PROJECT
CHECO
SOUTHEAST ASIA
REPORT
# PART V - AIR OPERATIONS

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PART V-A
   Supporting documents (Copies 1 and 2; only)

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AIR OPERATIONS

The air operations in RVN against the Viet Cong (see Part III) were conducted under the same overall conditions as those were reviewed in Part III and with the military situation and relationships which were treated in Part IV. With the preceding monographs as background, it was the intent in writing "Air Operations" to avoid repetition. Thus, broader issues, although implying upon air operations, may be found among the other monographs. For example, the topic of indiscriminate bombing was treated in Part III, border violations and destruction to civilian air operations are also treated in Part III; the doctrinal policies involving air operations were discussed at some length in Part IV, training of the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) will be found in Part VI.

The activity in RVN was extensive. The implications of unilateral and joint testing were reviewed in Part III and Part IV. However, test results have been documented in separate unilateral and joint reports, this monograph treats the subject of air operations only, as differentiated from operational tests and evaluations.
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CONCEPT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

On 8 December 1964, Admiral Felt sent a draft of an outline plan for RVN military action against the Viet Cong to the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (COSAG-V). The overview of the plan was: "To conduct a timely, aggressive, coordinated field campaign to defeat the communist insurgency and restore order to South Vietnam." 1

Felt acknowledged that the communist insurgency in South Vietnam had grown to such proportions that immediate response by the RVNAF was required initially to contain and then to defeat the communists. The counterinsurgency plan (CIP) was the primary instrument for coordinating various governmental level efforts directed toward achieving internal security in RVN.

The CIP provided for the following campaign objectives: 2

1. Gain control of critical areas, key facilities and the largest portion of the civilian populace of South Vietnam by concurrent, coordinated military operations designed to place the maximum pressure against Viet Cong targets at the proper time and place.

2. Maintain a posture near the 17th parallel that will deter overt aggression.

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operation directed that emphasis be placed on attacking VC support bases, severing VC "lifelines" by attacking and neutralizing VC land infiltration routes; stopping communist seaborne infiltration, and, providing close air support to infantry forces by the establishment of simple but effective air/ground support techniques. Operations were to be conducted to destroy the VC in the most heavily populated areas of RVN in order to gain, and then maintain, total control, control of those areas.

Step-by-step neutralization of specific objective areas was to be emphasized until the population was completely controlled, protected, and brought into alignment with GVN counterinsurgency efforts. This was to be accomplished by the effective, coordinated employment of Civil Guard, police, civil affairs, civil police, and the Self Defense Corps, supported by functional communications and intelligence systems and mobile reserves of regular forces.

With regard to air operations, Felt stressed:

(a) Close air support to include timely strikes against enemy targets located by operating forces and the employment of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft for tactical troop lift.
On 27 October 1961, after a trip to Thirtieth Air Force during which he had

discussions with Major General Maddox, felt advised his office that the 1 December (1961) deadline for

having JUNGLE JIM in place was unsatisfactory and

must be expedited. Draft my recommendation to CSAF

without further ado which should be to the effect

that we are ready to move JUNGLE JIM unit and it

should get underway immediately provided there are

no major logistics impediments.” Felt had already

received assurance from CIA that they would acquire

all available helicopters - couriers and augment

- TAB "A" in this memorandum is a working paper pre-

pared by Second Air Division for Commanders-

Ambassador Nolting had been queried by the State

Department concerning the use of air power in RVN.

Nolting requested MAC-V to assist in formulating

a reply, and the input from Second Air Division

was in response to MAC-V’s request. TAB "A"

represents a comprehensive document which places

in perspective many of the uses and effects of

CSAF air resources in RVN.
Susequently, Headquarters TACAF proposed to CONUS a concept of employment of "Farm Gate" (NODEL UIM) in covert operations. Utilizing the function of training the VNAF as a corps, the aircraft and personnel of Detachment 1, 2400th CTES would be used in support of RVNAF actions against the Viet Cong within the borders of RVN. The concept envisioned, "all feasible operational activity," on Viet Cong targets, and would be in addition to the advisory and training functions.

In the proposal, T-28's were to conduct aerial resupply, air drops of ARVN paratroopers. tactical intelligence collection and psychological warfare. The T-28's were to conduct close support operations, visual armed reconnaissance and interdiction. T-28's were to conduct close support operations, photo and armed reconnaissance, interdictions and shipping surveillance. "A central environment (TACS), and improved point-to-point and air-ground communications will be required to compress reaction time and to permit full utilization of aircraft available."
CINCPAC agreed with the PACAF proposal:

In addition, the operational test and combat support flights previously authorized by JCS and CINCPAC to train the VNAF, as decided at the SEC PAC meeting in December, all of which were non-tactical combat and combat support flights, can be flown by VNDF and the Detachment if the Vietnam Air Force staff provides a Vietnamese liaison officer aboard for purpose of transmitting combat support training.

FARM GATE deployment to have maximum benefit on 5 November 1961. The first local familiarization and orientation flights in SVN started 30 December 1961 and the first assigned mission was flown in December 1961.

RMI Deployment

The VNAF had no rules of engagement in late 1961 except to avoid overflying the boundaries of neighbor nations. Once an air strike was approved by the AOC or higher authority, the pilots were free to execute the seizure. Neither the VNAF nor the RNDF had rules of engagement for air defense.

Upon being advised of this, Admiral Felt suggested to COMUSNAVF that the VNAF be assisted, if they so desired, in developing rules of engagement initially for air defense. Admiral Felt then proposed guidelines for the interception, identification, and destruction of hostile aircraft intruding into the airspace of SVN.
CINCPAC agreed with the PACAF proposal.

In addition to operational tests, and combat support flights previously authorized by NE and PACAF to train the VNAF, as decided at the Sec Def meeting 16 December, all kinds of conventional combat and combat support flights can be flown in SVN by Detachment 2, 4400th CCTS provided a VNAF fighter is on board for purpose of receiving combat OUP training.

TANG GATE deployment to Bien Hoa had begun on 5 November 1966. The first local familiarization and orientation flights in SVN started immediately upon arrival and the first assigned missions took place in November 1966.

Rules of Engagement

The year had no rules of engagement in late 1966 except to avoid overflying the boundaries of neighbor nations. Once an air strike was approved by the AOC or higher authority, the pilot was free to strike the target. Neither had any rules of engagement for air defense.

Upon being advised of this, CINCPAC suggested to CHMAAG-V that the VNAF be assisted, if they so desired, in developing rules of engagement--initially for air defense. Admiral Felt then proposed guidelines for the interception, identification, and destruction of hostile aircraft intruding into the airspace of SVN.

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TOP SECRET-NOPORIN
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VNAF acquired the organzation and directed the rules of engagement. By late April 1962, NSB had approved them and was in the process of coordinating them with other government agencies. 10

MAC 7 Directive Number 62, 24 November 1962, established operational procedures for US aircraft to be employed in combat support missions. FARM GATE aircraft could operate only with a combined US and Vietnamese crew. The aircraft were to have VNAF markings. C-123's were to have US markings, and be operated with a combined US and Vietnamese crew. 11

Armament was provided in the SH-34J's and utilized from US Army CH-21C's and USMC UH-34D's; however, Directive 62 specified, "... for defensive purposes only. Armament in such aircraft will not be utilized to initiate fires upon any targets unless, if the aircraft is fired upon, it may return the fire. Aircraft will be US marked and named." 12

US Army armed UH-1's were to be used defensively only. They were not to initiate fires upon any targets, however, if they, or any aircraft they were escorting, were fired upon, they could return the fire. These aircraft were to bear US markings. 13
The US Army Mi-35s were to be utilized in an armed configuration in combat support missions when specifically directed by COMINCAP-V. The armament was to be used only defensively. "These aircraft will not be utilized as strike aircraft." They were to bear US markings and be manned with a US-Vietnamese crew.

Thus, there were aircraft operating within the Republic of Vietnam which had VNAF markings and Vietnamese crews, VNAF markings and US-Vietnamese crews, US markings and US-Vietnamese crews, and US markings with US crews.

Admiral Felt pointed out to General Harris that JCS message number 597 of 6 September 1962 had authorized the initiation of fires by armed aircraft engaged in escort.\textsuperscript{12}

By definition (JCS 9177) suppressive fires resulting from escort missions are considered defensive fire. You should amend paragraphs 50 and 6 of JCS message 8678 to indicate armament on AH-1's and CH-21/CH-34's may be used to initiate fire provided enemy target is clearly identified and it is a threat to the safety of the helicopter and passengers.

Moreover, JCS message 0610 of 16 February 1963 had authorized an amendment to the rules of engagement pertaining specifically to US
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Helicopters in SVN, to allow them to engage non-exclusively identified Viet Cong forces considered a threat to the safety of the aircraft and their passengers. JCS stated that during a visit of their team to SVN it was found that the JCS message of September 1962 concerning rules of engagement for armed Army helicopters had been erroneously interpreted to mean that the helicopter must wait to be fired upon before initiating return fire. "Such interpretation is more restrictive than was the intent . . . ." 13

General Harkins, referring to a test plan for the Mohawk proposed by the Department of the Army, asserted that the rules of engagement would have to be changed to permit the test. 15

To be effective in escort role, Mohawks must operate within the rules of engagement as other escort aircraft, i.e., armed helicopters.

1. Expanding role of Mohawks to include combat support helicopter will add another resource to support available to ground commanders.

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4. If test is approved, Mohawks will be used in escort of helicopters when desired by ground commanders.

a. On operations where Mohawks performed initial recon of operational area and/or landing zones.

b. On quick reaction type airborne operations.

c. Testing and evaluation will be accomplished during operational missions and no missions will be conducted solely for purpose of test.

The Mohawk test in the role of an armed escort for transport aircraft was subsequently approved.

It was recognized at the outset that great improvement in the military intelligence system in RVN was essential to successful operations. At the first Sec Def conference it was agreed to expand our intelligence effort and to seek integration of the US intelligence effort with that of the GVN. By February 1962, the basic plan for integrating the US and GVN intelligence efforts had been approved by JCS and the GVN, and 10 of the 176 authorized US intelligence advisors were in place. Work had begun on establishing a valid intelligence system. 

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basic Order of Battle. Among the problems confronting the intelligence effort were inadequate space and the fact that few of the intelligence analysts had had prerequisite training and experience in the geographic area. 

At the third Sec Def conference, 19 February 1962, Secretary McNamara asked if the United States did not have the necessary intelligence people. General Lemnitzer replied that the Army had plenty of specialists in that field. Lemnitzer listed the priorities for successful operations as intelligence, communications, and mobility. McNamara then asked what had happened to the VC; in July (1961) they had been reported to have a strength of 12,300 in December (1961) 17,000, and in January (1962) 20-25,000. "Have they increased or have we been understating?" The answer given the Secretary was that the increase resulted from differences in methods of evaluating and estimating the unknowns. McNamara noted that if we don't have a firm Order of Battle "today", we cannot determine what the changes in VC strength have been. Admiral Felt closed the subject by commenting that we are dealing with a real "guess-timate".
At the fifth Sec Def Conference in May 1962, the intelligence net was reported to have 92% of the required people and 98% of the equipment. However, the complete US intelligence net was not yet functioning.

On 23 July 1962, Secretary McNamara observed that intelligence reports received in Washington did not always reflect all that he wanted to know and were not what he expected in the light of the US effort in intelligence. Mr. Kinnaird (US Embassy, Saigon) expressed the opinion that there was more tactical intelligence available than could be acted upon by the RVNAF.

McNamara suggested that tactical intelligence might not be the problem. "... At the Washington level, US agencies have a feeling of insecurity as to what is happening in SVN. In brief, they need to know present trends and the outlook for the future." 23

In March 1963, COMMUNIST observed. 23

... The political conditions in Southeast Asia point toward an increase and not a decrease of Communist influence. In consonance with Communist global objectives, the external threat to the Republic of Vietnam will continue and would increase unless solutions external to Vietnam are found. ...
In USAF and joint doctrine, the Tactical Air Control System (TACS) was the instrument through which tactical airpower was controlled and employed. Thus TACS was a substantive point of focus in the G3/5 airpower policy, which involved organic vs centralized air. (See Part IV)

Precisely because TACS was a focus of contention, it had entered, directly or indirectly, into many other missions, programs, and decisions treated elsewhere in this monograph, and in Parts III, IV, and V as well. Treatment of TACS in this section has therefore been truncated to avoid repetition.***

*** See Part III, p. 86-95.
** See 739 & A, p. 200, 8.
* For additional detail on TACS, see History of Second ADVON, 15 Nov 61-8 Oct 62, Chapter 17, and Hq PACAF Test Directive No. 63-4, Operational Test & Evaluation TACS in Republic of Vietnam, Part II, 64, File, Hq 26th Air Division, APO 143, San Francisco, California.
On 19 November 1969, General O'Donnell advised...
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To provide for more efficient planning of air strikes against the Viet Cong, a JOE should be established, preferably at Tan Son Nhut, in consideration of its proximity to the Vietnamese Air Force and the army headquarters. This element would include US and VN Army, Navy and Air Force personnel and would perform both the JOE and JOA functions.

O'Donnell's letter included 16 attachments delineating each item as a proposed organization for TACS and JOE, a chart depicting VHF/UHF communications, a JOE/UHF communications net, and communications equipment for JOE, ASSOC's, CRC and CHC.

Admiral Felt, in a message of 2 December 1964, to Lt. Gen. Lewis C. McCarr, CINMACV stated:

"General O'Donnell's letter of 1 November 1964 proposed the installation of a US manned and operated limited TACS in SVN to permit reporting and timely allocation of air effort, more precise application and faster response. It is in agreement with these objectives.

Felt commented that the system proposed by McCarr was "rudimentary" by US standards and appeared to be inadequate to handle combined VNAF-US air resources. "The system proposed by McCarr has adequate capacity to handle both."

At his Sec Def conference of 16 December 1965, McNamara made the decision to..."
Deployment began on 1 January 1962. The system began operation just 3 days later. 18

By April 1962, Air Liaison Officers (ALO's) had been assigned to Corps and Division level. 26

By May 1962, the Commander Troops and the Chief Army Division MACV had made joint inspections and visits to ARVN field commands down to battalion level to encourage and assist in speeding reaction time within the ARVN request net. 26

As a result of these trips the Commander MACV pointed out that the US Army supplied equipment, as well as the procedures taught by US Army Signal advisors, needed revision and updating for counterinsurgency warfare. 21

For example, it is believed that air requests here not pass up through chain of command but rather go directly to ASOC, since in jungle terrain there to identify an enemy to use other type firepower (i.e., artillery, possible. Intermediate units should submit requests and disapprove only when absolutely essential.)
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Moreover, the point of doctrine regarding
the range of communications equipment between
army and air units had apparently been over-
looked. The US Army had supplied ARVN with
over 10,000 FM transmitters, though the unit had no
FM capability.

On 30 July 1962, General Archilles, in a

letter to Chief, MACV-2, took the position that
the ALO's should directly advise ARVN commanders
on tactical air operations.

USAF Air Liaison Officers (ALO's)
have been stationed with ARVN divi-
sions for the past three months, increas-
ing use and effectiveness of air sup-
port of ground operations during this
period in accordance with the wishes of
the ALO program. Because of the unique
situation in SVN, where US forces
operate in a purely advisory capacity,
problems can arise over their

duties and responsibilities. Since

ALO's are now being permanently

assigned at the division level, this

is an appropriate time to review their

status.

The Joint Air-Ground Operations
Manual, CCAR-251-100-1, 15 Septem-
ber 1957, states the primary duty of
the ALO is to act as principal advisor
to the Army unit commander and staff
for matters pertaining to tactical air
operations. In SVN, due to the non-
availability of VNAF pilots, the USAF
ALO is the only advisor available to
the ARVN Commander who has experience
in the application and capabilities of
tactical air support. Therefore, the
primary duty of the ALO in SVN is
to advise the ARVN Commander in
the use of air to best support his
mission.

On 16 August 1967, MAJ GEN VANCE, USA,
CHMAAG-V replied:

"It is recognized that CONCAR TT
110-100-4 of 15 December 77 pre-
ccribed that the duty of the ALO is
to be the principal advisor to
the Army unit commander in matters
concerning tactical air operations.
However, this situation is intended
for application to a US division
and not in an ARVN division where
a need for an advisor is provided.

In order to provide unified,
coordinated advisory effort so
vital to the successful operation
of an ARVN division, it is of
prime importance that the advisors
act as a team. Therefore, the prin-
cipal duty of the USAF ALO, until
such time as an ALO is provided by
U.S. forces, must be to act as principal
Advisor to the US Senior Division
Adviser in matters of tactical air
support.

This controversy gained momentum and increased
resentment feelings and continued throughout the re-
mainder of 1962 and 1963. It resulted in a series
of letters and memoranda exchanged between CHMAAG-V,
his Chief of Staff, CHMAAG-V and Commander ZADIVON.
(Detailed documentation of the issue is contained
in supporting document Number 20.)

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MAC-V J-1 sent a message to its subordinate units on 22 April 1963 which stated:

"Discrepancies in the exchange of air activities between Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) and Air Support Operations Centers (ASOC) are repeatedly reported to this headquarters. To assist toward resolution of this problem, ALO's will monitor air activities within AAA's and ASOC's fully informed.

Incident occurred on 22 April 1963.

As referenced in your message, numerous cases of lack of coordination of air activities have been brought to the attention of your headquarters by 2nd Air Division. Until recent, reports have shown a lack of coordination procedures by aircraft operating in the TOC to reported incidents of information being refused to TACS representatives.

Charging ALO's with responsibility of monitoring air activities in units does not appear to be proper solution. Air activities are necessarily monitored in the ASOC, not the TOC. ALO's are assigned to be available to corps and division commanders as representatives of Air Component Command.

Second Air Division has repeatedly recommended to your headquarters placement of Army air representatives in ASOC's and JAOC. Army air representation is presently in the JAOC but no action has been taken in regard to their placement in ASOC's. It is recommended that air activities in the
AIR OPERATIONS

Air Forces under TACS represented less than three percent of the total number of allied forces in RVN during the first eight months of 1965--yet accounted for 38 percent of the Viet Cong KIA (see CHART V-1). Expressed in different terms, .420 VC was KIA for every man assigned to air forces under TACS--compared to .021 per man for all other military forces (see CHART V-2).

A multitude of records detailing air operations in RVN were available. The record included individual missions at the two extremes of effectiveness—from successful beyond expectation to poor or nil. Nevertheless, the statistics presented above were significant--on a man-for-man basis, air resources employed under TACS (3% of military) killed 20 times the number of VC (.420 vs .021 per man) as the rest of the military.
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>6,156</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>1,578</td>
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<td>Regular Surface Forces Total: 209,381</td>
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<td>Civil Guard</td>
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<td>Self Defense Corps: 100,188</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15,976</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| VC (Hardcore) | 26,000 |
| VC Militia    | 100,000 |
| TOTAL         | 126,000 |

Sources: HAEC Strength Report 31 Jul 63
PACOM-WPS Intel Digest 7 Jul 63
and 24 Jul 63
TOP SECRET-NOFORN

during that eight-month period.

The following accounts are representative of the operational air missions flown in SVN by USAF VNAF aircraft controlled under TACS.

SLAUS-ADM-K促进了

On 20 July 1962, a planned combined air operation took place against a known VC battalion headquarters located 55 miles west of Saigon. Four FARM GATE T-28's escorted 16 USMC and 16 US Army helicopters which carried ARVN troops.37

About this operation began to develop. RB-26, T-28 aircraft were held on ground alert to replace the AD-6's and T-28's as they expended their ordnance. A total of 74 sorties were flown by the T-28's, AD-6's, RB-26, C-47 and L-101's.
A report was received on 21 November 1962, from a Special Forces officer at Long Phu that a Catholic Youth outpost had been attacked by 300 VC of the Cuu Long Battalion (317th Battalion) at 1300 hours on 22 November. A VC platoon had been sighted at one location and an unknown number of VC at another location. Long Phu requested aerial reconnaissance.

A raid was made by 11 Special Forces officers at 15:00 hours and expended 1,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, 35 rockets, six 100 pound general purpose bombs, and six 120 pound fragmentation clusters. Results of the strike, based on ground observation reported from Long Phu on 24 November, were 65 VC killed, over 70 wounded, 26 small boats sunk, an engineer yard destroyed, and two mountains to be destroyed.

Of a total of 296 men in the battalion, only 35 emerged from the airstrike unscathed. Ground observers reported that the VC were building about 200 coffins to bury the dead. A reasonable doubt existed that the VC Battalion which had been destroyed was actually the Cuu Long Battalion.
TOP SECRET - NOFORN

On 20 November, a request reached the top echelon for an urgent emergency supply of ammunition. The delivery was delivered at 1400 hours on 22 November to Long Phu, a mission was requested through the new VIP route, involving a direct flight from a previously used emergency airfield at Bien Hoa. 42

Four aircraft from the 42nd Bombardment Wing were called upon to supply ammunition. Despite a request received at 0600 hours on 22 November for an urgent emergency supply of ammunition; the delivery was delivered at 1400 hours on 22 November to Long Phu. A mission was requested through the new VIP route, involving a direct flight from a previously used emergency airfield at Bien Hoa. 42

On 22 November, two VC struck a small coastal town in Hon Long which was defended by the SFC. An airstrike was requested. The strike was made and resulted in 24 VC KIA. One SFC was killed during the VC attack. 42

Interdiction

There were three general types of interdiction targets involved in the war against the VC. 43
1. Structures abandoned by people relocated into strategic hamlets. The purpose of pre-planned interdiction missions against such structures was to deny to the VC their use as dwellings, training centers, arms factories, storage depots, etc.

2. Structures abandoned by the VC during ARVN operations against them. Immediately following the operation, and after GVN forces had withdrawn from the area, ARVN often requested air strikes to destroy the remaining structure.

3. Targets of known VC concentrations, headquarters, storage areas, communications and control centers, arms manufacturing facilities, etc. These targets were normally located in remote areas where the air interdiction mission was the only feasible method of destroying them.

On 27 May 1962, a joint ARVN/NPA-PAD operation took place in the southern section of I Corps. The requirement derived from JGS/MAC-V. The objective was to destroy a VC assembly area and an active VC radio installation. B-26, AH-6, and T-28 aircraft flew 28 sorties in the space of a few hours and expended napalm, .50 caliber and 20 mm ammunition, rockets and 100 to 1000 pound GP bombs, some of which had delay fuses.
TOP SECRET-NORFOHN

In addition to the structures destroyed, the VC radio went off the air. Since this air force operation was not followed by ground action, exact number figures were impossible to acquire. However, President Diem's political advisor, Mr. Thu, reported from his private source that approximately four hundred VC were killed. (Such unconfirmed reports were not used in KIA computations previously cited.)

The following is an extract from After Action Report, "Dari Zioa 166", dated 13 March 1963. The report was prepared by the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) of the 311 Tactical Zone, and forwarded to III Corps ASOC:

* * * * * *

The air strike was requested on 6 March 1963 for the following day. ARVN forces in the jungle felt that they had discovered a VC regiment and wanted to soften it up before attacking. The air strike came off as scheduled and the following results were noted by Major Dresden, BC, in Zioa 166 accompanied the ARVN forces.

(1) The aircraft were all on target. The jungle covering was very thick in the target area, but Major Pitts stated that the accuracy of the air-strikes was uncanny.

(2) Thirty-eight structures were found in the target area and all but six were burning when friendly troops entered the area.

TOP SECRET-NORFOHN
The napalm penetrated through the thick jungle covering to an estimated to be 70 to 80 feet tall all the way to the ground. In one area where napalm hit, everything within 20 square meters was burnt to the ground and trees were scorched out to 100 meters.

Rocket fragments, 20 mm cannon shells and casings were scattered throughout the target area.

Three large blood spots were found in different areas, but no estimate can be made of actual casualties as the VC carry their dead away and sweep up blood traces.

In all the camp areas were bomb shelters. These shelters were dug 6 to 8 feet below the ground and have logs 6 to 8 inches in diameter covering them. On top of the logs, 12 to 14 inches of hard packed clay is placed.

Escort -- Airland Assault

The following was extracted from Headquarters PACAF (PFOC) files on Operation Duc Thang, 2 January 1967: It is a reconstruction of the operation, prepared on 21 January 1963:

1. Military operations in South Vietnam on 2 January included one operation (TAY NINH) which was planned to be significant, and one operation (DUC THANG) which subsequent events made significant. During the planning stage, Operation TAY NINH was thought to be the most important, according to intelligence estimates. The objectives...
were so lucrative that TAY NINH was allocated all the available strike aircraft in the southern part of South Vietnam, totaling 15 A-1H's, 4 A-37's, 2 A-3's, and 2 T-28's. On 31 December the final decision was made to use the T-28's for air strike missions only. The reason for this was to allow the J-3 of the RVNAF to control all air support for the TAY NINH operation. This decision was not supported by the Commander of the IV Corps, who informed the Joint Coordinator that his unit, TAY NINH, would not be supported.

Operation Due Thang was instituted at 0730 hours on 2 January. There was no formal notification to the Joint Operations Center that the operation would be undertaken. The JOC was not given an opportunity to apply air support that might have been available in time to be applied to Due Thang. There appears to have been a decision to employ Army helicopters without reference to the JOC and other competent advisors on the use of tactical air support.

On the fatal day, both operations started concurrently. 48 aircraft supporting the TAY NINH operation were airborne between 0800 and 0900 hours. Two A-1H's and 2 A-37's were with the TAY NINH force as an air reserve. It is important to note that all the T-28's were highly successful. Thirty-eight VC were killed and a radio station was silenced (if not deliberately taken off the air due to VC prior knowledge). Strikes were made against the Viet Cong Central Committees for Staff and Finance, War, Logistic, Public Action, Special Services, Protective Service, Intelligence and Communication centers for North Vietnam. Friendly ground forces moved into this VC alleged stronghold unopposed.
4. The DUC THANG operation was quite another story. Five OH-1H's and 9's were utilized as the only air support for the 10 CH-21's conducting lifts into the target area. The operation proceeded as scheduled without incident until the 4th lift into the area. At this time, the gunners were waiting for them and poured small arms fire into the helicopters as they were withdrawing after unloading troops. All ten of the OH-1H's were hit and four of them were destroyed. Without elite air support, the South Vietnam Government forces were at a distinct disadvantage before the entrenched Viet Cong units. Casualties were:

- 68 KIA (including 3 Americans)
- 106 WIA (including 10 American)

5. The Joint Operations Center first learned that DUC THANG was in progress at 1030H when a request for air support was received. An immediate call was made to the A-1H's which were directing the CH-21's to proceed to DUC THANG. They arrived there at 1035H. One of the 2 RB-26's was not expended all its ordnance so it was diverted to another area, arriving at 1100H. The JOC quickly cancelled an operation scheduled for Zone Delta that afternoon and continued to support both DUC THANG and TAY NINH operations. One hundred and one casualties were inflicted upon the VC during the course of the day.

6. The informal actions of the 7th Division ALO have been interpreted by some as prior notification that DUC THANG was to be initiated as scheduled on 2 January. The facts are:

TOP SECRET-NOTOFORN
TOP SECRET-NOFORN

a. On the night of 31 Dec 69, Major Provost, ALO to the 7th Division, visited the JOC and advised that air support would be required for the BUC THANG operation. Maj Gilbert advised Major Provost that the entire force was committed to support ground operations in the TAY BINH area. Capt Gilbert further advised Major Provost that the decision to support the BUC THANG operation had been made by the Joint General Staff and that he had no authority to change the scheduled operation. He stated that he would, however, attempt to divert air support from TAY BINH to BUC THANG on the afternoon of 1 January. If requested, Major Provost left the JOC with no further inquiry on the BUC THANG operation and he advised higher authority of the problem.

b. Upon his return to Can than on 1 January, Major Provost found that the 7th Division still planned to continue the BUC THANG operation with air support. He then informally called the JOC to determine whether last minute changes would make air support available. Maj Gilbert, the JOC duty officer, confirmed that no air support was available. Major Provost stated that he strongly believed that the BUC THANG operation was still scheduled. On the other hand, the ARVN duty officer was not left with this understanding and was under the definite opinion that the operation had been postponed.

c. On the night of 1 January, Major Provost briefed all ARVN advisors and ARVN at 7th Division Headquarters to put in emergency air.
support requests if necessary, anticipating that air support allocated to other operations
might be limited. On 3 January
1967, Major General advised General
Markham, during his visit to the
headquarters, that the JOC was
aware of air support requirements
for the NIT TRANG operation
but was unable to comply due
to the JOC priority given to opera-
tions in the TAY TINH area.

Many conclusions can be
drawn from the visit on 2
January. Among them are:

a. The JOC is not a
temporary joint center. The JOC was
not kept advised of Army helicopter
plans and operations.
b. The Tactical Air
Control System in SOK is capable
of effective fast reactions. With
out the fast reaction of tactical
air power, the losses at NIT TRANG
probably would have been much
greater.
c. Army representation at
JOC is inadequate.
d. Coordination procedures
among the various agencies of the
MACV and the RVNAF structure are very
loose.
e. MACV directives on
the requirement to coordinate actions
involving air operations are not
being followed. Directives, however,
should be enforced to be effective.
f. There is an evident need
for tighter and clearer mission plan-
ing and coordination procedures.
h. The armed helicopter cannot replace fixed wing aircraft in the air support role.

i. Strong Air Liaison

* * * * * *

Operation DUC THA/G, 63/42, was launched on 13 October 1963. The operation was based on reliable information that the 1096th VC Battalion of 900-1000 men and a large cache of small arms and light artillery were located in the area to be attacked. A three pronged attack was planned. One near unit was to be airlanded to attack the objective from the north; another from the south; and the third from the east.

Four T-28's and two AD-6's were used to precede the armed helicopters to provide attack. Four T-28's were the light ship for the helicopters landed. The helicopters had moved in immediately--three to five minutes--after the fighters made their last pass. The armed assault was escorted by six armed HU-1B's.*

The first ARVN element, consisting of 150 men, landed some 600 meters south of the objective. By the time the unit had advanced 100

* HU-1B's reported 4 AD-6's.
TOP SECRET-NOFORN

...
COMUSMAC-V reported that:

Thirty-one air sorties (USAF/VNAF) did not include an I/L provided effective support but could not neutralize the extremely strong defenses, which ranged throughout the day.

Several hours earlier, MAC-V had reported:

At 1907Z, one CH-21 in support of the operation was hit by small arms, semi-automatic and automatic with tracers. Five of seven US Army officers and enlisted men, and one USAF lieutenant were wounded in the area.

The following extracts from a MAC-V press release related to the operation:

Twelve US Army officers and enlisted men, and one USAF lieutenant were wounded in an Operation Eagle attack. Of thirteen wounded Americans, 11 were pilots of the Delta Aviation Battalion (US Army) whose aircraft was hit by ground fire. Preliminary reports indicate the Vietnamese had suffered 26 KIA, and 95 WIA. It was not possible to enter the area to determine their casualties; however, 10 VC KIA have been confirmed and 3 prisoners taken.
TOP SECRET-NOFORN

To illustrate the complex nature of joint
air/ground operations in RVN, the after action
report of the ALO of the I Corps on Operation
LAM SON II, September 1962, has been presented verbatim in this text:

CONFIDENTIAL

CORPS OF I CORPS DIV DANANG

4 Sep 62

SUBJECT: Operation LAM SON II

TO: JOC

INFO: CHIEF AT L-3-3-3 NAM

1. The following comments are forwarded for your information in regard to
our future participation in the joint air/ground operation (LAM SON II) con­ducted
approximately 15 NM south of Danang on 30 August 62.

2. General Concept of Operation. To conduct a sweep of a specific area
upon the reported 500th Battalion region. Approximately 200 ARVN Rangers and
200 Vietnamese Special Forces troops were to be supported by US Army H-34's
and VNAF H-34's from Danang and Quang Ngai to attack specific assigned objec­tives.

3. Air Support required. VNAF and USAF aircraft were to provide the fol­lowing:

a. Fleet strike of specific assigned
b. Air C.O.V.Q.R for helicopters during landing and withdrawal.

c. Close air support for ground troops I-19 and fighters to be orbiting over operation area continuously.

d. Poststrike operation area after withdrawal of troops.

e. Night close air support capability in event troops had to remain overnight.

Wells, and Captain Than, VNAF 1 ASOC Director attended two joint preplanning meetings. General Don, CG I Corps did not attend either meeting; however, his Deputy Chief of Staff, C-2 and O-3 did attend. Colonel Phat, CO 2nd Air Division was appointed as Aerial Command Post Commander for the operation and attended the first meeting. Colonel Denno, Senior JOS Army Advisor, I Corps and his staff attended the 2nd meeting. CV DZIIOI.6:4:3:1 also attended. This phase of the operation was satisfactorily agreed upon with the exception of two very important points as follows:

a. US Army Advisors were insistent upon using a Caribou as the Airborne CP even though it pointed out the fuel range and orbit capability of the aircraft would require it to land and refuel during the operation. This, in effect, meant the post strike operation area to be reduced.

b. The deployment of more troops was necessary to achieve the mission objectives.
that while the aircraft was refueling, the command capability for air and ground decisions would be absent. Nevertheless, the situation was more with the Air Command situation: I made arrangements for the orbiting fighters to act as a relay for passing messages back to Danang ASOC concerning air problems and emergency requirements. I do not know how the Ground Forces maintained liaison with the Forward CP at Quang Ngai during the Rangers operation. I doubt there was any ground forces liaison capability from General Dorr's reports of the operation situation as I later indicated.

b. At the initial planning meeting, it was apparent that the Special Forces Commander and the ASOC representative aboard the Aerial CP would be required to use the same frequency and UN radio set to contact ground forces and fighter aircraft respectively. I strongly urged that a PRC-10 be made available to the ACP for the Special Forces Commander as he had been made available to the Rangers representative. The Special Forces Commander, in turn, would give both parties clear access to force control. I was unable to change the procedure even though I pointed out that during the operation, if the ASOC representative was using the radio, the Special Forces Command would be totally blind as to the ground situation and vice versa. At the second planning meeting I again voiced my objections to the communication system and was this time supported by the I Corps Deputy Chief of Staff. After much conversation between him and the Special Forces Commander, it was told the Special Forces Commander will bring aboard a PRC-10. Though, however, would not.
Aircraft made available to support the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-28'S</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-34'S</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-19'</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-19 (FAC)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-28'S (Night Alert)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-123'S (Airlift and Medical Evac)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-123'S (Fire ship)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-21'S</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-21 (ACP)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-19 (Helicopter Guide)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-19</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Planned timetable for operation was as follows on 30 August 61:

0530 - 0600  C-123's airlift 200 troops from Quang Ngai to Quang Ngai
0545  Caribou (ACP) depart Quang Ngai for W/S check in chopper landing and fighter prestrike areas
0700 - 0730  Fighters prestrike specific targets in operation area
0730 - 0750  withdrawal of 2nd wave of 200 troops into landing area
0750 until troop withdrawal - Minimum of 2 fighters to orbit operation area continuously for close support and to be replaced on station. Four fighters to provide chopper cover during each landing and withdrawal wave. Upon troop withdrawal all available fighters were to make post-strike of operation area.

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
Top Secret—NoFORN

Total USAF and VNAF sorties flown during operation T-28, AD-6 and B-26 STRIKE, COVER AND CLOSE SUPPORT 39
L-19, C-123, medical evacuation 24
Transport, Quang Ngai, Nha Trang 24
C-123 medical evacuation from Quang Ngai to Nha Trang hospital for American wounded 6

7. Personnel aboard Caribou were as follows:

ARVN - Aerial Command Post Commander
1 Corps 2-2 Representative
1 Corps 6-3 Representative
10th Rangers Battalion Representative
Special Forces Commander
USAF - I ASOC Director
I ASOC Assistant Director

USAF - Advisors
Captain Wells, Offensive Air Officer, I ASOC

US Army - Advisors
1 Corps 6-2 Advisor
1 Corps 6-3 Advisor
1 Corps Signal Advisor
1 Corps Army Aviation (Helicopter) Advisor
2nd Air Division Army Advisor

Top Secret—NoFORN
Colonel Denno, Senior Army Advisor landed with the 10th Ranger Battalion and stayed with them until they were withdrawn. I flew T-28 prestrike sortie and returned to Danang AOCR.

H. Operation Narrative

a. Six C-123s depart Danang for Quang Ngai at 0600 with 200 troops.

b. Carlhou departs Danang for WX checkpoint at 0600.

c. Prestrike and chopper cover fighters depart Danang and Bien Hoa at 0600. (Prestrike - 1 A-1G, 1 A-1H, and 1 RB-26) (Cover - T-28).

d. Helicopters depart Danang on 1st wave with 200 troops at 0600.

e. Carlhou makesweather check of operation area and ARVN ACP Commander gives go sign for operation.

f. First strike fighters arrive over target area at 0700 and begin strike. At that time I observed the prestrike troops in the target area and saw some of the landing areas.

g. First wave of choppers and the four cover fighters landed at Quang Ngai at 0730.

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
I. ARVN ACP Commander then requested the ASOC representative if they could put in another prestrike if they could put in another prestrike before the choppers tried it again and after the fog cleared. He was told that the four T-28s, three had landed at Quang Ngai, would be assigned specific prestrike targets. Fighters crews were scheduled to c clear by 0915 through 0925. Chopper landing time was to be 0925.

2. Four T-28s departed Haiphong at 0925, arrived over target (heavy weapons positions) and were cleared by ACP to commence attack at 0930. However, commanding H-21 called that he was too close to landing area and requested the T-28's not to strike. ACP proceeded.

3. First choppers were landed at 0925 and received considerable VC fire. One H-21 was hit and managed to return to the operation area. The H-21 finally landed approximately 10 kilometers southwest. ACP fired rockets and 50 cal. Crew including one wounded was immediately picked up by another chopper.

4. The four T-28s that had avoided the prestrike were then ordered by the ACP to drop their frag clusters on targets to the west and southwest of Quang Ngai, H-21 with their rockets and 50 cal. Due to communications difficulties, two of the T-28's commenced with their ordinance to Da Nang. Remaining two proceeded to only partially destroying the H-21. Two AD-6s were later sent in with napalm and finished the job.

5. Second wave of choppers landed with no injuries or chopper losses at approximately 1030.

6. ACP departed operation area to return to refuel at Da Nang. ACP was out of area approximately 12:25.
At approximately 1100 the ACP was informed that all ground objectives had been taken and the decision was made to withdraw.

At approximately 1700, 1st wave of choppers landed to withdraw troops. No chopper damage or casualties were received.

The Caribou returned and landed at Quang Ngai to discharge the ACP Commander at approximately 1900. Colonel Denno who had been on the 1st chopper withdrawal wave then boarded ACP. Again contact was lost with fighters for about one hour.

Second wave of choppers landed for the second withdrawal at approximately 1800. One H-21 was hit by VC fire and crashed. American wounded crew members were immediately rescued by HU-1A and evacuated.

Four T-28’s were directed by ACP to destroy downed H-21. Mission was accomplished.

No patrolling of the area was performed since the Special Forces Commander reported two troops missing and possibly alive. One L-19 and T-28’s were dispatched on 21 August for search. No contact made with missing men.

ACP remained in operation area until 1845 and landed Danang at 1910.

Remarks: Immediately upon landing I was told by Colonel Denno that the four T-28’s that departed Quang Ngai at 0900 to again patrol the operation area had missed the target. He stated this was the reason the choppers took such a beating on the first landing wave.
I immediately checked this out with Mission reports, Captain Wells and Colonel Thae (16000 District) and the aircraft did not miss the target. The facts are as indicated in Annex 3.

10. Conclusions

a. A primary reason for concentrated VC fire on first chopper wave was the fact that two hours had elapsed from the initial fighter pen-strike until the choppers landed. The elements of surprise, shock and suppression had worn off completely and the VC had time to regroup and were waiting for them.

b. ACCP were not able to contact fighter elements in operation area for some periods of time since the Special Forces Commander was talking to his ground troops.

c. Not various was entirely inadequate as to capability to remain in operation area. Time lost due to refueling was twice for air and ground command.

d. Some L-19 FAC control sorties during operation were ineffective due to lost communications and poor observer techniques.

11. A critique on LAM SON II was held by General Don, 1 Corps Commander on 3 September 62. I attended and their observations were as follows:

Staff Observations:

a. Discontinuity of Command

b. Weather check was not perfect.

c. Two hour delay in landing troops negated element of surprise.
d. Air/ground communication difficulties:

e. Change in chopper withdrawal plans not passed to ground troops by ACP, therefore, much confusion on pickup area and times.

f. Eliminate bright red stripes on top of A-21's and the large red and white + = very good VC aiming point.

General Ben's personal observations:

a. Operation only a partial success.

b. To postpone chopper landing --- a mistake. Should have used those landing areas that were clear of trees to take advantage of pre-strike and surprise.

c. Asked possibility of armed choppers to escort landing choppers to every adjacent area.

d. Much confusion during chopper withdrawal waves since ground troops were not aware of changed withdrawal plan.

e. Too many people talking on the same communication channel.

f. Horrified to hear that the ACP had to return to DaNang for fuel thereby leaving operation area without any command tool.

12. Statements from other USAF participants in Operation LAM SON II are attached as follows.

Maj. Runtz - Since he is the 2nd Division ALO, he was stationed at the Advance 1
Corps Command Post with General
Don at Quang Ngai to brief him
on the developing air situation.

Captain Ruman - As a FAC, attached
to the 1st VNAF Liaison Squadron,
he flew one L-19 FAC sortie over the
operation area.

Captain Wells - As the J ASOC Offic-
er, he attended both preplanning meetings
he was aboard the ACP to advise
Captain Than (J ASOC VNAF Director).

BYRON K. KALIN
Lt. Colonel, USAF
ALO 1 Corps

1. Statement by Maj.
Li Colonel, USAF
2. Statement by Capt
Wells
3. Statement by Capt
Ruman

LAM SON II FAC OBSERVATIONS

1. Communication between the ground and
the airborne FAC was very poor. One
reason being that the Observer (Vietnamese)
would not stay over the target area all
the time. Intermittently I was instructed
to leave the area and orbit a point 4
kilometers south. From this point it was
impossible to see the target area or
direct a strike.

2. The Observer would not allow me to fly
below 5,000 feet. This frustrated me so
that I started a very slow descent and
started climbing up the altimeter to
5,000 feet. This was continued until
about 2,000 feet above the ground. Upon
pointing out known VC mortar positions to
the Observer and asking for a strike from
the Airborne Command Post (I asked him
to call the CP for a strike) all he would
do is say, "Yes, VC, climb higher." In
three hours over the target area only one tar-
get was marked by this FAC. Since all
the talking was in Vietnamese. I do not know what transpired. The altitude at which the F-105's was at was 10,000 feet, due to the altitude.

2. The mission flown by this FAC was completely ineffective. This was passively but diplomatically brought up to the Squadron Commander, Capt. De, this observer is now undergoing more intensive training.

4. It is imperative that the L-19 be equipped with better communication equipment than the FAC-10. This pressure to bring to bear, from higher headquarters, on the Observers and Pilots to be more effective in looking for targets, reporting aircraft (during operations especially) and accepting more of the Reconnaissance role. Although all these comments mentioned above are mentioned and explained to me when I see them occurring, it is a very slow process.

5. About 50 percent of these pilots and Observers in this Squadron are aggressive, but the other 50 percent need much prodding and instruction. At present there are orders originating from somewhere that instruct the FAC to remain at altitude (10,000 feet) and just observe the B-26 missions in the Lam Son area. To say the least this is ineffective so that the B-26 wastes too much time looking for a lucrative target and from 3,000 feet it is impossible to accurately assess damage, much less mark a target if requested, and of course the weak ones in the Squadron just gobble this up.

6. In conclusion the LAM SON II FAC role was ineffective due to communication breakdown between the ground and the FAC.
and mainly due to the Observer not being aggressive in looking for targets, while the operation was in progress.

S. ANDO C. RUPPMAN
Capt 133AF

SECRET/NOFORN

0601/30 Airborne C. P. (ACP) departed Danang. All crew as good as
in area 10-15 KM east of target area and observed weather. 0300 Air Strike
strike. All area preplanned for strike
were hit on schedule. Landing area 3
The choppers and 4 T-28 air cover, were
hit 3 minutes from area, and the Army
decided not to bring the forces in. The
Army hit's made for the spot, but
were 4-7 minutes out of the area at this
time. Choppers returned to Quang Ngai
area. 0300 was last contact. ACP left
October shortly after 0415. ACP left
Quang Ngai 0535 with 4
T-28 aircover aircraft. ACP circled
Quang Ngai and area was
checked weather trying to
contact ground
of Quang Ngai. About 0630 contact was
finally made and decided to launch
for 2nd try. The 4 T-28 were briefed to
approach area a little for
choppers landing and to drop air cover.
Two more T-28 were
from Danang
and were in area. VNAF ASC 1 Director
ordered briefing to pilots to the near
by knowledge. The order was repeated to and
said yes and that
there would be 4 T-28's
in the area. 0935 was T.O.T. for 4
T-28's 1045 was new chopper landing.
During this phase of operation communications were nil and too many people from different forces were using the same radio:

AB-4 176.6, L-39 342.20, Special Forces 256.0, VNAF ASC 1 - Director for coordination of airpower, artillery and ground alert status at Nha Trang. The radio was only available to ASC 1 for air control for brief periods of time. In subsequent days communication was available for joint use. The choppers landed and took off from designated landing areas. No other forces were in contact with choppers to the best of my knowledge. All Vietnamese were spoken in air control and every time I asked how things were going or had they scrambled more aircraft, etc. I got the reply, "OK, do not worry". On one flight I experienced one of the choppers being hit (H-21) while leaving area and the crew commandeered a H-21 and took off from the target area. The crew was rescued by another H-21. T-28's were requested by the Army to destroy it. During this time ACP was again out of landing area over Vietnam and ground units were busy with ground forces and fighters due to extensive radio messages regarding H-21. T-28's were used by Special Forces and ACP UHF. Only one headset for UHF, VHF operation. I must mention here that there were plenty of aircraft available but no way in which to give battle progress to home stations or to schedule more in the battle. Aircraft were still showing up as planned and covered the target area at all times. There was no CAS request from ground troops to the best of my knowledge in the early stages of fighting. The second wave of troops landed and the choppers departed without mishap. There was however confusion as to where they would land and who would land in which area. Again communication was no good at all and it looked as though the choppers did not have an alternate landing area.
The ACP departed area and returned to Danang for fuel. ACP was out of the area about 1 hour 35 minutes. Aircover and Airborne FAC were out of target areas at all times. Aircover aircraft were out of target at 1345 and never less than a flight of 2 and one. When the ground troops decided to pull all troops at Quang Ngai by radio. The ACP again returned to Quang Ngai and remained over area for about 45 minutes trying to establish contact with ground. At this time flight control was again lost. The H-34, H-21 were finally contacted and withdrawal was started about two hours after request. By 1700 troops were withdrawn without incident. ACP in target area. ACP again returned to Quang Ngai and after troops loaded ACP took off for II Division (ARVN). Time out of target area one hour. Second wave of H-21, H-34 arrived back in area for troop withdrawal; about 1 hour 15 minutes later. Coming in the area there was complete confusion as to where landing zone the troops would be on. Again radios used to talk to ground troops and choppers. No other fighters could be scrambled for lack of communications. The troops looked as though they were skipping from LZ to LZ making themselves vulnerable for attack. The ACP Army Commander Colonel Denno advised that the hills on all sides of the LZ were hit but I do not know if they did. I asked about several times and got no absolute reply other than the L-19 would direct strikes. I did however see A-10 and F-105 making low passes over the hills near LZ 7. The choppers reported all people accounted for and were leaving area. The II Div. was unable flying at extremely low altitude out of the area was hit by ground fire. It looked as
though he was hit on his left side. A large white puff of smoke came from the aircraft. The H-21 settled in an open field with a high ridge line either side. A small chopper landed in the area and took up the crew and all troops that were alive so it was reported to the ACP. These were the last known casualties in the area. The Army checked the number of troops picked up and said it tallied with what they brought in. The Army suggested the M-28’s be destroyed, 2 T-28’s in the area used rockets and machine guns, 6 more T-28’s were sent to complete the job. ACP remained in the area until 1945 and landed Danang 1915.

KENNETH H. WELLS
Captain CSAF Offensive Air, I ASOC

Escort - Convoy/Train

At 1000 hours on 16 June 1962 a vehicle convoy departed Ben Cat to move to Diem Rong. The convoy consisted of two M-28 armored cars in the lead followed by a half-track, a 1/4 ton, a half-track and two 2 1/2 ton trucks. The convoy carried two platoons of ARVN troops and two US Army officer

Approximately four to five kilometers out from Ben Cat the convoy, and a civilian truck which was preceding the convoy, were ambushed by VC. A mine, believed to have been electrically

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
Detonated, demolished the civilian truck and killed its eight civilian passengers.

The lead armored car received a direct hit, believed to have been fired from a recoilless rifle. The second vehicle was hit by small arms fire. The third vehicle was apparently hit by a recoilless rifle. The fourth vehicle was hit by small arms fire and the remaining two vehicles were hit by .50 caliber machine guns and small arms fire.

Subsequent inquiries of civilians in the area disclosed that the VC arrived at the ambush position about 0300 hours and immediately commenced preparations. Existence of dug-in rocket launcher position 200 meters from the road indicated that the VC had occupied the area for some hours. Villagers estimated that the force comprised 45 to 50 personnel.

Seventeen bodies were recovered including those of the two US advisors. Eight were WIA and evacuated.

When the explosions were heard in Ben Cat, two platoons were dispatched to investigate. They ran into a road block caused by a fallen tree and were forced to proceed on foot.

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
Air support was requested -- and scrambled at 1217 hours. The action had long since been completed by that time.

Ambushing of convoys was not new in SVN.

From July 1963, in response to a message from CINCPAC, General Harkins advised Admiral Felt that, in a conversation with Secretary Thuan and General Ty the previous week, he had suggested that all convoy commanders be directed to request "cover" prior to putting a convoy on the road. Moreover, if the convoy was ambushed and the commander had not requested air cover, Harkins suggested the commander be relieved. Harkins stated that, "Thuan directed Ty to issue an order. Realize not all convoys can have cover due to many and varied circumstances but at least it can be requested. Will follow up and see how far the instructions have sifted down."

On 21 August, Harkins reported to Felt that the JCS and Field Command had sent messages to the three Corps TAC Zones over a period of two weeks which requested that security for convoys be studied and necessary pre-planning of L-19 flying hours be made. For minimum support to truck convoys especially on dangerous portions...
On 28 August 1962, CINCPAC quoted to JCS an extract from the JGS directive issued to the field:

"By order of the President, Quote. Effective immediately all important convoys need support by the Air Force [NAF], during movement. In order to avoid surprise ambushes creating heavy damage. Throughout the entire itinerary of these convoys, there must be an L-19, or other type aircraft, such as recommended by the Air Force, flying on reconnaissance and other support facilities as required (Air Force, artillery, etc.) must be prepared to intervene immediately when the occasion arises. Responsible authorities who allow the occurrence of incidents causing heavy damage to a convoy, when the reason for this is simply that they had not previously requested support from the Air Force, will be relieved. End of quote.

During the period January through July 1962, only 32 requests for convoy escorts had been submitted by ARVN. Between August and October 1962, 506 requests had been submitted and honored.

In early November 1963, a train was ambushed in the XII Corps area. The train had had an internal guard of 20 ARVN troops but was not..."
being escorted by an A-10. The entire ARVN military unit was killed by the VC while the train crew was released unharmed. 3

Approximately one month later, however, a train which had an aerial escort was ambushed. The VC exploded a mine under a train of gasoline cars. The engine and ten cars were overturned and several other cars were derailed. COMUSMACV reported: "Prompt reinforcement by aircraft and troops ... prevented the VC from any exploitation of the situation. There were no casualties or losses reported."

As of November 1963, only 20 percent of the trains were being escorted. Second Air Division reported virtually 100 percent of train escort requests received were actually furnished; yet, escort was not requested for all train schedules. Important area train schedules were adjusted to permit aircraft escort. 5

Airborne Assault

Airborne assault and re-supply of the Vietnamese Army (ARVN) was provided by USAF C-123's of the MULE TRAIN squadrons, C-47's of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), US Army C-12A's (Caribous), and US

3 Interview, Dep Br, III AOC, 6 Nov 63, with authors.

TOP SECRET-NOTFORB
Army helicopters.

In addition to the normal daily missions flown by these planes, a fast reaction, composite force, to be known as "Fire Brigade" was conceived early in 1962. The force was to be composed of five C-123’s, five C-47’s, and one L-19; a 30-minute alert was to be maintained by 500 airborne troops around the clock.56

The "Fire Brigade"'s mission was to support an ARVN unit or outpost undergoing VC attack. Special Forces had established a requirement for approximately 40,000 pounds of cargo per month to be delivered or air-dropped in isolated areas. In practice,57 this requirement was normally supported by three C-123’s, scanning forward areas, and two C-47’s of the First Air Commando Squadron (AirVn).58

This operation had the highest priority in RVN. As long as there was an aircraft in commission in 1962, special forces requirements were met.

During the period April through June 1962,

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56 Joint Operations Plan 62-2, 17 October 1962, SECRET, signed by the Chief of Staff, ARVN Field Command, Commander VNAF, and Commander Second Air Division.
the 777th Troop Carrier Squadron had been engaged mainly in low-level airdrops of supplies at 500 feet, and resupply by airlanding at remote, mountainous airstrips. In both cases, the aircraft had received small arms fire from battalions, peaks, and ridges. Six aircraft had received hits on the underside of the fuselage and nacelles. In mountainous terrain, aircraft were flying over peaks and ridges at 1000 feet. On low-level cargo drops, aircraft were flying at a relatively low altitude from one to two minutes out from the drop zone.

The nature of the mission made the aircraft vulnerable to some small arms hits; however, increasing altitude to several thousand feet above the peaks and ridges virtually eliminated small arms damage while举例. By flying over the drop/landing zone, the damage was greatly reduced by delaying descent and employing a steeper rate of descent. The 77th Air Division reported that, "Aircraft damage has been reduced to one incident since the inception of this technique and this aircraft was hit shortly after takeoff at low altitude." Additionally, the 777th Troop Carrier Squadron had also received battle damage from small arms fire on training drops of the aircraft.
airborne brigade. The drops were scheduled for the same time each Friday morning and employed the same routes and the same drop zones. Changing the drop zones, routes and times over target resulted in a reduction in battle damage. When weather permitted, routes were flown at 3500 feet above terrain.

Headquarters EMWAG made a comparison of the C-130 versus the C-124 and the C-123 for Special Operations and forwarded the evaluation to Admiral Felt on 17 March 1962. Among the three aircraft compared, only the C-130 had been designed for transportation operations. The C-123 and C-124 had been designed primarily for carrying cargo.

Both the C-130 and C-124 were equipped with radar. Both were faster than the other two aircraft, the C-130 was also much more maneuverable than the C-124. The C-130 could fly safely with two of its engines inoperative and had a greater survivability in a hostile environment. Night covert operations have been conducted by CAS utilizing C-130's without experiencing known detection."

In regard to an allegation that the C-130 left an exhaust stream which was visible at...
On the contrary the passage to Felt

"... The exhaust is visible from
the ground only after the aircraft
has passed directly overhead. It
is not visible from the sides or
as the aircraft is approaching as
is the case with B-17's, B-26's,
and C-123's. The C-130's exhaust can be seen
only when the observer is in a posi-
tion to see directly into the tail
pipe. Before a C-130 exhaust can be
seen, it will have been heard (if
at low altitude).

In response to a request from MAC-V to justi-
dy the process of supplies delivered by parachute
during the week of 8-15 October 1963, Headquarters
US Army Special Forces (Provisional) Vietnam
replied that the decision to resupply by parachute
was based upon many factors. Weather, time, vul-
nerability, and cost were cited, as was the avail-
ability of helicopters."

D. Availabilty and Availability of
Helicopters. Helicopter delivery is
possible only if they are available and
the distance from the drop point to
the detachment is within their range.
Even if helicopters are suitable for a
particular mission, frequently they
are not available because of other
Coop commitments. If available, there
are occasions when their use is not
practical. The resupply of 13,480
pounds to Ta Nat on 19 October (Item 4b,
Incl 3) would have required 16 sorties
by H-21's, each involving 110 minutes
flying time per round trip, compared
to the two C-130 sorties actually used.
The following after action report by the ALO of the III Corps illustrated, not only a signal successul airborne assault, but almost all other uses of air power in the counterinsurgency environment.

CONFIDENTIAL

Joint Air Operations Center
1st Air Division (IAD)
APO 161, US Forces

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: JAOO
SUBJECT: After Action Report Operation "Loi Phong" 20-31 Jan 1967
TO: O/D Dir JAOC

1. General: Operation "Loi Phong" was a "C" Room planned operation conducted in Phuoc Tuy province on the outskirts of Saigon. This was the initial large scale GVN operation conducted in this particular area. Because of probable experienced security leaks, extensive measures were taken by the Corps Commander to preclude compromise of this operation. For example IIIC Staff and most of the III Corps Advisors were not given access to the overall plan until their arrival at Baria, the Corps CCR. Even so, an apparent leak occurred. On the initial day of the airborne operation and just prior to the airborne phase, a VC communication was intercepted. The communication instructed the VC to disperse, avoid contact and evade GVN forces operating in the area.

2. Planning: For reasons stated above the entire planning phase of this operation was
rigidly controlled. The Corps Commander personally conducted the major portion of the planning effort. Pro-
gress of comments to the contrary, this plan appeared to be one of the more workable plans developed within
recent months. For once the operational area was to be squeezed from all sides while air and artillery
struck targets in the center of the area. Additionally it was noted
that all combat resources were to be
utilized in a rather unusually intel-
ligent scheme. Airborne, Rangers,
Infantry, Artillery, Armed Police and
Couriers, Civil Guard, Tactical Air
Transport, Tactical Air Support,
Aerial Radio Recon, and Helicopter
Transport were integrated into the
overall operation in their primary roles and to complement the
operational scheme. On Sunday, 27
January 63, the operation was briefed at III Corps, the JCS, and the JAOC.
by the Corps' Chief of Staff. The
presence of III Corps US Army Advisory
representation was noticeable. How-
over, airborne and helicopter advisor
personnel were present.

3. The Operation:

a. At 1430 Sunday 27 Jan 63, the III
Corps Staff (including the ATO) left
Saigon via convoy for Biafra. Upon arrival
1830, the Corps Tactical CP
was established. Pending establishment
of communications with Saigon, the Corps
Chief of Staff requested the ATO to go to
the Program Chief's headquarters and
confirm the availability of VNAF and US
Helicopters for the following day.

b. As a result of this inquiry it was learned
that the CH-21 helicopters had been
grounded for maintenance. The Corps
Commander elected to continue the operation
without helicopter support and issued instructions for the 6 Ranger Companies to deploy via trucks into the operational area Sunday night so as to be in position for N-Hour Monday morning. This was accomplished without incident.

b. The airborne drop occurred a few minutes late but with no degradation of the operation. In fact, the excellent drop was one of the highlights of the operation. The Corps Commander commended General Harkins on the unusually successful drop and the exceptionally low losses (1 KIA and 9 injuries out of 1400 men dropped). The Airborne Brigade Commander evaluated the drop as excellent, as well as did the Airborne Advisor on duty at the Corps Command Post. US Advisor personnel did not participate in this drop. Problems associated with the drop included: one trooper that jumped 5 minutes early on a misunderstood jump command; one trooper whose static line severed and who failed to activate his emergency release; and other troopers who injured legs. Subsequently, seventeen troopers were dispersed in the trees away from the drop zone but relieved the main force in a short time. Less than 100 parachutes were destroyed. More than 90% of the drop zone was intact.

c. Air support of this operation was excellent; and the Corps Commander acknowledged this to General Ty, General Harkins, and the Secretary of Defense, GVN. At the C/P briefing room the air support contribution was displayed on a sheerly adjacent to the ground order of the battle which occupied the center position of the display.
d. The Corps Commander designated nine targets for interdiction. The scheme, code-named "Blazing Arrow", was to have targets for air power tactics to expand ordnance on prior targets before moving to home base. Targets are listed as Attachment 2.

e. This operation utilized air support in the form of close air support, interdiction, air evacuation, airlift of airborne troops, night flare ship, photo recce, forward air control and air cover.

4. Results

a. Losses included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 - (5 by mine)</td>
<td>KIA 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - (2 by mine)</td>
<td>WIA 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>84*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Two of which were ARVN deserters.

b. Enemy material losses included as of 10:00, 24 Oct:

Six rifles, 44 tons of rice, 200 small arms, 120 grenades, a large quantity of 1,000 rounds, which was poured into a network of underground tunnels and ignited. Many food producing gardens and fields plus several food depots.

Note: As additional results are reported, the "take" should increase significantly. One Ranger Company was left in concealment behind to ambush VC returning to the area.
c. As of 10:00, 31 Jan 63, 432 civilians formerly under VC control were relocated from the operational area into a GVN controlled Strategic Hamlet. This is possibly the most significant accomplishment of this operation. Additional friendly people have been removed from VC control. Since the VC previously had no influence in the operational area and friendly people have been and will be removed, the area will become a "Free Area." The intent is to withdraw friendly people and then deny use of the area to the VC by periodic air strikes.

5. Summary. An operation into VC controlled territory in which the VC had not previously operated was conducted by III Corps. Persons (432) were resettled into a Strategic Hamlet. An additional 84 men of military age were captured. Since the area was primarily a VC recruit training area, it is believed that many of the captured were recently recruited. Finally the operation was considered successful but with limitations.

HAL G. BOWERS
Major, USAF
AIO, III Corps

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Helicopter Escort Tactics

Second Air Division published a regulation (55-12) titled "Helicopter Escort" dated 27 December 1962. The tactics were developed in RVN with the participation of US Army and USMC helicopter pilots. Moreover, the escort tactics were
designed to accommodate the flight tactics used by the helicopters in performing their various missions.

When fighter aircraft are assigned to helicopter escort duty, the role of the helicopters is paramount.

The fighter aircraft operated in flights of two. The number of flights was dependent upon the size of the helicopter formation, the extent of expected enemy resistance, and aircraft availability.

One fighter flew high and behind the helicopter formation while the other fighter flew low, in advance of the formation, "hunting" for enemy activity. The purpose of the low fighter was not necessarily to attack, rather, it was to call in or draw VC fire away from the helicopters.

Constant radio contact was to be maintained between the fighters, the helicopters, and the FAC. Observing or suspected hostile targets, the low aircraft was to call in the high fighter to investigate, return ground fire if fired upon, or strike as directed by the FAC. If the helicopter was fired upon, it was to identify the target for the fighter aircraft.

Helicopter landings were made generally from
Alerting approaches. Fighters were alerted by the
helicopter formation two minutes prior to
helicopter landing. At that time, the fighters
finished expending ordnance, if briefed to do so,
and assumed a position to either side of the land-
ing formation of helicopters. "As each helicopter
formation lands, the fighters will pull up and
back into a covering pattern to escort another
formation, if necessary, or to provide area cover."

The helicopter withdrawal phase commenced as
soon as possible after the landing phase. When
troops were landed, total time was not exceeded
15-30 seconds. When troops were being airlifted
out, the time period on the ground was extended.
During this phase, fighters were to orbit at 1000
feet absolute attitude searching and available to
attack on call.

Procedures were also established for: "soften-
ing up" attack preparatory to helicopter operations,
communications, lost communications, target mark-
ing, control of liaison aircraft, B-26 escort,
and, special procedures to be used when armed
helicopters also escorted the transport helicopters.

Flare Drop/Night Close Air Support
Night operations in SVN were conducted
TOP SECRET-NOFORN

primarily to support strategic hamlets and outposts under attack by the VC. Occasionally, C-47's had dropped flares during search and rescue for downed airmen.

C-47's, loaded with flares, were the first aircraft in RVN to be used regularly in night operation. Throughout 1962 and much of 1963 the VC almost invariably broke off their attack when flares were dropped.

The utilization of strike aircraft coupled with flare aircraft next evolved. Fighter aircraft (FARM GATE) were maintained on 30-minute ground alert from sunset to sunrise. Strikes were usually conducted in conjunction with a VNAF C-47 flare aircraft which also had a forward air control function. By mid-1963, the VNAF commenced night strike sorties.

In 1963 two flare aircraft maintained an airborne alert status for use in the III and IV Corps areas. The I and II Corps areas had two flare C-47's on ground alert. If one or all of the flare aircraft were employed, other VNAF aircraft were brought up to an identical alert status. FARM GATE C-47 night activity constituted a very small
Night strike missions were very effective in support of villages under attack. Most villages and outposts had a large arrow which could be sighted and rotated to point to the location of the attacking VC. Range of the VC from the village was indicated by individual light. Each light represented 100 meters. The flare aircraft had to have radio contact with the village and with the strike aircraft in order for the strike aircraft to expend ordnance.

Second Air Division Regulation No. 55-18, 2 August 1963, provided specific guidelines and procedures for Night Close Air Support.
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For flare aircraft, and procedures for strike aircraft were included in detail.

Near the close of the period reported upon (15 Nov 1963), Second Air Division stated:

Data accumulated thus far indicates the following: (a) No outposts/hamlets have been overrun after arrival of flare and strike aircraft.
(b) Air support has been extremely effective in supporting outposts/hamlets. When air support has been requested it is always considered to be a primary factor in breaking off attacks.
(c) New Flare/Strike aircraft posture has been greatly reduced by increased alert posture in both flare and strike aircraft.
(d) VNAF flare and strike capability and effectiveness has constantly increased in recent months.

Subsequent

Early in 1962, Headquarters USAF advised Headquarters USAF of the need for a 2.75 inch rocket head suitable for target marking purposes. The munition was required for marking difficult targets located in dense jungle. To do an effective job, the rocket head would have to give off a significant amount of dense and persistent smoke. Subsequently, rockets with smoke warheads were successfully tested in RVN. The system provided an offset capability for marking less accessible targets. The rockets were accurate, with errors not exceeding 150 yards. They were
to be supplementary to the smoke grenades, dropped by VNAF FACs in standard type aircraft, which were the primary means of target marking.

Over a period of months, the VC had acquired a supply of .50 caliber machine guns. (See Part II, "The Threat"). Some of these had been captured from armored vehicles and bombing aircraft.

Using armor piercing (AP) ammunition in the .50 caliber machine guns, the VC had begun to pose a problem to armored vehicles such as the M-113. In an effort to halt the flow of .50 caliber AP ammunition to the VC, COMPVN ordered the withdrawal of this type of ammunition from US units, and recommended its withdrawal from all NVA units.

Because of the limited supply of .50 caliber ammunition other than armor piercing incendiary (API), Second Air Division requested a waiver which was granted by MAC-V on 26 April 1965, pending a study of the feasibility of replacing API with other types of ammunition. On 13 May, MAC-V restricted the use of API ammunition to offensive missions, by fixed wing aircraft, where either AP or incendiary effects were warranted by the target structure or desired results. Further, when straight incendiary ammunition becomes available in sufficient quantity, it
Long delay fuses had proven effective against the VC when the possibility existed that the VC would return to the area following the air strike. Miniguns were found to be relatively ineffective in the rice paddy-delta area, although used extensively and effectively elsewhere. Phosphorus was particularly effective in the jungle. Napalm was effective against structures and entrenched troops. High explosive and 1,000 pound bombs were considered to be very effective against well entrenched, heavily defended VC positions and heavy AAA emplacements; however, the THAF had not been authorized to carry 500 pound bombs or to use delayed fuses for conventional missions, unless after the November 1963 Coup.

Reconnaissance

By December 1962 the ABLE MARLE reconnaissance task force operating out of Don Muang, Bangkok, Thailand, had flown over 1,000 sorties to support MAC-V and other requirements in Southeast Asia. In congratulating the ABLE MARLE group on the occasion of their 1,000th sortie, Major General Milton, Commander, Thirteenth Air Force, stated.
The fact that over 90 percent of the air strike targets in South Vietnam have been obtained through aerial photography indicates the large measure of USAF success in applying aerial reconnaissance to the insurgent insurgency problem. Additional evidence of the competence of ABLE is revealed in having flown over one thousand sorties without the loss of a single aircraft, although missions were repeatedly flown over the heaviest defended areas in Laos and now being flown daily over South Vietnam.

Early in 1962, ABLE aircraft encountered increasingly effective small arms fire. For recurring targets of clutter, aiming was modified to provide for varying the approach, altitude and time over targets. Two thousand feet was considered a hazardous altitude, and was avoided when possible. 80

Between minimum altitude and 5,000 feet, heading, altitude and airspeed had to be constantly changed. Airspeeds below 350 knots had to be avoided below 10,000 feet absolute altitude.

The concept of operations for FARM GATE armed reconnaissance was primarily to obtain maximum operational utilization of tactical aircraft on flights between the home base and deployed bases. The missions were controlled and directed by the TACS and a FAC had to be aboard if armament was
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expended. The only exception to the FAC requirement was when FARM GATE aircraft received enemy fire from a known source. In which case, return fire in self-defense was permitted.

The rules of engagement precluded a formalized overall armed reconnaissance plan for FARM GATE. New missions were "fraged" when necessary or appropriate. Major lines of communication (railroads, roads, canals) and areas of VC activities had been identified in all ASOC areas, and armed reconnaissance was primarily employed over those areas and targets.

Ordnance was not usually expended on armed recce missions. Rather, if FARM GATE pilots encountered likely air strike targets, this information was passed to the TACS and developed into an immediate target mission. Armed recce missions also generated information for preplanned targets and general intelligence.

Visual reconnaissance was often flown by L-19 and U-10A aircraft. In this category were such missions as combat observation, directing fighter and bomber strikes, artillery adjustment and reconnaissance for trains and convoys. At the May 1963 Sec Def conference, General Westmoreland reported that approximately 30 percent of the operational sorties flown by VNAF liaison aircraft were in the visual recce category.
The employment of tactical reconnaissance aircraft in a SAM environment in a manner which produced useful intelligence information has proven to be a challenging task and has highlighted many unique problems. One way to this environment, immediately discount the traditional World War II, Korean War or Cuban situation approach. For example, the targets in Cuba were stationary in nature. Crews could pre-plan missions against these targets and if weather prevented coverage on day, the target would still be there for another try the following day. Photo interpreters could examine daily photographs of SAM sites or port facilities to assess the degree of buildup or teardown or how many missiles were being shipped out. In contrast to these targets, our day targets are sometimes squad of men in diverse dress located in mountainous terrain under the canopy of jungle foliage. Specific problems which have limited the effectiveness of our reconnaissance effort are:

a. Inability to identify the enemy by geographic location, dress, weapons, or physical features which do not differ from the local friendly population.

b. Requirement for pinpoint navigation over extensive areas void of positive check points and navigational aids for accurate positioning and locating of targets and subsequent photography.
c. Heavy haze and adverse weather conditions.
d. Requirement for visual reconnaissance and photography along irregular, poorly defined borders.
e. Small, fleeting targets difficult to locate and photograph.
f. Inability to observe enemy activity below the dense forest canopy or in heavy foliage.

g. Proven techniques and procedures for employing night photography and IR in a SAV environment.

The enemy in Viet Nam relies extensively on the cover of darkness for movement of supplies and for attacks on defended points. If reconnaissance sensors such as low light level TV or image orthicon, which are now available and in development, could be made operationally available, we could expect greater return from our reconnaissance efforts. A capability for seeing the movement of canal, river and seaborne traffic at night while it is occurring, in a not too distant future, this capability is not a sufficient condition for an effective attack capability. It would require such as quarantine on imposition of permissive tides and routes of repair for friendly traffic. I feel that this sort of capability is not sufficient promise so that we could afford a moderate increase in sub-system complexity.

Bomb damage assessment (BDA) had been relatively ineffective in determining strike results in the heavy jungle areas of RVN. Clear photography
of the ordnance impact was seldom possible.

On 11 May 1962, a test was conducted to
determine the feasibility of making casualty
counts in combat jungles by means of aerial photog-
raphy. The positions and number of people were
known prior to the BDA test mission.

Results of the test indicated that it was
virtually impossible to identify personnel from
photographs taken under ideal conditions. More-
over, it was not feasible to make casualty counts
with the equipment then available.

Air Defense

Air defense measures posed a problem in
Vietnam throughout the period of this report. Many
"bogies" had been reported; however, there had
been no instances of successful intercepts. All
reported targets were moving slowly, and were
ostensibly using terrain features for concealment.

USAF aircraft were unable to maintain "lock-
on" after a radar scope fix because of low altitude
interference, and very slow speeds which would have
been necessary had contact been made. As a result,
extensive intercept testing was conducted by the
Tenth Air Force in the Philippines.

On 20 March 1962, at 0240 hours local time,
TOP SECRET-NOFORN

Radar units near Pleiku picked up two unidentified targets in the vicinity of the Vietnam-Cambodia border, approximately 40 miles west of Pleiku. At 0530, a B-26 was scrambled to investigate the bogies--local communication difficulties had prevented earlier contact. In the meantime, at 0325, four targets were picked up 65 miles west of Pleiku and 50 miles north, northwest. About ten radar contacts were observed.

Because of the relatively high speed of the B-26 compared to the speed of the unidentified targets, plus the very low altitude of the target, which varied between 600 and 2600 feet, definite visual contact was not established. However, the B-26 pilot reported seeing position lights, column of smoke and a fire on the ground. The target maneuvered continuously to evade the B-26. It disappeared and reappeared frequently on the radar scope, tending to indicate the use of terrain to avoid interception.

Intercept Control monitored one transmission, on 142.7 KHz, in which the Vietnamese language was purportedly used to discuss tactics. A later report, from the US Senior Advisor to the II Corps, indicated that the first words uttered were...
The transmission was Chinese. The transmission then immediately switched to Vietnamese.

The unidentified aircraft approached by the B-26 frequency by constantly clicking their microphones. MAC-V believed the unidentified targets may have been Colt AN-2 or Creek Yak 12 aircraft because of the reported speed of 80-120 knots with a maximum speed of 200 knots. MAC-V suggested that Yak aircraft may have been used as escorts.

The targets were observed on radar by the CO director of II Corps ASOC, and a USAF Captain who was MAC-V advisor and a qualified radarman. Radar contact with the bogies was lost at 0045 (L) over Cambodia territory on a heading of 270 degrees.

The next evening at 0630 (L), 2100 targets picked up 20 unidentified objects, southeast of Pleiku, at 3000 feet. An airborne B-26 was diverted to investigate and another scrambled at 0630 (L).

The B-26's reported noise jamming on 135.9 megacycles. Jamming was clear as if keyed by a microphone. Maximum duration was 30 seconds, over a five to ten minute period.

A C-130 was scrambled and six flares dropped. All bogies disappeared from radar immediately after the flare drop. The investigating aircraft reported
that the terrain appeared to be too rough for helicopter landing.

At 0230, radar contact was lost with the targets west of the Cambodia-Viet Cong border. No visual contacts had been made.

Experienced US radarmen, who had actually observed the scopes, indicated that, in most cases, radar paints were bonafide targets probably conducting air strikes. Some of the targets had the characteristics of helicopters, which were known to be deployed in Laos.27

On the radar scopes, the unidentified targets converged—apparently on pre-designated drop areas. Also the targets descended below the horizon when interceptors arrived in the vicinity or when they were unable to intercept. Another similarity which linked the unidentified targets was that their radar tracks withdrew into Cambodia when the intercept effort intensified.

Two aircraft were believed to have split when the interceptor approached, and both took evasive action. Further evidence which tended to confirm the validity of the radar plots was the jamming, the giving of fake steer to the intercepting aircraft, and the conversation in
Chinese and Vietnamese regarding evasion of interceptors.

The JADRON pointed out that the reaction of the multinational crews to intercept control transmissions strongly suggested that they were either monitoring VHF control frequencies or were actually under some form of ground control. It was suggested that lightweight early warning type radars could have been temporarily deployed in the general vicinity of the operation and remain undetected except during brief periods of operation.

Attempts at interception at night had been unsuccessful even when the ground radar vectored the misleading aircraft on a collision course. A similar situation was simulated using a T-28 as the unknown. Again, interception was unsuccessful— even when as many as 15 Mark-6 flares were used simultaneously.

Although aerial resupply of the VC had not been completely verified as of December 1963, there was some indication that the drops took place during the full of the moon prior to the rainy season. For this reason, jet interceptor elements were deployed to Tan Son Nhut on a six-week cycle. Each element remained in place during two phases of the full moon.
Although the subversive activities of the communists in Vietnam had thrust them into open military operations between the Viet Cong and the RVN Armed Forces, the continuing struggle was for the support and loyalty of the people. To influence this struggle, psychological warfare and civic action were recognized by the United States as important contributions to the overall counterinsurgency effort.

The USAF specified tasks relating to civic actions which were considered basic to all personnel assigned to Vietnam. Among these were to increase service capabilities, to improve air facilities, to increase airmen's technical and manual skills, to develop chart mapping capabilities, and to aid in agricultural, information, and community relations activities.

In this regard, an excerpt follows from a report by the commander of the 6222d Air Base Squadron at Da Nang for June 1962:

f. People to People Program and Activities:

(1) Operation "Life Line" was initiated by our Officers, NCO's and Airmen on 30 May 62. This project was
initiated to improve the central welfare of
the Sacred Heart Orphanage of Danang. This
organization has over 200 children, rang­
ing in age from a few days to fifteen years.
The projects completed to date are: bus
tours to the beach and returning for the
boys of the orphanage, screening the win­
dows and doors of the summer beach huts for
the smaller children, building bicycle
lines for the beach orphanage, spraying the
grass huts at the beach and clearing the
area of 21 high explosives by the EOD team.
The major activities include:
continuation of the trips to the beach,
placards to Marble Mountain, a sports and
recreational program, distinguishing the school buildings of the orphanage, publicity for
the embroidery and sewing work of the or­
phanage staff, monthly donations and a
clothing drive. A series of 16 mm movies
and still photos were taken of orphanage
life and activities. When these pictures
are available, we plan to prepare posters
and send them to Charitable Organizations,
Pharmaceutical Companies and newspapers with
a "Life line" appeal for food, clothing,
financial assistance and medicine.

(2) The local USAF Commander and
10 of his selected and 14 of his key staff
were entertained with refreshments and
dinner at our Officers’ and NCO Clubs on 23
June 62.

(3) The Mayor of Danang, Judge,
Chief of Police, President of the Council
and other officials were entertained
with refreshments and dinner at our Offi­
cers’ club on 10 June 62.

Although such action on the part of USAF per­
sonnel was common, it was accepted in addition to
normal daily training and advisory duties, and was
usually referred to as a part of reports for other
purposes.
TOP SECRET-NOFORN


This document stressed the problem associated with the relocation of the populace to Strategic Hamlets.

One of the first missions flown by the FARM GATE detachment, on 20 December 1961, was the use of an airborne instruction coupled with a leaflet drop. This plan had been devised by the Department of Defense Psychology Directorate in collaboration with power advisors of MAAG-V.

The plan envisioned trials over several Montagnard villages. One 2d ADVON SC-47 was initially scheduled. After learning that food was scarce in the village, two 2d ADVONs were added to the operation to drop rice and salt.

Over each village, ethnic music was played to gain the attention of the people. The music was followed by a voice message, the food drop, and finally, dissemination of the leaflets.

Voice broadcasts were made from an altitude of 500 feet. Leaflets were dropped in bundles and released by a static line. The technique, developed

* See TAB "A", pp. 33-37.
by a MAAG-V Psywar advisor, "worked perfectly."

The loudspeaker mounted in the underside of the SC-47 fuselage was not used. Instead, speakers were mounted on the main cabin door. With the aircraft in a bank to the left, this arrangement allowed a much longer time for the voice message to be beamed at a fixed point.

As early as March 1962, however, the VNAF had evidenced a reluctance to commit its C-47 aircraft to the psywar activities. This reluctance was apparently because the loudspeaker equipment precluded the use of the C-47 for other missions.

The loudspeaker/leaflet missions were considered to be effective, and, at the end of 1963, were still being conducted. On 27 July 1963, Ambassador McTavish advised the State Department that, "...while...".

The use of the sonic boom as a psychological weapon was proposed by 2d ADVON in January 1962. Permission was granted by COMUSMAC-V on 2 November 1962, after a briefing presented by 2d ADVON at a...
The first sortie was flown on 14 November by a TF-102 with drop tanks removed. By 20 December, 20 sorties had been flown, averaging three booms per sortie over Communist Zone "D." No more than one sortie per day was flown, and the sortie program was staggered so as to avoid establishing a pattern. Both day and night sorties were flown, with emphasis on daylight sorties during the daytime sorties.

The objectives were harassment of the VC, and an attempt to exploit the fear of the 18th which was believed to be paramount in primitive surroundings. The latter objective was, "... downgraded by reports of some activity appearing in Stars and Stripes 25 November, source unknown."

The intermittent use of the Farm Hand defoliation aircraft, on technical and political grounds, gave rise to a proposal by the Commander, 21st Air Division that the C-123 aerial spray aircraft be used for an insect control program in Vietnam. In his letter to Dr. Glenn of the US Operations Mission, Vietnam, General Archibald pointed out that the proposal, "... has received the enthusiastic recommendation of Headquar- ters US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam."

Dr. Glenn replied to the effect that his office
had been aware that these resources had been most-
ively for a specific purpose, but that the concept of aerial
spraying for insect control was, "contrary
to the accepted techniques of the World Health
Organization, both South Vietnam and the United
States are members of this organization."

Following a detailed explanation of the detri-
mental effects of aerial spraying for insect con-
trol, Glenn concluded:

"From the technical point of view,
we do not believe that the proposed
system of aerial spraying will ade-
quately, nor will it effectively re-

cure other insect-borne diseases under
the conditions that exist in Vietnam.
If you have evidence to the contrary,
we would appreciate seeing it, and we
are always available for any addi-
tional consultation that you may desire.

The beneficial results to be obtained from
such informal civic actions as the afore-citied
"Elite Line" plus ~ 164 in the children of Danang
could hardly be questioned. However, the cumula-
tive benefit of poppy and opium action as prac-
ticed by the RVN and US forces, had been the object
of some skepticism. In March 1963, General Houston's
report on poppy in RVN contained as a main premise
that, "overall poppy support of counterinsurgency
effort only marginally effective."
TOP SECRET

In summarizing, someone stated that:

... The area of psychological operations is one it is most important for us to

victimize are very sensitive, while in Vietnam they will accept technical advice on
how to operate a military area - tactics, they reject the suggestion that
a foreigner understands their people better than they do. They do not want
information propagandizing the Vietnamese people. Basically, the CO does not
want to be told what it should tell the people.

Allied in the problem of relations

with the press. This view is aware of its vulnerability and free press. It is able to
teach the local press and you are aware of its difficulties with the English press which is gaining
control. (See Part III, CHECO R-16.)

Psychological operations can never

exceed basic operational policy. When
general policies are good, psyops and
propaganda can help make them work
better and faster. When policies are

impractical or unrealistic, no amount
of psyops can make them succeed. I
have been ordered that as high

safes and I work to influence GET policy
but we do not determine it.

UNCONTROLLED AIR OPERATIONS

Operation LAM SON II described previously in the
section on "Air Escort", was summarized in a 2d
ADVON report to PACAF. Four A-1H aircraft had com-
pleted each attack via Fukuoka. The fires amount

a. The material in this and the following section
was prepared by the Directorate of Operations
(PFOO), Headquarters PACAF. Minor changes,
modifications, and deletions were made to adapt
the material to the requirements of OGC. CHECO.

b. TOP SECRET-NOFORN
landing by the helicopters was cancelled because of fog in one of the eight landing zones. The attack was re-scheduled for 0600 and was accomplished in two waves. The helicopter force commander called off the pre-attack which was to be made by four F-34 aircraft. The force commander had his own ground fire while leaving the landing zone during the first wave, sustained damage to the rotor shaft and was forced to land four miles south of the target area. At that time three F3 "air strikes were requested and were launched.

The first wave of the withdrawal phase was completed without incident, with four H-34s providing close air support. In the second phase, it appeared that some confusion was developing. Each OH-6A landed at several sites before receiving a full load. This made the helicopters vulnerable to attack from all sides, and made it very difficult for the escort aircraft to stay with the helicopters.

The last helicopter in the lift was very heavily loaded and could not gain sufficient altitude to return to a normal altitude. It proceeded at a low level, often below the ridge lines, which caused it to be exceedingly vulnerable to
CH-21 was hit by what the pilot believed to be a rocket, which tore a 1/2 inch hole in the side of the aircraft, killing three ARVN troops. The helicopters landed immediately. Fixed wing aircraft which were overhead during the latter phase were not used.

On 10 January 1963, Mohawk aircraft were being deployed to Qui Nhon from Nha Trang. When deployed, the Mohawks were under the operational control of the US Army Senior Adviser to the Ninth Division. The Mohawk operations were not coordinated with the Sub-ASOC located at Nha Trang.

As a result of this lack of coordination with the 636th AVN and the Tactical Air Control System, the loss of a Mohawk on 10 January was not reported for several days. The 636th AVN operation office had no information on which to base a search operation. The aircraft was never found.

Operation DAD TRANG 202B was conducted 28 nautical miles east of Kontum on 6 April 1963. In this operation six CH-21’s and four UH-1B’s were hit by Viet Cong small arms fire during the landing phase. During the first lift into the objective area, one CH-21 and three UH-1B’s were hit by ground fire, with one crew member sustaining
During the third lift two more CH-21's were hit. One of them exploded and killed six US personnel. This served as a signal of the enemy fire. Three other helicopters were hit during the operation.

One SH-60 was utilized to strike the landing zone prior to the arrival of the helicopters. This strike was stopped by the Army Air Support two minutes before the actual arrival of the transport helicopters. While the battle raged, the fixed wing aircraft and the Forward Air Controller remained overhead. The FAC offered assistance but it was not used. The Army representative explained that the Army controller could not tell our FAC where to direct air strikes with so many arms in the area at low altitude, there was danger of shooting each other.

There will always be some confusion in the area of the battlefield. In this instance, the fire power available would not be useful because of the number of helicopters in the area. If, in the confusion, the battle commander could not tell where the small arms fire was coming from, how then did the armed CH-21's know where to shoot?
Two USAF T-28's were striking a target at 16.00 hours local on 9 April 1963. The lead aircraft released a rocket salvo at the target. Just after firing, the pilot of Army OV-1 (Mohawk) in the path of the rockets, which hit 100-200 yards from the OV-1. The number two aircraft in the formation aborted his firing pass because of the presence of the OV-1 in the target area.

The OV-1 made several observation passes in the target area without making any contact with the T-28's or the Forward Air Controller. After the pass, the OV-1 continued their attacks.

On 17 July 1963, Colonel Donald H. Ross, Director of Operations, Second Air Division, sent a letter to the Senior US Advisor to I Corps pointing out the need to inform and engage the MOHawk aircraft operating in and through target areas for strike aircraft without the knowledge of TACS or ASOC's. Ross specifically referred to an incident of 5 July involving a Mohawk which flew between two T-28's which were on dive bombing runs.

ASOC personnel had no knowledge of the Mohawk flight until it was reported.
by the T-28 flight. When maneuvering in a target area, pilots of strike aircraft should not be burdened with the unnecessary hazard posed by the presence of independent and uncoordinated aircraft activities. One of the benefits derived from TACS control of all aircraft in a theater of operations is the minimizing of this type of incident. This benefit cannot be realized, however, unless all parties cooperate to the fullest.

On 10 July 1963 at approximately 1000 hours, Second Air Division reported that five OH-18 helicopters had expended ordnance on a Authorized Low Priority Interdiction Target (ALPIT) in Zone D. The Air Operations Center had had no knowledge of this unusual mission prior to the strike.

To insure proper control and prompt action in the event of damage to, or loss of, Army aircraft, the strikes should have been cleared with TACS. 109

At approximately 1630 hours local on 22 July 1963, six SU-22 fighter-bomber aircraft expended ordnance 25 nautical miles northeast of Saigon in close support of ground forces. Strike aircraft under the tactical air control system were operating in that vicinity. These included two A-1H's, one B-26 and four T-28's. The Forward Air Controller was unable to contact the helicopters. 110

On 23 July 1963 a request for air support
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was received by III Corps G-3. This request was
not given to the III Corps ASOC for action. Five
Army HH-53's went to the area shortly
thereafter the Corps G-3 gave another request to
the III Corps ASOC. A H-26 was scrambled to
provide close support in accordance with this
second request. The H-26 started its attack, but
could not continue because of interference from
helicopters in the same area. The FAC could not
call the helicopters even though he tried all
the designated frequencies. Second Air Division
pointed out that safety of flight was being com-
promised by failure of Army aviation to coordinate
air operations with TACS.

NO RFC USE OF AVAILABLE AIRPOWER

On 10 September 1962, Admiral Felt sent the
following message to General Markings:

1. I have read with interest
and some concern Capt Treadway's US
General Reserve report dated 10 August
describing encounter on 9 August with
VC near Camp Du Tho. He radioed for
help support but apparently did not
think of requesting AD or T-28 support.
This is another incident where VC effect
a successful withdrawal. It was un-
fortunate that Air did not arrive
with reserve troops. However, the out-
standing feature of the action is that

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because no air cover was planned or called for, VC moved across 2000 meters of open terrain and escaped in platoon size groups.

2. The job of indoctrinating personnel is never ending.

An ALO and TAC were on duty at the 23d Division Command Post on 24 February 1963. There was an ARVN operation in progress requiring one RB-26 or ground airlift for the operation and other aircraft available, if required. The FAC, utilizing an AN/MRC 94, which is equipped with SSB, was in contact with the JAOC at Tan Son Nhut.

At 1110 hours local, the FAC saw two CH-21's depart the Tan Son Nhut airfield. Mission and destination unknown. A short time later one CH-21 landed at Tan Son Nhut with two wounded on board. One of the wounded died 15 minutes after arrival at a hospital.

Investigation revealed the helicopters had taken off for the purpose of evacuating one wounded ARVN soldier from a point eight miles from Plein Tien. One CH-21 remained at approximately 1000 feet while the other helicopter went in for the wounded soldier. The hovering CH-21 was hit by ground fire, wounding the two gunners on board. This helicopter returned immediately to Tan Son Nhut. The CH-21 that
made the pickup received seven hits during the landing phase, withdrew and was forced down because of severe vibrations before it could reach Phan Thiet.

Later, the VNAF accomplished the mission without incident by using one unarmed H-34 escorted by one HU-1B.

The senior US Army Advisor for the operation, when asked why escort had not been requested, stated that the area had been reported clear.

Operation BACH PHUOC II, on 27 April 1961, was a heliborne operation conducted in I Corps area. The operation called for Marine helicopters transporting 300 troops to be escorted by five HU-1B’s. The HU-1B also gave fire support during the landing phase. The Air Force provided pre-strike and air cover throughout the operation.

At H minus 15 minutes, two T-28’s started pre-landing strikes at the landing zone. At H plus 20 minutes all ordnance except .50 caliber had been expended by the T-28’s. At H plus 20 minutes the transport helicopters, escorted by HU-1B’s, arrived. At H plus 22 minutes, one Marine H-34 was shot down in the Landing Zone. A total of six H-34’s were hit by Viet Cong ground fire during the landing.
The escorting LH-10's were providing suppressive fire. Throughout this phase of the operation, the friendly fighters orbited overhead at 4000 feet with their fire power neither utilized nor expended.

Any lapse between prelanding strikes and the actual landing of transport helicopters had proven to be disastrous, as was the 10 minute interval in this case.

Duc Thang Operation 34 was scheduled to occur on 3 July 1963 in the Vinh Long area. Continuous air cover was planned from 0600 hours local to 1800 hours with two additional T-28's on strip alert for escort duty. At 0830 the FAC for the operation was recalled from Vinh Long and told to fly an artillery observer to Kien Hoa where another operation was being conducted. When the FAC returned from this mission he learned that the forces for Duc Thang Operation were being directed to Kien Hoa. The helicopter part of the Kien Hoa Operation proceeded at 1400 hours without fixed wing escort. Four armed LH-10's were utilized to support the troop lift and to provide fire suppression. The ground battle was supported by A-26's.
However, the actual helicopter operations were apparently not supported by fixed wing aircraft. At one time during the battle, ten A-1H's were attacked because the FAC could not talk to the ground forces. During the course of the activity, eleven UN-18's were hit.

On 6 July 1963, after pre-strike missions had been flown by one B-26 and four A-1H aircraft, a B-26 escorted US Marine OH-34D helicopters into Landing Zone Lulu, located in a swamp. Aircraft were not landed because anti-helicopter stakes were in the Landing Zone. The OH-34's returned to staging base and the troop lift aborted. Pre-strike and escort aircraft landed at Da Nang and assumed ground role as requested by the Forward Area Command Post. At approximately 1010 hours one Marine OH-34, with the assault commander on board, returned to the landing area on a reconnaissance mission. The OH-34 was escorted by four Army OH-18's. No request for fixed wing escort was made even though aircraft were on alert for this mission at Da Nang. While hovering in the landing zone area, one of the OH-18 pilots was struck in the head by ground fire. He was reported dead on arrival at the staging base.
A VNAF ASOC office had offered to have the reconnaissance flight escorted with fixed wing aircraft. However, this offer was declined. Later, another reconnaissance mission was conducted in the same area without incident. This mission was conducted by two fixed wing 7-26's.

On 12 September 1963, Lt Keith N. Sawyer, USAF, was the pilot of an L-19, call sign Scotty Golf II. He was controlling a B-26, New Beau, on an air cover mission. At 1110 hours, 3 kilometers north of Dcn Cot at 1500 feet, Sawyer observed an Army L-19 and two Mohawks in the immediate vicinity. The Army aircraft departed to the north. Several minutes later, two artillery rounds exploded 200 yards east of Scotty Golf II. Sawyer immediately departed the area as shells continued to fall. The Vietnamese observer had continuous contact with both the 173rd and 17th Artillery Groups and observed the Army L-19 had been controlling the artillery fire. Lt Sawyer reported the incident to Paris control at approximately 1120 hours and the information was relayed to AOC at 1130 hours.

The following is an extract of the AOC Duty Report.
Officer Log for 12 September 1963:

1130 CRC notified AOC /Tha7/ Scotty Golf II reported one Army 1-19 and two Rhodesia in at 1300 270 near Ben Cat, interfering in his operation in controlling Nam Ben, artillery fire is N.W., impacting in his area. Scotty Golf II has no contact with the Army L-19 who appears to be directing the artillery.

1135 Called III AOC. They cannot contact 5th Division to shut off artillery.

1140 Called MACV Coc and inquired on situation and asked for assistance.

1145 CRC AOC has made contact with 5th Division. Major Procter at III Corps has notified 5th Division G-3 Duty NCO to coordinate into artillery or stop firing.

1203 Scotty Golf II notified through one to resume operation and watch out for Rhodesia as AOC cannot contact them.

1245 CRC advised Scotty Golf II VNAF Observer has ground radio contact at this time.

1300 From III AOC Duty Officer. Tornado Red pulled off target due to artillery. Scotty Golf II has been instructed to contact Ben Cat C. P. to coordinate with artillery fire. III AOC notified to get III Corps T.O.C. on a artillery fire. CRC AOC told to forward Scotty Golf and Nam Ben II artillery was not lifted.

At the close of the period of this CRECO report, 31 December 1963, Operation DAIYHOF -NO took place.
Ambassador Lodge, in a message to the Department of State, submitted the report of an embassy official, S. B. Thomsen, which was based upon conversation with US advisors to the ARVN 5th Division. Thomsen reported that on the afternoon of 31 December, the 32nd Ranger Battalion was engaged by an estimated two VC battalion force approximately 10 miles west of Ben Cat and 8 miles southeast of Tan Tien. An intense fire fight occurred during which the 32nd Ranger Battalion was reported to have fought hard and well.

Although two battalions of the 8th ARVN regiment were close (one battalion at Dau Tieng and one battalion at Ben Cat) the 32nd Battalion did not relieve Rangers until about noon January 1. By that time American advisors had separated into disconnected small unit action. American unit did not thin fight but positioned itself defensively short distance away. Rangers then treated to defense perimeter. After VC broke off, ARVN units merely moved forward to locate dead and wounded. Large number of KIA was result of the disintegration during later stages of battle; many of those reported missing have appeared in small groups at neighboring villages.
By reacting immediately with additional forces available (the 9th regiment in neighboring Tay Ninh province and airborne forces in Saigon), the 5th Division could have given the VC terrific beating instead of laying more than 10 hours. ARVN forces suffered from this.

American advisers feel the acting Division Commander almost criminally negligent in failure to send immediate help. This is just one more example, albeit one of most striking, of American failure to take advantage of superiority in fire power which can be obtained by rapid reaction to Viet Cong troop concentrations.

Second Air Division reported that there had been this operation throughout the day from 0730 to 1800 hours. The aircraft were armed with twelve 100 pound bombs and 800 rounds of 20 mm ammunition each, for a total of ninety-six 100 pound bombs and 1920 rounds of 20 mm ammunition committed and immediately available throughout the day. Moreover, additional resources were available at Bien Hoa (39 miles away) and Tan Son Nhut (15 miles away). This air power was not called into the battle.

General Maddux expressed to General Stillwell, J-3, MAC-V, his concern, "about the failure to make use of resources so readily available".
which, if used, might have resulted in a major victory instead of a defeat.

An Effort Toward Order

On 7 August 1961, 2AD AOC sent the following message to the I, II, III and IV ASOC's with MAC-V J-3 as information address:

As an additional step in coordination, the Air Force Component Commander's coordination responsibility for air operations as outlined in MAC-V Directives 36 dated 18 August 1961 and 44 dated 8 July 1963, ASOC's will conduct a daily coordination conference. Conference will be attended by representatives of Corps AO, USA/UC Aviation Headquarters Tactical Operations Center, MACV Staff, and others as deemed appropriate. Other local SOP's should be established to ensure complete coordination on a continuing basis. Appropriate data and status charts will be maintained within ASOC's showing total VN/US air effort in A5OC areas.

This was followed the very next day by a message from the Second Air Division AOC to the same addresses which changed the statement, "conference will be attended..." to, "conference should be attended..." COMUSMAC-V's reaction to the USAF effort to effect much needed coordination was set forth in a message to the US Senior Advisors of the four Corps areas, with Second Air Division as information address:

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
TO: General Paul D. Harkins
COMUSMACV, Saigon, Vietnam

From: General Anthus

In an attempt to determine whether proper air support was provided for the III Corps Heliborne Operation which took place 30 August in the Tay Ninh area, I have interviewed the Deputy Director of the AOC and III ASOC to ascertain how and to what degree air was used in the operation. I found that the US Army Aviation Officer assigned to III corps had not been invited by the AOC to attend the CTOC/ASOC Planning Conference on 30 August and the request for Air Support was received after the planning conference. The Aviation Officer had been invited to previous conferences by the Deputy Director of the ASOC, however, he has declined to attend. In accordance with MACV Directive #44, one of the primary responsibilities of the Aviation Commander's representatives at Corps Headquarters is to participate in and assist operational planning and the coordination of employment of III Corps Aviation with USAF Tactical Air.
As your Air Component Commander, you have charged me with certain responsibilities, one of which is coordination of your air effort. In order to fulfill this responsibility, the AOC directed the IMC to conduct and chair a daily planning conference attended by representatives of all units involved in air operations (Attachments I and II). This was dispatched by J-3 (Attachment #3) which you may not have seen seems to be contrary to the intent of Operation Air and #34.

I need full support and cooperation from all participating air activities in order to coordinate the air effort in RVN. This means that air has to be in on the initial planning for the use of all air assets in any major operation. To include all facets of the operation.

I flew a B-52 in support of the above referenced operation last Friday and I was appalled at the lack of information available to the aircrew about the operations. It was apparent that even though my assistance was available, I was unable to contact the J-2 which was required because the frequency the helicopters were using was unknown to us. I blame this lack of information in part of the AOC because apparently they did not persist in trying to obtain it. On the other hand this and other facets of the operation had participated in the Air Coordination Conference.

In order to insure smooth operation of the air effort it is mandatory that representatives of all units involved in the operation get together for daily planning conferences. This is essential in order to minimize mutual interference among operating agencies, obtain more effective utilization of air, and expedite
the safe and orderly flow of air traffic into and out of the combat area.

From the previous discussion, I have had with you on this subject, I am sure you share my feelings. However, we are having some difficulties in accomplishing effective air coordination which can be alleviated with your continued support.

Sincerely,

MAJ. GEN. WENNER
Major General, USAF
Commander

PARADOX

The MAC-V military structure, as reflected in the mutual relationships, has proven to be pseudo-synergistic as far as airpower was concerned. The COIN airpower policy had unquestionably contributed to the creation of duplicate US military air resources within RVN. Moreover, the controversy had had its effects upon the RMAF (see Para IV).

The vitiating nature of the dual structure upon the effectiveness of airpower was subject to far more exhaustive documentation than that which has been provided in this series of reports. Nevertheless, the existence of two essentially
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Separate and complete air entities and their performance of many of the very same missions exemplified the parasitism.

Effectiveness of Centralized Control

Of the 680 aircraft in RVN at the start of 1963, approximately half belonged to the US Army/USMG and the other half to the USAF/VNAF. The latter were operated under TASS.

The USAF/VNAF aircraft, operating under centralized control, accounted for 30 percent of the VC killed during the first eight months of 1963. The remaining 70 percent of the VC were killed by US Army aviation and RVN ground forces, which together accounted for 97 percent of the US/RVN military strength.

Outmoded Equipment

This significant accomplishment by the more centralized forces had been achieved with outmoded strike aircraft. The first line USAF counterparts to the 'out-sized' strike aircraft used in RVN were all jet powered and had been so for some years. Even the C-130, designed for paratroop

*See page 7, Part IV, GOMOR Report.
**See page 20, Part V, CHECO Report.

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delivery, was turbo-jet powered.

While the USAF had been constrained from employing its more effective weapon systems for various reasons, some of which were considered in Part III of the CHECO Report, the Army was more fortunate in that respect. The Mohawk, Caribou, and HH-1A's (turbo-jet powered), were first line aircraft designed to perform the task of air support as the Army envisioned it, and enhance the concept of organic airpower. Thus, the existence of two virtually separate and independent air forces remained the focus of contention.

Top Air War

Major General Archis, in a personal letter to General Stagg, dated 6 November 1965, neatly summed up the paradox:

The duplication of roles generates many tactical problems. The lack of control of parallel organization which is, in effect, prosecuting a second air war, is extremely serious, and time after time has significantly reduced the effectiveness of operations. In addition to the cost in effectiveness, we must consider the large investment costs of this duplication of roles in terms of men, material and money. We do not want a single man or piece of equipment that we do not need. However, we have always operated in RVN in an austere posture that never has afforded us all the

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men and machines that we could optimally utilize. I find it very difficult to rationalize our austere side by side with this very expensive duplicate organization.
FOOTNOTES:

1. Msg, CINCPAC to CHMAAG-V, DTG 065041Z Dec 61, TOP SECRET, Sup Doc 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Msg, PACAF to CHMAAG-V, DTG 002000110 Dec 61, TOP SECRET, Sup Doc 4.
6. Ibid.
7. Msg, CINCPAC to PACAF/CHMAAG-V, DTG 202238Z Dec 61, TOP SECRET, Sup Doc 5.
16. Record, Staff Conf., Msg CINCPAC, 19 Dec 61, TOP SECRET, p 38-1, Appendix I-A.
17. Record, Staff Conf., Msg CINCPAC, 19 Dec 62, TOP SECRET, p 38-2, Appendix I-A.
18. Ibid., p 3-14.
20. Record, SecDef Conf, Hq COMUSMAC-V, 11 May 62, TOP SECRET, Item 8, Appendix I-A.
21. Record, SecDef Conf, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Jul 62, TOP SECRET, p 5-2, Appendix 1-B.
22. Ibid., p 5-3.
23. Msg, COMUSMAC-V to CIA, DTG 100451Z Mar 63, SECRET, Sup Doc 58.
24. Ltr, Gen O'Bonnell to CINCPAC, 11 Nov 61, TOP SECRET, Sup Doc 56.
25. Msg, CINCPAC to CHMAAG-V, DTG 830122Z Dec 61, TOP SECRET, Sup Doc 56.
27. Msg, CINCPAC to CHMAAG-V, DTG 830122Z Dec 61, TOP SECRET, Sup Doc 56.
29. Ltr, Comdr 2ADVON to CHMAAG-V, 30 Jul 62, UNCL.
30. Ltr, CHMAAG-V to Comdr 2ADVON, 16 Aug 62, UNCL.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ltr, Comdr 2ADVON to CHMAAG-V, 30 Jul 62, UNCL.
34. Ltr, CHMAAG-V to Comdr 2ADVON, 16 Aug 62, UNCL.
35. Msg, COMUSMAC-V to multiple MAC-V units, DTG 220044Z Apr 63, SECRET, Sup Doc 30.
38. Ibid.
40. Ltr, ICAF to Hq PACAF, Subj: "Effectiveness of Alligator in COIN Operations", 21 Jan 63, SECRET, Sup Doc 23A.
41. See Footnote 29.
43. See TAB "A", p 3.
44. See Footnote 37.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
54. See Footnote 37.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
TOP SECRET

33. Msg, COCOMAG-V to CINCPAC, DTG 290720Z Nov 62, SECRET, Sup Doc 39.
34. Msg, COCOMAG-V to multiple addresses, USMAC-V
   re: DVC, 6 Apr 63, CONF, Sup Doc 30.
35. Msg, 2AD to 13AF, DTG 150661Z Nov 63,-secret, Sup Doc 31.
36. Ltr, Lt Col Charles J. Briere, Sup Dir JDC,
   re: 1120 AEB, 11 Apr 63, CONF, Sup Doc 32.
38. Memo, Hq PACAF, JFPOC to JFPOC, 20 Jul 63, SECRET, Sup Doc 34.
39. Ltr, Lt Col Mann, Lt Col Bowers, rct to Maj Anderson, 21 Oct 63, CONF,
   Sup Doc 35.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.

54. Msg, COCOMAG-V to multiple addresses, USMAC-V
   re: DVC, 6 Apr 63, CONF, Sup Doc 30.
55. Msg, 2AD to 13AF, DTG 150661Z Nov 63, secret, Sup Doc 31.
56. Ltr, Lt Col Charles J. Briere, Sup Dir JDC,
   re: 1120 AEB, 11 Apr 63, CONF, Sup Doc 32.
58. Memo, Hq PACAF, JFPOC to JFPOC, 20 Jul 63, secret, Sup Doc 34.
59. Ltr, Lt Col Mann, Lt Col Bowers, rct to Maj Anderson, 21 Oct 63, CONF,
   Sup Doc 35.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
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65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.

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69. See TAB "A", p. 31-30.
70. Ibid.
71. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, DTG 013000Z Mar 62, SECRET, Sup Doc 41.
72. 2AD Reg 55-18, 2 Aug 63, COM1 Sup Doc 41.
73. Msg, 2AD to HQ PACAF, DTG 160000Z Nov 61, SECRET, Sup Doc 41.
74. Msg, 2AD to HQ PACAF, DTG 170000Z Mar 62, SECRET, Sup Doc 41.
76. Msg, 2AD to 13AF, DTG 071041Z Aug 63, SECRET, Sup Doc 41.
77. Ibid.
78. See TAB "A", p. 31-30.
80. Msg, 13AF to 2AD, DTG 20090Z Feb 62, SECRET, Sup Doc 47.
81. Ibid.
82. Briefing by Cen Anthis at Shefwn, May 63, SECRET.
83. Msg, 13AF to HQ PACAF, DTG 310812Z May 62, SECRET, Sup Doc 47.
84. Ibid.
85. Msg, Admin COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, DTG 210512Z Mar 62, SECRET, Sup Doc 47.
86. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, DTG 211012Z Mar 62, SECRET, Sup Doc 47.
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88. Msg, COMUSMAC-V to OSD, DTG 240127Z Apr 64, SECRET, Sup Doc 51.


90. Msg USAF Pamphlet, AFF 55-2-1, "Air Force Civic Actions", 10 Jan 63, CONF.

91. Lt, 622d AB Sq to JACMAC, Subj: "Request for Items Relating to Activities in JACMAC Area", undated, SECRET, Sup Doc 26.


93. Msg, CHMAC-V to CINCPAC, 230412Z Dec 62, SECRET, Sup Doc 58.


95. Msg, 62nd FARKU to State, 10, 18 Jul 63, SECRET, Sup Doc 60.

96. Msg, JACMAC to MACV, DTG 091400Z Mar 63, SECRET, Sup Doc 61.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Lt, Gen Anthis to Dr. Stanley Glenn, Ph.D., USOM-V, 12 Feb 63, UNCL, Sup Doc 62.

100. Lt, Dr. Stanley Glenn, USOM-V to Gen Anthis, 26 Feb 63, UNCL, Sup Doc 63.

101. Msg, CHMAC-V to CINCPAC, DTG 100106Z Mar 63, SECRET, Sup Doc 64.

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103. Msg, JAD to HQ PACAF, DTG 050127Z Sep 62, SECRET.
104. Msg, JAD to HQ PACAF, DTG 150935Z Jan 63, SECRET.
105. Msg, JAC to CINCPAC, DTG 130337Z Apr 63, SECRET.
106. Msg, JAD to HQ PACAF, DTG 120700Z Apr 63, SECRET.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ltr, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 100631Z Sep 62, CONF, Sup Doc 66.
114. Msg, JAD to HQ PACAF, DTG 281040Z Apr 63, SECRET.
115. Msg, JAD to HQ PACAF, DTG 071355Z Jul 63, SECRET.
116. Msg, JAD to HQ PACAF, DTG 070915Z Jul 63, SECRET.
118. Ibid.
119. Msg, Anwar Saigon to Sec State, DTG 041132Z Jan 64, CONF, Sup Doc 68.

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120. Ibid.
121. Msg, 2AD to Com, 2AD G-4, 24 Sep 63, CONF, Sup Doc 69.
122. Msg, 2AD G-4 to Com, 2AD G-4, 24 Sep 63, CONF, Sup Doc 70.
123. Msg, 2AD G-4 to ASOC's I, II, III, IV Corps, 28 Sep 63, CONF, Sup Doc 71.
124. Msg, COMUSMACV to ASOC's I, II, III, IV Corps, 2 Sep 63, CONF, Sup Doc 72.
125. Ltr, Com, 2AD to COMUSMACV, 2 Sep 63, CONF, Sup Doc 73.
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AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

Response to draft letter on
Farmgate Interdiction

1. The attached draft response prepared by your office has been annotated to reflect our views on tightening up, in a manner supportable by the record, the argument in favor of continuing the Farmgate Interdiction effort in the RVN counterinsurgency campaign.

2. It is strongly recommended that the MACV analysis of the current Farmgate effort and procedures be attached to your memo as a basis for your analysis of the military aspects of the Farmgate Operation and its contributions. It is a comprehensive reference which would appear to go to be a valuable tool for use of the people in Washington in short stopping the type questions raised in Mr. Harriman's dispatch.

Atch PAUL D. HARRIMAN
Cy Draft ltr General, United States Army

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: CINCPAC TORDSLEAD
SUBJECT: Interection
mem. pa. 06266

FOR HARRIMAN AND HILLSMAN FROM MCINTOS

In response to the recent correspondence, my staff and I, with the close cooperation of MACV
and 2nd Air Division, have conducted a thorough
written and evaluation of the subject of Interection. In order to present the results of this study
and to provide a framework for more detailed comments
on the Department's arguments and for my conclusions,
I have taken the liberty below of restating the prob-
lem in different terms from those employed by the
Department.

During the past six months about 7,000 combat
support sorties, or a little over 1,000 per month, have been flown in SVN. About 2,000 of these,
or 30%, have been flown by Fongate (combined USA
and SVN). Of these 7,000 combat support sorties,
MACV has flown about 1,000 Interection missions,
while Fongate strikes have flown about 600 such
missions. Thus, Fongate has flown about 41% combat
support sorties per month over the past six months.
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of which about 100 per month have been interdiction missions. Accordingly, Farmgate combat support sorties have amounted to about 2% of all total such sorties flown in SVN over the past six months, while Farmgate interdiction sorties have amounted for less than 10% of that total.

There are three general types of interdiction targets involved in the war against the VC.

a. Structures abandoned by people relocated into strategic hamlets. The purpose of pre-planned interdiction missions against such structures is to deny to the VC their use as dwellings, training centers, arms factories, ammunition storage, etc.

b. Structures abandoned by the VC during ARVN operations against them. Immediately following the operation, and after GVN forces have withdrawn from the area, ARVN often requests an air strike to destroy the remaining structures.

c. Targets of known VC concentrations, headquarters, storage areas, communications and command centers, arms manufacturing facilities, etc. These targets are normally located in remote areas where the air interdiction mission is the only feasible method of destroying them.

Of these three types of targets, the third
kind may be assumed to be most likely to be inhabited at the time of an interdiction mission against it. Severe requirements of the target validation and existing processes reduce to a bare minimum the likelihood of this assumption being verified by actual fact. Because of the remote areas in which such targets are normally located, however, interdiction strikes against them are likely to affect many persons who might be considered as "innocent bystanders." There is no hard evidence, though, that the number of such individuals are great enough in proportion to the total numbers of people in SVN affected by all GVN and VC military operations to have any important effect on the GVN's efforts to gain control over and support of the mass of population.

The basic source of intelligence for interdiction target selection is GVN knowledge of those areas under VC control or in which VC influence is increasing. This knowledge is gained from secret agents in the GVN working at different levels; interroga­tion of VC prisoners and defectors; patrolling and scouting by ARVN, Rangers, Special Forces and paramilitary units; after-action surveillance of withdrawing VC to obtain information on escape and
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dispersal routes; VC ground fire; and photo reconnaissance. Sometimes, intelligence gathered from one or more of these sources has such a high reliability that a valid target can be established immediately. When, however, intelligence is fragmentary or has a lower evaluation rating, additional confirmatory evidence is sought by employing one or more of the sources mentioned above, as well as by photo reconnaissance flown specifically for target location and evaluation. Any time lag causing from this process requires revalidation of the target.

In many cases, the information provided by local civil GVN authorities establishes the basic requirement for an interdiction mission. This information is passed by civilians through the village and district chiefs to the Province Chief, who passes it to the GVN military authorities. Interdiction target requests originating with the local civilian authorities must be passed at least to Corps level for approval; target requests originating at the Corps level or higher must be passed to the local authorities to confirm the validity of the target. While the mechanism for
approving interdiction targets stems from Corps Headquarters to Corps Headquarters. All such targets must be approved at the Corps level.

Additional inviolable requirements for control of target identification and attack are effective target marking, two-way radio communications, and trained Vietnamese Air Force forward air controllers, all of which are required before Farmgate aircraft are authorized to attack an interdiction target. Final responsibility for the accomplishment of interdiction missions rests with the pilot. There are many cases on record of pilots refusing to attack targets because they were not satisfied that friendly personnel would not be jeopardized.

No one would claim that the sources of intelligence on which target selection is based are infallible; we ourselves doubt that. In general, the Vietnamese are not as sensitive as we are to the need to avoid indiscriminate treatment of areas and people in counterinsurgency warfare. Nevertheless, as described above, raw intelligence is subjected to painstaking scrutiny and confirmation at all levels before an approved target emerges that the risks arising from Vietnamese
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carelessness or insensitivity are considered to be minimal. Parenthetically, the stringent requirements and controls imposed on Fairgate interdiction missions have been adopted by the GVN and greatly improved VNAF operations and procedures.

It is admittedly difficult to obtain accurate and complete information on the casualties caused by interdiction strikes. Nevertheless, positive, official evidence is available in only one case in which some innocent people have been killed or injured in interdiction strikes. There are current rumors or incidents occurring some time ago, but these have been impossible to confirm with specific facts. It should be noted that (this case was) attributable to serious pilot error rather than to faulty intelligence or improper target selection. There is currently no evidence to suggest that the relatively small number of Vietnamese affected by interdiction missions react more adversely to the GVN than do the many more affected by all types of GVN and VC military operations. It also seems highly questionable to conclude that individuals affected by
Farmgate or VNAF interdiction strikes, even if these individuals are basically anti-VC or at least less than wholehearted VC supporters, are going to become more sympathetic to the VC. Just as good an argument to the contrary might be made: individuals who are half-hearted supporters of the VC or who are forced by circumstances to work for the VC could suggest the circumstances which exposed them to the strikes, and blame the VC for these circumstances; they could fear those strikes more than they resent the perpetrators of the strikes. Indeed, there is more evidence to support this argument than the contrary one. One of the generally accepted major reasons for the large-scale mass exodus into non-controlled areas over the past year has been their fear of being caught between VC and GVN military operations, including air strikes. Their reaction was not to go deeper into VC territory but to flee VC-controlled areas in search of GVN protection. Similarly, in a more recent case, it appears that the 1,300 or more refugees of Khmer origin who recently fled an area long controlled by the VC in the Tri Ton District of An Giang Province to receive GVN protection did so because the area...
where they had been living had just prior to their flight been subjected to heavy and sustained interdiction strikes. These people who have sought GVN protection have undoubtedly made an effective political choice between the VC and the GVN; rather they have sought safety and decided that safety lay with the GVN rather than with the VC.

As indicated above, less than 10% of the combat support sorties flown in SVN in the past six months have been interdiction missions flown by Farmgate aircraft. Farmgate aircraft bear no markings and their participation in the VNAF effort is not publicized. Moreover, as was originally stipulated in the rules for employment of Farmgate aircraft, they are employed in combat support missions only when the VNAF capability is exceeded. Despite frequent press reports on the role of USAF personnel in combat support missions, there is no more emphasis on that role than on the role of the US Army advisers attached to ARVN combat units. There is thus no foundations for believing that US participation in interdiction missions could intensify the Communist charges of US control over the war in SVN.
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or of the GVN's "neo-colonial" subservience to
the US.

Pros and Cons

In my view, the above restatement of the
problem reduces the subject of interdiction to
its proper proportions within the overall context
of the GVN's efforts against the VC and of the GVN's
efforts to win the support of the population.

The above restatement of the problem therefore
attaches more weight generally to the PRO arguments in the
reference instruction than to the CON arguments, largely
because the latter are reduced in importance when applied to the
subject of interdiction in its proper context. Nevertheless, it
is believed useful to make some specific comments
on the Department's pro and con arguments.

Pros

Regarding the first PRO argument, in-
elligence reports confirm that the interdiction effort
restricts VC movements, the consolidation and
storage of VC areas, equipment and supplies. Inter-
diction strikes also restrict the manufacture of
VC war goods, keep the VC forces off balance, dis-
rupt training centers, render medical attention
difficult and lower morale. In short, the
A key argument has been omitted from the reference instruction. Farmgate interdiction missions constitute about one-fourth of the interdiction missions in SVN. To reduce Farmgate participation in such missions before VNAF has the capability to fulfill the requirements and begin some wide operations against the VC are being intensified in accordance with the National Campaign would subject the GVN to an important military disadvantage. Undoubtedly, the plan of ground operations under the National Campaign would have to be accelerated and expanded in scope, resulting in a prolongation of the war. Similarly, the political impact of a Farmgate curtailment on US-SVN relations is likely to be considerable. The GVN would be likely to question the US intention to support fully the GVN in its struggle against the VC.

**Coun**

1. As the above statement of the problem would suggest, some arguments 1, 2, 5 and 6 are so general that they might be applied across the
board to all types of GVN military operations. To put these arguments on a specific aspect such as interdiction gives these arguments much more importance than they should have in relation to the pro arguments. One might very well ask, for example, that if Farmgate interdiction missions were ruled out, would the GVN be materially better able to win the support of the population, or would the VC be able to recruit with much less ease? Affirmative answers to these questions appear doubtful. In this connection, it may be a dangerous oversimplification, as Con argument 1. asserts, to regard any SVN territory as nothing or any village as VT. Moreover, it is an equally dangerous oversimplification to consider that there are no hard and fast SVN targets, base areas, training and supply centers, etc., which can be destroyed by air interdiction without endangering the lives of innocent people.

2. It is the considered military judgment here that Con argument 3. is not valid, since the extent or magnitude of the target, or its relationship to a battle line, does not matter. In the judgment of MACV, once a target is verified, it is just as legitimate in counterguerrilla
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warfare as in a limited or general conventional
case. We are therefore unaware of any reason
why insurrection methods are more applicable
to conventional warfare than to counterinsurgency
warfare.

3. Regarding argument 4, it is possible that targeting techniques cannot be refined
as great a degree as would be ideal. It may
also be admitted that the Vietnamese are not as
sensitive to the basically political nature of
the war, and therefore are not wholly trustworthy
as sources of information for interdiction target
selection. However, in absolute terms, target
selection techniques currently employed in SVN
are applied with greater care and with many safety
deVICES. Moreover, it must be recognized that,
largely because of the USAF advisory effort and
Farmgate operation, VNAF techniques of target
selection, marking and operational control have
been heightened up and improved considerably. In
this connection, there appears to be a misconcep-
tion as to what an interdiction target is. It
is not an area, but a pinpointed facility or troop
concentration. Thus, even if a province or
district chief considers an area an enemy
territory simply because it harbors VC, the interdiction effort is conducted not against an area but against a specific target—a target which is usually in a remote area. The 230-mile area referred to in the reference instruction was not the target but the target area. In that area there were 10 paddocks, targets of which 12 were hit and 7 were not hit because of weather. The incident referred to was caused by pilot error.

4. Corp argument 7 is a valid question for discussion. However, Farmgate aircraft are today operating under the same ground rules that were established when they arrived in Vietnam. There has been no change in those rules. Two changes have occurred, however, since Farmgate first arrived in SVN: (1) the number of Farmgate aircraft has increased to meet increased requirements and (2) the press has gradually devoted more attention to the role of air power in Vietnam’s war.

Conclusion
US-piloted interdiction missions, at the current stage of the war in SVN, are a necessary supplement to VMF’s interdiction capability, which
is growing but is still insufficient to fulfill the intensified requirements of the nationwide campaign. Total Farmgate and VNAF capabilities are still at times exceeded by those requirements. Intelligence reports confirm that the present combined interdiction effort of Farmgate and VNAF is restricting VC capabilities through the destruction of VC troops, arms, equipment and supplies.

The continued refinement of target selection, marking and operational control techniques has reduced to a minimum the likelihood that interdiction missions will cause casualties among innocent civilians or among people who are not wholehearted VC supporters, although there is no way to ensure that interdiction missions will avoid such casualties altogether. There is, on the other hand, considerable circumstantial evidence that those threatened by increased air attacks and other combat operations have found that the way to escape danger is to seek GVN protection. The GVN has not thereby won their loyalty, but has won control over them and denied them their resources and their energies to the VC. Against this, there is very little concrete evidence
available to give weight to the argument that interdiction missions, more than any other kind of combat operation, will render more difficult, if not impossible, the GVN's task of winning the war, and the interdiction of the enemy. To curtail or withdraw Farmgate interdiction operations on the basis of very little positive evidence of their effectiveness is much greater would, in my judgment, be a mistake. It would render more difficult and length the task of restoring internal security to SVN, give the VC an advantage, in some cases new bases, and raise questions in the GVN as to US support.
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AIRCRAFT FIRE CONTROL ROOMS

A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

1. DETAILS OF INTERDICTION TARGET SELECTION.

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1. THE SELECTION OF ANY TYPE TARGET IN SVN

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1. TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE INTERDICTION TARGET IN COIN OPERATIONS THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES ARE PRESENTED. THESE EXAMPLES WILL SHOW THAT WHAT ARE TERMED INTERDICTION TARGETS IN THIS COMBAT EFFORT DO NOT FOLLOW IN MANY INSTANCES, PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED DEFINITION OF INTERDICTION TARGETS; YET THIS TERM IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE OF THE PRESENT TERMINOLOGY OF AIR TARGETS:

a. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS WELL KNOWN BY ALL. ONE FUNCTION, ASSOCIATED WITH THIS PROGRAM, WHICH MAY NOT BE SO WELL KNOWN IS POINTED OUT HERE. AFTER THE ARVN CIVILIANS ARE RELOCATED FROM THEIR ORIGINAL DWELLINGS TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS THEY ABANDONED PROVIDE THE OF SPAIN MADE HOMES. TRAINING CENTERS, ARMS FACTORIES, ORDNANCE STORAGE, ETC. TO DENY THE VC USE OF THESE FACILITIES THE ARVN REQUESTS AIR STRIKES TO DESTROY THE STRUCTURES. THIS IS CALLED A PREPLANNED INTERDICTION MISSION.

b. ARVN FORCES CONDUCT WHAT ARE TERMED CLEAR AND HOLD OPERATIONS AND OTHER PLANNED GROUND OPERATIONS TO DESTROY VC AND THEIR FACILITIES IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THEIR OPERATION, AND AFTER
THEY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE VC INSTALLATION.

THE ARVN WILL REQUEST AIR STRIKES ON THE REMAINING STRUCTURES TO PREVENT THE VC FROM MOVING BACK IN AFTER THE ARVN HAS WITHDRAWN.

C. ANOTHER EXAMPLE WHICH PRODUCES MORE VC CASUALTIES INVOLVES TARGETS OF KNOWN VC CONCENTRATIONS, HEADQUARTERS, STORAGE AREAS, ETC. THESE TARGETS ARE NORMALLY LOCATED IN REMOTE AREAS WHERE THE VC ARE IN THE MOST DEFENSIVE METHOD IF ATTACKING AND DESTROYING THE TARGETS.

3. ALL TARGETS WHERE INTERDICTION AIR IS APPLIED IN SVN FALL INTO ONE OR TWO MAJOR CATEGORIES, INTERDICTION AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. BOTH OF THESE MAY BE EITHER PREPLANNED OR IMMEDIATE REQUEST-TYPE TARGETS. DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS, ABOUT 35% OR ABOUT 1,000 COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES FLOWN IN THE RVN HAVE BEEN BY COMBINED US/VNAF CREWS (FARMGATE), OF THE APPROXIMATELY 2,000 SORTIES FLOWN BY COMBINED US/VNAF CREWS, A FEW LESS THAN 600, OR 24%, HAVE BEEN INTERDICTION. VNAF PILOTED AIRCRAFT HAVE FLOWN ABOUT 1,900 INTERDICTION MISSIONS DURING THE SAME PERIOD, OR ABOUT 47% OF THEIR TOTAL OFFENSIVE SORTIES.

A. THE SCOPE OF THE INTERDICTION PROBLEM IS MUCH LESS THAN THAT PORTRAYED IN MR. HARRIMAN'S
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DISPATCH. In summary, combined USAF/VNAF crews have averaged 100 "interdiction" missions per month during the last six months. The indigenous VNAF crews have flown three times as many interdiction missions in the same period.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

1. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VNA'S AND FARM-GATE INTERDICTION TARGET SELECTION. **(GIVING CATEGORIES OF TARGETS AND PERCENTAGES, IF POSSIBLE).**

a. INTELLIGENCE BASIS

A. GENERAL: ALL INTERDICTION TARGET DETERMINATION AND SELECTION, IS A FUNCTION OF THE VNA'S JST OR THE SURFACE COMMANDERS, GROUND AND WATER.

2. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

a. THE BASIC SOURCE IS OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE AREAS WHICH THE VIET CONG CONTROL OR TO WHICH VIET CONG PERSONNEL REFER TO IN THE ZONES. WITHIN THESE ZONES, PINPOINTING OF VIET CONG FORTIFIED AREAS, TRAINING INSTALLATIONS, FOOD PRODUCTION AREAS, ARMS FACTORIES, MOBILE PERSONNEL CONCENTRATIONS, MOVEMENT ROUTES, WAY STATIONS, ETC., BEGINS.

b. AN INITIAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION IS THE SECRET AGENT, WHO MAY BE IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING: CIVILIAN DISTRICT OR PROVINCE CHIEFS; DIVISION OR CORPS
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COMMANDERS; THE JCS; THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL POLICE.

c. INTERROGATION OF POWS AND VIET CONG DEFECTORS PROVIDES BOTH INITIAL AND CONFIRMATORY DATA.

d. PATROLLING AND SCOUTING CONDUCTED BY ARVN, RANGERS, MILITARY FORCES, SELF-DEFENSE CORPS, AND CIVIL GUARD UNITS DEVELOPS INFORMATION OF VALUE FOR INTERDICTION TARGETING.

e. AFTER-ACTION SURVEILLANCE OF WITHDRAWING VIET CONG ELEMENTS ASSISTS IN ESTABLISHING OR CONFIRMING VIET CONG DISPERSAL ROUTES AND AREAS.

f. VIET CONG GROUND FIRE DIRECTED AT VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE, AIRLIFT, AND LIAISON AIRCRAFT ASSISTS IN PINPOINTING AREAS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

g. PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE TAKEN FOR A VARIETY OF PURPOSES MAY SECONDARILY REVEAL POTENTIAL TARGETS.

3. METHODS OF TARGET ESTABLISHMENT.

   a. RECEIPT OF INFORMATION FROM ONE OR MORE OF THE ABOVE SOURCES CONCERNING A POTENTIAL TARGET MAY BE OF SUCH SCOPE AND...
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HAVE SUCH A HIGH RELIABILITY/PROBABILITY RATING THAT A VALID TARGET CAN BE IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED. IMMEDIATE REQUEST FOR STRIKE MAY RESULT; IF A TIME LAG OCCURS RECONFIRMATION ON THE TARGET IS REQUIRED. LEVELS ON DIVISION G-2 AND IN TURN GOES TO LOWER ECHELON CIVILIAN IN MILITARY AUTHORITY.

b. WHEN INFORMATION RECEIVED IS MORE FRAGMENTARY OR HAS A LOWER INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION CODING, ADDITIONAL CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION IS SOUGHT. THIS CONSISTS OF EMPLOYING ONE OR MORE OF THE ADDITIONAL STEPS LISTED ABOVE, PLUS PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE FLOWN SPECIFICALLY FOR TARGET LOCATION AND EVALUATION.

c. JGS REQUESTED PHOTOGRAPHY, COLLATED WITH INITIAL AND ADDITIONAL GROUND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, CAN RESULT IN A JGS SERIALLY NUMBERED PROPOSED TARGET FOLDER, WHICH IS DISTRIBUTED TO THE CONCERNED CORPS AND DIVISION, WITH DIVISION G-2 CHARGED WITH INITIAL AND CONTINUED CONFIRMATION OF VALIDITY.

d. CORPS, DIVISION, AND SECTOR REQUESTED TARGETING PHOTOGRAPHY IS FORWARDED TO CORPS AND DIVISION WHERE ASSIGNED PHOTO INTERPRETERS CONDUCT INTERPRETATION. ARVN PHOTO INTERPRETATION
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CENTER (PIC) ACCOMPLISHES INTERPRETATION NOT WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF ASSIGNED INTERPRETERS AT CORPS AND DIVISION. THIS EFFORT IS SUBSTANTIAL. FOR EXAMPLE EFFORTS FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY THROUGH MARCH WERE SIGNIFICANT AND ARE LISTED BELOW:

1. FORTY (40) CAMPUS TARGET AREA FOLDERS CONTAINING 178 SPECIFIC PINPOINT TARGETS.
2. COMPLETE (66) AIRFIELD INFORMATION FOLDERS.
3. SEVENTEEN (17) OUTPOST INFORMATION FOLDERS.
4. INTERPRETED PHOTOGRAPHY ACCOMPLISHED TO FULFILL 172 SPECIFIC REQUESTS.
5. PREPARED DATA FOR THE RVN PHOTO INTERPRETATION SCHOOL AT CAT WAT.
6. ACCOMPLISHED ALL PHOTO REPRODUCTION REQUIREMENT.

COLLATION WITH INITIAL AND ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE AFFRMS OR NEGATES THE SITE AS A VALID TARGET. ANY TIME-LAG IN STRIKE REQUESTS AND EXECUTION REQUIRES RECONFIRMATION OF VALIDITY.

4. TARGET SELECTION. INDIVIDUAL INTERDICT...
TARGET SELECTION IS A JOINT OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION OF THE J-2 (G-2) STAFF, WHO CONSIDER THE EFFECT ON, AND CORRELATE SITE SELECTION AND STRIKE TIMING WITH MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND ECONOMIC OPERATIONS AND PROGRAMS, PLANNED OR IN PROGRESS.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

1. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VC AND FARM-GATE INTERDICTOR TARGET SELECTION. **GIVING CATEGORIES OF TARGETS AND PERCENTAGES, IF POSSIBLE.

b. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

ANSWER

1. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF INTERDICTOR TARGETS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

a. THE INTERDICTOR PROGRAM IS CONSIDERED TO BE VERY SUCCESSFUL AND IS DEPEND-ING ON IT TO SET THE STAGE AND WRACK THE VC FOR THE DECISIVE PHASE OF THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN PLAN. TWO RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE VALUE OF INTERDICTOR STRIKES FOLLOW:

1) On 27 March 63 two VNAF AD-4s struck VC installation in a village. One bomb made its mark, producing a secondary explosion with a 200 foot diameter fire ball; visible shock waves; a concussion effect on the strike aircraft; and with dense black smoke turning to white. This was probably a VC ammunition factory.

2) On 29 March 63 two Farmgate B-26s struck a VC concentration in IV Corps.
The mission was requested by Special Forces through ARVN channels. US Special Forces on ground reported 10 VC killed in action despite ground fire directed at attacking B-26s.

Intelligence obtained from defectors, agents and aerial reconnaissance, pinpoint and confirm locations of VC installations. Due to the vast jungle areas in SVN, sometimes the only practical way to destroy these targets is by air strikes. The high number of successful strikes has kept the VC on the move; it is impossible for them to feel secure in any area. In everything the VC does in his base areas he must take costly precautions against air attack. The tactical value of these missions are readily apparent. They eliminate VC capabilities to kill and torment people, and to damage and destroy facilities of the RVN.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
1. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF USAF AND VNAF
2. DATA INTERDICTION TARGET SELECTION. **(GIVING CATEGORIES OF TARGETS AND PERCENTAGES, IF POSSIBLE.)
3. SOURCE OF INTERDICTION REQUESTS

ANSWER

1. THE SOURCE OF INTERDICTION REQUESTS FOR THE USAF/VNAF IS IN ALL CASES THE CVN AUTHORITIES. THE INITIAL REQUEST MAY HAVE ORIGINATED FROM POLICE, MILITARY FORCES I.E., SELF DEFENSE CORPS OR CIVIL GUARD OR FROM THE VIETNAMESE NAVY, SPECIAL FORCES, RANGERS, ETC. THE REQUEST, IF APPROVED BY INTERMEDIATE ECHELONS OF COMMAND I.E., PROVINCE CHIEF, AGROINITY, DIVISION, ETC. REACHES THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) WHERE IT IS THEN PASSED TO THE VNAF AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER (ASOC) WHICH IS CO-LOCATED WITH THE TOC.

2. IN MANY CASES THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL ESTABLISHES OR IDENTIFIES THE BASIC REQUIREMENT FOR AN AIRSTRIKE. THIS INFORMATION IS PASSED BY CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES THROUGH THE VILLAGE CHIEF AND THE DISTRICT CHIEF TO THE PROVINCE CHIEF.
WHERE IT IS THEN PASSED UP THE REGULAR MILITARY (ARVN) CHANNELS. PREPLANNED INTERDICTION TARGETS ORIGINATING AT THE RICE ROOTS LEVEL MUST BE PASSED TO AT LEAST THE CORPS LEVEL AND SOMETIMES TO SAIGON AND PRESIDENT DIEM IN VERY IMPORTANT OR POLITICALLY DELICATE CASES. TARGETS GENERATED AT CORPS LEVEL OR HIGHER MUST BE VALIDATED AT THE RICE ROOTS LEVEL. WITH THIS PROCEDURE PRACTICALLY ALL LEVELS OF AUTHORITY ARE INVOLVED IN THE INTERDICTION TARG3T SELECTING AND APPROVING MECHANISM. THESE TARGETS, ONCE CONFIRMED AS VALID VC STRONGHOLDS, MUST BE DESTROYED. THE MANNER OF DETERMINING THE MOST SUITABLE METHOD FOR THEIR DESTRUCTION IS A FUNCTION OF THE ARVN FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING CENTER (FSCC). THE TARGETS MAY BE DESTROYED BY ARVN GROUND UNITS, A HELIBORNE OPERATION, MORTAR, ARTILLERY, ETC. OR IF NOT ACCESSIBLE OR SUITABLE TO THESE MEANS, BY AIR STRIKES. IN VIEW OF THIS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY USAF AIR ATTACK OF INTERDICTION TARGETS IS ISOLATED AS A POTENTIAL "INDISCRIMINATE KILLER", PARTICULARLY WHEN THERE ARE OTHER MILITARY ACTIVITIES ENGAGED DAILY IN THE DESTRUCTION OF INTERDICTION TARGETS. USAF PERSONNEL ARE EXPRESSLY INSTRUCTED THAT THIS IS A VIETNAMESE TOP SECRET
WAR AND OUR ENTIRE EFFORT IS DIRECTED TO
ELIMINATING USAF DEPLOYMENT IN
THE COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO
QUESTION IN OUR MINDS, BORNE OUT BY PREVIOUS
INTERACTIONS WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS THAT
EVEN SHOULD THE US GO SO FAR AS TO DIRECT THE
UTILIZATION OF USAF AIR INTERDICTION OPERATIONS,
THE VIETNAMESE GROUND FORCES AND THE USAF WILL
CONTINUE AND IN FACT, PROBABLY INCREASE THEIR
EFFORTS IN DESTROYING INTERDICTION TYPE TARGETS.
DESTRUCTION OF INTERDICTION TARGETS ARE THAT
IMPORTANT MILITARILY AT THE SAME TIME. THE
OUR WOULD HAVE A SOLID BASIS FOR QUESTIONING
THE US'S GOOD FAITH, GIVING THEM PURCHASE LICENSE
TO PURSUE THEIR OWN PARochial interests at the
expense of the successful resolution of the in-
sequently

3. IN SUMMARY, VC STRONGHOLDS THAT HAVE BEEN
CONFIRMED AND APPROVED FOR DESTRUCTION MAY BE
DESTROYED BY ONE OF SEVERAL MEANS. IF AIR POWER
ALONE IS USED THEY ARE REFERRED TO AS AIR INTER-
DICTION TARGETS. IF GROUND FORCES ARE USED, AND
THOSE GROUND FORCES ARE MOVED INTO POSITION BY
HELICOPTERS, IT IS REFERRED A HELIBORNE OPERATION.
IN THIS CASE THE AIRSTRIKES IN SUPPORT OF THE
HELIBORNE OPERATION ARE CALLED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS. THE TARGET HASN'T CHANGED, THE METHOD OF SELECTING THE TARGET HASN'T CHANGED AND THE PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING ITS DESTRUCTION REMAIN UNCHANGED. FURTHER, IF LONG RANGE ARTILLERY OR QUICK RANGE RAIDS ACCOMPLISH THE JOB, INTERDICTION LOSES ITS IDENTITY ALMOST BLINDLY AS A SPECIAL CLASS OF MILITARY TARGET.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

1. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VNAF AIR FORCE INTERDICTION STRATEGY. (GIVING CATEGORIES OF TARGETS AND PERCENTAGES, IF POSSIBLE.)

d. APPROVAL MECHANISM

APPROVAL

THE APPROVAL MECHANISM VARIES SOMEWHAT DEPENDING ON THE INITIAL SOURCE OF THE REQUEST AND THE TARGET INVOLVED. THIS ALSO VARIES WITHIN EACH CORPS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN I CORPS, ONLY THE CORPS COMMANDER OR HIS CHIEF OF STAFF ARE AUTHORIZED TO GIVE FINAL APPROVAL ON INTERDICTION TARGETS. IN OTHERS, FINAL APPROVAL AUTHORITY HAS BEEN DELEGATED BY THE CORPS COMMANDER TO OTHER RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF BUT ALL REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT MUST BE APPROVED AT CORPS LEVEL. THE APPROVAL MECHANISM AS SUCH FOR ANY AIR STRIKES IS NOT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VNAF/USAF OR US ADVISORY OFFICIALS. AS MENTIONED, THE ONLY AIR FORCE PREROGATIVE IS TO DISAPPROVE IF FOR ANY REASON THE TARGET OR OTHER CONDITIONS ARE CONSIDERED UNSUITABLE FOR AN AIR STRIKE. FOR MORE DETAILS SEE AIR SOURCE OF INTERDICTION REQUESTS.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

1. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VNAF AND TACTICAL INTERDICTOR TARGET SELECTION. *(GIVING CATEGORIES OF TARGETS AND PERCENTAGES, IF POSSIBLE.)*

2. CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND SELECTION OF WEAPONS (NAPALM, ALL PURPOSE DEED, MACHINE GUNS, ROCKETS)

ANSWER

1. THE CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTION OF WEAPONS ARE BASIC. WHEN THERE IS AMPLE TIME FROM RECEIPT OF THE REQUEST BY THE VNAF/USAF UNTIL DESIRED TIME TO TARGET ALL KNOWN FACTORS ARE CONSIDERED. THE MORE IMPORTANT ARE:

a. TYPE OF TARGET.

b. TERRAIN, TYPE VEGETATION, AND WEATHER.

b. SPECIFIC DESIRED.

c. ACCURACY REQUIRED.

d. PROXIMITY OF FRIENDS.

2. TARGETS IN SOUTH VIETNAM CONSIST MOSTLY OF COMBINATIONS AND CONCENTRATIONS OF PERSONNEL, SAMPAI'S AND LIGHT STRUCTURES. TERRAIN IN SVN IS A MAJOR CONSIDERATION AS IT VARIES FROM VAST...
Top Secret

Areas of rice paddies in the delta to dense jungles and mountains in the central and northern areas. In some of these areas, intelligence has confirmed the presence of earthen or mud bunkers, underground tunnels, and rice storage facilities. Viet Cong camps and bases consist mostly of tents, huts, or thatched huts and lean-tos. Many factors prevail in ordnance selection in Coin Operations, such as social, psychological, political, and military. Long delays have proven effective against the Viet Cong and are considered when the probability exists that they will return to an area following an attack.

3. Following are specific examples of ordnance considerations:

a. Rockets are relatively ineffective in the rice paddy areas of the delta.

b. Phosphorus is particularly effective in the jungle.

c. Napalm is effective against bunkers or ICs along the lines.

d. Few targets warrant the use of large bombs.
IT IS DOCTRINE TO USE THE LEAST AMOUNT OF FIRE POWER NECESSARY TO DESTROY THE TARGET.

4. IN SOME CASES, THE USAF AIR LIASON OFFICERS, LOCATED WITH THE ARVN UNITS, RECOMMEND SPECIFIC ORDNANCE TO BE USED BASED ON THEIR PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE AREA CONCERNED AND WEAPONS EFFECTS.

5. THE VNAF ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO CARRY 500 POUND BOMBS OR USE DELAYED FUSES WITHOUT USAF APPROVAL.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VNAF AND FARM-GATE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

   a. TARGET MARKING AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

   b. TARGET MARKING TECHNIQUES AND INSTRUMENTS Used.

   c. CONSTANT CRITICAL EVALUATION IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS. AT PRESENT, SMOKE GRENADES DROPPED BY VNAF FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS IN LIASON AIRCRAFT ARE THE PRIMARY MEANS OF VISUAL TARGET DESIGNATION UNLESS THERE IS POSITIVE TWO-WAY VOICE CONTACT, ATTACKS ARE NOT MADE. ROCKETS WITH SMOKE MARKERS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TESTED IN RVN AND WILL BE USED IN THE FUTURE AS A SUPPLEMENTAL METHOD. THIS SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE AN OFFSET CAPABILITY FOR MARKING LESS ACCESSIBLE TARGETS, PARTICULARLY IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN OR JUNGLE. THESE ROCKETS ARE ACCURATE, WITH ERRORS NOT EXCEEDING FIFTY YARDS. TARGETS ARE MARKED FROM THE GROUND USING SMOKE OR WHITE PHOSPHORUS SHELLS FROM MORTARS, ARTILLERY OR RECOILLESS RIFLES. DISTINCTIVE PANELS AND PROMINENT LANDMARKS ARE USED AS BASE OR REFERENCE POINTS. HERE AGAIN.
HIGH QUALITY RADIO COMMUNICATION IS ADVISED BEFORE A STRIKE IS CLEARED FOR EXECUTION.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL (MORE PROPERLY TERMED FIGHTER GUIDANCE) OF STRIKE AIRCRAFT DURING ATTACKS IS ALWAYS VESTED IN A TRAINED VNAF OBSERVER OR IN SOMEONE IN AN AREA CONTROL COMMANDER ESTIMATE FAMILIAR WITH THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN HIS ZONE OF OPERATIONS. THIS REQUIREMENT FOR MARKING OF TARGETS AND CONTROL OF ATTACK BY QUALIFIED VNAF PERSONNEL IS AN INVOLUNTARY REQUIREMENT BECAUSE COMBINED USAF/VNAF PILOTTED AIRCRAFT ARE AUTHORIZED TO ATTACK EITHER CLOSE SUPPORT OR INDEPENDENT TARGETS. AS A RESULT OF USAF INFLUENCE THE VNAF, ALSO, REQUIRES A FAC EXCEPT ON RARE OCCASIONS WHEN THE TARGET IS LOCATED IN AN OFFICIALLY ESTABLISHED VC DOMINATED AREA. THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT THE VNAF WOULD CONTINUE THIS REQUIREMENT IF FAVORABLE USAF VICTORIES ARE TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THE USAF PRACTICES DESCRIBED ABOVE.

THE USAF PRACTICES DESCRIBED ABOVE DETRACT FROM EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. MARKING OF TARGETS WITH SMOKE AND THE CHECKING OF EFFECTIVE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CONTROL AIRCRAFT OR GROUND PARTY BOTH TAKE APPRECIABLE PERIODS OF TIME WHICH PERMIT ENEMY PERSONNEL TO TAKE COVER OR RUN FROM THE AREA.
Although such attacks are invaluable despite these limitations, this is an instance where recognition of political and psychological factors outweigh pure military considerations.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF UNAF AND FARM-GATE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

3. PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF NIGHT MISSIONS.

Night strike missions have been in support of existing installations under attack almost exclusively. These missions have been extremely effective, as evidenced by the fact that no installation has been lost to VC night attack when supported by air. The flare-strike aircraft plays functions as a lobby co-ordinating unit utilizing tactics from extensive experience to peak efficiency. Most villages and hooches have a large arrow which can be lighted and rotated to point to the attack. Range is indicated by vertical lines (each representing 100 meters) at the base of the arrow. The flare aircraft must have radio communication with the installation under VC attack and with the strike aircraft; otherwise, night air support attacks are not made, although flares are dropped. The illumination from the high-intensity flares...
SUPPLEMENTED BY THE LIGHTED ARROW INDICATORS
AND VOICE INSTRUCTIONS RELAYED THROUGH THE FLARE
SHIP HAVE PROV\DED TO BE VERY EFFECTIVE FOR CONTROL
OF NIGHT ATTACKS AGAINST THE VC ATTACKERS. A
FAC IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THESE MISSIONS SINCE THE
FRIENDLY FORCES BEING SUPPORTED ARE WITHIN THE
PERIMETER OF A CLEARLY DEFINED INSTALLATION. IT
MUST BE EMPHASIZED HERE, THAT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OF INFORMATION IS THE LOCATIONS OF FRIENDLY PERSONNEL IN ORDER THAT THEIR SAFETY MAY BE PROTECTED.
WITHOUT POSITIVE INFORMATION AND CLEARANCES FROM
AUTHORITY ON THE GROUND, ATTACKS ARE NOT MADE.
NIGHT INTERDICTION MISSIONS ARE OCCASIONALLY
FLO\WN WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS. THIS CAPABILITY IS
AVAILABLE AND CAN BE EMPLOYED WHEN APPROPRIATE.
THE CONTROL PROCEDURES ARE ALMOST IDENTICAL WITH
THOSE USED TO DEFEND INSTALLATIONS UNDER ATTACK.
THE MAJOR EXCEPTION TO THIS ARE THE VC MISSIONS. NIGHT INTERDICTION OF TARGETS IN
KNOWN VC STRONGHOLD, SUCH AS LONE NURSES, ARE PARI\CULARLY EFFECTIVE BECAUSE OF THE ADDITIONAL SURPRISE
FACTOR AND THE MORALE-DESTROYING EFFECT ON THE VC
WHO REALIZE THAT THEY ARE SUBJECT TO "ROUND THE
CLOCK" HARASSMENT. CITED BELOW ARE SOME RECENT
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF MISSIONS ON WHICH ATTACKS

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

WE WERE NOT MADE AND THE REASONS THEREFORE:

14 MAY 62 - NIGHT OUTPOST ATTACK WE 340 250 - NO OPERATING AIRCRAFT SENT AS FRIENDLY HOUSES SURROUNDED OUTPOST AND NO AIR-GROUND RADIO AVAILABLE.

30 AUG 62 - NIGHT OUTPOST ATTACK WE 294 342 - NO RADIO IN OUTPOST, FRIENDLIES WITHIN 300M.

9 SEP 62 - BLIND OUTPOST ATTACK WE 294 342 - NO AIR, GROUND COMM - NO GROUND MARKING.

24 SEP 62 - NIGHT OUTPOST ATTACK AT 799 362 - NO FIRES OR FIRE ARRAYS AND NO RADIO CONTACT.

4 NOV 62 - NIGHT OUTPOST ATTACK WE 301 686 - NO COMMUNICATIONS WITH OUTPOST.

19 JAN 63 - VC ALONG RIVER BANK (NOT SHOWN) WE 476 610 TO WE 507 598 (NO MAC) - NO NIGHT IDM.

3 FEB 65 - OUTPOST WE 477 646 - NO STRIKE (RIGHT) FRIENDLY VILLAGERS ON BOTH SIDES OF OUTPOST AND FRIENDLIES AND VC'S WERE IN CLOSE CONTACT.

NOTE: DAYLIGHT STRIKE WAS MADE AFTER OUTPOST WAS OVERRUN.
TOP SECRET

7 FEB 63 - OUTPOST WQ 144 976 - NO RADAR CONTACT.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF USAF AND FARM-GATE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

The degree of discretion left to the pilot regarding carrying out missions rests with the pilot. Final responsibility for mission accomplishment rests with the pilot. Intelligence data, rules of engagement, and FACs are instruments which are provided to assist him on each mission. Attacks are made only after stringent control requirements are satisfied and with the safety of friendly personnel the overriding consideration. Listed are four cases on record of pilots refusing to attack targets because they were not satisfied that friendly personnel would not be jeopardized. This is testimony to the professional sense of responsibility and competence of the pilots and their knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of weapons accuracy, effects and the aircraft they fly. Listed below are examples of missions on which the pilots elected not to attack and the reasons behind these decisions.

74 ANG 62 - I 8-26 AND I 6-47 ON SPECIAL
TOP SECRET

FORCES MISSION UNABLE TO CONTACT GROUND, RETURNED TO BASE.

23 SEP 62 - ARVN AND VC CLASHING YT 510-455 - ARTILLERY WOULD NOT MARK TARGET DUE TO ARVN IN VICINITY. NO ORDNANCE EXPENDED.

27 SEP 62 - VC MASSING NEAR ULPANO. TARGET WAS OBSCURED BY WEATHER, AND NO RADIO CONTACT.

7 DEC 63 - A B-26 ON SAMPA EROOST WAS REQUESTED TO STRIKE SEVERAL SUSPECTED VC DAMS. B-26 DID NOT STRIKE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FAC AVAILABLE.

27 DEC 62 - TWO T-28'S WOULD NOT EXPEND BECAUSE TARGET WAS OBSCURED BY WEATHER.

31 JAN 63 - STRATEGIC HAMLET XR 767 917 - COULD NOT IDENTIFY VC'S EXACTLY. IN GENERAL AREA 2 KM NORTH TO 2 KM SOUTH.

TOP SECRET
A. operational aspects

2. detailed description of VNAF and fairgate operational control.

d. VNAF and USAF pilot attitudes regarding risk of innocent victims.

ANALYSIS

the concern for the safety of non-combatants is primary. it is manifested in the rigid control procedures imposed by the USAF which include the requirement for a vietnamese FAC for close air support and interdiction missions. this rule is inviolate for USAF pilots participating in combat support missions as part of combined USAF/VNAF crews. the VNAF followed suit, and require a FAC for their missions except in areas influenced by established V.C. controlled areas. two of the major concepts of the national campaign plan are to separate the V.C. from the people and to get popular support for the RVN. obviously, any actions by American or Vietnamese military which reflect a careless attitude towards the safety of the civilian population will seriously impair achievement of these objectives. with this in mind, VNAF and
USAF pilots are thoroughly indoctrinated with the need for safeguarding the lives and property of the civilian non-combatant population at all times. As pointed out in the preceding paragraph, the extent and success of this indoctrination program is evidenced by the number of times when pilots refrain from attacking targets because of the possibility of injuring non-combatants or damaging their property.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF USAF AND FASC-GATE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

6. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING RESULTS OF INTERRUPTION MISSIONS IN TERMS OF CASUALTIES AND DESTRUCTION.

ANSWER

THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF AIR STRIKE IS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE PILOT OF THE STRIKE AIRCRAFT AND THE FAC. GUN CAMERA FILM AND BOMA DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FILM IS USED WHEN POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, THE BEST AND MOST ACCURATE METHOD OF DETERMINING RESULTS IS GROUND FORCES FOLLOW-UP AFTER THE AIRSTRIKE, MOVING TO THE SCENE QUICKLY. THIS FIRST INFORMATION IN ADDITION TO DETERMINING AMOUNT OF DAMAGE DONE ALSO PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR FUTURE WEAPONS SELECTION, TACTICAL CHANGES AND REFINEMENTS IN THE CONTROL MECHANISM FOR AIRSTRIKES. US AUTHORITIES AND ADVISORS HAVE URGED THAT THE ARVN Move IN AFTER AIRSTRIKE AND ASSESS THE RESULTS. TO DATE, ARVN RESPONSE HAS BEEN LIMITED AND THIS VALUABLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION HAS, FOR THE MOST PART, REMAINED UNTAPPED. THE NEED FOR THIS INFORMATION IS URGENT AND CONTINUING IF THE FULL VALUE OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT IS TO
BE REALIZED, THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF ASSESSMENT OF INTERDICTION STRIKES ON REMOTE TARGETS AND SOME CLOSE SUPPORT STRIKES HAS BEEN AGENCY OF CLandestINE AGENTS AND TO A LESSER EXTENT DEFECTORS WHO HAVE HAD THEIR FILL OF BEING ON THE RECEIVING END OF THE GVN'S MILITARY OPERATIONS.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

2. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VNAF AND FARM-GATE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

f. AVAILABILITY OF STATISTICS ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN CASUALTIES.

ANSWER

RECORDS AVAILABLE IN MACV AND 2ND AIR DIVISION REVEAL ONLY ONE INCIDENT IN WHICH FRIENDLY PERSONNEL WERE KILLED AS A RESULT OF AIR Strike. THIS MISHAP OCCURRED ON 27 MAY 1962 IN I CORPS WHEN A PILOT MADE A SERIOUS MISTAKE AND STRUCK THE WRONG LOCATION. SINCE THEN, DEVELOPMENT AND REFINEMENT OF THE CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES REDUCE THE PROBABILITY THAT THIS WILL OCCUR AGAIN. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT ALL TARGET DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURES WERE FOLLOWED EXPLICITLY. THE FACT THAT THIS IS THE ONLY CONFIRMED INSTANCE OF THIS TYPE IN MORE THAN ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS OF TACTICAL AIR STRIKE OPERATION VALIDATES THE TARGET DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM AND THE AIRSTRIKE CONTROL MECHANISM. WE HAVE AGGRESSIVELY FOLLOWED UP ON THOSE OCCASIONAL GENERALIZED Vague REPORTS EITHER IN PRESS OR FROM UNEDUCATED OBSERVERS. HERE AGAIN SPECIFIC
INCIDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED, NOR HAVE THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS BEEN ESTABLISHED. RVNAF ATTITUDE INITIALLY WAS NOT TO BE OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT INVESTIGATIONS. BECAUSE OF OUR ACTIVE ENDEAVORS THEY ARE NOW PARTICIPATING WITH US IN INVESTIGATING ALLEGED INSTANCES, SO FAR WITHOUT CONCLUSIVE FINDINGS.
A. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

3. LESSONS LEARNED SO FAR AND REMEDIES CARRIED OUT.

ANSWER

1. THIS IS RATHER AN ALL ENCOMPASSING QUESTION ANSWERED IN PART THROUGHOUT THIS CORRESPONDENCE. LESSONS LEARNED IN WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS LEARNED BY RESEARCH OF OTHER COIN WARS WERE INITIALLY APPLIED IN SVN.

2. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF LESSONS LEARNED OR SOME PROPOSALS TO THIS COIN EFFORT THAT HAVE A BEARING ON THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

   a. THERE IS NO PLAN LINES, FRONT LINES OR FEDA (FORWARD EDGE OF BATTLE AREA).

   b. FRIENDLIES, FOR THE MOST PART, LOOK JUST LIKE THE ENEMY, FROM THE GROUND OR FROM THE AIR.

   c. THE TYPES OF TARGETS FOR AIR STRIKE VARY CONSIDERABLY FROM THOSE ENCOUNTERED IN A CONVENTIONAL WAR SUCH AS WWII AND KOREA. I.E., THERE ARE NO VC TRUCK CONVOYS, LIKE FRIENDLIES, THE VC RELY ON WATER BUFFALO, ELEPHANTS OR "A" FRAMES; ENEMY AS WELL AS MILITARY FRIENDLY
BRIDGES CONSIST OF ROPE STRETCHED ACROSS STREAMS; CONCENTRATION OF ENEMY PERSONNEL NORMALLY CONSISTS OF A HANDFUL RATHER THAN A LARGE UNIT; ARMS FACTORIES, AMMO DUMPS AND TRAINING CAMPS ARE HOUSED IN THATCH ROOF STRUCTURES, SIMILAR TO TENTS, USED FOR PEACEFUL DOMESTIC PURPOSES.

g. the three phases of war for TACTICAL AIR ELEMENTS, i.e., AIR SUPERIORITY, INTERDICATION AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ARE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM WAR IN THE CLASSICAL SENSE. THERE IS NO AIR OPPOSITION AND THEREFORE NO AIR SUPERIORITY THREAT. THE INTERDICTION TARGETING PROGRAM THAT WOULD NORMALLY BE CONDUCTED BEYOND THE BOMB LINE BY AIR FORCES IS NON EXISTENT. AS A RESULT OF ELIMINATING THESE TWO TACTICAL AIR FUNCTIONS, THE AIR FORCE, USAF, AND VNAF, IS OUT OF THE TARGET SELECTION BUSINESS. SINCE ALL TARGETS FALL WITHIN THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GROUND FORCE COMMANDERS THEY ARE IN REALITY ALL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TYPE TARGETS IN CLASSICAL DOCTRINAL TERMS. HENCE ALL MUST BE AND ARE SELECTED AND APPROVED BY THE GROUND FORCE COMMANDERS. IN VIEW OF THIS, ALL AIR MUST BE CONTROLLED; COORDINATION IS A MUST BETWEEN GROUND
AND ALL ASPECTS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS, AIR AND GROUND. JOINT PLANNING AT EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND IS ESSENTIAL; GATHERING OF SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE THROUGH TACTICAL AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND GROUND SOURCES FOR IDENTIFICATION OF AIR/GROUND TARGETS TAKES ON ADDITIONAL IMPORTANCE. DETERMINATION OF EFFECTIVE AIR POWER USE IS CRUCIAL.

RECOGNITION OF ALL TARGETS IS MANDATORY; AND THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM PROCEDURES MUST BE DILIGENTLY EXECUTED AT ALL TIMES.

c. AIR IS A PROVEN PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAPON.

d. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS PERTAINING TO IT MUST AND DO SHAPE ALL CLASSICAL MILITARY PLANNING AND EXECUTION IN A POLITICAL WAR SUCH AS THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN THE RVN.

e. AERIAL DELIVERY OF REGULAR GROUND TROOPS AND AIRBORNE FORCES HAVE EXTENSIVE ADVANTAGES.

f. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME RELATIVELY MASSIVE AIR POWER HAS BEEN EMPLOYED BY A LEGITIMATE, INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD IN PUTTING DOWN A FOREIGN CONTROLLED INDIGENOUS INSURGENCY SUPPORTED BY OUTSIDE RESOURCES - MOSCOW, PEIPING, HANOI.

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

This military problem is a new one in the overall importance of the relation to political considerations. We are working toward enhanced military effectiveness while simultaneously supporting the desired longer range political decision. However the VC insurgency is so widespread and its political/military/logistic apparatus is so effective, that all GVN military capabilities must be employed if the military/logistic capabilities of the enemy are to be reduced to a status where the political problem is manageable.

4. The establishment of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS), with the Tactical Air Support Operations Center (TASOC), Control and Reporting Center (CRCC) and Forward Air Controllers (FAC) was all based on lessons learned prior to us participating in SVN. There have been slight alterations to adapt this system to the counterinsurgency effort in SVN. However, the basic principles have been proven sound.

One major change of the TACS, implemented from the beginning in SVN, was the requirement for a VNAF FAC controller (FAC) on all interdiction missions flown by VNAF. This is not a normal requirement in a conventional war.
TOP SECRET

WITH WELL DEFINED ENEMY AND FRIENDLY TERRITORY
AND LINES OF CONTACT BETWEEN THEM ANOTHER
CHANCE WAS TO HAVE THE FAC AIRBORNE TO O.CILLI-
STATE VISUAL OBSERVATION OF THE TARGET. THIS
CONCEPT WAS UTILIZED IN THE KOREAN WAR BETWEEN
THE FRONT LINE AND THE BOMB LINE. ALL FIGHTER
STRIKES WITHIN THIS AREA WERE CONTROLLED BY THE
AT-6 (MOSQUITO) PILOTS, WHO WERE
TRAINED AND EMPLOYED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

IN SUMMARY, AFTER OVER A YEAR OF PAR-
TICIPATION, WITH THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL
STATION AND THE ESTABLISHED TACTICAL CONTROL
AND OPERATIONS BEING THOROUGHLY TESTED
AND EXERCISED, THE VALIDITY AND SAFETY OF THE
EXISTING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN PROVEN TO THE
EXTENT THAT IN RECENT MONTHS CONTRARY VIEWS
ARE BASED ON VENOMOUS IDIOT. INSIIATTE IRRITATIONS
WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SOLID
EVIDENCE.
3. POLICY ASPECTS

1. ORIGINAL GROUND RULES UNDER WHICH FARMGATE ESTABLISHED.

ANSWER

1. THE ORIGINAL LUMSOF OPERATIONS OUTLINED BY THE JCS FOR FARMGATE REMAINS UNCHANGED. A SUMMARY OF MISSION STATEMENT AND RESTRICTIONS FOLLOWS:

a. MISSIONS
(1) TRANS THE VNAF TO AN OPERATIONAL STATUS.
(2) PERFORM COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT MISSIONS AS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TRAINING.
(3) DEVELOP TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES.

b. RESTRICTIONS
(1) COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT MISSIONS WILL BE FLOWN ONLY WHEN THE VNAF LACKS THE CAPABILITY.
(2) COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT MISSIONS WILL BE FLOWN WITH A COMBINED US/GVN CREW FOR THE PURPOSES OF PROVIDING TRAINING TO THE GVN CREW MEMBERS.

THE COMMANDER 2D AIR DIVISION SUPPLEMENTED THESE RESTRICTIONS WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT
ALL TARGETS BE MARKED BY A VNAF FAC. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RULE ARE IN INSTANCES WHEN HOSTILE FIRE FROM A KNOWN SOURCE IS RECEIVED OR DIRECTED AGAINST FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS, CONVOYS, HELICOPTERS, TRAINS OR AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE BEING SUPPORTED OR ESCORTED. IN ADDITION, ARVN COMMANDERS CAN MARK TARGETS FOR AIRSTRIKES WHEN FAC ARE NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, AS STATED BEFORE, USAF AIRCRAFT CANNOT ENGAGE SUCH TARGETS UNLESS EFFECTIVE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH THE GROUND FORCES DESIGNATING THE TARGET TO BE STRUCK.
2. POLICY ASPECTS

I. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWING OR CURTAILING FARMGATE.

Answer:

1. The military implications of withdrawing or curtailling Farmgate in the near future would be grave indeed. Curtailing is assumed to mean restricting Farmgate from flying interdiction missions, or curtailedly reducing the numbers or types of targets for interdiction missions.

2. As a general rule, the requests for air support are fulfilled by VNAF aircraft to the maximum extent of their capability. The Farmgate aircraft are utilized when the ARVN requests exceed VNAF aircraft capability. There continue to be occasions when requests for air support exceed the combined capabilities of VNAF and Farmgate. Farmgate now flies approximately 35 percent of the total strike sortie. Should this contribution or a part of it be withdrawn, the military impact of withdrawal would be obvious. The 35 percent flown by Farmgate includes many important missions which would not
3. In addition to the overall support provided by Farmgate, this unit is now providing the vast majority of all strike aircraft for night missions. The success of the strike aircraft in mounting off night attacks on outposts, strategic hamlets, etc., is unquestionably a direct contributor to the success of the South Vietnamese political effort represented by the S.H.P. To eliminate this capability is to withdraw the potential deterrent to massive VC night attacks against isolated strategic hamlets.

4. The VNAF have proceeded considerably in the past year. With the addition of pilots and support personnel now in training, further progress is anticipated. This progress is measured not only by the increase in numbers and effectiveness of sorties flown but also the directing of these sorties through the Tactical Air Control System. The ultimate goal is for the VNAF to be capable both in manpower, equipment and facilities to provide the type and amount of air support required by the SVN to successfully accomplish its mission.
VNAF, at this time, definitely does not have this required capability. To withdraw or curtail the Farmgate function would be militarily unsound. This in turn would create an adverse political situation which could negate the entire effort and effort in SVN. The VNAF depends heavily on Farmgate for examples of professional air field in action and use. Consciously or unconsciously, the Farmgate operation as a standard against which to measure their own effectiveness and improvement. The impact on morale and effectiveness of the VNAF could be serious if Farmgate were withdrawn and the VNAF left to its own devices.

In summary, withdrawal or curtailment of Farmgate would give intolerable military aid and comfort to the enemy to the degree that progress towards resolution of the political conflict would be unacceptably prejudiced. The communists in the RVN could not be successfully prosecuted if by edict we were to suddenly and gratuitously make his base areas safe havens. There he could regenerate supplies, train troops and direct the insurgency safe from the attacks which now plague and
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DISRUPT HIS OPERATIONS TO SUCH AN EXTENT
THAT HE ISSUES FORTH OVER RADIO WAVES AND
OTHER OUTLETS INCESSANT PROPAGANDA AGAINST

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The political implications of withdrawing or curtailing Farmgate are directly associated with the military implications. For example, Farmgate was withdrawn at this time, creating a military impasse. The political impact would naturally follow. On the other hand, as the VNAF develops the capability to completely assume the air force role in support of the GVN, then the withdrawal of Farmgate or the gradual curtailment of their overall participation would be a natural and desired event with acceptance and political benefit to all concerned. Furthermore, withdrawal of Farmgate now could well cause serious damage to the prestige of the GVN by creating the impression that the US had lost its nerve in the face of incessant communist and pacifist propaganda. This false impression would be exploited by the communists to the utmost and, presumably, with telling effect.
1. POLICY ASPECTS

4. NET POLITICAL AND MILITARY VALUE IN WITHDRAWING FARMGATE IF USAF CONTINUES INTERD ICTION MISSIONS.

ANALYSIS

1. FOR ANY POLITICAL AND MILITARY VALUE IN WITHDRAWING FARMGATE IF USAF CONTINUES INTERD ICTION MISSIONS WOULD BE ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF THE LEDGER. FIRST OF ALL THE USAF OFFICIALS WOULD QUESTION THE US DECLARED INTENTION TO GUARD THE AIRPORT AND THE POSSIBLE USE OF THE USAF EXAMPLE TO RELAX THE RIGID CONTROLS NOW IN EFFECT THAT HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE USAF EXAMPLES. SINCE THE ARVN REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT AT TIMES EXCEED THE COMBINED USAF/VNAF AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY, THE VNAF IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO CONTINUE THE INTERD ICTION MISSIONS WOULD OF NECESSITY REDUCE TO A CERTAIN DEGREE THEIR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PARTICI PATION AND POSSIBLY NOT HAVE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR THE IMMEDIATE TYPE TARGETS. US INVOLVEMENT IN THE RVN COUNTERINSURGENCY IS WELL KNOWN IN RESPONSIBLE QUARTERS, THOUGH IT CANNOT BE PHYSICALLY PROVED. WITHDRAWAL OR SUBSTANTIAL
Curtailment of Farmgate would prejudice the successful outcome of military operations upon which the eventual successful political resolution depends. The inconsistency of U.S. withdrawal of active, vital support to the RVN now would undoubtedly detract from our worldwide stature as the champion of freedom and protector of the free world from communist aggression. It would probably have a disheartening effect on the resolve of underdeveloped and uncommitted countries to resist the encouragement of communist aggressors. A severe degradation of the enthusiasm and the scope of support extended the US by its allies most certainly would also ensue.
B. POLICY ASPECTS

1. POSSIBILITIES FOR TIGHTENING UP TARGET SELECTION AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL PROCEDURES.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TARGET SELECTION IN RVN WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN PARAGRAPH A-1 'ABOUT AND IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THIS IS AN ARVN

RESPONSIBILITY. THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL PROCEDURES USED DURING AIR STRIKES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND REFINED TO PROVIDE THE MAXIMUM SECURITY TO FRIENDLY PERSONNEL. IN THE RECENT FORRESTAL-HILLSMAN REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON CONVOY VEHICLES, THE EFFECT OF THE USE OF AIR POWER RATES THE CONTROLS OVER AIR STRIKES AS EXCELLENT. THE REFINEMENT OF EXISTING CONTROLS IS A CONSTANT OBJECTIVE. IMPOSITION OF SUBSTANTIVE RESTRICTIONS TO THE TARGET SELECTION AND CONTROL MECHANISMS WHICH EFFECTIVELY THREATEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR IN RVN. IN TURN THIS RESTRAINT WOULD RELIEVE JUST THAT MUCH PRESSURE ON THE VC LOGISTIC TRAINING AND POLITICAL CENTERS WHICH ARE SERIOUSLY VULNERABLE ONLY TO AIR ATTACK.
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C. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

1. CIVILIAN REACTIONS TO INTERDICTION

All civilians, but especially those close to the VC cadre, will strongly resent any kind of armed attacks that endanger their person or their property. They will resent being subject to any kind of fire, infantry, artillery or air interdiction attacks. It is likely that a sizable portion of the population of SVN consider themselves uninvolved in a contest between two rival factions for the political control of the country. They do not associate themselves with either side. A recent OSS survey of VC propaganda leaflets distributed by the VC in SVN during 1966 revealed that only two (2) leaflets mentioned aerial bombings. This seems to support the fact that extreme care is exercised in both the selection of air interdiction targets as well as in the actual delivery of ordnance on those targets. Political considerations have strongly influenced the
SELECTION OF AIR INTERDICTION MISSIONS. DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR, OPPOSING NATIONAL ENTITIES WERE INVOLVED AND ENTIRE POPULATIONS WERE CONSIDERED ENEMY, AND WERE SUBJECT TO AIR ATTACKS, ALTHOUGH ALMOST ALL TARGETS WERE SELECTED BY THE USAF BASED UPON THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THOSE TARGETS. THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WERE NOT AS IMPORTANT DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR AS THEY ARE TODAY IN DETERMINING THE LIST OF AIR INTERDICTION TARGETS. PRACTICALLY ALL THE PEOPLE OF A NATION INVOLVED DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR SUPPORTED THEIR NATION'S POLICIES, AND EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED AERIAL BOMBINGS AS AN INEVITABLE PART OF THE FORTUNES OF WAR. ON THE OTHER HAND IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE COMMUNIST VC HAVE NOT BLOWN UP THE SO-CALLED "INDISCRIMINATE SLAUGHTER" OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS BY AIR ATTACK AS A MAJOR PROPAGANDA ISSUE. THERE CAN BE ONLY ONE SUBSTANTIVE REASON WHY THIS HAS NOT OCCURRED: IT WOULDN'T SERVE THE VC'S PURPOSE. AS TO WHY NOT, THERE ARE SEVERAL SEEMINGLY LOGICAL REASONS. 1ST. THERE IS LITTLE OR NO POPULAR BASIS OF TRUTH. MUCH OF OUR INTERDICTION TARGETING INFORMATION COMES FROM "CIVILIAN NON-COMBATANTS"
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WHO HAVE HAD THE COURAGE TO LEAVE PROPERTY, HOMES, AND EVEN SOME RELATIVES BEHIND IN VC CONTROLLED AND EXPLOITED AREAS. THEIR SUPERIORITY WOULD BE LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR THOSE WHO TAKE THE TEMPORARILY EASIER WAY OF LIFE. THE BEING MAD, RATHER THAN DEAD!

2ND. THE COMMON MAN IN THE ORIENT HAS AN INordinate respect for power. WHEN IT IS OVER-THE+C-controlling and relatively impersonal, INSTINCT AND LITL. RATIONS CAN BE EITHER DOUGN AT OR USED BY

EVEN CONTROLLS IT. ON EITHER BASIS, THE VC RE-
CRUITER HOLDS FEW ATTRACTIONS FOR THE AVERAGE PEASANT. ANY KIND OF SUBSTANTIAL PUBLICITY BY THE VC ABOUT THE DEVASTATING EFFECTS OF AIR POWER WOULD TURN THE PEASANT AGAINST THE VC, HE WOULD KNOW THE VC COULDN'T PROTECT HIM.
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN AIR MISSIONS AND GROUND WARFARE ** (INCLUDING ARTILLERY AND HU-1B'S)

ANSWER

Perhaps the main psychological distinction between air and ground warfare stems from the air power characteristics of unavailable, remote and the personal machines as compared to the more accessible and personal machines and soldiers of the ground. However, these two media of warfare have major characteristics in common. Ordnance is delivered from both origins in massively destructive quantities, and in RVN, target selection is the function and responsibility of the GVN authorities, specifically authorities on the ground. Regardless of the delivery mode, ordinance delivery and effect are only as discriminating as the selection of the target. This rule applies to artillery and mortars, bombs, rockets and napalm, for all types of missions. However, the case of the HU-1B is unique, primarily because of the rules of engagement which pertain. This is an armed escort vehicle: a designation which

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CONNOTES A PURELY DEFENSIVE ROLE. A RECENT RULE CHANGE PERMITS THE USE OF VARIOUS ROCKETS AND MACHINE GUNS BEFORE HOSTILE FIRE IS RECEIVED IF KNOWN VC ARE ENCOUNTERED. IT IS ONLY A QUESTION OF THE DEGREE OF HAZARD TO NON-COMBATANTS WHO MAY BE IN THE AREA WHEN HELIBORNE OPERATIONS ARE TO PROCEED. IT IS A CHARACTERISTIC OF BOTH HELICOPTERS AND AIRCRAFT THAT THE NOISE OF THEIR APPROACHES MIGHT Warn NON-COMBATANT AND VC ALIKE OF IMPENDING DANGER.
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN HATING OR FEARING A SOLDIER WHO MISTREATS OR SHOOTS A CIVILIAN FACE TO FACE, AND HATING OR FEARING AN UNSEEN PILOT.

ANSWER

There seems to be little difference in the distinction between hating or fearing a soldier who mistreats or shoots a civilian face to face in the process of destroying an enemy occupied village in position, and hating or fearing an unseen pilot, who accomplishes the same mission more impersonally. In an undemocratized nation, such as South Vietnam, it is possible that the simple farmer may fear an unseen pilot more than he may have since evidence during World War II has shown that non-combatants personally affected by military actions toward the army or the soldier equally when his country was winning the war, whereas, his hatred probably was instilled by fear as his nation's fortune ebbed. It would seem that air attacks are primarily feared by non-combatants far more than attacks by soldiers, due to the elements...
OF SURPRISE AND MASSIVE FIRE. THOUGH THOSE WHO
HAVE EXPERIENCED MASSED ARTILLERY FIRE AVER
WHAT SMALLER ARE FAR LESS AIRMASSING AND
DESTRUCTIVE AGAINST PERSONNEL AND LIGHT
STRUCTURES, THAN ARTILLERY.
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C. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTION OF VC

INTERROGATION OF POWS AND DEFECTORS TESTIFY TO THE EFFECTS THAT USAF/USN BOMBINGS HAVE HAD ON THE VC. DESPITE ADMITTING THAT BOMBINGS HAVE CAUSED GREAT CONCERN AND FEAR AMONG THE VC, IT WAS ALSO STATED THAT THEY GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERALL CAPABILITY OF RVN MILITARY FORCES. CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES A CONTINUOUS AND URGENT VC PRIORITY PROGRAM DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF RVN/USAF AIR OPERATIONS. VC MILITARY PERSONNEL NOW RECEIVE SPECIAL TRAINING IN THE USE OF SMALL ARMS AGAINST LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT. THERE IS NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM THESE SOURCES TO INDICATE THAT THE VC HAS RATED VICTIMIZED BY OVERSEAS TROOPS ANY MORE AS A RESULT OF AIR ATTACKS OR THAT SUCH ATTACKS HAVE CAUSED THEM TO FIGHT MORE RESOLUTELY. CERTAINLY VC PROPAGANDA AIMED AT THE INDIGENOUS PEASANT AND CITIZEN HAS NOT SINGLE OUT EITHER AIR OR GROUND ATTACK BY AMERICANS AS A SPECIAL TARGET. MORE TO
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THE POINT, VC PROPAGANDA HAS EMPHASIZED FABRICATIONS OF PERSONNEL MURDERS FOR MILITARY "ATROCITIES" - KILLING CHILDREN, VIOLATING WOMEN, COERCION OF VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES, ETC.
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C. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

1. ABILITY OF VC TO EXPLOIT INTERDICT MISSIONS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE

ANSWER

REAL OR FABRICATED INiscriminate KILLING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS BY ALL MEANS, INNOCENT IN RVN, WOULD CERTAINLY BE EXPLOITED TO THE MAXIMUM BY THE VC THROUGH THEIR EXTENSIVE PROPAGANDA MEDIA AMONG INDIGENOUS GROUPS IF THEY THOUGHT IT SERVED THEIR PURPOSE. THEY HAVE THE FUTURE COMMUNITY HATE TO AID THEM AS WELL. HOWEVER, THE VC ARE NOT ABOVE MANUFACTURING MANUFACTURED "INdiscRIMINATE USAF BOMBING." RADIO HANOI HAS FEATURED MANY SUCH FABRICATED STORIES. AN ANALYSIS OF RADIO HANOI'S AUDIENCE RULES OUT THE MAJORITY OF PEASANTS IN RVN WHO HAVE NO RADIOS. IT IS STRANGE THAT SUCH INdiscRIMINATE BOMBING AND KILLING DO NOT CONSTITUTE A MAJOR PROPAGANDA ITEM FOR INTERNAL RVN CONSUMPTION. TWO REASONS ARE LOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THIS ABSENCE. SUCH OFFENSES AGAINST HUMANITY ARE NOT WIDESPREAD ENOUGH, IF THEY HAVE OCCURRED TO ANY EXTENT AT ALL, IN THE RVN TO BE A PROFITABLE PROPAGANDA OR PSYWAR LINE FOR THE VC AGAINST THE PEOPLE WHO KNOW THE
FACTS, THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES. SECOND, EXPLOITATION OF THIS LINE IS A DOUBLE EDGED SWORD WHICH THE VC DO NOT CHOOSE TO USE. THE WELL PUBLICIZED POWER OF AIR ATTACKS ITSELF AS A THREATENING FORCE Within THE RVN, MAY WELL CHASE LARGE NUMBERS OF UNCOMMITTED PEASANTS AND CITIZENS TO THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, DERIVING THEM TO THE VC. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THE PEASANT OF VIETNAM IS POWERED PRINCIPALLY IN FOOD. THE BASIC AMENITIES OF LIFE, SUCH AS SHELTER, CLOTHING, HEALTH, AND THE SECURITY NECESSARY TO PRODUCE AND ENJOY THESE AMENITIES.
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D. EVALUATION OF PROS AND CONS

a. AS PRECISE A STATEMENT AS POSSIBLE ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR EFFORT MADE BY INTERDICTION MISSIONS, DOCUMENTED WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

ANSWER

THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR EFFORT MADE BY INTERDICTION MISSIONS ARE NOT MEASURABLE IN NUMBERS OR PERCENTAGE OF VC KILLED OR IN THE TOTAL VALUE SOMETHING THAT CAN BE STATED IN NUMBERS AND CONCLUDE HARDS. A GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE TYPE OF INTERDICTION MISSIONS FLOWN IN SVN ARE NECESSARY TO APPRECIATE THE TRUE VALUE OF THE AIR INTERDICTION EFFORT. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS CORRECT THE FACT THAT THE AIR IS USED TO RESTRICT MOVEMENT, CONSOLIDATION AND STORAGE OF PEOPLE, ARMS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. INTERDICTION RESTRICTS MANUFACTURE OF WAR GOODS, KEEPS THE VC OFF BALANCE, AND ARE A MAJOR FACTOR IN CAUSING THE VC TO DEFECT. VC TRAINING CENTERS ARE DESTROYED OR DISRUPTED AND COMMUNICATION CENTERS, THEIR PERSONNEL AND POLITICAL CONTROL PROBLEMS ARE INCREASED CONSIDERABLY BECAUSE OF THE AIR INTERDICTION EFFORT.
Restrictions on open or fast movement imposed by the interdiction threat. The VC morale factor of day and night harassment - never tends completely secure - cannot be overlooked. Finally, the political nature of the struggle in RVN is found to cause a substantial part of the population to be undecided regarding their party affiliations. Their self-interest and part of the important elements influencing the outcome of the war. They will be greatly influenced by the national desire to be on the winning side. The application of controlled power and force by means of a disciplined interdiction program which achieves demonstrable military results, will attract many of the undecided factions to the side of the government. All plans currently in force address the twin problems of defeating the VC and reducing the scope and magnitude of US assistance to the GVN. They place the air interdiction effort on the highest priority list. To eliminate or seriously restrict this effort now is to assume prolongation of the current scale of military effort and invite the communists outside the RVN to escalate the scope and magnitude of their military and other assistance to the Viet.
CLOSE INSOURGENTS IN THE RVN.

b. ANY OTHER RELEVANT COMMENTS.

ANSWER

1. OVERSIMPLIFIED, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MAY BE LEANED TO PREVENTIVE MEDICINE AND INTERDICTION TO PREVENTIVE MEDICINE. A GOOD PREVENTION PROGRAM WOULD REQUIRE THE IDEA AND SEVERITY OF CORRECTIVE ACTION.

2. INTERDICTION MISSIONS STRIKE AT THE HEART OF THE VC ABILITY TO FIGHT. INTERDICTION TARGETS ARE MORE "HARD CORE" IN NATURE THAN ANY OTHER TARGET, THEY ARE CONCENTRATIONS OF WEAPONS, MUNITIONS, SUPPLIES, FOOD, TRAINING AND TROOPS. THESE TARGETS ARE SPECIFICALLY DEFINED AND THE TOTAL ORDNANCE EXPENDED DURING THE AIR STRIKE IS CONFINED TO A PRECISE AREA. DESTRUCTION OF THESE TARGETS REDUCES THE FLOW OF WAR MATERIAL TO THE DEPLOYED VC FORCES, REDUCING THEIR CAPABILITY AND WILL TO FIGHT. THIS HAS DUAL ADVANTAGES. IT REDUCES THE MILITARY TASK OF GOVERNMENT FORCES AND IT SPARES THE LIVES OF THE NON-HARD CORE IRREGULARS WHO, IF ARMED, MUST BE KILLED WHEN THEY THREATEN THE SECURITY OF LOYAL CITIZENS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES AND FACILITIES.
1. There is another favorable aspect to interdiction missions that must be considered. Targets are generally located in isolated areas, but their presence is usually known to the small remote non-combatant population, regardless of its political inclination. When interdiction targets are destroyed with precision and finality the government gains increased deference and respect. This cycle tends to be self-sustaining in that people generally want to be on the side of the victor. A citizen may withhold intelligence from the government if he can foresee no tangible results from passing it on, and knows he runs substantial risk of retribution if he does pass it on. However, if a citizen, not oriented to the VC way of life, gives information pinpointing a VC installation and then sees it destroyed, the impression on him and his associates should favor the government. These attitudes in turn produce more intelligence of more precise quality.

2. It is stated on page 4, paragraph 3 of Mr. Harriman's message that interdiction
STRIKES ARE MOST EFFECTIVE WHERE ENEMY
FORCES, SUPPLY LINES AND LOGISTICS ARE
HIGHLY ORGANIZED, WELL DEFINED, AND HENCE
VULNERABLE TO AIR ATTACK -- AIR INTERDICTOR
VC NASCENTLY A CONVENTIONAL WAR CONCEPT, AND
TO BE VALID, INTERDICTOR STRIKES REQUIRE
BLACK TRIMPLED ELEMENTS (TERMINAL)."

5. THE FOREGOING REFLECTS A MISUNDER- 
STANDING OF THE NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF
INTERDICTOR OPERATIONS IN THE RVN. THE
TERM “INTERDICTOR” APPLIES TO OPERATIONS IN
THE RVN OBJECTIVE EXPOSED TO NCN OR REGENT
TARGETS OF DEMONSTRABLE MILITARY VALUE TO THE
VC ENEMY BY MEANS OTHER THAN CONTINUED PHYSI- 
CIAL ATTACK AND OCCUPATION. AIR IS ONLY ONE
MEDIUM OF SUCH ATTACKS. INTERDICTOR IS ALSO
ACHIEVABLE BY ARTILLERY, SPECIAL FORCES AND
OTHER ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY FORCES. THE EXTENT
OR MAGNITUDE OF THE DAMAGE DOES NOT MATTER.
IT'S VALUE TO THE VC INSURGENCY DOES. A MATCHED
SUPPLY HUT OR ARMS DEPOT IN ZONE D CAN MEAN AS
MUCH TO THE VC INSURGENCY IN RVN AS A MANUFACT- 
URING COMPLEX IN THE RUHR VALLEY MEANT TO THE
GERMANS IN WORLD WAR II. IN FACT, FROM A RES- 
OURCES STANDPOINT, THE ZONE D TARGET MAY WELL
TOP SECRET

6. Offensive air interdiction attacks are the primary means of neutralizing major VC military capabilities which support and protect their political activities. To allow the VC to conduct these same major military activities unimpaired is to prolong and raise the cost of the counterinsurgency effort in and it would encourage the uncommitted element of the population to follow the line of least resistance, namely to the VC, or submitting docilely to VC coercion, secure in the knowledge that they would not be subject to the dangers and threat of imminent attack.
B. EVALUATION OF PROS AND CONS

1. CONS

a. IS IT ALWAYS DANGEROUS TO REGARD ANY TERRITORY AS GMN OR ANY VILLAGE AS VC?

IF NOT, UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES (E.G., ZONE D, DUONG-MINH-CHAU ZONE)?

ADDENDUM

1. FAILURE TO REGARD ANY TERRITORY OR VILLAGE NOT UNDER POSITIVE GMN CONTROL AS POSSIBLY UNDER VC CONTROL IS DANGEROUSLY UNREALISTIC. THE GMN, TO THE SATISFACTION OF US ADVISORS, HAVE DETERMINED THAT MANY OF THE 16,000 HAMLETS OF 100 TO 800 PEOPLE IN SVN ARE DEFINITELY UNDER VC CONTROL. THIS DETERMINATION WAS MADE BY TRAINED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE IN THE FIELD AT THE "BASE ROOT" LEVEL. IN ADDITION, LARGER AREAS OF SVN SUCH AS THE VC WAR CAMP AND "BATTLE BASES" (E.G., ZONE D, ZONE C, ZONE B, ZONE A, U MINH AND DONG TRAP MEO) HAVE BEEN UNDER VC DOMINATION AND CONTROL FOR MANY YEARS, SOME AS FAR BACK AS THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF WW II. IT IS IN THESE AREAS THAT CONFIRMED EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION,
AND THE MANUFACTURING OF ARMS AND OTHER
INSURGENT EQUIPMENT ARE CARRIED ON. INTER-
DICTION TARGETS ARE PINPOINTED IN THESE
AREAS ONLY FOR USAF/VNAF. FAILURE TO STRIKE
SPECIFIC TARGETS IN THESE AREAS CANNOT FAIL
TO AID THE ENEMY AND CAN ONLY STRENGTHEN AND
PROLONG THE VIET/N/C COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT.
CONTINUING INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE
VC IS GRADUALLY BUILDING TOWARD OPERATIONAL
UNITS OF REGIMENTAL STRENGTH, TO FACILITATE
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF LARGER COORDINATED
OPERATIONS. RECENT UNCONFIRMED REPORTS
REVEAL A POSSIBLE VC PLAN, WITH THE AID OF
DRV, SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA, TO
PROVIDE ELITE UNITS (17 BATTALIONS) TO DEFEND
THE VC WAR ZONES. SUCH TARGETS, WHEN DEFI-
NITELY PINPOINTED, MUST BE DESTROYED IF
THE VC IS TO BE ANY MORE FOR A SUCCESSFUL
PROSECUTION OF THIS WAR. IT IS ILLICIT
NOT TO ACCEPT THAT THE VILLAGES AND WAR ZONES
WHERE THESE VC ACTIVITIES ARE LOCATED, ARE
AREAS OF VC DOMINATION, AND, HENCE, ARE ENEMY
TERRITORY. RECENT GVN GROUND OPERATIONS
HAVE PENETRATED AREAS CONSIDERED BY THE VC
AS "SAFE HAVENS" AND HENCEFORE THOUGHT TO
BE IMPENETRABLE. THESE ACTIONS HAVE SENT AN EVER INCREASING NUMBER OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS WHICH HAVE REVEALED ORGANIZATIONS, PLANS OF FUTURE OPERATIONS, AND OTHER SECRET INFORMATION. TYPES OF EQUIPMENT, PLANS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS, ETC. HOWEVER, INDEED, VIVID, IMPORTANT, AND RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM INCREASINGLY INTELLIGENCE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE, PROVIDES AN INCREASINGLY RELIABLE BASIS FOR OUR SELECTION OF INTERDICTION TARGETS. THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS HAVE STATED THAT "WHEN A VC IS KILLED, A VIETNAMESE DIES." THIS PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FROM WHICH IT IS DERIVED ARE TRANSLATED INTO TARGET AND WEAPON SELECTION BY THE MILITARY.
TOP SECRET

With painstaking care, to ensure that maximum discrimination and minimum force are applied to achieve essential military objectives.

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

EVALUATION OF PROS AND CONS

1. CON)

1. To what degree is it reasonable to suspect that:
   (i) Interdiction missions generate popular resentment, and
   (ii) that this popular resentment is an important factor in the case of VC recruitment.

ANSWER

1. One must assume that if attacks occurred against innocents they will engender resentment. However, except for external VC propaganda and unfounded rumors, there is no evidence that interdiction missions have caused popular resentment or have aided the VC recruitment program. There is evidence that the VC recruitment program is aided by resentment created by alleged instances of the traditional oriental syndrome of craft, corruption, and mistreatment of individuals by indigenous military and civilian officials. There is a great deal of intelligence that indicates that a large portion of VC "recruits" are actually impressed and are
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Almost daily reports relate to the kidnapings of villagers who are then impressed into VC service. However many of these people are released to return to their homes, or they escape sooner than cast their lot with what is coming to be ever more widely regarded as a losing VC cause which demonstrably offers the peasant less than he has now plus increased hazards and inconveniences to his personal security and that of his family.
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2. CONS

c. WHAT IS THE RELEVANCE OF THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE REGARDING THE ALLEGED WORSENSING OF
ALREADY SERIOUS POLITICAL ANTAGONISM IN LOCALIZED CONTEXTS OF STRIKES?

ANSWER

1. FRANCE'S REFUSAL TO GRANT EVEN MIDEST FORMS OF ACCOMMODATION TO THE VIETNAMESE AFTER WORLD WAR II, AND THEIR COMPLETELY AUTOCRATIC POLICY, SUCCESSED IN ALIENATING ALMOST THE ENTIRE POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY. THE WAR AGAINST FRANCE WAS CONSIDERED BY MOST VIETNAMESE TO BE A PATRIOTIC WAR AGAINST A FOREIGN INVAADER. IF IT CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH, THE PRESENT CONFLICT IS MORE IN THE NATURE OF A CIVIL WAR. THE WOMEN, FRANCE, WAS ALWAYS IDENTIFIABLE. SHE MADE NO ATTEMPT, UNTIL THE WAR WAS PRACTICALLY LOST, TO PROVIDE THE VIETNAMESE WITH A HOPEFUL FUTURE. ADDITIONALLY, FRENCH FAILURE TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY AGAINST THE JAPANESE CAUSED MOST VIETNAMESE TO REGARD FRANCE'S MILITARY CAPABILITY AS LESS THAN IMPOSING. IT WAS PROVEN THAT ASIATICS COULD DEFEAT THE FRENCH. IT IS DOUBTFUL IF FRENCH AIR FORCE STRIKES CAUSED ANY FURTHER RESENTMENT AMONG THE POPULATION THAN
The French did not have a precise tactical air control system; they lacked a sympathetic, indigenous intelligence base. Their offensive air was almost exclusively manned and piloted by French nationals and, worse, heretofore, and they completely lacked a precisely analytical intelligence evaluation and target selection capability. All of these defects which combined to degrade, politically and militarily, the French air effort have been progressively addressed in the current civil/military insurgency arrangements. The maintenance of the effectiveness of these remedies is a daily personal concern of the highest civil and military authorities in Vietnam.
D. EVALUATION OF PROS AND CONS

4. WHY ARE PEOPLE SUBJECTED TO AIR STRIKES MORE LIKELY TO VOLUNTEER FOR THE VC THAN THEY ARE TO BE WON OVER TO THE GVN?

ANSWER

1. DURING THE PERIOD 1 SEP 1962 TO 3 APR

63 I-2 MACV RECEIVED AN AVERAGE OF 69 INTERROGATION OF PW'S REPORTS EACH MONTH. OF ALL THE INFORMATION, NOT A SINGLE PIECE ENLARGED THE INFLUENCE OF RVN/US AIR STRIKES AS A REASON FOR HIS HAVING BECOME A VC. THESE PW'S WERE BOTH HARDCORE AND IRREGULAR VC. THE ABSENCE OF THIS ITEM AS A REASON FOR JOINING THE VC SUPPORTS A CONCLUSION THAT AIR STRIKES DO NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE PEOPLE TO VOLUNTEER FOR THE VC CAUSE. ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE RECORDS, FRENCH INTERROGATION OF VIET MINH PRISONERS ALSO FAILED TO IDENTIFY AIR STRIKES AS A REASON FOR RECRUITMENT.
ORDINALS, EVALUATION OF PROS AND CONS

1. PROS

WHY DOES THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE SUGGEST THAT AIR INTERDICTIO~ IS NOT A USEFUL CONCEPT IN VIETNAM'S WAR?

ANSWER

1. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT AIR INTERDICTIO~ WAS DETRIMENTAL TO THE FRENCH WAR EFFORT OR THAT IT CONTRIBUTED TO THEIR DEFEAT. ON THE CONTRARY, FRENCH INTERDICTIO~ EFFORTS SUCCEEDED IN INFlicting SOME TELLING DAMAGE ON THE VIET MINH AND CAUSED THEM TO DEVELOP CHANGES IN THEIR TACTICS AND IN THEIR PLANS TO COUNTER STRATEGIC AIMS FROM THE AIR. SPECIFICALLY, THE VIET MINH WERE FORCED TO FRAGMENT THEIR TRANSPORTATION FORCE FOR USE IN SMALLER AREAS BECAUSE FRENCH INTERDICTIO~ HAD DESTROYED BRIDGES AND SPLIT THE VIET MINH TACTICAL ZONES INTO SEPARATE COMBATANTS. DESPITE LESS OF HOW EFFICIENT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, THE FRENCH AIR EFFORT WAS PART OF A CAUSE WHICH, IN RETROSPECT, WAS DOOMED AT THE OUTSET.

2. FURTHER, A COMPARISON OF THE FRENCH AIR EFFORT WITH THE PRESENT USAF/VNAF OPERATION...
TOP SECRET

AS IDEAL. ASIDE FROM THE SHORTCOMINGS NOTED
IN P.A., THE FRENCH AIR FORCE WAS A PART OF A
TOTAL FRENCH EFFORT, OPPOSED AS INVADERS BY
NATIONALISTICALLY AND RACIALLY MOTIVATED
VIETNAMESE, COMMUNISTS AND NON-COMMUNISTS ALIKE.

3. ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED
IS THAT THE FRENCH DID NOT BEGIN A PLANNED
INTERDICTION PROGRAM UNTIL 1952, OR ABOUT 6
YEARS AFTER THE WAR HAD BEGUN. HOWEVER,
DESPITE THE LATE START AND PREDESTINED LOSING
CAUSE, THE FRENCH INTERDICTION EFFORTS REDUCED
THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES TO THE VIET MINH FROM
1500 TO 2500 TONS A MONTH. THE VIET MINH ADMITTED,
IN tłumacz ELAS, THAT FRENCH AIR CAPABILITY,
WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FRENCH ADVANTAGES.

4. IT IS FALLACIOUS TO DRAW COMPARISONS
BETWEEN THE FRENCH NATIONAL AIR EFFORT, ALIEN
TO THE POPULATION, AND THE CURRENT INDIGENOUS
U.S. AIR EFFORT, SUPPLEMENTED BY A SMALLER,
RESTRICTED COMBINED US-GVN AIR EFFORT, WHICH
IS COMPLETELY CONTROLLED BY THE GVN. NEITHER THE POLITICAL ISSUES NOR THE
MILITARY OBJECTIVES TO SUPPORT THE POLITICAL
RESOLUTION ARE REMOTELY COMPARABLE, UPON CLOSE
INSPECTION.

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

EVALUATION OF PROS AND CONS

J. CONS

I. VC OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS

OFFICIALS' ATTITUDES CONSTITUTE A BARRIER TO
HONEST AND SELECTIVE INTELLIGENCE?

ANSWER

I. IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT SOME PENETRA-
TION OF VC OFFICIALS HAS BEEN MADE BY THE
VC. THERE APPEAR TO BE TOO MANY INSTANCES
IN WHICH THE VC ARE FOREWARNED OF IMPENDING
ANTI-VC OPERATIONS AND MOVE FROM THE AREAS TO
BE ATTACKED. IN SOME INSTANCES THE VC HAVE
SELECTED TO STAND AND FIGHT - SUCH AS AT AP
AND WHERE THEY PROBABLY HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE.
IT IS LIKELY THAT SOME INTELLIGENCE IS IN-
HERENTLY WORTH FROM AMERICANS. UNTIL ADDED
TO PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE, WOULD AID IMPENDING
OPERATIONS. THE WITHHOLDING OF SOME INFORMA-
TION IS EXERCISED BY ALMOST ALL NATIONS EVEN
WHEN DEALING WITH THEIR CLOSEST ALLIES. HOW-
EVER, SOME IS WITHHELD BY CERTAIN OFFICIALS
OF THE GVN BECAUSE OF AN ACTUAL DISTRUST OF
AMERICANS. IN MOST CASES THERE IS A FREE
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN THE GVN AND
THE US MILITARY, AND A FINE WORKING RELATIONSHIP
TO EXPOSE INNOCENT CIVILIANS TO AIR OR ANY OTHER TYPE ATTACKS. IT IS INTERESTING TO
NOTE THAT A NUMBER OF PROVINCE AND DISTRICT OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN INFAMOUS ACTORS AND
DISREGARO OF THE WELFARE OF THE POPULATION WHICH THEY ADMINISTER. THERE IS NO ISSUE
IN FACT FOR THE CONTENTURE AIREO IN PARA
GRAPHS 4 OF THE "CONS" IS SO FAR AS POLITICAL
NAIVE OR INEPTITUDE OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
CONTRIBUTING TO THE KILLING OF ANY INNOCENT
CIVILIANS IN ANY FASHION.
What is the answer to the GVN attack of June 1962 against a target of 230 square miles?

Answer

1. In actual fact, there were 19 pinpoint targets within an overall area of operation which was approximately 230 square miles. Twelve of these targets were hit; the others were not because of weather. These were pinpoint targets, each one documented and authenticated in target folders which included photographic information to the troop. This was the area secret war zone, headquarters of VC military region VI, inside targets were revalidated on the day prior to attack by flying VC defector (Le Van Ty) over the target area. Target area further validated by airborne of fix up to and including tot. Again these were pinpoint targets within an area and not the area per se. It was not a mission to bomb or burn everything that was built-up or which moved in the 230 square mile area as implied by the reference.
IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE THAT THIS DOCUMENTED EVENT OCCURRED ALMOST ONE YEAR AGO. THIS IS ELOQUENT PROOF OF THE EXCELLENT SELECTION AND CONTROL PROCEDURES THAT HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND MAINTAINED IN EFFECT IN THE RVN. THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF THE REFERENCED INCIDENT WAS NOT THEault OF THE PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED; IT WAS ADMITTEDLY, AN EXTREMELY ISOLATED CASE OF PILOT ERROR.
TOP SECRET

7. EVALUATION OF PROS AND CONS

2. CONS

II. ARE WE GETTING TOO CLOSE TO A
POSITION OF OPEN US INVOLVEMENT, OR IS OUR TRUE
ROLE OF "FRONT LINE ADVICE AND EXAMPLE" SIMPLY
BECOMING MORE AND MORE PUBLICLY REVEALED? IN
OTHER WORDS, IS OUR ROLE CHANGING OR IS IT
SIMPLY BEING EXHIBITED OUT BY REPORTERS?

ANSWER

1. NO. THE MAJOR AREA OF CONCERN HERE IS
CONCERN AND THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE
THAT THE "COVER" FOR THIS UNIT HAS BEEN COM-
PROMISED OR WILL BE COMPROMISED. ON EACH COMBAT
SUPPORT FLIGHT FARM GATE CREWS ARE ACCOMPANIED
BY VNAF CREW MEMBERS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES.
AIRCRAFT FORMS AND AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE TEST
COMBINED MANNING. A PRIMARY PART OF THE MISSION
OF THIS AIR COMMAND GROUP IS PROVIDING
TRAINING TO THE AIR FORCES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN
POWERS AND FARM GATE IS PERFORMING A TRAINING
FUNCTION HERE. IN FACT, AT PRESENT SEVERAL
PILOTS ARE ATTACHED TO TWO VNAF FIGHTER SQUAD-
IONS TO PROVIDE INSTRUMENT AND NIGHT FLYING
TRAINING AND ADVICE, BECAUSE OF THEIR SKILL IN
THOSE FUNCTIONS.

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

THE USAF LOGISTIC, RECONNAISSANCE AND AIR
DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES IN RVN ARE OVERT AND PASSIVE
IN NATURE AND DO NOT APPEAR VULNERABLE TO INTER
NATIONAL CRITICISM OF "INTERVENTION." ALL USAF
OPERATIONS IN RVN WILL BE REPORTED BY NEWSMAN.
AS IN THE PAST, WITH INCREASING DISCERNMENT.
HOWEVER, THE ORIGINAL ROLES ASSIGNED TO ALL
USAF UNITS AND PERSONNEL REMAIN UNCHANGED.
THE ROLES WHICH COVER THEIR PARTICIPATION ARE
ADEQUATE TO PRESERVE THE PRESTICE AND REALISTIC
INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM.

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

D. EVALUATION OF PROS AND CONS

CONS

1. ARE AIR MISSIONS ANY MORE IN VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT THAN HELICOPTER TROOP-CARRYING MISSIONS, SUPPLY LIFT, THE PRESENCE OF 12,000 US MILITARY PERSONNEL, EXISTENCE OF MACV, ETC.?

ANSWER


"IF WE ACCEPT THE GENEVA AGREEMENT AS APPLYING TO THE SITUATION AT ALL, THEN THE UNITED STATES IS IN VIOLATION OF THAT AGREEMENT."

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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1. DOES THE FARM GATE MANDATE CONTRA-VENE, OR GO BEYOND, THE ORIGINAL MANDATE FOR USING VC AIR FORCES TO EXECUTE VIETNAM WAR AIR STRIKES? IF SO, WHAT WAS THE STATED ORIGINAL FARM GATE MANDATE WHEN IT WAS SET UP?

ANSWER

Sovereign nation to repel that invasion, the uncommitted people of the world, as well as our friends, are probably far more interested in the spirit and determination with which the GVN/GUS team deals with communist aggression than they are with how well we live up to the letter of the Geneva Protocol, which, after all, was invalidated by the communists morally two years before overt US combat support was introduced into the RVN.