MR. MURRY: LET'S GO OFF.
(RECESS)

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. MR. STUMPF, HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE DOCUMENT AND THE PARAGRAPH OF THE DOCUMENT THAT I PUT IN FRONT OF YOU PRIOR TO THE BREAK?
A. YES, I'VE REVIEWED THE PARAGRAPH ON PAGE B 296, THIS PARAGRAPH SUB B RELATIVE TO ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FORCES. I HAVE NOT REVIEWED ANY OTHER PARTS OF THE DOCUMENT.

Q. NOW, IN SUBPARAGRAPH B DEALING WITH ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, THERE IS A DISCUSSION OF YOUR ESTIMATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, IS THERE NOT?
A. THERE IS.

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. AND IS IT YOUR TESTIMONY THAT DURING THE APRIL, 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE THE MACV DELEGATION ADVANCED NONE OF THE ARGUMENT SET FORTH IN SUBPARAGRAPH B IN DISCUSSING YOUR ESTIMATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES?
A. MY TESTIMONY IS AT THAT CONFERENCE WHILE I WAS IN THE ROOM COLONEL GRAHAM DID NOT ADVANCE ANY OF THESE POINTS OTHER THAN SIMPLY REPEAT HIS ESTIMATE.

Q. YOU SAID EARLIER IN DISCUSSING THIS 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE THAT YOU FELT THAT GRAHAM IN YOUR VIEW WASN'T AT THE CONFERENCE TO DETERMINE THE NUMBERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICE TROOPS BUT ONLY TO DEFEND HIS ESTIMATE OR MACV'S ESTIMATE.

A. YES.

Q. IS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT?

A. THAT'S SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT.

Q. NOW, ISN'T IT TRUE THAT IN CALLING THE CONFERENCE CIA HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THAT A REEVALUATION OF THE FIGURE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES WAS IN ORDER?

A. YES.

Q. ISN'T IT ALSO TRUE THAT THE MACV POSITION WAS THAT THE MACV FIGURES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES WERE SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT?

A. YES.

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. AND ISN'T IT ALSO TRUE THAT IN SUBSTANCE MACV'S POSITION WAS THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS BECAUSE THEY ALREADY IN THEIR VIEW HAD THE RIGHT NUMBER FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. I BELIEVE THE REASON WHY DANIEL GRAHAM DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THEIR ESTIMATE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS WAS HE REALIZED THE DISCUSSION WOULD BE EMBARRASSING AND WOULD BE QUICKLY SUBJECT TO CRITICISM THERE IN THE MEETING, MUCH AS THE DISCUSSION HERE IN THIS PARAGRAPH YOU'VE GIVEN ME CAN EASILY BE
TORN APART.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. SIR, DON'T YOU THINK THAT A SOPHISTICATED ANALYST
COULD ALSO FIND FAULT WITH VARIOUS ASPECTS OF YOUR ESTIMATE?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM. OBJECTION.

A. I BELIEVE THAT A SOPHISTICATED ANALYST WOULD FIND
MUCH MORE FAULT WITH MACV'S ANALYSIS OR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ANY
INFORMATION AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDE THIS PARAGRAPH HERE
THAN THEY WOULD FIND FAULT WITH THE SEVEN-PAGE DOCUMENTATION
THAT I PUT FORWARD.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WELL, YOU MAY THINK THAT, BUT I'D LIKE TO FIND OUT
FROM YOU IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION WHETHER AN ANALYST COULD
FIND BASES FOR CRITICIZING YOUR ESTIMATE AS WELL.

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM. OBJECTION. ASKED
AND ANSWERED.

A. ANY ANALYST CAN CRITICIZE ANY OTHER ANALYST'S PIECE
OF WORK.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT ARGUMENTS OR EVIDENCE WERE
PRESENTED BY THE MACV DELEGATION PERTAINING TO ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES AFTER YOU LEFT THE DISCUSSION, DO YOU?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. I'M NOT AWARE THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AFTER I LEFT THE MEETING. I BELIEVE
1 THAT IF THERE HAD BEEN, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN RECOUNTED TO ME.
2 BY MR. MURRY:
3 Q. AND YOU DON'T KNOW ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WHY GENERAL
4 GRAHAM SAID OR DID ANYTHING AT THE 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE
5 CONFERENCE, DO YOU, SIR?
6 MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.
7 A. THE PURPOSE OF THE SPRING 1968 ORDER OF BATTLE
8 CONFERENCE WAS FOR THE VARIOUS SIDES TO LAY OUT THEIR EVIDENCE
9 AND WORK AND COMPARE IT AND MEET TOGETHER AND SEE IF THERE WAS A
10 REASON TO CHANGE THE ORDER OF BATTLE. I CAME INTO THAT ROOM AND
11 DID THAT; GENERAL GRAHAM DID NOT.
12 BY MR. MURRY:
13 Q. YOU TESTIFIED EARLIER THAT YOUR ONE TO ONE RATIO
14 WAS BASED ON A GREAT NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS. DO YOU RECALL THAT?
15 A. I BELIEVE THE NUMBERS OF DOCUMENTS ARE LISTED IN MY
16 AFFIDAVIT, BOTH AT THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVEL.
17 Q. IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT OR DRAFT WORKING PAPER?
18 A. THE DRAFT WORKING PAPER ATTACHED TO THE AFFIDAVIT.
19 Q. AND THE NUMBERS THAT YOU WERE REFERRING TO ARE IN
20 PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE DRAFT WORKING PAPER?
21 A. YES.
22 Q. THAT'S 29 OF THE 225 VC DISTRICTS AND 5 OF THE 33
23 VC PROVINCES?
24 A. CORRECT.
25 MR. MASTRO: I HAVE TO OBJECT TO THE FORM OF THAT.
THE DOCUMENT SAYS "A REVIEW OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS FROM 29 OF THE 225 VC DISTRICTS AND 5 OF THE 33 VC PROVINCES," NOT 29 DOCUMENTS AND 5 DOCUMENTS.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. NOW, YOU SAID THAT THE ESTIMATE YOU PROVIDED AT THE 1968 CONFERENCE WAS BASED IN LARGE MEASURE ON MR. ADAMS' WORK ON THIS SUBJECT. IS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT?

A. MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

YES.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. DID MR. ADAMS TELL YOU AT ANY TIME THAT HE CONSIDERED HIS ESTIMATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TROOPS TO BE LARGELY A GUESS?

A. NO.

Q. HE NEVER INFORMED YOU THAT AT ANY TIME HE HELD THAT VIEW?

A. I DON'T RECALL MR. ADAMS CHARACTERIZING HIS ESTIMATE AS A GUESS.

AS YOU CAN SEE, MR. ADAMS HAS A METHODOLOGY HERE WHICH SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

Q. IF MR. ADAMS BELIEVED AT SOME POINT THAT HIS METHODOLOGY OR HIS ESTIMATE, I SHOULD SAY, FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES WAS LARGELY A GUESS, IS THAT SOMETHING YOU WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE KNOWN IN 1968?

A. MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.
A. THE USE OF THE WORD "GUESS" IS A LABEL. I CAN IMAGINE AN ANALYST AT THE TIME CHARACTERIZING SOMETHING AS A GUESS WHEN HE MEANT ESTIMATE.

I PRESENTED THIS PAPER TO THE OB GROUP, AND I PRESENTED IT AND PUT MY OWN PERSONAL REPUTATION BEHIND IT. I REVIEWED THE EVIDENCE. IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT ANYBODY ELSE MAY WANT TO SAY IN CHARACTERIZING IT, IT IS NOT A GUESS. IT'S A PIECE OF FAIRLY GOOD INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WHY MIGHT AN ANALYST CHARACTERIZE SOMETHING AS A GUESS WHEN, AS YOU SAY, HE MEANT ESTIMATE?

A. PERHAPS JOCULAR SHORTHAND FOR AN ESTIMATE. I'M SURE THAT ATTORNEYS HAVE, YOU KNOW, OCCASIONAL BANTER AMONG THEMSELVES TO REFER TO WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS IN SIMILAR MANNERS.

Q. WELL, TO REFER TO A PIECE OF ANALYSIS AS A GUESS TO A FELLOW ANALYST AND REFER TO IT AS AN ESTIMATE IN AN ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCE, DOES THAT STRIKE YOU AS INTELLECTUALLY DISHONEST?

A. NO.

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. OFTEN TIMES ANALYSTS USE THE TERM "OUR BEST GUESS ANALYSIS." THIS DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THEY'RE MAKING A GUESS OR A SHOT IN THE DARK AT SOMETHING. IT MEANS THAT IT'S THEIR MOST -- IT'S THEIR MOST
RECENT JUDGMENT. IT REPRESENTS THEIR BEST THINKING.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. BUT THE WORD "GUESS" ON ITS FACE COULD ALSO MEAN JUST WHAT THE WORD MEANS IN COMMON USAGE, THAT IT'S NOT AN ESTIMATE AT ALL, BUT IT'S A GUESS; ISN'T THAT TRUE, SIR?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. WE'RE HAVING SOMEWHAT OF A HYPOTHETICAL DISCUSSION HERE. I'M BEING ASKED TO REACT TO WHAT SOMEONE MIGHT HAVE SAID ABOUT A PIECE OF ANALYSIS.

I CAN TELL YOU WHAT I THINK OF THE ANALYSIS. IT'S NOT A GUESS. IT'S A PIECE OF -- I THINK I CHARACTERIZE IT HERE AS A SOUND AND CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE.

OTHER INDIVIDUALS MAY HAVE USED OTHER CHARACTERIZATIONS. I CAN TELL YOU MINE.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WELL, THE QUESTION I ASKED, AND WE GOT A LITTLE BIT DIVERTED WAS: IN 1968 WOULD YOU HAVE LIKED TO HAVE KNOWN IF MR. ADAMS HAD CHARACTERIZED HIS ESTIMATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AS LARGELY A GUESS?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. IT WOULDN'T HAVE MADE ANY DIFFERENCE TO ME ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. LET ME ASK YOU TO LOOK AT PARAGRAPH 7 OF YOUR DRAFT WORKING PAPER.
DO YOU SEE THERE AT PARAGRAPH 7 WHICH SAYS, "THE
PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR ESTIMATES AND THE
MACV ESTIMATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE STRENGTH LIES IN OUR
DIFFERING ASSESSMENTS OF THE CHARACTER OF THESE FORCES. WE
BELIEVE THEM TO BE PRIMARILY FULL-TIME, SKILLED, PROFESSIONAL
SOLDIERS. MACV TENDS TO DISMISS LARGE NUMBERS OF THEM AS
PART-TIME OR INEFFECTIVE PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, MACV HAS NOT
YET INCLUDED ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES SUBORDINATE TO CERTAIN
SUBREGIONS AND FRONTS IN ITS ESTIMATES."

DO YOU SEE THAT, SIR?

A. YES.

Q. DID YOU THINK IT WAS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE YOUR
BELIEF THAT ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE PERSONNEL WERE IN YOUR VIEW
"PRIMARILY FULL-TIME, SKILLED, PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS"?

A. YES.

Q. WHY IS IT SIGNIFICANT IN YOUR VIEW WHETHER
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE PERSONNEL ARE PRIMARILY FULL-TIME,
SKILLED, PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS IF THAT'S THE CASE?

A. IN THE ONGOING ORDER OF BATTLE CONTROVERSY WITH
MACV, MACV FREQUENTLY GAVE AS ITS REASON FOR NOT INCLUDING
PEOPLE IN THE ORDER OF BATTLE THE ARGUMENT THAT THESE PEOPLE
WERE NOT FULL TIME, WERE NOT SERIOUS, DIDN'T WEAR UNIFORMS, OR
WERE OTHERWISE INEFFECTIVE.

I WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR HERE THAT THE ADMIN.
SERVICES ESTIMATE WE WERE MAKING WAS FOR FULL-TIME EFFECTIVE
Q. LET ME ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR TRIP TO SAIGON.

IS IT ACCURATE THAT YOU DID NOT PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE IN THE ORDER OF BATTLE CONFERENCES PERTAINING TO SNIE 14.367 WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE SUMMER AND EARLY FALL OF 1967?

A. YES.

Q. AND YOU ARRIVED IN VIETNAM IN DECEMBER OF 1967; IS THAT CORRECT?

A. YES.

Q. DO YOU REMEMBER APPROXIMATELY WHEN YOU FIRST DISCUSSED WITH YOUR SUPERIORS THE IDEA OF YOU GOING TO VIETNAM?

A. NOT EXACTLY. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TWO OR THREE MONTHS, AT LEAST, EARLIER THAN THE TIME I LEFT.

Q. SO IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE EARLIEST SEPTEMBER OF 1967?

A. POSSIBLY, THOUGH I CAN'T BE SURE.

Q. WOULD IT HAVE BEEN ANY EARLIER THAN THAT?

A. POSSIBLY.

Q. YOU SAID THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF YOUR VISIT WAS TO INSPECT THE CICV FILES; IS THAT CORRECT?

A. YES, THAT WAS ONE OF THE PURPOSES I ENUMERATED.

Q. YOU SAY YOU RECALLED AN ANALYST NAMED MICHAEL FRABONI?
A. YES.

Q. I BELIEVE YOU SAY IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT THAT THERE WERE OTHER CICV ANALYSTS THAT YOU TALKED TO.

A. YES.

Q. WERE THESE ANALYSTS RECRUITMENT ANALYSTS?

A. I RECALL THAT TWO OF THEM WORKED ON RECRUITMENT AND HAD OTHER DUTIES AS WELL. I HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER CICV ANALYSTS WITH OTHER ORDER-OF-BATTLE-RELATED ASSIGNMENTS.

Q. THESE TWO ANALYSTS THAT YOU SAY WORKED ON RECRUITMENT, THEY WERE IN ADDITION TO MR. FRABONI?

A. YES.

Q. WHAT WAS THEIR WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH MR. FRABONI? WERE THEY SUBORDINATE TO HIM? SUPERIOR TO HIM?

A. MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT THEY WERE ALL ENLISTED MEN AND REGARDED MR. FRABONI AS A PEER.

Q. WERE THESE OTHER ANALYSTS THAT YOU SAY YOU TALKED TO ALSO PART OF THE SAME UNIT THAT MR. FRABONI WAS ASSIGNED TO WITHIN CICV?

A. I CAN'T SAY THAT FOR SURE, MR. MURRY. THEY APPEARED TO BE WORKING AT THE SAME SORT OF TASKS SIDE BY SIDE WITH MR. FRABONI.


I'D ASK YOU TO LOOK AT PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE AFFIDAVIT. READ ANY OTHER PART OF THE AFFIDAVIT THAT YOU LIKE,
BUT I HAVE A QUESTION ABOUT PARAGRAPH 3.

MR. MASTRO: PLEASE FEEL FREE TO READ AS MUCH OR AS LITTLE OF THE AFFIDAVIT AS YOU FEEL NECESSARY. IT IS A SHORT AFFIDAVIT.

A. I'VE READ THE AFFIDAVIT.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. TURNING TO PARAGRAPH 3, DO YOU SEE WHERE MR. FRABONI SAYS—I THINK IT'S THE NEXT TO THE LAST SENTENCE, I'M SORRY, IT'S TWO SENTENCES FROM THE END—"I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANYONE ELSE AT MACV INTELLIGENCE WHO WAS WORKING PRIMARILY ON ENEMY RECRUITMENT"?

A. YES.

Q. IS MR. FRABONI'S RECOLLECTION ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING. I RECALL THAT MR. FRABONI, AS I PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED, WAS ON OUT-OF-COUNTRY R&R AT THE TIME I ARRIVED, AND I WOULD ASSUME THAT HIS DUTIES WERE BEING PICKED UP AND DISCHARGED BY OTHERS.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WHAT ABOUT AFTER MR. FRABONI RETURNED FROM R&R?

A. I CAN'T SPECIFICALLY RECALL WHETHER THE INDIVIDUALS THAT I HAD TALKED TO EARLIER CONTINUED TO WORK ON RECRUITMENT WORKED ON OTHER DUTIES. I NOTICE SOME OTHER NAMES IN HERE THAT DO SEEM FAMILIAR TO ME. THESE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THE
I'm talking about these individuals who mentioned they had their numbers reduced by MACV, Mr. MacArthur and Mr. Gattozzi.

Q. Do you know what estimates, if any, Mr. Gattozzi produced?

A. Not specifically, no.

Q. It doesn't say that they had their estimates reduced. It says MACV command "seemed to be arbitrarily cutting their estimates of enemy strength and infiltration;" isn't that correct?

A. Yes, it does, but I regard that as reduced.

I recall from my own discussions with these people they told me that the reductions to their numbers were arbitrary and that when they asked about the reason for them, no reason was given other than that they were command decisions to change the numbers.

Moreover, it's clear from the context of all of Mr. Fraboni's affidavit here—which appears to be a very damaging one for the plaintiff—that he says that numbers were being quoted for recruitment back to Washington that were for periods of quarters and expressed reductions by late 1967 from 7,000 to 3- to 4,000 per month that he hadn't done and that, in fact, he believes was erroneous, and he was the only person supposedly working on recruitment.

Q. He says he was the only person working on
RECRUITMENT, BUT YOU TESTIFIED THERE WERE OTHER PEOPLE WORKING
ON RECRUITMENT.

MR. MASTRO: I HAVE TO OBJECT. IT SAYS
"PRIMARILY."

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. FINE. HE SAYS HE WAS THE ONLY PERSON WORKING
PRIMARILY WORKING ON RECRUITMENT, BUT YOU TESTIFIED THERE WERE
OTHER PEOPLE.

A. BUT THESE PEOPLE WORKED SIDE BY SIDE WITH
MR. FRABONI. I ASSUME IF THEY WERE MAKING ESTIMATES,
MR. FRABONI WOULD KNOW ABOUT IT. THESE PEOPLE'S DESKS ABUTTED
RIGHT NEXT TO EACH OTHER, AND THEY ALL WORKED TOGETHER AND HAD A
FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP.

Q. NOW, YOU TESTIFIED I THINK THAT THE MACV
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING RECRUITMENT WAS TO TAKE REPORTS FROM
DISTRICT AND PROVINCE ADVISORS AND ADD THEM UP?

A. THAT'S CORRECT.

Q. AS FAR AS YOU COULD ASCERTAIN, THESE ADVISORS DID
SEND IN REPORTS, DID THEY NOT?

A. IN MOST CASES, YES, AS FAR AS I COULD ASCERTAIN.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. IF YOUR RECOLLECTION IS ACCURATE, SIR, DO YOU KNOW
WHY MR. FRABONI SAID HERE IN PARAGRAPH 4 THAT "AT ONE POINT WE
SENT OUT A QUESTIONNAIRE TO FIELD OFFICERS ASKING THEM TO
ESTIMATE THE LEVELS OF ENEMY RECRUITMENT IN THEIR DISTRICTS. MOST OF THOSE QUESTIONED EITHER IGNORED OUR INQUIRY OR RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO TELL."

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT THERE WAS MORE THAN ONE POLLING OF THE DISTRICT AND PROVINCE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORS AND THAT THESE PEOPLE WHO MAY THE FIRST TIME AROUND HAVE TRIED TO PASS WERE ORDERED TO RESPOND AND IN FACT DID.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. YOU SAID EARLIER THAT SOME DISTRICT ADVISORS THAT YOU TALKED TO WERE ANGRY BECAUSE YOU SAID THEIR NUMBERS HAD BEEN REDUCED.

A. YES, SIR.

Q. YOU ALSO TESTIFIED EARLIER, AND LET ME INSTEAD GO TO YOUR AFFIDAVIT PARAGRAPH 7.

YOU SAY IN PARAGRAPH 7, DO YOU NOT, THAT YOU FOUND THAT THE QUALITY OF THE MACV FIELD ESTIMATES FOR RECRUITMENT VARIED WIDELY?

A. YES.

Q. YOU FOUND THAT TO BE THE CASE, DID YOU NOT?

A. YES.

Q. I THINK YOU TESTIFIED EARLIER THAT SOME OF THE ADVISORS SENT IN NUMBERS THAT WERE RELATIVELY RELIABLE, SOME ESTIMATES BY THE ADVISORS WERE NOT SO RELIABLE, AND SOME JUST SENT IN ANY OLD NUMBER. DO YOU REMEMBER THAT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.

Q. NOW, DO YOU THINK THAT THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AT MACV WOULD HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED IN INCLUDING IN THEIR ESTIMATES OF ENEMY RECRUITMENT UNRELIABLE NUMBERS FROM DISTRICT ADVISORS AND NUMBERS THAT WERE SENT IN BY DISTRICT ADVISORS WHO WERE JUST GIVING ANY OLD NUMBER?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. ONE WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME THAT THEY HAD A WAY OF KNOWING THAT. I DOUBT THAT THEY DID.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY BASIS FOR KNOWING ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WHAT STEPS THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AT MACV TOOK TO ASCERTAIN THE QUALITY OF THE RECRUITMENT ESTIMATES THAT WERE COMING FROM THE PROVINCE ADVISORS?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. I RECALL HAVING SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR MACV INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE AND TELLING THEM ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF THE DISTRICT LEVEL ESTIMATES AND THESE PEOPLE NOT BEING AWARE OF THE PROBLEM.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. CAN YOU RECALL THE NAMES OF THESE PEOPLE --

A. NO.

Q. -- THAT YOU SAY WERE SENIOR MACV INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS?

A. NO, I CAN'T RECALL.
Q. WERE THEY CICV AFFILIATED PERSONNEL?
A. I WISH I COULD BE MORE PRECISE WITH YOU, BUT I CAN'T BE.

Q. HOW SENIOR WERE THESE PEOPLE? CAN YOU RECALL THAT?
A. THEY WOULD BE PEOPLE ABOUT THE LIEUTENANT COLONEL OR COLONEL LEVEL.

Q. YOU'D AGREE, WOULD YOU NOT, SIR, IF A PROVINCE ADVISOR SENT IN, AS YOU PUT IT, ANY OLD NUMBER FOR HIS ESTIMATE OF RECRUITMENT, AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OUGHT NOT TO INCLUDE SUCH AN ESTIMATE IN HIS REPORT OF ENEMY RECRUITMENT?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. IF THE RECEIVING INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAD ANY WAY OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ONE NUMBER THAT WAS AN ACCURATE NUMBER AND ANOTHER NUMBER THAT WAS ANY OLD NUMBER, YES, I AGREE THAT THERE WOULD BE A REASON TO EXCLUDE THE ANY OLD NUMBERS. BUT UNFORTUNATELY, NUMBERS DON'T STAND OFF A PAGE AND SAY "I'M ANY OLD NUMBER." THEY LOOK JUST THE SAME AS THE ONES THAT ARE CAREFULLY PREPARED.

I CAN ENLARGE MY ANSWER BY SAYING THAT THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT OFFICERS WHO WERE SUBMITTING GOOD NUMBERS WERE THE ONES WHO WERE DOING SO WITH REFERENCE TO CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE LETTERS CIED STAND FOR?
A. I CAN'T RECALL WHAT THEY STAND FOR, BUT I REMEMBER SEEING THEM WITH RESPECT TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM.
Q. ARE YOU AWARE THAT CIIE was a division of MACV J-2?

A. I KNEW IT WAS AN INTELLIGENCE GROUP THAT WAS ATTACHED TO MACV, AND I THINK IT WAS ONE THAT HAD ACCESS TO SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE.

Q. DID YOU HAVE ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICERS IN ANY PART OF CIIE CONCERNING YOUR ESTIMATES OF ENEMY RECRUITMENT DURING YOUR VISIT TO VIETNAM IN 1967 AND THE EARLY PART OF 1968?

A. I CAN'T RECALL.

Q. YOU CAN'T RECALL ONE WAY OR THE OTHER?

A. I CAN'T SPECIFICALLY RECALL HAVING DISCUSSIONS OR RECALL NOT HAVING DISCUSSIONS WITH PEOPLE AT THIS LEVEL. IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS I WAS IN VIETNAM I SPOKE TO A GREAT NUMBER OF MILITARY OFFICERS AT APPROXIMATELY THE COLONEL LEVEL. I WALKED THROUGH THE HALLS OF MACV FROM OFFICE TO OFFICE. IT'S POSSIBLE THAT ONE OF THE PEOPLE I SPOKE TO WAS A CIIE MAN, AND IT'S POSSIBLE HE WASN'T.

Q. YOU DID NOT, THOUGH, WORK WITH PEOPLE FROM CIIE TO THE SAME EXTENT THAT YOU WORKED WITH THE PEOPLE FROM CICV; IS THAT CORRECT?

A. CORRECT.

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. NOW, YOU SAID YOU PRESENTED YOUR METHODOLOGY TO THE ANALYSTS AT CICV, YOUR RECRUITMENT METHODOLOGY.
1  A. YES, SIR.
2  Q. WHAT DID THE ANALYSTS AT CICV TELL YOU ABOUT THEIR
3  METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING RECRUITMENT PRIOR TO MAY OF 1967, IF
4  ANYTHING?
5  MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM.
6  A. I CAN'T RECALL DISCUSSING THE METHODOLOGY PRIOR TO
7  MAY, 1967. WE DISCUSSED THE CURRENT METHODOLOGY.
8  BY MR. MURRY:
9  Q. DID ANY ANALYST AT CICV TELL YOU WHAT THE MACV
10  ESTIMATE FOR RECRUITMENT WAS IN OR ABOUT FEBRUARY OF 1967?
11  A. I DON'T SPECIFICALLY RECALL.
12  Q. DID ANYONE EVER TELL YOU DURING 1967 OR 1968 THAT
13  THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BELIEVED THAT THE ENEMY WAS NOT
14  RECRUITING AT A RATE OF 7,000 PER MONTH IN THE SPRING OF 1967?
15  A. I CAN'T RECALL BEING TOLD THAT.
16  Q. DID THE PERSONNEL THAT YOU TALKED TO AT CICV TELL
17  YOU THAT YOUR METHOD FOR ESTIMATING RECRUITMENT WAS --- STRIKE
18  THE QUESTION.
19  YOU MENTIONED THAT THE CICV ANALYSTS TOLD YOU THAT
20  THEY HAD TO REPORT TO THEIR SUPERIORS WHO YOU TALKED TO AT CICV
21  AND WHAT YOU HAD FOUND OUT.
22  A. YES.
23  Q. DID THE CICV PERSONNEL THAT YOU TALKED TO GIVE YOU
24  THIS INFORMATION IN A SURREPTITIOUS FASHION?
25  MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM.
A. IT WASN'T NECESSARY FOR THEM TO DO IT SURREPTITIOUSLY. USUALLY, THERE WERE NOT SENIOR PEOPLE PRESENT IN THE ROOM AND THEY WERE ABLE TO CONFIDE TO ME.

SEVERAL PEOPLE AT CICV TOLD ME THIS. MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CICV PEOPLE VERY MUCH CONFIRMED THIS SORT OF INFORMATION THAT MR. FRABONI HAS GIVEN YOU IN HIS AFFIDAVIT, THAT THEY WERE DISGUSTED WITH WHAT WAS GOING ON AND THEY VIEWED ME AS A FELLOW ANALYST WHO WAS WORKING HARD ON THE PROBLEM, JUST AS THEY WERE, AND WAS INTERESTED IN SEEING THE TRUTH COME OUT.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHAT CIID'S ESTIMATES OF ENEMY RECRUITMENT WAS IN LATE 1967?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. NO, I DON'T.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. NOW, YOU SAY THESE PERSONNEL AT CICV TOLD YOU THEY HAD TO REPORT TO THEIR SUPERIORS WHAT YOU HAD READ AND WHAT YOU HAD LEARNED.

DID THESE PERSONNEL AT CICV TELL YOU THAT THEIR SUPERIORS HAD PROHIBITED THEM FROM SHOWING YOU ANY PARTICULAR DOCUMENTS OR OTHER INTELLIGENCE?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM, OBJECTION.

A. THESE ANALYSTS TOLD ME THAT THEIR SUPERIORS HAD PROHIBITED ME FROM GOING TO ANY OTHER ROOM AT CICV, SAVE THE BATHROOM, EXCEPT THIS ONE WORKROOM WHERE THE ORDER OF BATTLE
1 PEOPLE WERE WORKING.
2 BY MR. MURRY:
3 Q. AND YOU WERE THERE TO WORK ON AN ORDER OF BATTLE
4 MATTER, WERE YOU NOT?
5 A. I WAS.
6 Q. DID THEY TELL YOU, THESE PERSONNEL AT CICV, DID
7 THEY TELL YOU THAT THEY WERE PROHIBITED FROM SHOWING YOU
8 MATERIAL PERTAINING TO ENEMY RECRUITMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM?
9 MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.
10 A. I RECALL ONE SPECIFIC DISCUSSION WHEN I WAS TOLD
11 THERE WAS A DOCUMENT THAT I COULDN'T SEE.
12 WHAT HAPPENED OVER THE COURSE OF MY STAY AT CICV IS
13 THAT THE ANALYSTS BECAME MORE COMFORTABLE WITH ME AND CAME TO
14 KNOW THAT I WAS SINCERELY INTERESTED IN CONTRIBUTING POSITIVELY
15 TO THE RECRUITMENT STUDY.
16 AS THEY TRUSTED ME MORE, THEY PRODUCED MORE AND
17 MORE DOCUMENTS THAT THEY SEEMED TO FIND THAT OBVIOUSLY HAD NOT
18 BEEN IN THE FILES BEFORE.
19 SO I WAS IN A SITUATION OF GROWING TRUST WITH THESE
20 PEOPLE. I CAN'T SAY WHETHER THESE DOCUMENTS WERE PULLED OUT OF
21 THE FILE TO KEEP THEM FROM ME EARLIER AND THAT THEY WERE SHARED
22 LATER OR WHETHER THERE WAS ANOTHER REASON.
23 BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT DOCUMENTS THAT HAD BEEN
24 IN EXISTENCE IN CICV FOR A LONG TIME DRIBBLED INTO MY HANDS.
25 BY MR. MURRY:
Q. WHO TOLD YOU THAT THESE ANALYSTS, AS YOU PUT IT, COULDN'T FIND THEM BUT THEN FOUND THEM?
A. I CAN'T RECALL WHICH SPECIFIC ONES DID, BUT IT WOULD SIMPLY BE THAT I WOULD LOOK IN THE FILE AND A FEW MORE DOCUMENTS WOULD HAVE APPEARED THAT WERE OLD DOCUMENTS THAT OBVIOUSLY HAD BEEN THERE BEFORE AND HAD BEEN RECEIVED BEFORE.
Q. WELL, DID YOU EVER QUESTION ANY CICV PERSONNEL ABOUT HOW THESE DOCUMENTS GOT INTO THE FILE AT THE TIMES THAT THEY DID?
A. NO, I DIDN'T. AS YOU MAY KNOW FROM REVIEWING THE BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE, MR. MURRY, MY VISIT WAS A VERY SENSITIVE ONE.

MY INTEREST WAS IN GETTING THE INFORMATION AND NOT TRYING TO SPEAR OR INTIMIDATE PEOPLE WHO COULD OTHERWISE GIVE ME INFORMATION.

Q. YOU SAID YOU HAD A RELATIONSHIP OF GROWING TRUST WITH THESE CICV ANALYSTS. WHY THEN DO YOU SAY ASKING THEM HOW THESE DOCUMENTS APPEARED WOULD BE SPEARING OR INTIMIDATING THEM?
A. I CAN ONLY PRESUME THAT THEY KNEW THAT THESE DOCUMENTS WOULD HELP ME AND MY CASE AND THAT THEY WERE TAKEN OUT BEFORE. AND AS YOU'RE AWARE, THERE ARE SOME TIMES WHEN IT'S BETTER NOT TO ASK QUESTIONS.

Q. BUT NOT HAVING ASKED THE QUESTIONS, YOU PERSONALLY DON'T KNOW HOW THESE DOCUMENTS CAME TO BE IN OR OUT OF THE FILE AT ANY SPECIFIC TIME?
A. NO.

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. THAT'S MY TESTIMONY.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. NO, WHAT IS YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. I CANNOT SAY FOR SURE THE REASON WHY THEY WERE IN

OR OUT OF THE FILES.

Q. NOW, YOU SAID A MOMENT AGO -- NOT A MOMENT AGO, BUT

EARLIER IN YOUR TESTIMONY THAT YOU THOUGHT GENERAL DAVIDSON, THE

CHIEF OF MACV INTELLIGENCE, WAS UNEASY ABOUT LETTING A CIA

ANALYST INTO CICV. DO YOU RECALL THAT?

A. YES.

Q. ISN'T IT A FACT, SIR, THAT YOU KNEW THAT THE ORDER

OF BATTLE CONFERENCES IN 1967 HAD PRODUCED VERY ACRIMONIOUS

DISCUSSION BETWEEN MACV AND CIA?

A. YES.

Q. YOU KNEW, DID YOU NOT, THAT BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS

BETWEEN MACV AND CIA WERE EXTREMELY POOR?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. YES.

BUT I ALSO KNEW WE WERE ALL AMERICANS FIGHTING A

WAR AGAINST THE ENEMY, AND I DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE

REASONABLE TO TRY TO HANDICAP INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND

ANALYSIS EFFORTS OF ONE GROUP SIMPLY FOR BUREAUCRATIC REASONS.

BY MR. MURRY:
Q. MIGHT GENERAL DAVIDSON HAVE TAKEN THE SAME POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE CIA'S ESTIMATIVE PRACTICES?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. I RECALL NO INCIDENCE WHEN MACV REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION OR ACCESS TO CIA INFORMATION WERE DENIED.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. NOW, YOU SAID THAT PRESUMABLY GENERAL DAVIDSON KNEW THAT YOUR ESTIMATE OF ENEMY RECRUITMENT WAS HIGHER THAN THE MACV ESTIMATE; IS THAT CORRECT?

A. YES.

Q. IS IT CORRECT, THEN, THAT WHEN YOU WENT TO SAIGON YOU HAD ALREADY FORMED THE OPINION THAT ENEMY RECRUITMENT WAS HIGHER THAN MACV'S ESTIMATE FOR ENEMY RECRUITMENT?

A. BASED ON THE DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS THAT I HAD IN HAND, THAT WAS MY RESULT.

Q. WHERE DID THOSE DOCUMENTS COME FROM?

A. THE SAME PLACE THAT THE CICV DOCUMENTS CAME FROM. THEY WERE CAPTURED FROM ENEMY PERSONNEL, PROCESSED THROUGH, MAINLY THROUGH THE COMBINED DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION CENTER IN SAIGON AND MADE AVAILABLE TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN SAIGON AND WASHINGTON.

Q. AND MACV MADE THOSE DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE; IS THAT CORRECT?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. I WOULD PRESUME SO.
1 BY MR. MURRY:
2 Q. WELL, THE COMBINED DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION CENTER WAS
3 A PART OF MACV, CORRECT?
4 A. IT WAS A JOINT SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT/MACV
5 OPERATION.
6 Q. AND THE COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER OF VIETNAM WAS
7 A PART OF MACV AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE JOINT GENERAL STAFF; IS
8 THAT CORRECT?
9 A. YES.
10 Q. NOW, YOU SAID THAT YOU WENT DURING YOUR VISIT TO
11 VIETNAM, YOU WOULD DRIVE TO VARIOUS PLACES AND TALK TO PERSONS
12 IN THE FIELD AND THAT THEY TOLD YOU IN SUBSTANCE THAT YOU COULD
13 GO TO PLACES IN VIETNAM IN DECEMBER, '67, THAT YOU COULDN'T GO
14 TO FORMERLY AND THAT THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM WAS SHOWING
15 MORE PLACES WERE PACIFIED AND THEY WERE GRINDING DOWN THE ENEMY.
16 DO YOU REMEMBER THAT?
17 MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.
18 A. YES, I DO.
19 BY MR. MURRY:
20 Q. NOW, WERE YOU ABLE TO DISPROVE THOSE ASSERTIONS --
21 A. NO.
22 Q. -- AT THE TIME?
23 A. NO, I WAS NOT. IN FACT, I BELIEVE THAT IN GENERAL
24 THEY WERE CORRECT AND THAT ANY OBSERVER THERE WOULD HAVE
25 CONCLUDED THE SAME THING.
IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE, THOUGH, IN THE PERIOD
JUST IMMEDIATELY BEFORE I LEFT THAT THERE WERE SOME
INDICATIONS — I'VE TESTIFIED THAT THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS
FROM CIA STATION PEOPLE THAT THEY WERE BEGINNING TO NOTICE SOME
RESTIVENESS GOING ON IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

Q. DID YOU EVER TALK TO DANIEL GRAHAM, CHARLES MORRIS,
PHILIP DAVIDSON, OR WILLIAM WESTMORELAND ON THE SUBJECT OF HOW
THEY FELT ABOUT THE PRESS PERCEPTION OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. NO.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. YOU WERE FOR A TIME WITH SOMETHING CALLED THE
VIETNAM TASK FORCE; IS THAT CORRECT?

A. YES.

Q. DURING PART OF THE TIME YOU WERE WITH THE VIETNAM
TASK FORCE, THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR VIETNAMESE
AFFAIRS CONTINUED TO EXIST, CORRECT?

A. YES.

Q. DID THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS TO
YOUR KNOWLEDGE EVER PRODUCE ESTIMATES ON ANY CATEGORY OR ANY
ASPECT OF ENEMY STRENGTH IN VIETNAM?

A. I CAN'T SPECIFICALLY RECALL ANY ESTIMATES MADE BY
SAVE AT THE TIME, BUT I WOULDN'T BE AT ALL SURPRISED IF THEY
DID.

Q. AND THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE PRODUCED ESTIMATES OF
ENEMY STRENGTH IN VIETNAM, DID THEY NOT?

A. THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE DID NOT BEGIN IN 19 — IN LATE '66 AND '67 PRODUCING STRENGTH ESTIMATES ON VIETNAM.

I THINK I EXPLAINED THAT WE WORKED ON RICE AND LOGISTIC STUDIES FIRST. THE STRENGTH ESTIMATES BEGAN TO COME BEGINNING IN MID '67 AND MUCH MORE STRONGLY SO IN EARLY 1968.

Q. WHEN YOU RETURNED FROM VIETNAM, DID YOU TELL YOUR SUPERIORS WHAT THE ANALYSTS IN CICV HAD TOLD YOU ABOUT THE RECRUITMENT ESTIMATES?

A. YES, I DID.

Q. DID YOU DO IT ORALLY OR IN WRITING?

A. ORALLY.

Q. WHY DIDN'T YOU DO IT IN WRITING?

A. I WASN'T IN THE HABIT OF COMMUNICATING WITH MY DIRECT SUPERIORS IN WRITING. I NORMALLY MADE SUCH REPORTS ORALLY.

Q. WELL, WERE YOU SURPRISED AT WHAT THESE PERSONNEL AT CICV TOLD YOU?

A. YES, GENERALLY, I WAS. I WAS EXPECTING THAT THERE WOULD BE A MORE RIGOROUS AND HONEST ANALYTICAL PROCESS THAT CAME UP WITH NUMBERS.

I WAS SURPRISED THAT GIVEN THEIR ACCESS TO SUCH A GOOD DOCUMENT DATA BASE THAT THEIR SUPERIORS WOULD CREATE A SITUATION WHEREBY THE PRODUCT THEY PRODUCED WAS, I GUESS IN THEIR OWN WORDS, JUNK.
Q. DID YOU THINK WHAT THE ANALYSTS HAD TOLD YOU AT CICV ABOUT MACV'S ESTIMATES WAS IMPORTANT?
A. YES.

Q. WHAT DID YOU DO ABOUT WHAT THE ANALYSTS HAD TOLD YOU AT CICV AFTER YOU REPORTED TO YOUR SUPERIORS ORALLY?
A. I REPORTED IT TO MY SUPERIORS; I DISCUSSED IT WITH MY PEERS AT CIA; AND THAT WAS ALL.

Q. YOU SAID IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT, PARAGRAPH 6, YOU HAVE A REFERENCE IN THERE TO "THE ACTUAL NUMBERS RECRUITED."
MR. MASTRO: FOR CONTEXT, THE SENTENCE READS, "DURING MY VISIT IN SAIGON, SEVERAL CICV ANALYSTS PRIVATELY CONFIDED TO ME THAT THE MACV COMMAND ARBITRARILY REDUCED THEIR STRENGTH ESTIMATES, AND THEY AGREED WITH ME THAT THE ACTUAL NUMBERS RECRUITED WERE FAR HIGHER THAN THE MACV ESTIMATES."
BY MR. MURRY:
Q. DO YOU SEE THAT, SIR?
A. YES.

"Q." THERE AGAIN, NEITHER YOU NOR THE ANALYSTS AT CICV KNEW THE "ACTUAL" NUMBERS RECRUITED; ISN'T THAT TRUE?
MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.
A. WE SHARED A BELIEF THAT THE ACTUAL NUMBERS RECRUITED WERE HIGHER THAN THE MACV ESTIMATES. THE MACV PEOPLE THEMSELVES--THE WORKING-LEVEL PEOPLE--PREPARED ESTIMATES THAT WERE HIGHER THAN THE MACV NUMBERS THAT WERE RELEASED. THAT'S MY TESTIMONY. THAT'S MR. FRABONI'S TESTIMONY HERE.
WHAT WAS HAPPENING WAS THAT THESE NUMBERS WERE BEING MONKEYED WITH BY SENIOR PEOPLE AND MARKED DOWN.

BY MR. MURRY:
Q. WELL, YOU SAY THE MACV ANALYSTS PRODUCED THESE NUMBERS. ISN'T IT CORRECT THAT PEOPLE YOU TALKED TO WHO WERE PRODUCING THESE NUMBERS WERE IN A PARTICULAR SUBPART OF MACV CALLED CICV?
A. YES.
Q. YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT OTHER PEOPLE AT MACV WERE DOING WORK ON RECRUITMENT; ISN'T THAT CORRECT?
MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.
A. I DON'T KNOW IF THERE WERE ANY OTHER PEOPLE IN MACV WORKING ON RECRUITMENT.
BY MR. MURRY:
Q. IF THEY WERE, YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT WORK THEY WERE DOING; ISN'T THAT CORRECT?
MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.
A. IF THEY WERE, THEN MACV KEPT THEIR EXISTENCE A SECRET FROM ME, AND ONE WOULD HAVE TO WONDER ABOUT THEIR MOTIVATION FOR SO DOING.
BY MR. MURRY:
Q. IF THEY WERE, YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT WORK THEY WERE DOING; ISN'T THAT TRUE, SIR?
MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.
A. I ASKED THE PEOPLE AT MACV TO SEE THE PEOPLE WHO
WORKED ON RECRUITING. I WAS TAKEN TO THE CICV PEOPLE. IF THEY
DENIED ME ACCESS TO OTHER PEOPLE WORKING ON RECRUITING, THEN
THAT'S STILL ANOTHER MATTER.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. DIDN'T YOU FIND IT ODD WITH ALL THE OFFICERS AND
ANALYSTS AT CICV THAT MACV HAD ONE ENLISTED MAN WORKING ON
RECRUITMENT?
A. NOT AT ALL.

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. THE ONLY REASONABLE SOURCE ON RECRUITMENT IS
CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. THERE WAS ONLY ONE PLACE I KNEW WHERE THERE
WAS A LARGE ENGLISH TRANSLATION FILE OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS IN
SAIGON AT CICV.

I DON'T BELIEVE THAT MACV WANTED AN HONEST STUDY
DONE OF RECRUITING. I THINK THEY HAD THEIR OWN IDEAS OF WHAT IT
WAS. THE MORE PEOPLE THAT WERE IN THERE DOING WORK, THE MORE
PROBLEM THEY WOULD HAVE HAD.

MR. MURRY: MOVE TO STRIKE THE ANSWER AS
NONRESPONSIVE FROM "I DON'T BELIEVE."

MR. MASTRO: OFF THE RECORD.

(DISCUSSION OFF THE RECORD)

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. MR. STUMPF, IN YOUR TESTIMONY EARLIER YOU HAD USED
THE PHRASE OR YOU HAD SAID THAT THE PHRASE WAS USED IN LATE 1967
THAT THERE WAS SOME LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL.
DO YOU RECALL THAT?

A. YES.

Q. WHAT EXACTLY DID YOU UNDERSTAND THAT PHRASE "THERE WAS SOME LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL" TO MEAN WITH RESPECT TO THE OUTCOME OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM?


MR. MURRY: LIGHT. I'M HAPPY WITH "LIGHT."

A. "LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL" WAS A FREQUENTLY USED PHRASE IN LATE '67 TO CHARACTERIZE WHAT WAS THE MILITARY SITUATION THAT SEEMED TO BE IMPROVING BUT WAS LATER BY THE TET OFFENSIVE SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN NOT IMPROVING AT ALL.

IN MY EARLIER TESTIMONY HERE, I'VE DESCRIBED HOW IT BECAME EASIER TO DRIVE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, FOR EXAMPLE, AND HOW THE HESS EVALUATION STATISTICS WERE IMPROVING. THESE WERE FREQUENTLY CITED REASONS FOR THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL.

BUT WHAT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SHOWN TO BE THE CASE IN THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT THE LIGHT WAS, IF YOU WILL, A FALSE DAWN AND THAT WHAT WAS HAPPENING REALLY WAS THAT THE ENEMY WAS INTENTIONALLY REDUCING ITS RATE OF COMBAT, WITHDRAWING TO THE BASE AREAS, NOT FIGHTING, AND GETTING READY FOR A WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE.

OF VIETNAM NEARLY OVERNIGHT FELL TO THE ENEMY AND YOU COULDN'T
DRIVE ANYWHERE.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. NOW, LET ME ASK YOU A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT
THIS: YOU USED THE PHRASE "MOST OF SOUTH VIETNAM," OR SOMETHING
LIKE THAT, FELL TO THE ENEMY.

ISN'T IT A FACT, SIR, THAT WHAT HAPPENED IN THE TET
OFFENSIVE WAS THAT ENEMY TROOPS ATTACKED NUMEROUS CITIES IN
SOUTH VIETNAM AND WITH A COUPLE OF EXCEPTIONS WERE DRIVEN OUT OF
THOSE CITIES IN ABOUT 72 HOURS?

-MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. THEY ATTACKED MOST OF THE CITIES--NEARLY ALL OF THE
CITIES OF VIETNAM--AND CAPTURED MANY OF THEM, HOLDING SOME OF
THEM SUCH AS HUE FOR SUBSTANTIALLY LONGER THAN 72 HOURS. AND
POTENTIALLY MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE ENEMY RETOOK AND REASSERTED
ITS CONTROL OVER LARGE AREAS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. CAN YOU REMEMBER THE NAME OF ANY CITY OTHER THAN
HUE THAT THE ENEMY WAS ABLE TO HOLD FOR MORE THAN 72 HOURS?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM. OBJECTION.

A. TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION PROPERLY, I'D HAVE TO GO
BACK AND LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE FROM THE PERIOD. I JUST DON'T
HAVE THOSE STATISTICS AT HAND AND HAVEN'T LOOKED AT THEM FOR 17
YEARS.

I THINK IT'S SUFFICIENT TO SAY THAT NO ONE EXPECTED
THE ENEMY COULD ACCOMPLISH SUCH A MASSIVE INVASION AND INFILTRATION OF THE MOST SECURE AREAS OF VIETNAM, BUT THEY DID.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. NOW, WHAT I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT IS: WITH RESPECT TO THE ASSAULTS ON THE CITIES, DID THE ENEMY ENGAGE AMERICAN FORCES DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE THAT WERE IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AROUND THE CITIES, DEFEAT THOSE AMERICAN FORCES, AND PROCEED TO ATTACK THE CITIES?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. AMERICAN FORCES WERE LARGELY NOT IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AROUND SOUTH VIETNAM CITIES.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. SO THAT IS IT CORRECT THAT THE ENEMY SLIPPED BY AND AROUND AMERICAN FORCES AND THEN ATTACKED THE CITIES?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. IN MOST CASES THEY ENTERED THE CITIES BY STEALTH.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. NOW, ISN'T IT TRUE, SIR, THAT THE FACT THAT THE ENEMY WAS ABLE TO INFILTRATE THE CITIES BY STEALTH DOES NOT TELL YOU VERY MUCH ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE ENEMY FORCE THAT WAS ABLE TO INFILTRATE THE CITIES BY STEALTH?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION TO FORM. OBJECTION.

A. I DISAGREE. FOR THE ENEMY TO ENTER AND MAINTAIN A PRESENCE IN NEARLY EVERY CITY IN VIETNAM, TO ESSENTIALLY TAKE OVER THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, TO ESSENTIALLY TAKE OVER TAN SON NHUT
AIR BASE--ONE OF THE MOST HEAVILY DEFENDED PLACES IN SOUTH VIETNAM--TO TAKE OVER ALL THESE CITIES AND THEN MOREOVER TO TAKE OVER VAST AREAS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, TO DO THIS ALL AT ONCE, VERY GREAT NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN A COORDINATED CAMPAIGN HAD TO BE INVOLVED.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WELL, ISN'T IT TRUE, SIR, THAT YOU CAN TAKE OVER A LARGE NUMBER OF CITIES WITH A GIVEN MILITARY FORCE BY DISPERSING YOUR FORCES INTO SEVERAL SMALL UNITS AS OPPOSED TO CONCENTRATING YOUR FORCES INTO LARGER UNITS?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. DO YOU UNDERSTAND MY QUESTION?

A. YES, I UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION.

YES, AND WE KNOW THAT THE ENEMY ENTERED MAINLY IN SMALL UNITS AND ENTERED INTO THESE CITIES. THEY ARE, AFTER ALL, INSURGENTS, AND THAT'S THEIR METHOD OF OPERATION.

BUT HERE WE HAVE A SITUATION WHERE BARELY A MONTH OR SO BEFORE, GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS APPEARING BEFORE THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESS AND "LIGHTING THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL." AND THEN BARELY BEFORE THE LIGHT HAS A CHANCE TO BURN, WE DISCOVER THAT THESE PEOPLE CAN VIRTUALLY TAKE OVER THE COUNTRY.

AND IT'S FOR THIS REASON THAT, YOU KNOW, THAT I CITE THE TET OFFENSIVE AS BEING A TREMENDOUS VICTORY.
THE VIET CONG DIDN'T HAVE TO MILITARILY DEFEAT THE
UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM SOLDIERS AND DRIVE
THEM INTO THE SURF TO OBTAIN A VICTORY. THAT WAS NOT THEIR
STRATEGY.

THEIR STRATEGY WAS TO HUMILIATE, TO EMBARRASS, TO
REDUCE OUR WILL TO PERSIST. AND THEY ACCOMPLISHED THOSE THINGS.

Q. HOW DO YOU KNOW THEIR STRATEGY WASN'T TO DRIVE THE
AMERICANS INTO THE SEA AND THAT THIS OTHER EFFECT, WEAKENING OF
THE WILL AND SO FORTH THAT YOU MENTION, WASN'T JUST A BY-PRODUCT
OF A FAILED ATTEMPT TO DRIVE THE AMERICANS INTO THE SEA?

A. BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE TET OFFENSIVE, WE READ
MANY CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE ENEMY STRATEGY,
AND THESE DOCUMENTS INDICATED THAT THE STRATEGY WAS TO FORCE THE
AMERICANS TO WITHDRAW.

Q. BUT THE DOCUMENTS YOU READ DIDN'T TELL YOU WHAT THE
ENEMY STRATEGY WAS DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WHEN THEY ATTACKED
THE CITIES, DID THEY, SIR? DID THEY?

A. I CAN'T SPECIFICALLY RECALL WHAT STRATEGIES
REFERRED TO THE -- WHICH DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO THE ATTACKS ON
THE CITIES DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE.

I'M SURE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE HAD A HIERARCHY OF
EXPECTATIONS, ANYWHERE FROM A MASSIVE VICTORY IN THE CITIES THAT
WOULD CAUSE THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO COLLAPSE, DOWN TO A
MORE MODERATE OBJECTIVE WHICH WOULD BE TO INFLECT SERIOUS HARM
ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO

COPE WITH THEM.

Q. NOW, ISN'T IT TRUE, SIR, THAT IN NOVEMBER OF 1967 GENERAL WESTMORELAND STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN TWO YEARS OR LESS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO BEGIN TO PHASE DOWN ITS COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. YES, I BELIEVE I RECALL HIM SAYING THAT HE FELT THAT WE COULD BEGIN A NEW PHASE OF THE WAR, WHETHER IT WAS TWO YEARS OR NOT, I CANNOT RECALL.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WOULD YOU CONSIDER A STATEMENT BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND IN NOVEMBER OF 1967 THAT IN TWO YEARS OR LESS THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT BE ABLE TO BEGIN A PHASE-DOWN OF ITS COMMITMENT IN THE WAR OVEROPTIMISTIC?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. I BELIEVE THAT IF GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAD BEFORE HIM ACCURATE ORDER OF BATTLE NUMBERS AND ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THAT STATEMENT.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. ISN'T IT TRUE THAT IN 1969 THE UNITED STATES BEGAN A PHASE-DOWN OF ITS TROOPS IN VIETNAM?

A. YES. IN 1969 WE BEGAN A PHASE-DOWN, BUT THAT PHASE-DOWN WAS MORE A WITHDRAWAL THAN IT WAS A PREPARATION FOR A VICTORY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM.

I THINK WE REMEMBER IN 1975 VIETNAM WAS TAKEN OVER
BY THE COMMUNISTS JUST A FEW YEARS -- OR A YEAR, NOT MORE THAN A
YEAR AFTER OUR MAJOR UNITS WERE OUT.

Q. WELL, OUR MAJOR UNITS WERE OUT BY '73, WEREN'T THEY, SIR?

A. YES. I CAN'T REMEMBER WHEN THE LAST COMBAT UNITS
WERE ACTUALLY WITHDRAWN, BUT THERE WAS A RATHER SHORT PERIOD OF
TIME AFTER THAT UNTIL THE WHOLE THING FELL IN.

Q. WERE YOU AWARE IN 1967 AND 1968 THAT GENERAL
WESTMORELAND HAD IN DECEMBER, 1967, TOLD HIS MILITARY SUPERIORS
THAT HE ANTICIPATED A COUNTRYWIDE OFFENSIVE AT OR AROUND THE
TIME OF THE TET HOLIDAYS IN VIETNAM?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AT THE TIME OF TET EVERY YEAR
INDICATED THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE PLANNING A, QUOTE,
WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE.

SO EVERY YEAR AT THE TIME OF TET ONE COULD HAVE
PREDICTED A MAJOR OFFENSIVE. ONE WOULD HAVE BEEN CORRECT ONE

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. '68?

A. '68. EXCUSE ME.

Q. WHAT I WANTED TO KNOW IS WHETHER YOU WERE AWARE IN
1967 OR 1968 THAT IN DECEMBER, 1967, GENERAL WESTMORELAND TOLD
HIS MILITARY SUPERIORS THAT HE ANTICIPATED A COUNTRYWIDE SHOW OF
STRENGTH BY THE ENEMY AT OR AROUND THE TIME OF THE TET HOLIDAYS.
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1. MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

2. A. NO.

3. BY MR. MURRY:

4. Q. WERE YOU AWARE IN 1968 THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND INFORMED THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES THAT HE ANTICIPATED A COUNTRYWIDE SHOW OF STRENGTH BY THE ENEMY AT OR AROUND THE TET HOLIDAYS?

5. MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

6. A. NO.

7. BY MR. MURRY:

8. Q. WHO DID YOU TALK TO, AS YOU PUT IT, IN WASHINGTON TO WHOM THE TET OFFENSIVE CAME AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE?


10. Q. DID YOU EVER PERSONALLY MAKE AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF ENEMY PERSONNEL COMMITTED TO THE TET OFFENSIVE?

11. A. NO. THAT WAS NOT MY JOB.

12. Q. WHEN YOU SAY THAT THE ENEMY SURPRISED YOU AT TET, ISN'T IT TRUE THAT YOU KNEW THE ENEMY HAD THE CAPABILITY TO DISPOSE HIS FORCES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ATTACK MOST OF THE CITIES OF VIETNAM?

13. MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

14. A. I KNEW THAT THE ENEMY HAD FIVE TO SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND TROOPS AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL TO BRING TO BEAR AND
THEY COULD INFLICT TREMENDOUS HARM IF THEY WERE TO ARRAY THEM
AND USE THEM AT ONCE, PARTICULARLY BY SURPRISE.

BUT IN ALL CANDOR, I DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD
BE AS SUCCESSFUL AS THEY WERE. AND IF INDEED GENERAL
WESTMORELAND WAS AWARE THAT THERE WAS TO BE A COORDINATED
OFFENSIVE BY THE ENEMY AT THE TIME OF TET, ONE HAS TO QUESTION
WHY HE HAD SUCH A SMALL GUARD AT THE EMBASSY AND AT OTHER PLACES
WHERE U.S. FORCES WERE OVERRUN AND VIETNAMESE LIVES WERE LOST.

BY MR. MURRY:
Q. DIDN'T THE ENEMY HAVE THE CAPABILITY WITH 250,000
FORCES TO DISPOSE THEM IN A FASHION THAT WOULD PHYSICALLY ALLOW
HIM TO ATTACK ROUGHLY 80 CITIES IN VIETNAM?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.
A. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY COULD HAVE PUT
TOGETHER THE LOGISTICS FOR THAT EFFORT, COULD HAVE TAKEN CONTROL
OF THE COUNTRYSIDE AS THEY DID, AND TAKEN CONTROL OF THE CITIES
WITH 250,000 PEOPLE.

BY MR. MURRY:
Q. DID YOU EVER READ ANY REPORTS AFTER THE TET
OFFENSIVE WHICH INDICATED THAT WHAT WAS ASSUMED TO BE THE LEVEL
OF ENEMY CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRYSIDE SHORTLY AFTER THE TET
OFFENSIVE WAS IN FACT EXAGGERATED?
A. I RECALL SEEING REPORTING TO THAT EFFECT.

Q. ISN'T IT TRUE THAT A FORCE OF 250,000 MEN, IF
DISPERSED SUFFICIENTLY, COULD MOUNT ATTACKS ON OVER 80 CITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN A GIVEN TIME?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. IN A SENSE, IT'S TRUE THAT 80 MEN COULD MOUNT ATTACKS ON 80 CITIES IF SUFFICIENTLY DISPERSED.

WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE IS THE LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS THE ENEMY HAD IN A TET OFFENSIVE.

AND MY JUDGMENT IS THAT IT TOOK SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN 250,000 PEOPLE TO ATTAIN THAT LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. DO YOU HAVE AN EXPLANATION FOR WHY, IF THERE WERE AS MANY TROOPS INVOLVED IN THE TET OFFENSIVE AS YOU SEEM TO THINK THERE WERE, THE ENEMY SUFFERED SUCH EXTREME CASUALTIES DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE?

THE WITNESS: CAN I HAVE THAT QUESTION BACK? I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND IT.

(LAST QUESTION READ)

A. MY JUDGMENT IS THEY SUFFERED EXTREME CASUALTIES DURING THE OFFENSIVE BECAUSE THERE WERE A LOT OF PEOPLE THERE. IT WAS BECAUSE THERE WERE A LOT OF PEOPLE, NOT BECAUSE THERE WEREN'T A LOT OF PEOPLE THERE.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. BUT IF THERE WERE LARGE AND EFFECTIVE ENEMY FORCES INVOLVED IN THE URBAN ASSAULTS, DON'T YOU THINK THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO INFlict -- LET ME REPHRASE THAT.
IF THERE WERE NUMBERS OF ENEMY FORCES INVOLVED IN
THE TET OFFENSIVE LARGER THAN MACV HAD ESTIMATED, DOES IT NOT
SEEM REASONABLE TO YOU THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO AVOID
THE LEVEL OF DAMAGE THAT MACV WAS ABLE TO INFlict ON THEM?
A. NO.
Q. YOU SAID THAT THE ENEMY HAD CONTROL OF THE LEVEL OF
COMBAT BY AND LARGE IN VIETNAM; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. DID IT WORK TO THE ENEMY'S ADVANTAGE IN LET US SAY
1967 TO MAINTAIN COMBAT AT A HIGH LEVEL OR A LOW LEVEL OF
INTENSITY?
A. OKAY. THE QUESTION IS A BIT COMPOUND, BUT I'LL
ENDEAVOR TO ANSWER IT.
FIRST OF ALL, THE ENEMY ACCORDING TO MY ANALYSIS
HAD A GREAT DEAL OF CONTROL OVER THE RATE OF COMBAT.
WHAT THIS MEANT WAS THEY COULD FIGHT AND TAKE
CASUALTIES AND INFlict CASUALTIES ESSENTIALLY WHERE THEY WANTED
TO AND AVOID IT WHERE THEY WANTED TO. THAT, OF COURSE, IS THE
NATURE OF A GUERRILLA ACTION.
IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1967 I BELIEVE THAT THEY
CHOSE NOT TO FIGHT AND LAY BACK. AND THE RESULT WAS THIS
APPARENT IMPROVEMENT IN CONDITIONS THAT WAS SO DEVASTATINGLY
SHATTERED AT TET WHEN IT WAS DECIDED THEY WEREn'T GOING TO LAY
BACK ANYMORE.
AFTER TET, YOU REMEMBER, WE HAD THE MAY OFFENSIVE
OF MAY, 1968, WHICH WAS STILL ANOTHER HEAVY BLOW TO THE
COUNTRYSIDE.

Q. NOW, WHEN THESE ENEMY FORCES ENTERED THE CITIES OF
SOUTH VIETNAM AND ENGAGED IN COMBAT, THEY COULDN'T AVOID TAKING
CASUALTIES ANY LONGER, COULD THEY?
A. NO, THEY COULDN'T.

Q. THEY COULDN'T REALLY REGULATE THE COMBAT ANYMORE,
COULD THEY?
A. BUT THEY DID TO SOME DEGREE. I RECALL THAT THE
EVIDENCE WAS THAT A NUMBER OF MAJOR UNITS WERE HELD BACK IN BASE
AREAS AT THE TIME OF THE ASSAULT ON THE CITIES.

THIS WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE SOMETHING LEFT TO FIGHT
WITH IF THINGS WENT NOT SO WELL DURING TET. WE DID SEE THESE
UNITS COMMITTED DURING THE MAY OFFENSIVE.

Q. BUT THE UNITS THAT ENTERED THE CITY, THEY REALLY
LOST THEIR ABILITY TO REGULATE COMBAT, DIDN'T THEY?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. WAS YOUR QUESTION THAT THEY LOST THEIR ABILITY TO
REGULATE COMBAT? IF IT IS, AT THE MOMENT THAT THEY ENTERED THE
CITY, YES.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. NOW, IN LOSING THAT ABILITY TO REGULATE COMBAT AND
THEREBY REGULATE THEIR LOSSES, THE UNITS THAT WERE ORDERED TO
ENTER AND FIGHT IN THE CITIES GAVE UP THE DECIDED ADVANTAGE THAT
THEY HAD IN THE WAR, DID THEY NOT?
MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. ONLY BRIEFLY. THEY WERE IN THE CITY FOR A TIME.

THEY FOUGHT; THEY TOOK CASUALTIES; AND THEN THEY WITHDREW. AND THEN THEY REGAINED THEIR CONTROL TO REGULATE THEIR CASUALTIES.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WELL, THEY TOOK EXTRAORDINARY CASUALTIES IN THE CITIES, DIDN'T THEY?

A. YES, THEY DID. I THINK WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT A GREAT, LARGE NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS THAT WE SAW IN THE CITY AND SECRET SELF-DEFENSE, ASSAULT YOUTH. THESE ARE THE TYPES OF PEOPLE IN MANY CASES THAT TOOK CASUALTIES IN THE CITIES, PEOPLE THAT WERE SO-CALLED INEFFECTIVE OR WASHERWOMEN OR WHATEVER. AND I THINK THEY SHOWED THAT THEY COULD BE EFFECTIVE DURING TET.

Q. DID YOU EVER ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WHY, IF THE ENEMY HAD AS MANY EFFECTIVE TROOPS AS YOU SAY THE DID, THEY WOULD SEND SECRET SELF-DEFENSE AND WASHERWOMEN INTO THE TET OFFENSIVE?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION.

A. PRIOR TO THE TET ASSAULT ON THE CITIES, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE ENEMY USED A GREAT DEAL OF PROPAGANDA AND UPGRADING TO BRING THESE MILITIA FORCES UP INTO THEIR GUERRILLA AND LOCAL FORCE UNITS TO BE EMPLOYED DURING THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES.

THESE PEOPLE WERE TOLD THAT THIS IS THE FINAL PUSH, AND SO FORTH AND SO ON, AND THAT THEY COULD BE A PART OF A GLORIOUS VICTORY.
I HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT ALL OF THESE 500- TO 600,000 PEOPLE WERE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE ENEMY'S SCHEME AND STRATEGY FOR WINNING IN VIETNAM.

BEING ABLE TO REACH DOWN INTO A MANPOWER BASE AND DRAW UP THESE PEOPLE AND MOBILIZE THEM AND GET THEM OUT INTO THE CITIES, IT WAS A BIG Advantage TO THEM. IF THEY DIDN'T EXIST, THEY COULDN'T HAVE BEEN UPGRADED AND BROUGHT THERE AS THEY WERE.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE USE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PROSELYTIZING CADRES. AT THE TIME OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, THESE PEOPLE WERE MARCHED INTO THE CITIES IN GREAT NUMBERS. AND ALTHOUGH THEY ARE OFTEN SORT OF DISMISSED FROM THE OB AS NOT BEING MILITARY PEOPLE, THEY WERE VERY EFFECTIVE IN DISORDERING AND DISORIENTING VIETNAMESE FORCES AND CIVILIANS AND MAKING THE CAMPAIGN MORE EFFECTIVE.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. YOU MENTIONED EARLIER IN YOUR TESTIMONY—HERE AGAIN, I THINK I HAVE YOUR LANGUAGE—THAT THE SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA HAD A MILITARY MISSION THEY WERE ABLE TO CARRY OUT WITH CONSIDERABLE EFFECTIVENESS. DO YOU RECALL THAT?

A. UM-HUM.

Q. WERE YOU EVER INFORMED THAT MACV AND ARVN FIELD COMMANDERS DID NOT CONSIDER THE SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY FORCE?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. THE SECRET SELF-DEFENSE AND SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA
WERE AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VC/NVA
INSURGENCY. THEY FILLED AN ESSENTIALLY MILITARY ROLE IN THE
INSURGENT CONTEXT. COMPARED TO A MODERN, FULLY EQUIPPED
FIGHTING FORCE WITH TANKS AND AIRCRAFT, NO, THEY WERE NOT
EFFECTIVE.

BUT IN THE ROLE THAT THEY PLAYED IN THE INSURGENCY,
THEY WERE VERY EFFECTIVE.

BY MR. MURRY:

Q. WHAT I'M ASKING YOU IS: DID YOU KNOW IN 1967 OR
1968 THAT ARVN AND U.S. COMBAT COMMANDERS AND INTELLIGENCE
PERSONNEL DID NOT CONSIDER THE SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA AND SECRET
SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE?

MR. MASTRO: OBJECTION. OBJECTION TO FORM.

A. I WAS AWARE IN 1967 AND 1968 THAT AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS, DID NOT BELIEVE
THE SECRET SELF-DEFENSE AND SELF-DEFENSE MILITIA WERE AN
EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE.

I DISAGreed WITH THAT.

MR. MURRY: LET'S GO OFF THE RECORD FOR ONE MOMENT.

(DISCUSSION OFF THE RECORD)

MR. MURRY: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS AT THIS
TIME.

MR. MASTRO: LET'S TAKE A SHORT BREAK, AND THEN
I'LL CONDUCT MY REDIRECT.

(RECESS)