Q. IN DOING YOUR ANALYSIS ON THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, DID YOU FORMULATE ESTIMATES OF ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES?

A. YES, I DID. WE PREPARED AN ESTIMATE.

Q. DO YOU RECALL WHAT YOUR ESTIMATE WAS FOR TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES IN THE SPRING OF 1968?

A. YES. I BELIEVE THE NUMBER WE CARRIED INTO THE ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE WAS 75- TO 100,000 ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS.

Q. DO YOU RECALL WHAT MACV'S OFFICIAL ESTIMATE FOR TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES WAS IN THE SPRING OF 1968?

A. I BELIEVE THEY WERE DOWN AROUND 35- TO 40,000.

Q. DID YOU PREPARE A REPORT ON YOUR FINDINGS ABOUT THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS?

A. YES, I DID. I PREPARED THIS REPORT WORKING WITH MATERIAL THAT HAD BEEN BEGUN BY MR. ADAMS.

Q. WHEN YOU SAY WITH MATERIALS THAT HAD BEEN BEGUN BY --- WITH WORK THAT HAD BEEN BEGUN BY MR. ADAMS, HOW MUCH HAD MR. ADAMS DONE WHEN YOU BEGAN WORKING ON THE PROJECT?

A. QUITE A BIT. MR. ADAMS HAD GATHERED A SAMPLE OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AT THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVEL IN WHICH HE WAS ABLE TO RELATE THE NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS TO THE NUMBER OF MANEUVER FORCES.
Q. HAD SAM ADAMS FORMULATED AN ESTIMATE FOR TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES WHEN YOU BEGAN WORKING IN THAT AREA?

A. YES, I BELIEVE HE HAD AN EARLIER ESTIMATE. MY CONTRIBUTION WAS TO HELP A BIT WITH METHODOLOGY AND EXPANDING AND REFINING THE DATA BASE SOMEWHAT AND PREPARING A REPORT.

Q. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS MR. ADAMS' RESEARCH HELPFUL TO YOU IN PREPARING YOUR REPORT ON THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES?

A. IT WAS OF GREAT VALUE.

Q. WHEN DID YOU PREPARE YOUR REPORT ON THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES?

A. IT WAS PREPARED IN THE MONTH -- IT WAS COMPLETED IN THE MONTH OR TWO PRIOR TO THE ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE. I DON'T RECALL EXACTLY WHAT DATE THE CONFERENCE WAS HELD, BUT IT WAS IN THE SPRING OF 1978.

MR. MURRY: DID YOU MEAN TO SAY 1968, SIR?

THE WITNESS: YES. EXCUSE ME. 1968. THANK YOU,

MR. MURRY.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. MR. STUMPF, I'M GOING TO SHOW YOU A DOCUMENT WHICH HAS BEEN MARKED AS JOINT EXHIBIT 472 IN CONNECTION WITH THIS LITIGATION. IT IS ALSO ATTACHED, I BELIEVE, AS EXHIBIT A OF YOUR AFFIDAVIT OF APRIL 18, 1984.

COULD YOU PLEASE TAKE A MOMENT TO REVIEW THAT
DOCUMENT. THEN I'M GOING TO HAVE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THAT DOCUMENT.

A. YES, I'M READY.

Q. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THIS DOCUMENT?

A. I DO.

Q. IN WHAT CONTEXT DO YOU RECOGNIZE IT?

A. IT IS A DRAFT WORKING PAPER THAT I PREPARED FOR THE ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE IN THE SPRING OF 1978 CONCERNING ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ORDER OF BATTLE.

Q. DID YOU BELIEVE THIS DOCUMENT TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE AT THE TIME YOU WROTE IT IN 1968?

A. YES, SIR.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THIS DOCUMENT TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE TODAY?

A. I DO.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. PLEASE READ PARAGRAPH 13 OF YOUR AFFIDAVIT OF APRIL 18, 1984 INTO THE RECORD.

A. "I PREPARED A DRAFT WORKING PAPER FOR THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE DETAILING MY FINDINGS ON THE STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS. IN THAT
PAPER, A COPY OF WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THIS AFFIDAVIT AS EXHIBIT A, I CONCLUDED:

'It has seemed unreasonable to us that the enemy could have so few staff and support troops in relation to their maneuver strength. In the past few months, we have made a review of captured documents and interrogations available on the subject of administrative services. This effort has led us to conclude that the pre-Tet (MACV) estimate—about 38,000—is far too low, and that the actual number of administrative service troops prior to the offensive was on the order of 75,000 to 100,000.'

I believed this to be a sound and conservative estimate. I further noted in that paper that 'in the past, however, MACV has 'scaled down' the numbers of service and support troops reported in documents.' It was apparent to me that MACV's 'scaling down' of this strength figure had been done on an arbitrary basis. My draft working paper became CIA's position at a major order of battle conference in April 1968."

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DID YOU BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE AT THE TIME YOU SIGNED THIS AFFIDAVIT ON APRIL 18, 1984?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. I DID.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE TODAY?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. I DO.
BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. WHAT WAS THE ESTIMATE OF TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS THAT YOU SET FORTH IN THIS DRAFT WORKING PAPER ON ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES?

A. THE ESTIMATE WAS 75,000 TO 100,000.

Q. NOW, YOU SAY HERE THAT YOU "BELIEVED THIS TO BE A SOUND AND CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE."

A. WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY "A CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE"?

A. I MEANT THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR BELIEVING THE NUMBER WAS AT LEAST THE RANGE I INDICATED. IT COULD HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER.

Q. NOW, YOU SAY HERE IN THIS DRAFT WORKING PAPER WHICH YOU WROTE IN 1968 THAT, "IN THE PAST, HOWEVER, MACV HAS 'SCALED DOWN' THE NUMBERS OF SERVICE AND SUPPORT TROOPS REPORTED IN DOCUMENTS."

WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY "MACV HAS 'SCALED DOWN' THE NUMBERS OF SERVICE TROOPS"?

A. BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH MACV ANALYSTS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT MACV REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES TROOPS REPORTED IN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS TO ELIMINATE TROOPS THAT FOR SOME INEXPLICABLE REASON MACV FELT WERE NOT WORTHY OF BEING INCLUDED.

YOU SAY HERE, "IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT MACV'S 'SCALING DOWN' OF THIS STRENGTH FIGURE HAD BEEN DONE ON AN ARBITRARY BASIS."
WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY "ON AN ARBITRARY BASIS"?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. I MEANT THAT WE WERE NEVER ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THERE WAS ANY SPECIFIC REASON FOR REDUCING GIVEN TYPES OF TROOPS. FOR EXAMPLE, A DOCUMENT MIGHT STATE THAT A GIVEN DISTRICT HAD 15 MEDICAL PERSONNEL. MACV WOULD CHOOSE TO INCLUDE A NUMBER SUCH AS 2 OR 3 IN ITS ORDER OF BATTLE. THE REASON FOR EXCLUDING THE OTHER 12 OR 13 APPEARS TO BE ARBITRARY.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCES AS A VIETNAM INTELLIGENCE ANALYST AT CIA, DID YOU FORM AN OPINION AS TO THE ACCURACY OF MACV'S OFFICIAL ESTIMATE FOR TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS IN THE SPRING OF 1968?

A. I DID. I FELT THE ESTIMATE WAS WRONG. MACV'S ESTIMATING PROCESS WAS FUNDAMENTALLY TO COUNT THOSE TROOPS THAT IT HAD SOLID DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE EXISTED.

IN MOST CASES THEY DID NOT COUNT OR INCLUDE ESTIMATES FOR TROOPS THAT COULD BE PRESUMED TO HAVE EXISTED, BUT HAD NOT HAD DOCUMENTS CAPTURED TO INDICATE THAT THEY ACTUALLY DID EXIST.

IT IS TRUE THAT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE STRENGTH ESTIMATES MACV DID HAVE SOME MODEST AMOUNT OF ESTIMATED TROOPS INCLUDED, BUT THIS AMOUNT WAS FAR TOO SMALL AND BORE NO RELATION TO THE AMOUNT THAT WAS KNOWN TO ACTUALLY EXIST IN RELATION TO THE ENEMY'S MANEUVER STRENGTH.
MR. MURRY: EXCUSE ME, SIR. ARE YOU READING MR. MASTRO'S NOTES?

THE WITNESS: NO.

MR. MASTRO: I MOVE TO STRIKE MR. MURRY'S REMARK AND ITS UNFOUNDED INSINUATION.

MR. MURRY: WAIT A MINUTE.

MR. MASTRO: LET'S GO OFF THE RECORD.

MR. MURRY: STAY ON THE RECORD. I ASKED HIM A QUESTION.

MR. MASTRO: YOU'RE NOT ALLOWED TO ASK QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME. I MOVE TO STRIKE THE REMARK.

MR. MURRY: FINE. YOU MAY MOVE TO STRIKE ANYTHING YOU LIKE. I WANTED THAT CLARIFIED, AND I ASKED HIM THE QUESTION. AND I STAND ON MY RIGHT TO ASK HIM THE QUESTION.

MR. MASTRO: HE CLARIFIED IT. YOU HAVE YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO ASK YOUR QUESTIONS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. AND I AM GLAD YOU CLARIFIED THE RECORD ON THE POINT THAT YOU FELT YOU NEEDED TO.

MR. MURRY: MOVE TO STRIKE THE SPEECH.

MR. MASTRO: LOOKS LIKE WE'RE HAVING A LOT OF MOTIONS TO STRIKE HERE. IN ANY EVENT, LET'S PROCEED WITH THE EXAMINATION.

Q. MR. STUMPF, YOU TESTIFIED EARLIER THAT YOU BELIEVED THAT MACV HAD SCALED DOWN ITS OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ON AN ARBITRARY BASIS;
IS THAT CORRECT?

MR. MURRY: OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THE QUESTION.

A. YES.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. WHAT WAS ARBITRARY ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH MACV PRODUCED ITS OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION?

A. YES.

Q. PLEASE PROCEED.

A. ENEMY ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES SOLDIERS REPORTED IN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS WERE NOT PICKED UP IN MACV'S OB AS REPORTED IN THE DOCUMENTS.

MACV REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IT PICKED UP IN ITS ORDER OF BATTLE BY AN ARBITRARY NUMBER FOR REASONS THAT ARE NOT CLEAR BASED ON METHODOLOGY.

Q. MR. STUMPF, PLEASE READ PARAGRAPH 14 OF YOUR AFFIDAVIT OF APRIL 16, 1984 INTO THE RECORD.

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. "THE CIA'S REEVALUATION OF ENEMY STRENGTH AFTER TET PLACED THE TOTAL ENEMY FORCE AT LEVELS FAR HIGHER THAN MACV WAS CARRYING IN ITS OFFICIAL ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE. TO RESOLVE THE CIA/MACV DISPUTE OVER TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH, AN ORDER OF BATTLE
CONFERENCE WAS CONVENED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS IN LANGLEY, VIRGINIA, IN APRIL, 1968. DELEGATIONS FROM MACV, CINCPAC, CIA, AND DIA ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE. THEN COLONEL DANIEL O. GRAHAM HEADED THE MACV DELEGATION."

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DID YOU BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE AT THE TIME YOU SIGNED THIS AFFIDAVIT ON APRIL 18, 1984?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. I DID.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE TODAY?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. I DO.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. MR. STUMPF, PLEASE READ PARAGRAPH 15 OF YOUR AFFIDAVIT OF APRIL 18, 1984 INTO THE RECORD.

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. "I ATTENDED THE SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS WAS DISCUSSED. I PRESENTED AND DEFENDED CIA'S POSITION ON ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS STRENGTH AT THAT SESSION. CIA WAS ARGUING FOR A STRENGTH ESTIMATE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES CATEGORY THAT WAS APPROXIMATELY DOUBLE THE ESTIMATE PROPOSED BY
MACV. AFTER I COMPLETED MY PRESENTATION, GRAHAM ATTACKED THE
ESTIMATE. IT WAS CLEAR TO EVERYONE PRESENT THAT HIS ATTACK WAS
NOT BASED ON EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTED HIS POSITION BUT, RATHER,
ON A STONEWALLING APPROACH TO KEEP THE STRENGTH FIGURE AT THE
SAME LEVEL AS MACV'S PRE-TET ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE TOTAL.
GRAHAM COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ARGUING IN GOOD FAITH, GIVEN THE
EVIDENCE CONTRADICTING HIS POSITION."

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DID YOU BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND
ACCURATE AT THE TIME YOU SIGNED THIS AFFIDAVIT ON APRIL 18,
1984?

A. I DID.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND
ACCURATE TODAY?

A. I DO.

MR. MASTRO: OKAY. WE HAVE GONE BEYOND 12:30 OR
JUST ABOUT 12:30, AT WHICH TIME WE HAVE AGREED TO BREAK FOR
LUNCH. SO WHY DON'T WE BREAK FOR LUNCH, AND I WILL TRY TO
CONCLUDE MY EXAMINATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER LUNCH SO
MR. MURRY CAN ASK HIS QUESTIONS.

MR. MURRY: HOW MUCH MORE DO YOU HAVE TO DO? WOULD
IT BE POSSIBLE TO HOLD LUNCH SHORTLY AND THEN FINISH UP?
MR. MASTRO: I THINK I HAVE A LITTLE BIT MORE. I HAVE AT LEAST THREE LINES OF QUESTIONING TO GO OVER. I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE ME, BUT I HOPE TO DO IT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE I KNOW THAT YOU WILL HAVE QUESTIONS AS WELL.

MR. MURRY: OKAY.

LUNCHEON RECESS

MR. MASTRO: BACK ON THE RECORD.

Q. BEFORE THE BREAK, MR. STUMPF, WE HAD STARTED ON A LINE OF QUESTIONING ABOUT THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE. I'D LIKE TO CONTINUE WITH THAT LINE OF QUESTIONING. DO YOU RECALL APPROXIMATELY WHAT CIA'S POSITION WAS ON TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH THAT WAS PRESENTED AT THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE?

A. I DON'T RECALL EXACTLY, BUT I THINK IT WAS ON THE ORDER OF 500,000 TO 600,000.

Q. DO YOU RECALL WHAT THE MACV POSITION WAS ON TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH THAT WAS PRESENTED AT THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE?

A. I BELIEVE AROUND 300,000.

Q. DO YOU RECALL WHO REPRESENTED MACV AT THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE?

A. I CLEARLY RECALL COLONEL DANNY GRAHAM.
Q. DID YOU ATTEND ANY OF THE SESSIONS AT THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE?

A. I ATTENDED THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES SESSION ONLY, AT WHICH I PRESENTED AND DEFENDED MY ESTIMATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE ORDER OF BATTLE.

Q. WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF MEMBERS OF THE MACV DELEGATION TO YOUR PRESENTATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AT THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE?

A. THEIR REACTION WAS ONE OF REJECTION. THEY WERE VERY -- THEY WERE NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE METHODOLOGY THAT WAS USED IN DERIVING THE ESTIMATE OR THE INDIVIDUAL DOCUMENTS ON WHICH THE ESTIMATE WAS BASED. THEY JUST TOOK THE POINT OF VIEW THAT THEIR ESTIMATE WAS THEIR ESTIMATE.

I RECALL ONE SESSION IN WHICH I HAD A SPIRITED EXCHANGE WITH COLONEL GRAHAM.

Q. WHAT DID COLONEL GRAHAM SAY DURING THAT SESSION?

A. COLONEL GRAHAM WAS REFERRING TO OUR DOCUMENT-DATA BASE, AND HE ASKED ME HOW MANY DOCUMENTS WE HAD THAT GAVE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES STRENGTH AT THE PROVINCE LEVEL SUBORDINATE TO THE PROVINCE LEVEL. I TOLD HIM THE NUMBER.

THAT PARTICULAR NUMBER IN THAT DATA BASE WAS A SMALL NUMBER, SOMETHING LIKE SIX OR SEVEN DOCUMENTS, I BELIEVE.

COLONEL GRAHAM LOOKED AT ME AND SMILED AND ASKED ME IF THAT DIDN'T INDICATE THAT OUR ESTIMATE WAS REALLY JUST BASED ON THE THIN REED. I BELIEVE I'M QUOTING HIM EXACTLY FROM WHAT
HE SAID 17 YEARS AGO.

THE WHOLE POINT, OF COURSE, WAS THAT COLONEL GRAHAM WAS—I BELIEVE DELIBERATELY—MISSING WAS THAT THE ONE-TO-ONE RATIO WE WERE USING WAS BASED ON A GREAT MANY DOCUMENTS, NOT AT ALL A THIN REED, AND THAT HIS OWN ESTIMATE WAS JUST BASED ON THOSE FEW UNITS WHICH THEY HAD ACTUALLY ENCOUNTERED AND IGNORED ENTIRELY THE UNITS THEY HADN'T ENCOUNTERED.

IN SUM, COLONEL GRAHAM WAS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT OR EVEN CONSIDER THE ESTIMATE WE PUT FORTH. WHEN WE RAISED OUR OBJECTIONS TO THE WAY MACV WAS DOING ITS WORK, HE MERELY SMILED AND SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS.

I DIDN'T FEEL THAT WE WERE ABLE TO HAVE A MEANINGFUL EXCHANGE WITH COLONEL GRAHAM BECAUSE HE WAS SIMPLY UNWILLING TO BE A PART OF A CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESS TO DETERMINE HOW MANY ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS WERE ACTUALLY THERE.

Q. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO COLONEL GRAHAM'S CRITICISMS OF YOUR PRESENTATION ON THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES?

A. RECALLING BACK TO MY ACTUAL REACTIONS AT THE TIME, I BELIEVE THEY WERE SURPRISE IN A WAY BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT A HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICER COULD SCARCELY AVOID DEALING IN A FORTHRIGHT MANNER WITH THE EVIDENCE WHICH WE HAD PRESENTED TO HIM.

Q. YOU SAY HERE THAT "IT WAS CLEAR TO EVERYONE PRESENT THAT HIS ATTACK," MEANING COLONEL GRAHAM, "WAS NOT BASED ON
EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTED HIS POSITION, BUT RATHER, ON A
STONEWALLING APPROACH TO KEEP THE STRENGTH FIGURE AT THE SAME
LEVEL AS MACV'S PRE-TET ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE TOTAL."

WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY "A STONEWALLING APPROACH"?

MR. MURRY: OBJECT TO THE FORM OF QUESTION.

A. BY "STONEWALLING," I'M REFERRING TO COLONEL
GRAHAM'S REFUSAL TO DEFEND HIS OWN ESTIMATE AND SIMILAR
REFUSAL TO EVEN CONSIDER OURS WHICH WAS BASED ON MUCH MORE EVIDENCE THAN
HIS OWN.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. YOU GO ON TO SAY THAT "GRAHAM COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ARGUING IN GOOD FAITH, GIVEN THE EVIDENCE CONTRADICTING HIS
POSITION." WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY "GOOD FAITH"?

MR. MURRY: OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THE QUESTION.

A. BY "GOOD FAITH," I MEANT THAT IT APPEARED TO ME
THAT COLONEL GRAHAM WAS NOT ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE TO
DETERMINE THE TRUE NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS
PRESENT BUT RATHER THERE DEFENDING A NUMBER WHICH HAD LITTLE
BASIS IN SOLID METHODOLOGY OR FACT.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DID CIA AND MACV REACH AN AGREEMENT ON ENEMY
STRENGTH FIGURES AT THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE?

A. NO.

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHO SAM ADAMS IS?

MR. MURRY: WE'LL STIPULATE THAT THE WITNESS KNOWS
WHO SAM ADAMS IS.

A. MY KNOWLEDGE OF SAM ADAMS DATES BACK TO 1966 WHEN
WE BEGAN WORKING ON THE VIETNAM WAR.
SAM ADAMS AND I, THROUGHOUT MOST OF THIS PERIOD
UNDER DISCUSSION, WERE SITTING AT DESKS NEXT TO EACH OTHER OR
NOT MORE THAN TWO DESKS APART, I THINK AT ONE POINT.
WE SAW EACH OTHER AND TALKED ON A DAILY BASIS. AND
OVER THE TIME THAT I GREW TO KNOW SAM ADAMS, I CAME TO
APPRECIATE HIM AS A TRULY EXCEPTIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYST AND
EXTREMELY BRIGHT AND QUICK INDIVIDUAL, A MAN WITH A HIGH ENERGY
LEVEL, A MAN WHO WOULDN'T TAKE "NO" OR "IT CAN'T BE DONE" FOR AN
ANSWER, AND A CREATIVE AND INSIGHTFUL AND CLEVER ANALYST WHO
CONSISTENTLY WITHOUT EXCEPTION TURNED OUT EXCELLENT INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCT.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. WAS SAM ADAMS A CAREFUL ANALYST?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. YES. I'VE NEVER SEEN A PERSON WHO TAKES MORE
COPIOUS NOTES OR MAINTAINS MORE COMPLETE FILES.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCES AS A VIETNAM INTELLIGENCE
ANALYST AT CIA, HAVE YOU FORMED AN OPINION ABOUT SAM ADAMS'
ABILITIES AS AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. YES, I HAVE.
I WOULD CHARACTERIZE HIM AS HAVING BEEN ONE OF THE
BEST INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS I HAVE EVER RUN ACROSS IN THE YEARS I
WORKED IN THE INTELLIGENCE AREA AND, CERTAINLY, THE BEST
INTELLIGENCE ANALYST WORKING ON THE VIETNAM PROBLEM.
BY MR. MASTRO:
Q. MR. STUMPF, PLEASE READ PARAGRAPH 16 OF YOUR
AFFIDAVIT OF APRIL 18, 1984 INTO THE RECORD.
MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.
A. "I WORKED CLOSELY WITH SAMUEL ADAMS AT THE SOUTH
VIETNAM BRANCH. I CONSIDERED HIM TO BE THE CIA'S EXPERT ON
VIETNAM ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE. ADAMS WAS AN EXCELLENT ANALYST.
HE WAS EXTREMELY THOROUGH, PAINSTAKING IN HIS RESEARCH AND
PERCEPTIVE IN HIS CONCLUSIONS. I WAS AMONG THE MANY ANALYSTS AT
CIA WHO RESPECTED ADAMS' ABILITIES AS AN ANALYST AND BELIEVED
THAT HE WAS RIGHT ABOUT THE NUMBERS DISPUTE WITH MACV. OUR
RESEARCH IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH CONFIRMED THAT ADAMS'
METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATES WERE SOUND."
BY MR. MASTRO:
Q. DID YOU BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND
ACCURATE AT THE TIME YOU WROTE THIS AFFIDAVIT?
MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.
A. I DID.
MR. MASTRO: LET ME REPHRASE THE QUESTION.
Q. DID YOU BELIEVE THE PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND
ACCURATE AT THE TIME YOU SIGNED THIS AFFIDAVIT ON APRIL 18,
1984?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. I DID.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THIS PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND ACCURATE TODAY?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. I DO.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. WHEN YOU SAY HERE THAT "ADAMS WAS AN EXCELLENT ANALYST. HE WAS EXTREMELY THOROUGH, PAINSTAKING IN HIS RESEARCH AND PERCEPTIVE IN HIS CONCLUSIONS," WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY "PERCEPTIVE IN HIS CONCLUSIONS"?

MR. MURRY: OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THE QUESTION.

A. BY "PERCEPTIVE IN HIS CONCLUSIONS," I MEAN THAT HE WAS ABLE TO DRAW HELPFUL INTELLIGENCE CONCLUSIONS FROM A LARGE MASS OF SEEMINGLY TRIVIAL BITS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. WHEN YOU WERE WORKING WITH SAM ADAMS AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH IN 1968 -- STRIKE THAT. LET ME START AGAIN. WHEN YOU WERE WORKING WITH SAM ADAMS AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH, DID YOU DISCUSS WITH MR. ADAMS YOUR TRIP TO SOUTH VIETNAM IN LATE 1967 AND EARLY 1968?

A. YES, I DID.

Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM ABOUT THAT TRIP IN LATE 1967
AND EARLY 1968 WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING IN THE SOUTH V VINAM BRANCH?

A. I TOLD HIM MANY OF THE SAME THINGS THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED HERE TODAY. I TOLD HIM ABOUT MY VISITS TO CICV, THE INFORMATION I HAD LEARNED THERE CONCERNING ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AS WELL AS THE ARBITRARY DOWNWARD REVISION OF THE RECRUITING ESTIMATES; I TOLD HIM OF MY IMPRESSION OF WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AT THE TIME AND HOW THAT CONTRASTED TO WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN SAIGON AND WHAT MACV WAS SAYING; I DISCUSSED OVER A PERIOD OF DAYS THE VISIT AT GREAT LENGTH WITH HIM.

Q. DID YOU TELL SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH WHO HAD MADE THESE ARBITRARY DOWNWARD REVISIONS, AS YOU PUT IT, IN THE MACV RECRUITMENT ESTIMATES?

MR. MURRY: OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THE QUESTION.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH ABOUT MACV'S RECRUITMENT ESTIMATES?

A. I DESCRIBED FOR HIM THE METHODOLOGY THAT WAS SUPPOSEDLY USED BY CICV AND TOLD HIM HOW THE WORKING-LEVEL ANALYSTS HAD HAD THEIR NUMBERS ARBITRARILY REVISED DOWNWARD. I CAN'T SPECIFICALLY RECALL IF I TOLD HIM WHICH PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REVISIONS, BUT I CERTAINLY CHARACTERIZED FOR HIM THE LEVEL OF
THE PEOPLE MAKING THE REVISIONS.

Q. DID YOU DISCUSS WITH SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH WHAT MACV INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS IN SAIGON HAD TOLD YOU DURING BRIEFINGS WHICH YOU RECEIVED ON YOUR TRIP TO VIETNAM IN LATE 1967 AND EARLY 1968?

A. YES, I DID. I CAN RECALL TELLING HIM THE OPTIMISTIC BRIEFINGS ABOUT HOW THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL WAS BEGINNING TO APPEAR AND CONTRASTING IT TO SOME OF THE INFORMATION THAT WAS BEGINNING TO APPEAR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE; SPECIFICALLY, THAT IN SOME OF THE REMOTE PROVINCES CIA OFFICIALS WERE BECOMING CONCERNED ABOUT THE LEVEL OF SECURITY.

Q. DID YOU DISCUSS WITH SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH YOUR REACTIONS TO THE TET OFFENSIVE?

A. YES.

Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL SAM ADAMS ABOUT YOUR REACTIONS TO THE TET OFFENSIVE WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH?


YOU SEE, MR. MASTRO, I RETURNED TO WASHINGTON JUST A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE SAIGON -- BEFORE THE TET OFFENSIVE.
Q. DID YOU DISCUSS WITH SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH YOUR ESTIMATES OF ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS?

THE WITNESS: COULD I HEAR THE QUESTION AGAIN, PLEASE.

(LAST QUESTION READ)

A. YES, WE DISCUSSED IT EXTENSIVELY. I RELIED ON MUCH OF SAM'S WORK TO PREPARE THE ESTIMATE.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DID YOU TELL SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH WHAT YOUR ESTIMATE OF TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES WAS IN THE SPRING OF 1968?

A. YES. AS I'VE SAID, WE WORKED ON THIS PROBLEM TOGETHER.

Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM?

A. SAM WAS FULLY AWARE OF ALL MY THOUGHTS -- I SHOULD NOT SAY "ALL," NOT NECESSARILY ALL MY THOUGHTS -- BUT ALL MY ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE ADMIN. SERVICES, AND I BELIEVE I WAS AWARE OF HIS.

Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL HIM YOUR ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS WERE WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH?

A. I CAN RECALL TELLING HIM THAT I AGREED THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE FAVORED A RATIO OF SOMETHING LIKE ONE
ADMIN. SERVICE TROOP FOR EACH MANEUVER TROOP AND THAT WE SHOULD
BASE OUR ESTIMATE ON THAT APPROACH.

Q. DID YOU TELL SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE
WORKING AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH WHAT YOUR ESTIMATE WAS FOR
TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE
TROOPS?

A. THE REASON WHY I'M HAVING TROUBLE ANSWERING YOUR
QUESTION DIRECTLY ON THIS, MR. MASTRO, IS THAT SAM ADAMS AND I
PREPARED THE ESTIMATE TOGETHER. IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY AN
ENTIRELY SEPARATE ESTIMATE THAT I PREPARED AND TOLD MR. ADAMS,
BUT RATHER ONE THAT WE ARRIVED AT WORKING TOGETHER.

Q. WHAT WAS THE ESTIMATE THAT YOU ARRIVED AT WORKING
TOGETHER AT THE TIME IN, I BELIEVE, THE SPRING OF 1968?

A. 75,000 TO 100,000 TROOPS.

Q. DID YOU DISCUSS WITH MR. ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU
WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH MACV'S
OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF ENEMY STRENGTH?

A. YES, WE DID.

Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL --

A. IN FACT, MACV'S ESTIMATES OF ENEMY TROOPS WAS AN
INTEGRAL COMPONENT OF OUR ESTIMATE OF ENEMY TROOPS.

Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL MR. ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU
WERE WORKING TOGETHER IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH ABOUT MACV'S
OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF ENEMY STRENGTH?

A. THAT THEY WERE FAR TOO LOW BECAUSE THEY EXCLUDED
NUMBERS OF ENEMY TROOPS THAT WERE SUBORDINATE TO VARIOUS
MILITARY REGIONS AND SUBREGIONS THAT COULD CLEARLY BE INFERRED
AS BEING THERE FROM OTHER EVIDENCE OF THE NUMBERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TROOPS THAT SUPPORTED MANEUVER TROOPS AT THE
PROVINCE AND MAINLY AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL.

MR. MURRY: MAY I INQUIRE, COUNSEL, IN THAT LAST
QUESTION WHETHER YOU WERE REFERRING TO MACV'S ESTIMATE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS AS THE WITNESS APPARENTLY THOUGHT
YOU WERE FROM HIS ANSWER?

MR. MASTRO: MR. MURRY, I SIMPLY ASKED THE WITNESS
WHAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH MR. ADAMS ABOUT MACV'S OFFICIAL ENEMY
STRENGTH ESTIMATES, AND HE HAS TESTIFIED WHAT THEY DISCUSSED AT
THE TIME THE TWO OF THEM WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT SOUTH VIETNAM
BRANCH.

MR. MURRY: I THINK YOUR LAST QUESTION SAID "MACV'S
ESTIMATE OF TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH," AND DIDN'T QUALIFY IT BY
PARTICULAR CATEGORY. IF THAT'S THE CASE, THEN I OBJECT TO THAT
QUESTION.

BUT THE WITNESS' ANSWER FOCUSED ON ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICE, AND I WAS MERELY ASKING YOU WHETHER YOU INTENDED TO
HAVE HIM ANSWER THE QUESTION WITH RESPECT TO MACV'S ESTIMATE
OVERALL FOR ALL CATEGORIES, OR WHETHER YOU MEANT HIM TO ANSWER A
QUESTION WITH RESPECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.

MR. MASTRO: WELL, I THINK THE QUESTION AND THE
ANSWER SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, AND I WOULD PREFER TO PROCEED WITH
MY EXAMINATION. TO THE EXTENT YOU FEEL CLARIFICATION IS NEEDED,
YOU WILL HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY ON YOUR CROSS-EXAMINATION.

MR. MURRY: ALL RIGHT. LET ME NOTE FOR THE RECORD
I OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THE PRIOR QUESTION.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. MR. STUMPF, DID YOU DISCUSS WITH SAM ADAMS WHILE
THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH
MACV'S OFFICIAL ESTIMATE OF TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS?

A. YES, I DID. THE ANSWER I JUST GAVE CHARACTERIZES
THAT DISCUSSION.

Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL MR. ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU
WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH ABOUT MACV'S
OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH FOR THE ENEMY'S
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS?

A. THAT THOSE ESTIMATES WERE FAULTY IN THAT THEY
FAILED TO COUNT LARGE NUMBERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS
THAT COULD BE REASONABLY INFERRED AS BEING SUBORDINATE TO
VARIOUS MILITARY REGIONS AND SUBREGIONS--THAT WAS THE MAJOR
FAULT--AND THAT ANOTHER FAULT WAS THAT THE NUMBERS FOR THE
PROVINCE AND THE DISTRICT LEVEL WERE INCORRECT IN THAT THEY HAD
BEEN ARBITRARILY REDUCED TO EXCLUDE LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS THAT
WERE THERE AND, AT LEAST AS FAR AS THE ENEMY WAS CONCERNED,
SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE, BUT WERE OTHERWISE EXCLUDED BY MACV
FROM THE ORDER OF BATTLE.
Q. DID YOU DISCUSS WITH SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH THE APRIL 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE?
A. YES, WE DID.
Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH ABOUT THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE?
A. I REMEMBER DISCUSSING WITH HIM MY SURPRISE AND AMAZEMENT AT COLONEL GRAHAM'S PERFORMANCE AT THIS ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE. I'M SURE WE DISCUSSED MANY OTHER THINGS WHICH I CAN'T SPECIFICALLY RECALL NOW.
Q. I HAVE JUST ASKED YOU A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT DISCUSSIONS YOU HAD WITH SAM ADAMS WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH TOGETHER. DURING WHAT PERIOD DID THE TWO OF YOU WORK TOGETHER IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH?
A. SAM AND I WORKED WITH EACH OTHER AT A BIT OF A DISTANCE BECAUSE SAM WAS WORKING FOR SAVA, S-A-V-A, PRIOR TO EARLY 1978; BUT NONETHELESS -- EXCUSE ME, 1968 -- BUT NONETHELESS WE WORKED WITH EACH OTHER DURING THAT PERIOD. AND IN FACT, I THINK WE BEGAN WORKING TOGETHER BACK IN 1966. AFTER -- AROUND TET, 1968, SAM AND I WORKED TOGETHER VERY CLOSELY. WE WERE EITHER RIGHT NEXT TO EACH OTHER OR JUST A FEW DESKS AWAY, AND WE WORKED TOGETHER ON MANY INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS RELATING TO VIETNAM.
Q. FOR HOW LONG A PERIOD OF TIME DID YOU TWO WORK TOGETHER IN THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH?

A. I BELIEVE IT WAS UP UNTIL ABOUT THE TIME THAT I LEFT TO GO AWAY TO SCHOOL, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN 1970.

Q. SINCE THE TIME THAT YOU'VE DISCUSSED THE SUBJECTS THAT I HAVE JUST ASKED YOU ABOUT WITH SAM ADAMS WHILE THE TWO OF YOU WERE WORKING TOGETHER AT THE SOUTH VIETNAM BRANCH, HAVE YOUR VIEWS CHANGED ON ANY OF THOSE SUBJECTS WHICH YOU HAVE JUST TESTIFIED ABOUT?

MR. MURRY: OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THE QUESTION.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION?

A. I DO.

Q. DURING YOUR TRIP TO SAIGON IN LATE 1967 AND EARLY 1968, WERE THERE ANY RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON YOU BY MACV OFFICIALS?

A. YES, MACV OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION IN AND AROUND THE COUNTRY BY HELICOPTER AND FOR ARRANGING MEETINGS FOR ME WITH VARIOUS U.S. AND VIETNAMESE MILITARY OFFICIALS.

I FELT ON SOME OCCASIONS THAT I WAS RESTRICTED IN TERMS OF WHERE I WAS ALLOWED TO VISIT AND THE AVAILABILITY OF PEOPLE THAT I WANTED TO SPEAK TO.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE, MR. MASTRO, IS THAT CICV ITSELF,
ALTHOUGH I POSSESSED ALL THE NECESSARY CLEARANCES, I WAS ONLY ALLOWED TO GO TO ONE ROOM WITHIN CICV--AND THE BATHROOM--AND THAT WAS IT.

Q. WHAT WERE YOUR SECURITY CLEARANCES IN 1967 AND 1968?

A. I HAD A CIA TOP SECRET CLEARANCE THAT WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, A DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SECRET CLEARANCE, AND I HAD NUMEROUS COMPARTMENTALIZED CODE WORD INTELLIGENCE CLEARANCES AND WAS APPROVED TO SEE "EYES ONLY" MATERIAL RELATING TO VIETNAM AS WELL AS MATERIAL MARKED "SENSITIVE" REGARDING VIETNAM.

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM "SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE"?

A. BY "SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE," I'M REFERRING TO SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION METHODS TO WHICH NOT ALL PEOPLE WHO POSSESS A GIVEN CLEARANCE LEVEL HAVE ACCESS.

Q. DID YOU HAVE ACCESS TO SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 1967, 1968?

A. YES.

Q. MR. STUMPF, PLEASE READ PARAGRAPH 17 OF YOUR AFFIDAVIT OF APRIL 18, 1984 INTO THE RECORD.

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. "I HAVE SEEN THE CBS DOCUMENTARY, 'THE UNCOUNTED ENEMY: A VIETNAM DECEPTION'. BASED ON MY EXPERIENCES AS A VIETNAM ANALYST AT CIA, I FOUND THE BROADCAST TO BE ACCURATE IN
ITS DESCRIPTION OF THE MILITARY'S ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

CONTROVERSY WITH CIA IN 1967 AND 1968. DURING THAT PERIOD, I
CAME TO BELIEVE THAT MACV OFFICIALS INTENTIONALLY IGNORED AND
DISTORTED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ABOUT ENEMY STRENGTH TO GIVE
THE ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE REDUCING THE ENEMY'S
STRENGTH TO THE POINT THAT THE ENEMY WOULD SOON SUE FOR PEACE OR
GIVE UP. THE BROADCAST, THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF THE SEVERAL
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WHO APPEARED ON CAMERA TO ADMIT
THEIR PARTICIPATION IN OR KNOWLEDGE OF DISTORTIONS ON
INTELLIGENCE, CONFIRMED MY BELIEF."

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DID YOU BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND
ACCURATE AT THE TIME YOU SIGNED THIS AFFIDAVIT ON APRIL 18,
1984?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. I DID.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PARAGRAPH TO BE TRUE AND
ACCURATE TODAY?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

A. I DO.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. MR. STUMPF, HAVE YOU SEEN THE CBS BROADCAST, "THE
UNCOUNTED ENEMY: A VIETNAM DECEPTION"?

A. YES.
Q. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE BROADCAST?

MR. MURRY: OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THE QUESTION.

A. AS YOU CAN IMAGINE, IT WAS ONE OF TREMENDOUS INTEREST BECAUSE THIS IS AN AREA THAT TOOK UP SEVERAL YEARS OF MY LIFE IN WHICH I WAS INTIMATELY ASSOCIATED AND TO THIS DAY HAVE STRONG FEELINGS.

I WAS GREATLY PLEASED AND GRATIFIED THAT THE STORY OF THE MACV DISTORTIONS HAD FINALLY COME TO LIGHT IN THE MASS MEDIA AND THAT SAM HAD HAD A CHANCE TO -- BY "SAM," I'M REFERRING TO SAM ADAMS -- HAD A CHANCE TO TELL A VERY IMPORTANT STORY. I FELT THAT IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THIS TO COME TO LIGHT BECAUSE THERE IS A VITAL LESSON FOR US AS A PEOPLE TO TAKE FROM IT.

I FEEL THAT THROUGH A PERNICIOUS PROCESS THAT BEGAN WITH INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY, WE HAD A GROUP OF MILITARY PEOPLE WHO CAME OVER TIME TO BELIEVE THEIR OWN DISTORTIONS AND ADOPT AND PURSUE A STRATEGY THAT COULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL AND ENDED UP COSTING THIS COUNTRY A LOT OF YOUNG PEOPLE AND ITS HONOR.

AND I FEEL THAT IT'S A STORY THAT NEEDS TO BE TOLD AND RETOLD SO THAT OUR MILITARY PEOPLE AND OUR CIVILIAN PEOPLE, FOR THAT MATTER, DON'T EVER FALL INTO THIS TRAP AGAIN.

Q. YOU JUST TESTIFIED THAT THIS WAS A "VERY IMPORTANT STORY."

WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY "VERY IMPORTANT STORY"?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.
A. BY "IMPORTANT STORY," I MEAN THAT IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE BROADCAST THAT THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DISTORTED INTELLIGENCE WAS THE ADOPTION OF A FAULTED STRATEGY THAT COULD NOT HOPE TO SUCCEED.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. WHAT STRATEGY WAS THAT?

A. THAT WAS THE STRATEGY OF A WAR OF ATTRITION, THE STRATEGY OF TRYING TO MILITARILY OVERCOME THE INSURGENCY WITH AMERICAN TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

Q. BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCES AS A VIETNAM INTELLIGENCE ANALYST AT CIA, HAVE YOU FORMED AN OPINION AS TO WHETHER WE WERE WINNING THE WAR OF ATTRITION IN LATE 1967?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION.

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION?

A. I DO.

Q. PLEASE PROCEED.

A. I WANT TO BE EXACT IN MAKING MY ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION, MR. MASTRO. I'M NOT PREPARED TO SAY NOR DO I THINK ANYBODY HAS THE EVIDENCE TO SAY THAT IN ANY GIVEN MONTH THAT WE KILLED SLIGHTLY MORE -- KILLED AND REMOVED FROM BATTLE SLIGHTLY MORE OR LESS ENEMY SOLDIERS THAN IN THAT GIVEN MONTH THEY WERE ABLE TO RECRUIT OR INFILTRATE.

BUT IN A MORE MEANINGFUL CONTEXT, I BELIEVE THAT MY RESEARCH WAS ABLE TO SHOW THAT THE ENEMY SIDE ALWAYS HAD
CONTROL, IN FACT, NEARLY ALMOST TOTAL CONTROL OVER THE RATE AT
WHICH THEY TOOK CASUALTIES AND THE RATE AT WHICH THEY ENGAGED IN
BATTLE. AND BY DOING SO, THEY COULD GOVERN THE RATE AT WHICH
THEY PURSUED THE WAR ON THE MILITARY FRONT.

SIMILARLY, THEY HAD A GREAT DEAL OF CONTROL OVER
INFILTRATION AND RECRUITING.

FOR THIS REASON, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT WE EVER WERE
WINNING A WAR OF ATTRITION IN THAT, EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT
WE WERE ABLE TO START WEARING THEIR FORCES DOWN FOR A GIVEN
MONTH OR TWO, THE ENEMY ALWAYS HAD THE OPTION TO TURN THAT
AROUND ON US.

Q. YOU SAY HERE THAT IN 1967 AND 1968 YOU "CAME TO
BELIEVE THAT MACV OFFICIALS INTENTIONALLY IGNORED AND DISTORTED
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ABOUT ENEMY STRENGTH TO GIVE THE
ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE REDUCING THE ENEMY'S STRENGTH
TO THE POINT THAT THE ENEMY WOULD SOON SUE FOR PEACE OR GIVE
UP."

WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY "MACV OFFICIALS INTENTIONALLY
IGNORED AND DISTORTED INFORMATION ABOUT ENEMY STRENGTH"?

MR. MURRY: OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE QUESTION.

A. BASED ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM, MACV OFFICIALS
PERCEIVED THEMSELVES AS FIGHTING A WAR ON TWO FRONTS: ONE IN
VIETNAM, AND THE OTHER IN THE PRESS AND ON THE STREETS AND IN
THE CITIES IN THE U.S. WHERE THERE WAS TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION TO
THE WAR.
THE MACV PEOPLE IN MY VIEW FELL INTO THE TRAP OF
TRYING TO SEND BACK INFORMATION THAT SUPPORTED THEIR VIEW AND
MADE IT LOOK AS IF WE WERE WINNING THE WAR IN VIETNAM SO THAT
THEY COULD WIN THIS SECOND BATTLE, THE SECOND WAR THAT I HAVE
DESCRIBED FOR YOU.

THEN AFTER THAT, THEY FELL INTO THE WORST TRAP OF
ALL; THAT IS, THE TRAP OF BEGINNING TO BELIEVE IT THEMSELVES.

MR. MASTRO: I AM ABOUT TO CONCLUDE MY EXAMINATION,
BUT I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE A SHORT BREAK TO REVIEW MY NOTES. I
WILL ONLY BE TAKING A FEW MORE MINUTES, IF ANY MORE MINUTES, AND
THEN I WILL TURN THE QUESTIONING OVER TO MR. MURRY. SO,
MR. MURRY, YOU CAN PREPARE TO CONDUCT YOUR EXAMINATION WHILE WE
TAKE THIS SHORT BREAK.

MR. MURRY: I'M READY TO GO AT THE MOMENT YOU TURN
THE WITNESS OVER TO ME.

(RECESS)

BY MR. MASTRO:

Q. MR. STUMPF, WHERE ARE YOU CURRENTLY EMPLOYED?
A. G.A. TECHNOLOGIES.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR POSITION THERE?
A. I'M THE DIRECTOR OF PLANNING AND ECONOMICS.

Q. WHAT KIND OF A COMPANY IS G.A. TECHNOLOGIES?
A. G.A. TECHNOLOGIES IS A HIGH-TECHNOLOGY CONSULTING
AND PRODUCTS COMPANY.

Q. DOES G.A. TECHNOLOGIES DO ANY WORK WITH THE
GOVERNMENT?

A. YES. APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT OF OUR REVENUE IS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING. WE WORK WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.

MR. MASTRO: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. MR. STUMPF, I'M GOING TO BE CROSS-EXAMINING YOU ABOUT MATTERS YOU'VE TESTIFIED TO TODAY AND STATEMENTS YOU MADE IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT AND YOUR EXPERIENCES DURING YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE CIA.

IF YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND ANY OF MY QUESTIONS, PLEASE LET ME KNOW, AND I'LL BE HAPPY TO CLARIFY THEM FOR YOU.

THE FIRST THING I WANTED TO ASK YOU WAS: ARE YOU AWARE THAT THE LAWSUIT ABOUT WHICH YOU'RE TESTIFYING TODAY IS SCHEDULED TO GO TO TRIAL IN OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR?

A. YES, I AM.

Q. HAVE YOU BEEN ASKED TO APPEAR AS A WITNESS AT THAT TRIAL?

A. I HAVE NOT BEEN FORMALLY ASKED, BUT THE QUESTION OF MY AVAILABILITY HAS BEEN BROACHED TO ME BY ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANT.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR AVAILABILITY TO APPEAR AS A WITNESS AT THE TRIAL OF THIS LAWSUIT?
A. IT'S IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO ANSWER RIGHT NOW BECAUSE I'M NOT SURE WHETHER I WILL BE IN TOWN OR OUT OF TOWN AT THE TIME WHEN I WOULD BE CALLED TO TESTIFY.

I'M OCCASIONALLY REQUIRED TO TRAVEL ON BUSINESS AND TO ATTEND CRUCIAL MEETINGS HERE IN SAN DIEGO, AND I WOULD NEED TO COORDINATE MY AVAILABILITY WITH WHAT WAS GOING ON AT THE TRIAL. SO I'M NOT ABLE TO GUARANTEE MY ATTENDANCE.

Q. IF YOUR SCHEDULE PERMITTED YOU TO ATTEND THE TRIAL, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO APPEAR AS A WITNESS?

A. I WOULD.

Q. WE'VE BEEN DISCUSSING TODAY AN AFFIDAVIT THAT YOU SIGNED ON 18 APRIL 1984. COULD YOU TELL ME THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE AFFIDAVIT CAME TO BE EXECUTED BY YOU?

A. YES. SOME WEEKS BEFORE, MR. ADAMS AND MR. MASTRO WERE IN CONTACT WITH ME AND ASKED IF I WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPLY EVIDENCE AND DISCUSS MY EXPERIENCES DURING THE WAR THAT WOULD BE RELEVANT TO THIS CASE.

SUBSEQUENTLY, THESE TWO GENTLEMEN CAME TO SAN DIEGO AND MET WITH ME. WE TALKED IN MY OFFICE AND AT A LOCAL RESTAURANT FOR A NUMBER OF HOURS. I GAVE THEM THE INFORMATION THAT IS IN THE AFFIDAVIT BEFORE YOU, AND IN THE INTERIM THEY REDUCED IT TO A TYPE SCRIPT DRAFT.

SUBSEQUENTLY, I REVISED THAT DRAFT AND HAD IT RETYPED AND EXECUTED IT BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC HERE AT G.A.
Q. YOU SAY SOME WEEKS BEFORE THEY CONTACTED YOU. YOU MEAN SOME WEEKS BEFORE THE 18TH DAY OF APRIL, 1984?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WHEN THEY CONTACTED YOU, DID YOU CALL THEM OR DID THEY CALL YOU?
A. THEY CALLED ME.
Q. DO YOU KNOW HOW THEY OBTAINED YOUR CURRENT TELEPHONE NUMBER?
A. I DON'T KNOW HOW. I CAN ONLY SPECULATE THAT SAM ADAMS KNEW I WAS HERE IN THE SAN DIEGO AREA AND MADE USE OF A PHONE BOOK.
Q. DID YOU HAVE ONLY ONE MEETING WITH MR. MASTRO AND MR. ADAMS OR MORE THAN ONE PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION OF YOUR AFFIDAVIT?
A. I HAD ONE LONG MEETING WITH THEM.
Q. BETWEEN THE TIME THAT YOU SIGNED YOUR AFFIDAVIT AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF YOUR DEPOSITION THIS MORNING, HAVE YOU HAD ANY OTHER MEETINGS WITH MR. ADAMS?
A. YES. I MET BRIEFLY WITH MR. ADAMS MONDAY EVENING AT 4:00 P.M. OF THIS WEEK, AND I MET WITH MR. ADAMS YESTERDAY EVENING FOR DINNER.
Q. HAVE YOU HAD ANY TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. ADAMS BETWEEN THE TIME THAT YOU EXECUTED YOUR AFFIDAVIT AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS DEPOSITION TODAY?
A. NO.
Q. HAVE YOU HAD ANY MEETINGS WITH MR. MASTRO BETWEEN THE TIME THAT YOU EXECUTED YOUR AFFIDAVIT AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF YOUR DEPOSITION THIS MORNING?
A. YES, I HAVE, ON THOSE SAME TWO OCCASIONS I'VE JUST MENTIONED WITH MR. ADAMS.
Q. HAVE YOU HAD ANY OTHER CONTACTS EITHER BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON WITH MR. MASTRO OTHER THAN THE CONTACTS YOU'VE TESTIFIED TO?
A. NOT IN PERSON, BUT SEVERAL TIMES BY TELEPHONE ARRANGING MR. MASTRO'S VISIT OUT HERE, DISCUSSING THE RETURN OF MY EXECUTED AFFIDAVIT TO HIM, AND ALSO WITH RESPECT TO MY REQUEST THAT MR. MASTRO SUPPLY ME WITH CERTAIN OF THE FILINGS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE IN THIS CASE.
Q. WHAT FILINGS DID YOU ASK MR. MASTRO TO SUPPLY TO YOU?
A. I SPECIFICALLY ASKED TO SEE GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE. AND I WANTED TO SEE THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. I WANTED TO SEE A TRANSCRIPT -- WELL, THAT'S NOT A FILING. I WANTED TO SEE A TRANSCRIPT OF THE BROADCAST.
Q. DID YOU ASK FOR THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR WAS IT SUGGESTED TO YOU THAT YOU MIGHT WANT TO READ IT?
A. I ASKED FOR IT.
Q. HOW DID YOU KNOW A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAD
BEEN FILED?

A. I WAS TOLD BY MR. MASTRO.

Q. HAVE YOU EVER SPOKEN AT ANY TIME TO GENERAL WILLIAM WESTMORELAND?

A. NEVER.

Q. HAVE YOU EVER SPOKEN AT ANY TIME TO GENERAL PHILIP DAVIDSON?

A. NEVER.

Q. HAVE YOU EVER SPOKEN TO A COLONEL CHARLES MORRIS?

A. I CAN'T ANSWER YOUR QUESTION SURELY, MR. MURRY. IT'S CONCEIVABLE I COULD HAVE SPOKEN WITH HIM IN VIETNAM. THAT WOULD BE THE ONLY PLACE I COULD THINK OF.

IN VIETNAM I MET A NUMBER OF MILITARY OFFICERS. IT WAS A LONG TIME AGO, AND I SIMPLY DIDN'T KEEP NOTES OF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT I MET WITH AND DISCUSSED MATTERS.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC RECOLLECTION OF TALKING TO COLONEL CHARLES MORRIS?

A. NO. NO, SIR.

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHAT POSITION COLONEL MORRIS HELD IN MACV IN 1967 AND PART OF 1968?

A. FROM THE MATERIALS AND DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THIS CASE, I BELIEVE THAT COLONEL MORRIS WAS CONNECTED WITH MACV'S ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS GROUP.

Q. CAN YOU REMEMBER ANYTHING MORE SPECIFIC THAN THAT AS TO WHAT COLONEL MORRIS' POSITION WAS WITH MACV?
A. I COULD JUST GUESS. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE HEAD OF
OB STUDIES, BUT I FORGET, TO BE HONEST.

Q. NOW, A NUMBER OF TIMES TODAY YOU HAVE REFERRED TO
THE TERM "INTELLECTUAL HONESTY" AND "INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY."
I WANT TO ASK YOU: DO YOU CONSIDER INTELLECTUAL
HONESTY A GOOD THING?

A. I DO.

Q. AND DO YOU THINK INTELLECTUAL HONESTY IS A PRACTICE
THAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED IN THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS?

A. I DO.

Q. DO YOU THINK THAT INTELLECTUAL HONESTY IS A
PRACTICE THAT SHOULD BE ADHERED TO IN THE PREPARATION OF WRITTEN
STATEMENTS FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH LITIGATION?

A. I DO.

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM. OBJECTION.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT YOU HAD A RESPONSIBILITY AS AN
INDIVIDUAL TO BE INTELLECTUALLY HONEST IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT?

A. YES, I DO.

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE YOU HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY AS AN
INDIVIDUAL TO BE INTELLECTUALLY HONEST IN YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS
CASE?

A. YES, I DO.

Q. DO YOU THINK THAT IT IS INTELLECTUALLY HONEST TO
OVERSTATE THE STRENGTH OR VALIDITY OF A PROPOSITION?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM. OBJECTION.

A. I BELIEVE UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES IT COULD BE INTELLECTUALLY HONEST TO DO THAT IF IT WAS FOR THE SAKE OF EMPHASIS AND WAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE OVERSTATEMENT WAS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WOULD IT BE INTELLECTUALLY HONEST OR DISHONEST TO REPRESENT THAT AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS WAS BASED ON MORE SOLID EVIDENCE THAN IN FACT IT WAS BASED ON?

A. I THINK IT WOULD BE DISHONEST.

Q. LET ME ASK YOU TO LOOK AT YOUR AFFIDAVIT. I'D LIKE YOU TO REVIEW YOUR AFFIDAVIT AND TELL ME IF THERE IS ANYTHING IN THE AFFIDAVIT UPON REVIEW AND IN LIGHT OF OUR DISCUSSION TODAY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER PERHAPS AN OVERSTATEMENT.

A. I DON'T KNOW OF ANYTHING IN HERE THAT I BELIEVE TO BE AN OVERSTATEMENT.

Q. WELL, WOULD YOU LIKE TO REVIEW IT, JUST TO MAKE SURE?

A. SURELY.

I REVIEWED MY AFFIDAVIT, AND I DON'T SEE ANYTHING HERE THAT I BELIEVE TO BE AN OVERSTATEMENT.

Q. OKAY. WHEN DID YOU FIRST HEAR THE TERM "ORDER OF BATTLE"?
A. I can't precisely recall the time at which I first heard or became acquainted with the term. It may well have been in my early days as a soldier prior to joining CIA.

Q. Which branch of the service did you serve in?
A. The Army.

Q. When was that?
A. I was enlisted in the Army on 19 January 1964 in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Q. Did you ever serve in Vietnam in the Army?
A. No.

Q. Did you ever see combat duty in any place while you were a member of the United States Army?
A. No.

Q. When did you leave the reserves?
A. In January, 1970.

Q. Have you ever studied enemy order of battle pertaining to countries other than Vietnam?
A. I recall reading some things about German order of battle in World War II.

Q. Have you ever looked at the CIA order of battle on the forces of the Soviet Union?
A. I may have seen a few things in that regard in my years with CIA, but you must understand that intelligence operates on a compartmentalized system. Those who do not have a need to know certain information are on their honor not to avail
 THEMSELVES OF THAT INFORMATION.

Q. DID THE ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE THAT THE U.S. MAINTAINED WITH RESPECT TO THE GERMAN FORCES IN WORLD WAR II HAVE A CATEGORY FOR HOME GUARD ELEMENTS?

A. I SIMPLY DON'T KNOW, MR. MURRY.

Q. HAVE YOU EVER STUDIED ANY INSURGENCIES OR INSURGENT WARS OTHER THAN VIETNAM?

A. NOT IN GREAT DETAIL, BUT I'VE READ SOME THINGS ABOUT THE HUK INSURGENCE AND ABOUT THE INSURGENCY IN MALAYA.

Q. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE PERTAINING TO THE HUK REBELLION OR THE INSURGENCY IN MALAYA?

AND WHEN I SAY "ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE," I MEAN THE DOCUMENT ANALOGOUS TO THE MACV ORDER OF BATTLE THAT WAS KEPT ON THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES.

A. NO, SIR.

Q. COULD YOU DESCRIBE FOR ME IN DETAIL WHAT THE ENEMY FORCES THAT YOU REFERRED TO AS ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, WHAT THEY DID?

A. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS CARRIED ON A WIDE VARIETY OF FUNCTIONS. THESE INCLUDED: HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CARE, TRAINING; THEY SERVED AS ARMORERS; THEY SUPERVISED TRANSPORTATION BATTALIONS; THEY FURNISHED CLOTHING AND SUPPLIES. THEY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING RECORDS AND FILES; FINANCE FUNCTIONS, PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS; YOU KNOW, THESE AND THE NUMEROUS OTHER FRONT OFFICE AND BACK OFFICE AFFAIRS OF AN ARMY.
Q. WHAT KIND OF HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL FUNCTIONS DID PEOPLE WHO WERE INCLUDED IN YOUR DEFINITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS PERFORM?

A. WELL, THIS WOULD VARY AT THE LEVEL. LET'S MAKE MY ANSWER PERTAIN TO SOMETHING LIKE THE MILITARY REGION LEVEL. THIS WOULD ENTAIL TYPICALLY THE OPERATION OF A HOSPITAL: DOCTORS, SURGEONS, NURSES, PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR RUNNING AND CARING FOR THE HOSPITAL, PERFORMING MEDICAL TESTS. IT WOULD ALSO INCLUDE CERTAIN PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTING WOUNDED SOLDIERS FROM PROVINCE OR DISTRICT LEVEL UNITS THAT REQUIRED AND WERE LUCKY ENOUGH TO RECEIVE MEDICAL CARE AT A HIGHER LEVEL.

Q. IN OTHER WORDS, IT WOULD INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO WERE MORE OR LESS LIKE LAB TECHNICIANS IN ONE OF OUR HOSPITALS; IS THAT CORRECT?

A. I WOULD DOUBT THAT THEY'D HAVE LAB TECHNICIANS. BUT I WOULD INCLUDE VERY MUCH THE SAME SORT OF PEOPLE THAT WE HAVE IN THE U.S. ARMY MEDICAL CORPS AT, SAY, LIKE THE FIFTH FIELD HOSPITAL IN VIETNAM.

Q. AND YOU MENTIONED PEOPLE WHO WOULD GET WOUNDED NORTH VIETNAMESE OR VIET CONG TROOPS TO THE HOSPITAL. IS THAT ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING IT WOULD INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO WERE EFFECTIVELY AMBULANCE DRIVERS?

A. IT MAY POSSIBLY HAVE INCLUDED SOME OF THOSE PEOPLE; BUT VERY OFTEN PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTING WOUNDED
PEOPLE WERE CIVILIAN LABORERS, AND THEY WEREN'T INCLUDED IN THESE NUMBERS. LABORERS WERE OFTEN USED TO TRANSPORT WOUNDED PEOPLE BY THE ENEMY.

Q. YOU DID NOT INCLUDE CIVILIAN LABORERS IN THE DEFINITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES?
A. NO, SIR.

Q. WHY NOT?
A. BECAUSE CIVILIAN LABORERS ARE NOT TYPICALLY INCLUDED BY THE ENEMY IN THEIR DEFINITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.

AS FAR AS THE ENEMY WAS CONCERNED, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES WERE THE REGULAR FULL-TIME MILITARY PEOPLE. AND CIVILIAN LABORERS MIGHT BE JUST SOME GUY THAT THEY DRAGOONED OUT ON THE CROSSROADS AFTER A BATTLE TO HAUL AWAY SOME WOUNDED PEOPLE OR SOME PEOPLE THAT WERE SCROUNGED UP FROM A HUT AT NIGHT TO MOVE RICE FROM HAMLET A TO HAMLET B.

A. YES, I THINK SO, AND ALSO AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL. THE TYPES OF SERVICES THAT WERE PROVIDED AT THE SUBREGION, REGION AND FRONT LEVEL WOULD BE MORE COMPREHENSIVE THAN THOSE
THAT WOULD BE PROVIDED AT, SAY, THE DISTRICT LEVEL, TO DRAW THE
DISTINCTION MORE SHARPLY FOR YOU.
FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL THERE WOULD BE
NO HOSPITAL AND NO DOCTOR.
Q. NOW, IS IT CORRECT THAT THE VIET CONG HAD DIVIDED
SOUTH VIETNAM INTO THEIR OWN DESIGNATIONS OF PROVINCES?
A. GENERALLY SO, YES. THESE PROVINCES TENDED TO
FOLLOW THE OLD SORT OF FRENCH SYSTEM OF PROVINCES AND REGIONS
RATHER THAN THE CHANGES THAT WERE LATER MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF VIETNAM.
Q. THESE PROVINCES WERE SUBORDINATE TO MILITARY
REGIONS?
A. YES, AND THEN ALSO FRONTS.
Q. YES.
THE MILITARY REGIONS, WERE THEY SUBORDINATE TO
FRONTS OR SUBFRONTS?
A. TO BE CANDID, I'VE NEVER BEEN ENTIRELY SURE ON THAT
POINT. I THINK IN SOME CASES YES, AND IN SOME CASES NOT
NECESSARILY SO.
Q. LET US TAKE A HYPOTHETICAL ENEMY UNIT, THE SEVENTH
VC REGIMENT.
WOULD THAT REGIMENT BE SUBORDINATE TO A PROVINCIAL
HEADQUARTERS AND IN TURN ALSO RESPONSIVE TO MILITARY REGION
HEADQUARTERS WHEN THE MILITARY REGION ENCOMPASSED THE PARTICULAR
PROVINCE IN WHICH THE REGIMENT OPERATED?
MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. AGAIN, IT'S A LITTLE BIT HARD TO ANSWER A NONSPECIFIC EXAMPLE LIKE THIS. A VC REGIMENT WOULD BE A VERY LARGE SIZE UNIT AND TYPICALLY, YOU KNOW, WOULD NOT BE SUBORDINATE TO A PROVINCIAL AUTHORITY, ALTHOUGH SOME PROVINCES DID HAVE REGIMENTS. BINH DINH, FOR EXAMPLE HAD A DIVISION. BUT MORE TYPICALLY, A REGIMENT WOULD BE REPORTING TO A FRONT-TYPE ORGANIZATION.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. LET ME TRY IT THIS WAY: LET US TAKE A VIET CONG BATTALION.

TYPICALLY, WOULD THAT BATTALION BE SUBORDINATE TO A GIVEN VC REGIMENT?

A. IN THE MAIN FORCE CONTEXT, YES. IF IT WERE A PROVINCIAL BATTALION, IT MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY BE A PART OF A REGIMENT.

Q. IT MIGHT BE AN INDEPENDENT BATTALION?

A. YES, SIR.

Q. IF A GIVEN VC BATTALION WERE SUBORDINATE TO A REGIMENT, THAT BATTALION WOULD HAVE A LINE OF COMMAND TO A PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS AND EFFECTIVELY TO A MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS AS WELL; IS THAT CORRECT?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. IT COULD. BUT, AGAIN, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT, YOU KNOW, A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE HERE. AND IT WOULD -- YOU KNOW, TO
BE ENTIRELY CLEAR ON THE POINT, WE WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT SOME
SPECIFIC UNITS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THESE UNITS TO SPEAK TO THE
POINT PRECISELY.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WELL, WOULD A VC BATTALION THAT WAS SUBORDINATE TO
A VC REGIMENT TYPICALLY HAVE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WITH BOTH
PROVINCIAL AND MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS?

A. INDIRECTLY, YES, BUT NOT DIRECTLY. ONE WOULD BE IN
THE ADMIN. SERVICES CONTEXT; ONE WOULD BE SERVED ONE WAY, AND
THE OTHER WOULD BE SERVED THE OTHER WAY. THEY WOULDN'T GET
SERVICE FROM TWO LEVELS.

Q. SO THAT THERE WOULD BE CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICE FUNCTIONS THAT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AT THE BATTALION
LEVEL, THE PROVINCE LEVEL, AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE
FUNCTIONS THAT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AT THE REGIMENTAL LEVEL; IS
THAT CORRECT?

A. AT THE PROVINCE LEVEL OR AT THE SUBREGION OR REGION
OR FRONT LEVEL, YES.

I'M JUST MAINLY MAKING THE POINT THAT INDIVIDUAL
UNITS LOOK TO INDIVIDUAL ADMIN. SERVICE GROUPS FOR SUPPORT. AND
IN FACT—BY WAY OF COMMENT—IT WAS — IF YOU HAPPENED TO BE A
DISTRICT OR PROVINCE LEVEL SOLDIER OR A VILLAGE LEVEL GUERILLA
AND YOU BECAME WOUNDED, YOUR CHANCES FOR GOING TO A FRONT
HOSPITAL WERE NOT GENERALLY GOOD BECAUSE YOU WERE NOT PART OF
THAT PARTICULAR ADMIN. SERVICE CHAIN OF COMMAND.
Q. WERE ANY ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE PERSONNEL PART OF THE VIET CONG POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?
A. IT'S POSSIBLE THAT SOME MAY HAVE BEEN. IN FACT, IT'S ALMOST A CERTAINTY THAT SOME MAY HAVE BEEN, BUT NOT MANY. THE ADMIN. SERVICE PEOPLE WERE, YOU KNOW, IN EFFECT HAD A FULL-TIME JOB, AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE PEOPLE HAD ANOTHER SET OF FULL-TIME JOBS.

I'M SURE IN SOME OF THE WEAKER AREAS THERE POSSIBLY WOULD HAVE BEEN SOME DOUBLE-HATTING, BUT GENERALLY SPEAKING NOT.

Q. ISN'T IT TRUE, SIR, THAT MACV INCLUDED ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOUTH VIETNAM WITHIN THEIR DEFINITION OF VIET CONG POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?
MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.
A. I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. ISN'T IT TRUE THAT YOU STATED IN 1968 THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE PERSONNEL WERE COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS?
A. YES, I SAID THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF THE ADMIN. SERVICE PEOPLE WERE PARTY MEMBERS.

Q. ISN'T IT ALSO TRUE THAT AT LEAST FROM TIME TO TIME VIET CONG WHO WERE SERVING IN, LET US SAY, THE POLITICAL CATEGORY WOULD ASSUME A JOB IN THE MORE TRADITIONAL MILITARY CATEGORIES, SUCH AS ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE?
MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.
A. AS I'VE SAID, THAT MAY OCCASIONALLY HAVE HAPPENED. BUT TO CLARIFY MATTERS, FIRST, BEING A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN A COMMUNIST CONTEXT DOES NOT REALLY MAKE YOU A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. IT JUST MAKES YOU A MEMBER OF A SPECIAL ELITE THAT'S ACCEPTED.

COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS CAN BE IN THE MANEUVER BATTALIONS; THEY CAN BE IN THE ADMIN. SERVICES; THEY CAN BE IN THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. CERTAINLY, NOT EVERYBODY IN THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WAS A COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER. I WOULD WAGER IT WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN HALF.

PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND INFRASTRUCTURE DON'T MEAN THE SAME THING.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WELL, NOW I'M CURIOUS TO KNOW HOW YOU DEFINE THE TERM "INFRASTRUCTURE" SINCE YOU SAY THAT NOT EVERYBODY IN THE VIET CONG POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WAS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

A. THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, AS I UNDERSTOOD AND USED THE TERM WHEN I WAS AN ANALYST AT CIA, RELATES TO THE SHADOW GOVERNMENT THAT THE VIET CONG HAD FOR SOUTH VIETNAM. THEY HAD PROVINCE CHIEFS AND DISTRICT CHIEFS AND POLITICAL OFFICERS AND JUST A WHOLE GOVERNMENT APPARATUS: TAX COLLECTORS, PEOPLE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROPAGANDIZING, PEOPLE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAINING, PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PROSELYTIZING. THERE WAS A WHOLE -- I
MEAN THERE WERE A LOT OF THESE PEOPLE. AND THAT WAS ENTIRELY 
DIFFERENT FROM THE MILITARY STRUCTURE, AND NOT ALL OF THESE 
PEOPLE WERE PARTY MEMBERS.

Q. YOU SAID IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT THAT THE DRAFT WORKING 
PAPER THAT IS ATTACHED AS EXHIBIT A TO YOUR AFFIDAVIT BECAME THE 
CIA POSITION AT THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE; IS 
THAT CORRECT?

A. YES, SIR.

Q. I'D LIKE YOU TO LOOK AT THE DRAFT WORKING PAPER, 
AND I WANT TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT IT:

I'D LIKE YOU TO LOOK AT PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE DRAFT 
WORKING PAPER. YOU SAY THAT THERE'S BEEN A REVIEW OF CAPTURED 
DOCUMENTS FROM 29 OF THE 225 VC DISTRICTS AND 5 OF THE 33 VC 
PROVINCES "WHICH GIVE COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
PERSONNEL AND INFANTRY-TYPE UNITS."

A. YES.

Q. YOU SAY BASED ON THIS, "WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO 
ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS A RATIO OF ABOUT ONE TO ONE BETWEEN 
THESE TWO PERSONNEL CATEGORIES AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL AND A 
SLIGHTLY LOWER RATIO IN FAVOR OF INFANTRY AT THE PROVINCE 
LEVEL."

DO YOU SEE THAT, SIR?

A. UM-HUM.

Q. WHEN YOU SAY THAT THESE DOCUMENTS GAVE COMPARATIVE 
STRENGTHS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND INFANTRY-TYPE UNITS,
DID YOU MEAN TO SAY THAT IN A SINGLE DOCUMENT THERE WAS A
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE STRENGTH FOR A PARTICULAR
UNIT AND THE INFANTRY STRENGTH OF THE PARTICULAR UNIT, OR DID
YOU MEAN TO SAY THAT THERE WAS A FIGURE FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICE UNIT AND ALSO THERE WERE FIGURES FOR INFANTRY-TYPE
UNITS?

MR. MASTRO: I WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY ONE THING FOR
THE RECORD. THE DOCUMENT ACTUALLY SAYS THERE ARE "COMPARATIVE
STRENGTHS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE PERSONNEL." MR. MURRY
FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO "ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL," AND THE
DOCUMENT STATES "ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE PERSONNEL."

MR. MURRY: I MEANT TO SAY "ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE
PERSONNEL." IT WAS INADVERTENT.

MR. MASTRO: I OBJECT TO THE FORM.

A. THE PROBLEM I HAVE GIVING YOU AN ANSWER IS REALLY
THE PASSAGE OF TIME HERE, 17 YEARS. AND I JUST CAN'T REMEMBER
TO THE EXTENT THE SAME DOCUMENTS HAD SAME MANEUVER STRENGTH AND
ADMIN. SERVICE STRENGTH IN THEM.

THERE MAY HAVE BEEN TWO DOCUMENTS CAPTURED AT THE
SAME PLACE AND TIME THAT HAD THAT. TO GIVE YOU A FAIR ANSWER, I
WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK AND RECOVER THIS DATA BASE AND LOOK AT IT.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. DID IT SURPRISE YOU, IF YOU CAN RECALL, THAT THERE
WAS A SLIGHTLY LOWER RATIO IN FAVOR OF INFANTRY BETWEEN
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE AND INFANTRY TROOPS AT THE PROVINCE LEVEL
1 THAN THERE WAS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL?
2
3 MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM.
4
5 A. IT MAY SEEM SLIGHTLY ANOMALOUS, AND IT MAY IN FACT
6 BE. BUT IF YOU LOOK AT THE ACTUAL FIGURES FOR EACH OF THE
7 DISTRICTS AND PROVINCES IN QUESTION, YOU SEE THAT THE DIFFERENCE
8 HERE IS PROBABLY NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT.
9
10 SO ONE A LITTLE ABOVE AND ONE A LITTLE BIT BELOW
11 MAY NOT BE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT.
12
13 I'M SURE I WOULD HAVE TESTED IT AT THE TIME. AND I
14 DON'T HAVE A COMPUTER HERE IN THE ROOM TO CHECK IT, BUT I WOULD
15 GUESS THAT THAT'S THE CASE.
16
17 BY MR. MURRY:
18
19 Q. WHY MIGHT IT SEEM SLIGHTLY ANOMALOUS FOR THE
20 DISTRICT LEVEL RATIO BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE AND MANEUVER
21 TROOPS TO BE A SLIGHTLY LOWER RATIO THAN -- I'M SORRY.
22 WHY WOULD IT SEEM SLIGHTLY ANOMALOUS FOR THE RATIO
23 BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE AND MANEUVER TROOPS AT THE
24 PROVINCE LEVEL TO BE SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN THE RATIO FOR THE
25 DISTRICT LEVEL?
26
27 MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM.
28
29 A. IT WOULD BE BECAUSE I WOULD NORMALLY EXPECT
30 SOMETHING MORE SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED AT THE PROVINCE LEVEL, BUT
31 I WOULDN'T EXPECT THERE TO BE GREATLY MORE SERVICES THERE.
32 WHAT I'M REALLY SAYING HERE IS: I DON'T THINK WE
33 HAVE SOMETHING WHICH IS STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT.