"CAS estimates their outer positions will hold but place untenable as operating radar site."

"TACAN unit reported burning and damage to other TSQ equipment. Steps being taken to destroy all remaining equipment prior to evacuation."

Shortly before 0700L, incoming fire ceased; at 0620L smoke had been observed rising from the TACAN site. (Fig. 9.) About 0700L, the helicopters were standing by, ready to come in, but were drawing enemy fire from the top of the summit. The senior CAS advisor with ten Meo guerrillas proceeded to the TSQ/TACAN site to ascertain the status there and determine from where the fire directed at the helicopters originated.

Upon arrival at the TACAN location, the CAS representative found the living quarters locked and the TACAN severely damaged. The senior CAS representative then called out to any Americans who might have been hiding nearby, but he received no response. Coming around the west side of the complex, shots were exchanged with one enemy soldier dressed in "typical North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao uniform." After circling further south and west, two more of the enemy were encountered, one manning a machine gun behind sandbags. Fire was exchanged and one of the enemy was hit, but the friendly force beat a hasty retreat down the hill toward the command bunker. En route, the CAS representative was wounded slightly in the leg.

Back at the bunker, the CAS representative estimated that either the TSQ-81 was in enemy hands or they were conducting a raid, hence
friendly heavy weapons fire was directed at the TSQ site and some hits were scored. A-1Es in the area apparently noted that the defenders were firing at the site and also delivered their ordnance on the TSQ location. The CAS representative was of the opinion that the TSQ gear was demolished. However, this was incorrect. Unfortunately, as one survivor reported later, the A-1E attack forced one enemy soldier to scurry for safety down the slope and en route, he engaged in a firefight with another American survivor, killing him.

The helicopters were then able to come in and perform the rescue attempts. Of the 19 Americans at the site, only five technicians and two CAS people were extracted. One of the CAS people was wounded; five of the six technicians were wounded, one of them being hit while in the helicopter—this man died en route to Site 36 and Udorn AB, Thailand. The remaining eleven Americans were presumed dead.

Return flights by helicopters were able to recover a few American and Laotian bodies, plus some wounded defenders from the summit, but they continued to draw occasional fire.

Apparently the defenders around the site still held the trail systems to the summit as late as 0730L. Soon thereafter, the guerrilla defenders melted away to regroup at other locations for airlift to safer areas. It was not expected that the enemy offensive would halt with the fall of Site 85. In fact, Site 111 fell on 12 March; to the east, enemy pressure mounted at Site 184; Site 239 and Site 107 were abandoned due to enemy activity; on 13 March Site 204
was subjected to heavy but sporadic enemy fire. By 12 March, 129 of 203 defenders of Site 85 had definitely been evacuated.

As early as 0940L on 11 March the Deputy Commander 7/13AF at Udorn AB, Thailand had begun coordination to utilize some of the available helicopters to airlift a force of approximately 200 Laotian military personnel to Site 85 in order to recapture the site, but this design was delayed indefinitely so that a maximum effort could be exerted to try to recover the remaining U.S. personnel and friendly forces.

Denouement

After the evacuation of Americans and friendly forces was completed on the morning of 11 March, only three tasks remained to be performed:

- Missing Americans had to be accounted for, either by recovering them as they still evaded capture or by recovering their bodies and establishing their death.

- Site 85 had to be destroyed so that the equipment would not fall into enemy hands for subsequent analysis. In addition, any politically embarrassing evidence had to be eliminated.

- The Prime Minister of Laos, Souvanna Phouma, had to be informed of the situation to permit him to prepare a position against potential communist charges of American involvement at Site 85.

As more details of casualties were obtained from survivors and a concentrated search and rescue effort was conducted at the site, American losses became somewhat clearer. Of the nineteen Americans at the site, sixteen had been site technicians, two were CAS
representatives, and there had been one Attache Office FAC. The CAS representatives and the FAC were rescued. The senior CAS representative had been slightly wounded. Of the sixteen American technicians, five were extracted (one died en route), eight were known to be dead, and three others were unaccounted for, but presumed dead. There was the possibility that the bodies of the missing three men might have fallen from the ledge where the Americans hid. Off the ledge, there was a sheer drop of almost 2,000 feet.

Presuming those who were not evacuated on the morning of 11 March were dead, a fairly concentrated air effort was launched on that same day to destroy the technical and personal equipment left behind on Site 85. The major phase of this activity ended on 15 March but further examination revealed one strike each at Site 85 on 19, 22, and 28 March. The 22 March strike included a Bull-Pup missile.

On the morning of 13 March, the American Ambassador met with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos. The Ambassador related that the facilities at Site 85 had not been destroyed prior to evacuation, but that USAF napalm strikes were being delivered against the site. He also told of the American losses and that some of the bodies had not been found. The Ambassador reported Phouma's reaction:

"Souvanna winced at these two items of information and said they increased the risks that enemy could be able, if he chose, to make some pretty damaging disclosures."
Both the Ambassador and the Prime Minister noted that no mention of incriminating evidence had yet been made by either the Laotian Communist or North Vietnamese Racios. They agreed that the best thing to do was to "sit tight" and see what evidence the enemy had accumulated and what he planned to do with it. The Ambassador's report of the meeting concluded with the following comment:

"Souvanna obviously does...not wish to make decision on posture he will take towards potential Communist exploitation of this incident until he knows how damaging their evidence is. He urged me to destroy as much evidence as we can rapidly. Since his position is understandable, I did not repeat not try to press him one way or another on contingency statements."

Epilogue

It is difficult to firmly establish the enemy intentions without access to enemy documents and plans. Of course these were not available for this study. However, after analyzing the data which were available, a number of observations are offered.

Apparently Site 85 was not the single target of enemy aims in the dry season offensive which began in November 1967. Indeed, Site 85 appeared to have been only one of the friendly strong points which the enemy seemed determined to reduce in this area.

It is generally assumed that the enemy mounted his activities against Site 85 in order to destroy the Top Secret TSQ facilities at Phou Pha Thi. However, no documentary evidence of this fact has been
found in the research for this study, although the existence of such a specific objective can be neither confirmed nor denied. Certainly the enemy was aware of this guerrilla base near his vital supply routes; he also knew that there was a TACAN at Site 85. These two factors, alone, would have provided sufficient incentive.

Guerrilla forces do not normally stand and fight it out; generally this is not their function, unless they are called upon to defend a very vital interest. Realizing this, the enemy first attempted to eliminate friendly forces at this site with as small a commitment on his part as possible.

However, to supplement a small commitment, the enemy used a full barrage of propaganda. CAS reports for the entire period contained numerous references to Communist-held meetings and soldiers' statements which indicated enemy determination to capture Site 85. He used this tactic to enlist the active and passive support of the local populace; he may, also, have counted on these statements reaching the guerrilla defenders, thereby, undermining their will to resist and making them think it was senseless to stand and fight.

The first two attempts to take Phou Pha Thi, the small force advance which stalled at Phou Den Din in mid-December and the AN-2 Colt attack, were certainly not large commitments. After these failures, the enemy was forced to concentrate more troops and develop elaborate plans and support for them.
The application of airpower around Site 85 was intended to be responsive. Therefore, if the demand lessened or if targets could not be definitely fixed, the air effort proportionally contracted, for, there were other requirements elsewhere which had to be met. This was demonstrated by the lull in early February.

Airpower was the vital ingredient in halting what most probably was an enemy plan to take Site 85 in late February. But at that stage of events, as the accurate unofficial estimate of 25 February pointed out, even with successful ground harassment and continued airstrikes, the security of the site was doubtful after 10 March, because the attackers appeared willing to mount the necessary effort and accept the accompanying losses.

On the night of 10-11 March, the Attache Office in Vientiane reported at 0138L on the situation at Site 85 and stated that "sufficient resources" were available. At 0247L, the terms used were "sufficient air support". Unknown to anyone not at the TSQ location, the facilities were lost to the enemy no more than one hour later.

Site 85 had provided direction to about 1/4 of the USAF missions over North Vietnam and BARREL ROLL from November 1967 to 11 March 1968. No other facility existed to provide a similar coverage over these areas. While this loss was a serious blow to the USAF air effort, it was not crippling.

The possibility that evacuation might have to be carried out was
Although airpower was to be a major factor in the defense of Site 85, it could not be applied without limitations and restrictions. Defense of Site 85 was not the sole task of limited air resources in the Southeast Asian conflict. For example, during this same period, the 1968 Tet Offensive was underway in South Vietnam, the Marine outpost, Khe Sanh, was under siege, and there existed an unprecedented flow of enemy logistic traffic which had to be interdicted.

In addition, airpower could not be applied without major restrictions. As early as 8 December 1967, the U.S. Ambassador to Vientiane had withdrawn blanket approval for Commando Club strikes in BARREL ROLL, and instead, approved them on an individual basis. By 8 February 1968, only nine targets around Site 85 and outside the 12 km circle had been approved for Commando Club operations. With Commando Club strikes outside the 12 km circle limited to only approved targets, visual means had to be utilized if newly discovered targets, not on the authorized list, were also to be attacked. Visual strikes were limited by bad weather, which was particularly poor in early March. Hence, the defense of the site hinged considerably on the capability to visually acquire targets to be struck.

Within the 12 km circle, similar restrictions applied. It was not until 21 February that authorization was extended to the Local Area Defense Commander (LADC) to task the TSQ facility to conduct strikes against any target within the 12 km circle.
fully realized. Plans to accomplish the evacuation existed. However, a set of circumstances developed which negated their timely execution. Had personnel at either Vientiane or the command post at Site 85 been aware of the situation at the TSQ/TACAN location atop Phou Pha Thi, steps might have been taken to eliminate the infiltrators, safely evacuate the technicians, and destroy the classified facilities. But the loss of intersite communications between the personnel at the facility and the command post prevented this action. Subsequent decisions were based on incomplete and erroneous information.

One question, basic to the relation of events in the fall of Site 85, has not been fully answered by available documentation and information: how did a twenty man team, armed with automatic weapons reach the top of Phou Pha Thi unnoticed?

Messages already quoted in this study described the defensive arrangements at the site. The northwestern side of the mountain was a sheer cliff of nearly 2,000 feet. Other approaches were heavily mined. In addition, by early January there were "200 troops in immediate vicinity of site; and additional 800 troops in the lower portions of the mountain."

It has been surmised that the enemy infiltrators scaled the 2,000 foot cliff. This theory might appear to account for the lack of any kind of warning before the enemy force hit the American technicians and captured the summit. However, this does not explain how twenty heavily armed soldiers climbed a 2,000 foot cliff at night, unnoticed by 200
defenders. Nor does it relate why these twenty infiltrators were not eliminated by the defenders atop Phou Pha Thi. Apparently the friendly troops at lower elevations held fast against the enemy attacks.

On 14 March 1968, the Commander, 7AF, sent a message to the American Ambassador in Vientiane:

"I am concerned about the need for a postmortem analysis on the loss of Site 85. In terms of assessing whether future sites should be established believe it important to determine how a relatively small force was able to take such an allegedly well defended installation. No indications have been received here as to what efforts if any were made by local defense forces on site to defend installation, especially in view of clear indications of impending attack. Your views on how future sites might be defended in view of experience with Site 85 would be appreciated."

The Ambassador replied on 16 March. He concurred that a postmortem on the loss of Site 85 was in order, and suggested that procedures for such an analysis be jointly developed by 7AF and Embassy representatives. Regarding the size of the enemy forces, the Ambassador explained:

"Believe you should understand, however, that enemy force was not... 'relatively small.' Our intelligence indicates their numbers between five and seven battalions, with artillery and rocket support, considerably outnumbering local defense forces, which never numbered more than 1,000 men in 12 kilometer defensive perimeter which drawn around Site 85."

It was also emphasized by the Ambassador that his office had "made clear from the beginning" that the site could not be defended
against a determined and superior enemy force. He also stated that the Embassy had given regular and accurate estimates of the site's progressive deterioration, and as early as 26 February, had advised that the site would probably not be held beyond 10 March. "Therefore, its fall should have come as no surprise to anyone," he said. The Ambassador made the following additional observations:

"The manner in which enemy accomplished its fall is, however, instructive, and should, I think be carefully studied with view to future operations. Artillery fire, at relatively long range, was surprisingly accurate. According fragmentary reports of survivors, direct hits were scored, very early in the barrage, upon personnel quarters, operations structure, and bunkers. It seems possible that installations were rendered effectively inoperable even before destruction order was given. There may be some lessons in this which should be studied with respect to length of time technical personnel should be required stay at their posts after installation falls within artillery range. In hindsight, it seems to me we should have pulled all technicians out morning March 10 even if this means losing the last several hours of the installation's capabilities.

"What concerns me most is not the defensive action, but the disruption of preplanned evacuation procedure. It is still not clear why technical personnel went over cliff to a narrow ledge rather than down trail to chopper pad. CAS and local personnel subsequently went up same trail to installation searching for technicians, so we know trail was traversable, even if under artillery fire. It is also not clear to me how small Vietnamese suicide squad got to installation site, although it seems they must have scaled the cliff which all of us considered impassable."

Within a few weeks of the fall of Site 85, the President ordered the cessation of bombing over the northern two-thirds of North Vietnam. As of the publication of this study, bombing in this area has not been
resumed. No replacement facility for the TSQ-81 has been built. During a farewell visit with the American Ambassador in Vientiane on 2 July, the 7AF Commander discussed with him the requirement for additional navigational aids in North Laos and agreed to reexamine requirements. The Ambassador reported on this discussion:

"We both feel that, in current circumstances, there is no justifiable requirement for MSQ installation in Laos. Therefore, our site selection in country or in neighboring Thailand ought, for the time being, concern itself with TACAN sites. In this connection General Momyer agreed to review prospects for TACAN at Site 36 and one on prominent hill in Thailand. I agreed reexamine MSQ problem again in event bombing operations resume north of 20th parallel."
FOOTNOTES

1. (TS) Laos Situation Briefing, CAS to CINCPACAF, Sep 67.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. (TS) Interview with Maj Arlie R. Conner, Commando Club Project Officer, DOSO, 7/13AF, Udorn AB, Thailand, 25 Mar 68. (Hereafter cited: interview with Conner, 25 Mar 68.)

5. (S) Opresp-4 extracts, 1 Nov 67 - 10 Mar 68, Hq 7/13AF, Udorn AB, Thailand, and Hq 7AF, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN. (Hereafter cited: Opresp-4 extracts.; (TS) discussions with Capt Thomas E. Penick, DOCNAV, 7AF, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. (TS) Interview with Conner, 25 Mar 68.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. (S) North Laos briefing, CAS to CINCPACAF, Dec 67.

19. Ibid.

20. (C) CAS Report, Field Office, Vientiane, (FOV) 12520, 27 Nov 67.

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21. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
27. (S) Msg, CSAF to USAFO, Vientiane, Laos, 7 Dec 67.
29. (S) Msg, American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos to CINCPAC, 3 Jan 68.
30. Ibid.
31. (C) CAS Report, FOV 12923, 8 Jan 68.
32. Ibid.
33. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13021, 15 Jan 68.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid; (S/NF) Msg, American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos to Secretary of State, 12 Jan 68.
38. (CNF) CAS Report, FOV 12964, Subj: Enemy Air Attack on Site 85, 12 Jan 68. Doc. 3.
39. (S) Msg, American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos to Secretary of State, Subj: Air Attack on Site 85, 13 Jan 68. Doc. 4.
40. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13057, 20 Jan 68.
41. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13098, 25 Jan 68.
42. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13068, 22 Jan 68.
43. (SNF) CAS Report, FOV 13100, Subj: Security Appraisal of Site 85, late Jan 68. Doc. 5.

44. (SNF) Report, Subj: AA Installations at Site 85, DI, 7/13AF, Udorn AB, Thailand to AFSSO, 13 AF, Clark AB, Philippines, 17 Jan 68.

45. (SNF) Msg, Dep Comdr 7/13AF to Hq 7AF, Subj: AAA Defenses TACAN Channel 97, 1 Feb 68. Doc. 6.

46. (SNF) Report, AA Installations at Site 85, DI, 7/13AF to AFSSO, Hq 13AF, 17 Jan 68.

47. (S) Msg, JUSMAGT to Dep Comdr 7/13AF, 26 Jan 68.

48. (SNF) CAS Report, FOV 13100, late Jan 68; and (S/LIMDIS) Memo on Changes at Site 85, 4802 JLD to DI, 7/13AF, 1 Feb 68.

49. (S) Oprep-4 extracts.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. (TS/NF) Rpt, DO, 7/13AF to Dep Comdr, 7/13AF and DO, 7AF, 25 Jan 68.

53. Ibid.

54. (S) Msg, 7AF to 7/13AF, DOSO, 5 Feb 68.

55. (S) Oprep-4 extracts.

56. Ibid.

57. (SNF) Msg, 7AF to AIRA, Vientiane, Laos, 7 Feb 68.

58. (S) Msg, USAIRA, Vientiane, Laos to Hq 7AF, 8 Feb 68. Doc. 7.

59. Ibid.

60. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13141, 30 Jan 68.

61. Ibid.

62. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13153, 31 Jan 68.

63. (S) 1330Z 30 Jan 68 entry, 7/13AF TACC Log. (Hereafter cited: Entry in 7/13AF TACC Log.)

64. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13153, 31 Jan 68.
65. Ibid.

66. (C) CAS FOV Reports, 31 Jan 68-16 Feb 68.

67. Ibid.

68. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13220, 6 Feb 68.

69. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13249, 9 Feb 68.

70. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13347, 19 Feb 68.

71. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13288, 13 Feb 68.

72. (S) Oprep-4 extracts.

73. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13347, 19 Feb 68.

74. (C) CAS FOV Report, 23 Feb 68, no FOV number.

75. (SNF) CAS Report, FOV 13429, 25 Feb 68, Doc. 8; (C) CAS Reports FOV 13415, 24 Feb 68, and FOV 13375, 20 Feb 68, Doc. 9.

76. (SNF) CAS Report, FOV 13429, 25 Feb 68.

77. (CNF) CAS Report, FOV unknown, 23 Feb 68; and CAS Report, FOV 13468, 28 Feb 68. Doc. 10.

78. Ibid.

79. (TSNF) Msg, USAIRA, Vientiane, Laos to Hq 7AF, 17 Feb 68.

80. (SNF) CAS Report, FOV 13429, 25 Feb 68.

81. (TS) Msg, USAIRA, Vientiane, Laos to Hq 7AF, 21 Feb 68.

82. (S) Oprep-4 extracts.

83. (S) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 23 Feb 68. Doc. 11.

84. (S) Oprep-4 extracts.

85. (SNF) CAS Report, FOV 13429, 25 Feb 68.

86. Ibid.

87. (S) Msg, American Ambassador, Vientiane, Laos to CSAF, 26 Feb 68.

88. (S) Memo on Emergency Evacuation Plan for Site 85, CAS to DO, 7/13AF 24 Feb 68.
89. Ibid.

90. (TSNF) Memo on Helicopter RON at Site 98, Dep Comdr 7/13AF to American Ambassador, Vientiane, Laos, 2 Mar 68.

91. (TSNF) Msg, USAIRA, Vientiane, Laos to 7/13AF, 4 Mar 68.

92. (S) Memo on Emergency Evacuation Plan for Site 85, CAS to DO, 7/13AF, 24 Feb 68.

93. (S) Movements plotted from data and locations contained in CAS FOV Reports.

94. (TS) Msg, 7AF to USAIRA, Vientiane, Laos, 2 Mar 68.

95. (S) Oprep-4 extracts.

96. (TS/LIMDIS) Msg, 7AF, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN to CINCPACAF, DOCO, 051215Z Mar 68.

97. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF to 7/13AF, 5 Mar 68.

98. (S) Oprep-4 extracts.

99. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13613, 10 Mar 68.

100. (S) Oprep-4 extracts.

101. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13596, 9 Mar 68.

102. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13599, 9 Mar 68.

103. (SNF) Undated debriefing of unnamed senior CAS representative at Site 85. (Hereafter cited: Debriefing Report.) Doc. 12.

104. (S) Entries in 7/13AF TACC Log, 9 Mar 68.

105. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13612, 10 Mar 68.

106. (C) Memo, Subj: Projected Meo Moves, CAS to 7/13AF, 10 Mar 68.

107. (S) Interview with two wounded survivors of Site 85, 11 Mar 68 at Udorn AB, Thailand. (Hereafter cited: Interview with Survivors.)


109. (S) Entry in 7/13AF TACC Log, 10 Mar 68.

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111. (S) Entry in 7/13AF TACC Log, 10 Mar 68.
112. (S) Interview with survivors.
113. (S) Oprep-4 extracts; (S) Entry in 7/13AF TACC Log, 10 Mar 68.
114. (S) Msg, JANAF, Vientiane, Laos to JCS, 10 Mar 68.
115. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13619, 10 Mar 68.
116. (S) Entry in 7/13AF TACC Log, 10 Mar 68.
117. (SNF) Msg, AFSSO, Udorn AB, Thailand to AFSSO, 7AF, 11 Mar 68.
118. (S) Msg, JANAF, Vientiane, Laos to JCS, 10 Mar 68.
120. (S) Interview with survivors.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
127. (S) Interview with survivors.
128. (S) Msgs, JANAF, Vientiane, Laos to JCS, 10-11 Mar 68.
130. (S) Msg, JANAF, Vientiane, Laos to JCS, 10 Mar 68.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
135. (S) Msg, 432TRW, DOCP, Udorn Ab, Thailand to AIG 913, 11 Mar 68.
136. (S) CAS Report, FOV 13620, 11 Mar 68. Doc. 15.
137. (S) CAS Report, FOV 13640, 12 Mar 68; (S) Msg, American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos to Secretary of State, 12 Mar 68. Doc. 16.
138. (C) CAS Report, FOV 13680, 14 Mar 68.
139. (S) Entry in 7/13AF TACC Log, 11 Mar 68.
140. (TS) Msg, USAIRA, Vientiane, Laos to 7AF, 12 Mar 68, Doc. 17.
141. (S) Msg, American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos to Secretary of State, 12 Mar 68.
142. Ibid.
143. (S) Oprep-4 extracts.
144. (TS) Msg, American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos to Secretary of State, 13 Mar 68. Doc. 18.
145. Ibid.
146. (S) Discussions with Brig Gen G. J. Keegan, Jr., DCS/Intelligence, Hq 7AF, 10 Jun 68.
147. (S) Msg, 7AF to American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos, 14 Mar 68.
149. Ibid.
150. (S) Msg, American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos to Sec State, Vientiane 7592, 3 Jul 68.
### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCCC</td>
<td>Airborne Command and Control Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Auto Defense de Choc</td>
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<td>CBU</td>
<td>Cluster Bomb Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forward Air Controller</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>km</td>
<td>kilometer</td>
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<tr>
<td>LADC</td>
<td>Local Area Defense Commander</td>
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<td>mm</td>
<td>millimeter</td>
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<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td>Pathet Lao</td>
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<td>RBS</td>
<td>Radar Bomb Scoring</td>
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<td>RON</td>
<td>Remain Over Night</td>
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<td>RR</td>
<td>Recoilless Rifle</td>
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<td>RRA</td>
<td>Radio Relay Aircraft</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<td>Tactical Air Control and Navigation</td>
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