he was doing the infrastructure. Political infrastructure.
Duane Gatterdam, my recollection was Economic Research on VC
controlled areas. We only looked at VC. I mean not VC, but
GVN.

The military was supposed to be telling us what
was going on in the pacified areas. We were trying to tell what
was going on in the VC areas. So we worried about rice
production in the delta, whether it was enough to feed the
troops, that type of thing. But my best recollection, there
came a time when Sam Adams joined the South Vietnamese Branch
around Tet, 1968.

Q. Was that at the beginning of this time that it was
called the South Vietnamese Branch?

A. No. I think we split off back in August or
something like that of '67. We still called it the task force.
Walsh called it the task force, but I think officially we were
the South Vietnamese Branch.

Q. Of the Office of Economic Research?

A. Yes. There was probably an office in between,
if you obviously had a little experience, and that was the CIA.
But everybody had an office and everybody had a title.

Q. Were any analysts at the task force during this
time doing analyses of the Self-Defense militia?

A. I was doing that.

Q. You did both guerilla and Self-Defense militia?

A. Yes, except at the point where Allen took it over
in preparation for the CIA Conference. CB Conference at the CIA headquarters.

Q. Why did Mr. Allen take over the analysis of the Self-Defense militia from you?

MR. MASTRO: Objection. Form.

THE WITNESS: I was working on four papers, all four of which were important. If we were going to do a good job, we couldn't have one person doing all four. It was divided up. He knew a heck of a lot about Self-Defense militia. I gave him what I had and he took it from there, and I concentrated on the guerillas.

Q. (By Ms. McGinn) What were the four papers you were working on at that time?

A. Guerillas, militia, recruitment, assault youth. Assault youth, as I mentioned -- I don't know if I mentioned it before, but I mentioned those four areas just a few minutes ago. I was just dabbling in assault youth.

Q. Mr. Parry, Exhibit 61, which has been described by you as a draft working paper, Viet Cong guerilla strength in South Vietnam, was there ever a time when this became a final working paper?

A. I don't know.

Q. You never completed a paper or --

A. The draft working paper meant this is the best thing we have right now, but if we're going to make a big deal
of it, print it -- it means it hasn't been finely printed, then
that became a working paper or whatever.

But because my function was to keep this updated,
put draft working paper on it and let people know there may be
an update and they ought to check that before they rely on it.

Q. Where was this distributed?
A. As I said, the best thing I know is it went to
SAVA and to Walsh. I don't know where else.

Q. Do you know if it was distributed beyond the CIA?
A. I don't know that. It's possible that people --
it was available at the April conference. That's why this
draft was prepared.

Q. Do you know what kind of reports the analysts at
SAVA prepared on guerilla strength during the fall of 1967?
A. During the fall of '67?
Q. Yes.
A. All I know is that they were preparing reports, as
was Walsh, on the NIE 14.3.

Q. Did you see any of those reports?
A. I saw an awfully lot of analyses going to the
14.3. I know there was something prepared for the Saigon
Conference. Whether that was the working paper, whether -- what
exactly it amounted to, I don't know. I did not help in the
preparation of it. They were not sending out, at least not to
me, a monthly estimate.
Let me explain it a little better. SAVA was much more involved in the 14.3 than we were. Walsh was getting involved in 14.3, and that's why I was meeting with him, as I mentioned earlier, on almost a regular basis. But Carver was the one who was talking to the director of 14.3 more than Walsh, letting his opinions be known.

(Continued on next page.)
Q  During the time that you were at the task force later in the South Vietnamese Branch, was there ever an analyst working on the Main force, Local force section?

A  That was covered, and I think that it was a function either by Duane or Dave Shields.

Q  Duane being?

A  Duane Gatterdam or Dave Shields. That was not an area that we were really involved in the task force, the Main force units either NVA or VC.

Q  Why was that?

A  Why was that? I'm now supposing. I thought that SAVA was doing a lot of the Main force work. It also required a lot of analysis of units and there was a NAGV publication. I'm not sure it was in the Order of Battle, which listed all the units. There was a publication, as I recall, that listed all the units identified. The other reason is, aside from those people who were looking at it, we didn't have the manpower. We were a South Vietnamese branch and the guerillas were basically the South Vietnamese force.

Q  Mr. Parry, were the draft working papers that you prepared while you were with the task force considered -- deemed top secret?

A  I really can't recall what they were stamped. My guess, they were only secret, if that's an only.

Q  What was your testimony earlier about your security...
clearance?

A  We were cleared for "Top Secret Eyes Only" and my recollection was it was three code words.

Q  What procedures did you follow when you were preparing your draft working papers to maintain the secrecy?

A  I locked them in my safe and I showed them to no one else unless they had the same clearance and they needed to know. That's why I had no dissemination authority.

Q  Did you take any of them home?

A  Never.

Q  Did you Xerox any of them to keep?

A  You mean after I left the Agency or you mean to take with me when I left the Agency?

Q  Yes.

A  No. I did not take any of my papers with me.

Q  Would it have been against CIA regulations to take any of your papers marked "Secret" with you?

A  If they were classified "Secret", yes.

Q  Do you know if it would have been against the law to do that?

A  Are you asking me now as a South Vietnamese analyst or as an attorney to make that legal opinion?

Q  I'm asking you as a South Vietnamese analyst.

A  Let me put it this way: The CIA drummed into us all the time that we were not to take documents away from the
Agency unless we were going to another CIa building or to another
Intelligence office. We were not to take them home -- the idea
was that if you were going to some other place with a secret
document that you would bring them back and lock them up. That
was not always done, from what I understand, because they kept
giving you examples of -- I can remember one example of someone
who was in a car wreck and his briefcase with all of his secret
documents was spread all over the street. I don't know whether
that was true or not. We got security briefings all the time,
you know, like "Leave the documents in your safe." We also
were behind a barrier, which meant that there were guards, that
no one could get into our offices without that clearance. We
also had a combination lock on our door, I think, when we were
in task force. It was fairly secure, and I did not know the
combination.

Q  Do you know when the Self-Defense force was
introduced into the military Order of Battle?
A  When the Self-Defense force was?
Q  That's right.
A  It was obviously sometime prior to my arriving
at the agency. You're talking about the MACV Order of Battle?
Q  The MACV Order of Battle.
A  No. I don't know when they first came up with
an OB.
Q  Mr. Parry, I think you referred yesterday to the
COSVN Current Affairs Committee. Can you explain what that is?

Q: What the COSVN Current Affairs Committee is?

A: Yes.

A: Dave Shields can do a lot better job because that was part of the political infrastructure, but from my recollection, this was not something that I studied, the Current Affairs Committee was the committee of COSVN. COSVN is the South Vietnamese headquarters of the Viet Cong, was the committee who would oversee what was going on and what was to be done in South Vietnam. It kept track of, militarily, anyway, what had happened during the last season, whatever that was, and made projections as to what should happen in the future. That is my best recollection in an area that I read documents from, but did not analyze.

Q: Mr. Parry, do you know if the function of the COSVN Current Affairs Committee was to keep track of what was going on out in the provinces?

A: Based on what I just said, it was to keep track of everything that was going on in VC -- I mean, not everything, but it was to cover all VC areas. There was a Current Affairs Committee at the province level, there was a Current Affairs Committee at the district level. Supposedly there was a Current Affairs Committee at the village level, but that may be one guy who held ten titles. You know, it depended on the area. Those Current Affairs Committees reported all the way up and
somebody at the top would assimilate the information and you
would get a Current Affairs Committee report.

Q: Do you know if that Current Affairs Committees
would make demands on guerrillas, for instance, requiring quotas
on how many guerrillas should be recruited?

A: I'm not sure whether it was the Current Affairs
Committee that did that. There was a political committee where
that would come out of saying, "These are our projections for
the year." It would then come down through that channel. It
would also come down through the military channel, which may
be the Military Affairs Committee, but my best guess of this
was that it was the Current Affairs Committee. I'm not sure,
but in any event, it would come down politically, tap into the
military and be taken care of that way.

Q: So then your answer is that such demands would be
made by one committee or another?

A: Demands would be made at the COSVN level for an
overall, what are we going to do this year.

Take an example, the COSVN Current Affairs
Committee document that says, "Our goals are 300,000 of each
we've only got so many. Go out and get them."

That would go out and at some point it would
go across, but the real leader of the Village units was not
the best fighter, but was the political man, and may have been
the best fighter, but it's a political organization.
Q. Mr. Parry, you testified yesterday that Ron Smith told you when you joined the Task Force that your job was to get better than SAVA, is that correct?

A. Yes, that the job of the Task Force was to be better than SAVA. I didn't have to be better than all of SAVA.

Q. Do you know why he told you that?

A. Yes, because he wanted to become the expert. He had a job and his job was to find out everything there was to know about the Communist control of South Vietnam. If you're any good, you want to be the best. He wanted to be the best.

Q. Do you know if there was any rivalry between SAVA and the Task Force?

A. I'm not sure that there was any rivalry between SAVA and the Task Force. In answer to your question a day or so ago, it seems like a week, as far as I knew, there was cooperation. But, when it got at the higher levels where people were discussing back and forth at the Walsh-Carver level, I really don't know. As far as I knew, our numbers were not always exactly the same, but my guerilla estimates and SAVA's guerilla estimates and estimates as to what the militia was doing and what their strengths were and the Assault Youth, were the same, although not identical. Therefore, what would the rivalry be? Sure, I wish I had been a couple of years earlier and been to the Saigon Conference. Well, I don't know.

Q. You said yesterday that SAVA and the Task Force...
worked independently but shared information. What did you mean by that?

A Again, I'm basing it on my own experience with SAVA and with the experience of some of the other analysts, but I didn't pay that much attention. I knew that Dave Shields and Duane Gatterdam went up to SAVA quite often to discuss things with them. Yes, discuss things, to take documents or whatever they were working on. I knew that I shared everything I received with Sam, and it was my impression that he was sharing everything with me.

Q Did you get any information at the Task Force about guerillas that SAVA didn't get?

A I'm sure I received documents on guerillas that SAVA didn't get. Just as I explained, the dissemination system was not the best and there were lots of times that in one packet a CDEC document or report containing a number of translation reports would be missing. That just happened. That was one good reason why Sam and I exchanged. Another good reason, or at least the reason I wanted to exchange, he may read a document and see something in it that I didn't and I wanted him to tell me every document that he saw that was important in case I missed something or in case he saw something differently.

Q Could I ask you, I think you answered this yesterday, but I've forgotten, what were the sources of the documents you received?
A The bulk of the documents which I received were translation reports of enemy documents which were the CDEC documents. I also received interrogation reports of captured enemy. I also received full translations, when requested, either by me or someone else. I received a number of intelligence community publications, most of those were interesting to read, but really didn't -- I mean, they weren't specific enough to be helpful.

Q Can you be more specific about what those intelligence community publications were?

A I know I was reading -- I just can't recall. I was reading reports on pacification, I was reading reports on Hamlet evaluation, I was reading reports on daily intelligence, what was going on in the world, which was, as I said, something interesting, but it didn't have anything to do with South Vietnam. I mean, it was just like a newspaper, a secret newspaper. We received reports initially -- we received reports more than initially, we received reports on the bombing of North Vietnam -- I said initially because I was thinking of North Vietnam, but we also received reports on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I received reports on guerilla activities in Laos and CIA activities in Laos. I received reports on U.S. operations in Cambodia that did not come out of the captured enemy documents.

I read a lot of table traffic on that.

MR. MASTRO: I'm sorry to interrupt, but when a
convenient point comes up, I need to take about a two minute break.

(Short recess.)

(Continued on next page.)
Specifically from which members of the intelligence community did you receive these publications, do you recall?

A All publications?

Q The intelligence community publications to which you just referred.

A A lot of them were in-house. A lot of them were MACV, and all of the combined intelligence offices in Vietnam and Saigon. There were some reports that came through from CINCPAC. I can't recall any Air Force. I can recall some from NPIC. National Photographic Information Center, or -- that doesn't seem right. NPIC. They had reconnaissance pictures and evaluated them. That was on the Trail. Ho Chi Minh Trail. We received some things from State. There was a publication, as I recall, from DIA. The Defense Intelligence Agency. I can't recall specifically.

Q Did you receive things from the State Bureau of Intelligence and Research?

A I just really can't recall who I received them from from State. I did not rely very heavily on State information. Something that came across -- a cable sometimes that would come through. I don't know where they originated, but come in or out of State. I don't know why I got them. It wasn't State sending them over to us. Somehow it got routed to us. There were some State publications, but they didn't know enough about the guerilla structure in South Vietnam to
be helpful. They were rarely trusted, if ever.

Q Mr. Parry, you said yesterday that Sam Adams
had better contacts with the military than you did.

A Had what, better --

Q Better contacts with the military than you did in
the fall of 1967.

A Yes.

Q What did you mean by that?

A I meant he knew people at the Combined Intelli-
gence Center in Vietnam, and MACV people. He had been working
with them for a long time. He had been to at least the Saigon
Conference. I'm not sure if he went to Hawaii or not, but any-
way he had ongoing dealings with them. I had never.

Q Would that affect Sam's -- do you know if that
would have affected Sam's analyses of guerilla strength in
Vietnam?

A Well, the only way I can answer that is by saying
I did not have the contacts, and our analysis was pretty much
the same.

I really don't understand your question. Are you
asking whether he didn't like somebody over there so therefore
he objected to MACV, or he liked someone over there so there-
fore he accepted their numbers?

I didn't understand, but all I can say is I didn't
see any reason why it affected him. Either "e" or "a".
Mr. Party, the reference to Sam Adams and the contacts with the military was made in your deposition testimony yesterday when you were asked about what kind of information you were getting as opposed to SAVA?

A. Okay. There were two ways. One is that he had this relationship with people that he could talk with them I assume the way I could talk with him. I didn't know them so I couldn't.

For example, the Hawkins story. I didn't know anybody at MACV that would come across to me and say we agree with you, we disagree with our own estimate. But there was something more than that, and that was he was sending cables over there asking tell me what you think about this.

It was, as I recall, the McChristian evaluation of the notebook, the one that said 130,000 and 150,000 guerrilla strength in 1966, that was in the Anhson speech, and the second one which came out of the Current Affairs Committee. He cabled, my recollection, Saigon and said, "Hey, tell me what you think about this." He did that.

MR. MASTRO: "He" being --

THE WITNESS: He being Mr. Sam Adams.

So when he did that -- there were some times that we would discuss and say "Hey, we would like to get the whole document." He would cable for it. I did cable on one or two occasions. There was a way, a procedure to send back and say
you want the whole document, but it didn't take special contacts
to do that.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Mr. Parry, you also testified
yesterday that if you saw an initial interrogation report which
looked interesting to you you could then have that person
interrogated in Vietnam and ask those questions that you wanted
asked. Do you recall that?

A Yes.

Q You also said that you didn't find that kind of
interrogation report reliable?

A Correct.

Q Would you tell me why not?

A Because the persons asking the questions didn't
understand what he was asking. It's sort of like taking a
deposition in a case that you know absolutely nothing about.
You don't know what an answer means or whether to follow up
on it.

You needed a guerilla expert to interrogate a
guerilla if you wanted to get the answers. Not just someone
that speaks the language. You needed a guerilla expert who
spoke the language.

Q How many times did you send follow up questions
of this sort to Vietnam for interrogation of guerillas?

A I can't really recall. It was not very many. I
tried it initially and then decided it wasn't worth it. It
also took a long time.

Q How did you determine that the person interrogating this guerrilla was not asking the proper questions?

A Because of the answer that came back. I mean I then got a transcript of the interrogation and what you would do is you would say I would like you to ask these questions, but you were not -- a prisoner doesn't ask a guy tell me how many guerrillas there are in the province. He is not going to know. What you want to find out is what they are thinking. The best thing you can find out from people is are the Village Guerrillas happy? Are they deserting? That type of thing.

He would ask a question and he would get an answer, which to my mind ten questions would pop up, that wouldn't get asked. They were always short and sweet answers and questions. I just found that there wasn't enough information there.

Q Could you send follow up questions?

A You could go forever if you wanted to.

One of them I sent over and the guy was in cages on the island and he wasn't worth anything when it got to him.

Q Do you know who was doing the interrogating?

A No. I don't know if they were MACV employees. I assume they would be hired among the combined intelligence.

Q So you don't know if they were purported guerrilla analysts or not?

A My understanding is that they were not. I'm not
trying to suggest that the military was doing anything wrong.

Just the nature of the thing didn't work.

(Continued on next page.)
Yesterday in your testimony, Mr. Parry, you said that you had access because of your security clearance to telegrams to and from the White House, especially those discussing enemy strength in Vietnam; is that correct?

MR. MASTRO: Excuse me. Where is that in the transcript?


THE WITNESS: The way you read that --

MR. MASTRO: Hold on just a second.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

MR. MASTRO: Would you mind if I read the entire passage of that into the record?

MS. McGINN: Yes, I would mind because I'm asking Mr. Parry for his recollection. If it's not his recollection then he is entitled to correct it.

MR. MASTRO: Well --

THE WITNESS: I object to that. The question has been asked and answered.

MR. McGINN: Pardon me?

THE WITNESS: It's been asked and answered.

MR. MASTRO: I object to the question.

THE WITNESS: My recollection is not the way you state it.

MS. McGINN: No, it's not been asked and answered, Mr. Parry. I asked you if you recall.
THE WITNESS: No. I do not recall the way you told it.

MS. McGINN: Do you recall saying anything about having access to telegrams to and from the White House?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Do you recall saying that you had access to telegrams that may have discussed the enemy strength?

A I can recall that I at one point in the deposition made reference to the fact that I had received copies of cables which were routed somehow to the White House -- to and from the White House, which included enemy strength.

Q Do you recall specifically any such telegrams?

A Today, no.

Q Do you recall who at the White House these telegrams were sent to?

A Based on my knowledge as to who gets those telegrams, I could come up with a name, but that's not my recollection. I don't have a recollection.

Q Could you recall who at the White House might have sent those telegrams?

A The same person.

Q You just don't specifically recall at this point?

A I don't have a recollection today.

Q Mr. Parry, do you know whether the guerillas
planted mines and booby traps in Vietnam during 1967?

A Which?

MR. MASTRO: Objection.

THE WITNESS: Village-Hamlet or Secret --

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Component guerrillas you have described?

A Yes.

Q Do you know whether the Main force, Local force units planted mines and booby traps in Vietnam in 1967?

A Do I know? Yes.

Q Mr. Parry, can you say how many of the U.S. casualties inflicted by mines and booby traps in 1967, were caused by mines and booby traps planted by the Main force, Local force?

A Do you want a specific number?

Q I want any recollection or any estimate you may have.

MR. MASTRO: You are referring simply to mines and booby traps actually planted by Main, Local forces?

MS. McGINN: That's right.

THE WITNESS: Object to the question, but, no.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Do you have any idea how many mines and booby traps planted by guerrillas in 1967, caused casualties -- friendly casualties?

MR. MASTRO: Objection.
one-fourth or one-third.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) One-fourth to one-third of all casualties?

A Friendly casualties. That would be close to it.

MR. MASTRO: Do you mean one-fourth or one-third of the casualties caused by mines and booby traps?

THE WITNESS: No. She asked me -- is that the question?

MR. MASTRO: We have confusion on this question. Could you please read back what the last question was?

(Question read.)

MR. MASTRO: I believe her question referred to what percentage of our friendly casualties.

MS. McGINN: I'll rephrase it. I don't think he understood it.

MR. MASTRO: I don't think he understood it, either.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Mr. Parry, do you have an estimate of the percentage of friendly casualties caused by mines and booby traps planted by guerillas in 1967?

MR. MASTRO: Objection.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Can you give me that estimate?
A large percentage of them.

Q Let me see if I understand this, Mr. Parry. Understand what you are saying.

A Well, I can explain it.

I can't tell if the mine was set by a guerrilla or by a militiaman. I know that was the function of the militia and the Hamlet guerrillas, and that village guerrillas also got involved in it, and to a certain, but much more limited extent, Main force units did. But everybody had their job.

MR. MASTRO: So you are saying that both the Self-Defense militia and guerrillas placed mines and booby traps?

MS. McGINN: I'm asking the questions.

MR. MASTRO: Just trying to clarify.

MS. McGINN: I understood him.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Mr. Parry, you testified yesterday, and I think again this morning that at the April, 1968 Order of Battle Conference held at CIA headquarters one MACV individual made comments on your guerrilla strength briefing; is that correct?

A Correct.

MR. MASTRO: I think he said criticisms.

THE WITNESS: There were comments made, yes.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Do you remember if he criticized the numbers given at your briefing?
That was included in the criticism, yes. At first attack the entire paper, and then as an example, he attached the numbers.

Q: Do you recall if anybody else made any comments?
A: Yes.
Q: About your paper?
A: Yes.
Q: Who was that?
A: George Allen. I skipped a question, but that's okay.
Q: Mr. Allen defended your paper?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you ask for comments after the briefing?
A: I did not have time.
Q: Why didn't you have --
A: You mean before the MACV person reacted?
Q: Maybe I better find that out.
After you gave your briefing was there any time to ask for comments, or did you immediately sit down?
A: I immediately sat down. In fact, I may have been sitting down the entire time. I just can't recall that. There was a time for discussion following it, but my recollection is no one said are there any comments. The comment was made before anyone had an opportunity to do that. My best recollection is that comment came before I was through, but that's the way I
Q Were there any other briefs presented on guerrilla strength at this conference?

A No. Not official briefings. Everyone had their position and they were discussed. Discussed after the CIA had made the presentation.

Q Why was your briefing considered an official briefing?

A Well, what I was meaning was that there was going to be a paper or a briefing, whatever it was, presented, which would be the CIA position, and at that point all people present would have then the opportunity to discuss it, and it wasn't their turn then to stand up and present their paper. But they certainly had an opportunity then to explain their position. If they happened to read a paper I guess they could do that, but you understand the way it went? One person presented a paper and then we just discussed it.

(Continued on next page.)
Q Did this discussion take place immediately after you presented your briefing paper?

A My best recollection is that it did. It was scheduled to take place -- the way it was set up would be that there would be a paper in the morning and a discussion, a new paper in the afternoon and a discussion, and the next day it went that same way. I know my paper did not take four hours to deliver.

Q In the sequence of events, Mr. Party, that you presented your briefing paper, there was criticism from someone at MACV, was it then followed by a general discussion by the persons at the OB Conference.

A That is my --

MR. MASTRO: Objection.

THE WITNESS: That is my best recollection.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Did anyone from MACV present the MACV position on guerilla estimates at that time?

A My recollection is at that time there was an exchange, a discussion, and this is following the paper. I'm talking about after that, but there was an exchange and a discussion which involved primarily George Allen and Sam Adams on the CIA side. I was also involved in it, and that there was discussion by other members of the MACV group. There were also other comments by the same individuals during the discussions. My best recollection is that there was a good
discussion back and forth between MACV and CIA with one exception. I mean, one person excepting on the comments. That's my best recollection.

Q Do you recall what was being discussed at this --
A Guerillas.

Q Do you recall what MACV's position was?
A MACV's position was that the CIA was wrong.

Q Did MACV have any further positions?
A MACV's position, as I recall it, was something in the neighborhood of 47 to 50,000 guerillas. That's my best recollection.

MR. MASTRO: If you want to refer to a document, please do.

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Do you recall a discussion of MACV's basis for these figures?
A There was no documentary evidence presented by MACV. They were arguing, basically, that they were there, they were in the field and, therefore, they should know what was going on. They discussed that, as I recall -- and these are generalities -- they discussed that they did not believe that there could possibly be that many guerillas based on the man-power base, as many as the CIA said. That was generally the discussion that went back and forth. There was further disc-

Q Do you mean at the conference?
I did not go back. There were discussions later in the week after all the papers had been presented.

Q Mr. Parry, do you recall what branch of the service the MACV individual who made the first comments on your paper was in?

A You mean whether he was Army?

Q (Indicating affirmatively.)

A I think he was Army.

Q Mr. Parry, what other members of the intelligence community attended the April, 1963 CB conference as the CINCPAC?

A There were representatives there from CINCPAC.

My best recollection is there were representatives from Defense Intelligence Agency, there were people coming and going from the State Department and, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency. I think there was someone there from the Department of Defense, and I -- I think.

Q Do you recall who represented CINCPAC at the conference?

A No. The only other person that I knew who it was, was General Brown.

Q Do you recall how many people were them from CINCPAC?

A Four, maybe.

Q Do you recall how many people were at the
conference?

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A At any given time?

Q When you were there.

A Well, I was there two times, once in the opening, the place was packed, everybody was there. I mean people were standing because they couldn't fit around the table.

Q Can you give me a better approximation than packed?

A Thirty people. I'm trying to think of how large that conference table was. It was a lot larger than this. The conference table probably held 20 to 22 people. At the time I delivered my paper, it had thinned out considerably. The State Department, as I recall, had -- you know, there may have been one observer there. They didn't really contribute very much. I don't remember anything they said. I know in the beginning that all of the DIA people were there because Brown was sitting at the end of the table and there were some around him. There were not that many DIA people there when I delivered my paper. My best recollection is that there were four MACV people sitting together who were there, the same four were in the same position both the opening and when I delivered the paper. How many others were MACV related, I don't know.

Q So at the time you delivered the paper there were four CINCPAC people there?

MR. MASTRO: He did not say that.
MS. McGINN: I'm asking him that.

THE WITNESS: I don't know. I'm trying to see how many people sat around the table. My best recollection, I was sitting here and I think Adams was next to me. This is when I delivered my paper. Allen was next to him. DIA was at the end of the table. MACV was over here and CTMC PAC was over here and Walsh was here. I cannot recall where State was and I can't recall whether there were other people -- an example, see, in the beginning all the CIA people who delivered papers were there, but I didn't go back for every CIA paper. So that's the true of fluctuation that was going on. My recollection, I was there for mine and George Allen's. I think that was it.

Q (By Ms. McInn) Do you recall how many people from DIA were at the conference table when you made your briefing?
A I really can't recall that. I can't recall whether General Brown was still there or not. One, possibly, at the most three. I just can't recall.

Q Do you recall if anybody from DIA was there?
A My recollection is that DIA was represented at the time because -- the reason why I say that is because I was trying to figure out how DIA could take a different position from MACV or MACV take a different position from DIA. I sort of thought they should be related.

Q Did DIA present a position on guerilla strength estimates at the discussion following your guerilla briefing?
DIA did not present a position. My recollection is that there were comments made by DIA which were in agreement with the CIA. That comes back, I have this recollection that I couldn't -- I was wondering how this difference could be.

Q You don't recall anything specifically about DIA's opinions at this discussion?

A No, I really don't.

Q Do you recall if there was any negotiating done among the various components of the intelligence community of guerrilla strength estimates while you were there?

A Not while I was there.

Q Do you know if any negotiating took place when you were not there?

A As I understand it, after all the papers were presented, the group would get together, not at the analysts level but at a higher level to work out estimates. It was my understanding -- I can only assume it was done.

Q Mr. Parry, what do you mean when you say "work out estimates"?

A If you are asking me what I thought the workout was, it was to show them our evidence and convince people that our numbers were right. Whether, to use your terms and say negotiate, that could be a possible characterization. My understanding was that after the evidence had been presented, the people who could make decisions in the various agencies
would sit down and evaluate that and come up with an estimate.

Q: Would this be an estimate, a consensus estimate of the members that attended the conference?

A: I'm not sure whether it was a consensus estimate or not. I recall that I was told to get prepared for this, "That the intelligence community is now willing to listen to us after TET and we are going to show them why we have the numbers we have." That's what I understood this conference to be, was that now people were willing -- realized they were wrong, were willing to listen to the CIA. That's the way I prepared it, presented it. What that discussion was going to be afterwards, I really can't say. I mean, all I can tell you is that this is what I understood the conference to be, this is what I knew happened while I was there, and based on that, I just projected what was to happen the last day. I don't know.

Q: Was this conference intended to present CIA's Order of Battle or was this a Special National Intelligence Estimate Conference?

A: I think it was a Order of Battle Conference. I don't know of an NIE that was prepared at the time.

Q: You do not know that an NIE resulted from that conference?

A: I don't know if one resulted from it or not. At the time that I was presenting the paper, I was not presenting it to do -- it would have been an SNIE. I was not doing it.
for that purpose.

Q Prior to this April, 1968 Conference when you presented this CIA position on guerilla strength estimates, had CIA prepared its own military Order of Battle?

A I know that that chart had been prepared which had been presented, which was Exhibit C-80. If that is CIA's Order of Battle, the answer to your question is yes. It obviously -- that document is obviously not the same as the MACV Order of Battle, but that was an Order of Battle.

Q Do you know what the guerilla strength estimate presented in the CIA's Order of Battle was after the April, 1968 Conference?

MR. MASTRO: Objection. He did not testify that there was an official Order of Battle of the CIA.

THE WITNESS: I don't know of an Order of Battle published by the CIA after the conference. You mean a decision that was reached?

Q (By Ms. McGinn) Was there a decision reached by CIA that was published after the April, 1968 Conference?

A I don't think so.

MR. MASTRO: Objection.

THE WITNESS: Excuse me. I don't think so. Our job there was to convince MACV. That's the way I understood the conference. I was waiting for the MACV April 31 Order of Battle.
Q (By Ms. McGinn) There were no results published about what had transpired at the April, 1963 Conference?

MR. MASTRO: Objection to form.

THE WITNESS: I don't know whether that happened or not. I'm sure there was a summary done. It was always done. I was not a party to it.

MS. McGinn: Actually, this is a good time for me to stop today, if that's all right.

MR. MASTRO: I'm willing to continue.

THE WITNESS: I'll do whatever you want.

MS. McGINN: Initially I was under the impression that you would like to stop at about 4:00 o'clock. I was thinking we would be through, I was hoping. I realize that it gets tiring during the day. If there's any way we could finish let's do it. Man, I would buy the dinners myself. I understand the problem, so if you need to quit now, let's start early.

MS. McGINN: Let's start at 9:30.

(Whereupon, the deposition was adjourned until August 26, 1983, at 9:30 a.m.)

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