Q I used the word antagonists guardedly. You understand what I am saying is that the two sides, those who under your direction favored the estimate that there would be 200 planes, German planes flying against you. That was under your supervision?

A Well, there was a British wing commander who headed that section, but he gave me very great freedom of action. Of course, none of this was -- it was simply a personal judgment, of 200. We exchanged views. We listened to Ron Horn's people and we talked a lot and came collectively to that judgment, not because they didn't have the planes, but we had found that the difficulties with oil supply and other things put the German air force in a position where even then the highest priority targets, even at that time, were oil installations. They were only capable of mounting many fewer planes than their Order of Battle suggested and in any case, that was our best guess and there is a book by Gallant who is head of the German air force that said several hundred got up in the air, but they never could get there, but as I remember the figure at the time, it was about twelve.

Q Who was it that came up with the estimate of 2,000, the prediction?
This was the Order of Battle section.

Q Of the RAF?

A Of the Air Intelligence, that's right.

What was involved there to be clear, was not merely how many planes did they have in their Order of Battle.

Q I understand the argument was how many were likely to be put in the air.

A Effectively.

Q To inhibit the D-Day invasion; is that correct?

A Yes. How many would fly against the fleet and our aircraft and the men on the ground on D-Day. That's right. That was the question that was put to us.

Q Did you believe at the time that the Air Intelligence persons who proposed that -- suggested, believed, argued that 2,000 planes would fly against the D-Day invasion -- did you believe they held that view honestly?

A Oh, I am sure they held it honestly.

Q Did you hold your view honestly?

A Indeed, I did. I can't imagine a more searching question to put to men in a war and to give their
best judgment on a question like that and everyone involved had total integrity.

Q Would it have disturbed you if you felt that those arguing -- strike that.

Would it have disturbed you if you felt that those estimating that 2,000 German planes would be thrown against the D-DAY invasion had not been arguing that in good faith, had not really believed that 2,000 planes --

A Yes, it would have disturbed me.

Q Do you think it would have disturbed your counterparts in Air Intelligence that in fact you had not really believed that 200 planes would be launched by the Germans on the D-Day invasion?

A Give me your question again. I know what you are getting at.

Q Do you think your counterparts, who you are arguing, you say, you believed honestly felt that 2,000 planes were likely to be flown by the Germans against the D-D invasion and had they believed -- and that they believed you were not arguing in good faith, would that have bothered them?

A Yes, it would have.

Q Why is that?
A Why should we be disturbed that people are not arguing in good faith?

Q Yes.

A Because we are all bearing serious responsibilities for other human beings' lives. We were intelligence officers and the premium on integrity and character in the intelligence business is the highest order of criterion.

I came out of the war understanding something which I already understood in academic life, which is that integrity is and honesty in these matters has an enormous weight in the intelligence business, just as it does in academic life; but you know, it has a special meaning when human lives are at stake.

But the problem in Intelligence is exactly the same: problems in academic life only heightened because people in intelligence form a view of the situation. They become deeply attached to that view. It develops emotional foundation which I don't wholly understand and I have talked to psychiatrists and they don't wholly understand.

I was so interested in it that I have written a series of six books called "Ideas in Action" in which one of the things I am exploring is what is...
the mechanism by which these images grow in people's minds and they hold on to them with passion which is obviously not intellectual in some sense.

So anyone who has ever been in this business as anyone in intellectual life that you have these debates in intelligence in which much more is involved than certainly intellectual, more human beings become engaged in.

I once asked a psychiatrist, a woman and she said, "You know, they get their egos attached to it" and then she said, "That is only restating the problem. It doesn't explain it. That's what happens."

Therefore, that is why I tried to warn Crile and Mike Wallace about, that they must understand that debates and intelligence of a passionate kind are normal. Every part of intelligence life that I have ever seen.

(Continued on next page.)
Q I want to pick up on our earlier conversation, that is, I am not asking you -- well, it seems to me what you are saying here is that in these debates, each side gets wedded to a position, and, I think you are arguing, tends to attribute bad faith or there may be a tendency to attribute bad faith to a person on the other side because he doesn't agree with you.

Is that what you are arguing?

A That doesn't always happen.

Q You are saying that can happen?

A That is one thing that can happen.

What often happens, however, is simply that a belief so deep and passionate that you think the other man is -- may not be a knave, but is he a fool. Sometimes he is both a knave and a fool.

There is a third debate we had on bombing policy, in which Lord Tedder, after, after the war -- here is Tedder, number two man to Eisenhower, he had risen after the war, every honor, to be head of the RAF, and writing his memoirs and going back to the debates, how you should attack a transport.

But he really felt that the other side was -- he used the word, I think, "conspiracy", but they were
engaged in conspiratorial operations, some phrase like that. You will find it in Taddei's memoires.

I have it quoted in a book of mine. Preinvasion bombing strategy. That kind of emotion is typical in these battles.

Q What I am trying to get you to address your attention to here, sir, is the problem where one person on one side of that argument genuinely does not believe in the position he is arguing for.

And when I asked you earlier whether it disturbed you -- whether it would disturb you if the person on the other side did not believe in good faith what he was arguing for. And you answered yes.

A Yes.

Q I am trying to get you to imagine a situation where this wasn't just something that you inferred.

Supposing the man on the other side came to you and told you that he didn't believe what he was arguing for.

Would that disturb you?

MR. MURRY: I object to the form of the question.
Rostow

You may answer.

A  Sure. Yes. It would disturb me if people were arguing a case that they didn't believe.

Q  Why is that?

A  Because in matters of this kind and matters of every kind, integrity is important. I don't know any fancier answer than that.

I rate integrity very high among the values by which I judge situations and people.

Q  If you are -- well, you are a historian now, but you were a policy maker once or a policy advisor once; is that fair?

A  That is fair.

(Continued on next page.)
Q As a policy advisor, would it disturb you if you knew that one party to an intelligence debate did not believe in the argument that it was making?

MR. MURRY: I object to the form of the question.

Q You understand I am asking a hypothetical question. I will state that freely.

A Yes.

Q Yes, it would bother you?

A Yes, it would bother me, sure.

Q Why would it disturb you as a policy adviser?

A Because, in policy, one must take into account all manner of different views, and if you work as I have, or had the privilege of working for a President or a Secretary of State, you know that man is trying to weigh and assess all manner of different perspectives, legitimate perspectives on a problem, but he would hope -- one would hope that the perspectives that were thrown up at him, as an executive, would be thrown up in good faith.

If there was someone who, for example, has his finger up in the wind and judging, as I have seen people
in Washington shifting their opinion as they read
The New York Times and Washington Post editorials,
makes that person not especially useful to a high
executive because he is not getting an authentic
expression of that man's judgment.

There are other variables at work there. And
high executives become -- have to be extremely good
judges of people and what it is that makes them come
up with judgments of the certain kind as opposed to
others. Some of them must be biases, which they
must respect, or whatever.

That makes it very difficult for a high
executive, and he bears that responsibility as he
steps off in the dark; he has got people that they
are not saying what they really believe but they are
putting forward an opinion governed by some other
criterion and it is not their authentic belief.

Q Does that apply to intelligence officers?
A Yes, it could apply to intelligence officers.

Q As a policy adviser, did you assume that
when you were handed an intelligence estimate of any
kind, that you -- that that estimate represented the
good-faith view, the honestly held view of its author?

MR. MURRY: I object to the form of the
question.

A Unless I had reason to make a contrary estimate, yes.

Q You say unless you had reason to make a contrary estimate.

A Of the source, that's right.

Q Oh, of the source. And the source's good faith.

A Yes.

(Continued on next page)
Q Well, you said we were talking abstractly. When you were a policy advisor for a number of years during the Johnson administration --

A Yes.

Q And I suppose dating back to the Kennedy administration --

A That is correct.

Q During those years when you were a policy advisor, did you, when you received intelligence estimates, assume that those intelligence estimates reflected the good faith or honestly held view of the persons who presented them to you?

A Yes. Except once. Except once.

Q Well, at the risk -- let me ask you, am I going to ask you to cast aspersions on someone's character if I ask you to do that?

A Yes.

Q Before I ask you to do that, I will leave to my superior officer the decision as to asking you whether you should do that. I am not going to ask you to do that now.

A I am under oath and I have got to say -- I have every desire not to get into it. You asked me, did it ever happen. It happened once.
Q I respect your recognition and your obligation to answer. I am not saying I am not going to ask you. I am not at this juncture making the judgment -- this case has required a lot of people to discuss things that they didn't particularly want to discuss under oath fully and freely.

A I understand.

Q After the Second World War was over, did you remain involved in intelligence work at all?

A Let me see. I worked for a year in the State Department on German-Austrian economic affairs in a junior post as the economic -- that was a division or a section. I was the deputy.

We had a certain amount of intelligence flow on what was going on in Germany and various government approaches to Germany.

I was then a year at Oxford as the Harmsworth Professor of American History. There I had no access and no interest in intelligence matters.

Then I went to Geneva to help a man named Gunnar Myrdal set up the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva, which was part of the United National, an East-West outfit. That post we didn't have any independent flow of intelligence. In our job we
Rostow
dveloped certain impressions in what was going on
in Europe.

Then I came come to -- no. Then I was at
Cambridge '49, '50, I was the Pitt Professor of American
History.

Then I went to MIT and in 1951 I helped set
up something called the Center for International Studies
at MIT. I continued to teach economic history, but
helped set this up.

I began to get back into certain contacts with
intelligence because I did a study on the Soviet
Union called "The Dynamics of Soviet Society" and
that was financed by the CIA. The financing was the
CIA, but we didn't report to the CIA. We reported
to NSC, the National Security Council and the CIA
was acting as the agent for the whole intelligence
community.

Out of that came studies of the dynamics of
Soviet society and focused quite a lot on what would
happen after Stalin died.

Again we had certain contacts with the
intelligence and had a certain amount of what we might
call low level intelligence flow to Washington. We
had a classified installation at MIT. That study
and its timing turned out to be useful to the Eisenhower administration when it came in.

I was called down to help design policy and do the first draft of Eisenhower's speech after Stalin died.

So they thought we were useful and then they asked us to do a study of Communist China and I did that in 1953, '54 reluctantly because we couldn't get anybody else to touch it.

So again, we had a sort of flow of what I call low level intelligence available to us in writing the prospects for Communist China and American policy in Asia, but those were books that were published in a perfectly normal academic way.

The point was, you are asking me a question. What contacts did I have with the intelligence business.

Q You wouldn't characterize these as personal involvements in intelligence work?

A Intelligence stuff is a very small margin.

I was working with open material, unclassified material and I published unclassified documents in the normal
Rostow 108

academic way along with my colleagues.

Q This would be as distinguished from
what you were doing during the Second World War?
A Exactly.

Q The work that you did subsequent to
the Second World War?
A Right.

Q And particularly in the early fifties
was distinguishable from the work you did during the
Second World War which was more -- the work you did
during the Second World War was more of an intelligence
officer's type of work; is that correct?
A It was intelligence combined with military
planning. In other words, you had to try to convert
your insights to intelligence to priority targets
for bombing. Whereas --

(Continued on next page.)
Q So you were bringing sort of an intelligence and operation function in the Second World War?
A Precisely.
Q Later on, after the war, the work you were doing was much more of an analytical -- both analytical type of work but bringing together a whole variety of sources, both intelligence sources and publicly-available sources?
A Intellectually, if you want to probe at this, the difference is really not so much in the character of the tasks as in the form of the output and the degree of classification.

For example, we did the study of the Soviet Union, the dynamics of Soviet society. I don't know the classified -- I mean intelligence input into that would be minimal.

We did focus on what should the United States do after Stalin's death, which was an operational question. We had a view.

Then Stalin died and we were asked our view, and the view was that the wisest thing was we could do if we wanted to see change within the Soviet Union was to be unaggressive and to hold out a vision of
peace. That was the origin of Eisenhower's famous peace speech.

In the end, it was an operation. The difference was that the medium was not classified, and the end product was not a bombing raid, it was a speech.

Q Have you met with your counsel before today, at any time this week?

MR. MURRY: Objection, and I instruct him not to answer.

MR. BARON: If he met with his counsel prior to today?

MR. MURRY: Yes.

You are instructed not to answer.

MR. BARON: I don't want to draw this out unnecessarily.

Is it your position that you won't permit him to answer any question, even the fact of his having talked to his counsel at any time since his return -- between his return from Europe and the present day?

MR. MURRY: I am inclined, at this stage, to instruct him not to answer those questions, and I will leave it at that.

MR. BARON: And you do so instruct him?
MR. MURRY: Yes, and I do so instruct him.

Q Let us move on into somewhat more recent history.

Just for context, then — and you need not go into enormous detail if it doesn't relate either to intelligence work or to Southeast Asia — what did you do, say, between the mid-Fifties and the beginning of the Kennedy Administration?

Just give us the jobs that you held.

A I was an occasional consultant to the Eisenhower Administration for particular jobs.

For example, during the Lebanon-Jordan crisis in 1958, I was on a committee headed by Crawford Greenwald, who was the president of duPont. I was assigned to advise the President as to whether he should or should not mount a space program to send a man to the moon and get him back. I was on as a nonscientist.

There were other such minor advisory functions, but at that period, my work was primarily on developing problems, and I worked with a different branch of the government.

I started working with John Kennedy and others on the problem of how to expand aid to India and developing areas. That was not intelligence, but that
developed the study of the development problems:
Latin America, Africa, the Middle East.

Q. This was in the early Sixties?
A. No, this was in the late Fifties.

And then I worked informally with Senator John Kennedy from February of 1958 on, while carrying out my academic duties, in helping him in his effort to seek the nomination of the presidency.

So, except for these minor occasional episodic periods of consultation with the executive branch on specific problems at their request, I had no contact with intelligence.

Q. Then beginning with the Kennedy Administration, did you take a position immediately when the new administration came in, in 1961?
A. Yes. I was sworn in on the 21st of January 1961.

Q. In what capacity?
A. As deputy special assistant to the President for national security affairs.

Q. How many deputies did the special assistant to the President for national security affairs have at that time, if you recall?
A. One. But there is a phrase of art there, just
to get it precise. I was deputy special assistant to
the President. The reason for that was a special
assistant, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, took the view that I
had known the President so well that on the issues that
I worked, that he, the President, would wish me to
report to him directly, and he very generously suggested
that's the way we should work, so we split the task
between us. I never sent paper to the President
without sending McGeorge Bundy, who is a very close
friend to this day, a copy.

I was deputy to the President, not to McGeorge
Bundy, if you see what I mean. It's quite unimportant,
but it meant that I worked directly with the President,
not necessarily through the national security advisor.

Q I think I understand.

Did the national security advisor, which
we can agree, I think, is an accepted shorthand
description of the post special assistant to the
President for national security affairs --

A Yes.

(Continued on next page)
Q So we will refer to that position henceforth as national security advisor.

A All right.

Q Did the national security advisor, who was then McGeorge Bundy, have other deputies at that time?

A No.

Q In the answer you gave earlier, you were explaining that while you were in the departmental organization, the deputy to Mr. Bundy, the way Mr. Bundy set up that position entitled you to report directly to President Kennedy.

A Well, the language, actually, of the title was set up to reflect that. It couldn't be a less important matter. If you want to get it accurate --

Q I think it's pretty clear on the record.

A Yes.

Q Did you have any regular or particular responsibilities on that job?

A Yes.

Q Any focus of responsibilities in that job and what were they?

A Mr. Bundy took on intelligence, professional intelligence relations with the CIA, nuclear matters,
Berlin, Congo, Cuba.

I was Southeast Asia, planning, generally Asian problems like Indonesia, Japan, et cetera, Africa.

I played a role in foreign aid and worked with the President setting up foreign affairs planning which we launched from the White House and -- but what turned out to be my largest responsibility was that President Kennedy assigned me Southeast Asia.

Q Did you, at the time you assumed that responsibility -- and this is 1961 --
A Correct.

Q -- did you have any extensive prior knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia?
A Yes. I had very extensive knowledge because the study I did of China and of Asia policy, 1953-54, was an occasion to look very far back and very far forward with respect to China and Asia.

And in the course of that period, I studied what was happening in Korea and Japan in the wake of the war, what was happening on Formosa, what was happening in Southeast Asia. And I already knew a great deal what was going on in India because of my work on economic development.
I formed, in tranquility in that period, as an academic, very serious views on Asia as a whole, China in relationship to Asia, Southeast Asia in relationship to Chinese interests, Soviet interests, Australian interests, U.S. interests.

Yes. That was a very deep experience, those years of study of China and Asia.

I did not keep up in detail, but I never lost an interest in Asia.

So it is fair to say you had a background on the region. You understood the region historically at least.

Yes. I also had policy views.

You might not have been an authority on day-to-day or year-to-year developments there.

That is exactly true.

And it became your responsibility to monitor developments there for the President in the early -- in 1961.

By "there," I mean in Southeast Asia.

Yes. I had to catch up very quickly.

Was that your first exposure to what can be called -- I don't know if we will agree on a term, but guerrilla or unconventional warfare?
No, it was not. The Center for National Studies had work going on within it which I did not direct, but which I monitored closely on guerrilla warfare headed by a man named James Elliott Cross.

Cross had been in the OSS and dropped behind the lines in France and had been involved, I think, in the Philippines, perhaps with CIA, during World War II.

In any case, he developed a study of guerrilla warfare in which he called on examples reaching all the way back to the Spanish guerrilla studies against Napoleon, the Irish guerrilla study against the British, all the way down to more contemporary cases in the Philippines and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

So we had Jim Cross' project going, which was really a quite sophisticated study of the nature of guerrilla warfare.

Simultaneously, and perhaps the greatest of the experts on China -- and I regard him now as probably the best single American academic expert on China, Lucian Pye -- went out and did a study which has been published, interviewing guerrillas who come out, captured or defected in Malaya.
So he did a study really of the anatomy of the Malayan case. There was -- I followed closely the work of my colleagues in this field.

I did not do independent research, but I gave a lot of thought to the nature of guerrilla warfare and how it related to the early process of modernization when post-colonial countries were in the process of making the transition from a rather amorphous independence to what you might call solid national structure.

I was then developing my concept of the stages of economic growth.

So this work by my colleagues interested me as a kind of problem that could easily arise in these early transition stages in the development of modern society.

MR. BARON: I am going to stop here.

(Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., a luncheon recess was taken.)