all along the east perimeter, where the first air and artillery strikes began against the Viet Cong who were caught massed in the open.

Captain Engles, aboard the first FAC ship to reach the scene that morning, described the development of air support:

"...On the morning of the first, we were awakened sometime after 0515 with the call that Dobol was in contact once again. They were receiving heavy mortar fire, so Major Savage and I scrambled at 0545, with myself in the front seat and Major Savage in the rear, and headed towards George.

"It took us about 20 to 25 minutes to get there and it was starting to get light at this time. Spooky was on station dropping flares. I believe he was also shooting the mini-guns at the flashes of mortar positions before we arrived. Shortly after that Spooky departed as the flares were no longer necessary. Almost simultaneously with his departure, the fifty cal opened up with tracers on the helicopters and anybody that was in the local area.

"About 0650...we had the first immediate up, a Silver Flight, and were ready to put in the first ordnance. I was going to try and get the fifty first. It was firing tracers and was readily visible. I tried to fire my rockets, but we had rocket failure that morning—couldn't get the damn things off. Of all the days for the rockets not to work. So about this time, after I'd tried three times to hit the fifty with the rocket, they started calling from the ground that the attack had actually started, so we had to abandon the attack on the fifty.

"From having been in the area the day before, we needed only a minimum of instructions from the ground forces. This time they were coming in from the northeast. It was still pretty dark down there. We couldn't see anything except tracers going all over the place. We dove down through it and Major Savage dropped a smoke grenade right in the middle of the area. Then we began walking the napalm towards the perimeter. We put it in at 75 meters, then two more at 50 meters, and finally the fourth went in about 25 meters from our troops. Then we strung
CBU all across the clearing starting a good 200 meters up the left arm, all the way across and about 500 meters out into the woods on the other side. We continued to make CBU runs until they ran out. Then we had them give the general area a hose down with strafe as we slipped in the next flight. This one had napalm and bombs which we put on the same outcropping of woods where the attack was coming from. They expended all their (wing) ordnance and started to strafe.

"The fifty was still firing all this time... As soon as the fighters ran out of strafe, the helicopter gunships, which were not under my control, snuck in and took care of the fifty with their rockets and mini-guns. They silenced it for awhile but it came back up again later. I'm not sure what ever did happen to it but they did capture one of the guns...."

The main enemy assault had been caught in the open by napalm and CBU of the first airstrike, and the enemy attack began to falter. The second airstrike caught the main enemy force squarely with bombs and more napalm, turning the wavering attack into a complete rout. In his after action report, the brigade commander stated it this way: "By 0750 the VC attackers were in full retreat as the full might of U.S. close air was brought to bear."

With the main attack crushed, the FAC now turned his attention elsewhere.

"...At about this time the attack from that particular quarter was broken, but it started afresh back where it was the day before--across the field, so once again we had to dive down through the thing. I was using Major Savage as my bombardier. I flew and he dropped the grenade. The weather was very hazy. The visibility was about a mile and a half and we had to run the next flight directly into the sun because the artillery would not allow us to come in from the east. We actually had to overfly Devour, so rather than take a chance of trickling CBU on them, we had to fly them into the sun, which made life a little more difficult. We put in rockets after that along the trench line. Then we began to see some
green smoke filter up through the trees opposite Devour. Devour 6 called us on the radio and said, 'Our troops are marking with smoke. There's green smoke across the clearing—it's not ours.' We... then had the fighters strafe the green smoke. We put bombs and napalm in the trenches on the next flight and that pretty well ended it...."

The 2d Brigade FACs continued to rotate missions until 1808 hours, when the immediate sorties were finally shut off. A total of 62 F-100s, 6 B-57s, 5 F-5s, and 4 F-4Cs, on scramble and divert sorties, had expended more than a hundred tons of ordnance in support of the day's contact around LZ George. Additional support was provided during the afternoon when a three-sortie ARC LIGHT mission was ground-diverted and struck the area halfway between the northern edge of the LZ and the Cambodian border.

As at Suoi Tre, ten days earlier, the Battle of Ap Gu in LZ George resulted in a crushing defeat for a major enemy unit. The 271st Regiment was badly mauled. American soldiers made an initial body-count of 581 Viet Cong, but numerous bodies, killed farther out in the jungle by artillery and airstrikes, were found during the next few days, increasing the final number of dead to 608. Five prisoners were taken and a large amount of enemy equipment was captured, including 22 AK-47s, 5 RPG rocket launchers, 9 assault carbines, 6 CHICOM light machine guns, 1 12.7-mm AA gun, 4 BARs, 4 M-79 grenade launchers, 1 M-16 automatic rifle, and 1 .45 caliber pistol. The final report placed American casualties at 11 KIA and 77 WIA for the engagement.

More than any other factor, air support was responsible for the victory.
at Ap Gu. In a press interview following the battle, U.S. Army Capt. George A. Joulwan, Operations Officer for Dobol, was recorded as stating that the troops of his battalion were overrun at two positions before the "massive air and artillery support helped drive the communists back. The battalion's C Company counterattacked through the two fallen posts as the supporting fire cut off VC withdrawal." Captain Joulwan personally credited air and artillery with killing 80 percent of the enemy body-count.

9. Conclusion

After termination of the second phase of JUNCTION CITY on 15 April, the operation continued into Phase Three on a greatly reduced scale. The 3d Brigade, 4th Division, remained in the operation until 20 April, when it returned to its Dau Tieng Base Camp. This left only the 1st Brigade, 9th Division, still OPCON to the 25th Division, to carry on operations as a mobile brigade force throughout the lower half of War Zone "C." The only significant contacts during this phase were with two enemy squads on 27 April, and support fires against 15 VC on 9 May.

When JUNCTION CITY terminated on 14 May 1967, it had achieved a record as the most successful operation to that date in terms of confirmed enemy losses. A total of 2,728 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese had been killed by body-count; 99 were detained; and 137 were accepted as returnees. This was accomplished with a friendly toll of 282 KIA, 1,576 WIA, and approximately 180 tanks, carriers, trucks, support vehicles, and artillery pieces destroyed or damaged.
Enemy equipment losses were staggering considering the level of sophistication of their equipment. Nearly 500 small arms, 100 crew-served weapons, 100,000 rounds of small arms ammo, 750 rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition, and large quantities of field telephones, radios, cameras, sewing machines, printing presses, typewriters, switchboards, batteries, dynamos, transmitters, projectors, tape recorders, generators, and mimeograph equipment were captured or destroyed. Other losses included more than 800 tons of rice, 10 tons of salt, large quantities of cloth, field equipment, uniforms, explosives, bicycles, oxcarts, sampans, 2,659 cans of POL products, 4,313 bunkers, 1,463 military structures, and 72 tunnels.

Total tactical air sorties flown in support of JUNCTION CITY reached 5,002, and delivered 7,429.8 tons of ordnance. The 126 B-52 sorties expended 4,723 tons of ordnance, while another 2,057 airlift sortie moved 17,524 passengers and 11,307.7 tons of cargo. There were also 89 recce targets photoed.

While JUNCTION CITY was in progress, War Zone "C" was effectively denied to the communists as a viable base and staging area. As with previous incursions into the area, however, the communists quickly returned in force. The combat effectiveness of the 9th VC Division was seriously impaired with approximately a quarter to a third of the division's personnel killed in action. After Operation JUNCTION CITY, the 9th VC Division was displaced to War Zone "D," and the 7th Division moved into War Zone "C" as a replacement. Two other North Vietnamese Army Regiments, new to the area, were also subsequently identified there, possibly as replacements for heavy casualties suffered during the operation.
Although all three combat regiments of the 9th VC Division were rated ineffective at the termination of JUNCTION CITY, the enemy had repeatedly demonstrated an ability to replace their losses. Because the VC personnel pool had become increasingly depleted, they may be forced to fill the manpower gaps with NVA troops or from other sources.
FOOTNOTES

1. (C) MONEVAL, USMACV, Apr 67.
2. Ibid.
3. (C) Notes, III DASC, Daily Logs, 22 Feb - 15 May 67; Working Cy, 7AF, DOA, Cdr's Ops Cmd Bk, Undated.
4. (C) Project CHECO Special Rpt, "Operation BIRMINGHAM," 29 Jun 65.
5. (C) Project CHECO Special Rpt, "Operation ATTLEBORO," 14 Apr 67.
6. (C) MONEVAL, USMACV, Jan 67.
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10. (C) Working Cy, 7AF, DOA, Cdr's Ops Cmd Bk, Undated.
11. (C) MONEVAL, USMACV, Feb 67.
12. Ibid.
13. (C) Working Cy, 7AF, DOA, Cdr's Ops Cmd Bk, Undated.
14. (C) AAR, 1st Inf Div, JUNCTION CITY, 6 May 67, Doc. 1; AAR, 25th Inf Div, JUNCTION CITY, 19 Jun 67, Doc. 2.
15. Ibid.
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17. (C) AAR, 25th Div, JUNCTION CITY, 19 Jun 67, Doc. 2.
18. (C) Working Papers, 7AF, DIS, by Lt Col Richard W. Palmer, Undated.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. (C) WAIS & AF, 19 Feb - 25 Mar 67.
22. (C) Working Papers, 7AF DIS, by Lt Col Richard W. Palmer.

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23. Ibid.
24. (C) AAR, 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div, JUNCTION CITY, 25 Apr 67, Doc. 3.
25. Ibid.
26. (C) Notes, III DASC Daily Logs, 28 Feb 67.
27. (C) AAR, 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div, JUNCTION CITY, 25 Apr 67, Doc. 3.
28. (C) Interview with Maj Clay B. Jackson, ALO, 3d Bde, 1st Div by Maj Richard Durkee and Lawrence J. Hickey, Lai Khe, 12 Apr 67, Doc. 4. (Hereafter cited: Interview with Major Jackson, 12 Apr 67.)
29. (C) AAR, 3d Bde, 1st Div, JUNCTION CITY, 25 Apr 67, Doc. 3.
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34. (C) AAR, 1st Inf Div, JUNCTION CITY, 6 May 67; AAR, 25th Inf Div, JUNCTION CITY, 19 Jun 67, Doc. 2.
35. (C) Notes, Interviews with U.S. Army MI Personnel, Dau Tieng, 29 Mar 67.
36. (C) AAR, 3d Bde, 1st Div, JUNCTION CITY, 25 Apr 67, Doc. 3.
37. (C) Interview with Major Jackson, 12 Apr 67, Doc. 4.
38. (C) AAR, 3d Bde, 1st Div, JUNCTION CITY, 25 Apr 67, Doc. 3.
39. (C) Interview with Major Jackson, 12 Apr 67, Doc. 4.
40. (C) Notes, III DASC Daily Logs, 10-11 Mar 67.
41. (C) AAR, 3d Bde, 1st Div, JUNCTION CITY, 25 Apr 67, Doc. 3.
42. (C) Interview with Major Jackson, 12 Apr 67, Doc. 4.
43. (C) Notes, III DASC Daily Logs, 10-11 Mar 67; AAR, 3d Bde, 1st Div, JUNCTION CITY, 25 Apr 67.
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45. (C) Interview with Major Jackson, 12 Apr 67, Doc. 4.
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66. (C) WAIS, 7AF, 26 Mar 67.

67. (U) Information provided by 7AF Awards and Decorations Branch.
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87. Ibid.
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89. (U) Silver Star Citation, 1/Lt Walter H. Forbes, III, 25 Mar 67.
91. (C) AAR, 3d Bde, 4th Div, JUNCTION CITY, Doc. 6.
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93. (C) Interview, Capt Walter C. Sager, FAC, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div by Maj Richard Durkee and Lawrence J. Hickey, Dau Tieng, 29 Mar 67, Doc. 9. (Hereafter cited: Interview with Captain Sager, 29 Mar 67.)

94. Ibid.

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96. (C) Interview, Major Meyer, 29 Mar 67, Doc. 8.

97. (C) AAR, 3d Bde, 4th Div, JUNCTION CITY, Doc. 6.

98. (C) Interview with Major Meyer, 29 Mar 67, Doc. 8.

99. Ibid.

100. (C) Interview, Major Meyer, 29 Mar 67, Doc. 8.

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102. (C) Interview with Major Heyer, 29 Mar 67, Doc. 8.

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104. (C) Notes, III DASC Daily Logs, 21 Mar 67.

105. (U) Statement, Lt Col John A. Bender, USA, CAS, Battle of Suoi Tre, 29 Mar 67.

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108. (C) Interview with Captain Sager, 29 Mar 67, Doc. 9.

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115. (C) Interview, Capt Marvin R. Keller, FAC, 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div by Maj Richard Durkee and Lawrence J. Hickey, Lai Khe, 12 Apr 67, Doc. 10. (Hereafter cited: Interview with Captain Keller, 12 Apr 67.)

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123. (C) AAR, 2d Bde, 1st Div, JUNCTION CITY, Doc. 5.

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127. (C) Interview with Captain Engels, 12 Apr 67, Doc. 11.

128. (C) AAR, 2d Bde, 1st Div, JUNCTION CITY, Doc. 1.

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130. (C) Interview with Captain Keller, 12 Apr 67, Doc. 10.

131. (C) Notes, III DASC Daily Logs, 1 Apr 67.

132. (C) WAIS, 7AF, 9 Apr 67.


134. (U) News Item, Pacific Stars and Stripes, 3 Apr 67.

135. (C) AAR, 25th Div, JUNCTION CITY, Doc. 2.
136. (C) Daily SITREP, COMUSMACV, 15 May 67.

137. Ibid.


139. (C) MONEVAL, USMACV, May-Jun 67.
# GLOSSARY

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALO</td>
<td>Air Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operation</td>
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<td>APCs</td>
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<td>Cluster Bomb Unit</td>
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<td>Chinese Communist</td>
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<td>Viet Cong</td>
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