In view of the buildup in the enemy's air defense system, US losses over North Vietnam have remained surprisingly low, and the over-all ratio actually has declined as the hostilities have progressed. The lower trend in US losses has been especially apparent since the spring of 1966. A comparison of US loss ratios by year for operations over North Vietnam is given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Attack Sorties</th>
<th>Combat Losses @</th>
<th>Percent of Total Attack Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>25,040</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>82,170</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 b/</td>
<td>20,550</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Excluding operational losses due to equipment failure.


There are some indications, however, that the favorable decline in the loss ratio may be reversed if there is a major escalation in the number of US attacks against the northern areas of North Vietnam. The loss rate for the recent attacks on targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area is 3.7 percent compared with the 1967 average for all areas of about 0.25 percent. About 40 percent of US combat losses during 1967 to date were over Route Packages V and VI, although only about 9 percent of total attack sorties were flown over these areas. These route packages are defended by almost 67 percent of the enemy's inventory of 37 to 57-mm. guns and more than 90 percent of the inventory of 85 to 100-mm. guns. Furthermore, an increasing threat from SAM defenses is apparent from the following tabulation, which gives SAM missiles fired by North Vietnam per 100 attack sorties flown over Route Packages V and VI.

---
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Month</th>
<th>Attack Sorties a/</th>
<th>Missiles Fired</th>
<th>Missiles Fired Per 100 Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March-April</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-June</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-August</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September-October</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November-December</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-February</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Rounded to the nearest 10.

As shown above, in the first two months of this year, almost 35 SAM missiles were launched by the North Vietnamese for every 100 attack sorties flown over the northern route packages by US air forces. The effectiveness of the SAM response to US attacks should be increased by the recent indications that Soviet personnel have assumed more control over SAM operations.

C. Decentralization of Industry

Although North Vietnam asserted the importance of local industry and called for its continued growth long before the country was subjected to US bombing, the country's main industrial objective before 1965 was to establish a heavy industrial base consisting of large capital-intensive plants. The advent of US air strikes in 1965 forced an admitted reversal of these priorities and resulted in a renewed and sharply increased emphasis on local industry, which was to be expanded through the dispersal of industry from potential urban target areas as well as through the construction of small facilities supplied with new equipment.

Dispersal of existing facilities reportedly began early in 1965, just before the start of the Rolling Thunder program. It is estimated that most dispersal has involved those facilities -- small factories and cooperatives -- with easily moved machines and easily divisible production processes. Dispersal has
been applied both to facilities in urban areas and to those near probable targets in the rural provinces.

The extent of dispersal of even small facilities in 1965 and 1966, however, is unclear. Several conflicting reports have been received on dispersal of industry in Hanoi and Haiphong, some suggesting almost total economic dispersal of industry, others emphasizing the large numbers of facilities still operating. The mayor of Hanoi, in an interview with a Czechoslovak reporter in January 1967, said that, although several enterprises were evacuated from the city, there were still more than 200 industrial enterprises of various sizes remaining. The North Vietnamese press also has periodically criticized the slow pace of dispersal. On the other hand, there is little doubt that many small facilities have been dispersed, and the movement probably has been stepped up since the heavy raids in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong in the spring of 1967. One Czechoslovak report from Haiphong, dated 29 April, said that production in several industrial plants has been stopped and will be transferred elsewhere.

Only two large industrial facilities -- both textile plants which accounted for about 75 percent of the national weaving capacity -- are known to have been extensively dispersed. Evacuation of the Ham Rong Textile Mill probably began even before it was unintentionally damaged by an air strike in July 1965, and all spinning and weaving equipment probably was dispersed by the spring of 1966. Photography confirms the absence of equipment in a sizable area of the plant. North Vietnamese films show that the 3 March Textile Mill in Hanoi also had a large part of its capacity removed by early 1966. The Hanoi Engineering Plant is the only large plant reported to have dispersed some equipment, but this plant also has had new equipment installed at the original site.

North Vietnam's heavy industrial plants generally are not easily dispersed because of technological considerations and/or because of the size of equipment involved. Photography has even
shown recent construction activity at the 8 March Textile Mill in Hanoi, at the Hanoi Chemical Fertilizer Plant, and adjacent to the Hanoi Engineering Plant. This activity remains unexplained and conceivably is not associated with industrial expansion. The psychological effects of the recent strikes near urban areas cannot be discounted, however, and a determined effort may be under way or in planning to disperse parts of heavy industrial plants -- perhaps machine shops from the large engineering plants and batch operations at the large chemical plants -- which may not have been affected heretofore. Nevertheless, such industrial processes as the blast furnace operations at Thai Nguyen, chlorine production at Viet Tai, and the kiln operations at the Hai Phong Cement Plant still would not lend themselves to dispersal.

Little is known about the locations to which the evacuated equipment is taken. Most North Vietnamese commentary refers to movement to the "countryside." On return to Hanoi at night of many occasions, the city suggests that the facilities dispersed from the city may not have been moved very far. And, certainly, however, have been moved to the north or a northwest, reportedly to take advantage of the peace potential presented by the presence of numerous small streams. This movement and the patterns in North Vietnam's longstanding interest in self-sufficiency in cultivating the land is the background for the suggestions made by all relevant agencies of the city.

Little information has been released concerning the extent to which equipment from the Hai Phong Textile Mill and from the Hanoi Chemical Plant has been moved to the countryside. The primary concern is to move the significant quantities of equipment from the interior into the outer reaches of the country to the extent possible to provide maximum protection against air attack.

The de-centralization program probably has been successful from North Vietnam's stand-

point. Efficiency of production and more production per equipment has been lost in the evacuation process, as well as in the installation of equipment in less than ideal circumstances. Probably more important, though, has been the accelerated establishment of new machinery and repair shops, new food-grain seed facilities, new irrigation fa-

-48-
the economy of the rural areas without detracting from the economy elsewhere.

D. Countermeasures on Lines of Communication (LOC's)

1. Construction and Repair Activity

The main effect of the Rolling Thunder program against lines of communication in North Vietnam has been a strenuous and successful effort by the North Vietnamese to keep all important transportation routes open to traffic. Besides diversifying the means of transport to include greater use of inland waterways and porter trails, the North Vietnamese have constructed multiple bypasses at road and railroad bridges on all important stream crossings, built alternate roads, and upgraded the rural road system to provide alternatives to heavily bombed routes. The program of countermeasures has had equal priority on LOC's in North Vietnam and the Laos Panhandle and has been accomplished at relatively low cost because of a willingness and ability to use primitive methods and materials. The net effect in terms of logistic supply capability has been to make North Vietnamese transport more flexible than before the bombing by offering more choices of possible crossings and routes by which to supply the Communist war effort in South Vietnam. Added routes, moreover, further reduce a rather low average daily tonnage requirement per LOC.

The success of the North Vietnamese in outpacing the damage inflicted on LOC's by air strikes can be measured by the change in the number of bypasses built over stream crossings. A comparison of the period from the start of the bombing through September 1966 with the period from October 1966 through April 1967 shows that the average number of separate bypasses for damaged bridges increased from 0.98 to 1.15 per highway bridge and from 0.51 to 0.86 per

Bypasses include temporary bridges, fords/culverts, ferries, and pontoon and cable bridges.
railroad and combination railroad/highway bridge. In addition, the Communists are in a less vulnerable position because they have had time to put in alternative crossings even at points not yet struck. In addition to the construction of bypasses, the North Vietnamese often repair the original bridge if the damage is not too extensive.

Greater speed in repairs during 1966-67 can be directly attributed to an extensive development of bypasses and to a variety of deception techniques. To augment traditional bypasses such as fords, ferries, and timber bridges, more use was observed in 1966 of prefabricated movable spans, steel cable bridges, and camouflag. The use of a variety of multiple stream crossings suggests that the only effective way for air strikes to render a crossing unserviceable is to destroy the original bridge and all bypasses simultaneously—a very difficult and costly tactic.

A slightly different but equally effective pattern of countermeasures emerges in the Laos Panhandle where an interdicted bridge or ford is usually bypassed by a construction of a short road around the entire chokepoint. Crossings that have been repeatedly bombed take on a cobweb pattern of bypass roads, of which one is serviceable most of the time.

New road construction and the upgrading of rural roads and trails also provides the North Vietnamese with additional supply routes to counteract the effects of the bombings and reduce the tonnage per road. In North Vietnam during 1966, a system of alternative roads was built to bypass the main coastal route 1A between Thanh Hoa and Quang Khe, while a new border crossing road into Laos was built as a supplement to route 15 through Mu Gia Pass. The pattern of road construction in the Laos Panhandle during the 1967 dry season has emphasized many short bypasses around heavily interdicted points on the existing road system that was so greatly expanded during 1966. The extension of route 922 east into the A Shau Valley of South Vietnam has been the most strategically important new road built thus far in 1967 and the first time
The Ho Chi Minh Trail has been made into a motorable road across the border into South Vietnam.

3. The Effectiveness of Bombing Bridges

The bombing of bridges in North Vietnam has been unsuccessful in reducing the flow of men and material toward South Vietnam. Moreover, bridge targets have been very costly in terms of planes lost and have been effectively and quickly bypassed when they were destroyed.

A sample of 49 ICB-numbered bridges has been analyzed in detail to determine the effectiveness of bombing bridges in North Vietnam as a tactic to interdict traffic. Since the start of the Rolling Thunder program in February 1965, the US and the South Vietnamese have bombed 44 out of a total of 41,000 bridges in North Vietnam. During the numerous strikes and restrikes against these bridges, at least 15 planes were lost.

The North Vietnamese have been able to offset the effects of bomb damage to bridges by
constructing multiple bypasses for every chokepoint bridge in the country. They have been able to build 96 separate bypasses for 45 JCS bridges within the immediate vicinity of the 45-JCS-targeted bridges or an average of slightly more than two bypasses per bridge. A single bridge is a very difficult target to destroy by aerial bombardment, and construction of multiple bypasses at a crossing site further reduces the probability of effectively interdicting a LOC. The following tabulation shows a breakdown of the North Vietnamese countermeasures used to bypass 45 JCS bridges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Bypass</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternative bridges</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontoon bridges</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable bridges</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferries</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fords</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The construction of multiple bypasses, in addition to ensuring a flow of traffic for the North Vietnamese, greatly increases the cost of the bombing program to the US. In general it takes as many sorties and as much ordnance to interdict bypasses as to interdict the original bridge.\[1\] The

\[1\] It is assumed, for example, that 11 tons of supplies each day are moving over a LOC containing one bridge, past performance suggests that one hit on the bridge will be scored and traffic interdicted if 17 bombs are dropped. The average ordnance load carried by aircraft over North Vietnam is just under two tons. If the load consists of 100-pound bombs, it takes approximately six sorties to interdict a bridge. To interrupt the same 11 tons of traffic which can be handled by three possible crossings -- the original bridge or each of two separate bypasses -- 171 bombs in the 100-pound class must be expended and 11 sorties flown.
cost to the US of bombing, therefore, increases at a much more rapid rate than the cost to the North Vietnamese because the majority of the bypasses are low-cost expedients which can be repaired rapidly.

E. Contingency Planning

Along with reacting to existing bomb damage, the North Vietnamese have, since the inception of the bombing, developed contingency plans -- countermeasures taken before bombing occurs -- to cope with escalation and shifts in emphasis of the Rolling Thunder program. These contingency plans are difficult to separate from other reactions to existing bomb damage, and thus often not easily recognizable. In addition, contingency plans and countermeasures to existing bomb damage must compete for the same scarce resources.

The nearly complete civil defense evacuation system in Hanoi and Haiphong and the elaborate system of bridge bypasses are examples of ambitious contingency planning. A civil defense shelter program is nearly complete in Hanoi, despite the capital's relative immunity from air attack. In addition, a full half of the populations of Hanoi and Haiphong are believed to have been evacuated. A number of unstruck North Vietnamese bridges have highway and rail bypasses already in place in anticipation of future possible strikes. Before the Hanoi Highway and Rail Bridge over the Canal des Rapides (JCS 11) was struck in late April, piers for a bypass span had been in place for a number of months, and bridge decking was stored on the river bank. A 7.1-mile rail bypass and rail ferry skirts the unstruck Hanoi "Doumer" Bridge (JCS 12).

Despite an ability to transport an adequate level of supplies to the South with its existing although constantly attacked transportation network, North Vietnam has continued to expand the capacity of the network. For example, the Dong Danh Rail Line has been dual gauged and extended from Kep to Thai Nguyen. An alternative road network to Route 1A is nearing completion south from Thanh Hiea. Presumably Hanoi is preparing for the contingency that the US will greatly escalate the LOC campaign or mine Haiphong harbor, necessitating the use of this extra capacity.
In other areas, Hanoi's contingency plans have been less ambitious because of the strain placed on resource availability by countermeasures to existing bomb damage. Although small portable diesel electric power generators were received from the USSR in small numbers during 1964 (27 in 1964), purchases did not pick up to their present high rate until the US had begun attacking thermal powerplants in the southern route packages in mid-1965. Although partial dispersal of several textile mills and some handicraft industry took place in 1965, other major, unstruck plants appear to be in full operation despite their vulnerability.

Some dike and road interdiction contingency plans appear to have been put into operation. Steel mesh for repairing breaches has been reported in storage along dikes. Piles of stone and earth have been observed along roadsides; local village "volunteer" crews are ready to fill crater holes.

F. Imports and Foreign Aid as Countermeasures

1. Economic Aid

The sharp and continuing rise in economic aid to North Vietnam in the form of imports from the other Communist countries has been an important countermeasure to the bombing effort in North Vietnam. This aid has risen from an annual average of $50 million to $75 million for 1955-64 to an estimated $150 million in 1965 and $275 million in 1966, and it seems to be increasing again in 1967. Most of the aid extended through 1964 was for North Vietnam's economic development program. The more recent aid agreements make it clear that the Communist countries have implicitly guaranteed to finance the economic losses incurred by North Vietnam in its war effort. An unconfirmed report following the Warsaw Pact meeting in November 1966 stating that the Pact countries had pledged $1 billion to support Hanoi's war effort seems an indication of the effort that the Communist countries seem willing to make.

The value of this aid can be seen principally in the rise in imports in 1965 and 1966,
particularly the rise in imports of those goods supporting the war effort.

The Communist countries have provided substantial quantities of equipment for transportation, construction, power, communications, and maintenance programs. Furthermore, machinery and equipment apparently have been made available for both new and continuing aid projects which are not military associated, although this category of aid goods seemed to decline in 1966, and seems likely to decline even further in 1967.

There have been sharp increases in imports of machinery and equipment -- machine building shops, repair shops, small manufacturing enterprises, vehicles (road, rail, and water), heavy transport and roadbuilding equipment, machine tools, small diesel generators, and volumes of spare parts -- all related to the repair and replacement of parts in the transportation and power sectors of the economy and to repair and reconstruction programs. The power sector is particularly dependent on diesel generators because the regular electric power industry has been so heavily damaged by the bombing and because of the decentralization of industry. Telecommunications imports are another valuable but small-volume category, with most military communications equipment supplied by Communist China, probably by rail.

Petroleum products are an extremely large volume import -- imports by sea increased to 200,000 tons in 1966 compared with 170,000 tons in 1965. Early 1967 reports show another large increase. Petroleum imports are essential to the transportation, construction, and power sectors of the economy, particularly to the power sector since it has become so dependent on diesel generators.

Almost all iron and steel products must be imported because North Vietnam makes no steel, although it does produce pig iron at the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex. Products related to the war effort, such as barges, jet storage tanks, pontoons, building members, possibly bridge trusses, and other structured shapes, are fabricated at Thai Nguyen and
possibly at other locations. Most of these metal products come from the USSR and Japan by ship, although Communist China probably ships some steel products by rail. Imports of these metals by sea during 1966 were double the volume in 1965.

Bulk foodstuffs imported by sea have increased sharply in late 1966 and early 1967. This increase parallels the reports of losses of rice production in North Vietnam in 1966, and it may also reflect internal distribution problems. Food imports could become important if the seeming food shortage worsens. Another factor in the food supply has been the large and increasing imports of fertilizers. Maintenance of the food supply may be more difficult if the fertilizers are not received and distributed properly.

The relative backwardness of North Vietnam's economy, however, makes it less vulnerable than its dependence on imports might suggest. The economy of North Vietnam is still basically one of subsistence agriculture, with an essential self-sufficiency in food, although continuation of the shortages reported in late 1966 would bring about a critical situation if imports are cut off. Denial of imports to North Vietnam otherwise would have minimal effect on the nonindustrial economic organization generally. Even the loss of transport equipment could be compensated for in the domestic economy by the extensive use of manpower for the transportation of necessary goods.

2. Military Aid

In addition to increasing their deliveries of economic goods, the USSR and Communist China responded to the Rolling Thunder program by increasing sharply the levels of military assistance, as shown in the following tabulation:

-56-
Deliveries of military equipment, which previously had been on a very small scale, reached an estimated $245 million in 1965 and $445 million in 1966. Deliveries in the first quarter of 1967 have been at a slightly higher rate than that observed during 1966, and may increase even more during the remainder of 1967.

Chinese military aid programs follow well-established lines which reflect the capabilities of the donors. The USSR has provided heavier and more advanced equipment such as antiaircraft guns, radar, tanks, artillery, SAM systems, and most of the advanced fighter aircraft. The Chinese have been the major suppliers of trucks, small arms ammunition, and equipment for ground forces. A breakdown of the major items of Soviet and Chinese deliveries of military equipment is shown in Table 5 and 6.

In addition to deliveries of military equipment, the USSR and Communist China have provided military advisers and technicians to North Vietnam. The Chinese contribution in this area is far greater than that of the USSR. At the end of 1966 an estimated 25,000 to 45,000 Chinese support troops were in North Vietnam working on the construction, repair, and defense of transportation infrastructure.
facilities. In contrast, the number of Soviet military technicians was between 2,500 and 3,000 during 1965 and currently is estimated at from 1,000 to 1,500.
A. The Success to Date

The objectives of the bombing program are stated currently to be two-fold:

1. To limit or raise the cost of sending men and supplies to South Vietnam.

2. To make North Vietnam pay a price for its aggression against the South.

To the extent that any degradation of enemy capabilities or any penalties imposed on his aggressive conduct in South Vietnam are indicative of successful achievement of US objectives, the US bombing program must be judged to be meeting with some success. But the degree of success is limited. The bombing program has undoubtedly raised the cost and increased the burdens of maintaining the aggression in South Vietnam. These exactions appear to be within acceptable limits to the Hanoi regime. Given a continuing flow of economic and military aid from Communist China and the USSR, North Vietnam remains capable of maintaining and supplying its forces in South Vietnam at both present and higher levels of combat. The price of its aggression, with the exception of manpower losses, is being assumed by its Communist allies.

Despite the increased weight and broadening of the air attack, North Vietnam has increased its support of the insurgency in South Vietnam. There was a three-fold increase in the level of personnel infiltration in 1966 and additional thousands of troops have been positioned in and around the DMZ. The flow of material supplies to the VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam during the current dry season is at least equal to and may well exceed the volume made available last year.

The North Vietnamese economy has suffered increasing damage, but this has had no decisive effect on the attitude of the regime toward the war, nor has it caused a deterioration of popular morale.
to the point where the regime has lost the support of its people. The performance of the domestic transportation system exceeds that achieved before the Rolling Thunder program; imports both by sea and by rail have moved to increasingly high levels. Deficiencies in domestic food supply are being met by the USSR and Communist China and food shortages have not attained serious proportions. The vital petroleum storage system, as currently dispersed, has survived the destruction of more than 85 percent of its major bulk storage capacities, and petroleum stocks have been maintained at essentially early 1966 levels. The neutralization of 70 percent of the country's electric power generating capacity has created severe shortages of power and disrupted much of North Vietnam's modern industrial economy. It is unlikely, however, that the loss of electric power can have a significant impact on military operations.

B. Outlook

The outlook for marked success in achieving the current objectives of US bombing programs is not bright. The US bombing program had by the end of April attacked 173 targets or more than 70 percent of the targets on the JCS list. About 20 of these targets received only minor damage, so that their pre-strike capacity is relatively intact. These targets and the 69 unstruck targets are grouped, by category, as follows:
In addition, there are seven non-targeted industrial facilities that are significant to the North Vietnamese economy and its war-supporting activities.

The returns that can be realistically expected from the neutralization of the remaining economic, military, and land transport JCS targets is small. The two most promising target systems -- locks and mineable areas -- have been unacceptable to date on human grounds or because of the political problems their neutralization would create. The enemy's success in countering attacks on bridges and in sustaining traffic movement is too well cataloged to warrant further discussion. Attacks on military installations would have only limited effects. Many of these facilities are inactive, and contingency plans to counter their loss are undoubtedly well developed. Even if North Vietnam were denied complete access to its airfields, this alone would be unlikely to significantly alter the regime's attitude toward the war since it would have only a marginal effect, through increasing costs, on the flow of men and supplies to the South.
The neutralization of North Vietnam's remaining industry would extract a high price in terms of the elimination of the results of years of economic development, loss of foreign exchange earnings, and the displacement of the urban labor force, and would add to the burden of aid from other Communist countries. There is no apparent reason why such losses would force Hanoi to the negotiating table. The loss of its modern industrial sector is apparently a tolerable burden in a country that has an overwhelmingly agrarian economy. The contribution of North Vietnam's modern economy to the war effort is small and its loss can be countered as long as essential economic and military supplies can be obtained from the USSR and China.

The greatest possible impact on Hanoi would result from a US strike program which would include mining the major ports and inland waterways, to which the remaining JCS transport targets, other than the locks, would make a useful addition. It has previously been estimated that such a program would be a matter of serious concern to the Hanoi leadership. Some import programs would have to be forgone and problems of supply and distribution would be acute. However, even this program's successful execution would be unlikely to dampen down the continued movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam to the South.

C. Costs to the US

The US would probably pay increasing costs -- both political and military -- in choosing any of the available options for escalation of the air war. The political costs in terms of both domestic US and international reactions would vary with the options chosen. US aircraft losses on the recent strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area have been at a rate of more than ten times those experienced during the 1966 campaign and in attacks on more isolated targets during 1967. The preponderance of the targets yet unstruck or warranting restrike are in the more heavily defended areas of North Vietnam. Almost 90 percent -- 86 targets -- are in Route Packages 4, 5, and 6. Of these, eight are in Route Package 5, 69 are in Route Package 6, which includes Hanoi and Haiphong, and nine targets are in the buffer zone along the Chinese-North Vietnamese border.
VI

The Pacification Program
THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM

Summary

The magnitude of the task ahead -- and the extent of progress to date -- is reflected in statistics derived from the new Hamlet Evaluation system implemented in January. Tentative results of this new system reveal that of 12,000 hamlets in South Vietnam, roughly one-third are controlled by the Viet Cong, and government influence is marginal to negligible in another third. Real progress toward pacification and nation-building goals exists in only 14 percent of the hamlets, and only fair progress is reflected in another 25 percent. These figures include about 500 hamlets added to the "secure" category last year. About 1,100 hamlets are scheduled for development by RD teams this year, and a few hundred others may have their status improved through ad hoc local arrangements. The 500 RD and Montagnard teams now deployed in the field have been directed to take a more methodical, deliberate approach to their task this year in order to avoid some of the shortcomings of last year's over-hasty operations.

Even these modest goals for 1967 may represent an overextension of available resources in the face of Viet Cong counterpressure. The Communists have reinforced their guerrilla potential in rural areas, and are mounting an intensive attack on RD teams and administrative and population centers in the countryside. On the whole, the teams have held up fairly well, although replacing their heavy losses will impose a drain on the planned output of new teams from the training center at Vung Tau.

The Viet Cong campaign has revealed serious weaknesses in the security of pacified areas. Although more than 50 ARVN battalions have been committed to direct support of pacification, their
performance has been spotty, and they have not been able to check the Viet Cong guerrilla campaign. Only one-third of the Popular and Regional Forces are committed to direct support of pacification, and their efforts have not been effectively coordinated with RD activities; our Mission is reviewing local arrangements to improve this situation. The National Police generally lack the strength to carry out effective countersubversion activities in the villages and hamlets, and the Police Field Force is generally being misused in static security functions rather than in direct support of RD as reflected in the enemy's counterthrust.

In sum, little progress has been made so far this year and prospects for significant improvement in the near term future are very bright. If the Vietnamese Armed Forces can be effectively directed to provide requisite local security, however, the longer term prospects will be favorable.
Present Status

1. Little progress has been made in pacification so far this year, and prospects for significant improvement in the near-term future are not very bright. Planning delays, conceptual changes, new command, administrative and procedural arrangements, and preoccupation of GVN officials with other tasks have inhibited progress. Moreover, the intensive Viet Cong campaign of guerrilla pressure since the first of the year has set back the program in some provinces, and has revealed generally inadequate security arrangements elsewhere. There have been improvements in terms of bureaucratic streamlining (particularly on the US side), and an ever-broadening understanding of the importance of the program and its concepts and techniques. But at best we are still laying the basis for an effective program which -- even with a respite from Viet Cong pressure -- offers only limited prospects for attaining real momentum before the end of the year. If the RNAP can be effectively geared to provide the requisite security, however, the conceptual base and organizational tools which have been evolved will enable us to gain momentum over the long term.

Nature of the Problem

2. By its very nature, pacification is a very complex, slow-moving program -- one in which history has amply demonstrated that haste most decidedly leads to waste. The fundamental aim is political: aligning the people against the Viet Cong and en-gaging them in support of the government. To achieve this aim requires close integration of a wide variety of political, psychological, economic, social, military and paramilitary programs conducted jointly by a number of GVN and US agencies. The effective meshing of such programs would sorely tax the most efficient of organizations, requiring as it does the comprehension of sophisticated concepts and a universal sense of cooperation, confidence, and dedication. The operational milieu
of Vietnam has thus far offered few of these attributes.

3. Pacification involves a contest between the opposing political mechanisms of the Viet Cong and the GVN, each supported by military and paramilitary forces whose function is to protect and support their respective political structure while destroying that of the opposition. The security problem for the GVN is compounded by the essentially clandestine and subversive character of the Viet Cong's mechanism -- the Communist party apparatus -- and its reliance on terrorism. The Communist apparatus, including its guerrilla and local force support elements, is flexible and mobile. It evades military operations by refusing battle and dispersing or temporarily going underground; it presents few fixed targets. The government's political apparatus and its support elements, on the other hand, operate overtly with fixed facilities. It is by nature less flexible and hence presents vulnerable targets. The establishment of a secure environment for the government's political mechanism -- which is a sine qua non of the pacification effort -- must therefore be addressed on two fronts: security against military attack, and security from subversion and terrorism.

Security Aspects

4. Security against local military pressure is a function of counter-force operations aimed at neutralizing or destroying those Viet Cong elements -- local force and guerrilla units -- whose primary mission is to disrupt Revolutionary Development activity and to protect the Viet Cong political apparatus. Protecting pacified areas against attack requires more than passive or "screening" action. While saturation of pacified areas by friendly patrol and ambush activities can contribute to the task, it requires a disproportionate number of security forces, and leaves the enemy free to exploit patterns of defensive activity. Only by aggressive combat action aimed at eliminating those
enemy units which pose the most direct threat can pacified areas remain secured. Destruction of the Viet Cong’s “concentrated units” operating at village and district levels will eliminate this threat, and deprive larger units of the local support they require to mount operations against the RD program.

5. Security against subversion is essentially a function of political actions aimed at aligning the people with the GVN. Military and political security are complimentary, since attainment of popular support will enhance the prospects for obtaining information on impending Viet Cong military actions. Countersubversion potential is developed through intelligence activities, including census grievance operations, police informant and agent operations, and more importantly by organizing the populace into various groups which engage in activities contributing to the self-defense of the hamlet.

Concepts

6. Current concepts for pacification are reflected in the planning documents which divide the process into three phases: the military offensive, securing (or Revolutionary Development), and development (or nation-building). In the first phase, regular military forces conduct operations to clear an area of enemy main force units larger than company in size. In the second phase Revolutionary Development teams, normally comprising 59 men, are introduced into cleared hamlets to identify and eliminate Viet Cong cadre, re-establish effective hamlet government, organize the populace for self-defense, engage in immediate impact civic action projects based on the “self-help” principle, and stimulate political support for the GVN. During this phase, Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces are expected to provide security for the teams. In the third phase, further civil programs are undertaken to improve social and economic standards in the hamlet. During this phase, responsibility for security is expected to pass to the National Police when feasible. These phases are to be carried out essentially in terms of the
"oil spot" concept, working gradually outward from secured and developed areas into insecure areas. The distinction between the second and third phases has been muted during the planning cycle for 1967, so that "developmental" or "nation-building" tasks will be undertaken more or less simultaneously with the "securing" or "Revolutionary Development" task.

7. The current program represents a substantial improvement over those in the past, drawing as it does the best features of most of them. The program enjoys unusually perceptive, dynamic and aggressive leadership on the GVN side. In the short year since he assumed responsibility for the program, General Thang has focussed on developing an awareness of the concepts by Vietnamese officials at all levels. The program has attained status and its importance is being increasingly acknowledged. Nevertheless, there are some areas for concern. The fundamental importance of the essentially political objective is not fully accepted by many responsible officials, both Vietnamese and American. Another danger is the tendency to inhibit flexibility in selecting areas for local pacification emphasis by insisting on rigid adherence to priorities established by successive layers of authority. Current priorities generally seem to be based more on exclusively strategic military considerations than on political feasibility or desirability, i.e., the political fertility of the human terrain.

GVN Weaknesses

8. The Vietnamese administrative structure has generally been very weak, especially in terms of its ability to execute programs as complex as pacification and nation-building. The entire administrative apparatus suffers from an inadequate reservoir of trained and dedicated talent. Inefficient methods have compounded the inadequacies of outmoded laws and regulations. The military establishment is only slightly less inefficient than the civil structure. Both have been submerged
under a plethora of complicated, interrelated projects with competing priorities which would tax the capabilities of a relatively efficient organization. Competing and overlapping chains of command, between and within the civil and military establishments, have further reduced efficiency. Vietnamese administration is characterized by the issuance of decrees and policies which are often ignored in the field. With the assumption of power by military officers at most echelons, lower priorities have been accorded to civil and political tasks. The entire structure is afflicted with rigidity, and is generally unresponsive to pressures from below and direction from above.

The 1967 Plan

9. The 1967 Provincial Pacification Plans reflected the weaknesses in the Vietnamese administrative and military structures. The GVN's Ministry of Revolutionary Development, which is charged with overall pacification responsibility revised, as necessary, the provincial plans emphasizing the themes "consolidation" and "quality rather than quantity" in developing the 1967 national pacification program. A major change in approach for 1967 was made when ARVN was assigned the task of neutralizing and destroying the capabilities of local Viet Cong forces to disrupt Revolutionary Development activities. Apparently recognizing the limitations of the GVN administrative and military structure the nation-building or third phase of pacification has been combined with the Revolutionary Development phase where it has been programmed, but in general in 1967 the essential nation-building activities and follow-up of Revolutionary Development are not included in the pacification plan. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development and OCO are alert to this limitation and are working with the other ministries to initiate nation-building programs through the village structure.

10. The magnitude of the task ahead -- and the extent of progress to date -- is reflected in statistics derived from the new Hamlet Evaluation system implemented in January. Tentative results of this
A new system reveals that of 12,000 hamlets in South Vietnam, roughly one third are controlled by the Viet Cong, and government influence is marginal to negligible in another third. Real progress toward pacification and nation-building goals exists in only 14 percent of the hamlets, and only fair progress is reflected in another 25 percent. These figures include about 500 hamlets added to the "secure" category last year. About 1,100 hamlets are scheduled for development by RD teams this year, and a few hundred others may have their status improved through ad hoc local arrangements. The 500 RD and Montagnard teams now deployed in the field have been directed to take a more methodical, deliberate approach to their tasks this year in order to avoid some of the shortcomings of last year's over-hasty operations.

11. Even these modest goals for 1967 may represent an overextension of available resources in the face of Viet Cong counterpressure. The Communists have reinforced their guerrilla potential in rural areas, and are mounting an intensive attack on RD teams and administrative and population centers in the countryside. On the whole, the teams have held up fairly well, although replacing their heavy losses will impose a drain on the planned output of new teams from the training center at Vung Tau. The Viet Cong campaign has revealed serious weaknesses in the security of pacified areas. Although more than 50 ARVN battalions have been committed to direct support of pacification, their performance has been spotty, and they have not been able to check the Viet Cong guerrilla campaign. Only one third of the Popular and Regional Forces are committed to direct support of pacification, and their efforts have not been effectively coordinated with RD activities; our Mission is reviewing local arrangements to improve this situation. The National Police generally lack the strength to carry out effective countersubversion activities in the villages and hamlets, and the Police Field Force is generally being misused in static security functions rather than in direct support of RD.
Prospects

12. While the short-term outlook is indeed sombre, prospects over the long-term are not so bleak. We have come a long way during the past few years in developing our understanding of the problem, and in devising the concepts, techniques and organizational tools necessary to a successful program. That our endeavors thus far have been properly oriented and successfully implemented is reflected in the intensity of the enemy's counterthrust. If the RVNAF can be effectively engaged in providing the requisite security, the other problems can be surmounted through evolution, and the prospects for long-term progress will be favorable.
North Vietnamese Intentions in Regard to the War
Summary

The Vietnamese Communist leadership clearly retains its high level of motivation and displays every intention of continuing the war. Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants are convinced that they can outlast the US in Vietnam and have programmed their tactics accordingly.

It is unlikely that the Communists will attempt to launch a direct, conventional ground attack across the Demilitarized Zone or that they will commit their assets in South Vietnam to one large campaign at any time in the near future. They are more likely to continue along basically the same lines as at present, attempting to wage a grinding war of attrition, which, they believe, will sooner or later force major concessions on the part of the US. To this end, they will probably continue to infiltrate sufficient replacement personnel to keep existing units at combat effective levels and they will also move additional units to South Vietnam as needed to counter the introduction of more allied units.

There seems little chance in the foreseeable future that Hanoi will seek the commitment of large numbers of foreign combat troops for South Vietnam. It is always possible that, for propaganda purposes, an "international brigade" will be formed and sent South but only the Chinese Communists have troops readily available in sufficient strength to pose an actual threat. Hanoi probably does not believe that foreign volunteers will be needed in South Vietnam and apparently is not convinced the Chinese Communists would make troops available to fight in South Vietnam even if they were needed.

Judging from the comments on Hanoi's military plans for the next few months made by a North Vietnamese officer who recently defected in South Vietnam,
The North Vietnamese believe that they can initiate a local offensive in the northern half of South Vietnam. Their experience over the past several years has undoubtedly confirmed their belief that the allied forces, with the men now in South Vietnam or with even a considerably expanded force, will not be able to drive the Communists from the field. They seem to believe that they can continue to fight as they have over the past several years, taking heavy casualties but inflicting increasing casualties on the US in return. Captured documents reveal that the North Vietnamese have concluded that a military stalemate will eventually result in a political victory for them because they believe the US will not be able to tolerate such a stalemate as long as they can.

The North Vietnamese, however, are unlikely to call for foreign ground troops unless a US invasion should threaten the heartland of the DRV, the Red River Delta. There is a possibility that Hanoi would ask for Chinese troops to man defensive positions in the strategic delta area if the bulk of the North Vietnamese Army had to be committed in the southern area of the DRV. On balance, however, it is more likely that Hanoi would not deplete its own forces in the delta for operations farther south. In numerous articles over the past several years, North Vietnamese military leaders have discussed the possibility of a US invasion and have laid out the general outlines of
the DRV response. The plan calls for the North Vietnamese to wage almost the same type of war that is being fought in the South, a mixture of conventional and guerrilla warfare. They believe that such tactics, together with the war in the South, would force the US to commit more men to the war than it would consider acceptable.

Should such tactics fail, the North Vietnamese leaders would undoubtedly call for the Chinese Communists to come to their aid. Despite the age-old antipathy of the Vietnamese for the Chinese, Hanoi's actions thus far in the war indicate that the present leaders would much prefer to see the Chinese enter North Vietnam in force than to suffer defeat by the US. When faced in early 1965 with the problem of whether to call for Chinese Communist help to offset US air strikes or to negotiate an end to the war as the US requested, Hanoi decided to invite the Chinese to send logistic and antiaircraft troops to North Vietnam to meet the attacks. Faced with the reality of an invasion by the US, there is little doubt that the North Vietnamese would appeal to the Chinese again.
North Vietnam: Motivation and Intentions

1. The decision as to whether or not the Vietnamese Communists will persist in the war in South Vietnam rests with the 11 men who form the politburo of the Vietnam Workers Party. The determination shown by this small group in pursuing a war that has brought great destruction to North Vietnam as well as heavy losses to the ranks of Communists and their supporters in South Vietnam stems largely from two factors.

2. One is their complete and militant dedication to the precepts of Communism, including the most doctrinaire revolutionary aspects of Communist theory. In numerous public statements, the official party journals and leading party spokesmen have made it clear that the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) rejects the Khrushchevian notion of "peaceful coexistence" as far as South Vietnam is concerned and that it opposes the "modern revisionist" advice that political methods are preferable to violent means in "wars of liberation." In the area of Communist ideology, the VWP has left no room for doubt that it is far closer in viewpoint to the philosophy of the Chinese Communists than to that of the USSR.

3. Ho Chi Minh and his top lieutenants are battle-hardened revolutionaries who fought and defeated the French. They are convinced that their success was due in large measure to the fact that they correctly interpreted and properly applied Communist ideology to the situation in Vietnam. Those men genuinely believe that the "immutable" laws of history, as interpreted by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao, have assigned them the duty--and the glory--of leading the Vietnamese people in a struggle for independence. They also see themselves as the battle front command- ers in the world-wide struggle against the "number one imperialist," the US.

4. The second chief factor influencing Hanoi's determination is a strong spirit of nationalism, which finds its expression in bitter anti-Americanism. Ho and his aides are thoroughly convinced that the US deliberately set out to undermine the 1954 Geneva agreements and the provision therein for national
elections in Vietnam in July 1956. The WP hierarchy remains convinced that had those elections been held, Vietnam today would be united under a government headed by Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Workers Party. They lay at the feet of the US the entire blame for the situation which developed after 1954, including the success of Ngo Dinh Diem in creating a viable government and particularly his increasingly effective campaign to roll up the Communist cadre left behind in the South after 1954.

5. The Vietnamese Communist leaders believe deeply that they were the victims of US duplicity in the years after 1954. They believe that they were fully justified in turning to the use of force in order to overthrow Diem and unify the country after the repeated refusal between 1954 and 1956, and even later, of Diem to respond to North Vietnamese offers to hold meetings preparatory to national elections. In their eyes, they had little choice but to take up arms once again against what they termed "My/Diem," roughly translated as "US-Diem." They do not see themselves as aggressors attempting to seize control of a neighbor nation but rather as the legitimate authorities of a national government denied control over half their country by a foreign invader. The initiation of US air strikes against North Vietnam in February 1965 and the introduction of US combat forces into South Vietnam in 1965 further inflamed the Hanoi leaders' feelings and reinforced their view that the US was bent on denying them their rightful place at the head of a unified Vietnam.

Current Attitudes

6. That the North Vietnamese leaders are still fanatically devoted to their goal is indicated by all the current evidence on the subject. Recently captured North Vietnamese soldiers from the fighting near Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province, for example, state that three additional regiments from the 325th Division have moved across the Demilitarized Zone since March. The continued dispatch by North Vietnam of combat units to South Vietnam indicates that, at least over the next few months, Hanoi intends to stay in the fight. Moreover, the
increased use in northern Laos and the DMZ of Communist mortars and artillery, coupled with plausibly reports that the Soviet Union has agreed to provide more artillery, adds further evidence of an intention to continue the fight.

5. Other similar indications include the early April trip to Moscow by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong during which he reportedly discussed additional Soviet military aid. The appearance of Chinese Communist jet fighters over northeast North Vietnam on several occasions beginning on 24 April and their efforts to engage US aircraft in that area—the first such actions since September 1966—suggest a North Vietnamese willingness to continue to rely heavily on Peking rather than Hanoi to identify.

4. The negative results of US efforts to arrange peace talks with Hanoi further indicate Hanoi's intention to keep the war going. The North Vietnamese have consistently stuck to their refusal to offer any Quit Pro Juvo in return for a cessation of the bombings. Hanoi's release on 13 March of the exchange of letters between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh was intended to suggest to the United States that the North Vietnamese regard them primarily as a tactical device to be used in conjunction with continued warfare in order to extract maximum concessions from the US. There is nothing in the documents to suggest that the North Vietnamese entertain any notion of withdrawing from South Vietnam as a result of negotiations.
9. It is, perhaps, inherent in the very fanaticism of the Vietnamese Communist leadership that they should prefer to make the war a test of wills. They are convinced that their motivation is stronger than that of the Americans. Thus, they have programmed their effort to take over South Vietnam to be a grinding war of attrition. They believe that a military stalemate in South Vietnam will suffice for their purpose, whereas, in Hanoi's assessment, the US must either win quickly or settle on terms favorable to the Communists.

10. Given this long range strategy, it appears unlikely that the North Vietnamese intend to make any dramatic military move such as an overt invasion across the DMZ in the near future. They are more likely to continue the same basic approach as in the past, infiltrating sufficient replacement personnel to keep existing units at combat level and introducing additional combat units to the South as needed to maintain or perhaps gradually exceed a relative balance with US and allied forces.

11. A North Vietnamese officer who recently defected, claims that Communist plans for the upcoming year include a major military campaign in the western highlands of Kontum and Pleiku. This is to be coordinated with two other moves in the northern half of the country. One will be a thrust in northern Quang Tri and Thua Thien and the other will be in the coastal areas of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. The North Vietnamese must realize that their successes, if any, in these campaigns will be relatively modest. They will probably be satisfied if these campaigns result in heavy US casualties, even at the cost of heavier Communist losses.

12. Captured documents, as well as articles in the press by North Vietnamese military leaders, disclose that there has been considerable concern among Vietnamese Communist leaders over the way the war in South Vietnam has been going. This concern has been manifested in a lengthy debate among the Communist military leaders over the proper military tactics to be used against US forces in South Vietnam. One group advocated a policy emphasizing large unit
offensive actions directly against US units. Another group believed that the role of guerrilla warfare was being underplayed in the South.

13. For the present, judging both from Communist action in the field and from recent articles in the DRV press, a compromise solution has been reached—although some aspects of the debate appear to be continuing—with heavier emphasis being given to the guerrillas than in the past two years but primary weight is still being given to large unit actions.

14. One of the major points of dispute within the Vietnamese Communist military establishment has been the relative number of casualties the Communists believe they can afford to take in comparison with the losses of the allies. For example, Politburo member General Nguyen Chi Thanh, chief military and political officer for Communist forces in the South, in July 1966 criticized those who claimed that the Communists needed a two to one troop superiority in order to defeat an ARVN unit and at seven or even nine to one to defeat a US unit.

15. Complicating this problem for Hanoi is the difficulty in getting accurate details of the battlefield situation in the South. Captured documents indicate that local Communist commanders report their own losses accurately. There are some indications, however, that local commanders grossly exaggerate the number of casualties their units have inflicted on US units. Hanoi has several means at hand to overcome this problem.
Foreign Volunteers for South Vietnam

16. It is unlikely that Hanoi or its National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF/SV) will at any point seek substantial help from Communist China, the Soviet Union, or the rest of the Communist bloc in the form of combat personnel for the war in South Vietnam. In part this is because the Vietnamese Communist leadership appears confident that the manpower available to them in North and South Vietnam is sufficient to carry on the war. A recently captured notebook contained what appears to be notes from a lecture to Communist cadres in the South on Hanoi's "12th Central Committee resolution" on war policy. According to these notes, the Communist High Command anticipates that the US may raise its force level in South Vietnam to one or one-and-a-half million men. The Communists are confident that they can defeat even that large a force, according to the notebook, and no mention was made of foreign volunteers.

17. In part, Hanoi's attitude probably stems from a realization that no significant foreign ground combat force is likely to be made available for fighting in South Vietnam. Although there is always a possibility that at some point an international brigade type of volunteer unit will appear in South Vietnam at the behest of the NLF/SV, such a unit would be primarily for propaganda rather than combat purposes.

18. Certainly Hanoi is under no illusions that the Soviet Union or any Eastern European country is going to send substantial ground forces to South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese also appear to believe that there is little prospect of significant Chinese Communist intervention in South Vietnam. A captured document containing an analysis of the war by party first secretary Le Duan pointed out that "South Vietnam's resources in manpower and material is in the north." Le Duan went on to state that it is possible the US will attempt to move into Laos in order to cut off the supply lines from the north to the south. He asserted that in such an event "the US troops would have to clash with the North Vietnamese main force."
In neither case did Le Duan suggest that foreign troops would enter the fight.

19. Le Duan also stated his belief that the US had been encouraged in sending troops to South Vietnam by the fact that a situation existed in which "our camp's unity was seriously impaired," and therefore the US would not become "involved in a major war" encompassing the entire socialist bloc.

20. Another captured notebook, containing excerpts from a lecture by a Communist official named Vinh*, asserted that the Chinese would enter the combat "if the war is expanded to North Vietnam," implying that China will not enter as long as the war is confined to the South. Thus, it is clear the leadership did not want to raise any hopes that the Chinese would step in to save the day for the Vietnamese in South Vietnam.

21. Hanoi's handling of the subject of foreign volunteers in its propaganda also suggests that it does not intend to raise any hopes among Viet Cong supporters in the South of massive Chinese intervention on their behalf. On 22 March 1965, the Central Committee of the NLF issued a statement containing a warning that it would call for foreign volunteers if the US and its allies continued to send troops to South Vietnam and continued "to expand the war to the North and Laos." When Hanoi rebroadcast this NLF statement, however, it added the caveat, "when needed." From then on, both the NLF and Hanoi inserted that or a similar caveat whenever referring to the possibility of foreign volunteers.

22. Moreover, after the summer of 1965, Hanoi appears to have attempted to lump the threat of foreign volunteers for South Vietnam together with the possibility of volunteers for the North. Hanoi spokesmen and news media now use such terms as "the Vietnamese people" will call for foreign volunteers "when needed," thus blurring the issue as to which half of Vietnam these volunteers would be sent. At no time have Vietnamese Communist spokesmen specified any point at which foreign combat personnel would be

*Possibly Reunification Committee chairman General Nguyen Van Vinh, although the evidence on Vinh's identity is inconclusive.
requested. If all available evidence suggests that Hanoi does not expect that point ever to be reached.

21. Even in the event that Communist main forces in South Vietnam were defeated and the guerrillas and political infrastructure destroyed, it is unlikely that Hanoi would call for Chinese Communist assistance in the form of combat personnel for the South. This is due, if for no other reason, to the fact that Hanoi undoubtedly understands that Peking would not respond favorably to such a request. Lin Piao's famous September 1965 treatise, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," stated in unmistakable terms the Chinese position that oppressed peoples must wage War of Liberation—and Vietnam was held up as the prime example of such a war—largely with their own resources. Le Duan's letter, mentioned earlier, stated that one of the chief requirements facing the communists is to "persuade the socialist bloc to be also resolute like us to foil the US aggression in the South," suggesting that Le Duan thought the rest of the bloc was not providing as much assistance as it might.

Foreign Combat Personnel for North Vietnam
10. If US air strikes continue to hit key targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, the North Vietnamese can be expected to request an additional commitment from their allies for air defense. This could include an appeal for Soviet and East European “volunteer” pilots, regular Soviet SAM units, a Cuban jet pilot contingent and Chinese Communist jet intercepter units as well as additional Chinese AAA.

11. There is little likelihood that US air strikes will bring the Hanoi regime to such straits that it will request the introduction of Chinese Communist ground combat forces into the war. The North Vietnamese have made extensive preparations for the evacuation of their government offices from
Hanoi and have already begun to disperse some offices to the countryside. Even under the heaviest bombing attack, the regime could probably continue to function well enough to continue to support and direct the war in South Vietnam. After more than two years of intensive bombing, the North Vietnamese are still capable of moving substantial quantities of goods and men to South Vietnam and there is little reason to believe that this capability will diminish enough as the result of air strikes to end the war. Moreover, captured documents such as the notebooks mentioned above, state Hanoi’s intention to confine the war to South Vietnam. Le Duan particularly dwelt on this aspect, calling it a duty of the Vietnamese Communists to contain the conflict within that area.

32. North Vietnam probably would not rule out a call for foreign ground force help (in practice this would have to be primarily Chinese) in the event of an invasion of its territory by US ground forces. The aforementioned lecture by Vinh to Communist cadre in South Vietnam stated flatly that the Chinese Communists will enter the war if it is extended to North Vietnam. It should also be recalled that in 1965 Hanoi was faced with the decision of whether to ask for Chinese help, including the presence of large numbers of Chinese personnel, to cope with the effects of US air strikes. At that time, despite its ingrained antipathy to having large numbers of Chinese in their country, the North Vietnamese decided to invite in the Chinese. Faced with the even greater threat posed by a US invasion, it is likely that Hanoi will take the necessary step of inviting further Chinese presence. It is possible that Hanoi would call for Chinese troops to replace North Vietnamese forces sent to counter a US invasion of the southern DRV but it is more likely that Hanoi would wait until it determined whether the US forces intended to remain near the DMZ or whether they intended to move farther north. Hanoi would also wait until it made certain its own forces could not contain the US troops before calling in the Chinese.

33. Hanoi might also call for volunteers from other countries but only the Chinese could offer an

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*See note on paragraph 28.
effective ground combat force. Any Communist ground force operating in North Vietnam would be almost totally dependent on supplies coming through China.

34. In the event of a US invasion of North Vietnam, Hanoi could decide to opt for negotiations as proposed by the US. It is more likely, however, as long as Hanoi is convinced it can rely on the Chinese for support, ultimately including the commitment of ground troops, that the North Vietnamese would continue to fight. A number of articles written over the past several years by top-level North Vietnamese military leaders have addressed the question of how North Vietnam would handle an invasion by the US. They all indicate an intention to fight rather than negotiate in such an event. According to these articles, the North Vietnamese intend to use tactics similar to those used in South Vietnam.

35. Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap in an article published on 22 December 1964 stated that "if the enemy wages an aggressive war against North Vietnam...standardized warfare and guerrilla warfare will be simultaneously used in the war launched by our people to protect the fatherland." The deputy chief of the North Vietnamese Army's General Staff, Hoang Van Thai, wrote in December 1964 that "in case of war in North Vietnam," both "conventional and guerrilla warfare will be used." These and other such articles also stress the fact that Hanoi will wage a "protracted war" in its own defense, just as in South Vietnam. Other more recent articles by leading North Vietnamese echo this theme. They all reflect a determination on the part of the North Vietnamese leadership to fight such an invasion and the tactics they say will be used suggest that they believe, in combination with the war in South Vietnam, they can effectively wear down the US as they did the French.