INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Organization, Activities, and Objectives
Of the Communist Front in South Vietnam

Summary

The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) is ostensibly a democratic and independent organization. In reality, it was established by and receives its over-all guidance from North Vietnam. The NFLSV provides the Communists with a banner under which all facets of insurgent political and military activity in the South are organized. The Front is also designed to provide an alternative to the Government of South Vietnam. The Communists have set out in the Front's name a program of broad political and economic objectives which can be accepted by the majority of people in the South. A phalanx of affiliated front organizations has also been created to give the impression that the NFLSV embodies every significant social, ethnic, religious, and professional group.

A number of the top public posts in the NFLSV are held by "progressive" South Vietnamese, most of whom are crypto-Communists. Behind these men are the hard-core Communist leaders in the South who are members of the "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP)--the name under which the Communist party in North Vietnam operates in South Vietnam. The evidence indicates that PRP committees exist down to the hamlet level in insurgent-controlled areas.

NOTE: This memorandum updates a CIA Memorandum of the same title dated 7 September 1965. The earlier memorandum was produced by the Office of Current Intelligence in collaboration with the Office of Central Reference, and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Directorate for Plans. The present update was also produced by the Office of Current Intelligence with the collaboration of the Office of Central Reference.
NFLSV committees have also been established down to the hamlet level throughout most of the insurgent-held area. These committees, controlled by the local Communists, often exercise a wide variety of governmental-type functions, including the collection of taxes and the organization of the local economy. Even in the areas held firmly by the rebels, however, the NFLSV has failed to pick up an independent following of any size, and its authority is based mainly on insurgent coercion. The Front has also been unable to attract any significant support from any of the politically influential groups, such as the Buddhists and the labor unions, outside the Communist-held sectors.

On the international scene, aided and abetted by the DRV, Liberation Front efforts to publicize the activities and program of the insurgents have steadily expanded since the first permanent NFLSV office was opened abroad in 1962. There are now over one dozen permanent Front missions abroad, several of them in Free World countries. Since the early months of 1965 the Vietnamese Communists have waged an increasingly vigorous campaign to gain Free World acceptance of the NFLSV as the "legitimate representative" of the South Vietnamese people. This campaign has involved a broadening of Communist claims on the extent of Front control in South Vietnam, and a further open assumption of government trappings by the NFLSV. So far, the Communists have stopped short of declaring the formation of a provisional Front government at the national level in South Vietnam. A number of problems still stand in the way of such a move, and it does not appear likely in the near future.
The Formation of the Front

1. The Ho Chi Minh-led Communists in Indochina have persistently operated under the cover of a large "front" movement. While resisting the Japanese during World War II, Ho and his comrades functioned behind the facade of the old Viet Minh league. In 1946, they formed the Lien Viet, or Vietnam United Front, to conceal Communist direction of the war against France. When the struggle shifted to South Vietnam following the Geneva agreements of 1954, the North Vietnamese organized the Vietnam Fatherland Front to garner support for "re-unification" with the South.

2. This organization, headquartered in North Vietnam, had little success in luring public backing in the South. In late 1958, Hanoi apparently began to plan to revitalize its Front apparatus in South Vietnam. Viet Cong documents captured in that period disclosed the Communists' chagrin at their failure to win a significant following in the South. These documents also indicated that the Viet Cong fully appreciated the importance of winning popular favor if their rebellion was to have any chance of eventual success.

3. The theory underlying the Communist front movement in Vietnam has been to establish very broad, general objectives which can be accepted by the majority of people, and then to enlist support from every section of the population in an all-embracing political organization. If properly carried out, "all the people" will unite in one organization against the "enemy"—in this case the Saigon government. This theory is implicit in the treatise on revolution in Vietnam, People's War, People's Army written by the North Vietnamese minister of defense in 1961.

4. By September 1960, Hanoi had apparently completed its general plans for a new and widely based front organization, ostensibly indigenous to the South. At a North Vietnamese party congress in September, Le Duan, the party first secretary, called for the creation of a "broad united front" in the South which would have the long-range goal of establishing a "national democratic coalition government."
5. The abortive coup against the Saigon regime in November 1960 provided the final impetus for the formation of the Front. The insurgents announced the establishment of the "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" on 20 December of that year. In order to sustain the fiction that the NFLSV was the product of an indigenous band of patriots in the South, Hanoi itself gave no publicity to the new organization until January 1961.

6. The Front's manifesto was first aired in a Hanoi radiobroadcast on 29 January 1961—a procedure which itself testified to North Vietnam's guiding role in the formation of the organization. When broadcast again from Hanoi on 11 February, the manifesto contained several significant changes. These changes eliminated material the DRV, on second thought, apparently believed would tend to undercut potential support for the Front in South Vietnam. Some passages which suggested Communist origin or ambitions were altered or deleted. The term "agrarian reform," for example, was dropped. Vicious and bloody excesses carried out under this slogan in North Vietnam had caused widespread revulsion in the South.

The Manifesto's Ten Points

7. In its final version (see Annex II), the manifesto bore a remarkable similarity to Le Duan's speech before the party congress in Hanoi, in the spring of 1960, even using his words to describe some of the Front's aims. Outlining a ten-point program, the document declared that the Front's most immediate task was to overthrow the Saigon government, implicitly through armed revolution. When this was achieved, the Front would form a "broad national democratic coalition administration" to "negotiate" with North Vietnam on "reunification." These and other goals of the Front, such as the adoption of a foreign policy of "peace and neutrality," and the redistribution of land in the South were identical with the actions long advocated for South Vietnam in Hanoi propaganda broadcasts. The goals were phrased in such a manner, however, that the politically inexperienced masses in the South would understand them to mean little more than the replacement of the current Saigon government by a more "representative, humane" administration.
8. The manifesto contained several highly generalized statements on the necessity for social and economic reforms. These were designed to appeal to many of the politically and socially dissatisfied elements in the South. Such words as democracy, social justice, full employment, higher wages, and lower rents, were liberally used. A general amnesty covering political prisoners of the Saigon government was promised. The document also played on Vietnamese sentiments of nationalism, calling for the elimination of foreign cultural influences and a return to Vietnamese traditions.

9. Partly because the Front manifesto concentrated on the political aims of the insurgency, and also because early Front propaganda primarily stressed the political activities of the NFLSV, the impression was created that Hanoi intended the new organization to serve mainly as the "political arm" of the Viet Cong. In fact, however, Hanoi intended that the NFLSV provide a facade covering all facets of Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, military as well as political. Shortly after the Front's formation, for example, it was publicly announced that all the insurgent forces had been organized into the "Liberation Army of South Vietnam" under the leadership of the NFLSV. Today, the Communists attempt to carry out as much insurgent activity as possible in the name of the Front, whether it is a military directive for an attack on a government post, a propaganda harangue at gunpoint in a village compound, or an official public statement on policy.

Staffing the Front's Top Public Posts

10. In order to support the assertions in the Front manifesto that the NFLSV was a broadly based organization embracing many shades of popular opposition to the Saigon government, the Vietnamese Communists studded the announced leadership of the Front with a number of "progressive" South Vietnamese who could not be positively identified as card-carrying Communists. These men were to run the day-to-day activities of the Front's public administrative apparatus, while remaining fully pliable to hard-core Communist direction in the background.
11. The objective was to give the Front the appearance of broad representation among workers, religious orders, soldiers, farmers, and intellectuals in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong also attempted to select persons who would add prestige to the NFLSV and who would be capable of winning active public support. Reports of the organization of bodies affiliated with the Front suggest that the Communists always made sure that at least the secretary of the committee was a Communist.

12. It appears that the Communists had a good deal of difficulty in securing enough of the right type of personnel for all of the top public posts in the Front. Although the first NFLSV central committee announced in March 1962 reserved places for 52 members, it contained only 31 names, most of them unknowns even in South Vietnam. NFLSV propaganda claimed that the meeting at which the central committee was elected was "truly representative of the people" and heavily attended. Actually, fewer than 200 people participated.

13. The second central committee, announced in January 1964, had only 41 members. Of the 31 who had served on the first committee, only about half retained their posts, suggesting that a number of the original appointees proved incapable of fulfilling their duties. Despite Hanoi's wish to conceal the real Communist domination of the Front, the Communist associations of those chosen to fill the top public posts in the NFLSV stand out clearly.

14. Most of the top NFLSV leaders are known to have long histories of cooperation with Ho Chi Minh's old Viet Minh league. The chairman of the central committee and the NFLSV's major public spokesman, Nguyen Huu Tho, is a lawyer who has been involved in pro-Communist political agitation in Vietnam since 1947. Although Tho claims in public to be a "socialist," and to represent an affiliated socialist party in the Front, he is clearly a crypto-Communist.

15. Nguyen Van Hieu, the first secretary general of the central committee, was a leftist journalist who had spent most of his career propagandizing in favor of the Communists and North Vietnam. In 1963, Hieu relinquished the post of secretary general and
went to Prague from where he directed the Front's foreign activities outside Asia until May of this year when he was recalled home. Kieu's eventual successor as secretary general, Huynh Tan Phat, has apparently been under North Vietnamese tutelage since he took his "democratic" party into the Viet Minh fold in the early 1950s. Phung Van Cung, who heads both the Front Red Cross and the Front Peace Committee, is also a former Viet Minh. Another top public leader of the NFLSV is Tran Buu Khiem, who heads the Front's Foreign Affairs Commission. He is reported to have been one of the organizers of the Viet Cong military effort and a former chief of security for the Communist organization in South Vietnam.

The People's Revolutionary Party

16. Behind the publicly acknowledged leaders of the NFLSV, there is another, clandestine group of professional revolutionaries, most of whom are full-fledged members of the Lao Dong Party, the name taken by the North Vietnamese Communists. They provide the hard-core leadership in the so-called "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP), the southern component of the Communist party in the DRV. The PRP's founding was announced publicly by a Liberation Front spokesman in January 1962, and although the announcement admitted the PRP's lineal descent from the original Indochinese Communist Party, it was phrased to give the impression that the decision to organize the PRP was made by the Communists in South Vietnam.

17. The fact that the PRP and the Lao Dong Party are identical was revealed in a secret Lao Dong central committee resolution of November 1961:

First of all, it must be clearly understood that this is only a name change. Although the overt name is different from what it is in North Vietnam, nevertheless, secretly... the party segment in South Vietnam is a segment of the Lao Dong Party under the leadership of the party central committee, headed by Chairman Ho... except for the name, there is no change whatever.
16. Most of the hard-core Communist leaders in the South are shadowy figures, but several of the chief military personalities have become known through interrogation of defectors and captured Viet Cong. Additionally, Hanoi inadvertently revealed in 1960 that some members of the North Vietnamese party central committee were operating in South Vietnam.

19. Chief among those North Vietnamese officials identified in the South is Nguyen Chi Thanh, a politburo member of the North Vietnamese Communist Party. Thanh, who is a general in the North Vietnamese Army and was also the army's political commissar until 1961, left North Vietnam in early 1965 to take over the running of the entire Communist war effort in South Vietnam. His two principal deputies are also generals in the North Vietnamese Army and members of the central committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party. One of them, the military deputy, is Tran Van Tra, a former deputy chief of staff of the North Vietnamese Army. Now, under the alias of Tran Nam Trung, he is listed as chief of the military affairs committee of the Front. The deputy who runs the Communist political organization in South Vietnam is General Tran Do.

20. It is not unusual to find the same man overseeing both the military and political program of the Vietnamese Communists, particularly in a war situation. For example, the military and political posts in the Northern half of South Vietnam—called Military Region V by the Communists—are believed to be under the command of Major General Nguyen Don, former commander of the North Vietnamese 305th Division, who has been operating in the South since 1962.

PRP Organization and Activity

21. The organization of the PRP furthered Hanoi's efforts to depict the insurgency in the South as an indigenous patriotic movement. It also permitted the Communists to gain an open and readily explicable voice in the NFLSV. Front conferences attended by affiliated non-Communist organizations in the Front, for example, could be more easily manipulated through the use of the PRP operating openly at the meetings.
22. The connection of the PRP with the Front was explained in carefully phrased terms in the original NFLSV announcement of the PRP's formation. The impression was given that the PRP was to form only a constituent element of the NFLSV with a voice equal, but certainly not superior, to that of the non-Communist groups active in the Front. In its own initial statement, however, the PRP was more candid, terming itself the "vanguard" of the insurgency. The statement also placed the PRP first when calling on members to "carry out the program of the party and the program of action" of the NFLSV.

23. The PRP organizational structure is a duplicate, insofar as possible, of the North Vietnamese Party. A special department of the party in Hanoi concerns itself with the problems of the struggle in the South and with the southern party segment. This department acts mainly through the party's Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) which functions as the headquarters for the PRP, controlling through covert party channels the NFLSV and acting through party channels as the high command of the Viet Cong forces—the Liberation Army.

24. COSVN sends directives down through a traditional pyramidal party structure of which the village party committees, and the village or hamlet party chapters and cells they control, provide the essential grass roots. The local party chapters and their component three-man cells provide the party members who lead the local guerrilla unit, control the local Liberation Front associations, and recruit for the party, the Front or the guerrilla unit.

25. Acting as much as possible through the Front, party cadre disseminate propaganda, round up local labor for Viet Cong military units operating in the area, and collect taxes and information—or monitor or control those who do. If the village or hamlet is under firm Viet Cong control, this may be done more or less overtly in the name of the party. If it is not, there may be only a few party members who must attempt all this on a covert basis.
26. If the party has established a local village or hamlet government (a village "Liberation Committee" or a hamlet "Administrative Committee" or "Board"), the party ensures adherence to its directives by planting its members in key positions or by having the local party secretary monitor village activities. In government-controlled areas and in the cities, it is the party member operating covertly who recruits and agitates and who enlists or buys agents or sympathizers.

27. The Communists claim they are only one element in the Front, albeit the "vanguard" element. However, through the selection and manipulation of the membership of the executive committees making up the NFLSV and running its ancillary regional and functional "Liberation Front" associations, the party controls the Front in classic, covert Communist fashion. The headquarters of the central committee of the Front is known to be colocated with COSVN.

Hanoi and the Liberation Front

28. The North Vietnamese Communist party and government have carefully avoided establishing any direct, public organizational ties with the National Liberation Front. Close links clearly exist, however, and DRV directives can be quickly implemented. Hanoi's control over the Front is organizationally maintained through the Communist leaders in South Vietnam to whom the DRV issues overall guidance and instructions.

29. The Front does not, publicly at least, maintain an office or permanent representative in Hanoi as it does in many other bloc capitals. When the activities of Front delegations in the DRV are publicized, the delegations are carefully linked officially with the DRV's own mass front organ, the Fatherland Front, and not with the DRV Government or party. This facade, of course, is designed to add substance to Communist claims that the insurgents are completely self-propelled revolutionaries.
30. Unofficially, Hanoi has adequate opportunity for close liaison with the top public leaders in the Front. Some of these individuals apparently visit the DRV frequently, traveling via Cambodian or Chinese transportation routes into North Vietnam. Moreover, DRV and Front delegations frequently travel together on tours abroad, with the NFLSV representatives usually using DRV passports.

31. Occasionally, DRV and Liberation Front propaganda differ somewhat in treating developments related to Vietnam. These differences do not appear to indicate significant policy fissures between the DRV and the insurgents in the South. They apparently stem mainly from the tactical considerations facing the two groups, and do not relate to their accord on over-all objectives.

Strength of the Front

32. The best evidence available on the numerical strength of the Front is contained in a few captured Communist documents that list the number of "members" of various Front associations and organs in a few scattered areas. The individuals listed probably include both the full, card-carrying NFLSV members and those whom the Communists consider enrolled in the Front organs even though their participation may be passive and they may not be fully committed to NFLSV or insurgent objectives. Occasionally, some of those in the latter category may participate in Front-sponsored activities.

33. One fairly reliable document captured in 1963 places the Front strength at that time at 60,000. By mid-1965 extrapolations from captured documents listing Front membership indicate that the strength of the NFLSV had grown substantially. By mid-1965, the Communists could count around 500,000 South Vietnamese (presumably over 16) as being enrolled in one or another of the "liberation" associations.

34. Although hard evidence of the actual growth of Front membership during the last 12 months is still
lacking, it is doubtful that the Communists met their high recruitment goals, particularly in areas of considerable military activity. In these areas there have been indications of growing reluctance on the part of the local populace to provide labor and other support for Viet Cong activity. Taking into consideration the past growth rate of the NFLSV, it is unlikely that its strength is higher than 700,000 to 750,000 at present.

The Front’s Grass-Roots Structure

35. Efforts to develop the NFLSV at the local level in South Vietnam began shortly after the Front was established. A captured Communist document issued in March 1961 urged the immediate organization of full NFLSV committees in villages and towns. It was apparent that the Vietnamese Communists intended to follow the pattern already established in North Vietnam, where general committees of Hanoi’s Fatherland Front exist alongside Communist Party committees down to the local level. The available evidence indicates that regular NFLSV committees now have been formed at these levels throughout most of the Viet Cong – controlled area where, according to the most reliable statistics available, approximately 20-25 percent of the rural population resides.

36. To assure broad representation on these committees, the number of card-carrying Communists, according to captured documents, is limited to two fifths of the total membership. In one village, which has been controlled by the insurgents for more than two years, the NFLSV committee is composed of representatives of all classes and organizations existing in the village. There is a representative for the landowners, one for the farmers, one for the women, and representatives for other groups. In this village, the secretary of the Front committee represents the local PRP element, since he is also a member of the village PRP committee. The PRP chapter receives its orders from the higher district party committee. These orders are passed to the village Front committee, which is responsible for carrying out the orders.

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37. It appears that the regular Front committees in Communist-controlled areas exercise a wide variety of functions. They are the body used by the Communists insofar as possible to collect taxes, conscript manpower for military and economic services, organize the local economy, and run rudimentary schools, hospitals, and courts. The Front committees provide an organization with a potential for winning the voluntary support of the population by various activities of a welfare or civic-action nature. Working through the Front, the Communists try to show that the insurgency is a more efficient, honest, and humane administration than is the Saigon regime.

38. At the grass-roots level in the Communist-controlled areas, the insurgents appear to be following much the same strategy with the NFLSV as they did with the local "administrative-resistance" councils set up by the Viet Minh in rebel-held territory during the war against the French. Captured Viet Minh documents frequently dealt with programs carried out under the authority of the councils to raise the living standards. Such documents often contained statistics on the establishment of schools, number of children and adults in school, medical dispensaries, sanitation efforts, and other civic responsibilities.

39. In the rebel-dominated areas, there appeared to be an initial surge to participate in the NFLSV as a reincarnation of the former Viet Minh. The Front thus picked up former Viet Minh activists and recipients of land redistributed by the Viet Minh. This surge appears to have been short-lived, however. For one thing, informants and Viet Cong prisoners indicate that early attempts to force "middle-class" peasants to give land to the poor were too harsh and resulted in a considerable loss of popularity for the NFLSV. The subsequent growth in influence of local Front organizations appears to have been largely the result of rural passivity, combined with the growing threat from the expanding insurgent military arm.

40. It is doubtful that enrollment in one of the Front organizations represents in many cases a willing
individual commitment to the Viet Cong cause—except, probably, for those recruited covertly in government-held or nearby "disputed" areas. Nonetheless, once enrollment is obtained, it is the Communist intention to get such commitment. In "newly liberated" areas, the Communists see the organization of Front associations as a major step in the consolidation of their control, a wedge further separating the people from the government. This appears to be one of the primary tasks for party cadres in organizing a village or a hamlet after government officials or troops have left.

41. Because it lacked attractiveness, the grass-roots structure of the NFLSV appears to have required greater direct Communist control than originally expected. A captured top secret PRP document ordered the use of the NFLSV during 1965 to "positively implement the party's policy" in the countryside. In some villages in the insurgent-controlled areas, the PRP unit has had to engage openly in such activities as the collection of taxes, and the organization of the local economy.

42. Outside the areas held firmly by the rebels, NFLSV activity varies in intensity and effectiveness. It is most intense in those rural regions where irregular insurgent bands and sympathizers are able to operate almost at will, and where there is often little in the way of effective governmental machinery answerable to Saigon. Organizing and proselytizing in the name of the Front are carried on actively in these areas, where about 25 percent of the rural population resides. In the rural regions where the government has begun planning or has begun to implement pacification programs, there is less Front agitation. Approximately 10 to 15 percent of the rural population lives in such regions. NFLSV influence is nearly negligible in the remaining sections of the rural area where government military and civil control is firm. Some 35 percent of the rural population lives in these areas.
43. Probably only a few NFLSV committees exist at the local level in those rural areas not firmly controlled by the Communists. In the contested regions, the greater part of the influence exerted by the insurgents appears to stem directly from Communist Party action. For example, one source from a village of 8-9,000 people in the delta, where a negligible amount of security was provided by the government, indicated that the PRP openly exercised direct administration over village affairs.

44. Front influence among the nearly 3,000,000 residents in the major cities and towns of South Vietnam is also minimal. One Communist Party member reported that as of November 1964, Front organizations in the Saigon - Gia Dinh Special Zone were nominal. Communist organizers had been unable either to establish a Front committee or to set up any of the Front's mass organizations. In practice, the hard-core Communist underground located in the area acted in the Front's name. A captured top secret PRP document stated that increasing the prestige of the NFLSV, specifically in the urban areas, was an urgent, critical problem that must be solved. There is no evidence that the NFLSV has been successful in attracting significant support from any of the politically influential groups in South Vietnam. Both overt propaganda and extensive clandestine penetration nevertheless continue to be directed at the Buddhists, students, labor union members, and armed forces personnel.

**NFLSV-Affiliated Organizations**

45. In addition to acquiring the proper personnel to fill the top offices in the Front, the Communists have expended considerable effort in fleshing out the NFLSV with a phalanx of affiliated "liberation" organizations. These groups have been added to give the impression that the Front is representative of every significant social, ethnic, religious, and professional group in South Vietnam. The complexity of this task was mitigated by the fact that the Communists already had experience in conduct-
ing a similar operation during the war against the French.

46. In the first several months after the formation of the NFLSV, associations specifically for farmers, students, women, youth, and urban workers were set up. Many others have been added since that time. By early August 1964, the Front had publicized the operation of some 20 affiliated bodies. The top echelons of most of these groups appear to be maintained with very small staffs, if any at all. The Communists have put more effort into the organization of active farmer, women, and youth groups of the Front at the local levels in South Vietnam, where advantage could be more effectively taken of the natural inclinations and aspirations of these elements of society.

47. Where possible, the affiliated organizations of the NFLSV have been tied in with corresponding international Communist-front organizations. This gives them an international character, stimulates publicity about them, and makes them appear far more important than they actually are.

48. Two "political parties" in addition to the PRP have also been attached to the Front as constituent bodies. They are the so-called Radical Socialist Party and the Democratic Party. It is interesting to note that the only two political parties permitted to exist in North Vietnam, aside from the Communist Party, bear names almost identical to those in the South. In the North, they supply a facade of democracy to the political process in the country, and operate in such a manner as to attract support from the intellectual and "bourgeois" classes. They have the same function in the South. Similar groups existed in the Communist front during the war against the French, and it is probable that some of their members were ordered by Hanoi to remain in the South after the 1954 war settlement.
Front Propaganda Machinery

49. The NFLSV boasts an especially well-organized propaganda arm, the Liberation News Agency (LNA). The LNA was set up early in 1961, parallel with the establishment of the Front itself. The LNA provides an easily controlled mechanism for the information dissemination which the Communists have found so essential and effective in coordinating and backstopping their political agitation activities. Several major LNA broadcast stations produce a steady diet of propaganda for public dissemination in the South.

50. Hanoi often rebroadcasts NFLSV statements within an hour or two of the time they were first issued by LNA. Under the banner of the Front, the Communists also publish a number of "revolutionary" newspapers; they claim 40 in the "liberated" areas—as well as periodicals and pamphlets for special audiences such as youth and women. Some are prepared clandestinely and are disseminated covertly in government-controlled areas. Much of the material produced within South Vietnam is distributed in Communist countries. NFLSV propaganda publications are printed in several languages in Hanoi by the government's official publishing houses, apparently to be distributed abroad under the aegis of the North Vietnamese Government. English-language editions of Front documents, for example, have been distributed in England by the correspondent of the DRV newspaper Cuu Quoc.

51. In France, NFLSV publications reach the large resident Vietnamese community through the North Vietnamese economic mission in Paris. Presumably the material is sent to Paris from Hanoi through official DRV channels. The several permanent Front offices abroad also distribute mountains of NFLSV propaganda; several of them put out periodic information sheets which are distributed to local leftist press sources for inclusion in local newspapers.
NLF Program Abroad

52. One of the main aims of the Front since its formation has been to publicize its activities and programs abroad. By representing itself as an organization struggling to free Vietnam from "colonialist and imperialist aggression," the NLF has made a special effort to enlist the sympathy and support of the newly emerging countries in Africa and Asia. A steady flow of telegrams of greeting and congratulations go out from the Front to foreign governments and heads of state. Coordination and advice for this kind of activity probably come from the more experienced bureaucrats in Hanoi.

53. The Front has long been sending representatives on overseas tours, at first mainly to the Communist bloc, but with increasing frequency to Africa and Asia. Front delegates have also been attending meetings of leftist- and Communist-sponsored conferences abroad since late 1962. The attendance of Front representatives at foreign conferences and meetings has been gradually accelerated. Under Hanoi's sponsorship, these delegates now often appear at Communist-sponsored world or regional conferences on an equal footing with national delegations. It is believed that a hard core of "delegates" for the Front is stabled in North Vietnam, where entrance and egress are easier than from South Vietnam.

54. The first permanent Front office abroad was opened in Cuba in August 1962. By mid-1964, permanent Front "missions" had also been established in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Algeria, Indonesia, and the UAR.

55. In view of the long history of Algerian opposition to French "colonialism," the Vietnamese Communists doubtless view Algeria as a fertile area in which to enlist support for the insurgency in South Vietnam. The organization and operation of the Front office in Algiers thus provide a good illustration of the NLF techniques and activities abroad. This mission was established by Huynh Van Tam in February 1963, and headed by him until June of this year. For
some time, there was no indication that the Algerian Government had taken official notice of the local NFLSV mission, other than to allow its establishment. During 1964, however, the Front representatives apparently gained official standing in the eyes of Algerian officials. On several occasions, Tam conducted official conversations with the Algerian foreign minister. Such activities tend to bolster the Front's status in the eyes of the local populace.

56. Tam also contributed articles to French-language newspapers in Algeria and undertook many other quasi-political activities, including film showings and speeches to leftist youth meetings. In May 1963, for example, he addressed a Communist-sponsored conference of "Anti-Colonialist Youth" in Algiers, and appealed for world-wide support of the Viet Cong. Tam also attended the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity meeting in Algiers in March 1964. His speech, predictably, dealt with the "certainty of final victory for the South Vietnamese people" and appealed for moral and material support.

57. One of the most active of the NFLSV posts abroad is the office in Peking, which was established in September of 1964. Its representatives have been invited to Chinese receptions for foreign dignitaries and have been increasingly successful in arranging private audiences with the stream of Afro-Asian personalities flowing through Peking. In April 1965, the NFLSV opened an office in Moscow--its seventh full-time post abroad. The Communists probably hoped that Soviet propaganda support derived from this new publicity outlet would significantly boost their cause and that the office would also open new avenues for NFLSV contact with the non-Communist world. Later in 1965 the NFLSV secured agreements from Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary for the establishment of permanent offices in their capitals. Thus far, however, only the post in Hungary has been filled. An office in North Korea was opened and staffed in early 1966.
Recent Activities Abroad

58. During the past two years, the Vietnamese Communists have concentrated mainly on pumping up NFLSV relations with Cambodia. They have tried to elicit statements and actions by the Sihanouk regime supporting the Front's claim to be the "legitimate" representative of the South Vietnamese people. With the active backing of the North Vietnamese, Front representatives have had several sessions with Cambodian officials to discuss a formal treaty defining and guaranteeing the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Although the negotiations have as yet failed to produce an agreement, Sihanouk's publicly demonstrated willingness to engage in treaty discussions with the NFLSV is a decided plus for the Communists. Sihanouk has also insisted that the NFLSV should represent South Vietnam in any international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality.

Recognition Strategy

59. With the initiation of the US air strikes in 1965, Hanoi and the NFLSV began to put greater emphasis on their long-standing demand that any settlement of the war in South Vietnam be "in accordance" with the Front program. In a major policy statement of 22 March 1965, the Front asserted for the first time that it must have the "decisive voice in any negotiations to end the Vietnamese war."

60. In apparent support of such assertions, the NFLSV and the DRV suddenly increased their propaganda claims concerning the size of the "liberated areas" under front control in South Vietnam. Throughout 1964, the Front's standard claim was that it controlled about two thirds of the territory and about half of the population in the South. Beginning in 1965, however, the claim was expanded to four fifths of the territory and almost 75 percent of the population.
61. The long-standing allegation by the Front that it is the "genuine" or "legitimate" representative of the South Vietnamese people was also given greater emphasis in 1965. In the 22 March statement, the Front proclaimed itself the "only" legitimate representative. At about the same time, propaganda from Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow began to give greater play to NFLSV claims of legitimacy, identifying the Front in some cases as the only "legal" agent of the people in the South. This line, intended as a counterpoint to the slipping prestige of the Saigon regime, also appeared to reflect a Vietnamese Communist estimate that Saigon and the United States could eventually be brought around to deal directly with the Front as an independent political entity, thus strengthening the Communist position in any war settlement.

62. The Vietnamese Communists appear to believe that it is no longer possible to force a bilateral settlement of the war on a weakened Saigon government. They have probably concluded that, because of the direct and growing US participation in the conflict, an end to the fighting can be obtained now only in a mulitiilateral, internationalized arrangement of the type that ended the Indochina War in 1954. In the course of such a settlement, the Communists realize that a strong image of NFLSV prestige and physical control in South Vietnam will be extremely important. It will not only help undermine the standing of the Saigon authorities, but will also assist the Communists in gaining an effective position in any postwar political establishment in South Vietnam.

Additional NFLSV Goals

63. US and South Vietnamese agreement to deal directly with the Front and to treat it as a "partner" in settling the war would by no means guarantee that the Communists would move quickly toward a political settlement of the conflict. If the US and Saigon recognized the independent status of the Front while the Communists retained the military initiative in South Vietnam, Hanoi and the Viet Cong would certainly take it as a sign of weakness and probably would hold out for additional concessions before acquiescing to any meaningful discussions on the conflict.
64. Beyond broad statements of Front policy such as the intent to form a "national, coalition government" and to move toward "reunification" with North Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists have been very vague concerning specific NFLSV goals when the fighting ends. An intent to leave considerable maneuvering room seems to lie behind the basic Vietnamese Communist line that any settlement of the war must be in "accordance" with the NFLSV program.

65. It is probable, however, that at a minimum the Communists would seek to gain the key defense, foreign policy, information, and economic offices in any coalition government so that they could make a quick move toward implementing such policies as land redistribution and socialization of industry. The Front's secretary general, Huynh Tan Phat, reportedly told a Western newsman that a "socialist economy" would be developed in the South after the war at the same time as the war devastation was being repaired. Possession of the key offices in a coalition government would enable the Communists, operating through the Front, to stifle quickly any opposition to a full and open Communist take-over. The Communists sought these offices during the political settlement in Laos in 1962, under which a coalition government was set up.

Forming a Provisional Government

66. The best evidence, perhaps, of the relative weakness of the Front as a political force in South Vietnam is its failure to establish a provisional national government. While both North Vietnamese and Front officials have hinted on several occasions in the past year that such a move was in process, such an action would pose formidable problems for the Communists and actually further expose the lack of public support for the Front. It would almost certainly alienate politically active groups in the South, such as the Buddhists, who do not entirely support the Saigon government and have political ambitions themselves. The Front would also find it difficult to establish a satisfactory seat of government in South Vietnam. The leadership of such a provisional government would have little attraction among politically
conscious elements of the population not allied with the Communists. In addition, any movement toward the opening of negotiations on the war, should the Vietnamese Communists decide to do so, might also be complicated by the establishment of a Front government.

67. Despite the weaknesses of the Front, however, there are compelling reasons for the Vietnamese Communists to continue to operate under its banner. It provides, for example, a formal medium under which all facets of the insurgent political and military activity in South Vietnam can be organized. Although it does not yet pretend to formal government on a national scale, it does establish for the Communists a needed organizational alternative to the Saigon regime. It is also useful as a platform for advertising the broad program of political and economic objectives the Communists have set forth as their alleged goals in South Vietnam.
ANNEX I:

PREFACE

The following study of the NFLSV organization attempts to identify as many of the leaders of the front as possible. Most of the affiliated associations have been identified by Radio Hanoi and the NFLSV Liberation Broadcasting Station, and others have appeared in Communist publications and documents. Many of the groups exist only on paper, and it has not been possible to identify the membership of a number of the organizations. It should be noted that some of the names may have been used without permission and that some may be totally fictitious. In many instances names are received orally and may be spelled incorrectly or rendered phonetically. The organizational listing is followed by biographic reports on as many of the officials and members as possible, arranged in alphabetical order by family name.
CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

Central Committee
Central Committee Departments

QUASI-DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION

ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS

Liberation Federation of Trade Unions
Liberation Peasants Association (Liberation Agricultural Association)
Liberation Youth Association
Liberation Women's Association
Liberation Students and Pupils Association
Liberation Writers and Artists Association
Association of Former Resistant
Patriotic and Democratic Journalists Association
South Vietnam Patriotic Buddhists Association
South Vietnam Patriotic Teachers Association
Highland Peoples Autonomy Movement
Liberation Red Cross
Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee for Solidarity with the Latin American People
Committee for Protection of World Peace
Military and Civil Medical Council
Liberation Army and Popular Armed Forces
People's Revolutionary Party
Radical Socialist Party
Democratic Party
Liberation Press Agency
Liberation Broadcasting
Association of Writers and Artists of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Area
*People's Liberation Youth Group
*Industrialists and Businessmen Against the US-Diemists
*Democratic Lawyers Association

*Membership not available

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SECRET
ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS (cont.)

* Council of Heroic Disabled Servicemen
* South Vietnam Veterans Association
* Association of the Families of Patriotic Soldiers
* Association for the Improvement of Morality (of the Hoa Hao Buddhist sect)
* Patriotic and Peace-Loving Boys and Girls Group
* Reformed Cao Dai Sect
* Group of Fighters for Peace, Reunification, and Independence of the Vietnamese Fatherland Patriotic Servicemen in the Ranks of the US-Diem Army
* Committee for the Peace and Amelioration of South Vietnam
* Association of Patriotic Teachers of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Area
* Association of Patriotic Teachers of the Western Region of South Vietnam
* Vietnamese Nationals of Chinese Origin
* Saigon-Cholon Peace Committee
* Patriotic Khmer Monks Solidarity Association
* Khmer Buddhist Research Institute of South Vietnam
* Group of Soldiers Who Have Returned to the People

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION Page I-16

BIOGRAPHIES Page I-19
NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Presidium
Chairman  *NGUYEN HUU THO
Vice Chairmen  *HUYNH TAN PHAT
                *PHUNG VAN CUNG
                *TRAN NAM TRUNG
                *VO CHI CONG
                *Y. BINH ALEO
Members  *DANG TRAN THI
                *NGUYEN HUU THE
                *NGUYEN THI DINH
                *NGUYEN VAN NGOI
                *PHAM XUAN THAI
                *THIEN HAO (Thich)
                *TRAN BACH DANG
                *TRAN BUU KIEM

Secretariat
Secretary General  *HUYNH TAN PHAT
Deputy Secretaries  *LE VAN HUAN
                     *HO THU
Members  *UNG NGOC KY
                *HO XUAN SON

Members of the Central (elected January 1964)
Committee

DUONG TRUONG THANH
*HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie
*HUNG TU, aka Hong Liep, aka Nhan Tu
*HUY SON
*HUYNH BAI
*HUYNH CUONG
*HUYNH VAN TAM
*LAM TRI CHANH
*LE THANH NAM
*LE THI RIENG

* Biographic information included.

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Members of the Central Committee (elected January 1964) (cont.)

*LE VAN THA
*MAI THE
*MAI VAN TI
*NGUYEN HOC
*NGUYEN NGOC THUONG
*NGUYEN THAN
*NGUYEN THI BINH
*NGUYEN VAN HIEU
*NGUYEN VAN TIEN
*PHAM XUAN VI
*ROCHOM BRIU
*TRAN HUU TRANG
*TRAN VAN THANH
*VO DONG GIANG
*VO VAN MON
*VU TUNG

Members of the First Central Committee (elected in 1962)

*DANG TRAN THI
*HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie
*HO THU
*HUYNH CUONG
*HUYNH DANG (1)
*HUYNH HAN PHAT
*HUYNH VAN TAN
*LAM KIEN KHANH (1)
*LE NGOC QUANG (1)
*LE THANH NAM
*LE THI DUONG (1)
*LE THI RIENG
*LE VIET HUNG (1)
*MA THE
*NGOC TU (1)
*NGUYEN CUU BIC (1)
*NGUYEN HUK THE
*NGUYEN HUI THO
*NGUYEN NGOC THUONG
*NGUYEN THACH (1)
*NGUYEN THI BINH

(1) Not currently a Central Committee Member.
Members of the First Central Committee (elected in 1962) (cont.)

*NGUYEN VAN HIEU
*NGUYEN VAN NGOI
NGUYEN VIET MAU (1)
NHU SON (1)
*PHAM XUAN THAI
PHAN TUYEN (1)
*PHUNG VAN CUNG
*ROCHOM BRIU
SON VONG (died March 1963) (1)
*THIEN HAO
*TRAN BACH DANG
*TRAN BUU KIEM
*TRAN HUU TRANG
*TRAN NAM TRUNG
*UNG NGOC KY
*VO CHI CONG
*Y BINH ALEX

Recently Identified Central Committee Members

*DANG QUANG MINH
TRAN HOAI NAM
VU NGOC HO
HUYNH THIEN TU

Central Committee Departments

MILITARY COMMITTEE

Director *Tran Nam Trung

Members Le Van Tien
Bay Quan

INFORMATION, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE

Chairman *Tran Bach Dang

Deputy Chairman Muoi Tai

EXTERNAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Chairman *Tran Buu Kiem
**DEFENSE OF BUDDHISM COMMITTEE**

**Representative** Thich Vinh

**PUBLIC HEALTH COMMISSION**

**Commissioner** *Phung Van Cung

**INSPECTORS GROUP**

**Representative** *Nguyen Van Hieu

**Quasi-Diplomatic Representation**

**ALGERIA**

*Tran Hoai Nam  
*Vo Cong Trung  
Truong Van Loc

**CHINA**

*Tran Van Thanh  
*Nguyen Minh Phuong  
Nguyen Trong Kha

**CUBA**

Hoang Bich Son  
*Ly Van Sau  
Hoang Kinh

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

*Ha Tam Lam  
*Dinh Ba Thi  
*Ma Thi Chu

**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

*Nguyen Van Hieu  
*Duong Dinh Thao  
Tran Huu Kha

**HUNGARY**

*Le Phuong

**INDONESIA**

*Le Quang Chanh  
*Huynh Van Ba

**USSR**

*Dang Quang Minh  
Nguyen Van Dong  
*Nguyen Thanh Long  
Luu Xuan Thanh  
Ngo Ton Hoan

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Quasi-Diplomatic Representation (cont.)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
*Huynh Van Nghia
*Nguyen Van Tien

HUNGARY
Dinh Ba Thi

NORTH KOREA
Vu Ngoc Ha

BULGARIA

POLAND

RUMANIA

ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS

LIBERATION FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (Formerly Liberation Labor Association (HOI LAO DONG GIAI PHONG))

Chairman
*Pham Xuan Thai, aka Xuan Thai

Vice Chairman
*Dang Tran Thi

Standing Committee
Members
*Dinh Ba Thi
*Huynh Van Tam
*Le Thanh Nam
*Nguyen Minh Phuong
*Tran Hoai Nam
*Tran Van Thanh

LIBERATION PEASANTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NONG DAN GIAI PHONG)

Chairman
*Nguyen Huu The

Member
Tu Lap

LIBERATION YOUTH ASSOCIATION (HOI THANH NIEN GIAI PHONG)

Chairman
*Tran Bach Dang

Vice Chairman
Nguyen Van Chon

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LIBERATION YOUTH ASSOCIATION (HOI THANH NIEN GIAI PHONG) (cont.)

Secretary General         Nguyen Van Yen
Deputy Secretary General   Cao Van Tai
Members                    Anh Theo
                                      Cao Van Sau
                                      Cao Xuan Bo
                                      Do Duy Lien
                                      Ho Bao Hon
                                      Ho Phong
                                      Huynh Van Tuan
                                      *Le Phuong
                                      *Le Quang Chanh
                                      Minh Tanh
                                      Nguyen Dong Ha
                                      *Nguyen Thi Binh
                                      Nguyen Van Phuc
                                      Nguyen Van Tai
                                      Nguyen Van Tan
                                      Nguyen Xuan Thuy
                                      *Thanh Hai, aka Luu Thanh Hai
                                      Tran Tiem Dung
                                      Tran Tri Dung
                                      Tran Van An
                                      Tran Van Thuan
                                      Trich Van Thanh

LIBERATION WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (HOI PHU NU GIAI PHONG)

Chairman, Standing Committee
                                   *Nguyen Thi Binh
Vice Chairmen                   *Mi Doan
                                   *Le Thi Rieng
                                   *Thanh Loan
Standing Committee Members
                                   *Nguyen Thi Thanh
                                   *Nguyen Thi Tu
                                   Phung Van Cung (Mrs.)
                                   Tran Thi Lieu

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LIBERATIONS WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (HOI, PHU, NU GIAI PHONG) (cont.)

Members
*Bui Thi Me
Buu Hoa
Do Duy Lien
Hai Lua
Ho Thi Buu, aka Ho Thi Buoi
*Ma Thi Chu
Ngoc Dung (see *Nguyen Ngoc Dung)
*Nguyen Thi Chon
Nguyen Thi Duoc, aka Nam Ly
Nguyen Thi Ha
Nguyen Thi Hoa
Nguyen Thi Sang
Thua Hoa
Tran Thi Dan
Tran Thi Dau
Tran Thi Dinh
Tran Thi My
Tran Thi Tu
Tran Thi Trung
Truong Thi Hue

LIBERATION STUDENTS AND PUPILS ASSOCIATION
(HOI LIEN HIEP SINH VIEN HOC SINH GIAI PHONG)

Chairman
*Tran Buu Kiem

Members
*Ly Van Sau
*Nguyen Ngoc Dung
*Nguyen Thi Binh
Tran Van An
Tu Le
Viet Hung

LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI VAN NGHE GIAI PHONG)

Chairman
*Tran Huu Trang

Vice Chairmen
Van Tung
Tran Hieu Minh

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LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI VAN NGHE GIAO PHONG) (cont.)

Secretary General  Ly Van Sam

Secretariat Members
Giang Nam
Pham Minh Hoa
Bui Kinh Lang

Members
Bui Xuan Lang
Ly Van Phung
Nguyen Hien
Nguyen Van Vinh
Pham Van Hoa
Phan The
*Thanh Hai
*Thanh Loan
Thanh Quy Minh
Trieu Van
Truong Binh Tong
Truong Thanh
Tung Long
Van Nam

ASSOCIATION OF FORMER RESISTANTS

Secretary General  *Tran Bach Dang

PATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION
(HOI NHIA BAO YEU NUOC VA DAN CHU)

Chairman  *Vu Tung
Vice Chairmen  *Tam Duc
*Nguyen Van Hieu
Nhi Muc

Secretary General  Thanh Nho
Deputy Secretaries
General  *Nguyen Thi Chon
*Thanh Huong

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SECRET
PATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION
(HOI NHA BAO YEU NUOC VA DAN CHU) (cont..)

Members
*Duong Dinh Thao
  Hieu Chan
  Hoang Xuan Ba
*Nguyen Thi Binh
*Nguyen Van Tai
*Rochom Thep
  Thach Thien Chi
  Tu Chung

SOUTH VIETNAM PATRIOTIC BUDDHISTS ASSOCIATION
(TRUNG UONG HOI LUC HOA)

Chairman *Thien Hao
Members *Hung Tu
  Giac Hao

SOUTH VIETNAM PATRIOTIC TEACHERS ASSOCIATION

Chairman *Le Van Huan
Vice Chairmen *Bui Thi Me
  *Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
  *Nguyen Thanh Long

Secretary General Le Thuoc

HIGHLAND PEOPLE'S AUTONOMY MOVEMENT (UY BAN
DAN TOC TU TR1 TAY NGUYEN)

Chairman *Y Binh Aleo
Vice Chairman *Mi Doan
  *Rochom Briu
  *Rochom Thep
  *Xat

Members  Ba Quan
  Rochom Ban

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LIBERATION RED CROSS (HOI HONG THAP TI GIAI PHONG)

President *Phung Van Cung
Chairman, Executive Committee *Vu Ngoc

COMMITTEE FOR AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY (UY BAN DOAN KET A PHI)

Chairman *Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
Vice Chairman *Thien Hao
Secretary General *Huynh Cuong
Members *Huynh Van Nghia
   *Huynh Van Tam
   *Le Thanh Nam
   *Ma Thi Chu
   Ngo Tan Dao
   *Nguyen Van Tien
   *Rochom Biru
   *Tran Hoai Nam

COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLE (UY BAN DOAN KET DAN TOC MY LA TIN)

Chairman *Le Van Huan
Member Chau Hoang Nam

COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF WORLD PEACE (UY BAN BAO VE HOA BINH THE GIOI)

Chairman *Phung Van Cung
Members *Ma Thi Chu
   *Ho Hue Ba

MILITARY AND CIVIL MEDICAL COUNCIL

Director *Phung Van Cung
Member *Ho Thu

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LIBERATION ARMY AND POPULAR ARMED FORCES (GIAI PHONG QUAN VAN CAC LUC LUONG VO TRANG NHAN DAN)

Deputy Commander *Nguyen Thi Dinh

Members
Sau Hoang, aka Cao Dan
Chiem, aka Dom, aka Sau Cia, aka Sau Rau
*Tran Nam Trung
Nguyen Van Luong
Nguyen Van Huu

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (DANG NHAN DAN CACH MANG VIET NAM)

Chairman
Secretary
General
Executive Committee Member
Member, Youth Group

RADICAL SOCIALIST PARTY (DANG XA HOI CAP TIEN)

Secretary General *Nguyen Van Hieu
Deputy Secretary General *Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
Member, Standing Committee *Le Van Tha

DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DANG DAN CHU)

Chairman Ngo Ngoc Sang
Secretary General *Huynh Tan Phat
Secretary *Nguyen Thanh Long

SECRET
SECRET

DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DANG DAN CHU) (cont.)

Central Committee
Members
*Duong Van Le
 Ho Kim Son
 Nguyen Van Lan
 *Tran Buu Kiem
 Tran Van Huong
 *Ung Ngoc Ky

LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY

Deputy Director Lam Thinh
Director, East German Bureau *Duong Dinh Thao

LIBERATION BROADCASTING

Director *Tam Duc
Deputy Director Thanh Khenh

ASSOCIATION OF WRITERS AND ARTISTS OF THE SAIGON-
CHOLON-GIA DINH AREA

Chairman Vo Hoai Linh, aka Hoai Linh, aka Truong Vinh Tong
Vice Chairmen Son Anh, aka Hoang Minh, aka Phong Anh
*Thanh Loan
Members Ngoc Tung
Pham Huy
Tran Chinh Truc
*Tran Huu Trang
*Tran Van Choi, aka Chin Choi, aka Tran Van Chau
Vu Hien Thinh

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