VIII

The Effect of the Bombing on North Vietnamese Thinking
THE EFFECT OF THE BOMBING ON NORTH VIETNAMESE THINKING

Summary

Twenty-seven months of US bombing of North Vietnam have had remarkably little effect on Hanoi's over-all strategy in prosecuting the war, on its confident view of long-term Communist prospects, and on its political tactics regarding negotiations. The growing pressure of US air operations has not shaken the North Vietnamese leaders' conviction that they can withstand the bombing and outlast the US and South Vietnam in a protracted war of attrition. Nor has it caused them to waver in their belief that the outcome of this test of will and endurance will be determined primarily by the course of the conflict on the ground in the South, not by the air war in the North.
Hanoi's View of US Aims

1. The reaction of the Hanoi leaders to the bombing cannot be separated from the broader question of their assessment of US objectives in this conflict. Their determination to endure and defy the air attacks has been reinforced by their conviction that the US is seeking a clear military victory involving the destruction of Viet Cong forces and political apparatus, the partition of Vietnam on the Korean pattern, and the indefinite presence of American forces and bases in South Vietnam. With this perception of US policy, the North Vietnamese see no advantages in undertaking a serious exchange of views with the US and no prospects for formal negotiations on terms acceptable to them.

2. The bombing has not weakened Hanoi's confidence that time is still on the side of Communist forces in the South and that the US eventually will be compelled to scale down its objectives and modify its terms for negotiations. The air strikes, moreover, have had no discernible effect on Hanoi's ability and intention to maintain at least a rough military stalemate in the South—which the North Vietnamese view above all as the essential prerequisite to forcing an eventual adjustment in American policy.

Effects of the Bombing on North Vietnamese Determination

3. There is no evidence that the bombing has had any significant effect in impairing the morale of either the Hanoi regime or the population. Many non-Communist foreign visitors have testified to the North Vietnamese "unshakable will to resist" and to their "ability to deal with the situation" no matter how much the US increases its efforts. Hanoi officials have privately conceded that the bombing has caused great damage but they profess confidence that morale will remain high so long as population centers are not subjected to sustained and systematic attack.

The Air Strikes and Hanoi's Attitude Toward Negotiations

4. The bombing has heightened Hanoi's unwillingness to contemplate negotiations from a position of...
for a unilateral American concession, Hanoi's shift in tactics may also have been conceived as a means of deterring new US escalatory measures such as an invasion of southern North Vietnam which Hanoi apparently anticipated in the weeks following the American election last November.

8. It is possible that the concern over the dangerous implications of the growing disorder in China in late 1966 also influenced Hanoi's decision to modify its public stance on negotiations in January. Over the longer term, the situation in China will certainly have an important effect on North Vietnam's attitude toward negotiations. In addition, the North Vietnamese may have entertained a modest hope that the US might be obliged by the foreign and domestic response to Trinh's statement at least to curtail the pace and scope of its bombing operations.

Hanoi's Attitude Toward A De-Escalation of the Bombing

9. Hanoi's reaction to a de-escalation, short of a cessation, in the bombing program probably would be to interpret it as a sign of weakness on the part of the US. North Vietnam has been throwing its entire air defense strength against recent US strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. A de-escalation coming after these attacks would almost certainly appear to Hanoi as a sign that its defenses had cost the US more than it was willing to expend. North Vietnam would seek to make the most of such a de-escalation by making extensive repairs to damaged facilities and by stockpiling supplies in case the air war should again be escalated.

10. Present evidence suggests, however, that the North Vietnamese are preparing against a further escalation of the air strikes. They are unlikely to change their current stand on negotiations even if faced with more extensive damage. It is always possible that other factors such as the internal situation in China or developments in the war in South Vietnam will bring about some change in Hanoi's attitude. It does not appear, however, that the air strikes alone will accomplish such a change.
The Bombing and Hanoi's Strategy for a Settlement

11. In addition to the impact of bombing in reinforcing Hanoi's suspicions of US war aims and of the genuineness of the American interest in negotiations, the air strikes have complicated North Vietnam's political strategy concerning the shape of an eventual settlement. From Hanoi's vantage point, the bombing has served to dramatize US insistence that the war is essentially a war of aggression by the North against the South, rather than a civil conflict in South Vietnam. Thus, Hanoi cannot agree to a reciprocal de-escalation in the South in return for a cessation of bombing without appearing to validate the US portrayal of the fundamental issues at stake. North Vietnam has consistently denied any direct intervention in the South and it apparently continues to attach great importance to maintaining this pretense for this position has a direct bearing on Hanoi's aim of winning an equal voice for the National Liberation Front in any future negotiations and political settlement. Hanoi has taken the line that any peace negotiations must be confined to the parties directly involved—the Saigon government, the US, and the National Liberation Front—and that Hanoi would be limited, at least at the outset of a negotiating process, to playing a mediatory role in getting talks started. Hanoi contends that the only subject of any bilateral US—North Vietnamese talks would be the cessation of bombing and "other acts of war" against the DRV. Thus, any formula which equates US bombing of the North with North Vietnam's military presence in the South is seen by Hanoi as endangering vital political objectives in any future settlement.

12. One final effect of the bombing should be noted—the increased dependence of North Vietnam on both China and the Soviet Union for vital air defense weapons and equipment, food, and a vast array of other war-related supplies. This dependence inevitably has drawn Hanoi into deeper involvement in the Sino-Soviet antagonism and the extremely delicate problem of maintaining good relations with both powers has imposed further inhibitions on North Vietnam's freedom of maneuver.
The Effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder Program and Enemy Countermeasures
1 January 1966-30 April 1967
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
AND ENEMY COUNTERMEASURES
1 January 1966 - 30 April 1967

Summary

The Rolling Thunder program has made some progress in meeting its current two-fold objective:
(1) To limit, or raise, the cost of men and supplies to South Vietnam.
(2) To make North Vietnam pay a price for its aggression against the South.

The recent expansion of the bombing program has had some positive effects relative to these objectives, particularly in the modern sector of the North Vietnamese economy. Increased disruptions to orderly economic activity and sustained pressures on North Vietnam's limited human and material resources are evident. The damage to economic and military target systems has not been sufficient, however, to cause a meaningful degradation of North Vietnam's ability to support the war, at least current levels of combat. There are no signs that the determination of the regime to persist in its aggression has abated despite increasing hardships, popular morale has not eroded to the point where widespread apathy and war weariness are threatening the control of the Hanoi regime.

The bombing program has forced North Vietnam to divert from 575,000 to 700,000 individuals, about equally divided between full-time and part-time workers and troops, to air defense activities and to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs. The cost of physical and military damage has been growing. Total damage resulting from air attacks through April 1967 is estimated at over $233 million. More than 70 percent of this damage was inflicted on economic target systems.

Despite the increasing costs and burdens resulting from the air attacks, North Vietnam, aided by an increased flow of imports from the USSR and Communist
China has managed to maintain, and in many respects to improve, its organized support of the war. The electric power industry has been the most heavily damaged sector of the economy, and its neutralization may paralyze almost all of the modern industrial sector. However, the modern sector makes only a marginal contribution to the war effort since virtually all war-supporting material is imported. Other important targets which have been subjected to heavy attack -- particularly transportation and petroleum storage facilities -- have successfully employed countermeasures so that their overall performance and support capabilities remain as high as, if not higher than, they were when the bombing programs started.

The attacks on military target systems through April 1967 had not significantly reduced the capabilities of the military establishment. These capabilities have, in fact, been greatly expanded through large infusions of military aid from the USSR and Communist China.

The ability of North Vietnam to withstand the pressures of air attacks is explained by several factors. The economy is essentially agrarian and provides little direct input, other than manpower, into the war in the South. The increasing flow of essential economic and military aid into North Vietnam far surpasses the total damage resulting from air attacks. This aid provides North Vietnam the necessary materials to continue the war; it also implies that the USSR and Communist China will underwrite the damage sustained and the eventual reconstruction of the country, as they did in the case of North Korea. Finally, the North Vietnamese have devised and employed an elaborate and highly successful system of countermeasures -- dispersal of industry, mobilization of labor units, evacuation of population and the like -- which negates most of the desired impact of air attack on the vital flow of men and supplies to the war in the South.

The results to be expected from a further expansion of the bombing program, with the possible
exception of a mining program, are limited, ruling out attacks on dikes or population centers. Experience indicates that the remaining land transportation targets will be extremely difficult and costly to interdict. The few lucrative economic targets remaining do not make a significant contribution to the war effort, and their loss can be compensated by additional foreign aid. The neutralization of the remaining military targets, such as airfields, SAM sites, and radars, would reduce losses to US aircraft but would have virtually no effect on the ability of Hanoi to support the war in the South.

In summary, no bombing program alone is like to create sufficient pressures or problems to prevent Hanoi from sustaining the flow of essential military materials and continuing its support of the war in the South. While the mining of Haiphong and other ports would impose greater hardships on North Vietnam and raise further the cost of sustaining the insurgency than would other alternatives, such action, by itself, would probably not have a decisive impact on North Vietnamese thinking.

Virtually all of the remaining economic targets are concentrated in densely populated and heavily defended areas of North Vietnam. Their neutralization could be very costly to US air forces. The recent attacks on targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area indicate, for example, that the combat loss rate for US aircraft could be as much as 10 times greater than that experienced in the air campaigns over other areas of North Vietnam.

Continued harassment and attacks on the road, rail and trail network in the southern portion of North Vietnam and in Laos will not prevent or stop infiltration but will make it more costly and will force North Vietnam to pay a continuing price on its own territory for its continued support of the war in the South.
I. Physical Effects

A. General

The extension of the Rolling Thunder program during 1967 to include attacks against major industrial facilities in former sanctuary areas, and against important military targets such as airfields, has given new dimensions to the nature of US air operations. However, the program remains preponderantly an interdiction campaign against lines of communication and logistic targets of opportunity in the southern part of the country.

The changed scope of the bombing program has been sufficient to erode significantly North Vietnam's limited industrial and military base. The increased damage inflicted on North Vietnam undoubtedly will have unfavorable repercussions, particularly in the modern industrial sector of the economy. Many of the achievements of a decade of industrial growth have been neutralized, if not lost. Programs for orderly economic development have been forgone. The allocation of limited human and material resources has been a particularly disruptive problem.

The cumulative measurable damage to economic and military target systems through April 1967 is estimated at over $233 million. Overall 70 percent of the cumulative damage has been inflicted on economic targets. A comparison of total measurable damage

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**Note:** These estimates are based on bomb damage assessments using post-strike photography available to the Agency as of 7 May 1967. This photographic coverage, with minor exceptions, includes all major targets as of the end of April 1967.
to economic and military target systems for 1965, 1966, and January-April 1967 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Target</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>January-April 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>112.4</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cost of damage to both economic and military target systems has increased as the US air campaign has been directed against the more lucrative targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area of North Vietnam. Economic damage in the first four months of 1967 has been at an average monthly rate of $36.2 million, compared with rates of $36.2 million during 1965 and $19.1 million during 1966. Military targets have sustained damage at an average monthly rate of $16.0 million during January-April 1967, compared with rates of $32.5 million during 1965 and $19.1 million during 1966.

The estimated value of damage to the economic and military facilities and equipment attached under the Rolling Thunder program through April 1967 is as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Excess</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Shipyard</th>
<th>Marine &amp; Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Subtotal, direct &amp; indirect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>143.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>182.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The total is calculated as the sum of the direct and indirect losses.*
Despite the rising costs inflicted by the Rolling Thunder program, the damage to North Vietnam has apparently been within acceptable limits, and the regime has continued its hard-nosed stand on negotiations. No vital part of Hanoi's military establishment has been neutralized nor has its war-supporting capability been significantly reduced. With the exception of electric power generation, the North Vietnamese have been able to devise and execute adequate countermeasures to keep most essential economic war-supporting activity going. The loss of electric power facilities is having unfavorable repercussions throughout most of the modern industrial sector. But modern industry does not play a vital part in sustaining North Vietnam's ability to continue with the war. The USSR and Communist China are underwriting most of the costs of the war by providing the military and economic aid necessary for the defense of North Vietnam and its aggression in the South. The North Vietnamese regime shows no apparent weakening in either its determination or its ability to continue with the war. Although reports of food shortages, distribution problems, and increasing hardships being borne by the people are received more frequently, popular morale is judged not to have eroded significantly.

B. Economic Damage

1. Direct Effects

The cost of direct damage inflicted on economic target systems in North Vietnam through April 1967 is estimated at over $112 million. (For a chart showing total damage--direct and indirect--see Figure 1.) More than one-fourth of this damage--$28.9 million--occurred in the first four months of 1967, as shown in the following tabulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damage to economic facilities and equipment</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Million US $</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-4-
North Vietnam: An Economic Appraisal
Chinese Attitudes Toward the War in Vietnam
CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR IN VIETNAM

1. China has a substantial stake in the conduct and outcome of the war in South Vietnam, and a vital interest in the preservation of a friendly Communist regime in Hanoi. From the beginning of the Viet Cong insurgency, in the late 1950's, China has provided political support and encouragement to Hanoi, and in later stages direct military aid. Vietnam has been the testing ground for one of China's principal ideological theses: that in the present era wars of national liberation can be successfully and safely pursued not only in Southeast Asia but throughout the underdeveloped world. By late 1964 and early 1965, Communist successes promised early vindication of this thesis which Mao had made a major issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Chinese were urging Hanoi to move on to the final stage of mobile warfare.

2. US intervention with ground forces thus threatened a major blow to Chinese aspirations in Asia and the Communist world. A second factor affecting Chinese attitudes was the USSR's direct reengagement in the situation in 1965. As a result of these two developments, the Chinese position has changed somewhat.

3. Since the US intervention and the bombing of North Vietnam, the Chinese have gradually begun to attribute a new strategic significance to the war. In the Chinese portrayal, US intervention was not only a desperate effort to retrieve a local defeat, but might also be a preliminary for an aggressive war against China. The Chinese were thus forced to give increasing attention to the chances that out of the Vietnam War would come an attack on China. Consequently, China's fairly clear and explicit expressions of military commitment to Hanoi became progressively qualified. References to Chinese volunteers and comparisons with the Korean
War declined in 1966, and in the Chinese formulas both Hanoi and Peking would decide what Chinese actions were "deemed necessary." And at critical junctures, in late 1965 and mid-1966 (the bombing of Haiphong POL), the Chinese reminded Hanoi that a principal virtue of people's war was self-reliance. Only recently, Chou En-lai made a similar remark to an American journalist.

4. In such circumstances, it might have been prudent for China to advise Hanoi to seek a political solution before the US buildup could be accomplished. But, in fact, China's hostility to negotiations of any kind has become more and more rigid, even to the point that Peking has been openly at odds with Hanoi on the question of whether a cessation of the bombing could be followed by US-North Vietnamese talks.

5. China's intransigence reflects several factors. The Chinese leaders, particularly Mao, probably still have faith that even in the new military circumstances the US can be defeated provided that Hanoi pursues a strategy of protracted conflict relying on the proper guerrilla warfare tactics. But even if Peking recognizes the diminishing chances of success for Communist aims, there are other compelling political reasons for Chinese insistence that the war continue. Peking probably realizes that the USSR would play a large role in any political solution in Vietnam, and that in peaceful conditions the USSR's economic and military assistance to Hanoi would pose a major threat to Chinese influence there. In its efforts to limit the influence of the USSR in Vietnam, China has already paid a high price in its relations with North Korea, the Japanese Communist and other sympathizers. To yield at this point would, in the Chinese view, not only be a defeat for Peking's general line of revolutionary strategy, but would represent a major gain for the USSR.

6. We believe the Chinese are prepared to exert considerable pressure, to increase types of military and economic aid, and, if requested, to station combat troops in North Vietnam in order to sustain Hanoi's will and ability to prolong the war in the
9. A more ambiguous situation would be a threatened collapse of the Hanoi regime. It would be extremely difficult for either the North Vietnamese leaders or the Chinese to decide at what point a large deployment of Chinese forces in North Vietnam was necessary to maintain internal security. And this might be a gradual process, wherein Chinese forces were gradually introduced to free North Vietnamese forces for combat or public security. Even so, once having secured North Vietnam against an internal breakdown it is unlikely that Chinese forces would then move into South Vietnam.

10. Any estimates concerning Chinese actions must be qualified because of the uncertain situation in Peking. We cannot be sure what the impact of the internal struggle has had or will have on Chinese policies. It is conceivable that under some circumstances a foreign war might appear to certain leaders or factions as a desperate way out of a political impasse. It seems more likely, however, that the Chinese leadership would seek to avoid a major external crisis so long as internal affairs remain in disarray.
Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War
North Vietnamese Political Capabilities in the Non-Communist World
NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL CAPABILITIES
IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD

Summary

The North Vietnamese expend a great amount of effort attempting to encourage among non-Communist nations support for their cause and opposition to US actions in Vietnam. To this end, Hanoi invites sympathetic foreigners to North Vietnam, sends high-powered delegations to leftist front meetings, and provides "documentary" evidence to interested parties showing US "atrocities." The major channel through which Hanoi pumps its propaganda to each non-Communist country is provided by the local Communist party. Wherever possible, of course, influential newsmen are used by the North Vietnamese to carry their story to the free world.

The North Vietnamese, however, are hampered by several factors in their effort to elicit such support. One inhibiting factor is the paucity of permanent North Vietnamese representation in the non-Communist world. Another is the fact that Hanoi's policy toward negotiations has been far too inflexible to stimulate much support. Even its Soviet bloc allies have found it difficult to argue North Vietnam's case on negotiations persuasively.

On balance, it appears that Hanoi's cause is best served in the non-Communist world not by the sympathy it has been able to generate but by the fact that many non-Communist nations, fearing the war will grow larger, apply pressure on the US to bring the war to a close.
The Hanoi Apparatus

1. Hanoi's own ability to get its message on the war across in the non-Communist world is extremely limited. The North Vietnamese diplomatic and governmental apparatus abroad is quite small, comprising in the free world around 15 officials in 15 countries. In addition, the North Vietnamese control the operations of some 25 National Liberation Front representatives in many of the same countries. Hanoi also holds membership in a small number of Communist front groups in the free world through which leftist elements can be contacted and printed propaganda disseminated.

2. The North Vietnamese are also able to promote their cause by inviting sympathetic foreigners—particularly from the US and its allies—to the DRV, where they are given guided tours designed to provide them with "hard evidence" of US "war crimes" which they can publicize on their return home. In addition, Hanoi devotes a significant amount of its limited resources to radio propaganda broadcasts which are beamed to audiences in Southeast Asia. The number of listeners, however, is believed to be fairly limited.

3. Aside from their own foreign apparatus, the North Vietnamese profit from the propaganda efforts in the free world of the other bloc countries, mainly the Soviet Union and China, which basically complement Hanoi's own line on the situation in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese political capability in the free world, however, is confined mainly to propaganda dissemination, for Hanoi has virtually no political or economic leverage which it can exert on any country outside Southeast Asia.

4. Probably the strongest "bonus" factor which the North Vietnamese have working for them in the free world is the concern which has developed over the course of US policy in Vietnam. This has been stimulated by factors completely apart from North Vietnamese political operations abroad. Involved are such things as revulsion over the destructiveness of the war and fear over a possible widening of the hostilities.
North Vietnamese have naturally sought to exploit these concerns, but it is impossible to measure the effectiveness of their efforts.

Importance of Various DRV Foreign Posts

5. Not all of the North Vietnamese representatives are equally active in promoting and publicizing Hanoi’s policies abroad. Among Hanoi’s diplomats currently most active are those in New Delhi and Cairo. Both of these representatives frequently call press conferences, maintain active contact with foreign office officials of the host government, and actively seek out local press interviews.

6. In India, the DRV representatives have apparently sought to work partly through the rival Indian Communist factions, both of which view the Vietnam issue as a useful lever for their own purposes in domestic politics. In the UAR, the press has given wide coverage to the war, almost always biased in favor of Hanoi’s position. However, efforts by the leftist organizations to stir up support for Hanoi by mounting public rallies have not aroused much enthusiasm.

Africa

7. Algeria provides one of the widest and most sympathetic audiences for the DRV in Africa. The Algerian press regularly features articles favorable to Hanoi’s position and the government permits and encourages anti-US demonstrations. The DRV representative in Algiers formerly sought extensive public exposure, but with the Algerian coup and the simultaneous replacement of the DRV ambassador in mid-1965, activity at this post has declined.

8. In general, North Vietnam’s ability to obtain a ready hearing on the African continent is limited to a greater degree than is generally appreciated. The North Vietnamese maintain a diplomatic presence in only five African countries: Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and Congo (Brazzaville). With the exception of these countries,
the receptivity of the remaining African states to
the DRV position on the war is marginal at best.
Their attitude ranges from almost complete indif-
ference to an ill-defined general reluctance to
become embroiled in what they consider to be a
"big-power" conflict.

9. To a large extent, the impact of the
DRV's position depends upon the stratum of society
which is addressed. Among the educated elite in
Africa, for example, the Tunisian weekly Jeune
Afrique probably does as much to influence attitudes
as anything else. The paper, published in Paris
and probably subsidized by the French, is highly
critical of the US and gives considerable cover-
age to the North Vietnamese position.

France and Western Europe

10. One of the most effective diplomatic as-
sets Hanoi has anywhere in the world is its rep-
resentative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. France is the
only major free world power in which the DRV has
representation, and although Mai Van Bo has only
quasi-diplomatic status, he apparently has easy
access to French Foreign Ministry officials and
commands extensive publicity from an interested
and sympathetic press. Bo has at times been
chosen by the DRV Government to make the first
announcement of important official statements,
particularly on the subject of a negotiated set-
tlement of the war or DRV relations with the US.

11. The January 1967 DRV offer to talk with
US officials in exchange for a cessation of the
bombings, for example, was first discussed by Mai
Van Bo in a press interview some three weeks be-
fore it was officially announced as DRV policy
by the foreign minister. Available evidence sug-
gests that the French government occasionally un-
dertakes private discussions with Mai Van Bo in
making its evaluation of North Vietnamese policy.
The French Communists, who have relatively good
relations with Hanoi, have carried on a campaign
to drum up support for the DRV, but the response
to such appeals has been apathetic and unimpress-
sive—even though public opinion polls indicate
that the average Frenchman believes the US to be principally responsible for the war.

12. Although the DRV maintains a press representative in Great Britain, it is doubtful that his efforts have been anything more than marginal in affecting British public opinion, which is not so much receptive to the Hanoi line as it is uneasy about the danger of a major expansion of the war.

Southeast Asia and the Far East

13. The most important of the DRV posts in Southeast Asia at the present time is located in Phnom Penh. The Sihanouk regime has given quasi-diplomatic status to Hanoi’s representative. Both the DRV and local National Liberation Front officials are quite active within the Cambodian Vietnamese community and through them probably have contacts with the local left. Although Hanoi’s use of Cambodian territory for flugge and resupply in the Vietnamese war would seem to offer possibilities for exerting political leverage on Sihanouk to support Vietnamese Communist policy, it appears that Hanoi is extremely circumspect in this regard, preferring instead to take advantage of Cambodian antagonism toward US Asian policy generally in pushing North Vietnamese interests.

14. A similar situation exists in Laos, where North Vietnam, by virtue of geographic contiguity, also has the potential for considerable leverage with the Royal Laotian Government. Vientiane, nonetheless, has remained reasonably sympathetic to allied policy interests. The DRV diplomatic establishment in Vientiane, in fact, seems relatively inactive in the propaganda field.

15. Formerly, the North Vietnamese and the Liberation Front were quite active among government elements in Indonesia. This situation changed, however, with the anti-Communist uprising there and the subsequent cooling in Hanoi’s relations with the Indonesians. Although the Vietnamese Communists remain in contact with some official elements, they do not appear to be active among Indonesian leftist groups.
16. The DRV has no representation in Japan, but Japanese leftists have been of considerable assistance in facilitating Hanoi's contacts with business and communication sectors in Japan. The Japanese Communist Party has also worked closely with Hanoi to help build up Japanese support for the Bertrand Russell war crimes tribunal.

The Western Hemisphere

17. The DRV has no representation in Latin America and the public remains largely indifferent to the Vietnam war. Most politicians have avoided taking a public stand on the issue in order to prevent local Communists from exploiting the question against the government. Cuba, of course, represents a special case and, partly through the efforts of the local Vietnamese Communist representatives, the DRV's views are given wide dissemination. The Canadian public is greatly interested in the course of the war, but it is more a case of heavy press coverage than any particular receptivity to the North Vietnamese position. The Canadian Government, however, remains somewhat sensitive to North Vietnam views, since it wishes to preserve a possible mediatory role for Canadian ICC representatives in North Vietnam.
Implications of the Vietnam War for the US International Position
INTRODUCTION

1. The US international position with respect to the Vietnam war is unique in modern American experience. Not within memory have we been so heavily engaged with so few active allies and so much strong criticism, both at home and abroad. Because so much of the world considers itself affected, or likely to be affected if the war is prolonged and intensified, developments affecting the war have become a major concern of many friendly nations. Moreover, because of the world role of the US as the strongest and leading power of the non-Communist world, the way in which the war is conducted and terminated is widely felt to involve great significance for the future of the free world itself.

2. There was indeed bound to be a certain ambivalence in the attitudes of others toward any policy which the US chose to follow in Vietnam. In the abstract, there was certain to be support for the idea of protecting small nations from aggression and an accompanying fear that this might lead to an uncontrolled and dangerous conflict. In any case of big power intervention there will always be those who applaud and those who object. If US intervention had been brief and quickly decisive, much of this ambivalence would have dissolved. The objectors would have been routed by success and the fears of the sympathetic dissipated. The US problem has arisen largely because the conflict has been prolonged and success appears dubious, at least by means considered acceptable in many parts of the world. This has removed much of the world's approach to the problem from the abstract to the specific. It is no longer for many foreign observers and governments a question of principle, but a specific case to be examined on its merits.
Current Attitudes and Policies

3. Western Europe. Generally speaking, articulate opinion in Europe actively disapproves US intervention in Vietnam and US military strategy in Vietnam. With certain exceptions (Spain and Portugal and, to some extent, West Germany), it is an almost universal view that the US has blundered in the fact and the extent of its involvement. Moreover, among intellectuals, youth, and organized labor there is a strong moral revulsion against the bombing policy and against what has come to be thought of as the US objective, namely, to impose a puppet militaristic regime upon a people trying to establish their own national identity.

4. These views contrast strongly with the official policy of most governments, one which might be described as support for our general objectives and sympathy for the problems and difficulties we have encountered. But even the governments which quite honestly make these pronouncements of support often maintain grave reserve about the wisdom and content of our policy. This reserve is not often expressed to US representatives, but it nevertheless exists. It seems to have deepened during the past several months -- in contrast to most of 1966, when our military progress was noticeable, our willingness to negotiate accepted at face value, and the recalcitrance of our enemy easy for all to see. But with intensification of the bombing campaign, an apparent slowdown in military progress on the ground, and a growing suspicion about the actual US willingness to negotiate, the misgivings of government leaders have intensified.

5. These misgivings have not reached critical proportions, nor do they seem likely to do so short of major intensification of the war. But Socialists in the governments of Britain, Italy, and Scandinavia would have great difficulties -- and some cases might fail -- in holding the support of their parliamentary contingents and local organizations if certain types of military escalation occurred or if it appeared that the US was refusing what they considered to be reasonable terms for a political settlement.
6. A special situation exists in West Germany, where the general principle — US readiness to honor a commitment — has more meaning than the specifics of the individual case. The Germans are also somewhat less troubled by the moral issue involved in the bombing. But there is some dismay over what appears to be a reduced importance attached to Europe in American calculations and over what appears to them as a military miscalculation, namely, the belief that we can win a struggle under the conditions in which we might fight.

7. In Europe generally there has been a consequent decline in US prestige and a growth in anti-Americanism. To some degree this anti-Americanism is a normal reaction to the discomfort of a great power, all the more because the Europeans have not enjoyed their past dependence upon it. But it is primarily the consequence of the widespread apprehensions over the wisdom of US policy and the morality of US military policy. The US is believed to have become involved in something it cannot bring to a satisfactory end, to have been successfully defied by a small country, and to have been caught up in a militaristic approach not justified by or appropriate to the problem. This has been of very considerable help to the USSR. In the context of the present phase of Soviet policy, in which the USSR has sought to present itself as flexible and moderate, there has been some reversal of process; the US now appears less charitable and more self-righteous, while the USSR appears more peace-loving and less nationalistic than in the post-war period.

8. The specific effects of this reduced prestige are difficult to measure. The decrease in the US enjoyed in Europe was the decline in any case, for a variety of reasons. What the US involvement in Vietnam has done is to accelerate the process and to provide additional talking points to those who have wished to reduce the US role. US involvement has reduced the Europeans, especially the West Germans, that the US has other problems besides Europe in which it is interested, and thus has encouraged Europeans to take more things into their own hands. This in turn has made De Gaulle's
policies more palatable and contributed to our difficulties with the Kennedy Round, the NPT, and proposals regarding international liquidity. Without the Vietnam war and with the time and opportunity to develop a new atmosphere for treating with European security and international economic relations, we might have been able to cope more readily with our problems in Europe, but one cannot be certain. What is clear is that the war has complicated the already difficult problem of exercising the kind of US leadership which the free world and the Europeans would like to have.

9. Asia. The Far Eastern and South Asian countries constitute a special case because of the significance and future impact of the Vietnam conflict upon power relationships in the area. The Australians and New Zealanders, of course, would like to block Communist expansion and believe it in their national interest to provide political and military support to the US. Our other allies feel the same way, notably the Thais and South Koreans. Even the countries not allied with us wish to block Communist expansion and wish to see the US efforts succeed, but some have been cautious; they do not wish to be in an exposed position in case of a compromise political settlement. Though a number of Indian and Pakistani leaders have privately expressed sympathy for US efforts in Vietnam, sentiment in both governments is against US action—particularly the aggressive North Vietnamese. However, both countries are heavily dependent on US economic aid, and this circumstance generates criticism, as does India's loss of China.

10. Japan has certainly felt more comfortable in the vicinity of its Communist neighbors with the visible US military presence in the Far East. But Japan still has a large and vocal nationalist and anti-American minority, and the government is concerned that a prolonged war in Vietnam would be exploited by these groups to complicate seriously negotiations with the US for renewal of the security treaty in the late 1960's. The government has been active in seeking a political settlement of the war and would be worried and upset if the war were
intensified or broadened. It hopes for an early settlement that would limit the prospects for further Communist advances in Southeast Asia.

11. Other Areas. Most Latin American, African, and Near Eastern countries have problems of their own and simply do not feel that Vietnam is related to their concerns. Most would like the war over with; many feel that the US has lost interest in them or, in Latin America especially, takes them for granted. Those with useful bilateral relations with the US want to avoid endangering those relations by criticizing the US. Those with poor relations with the US -- and these are largely the more radical of the new, post-colonial regimes -- feel free to vent their criticisms of the US. Many of these countries have a natural disposition to dislike or fear large advanced nations which deploy their power against other small former dependencies. How much this has hurt US policy in a specific sense is difficult to judge. The Vietnam war has probably added to the deterioration of relations with those who are antagonistic anyway; for the others, while they are doubtful and uncomfortable, it has not in itself provided the occasion for attacks upon US policies.

Future Problems and Implications

12. A great deal of the loss to US prestige and much of the legacy of opposition to US policy would probably be dissipated by an early termination of the war. There would be general satisfaction that the conflict was ended, especially if it came to an end in a fashion which preserved the integrity of both South and North Vietnam. As time went on and the world became interested in other things, even those who have been especially bitter critics of US policy would find fewer and fewer listeners.

13. Nevertheless, there would remain certain residues which could not easily be overcome. These would be of two types. The first would be in terms of the respect accorded US leadership. Especially in Europe, something has been lost which will take time to recover; because of the widespread belief, even among those who support us, that the US has
blundered and refuses to recognize its blunder, the US will have greater difficulties in procuring support for its policies. On European questions US leadership will particularly suffer, since it is now widely suspected that the US is not really interested in Western Europe anyway and is prepared to sacrifice European interests to broader considerations of US interest. A longer-lasting damage to US influence would come from disillusionment, especially among European intellectuals and youth, with US morality. European youth is preoccupied with questions of political morality and has the time and the disposition to worry about the bombing and about the correctness of the US intervention. Rightly or wrongly, it has been highly critical of both, and this will plague us for many years to come.

14. The longer the war lasts, the more intractable our problems will become. Some of these will be related to the conduct of the war itself. Considering the depth of feeling expressed by opponents of the war and reservations maintained by those who support US policy, it is important to recognize that the tolerance of our friends is not unlimited. There is little doubt that the US could make some increases in the level of military action in Vietnam without suffering serious and immediate damage to its international position, and it is impossible to judge precisely what would precipitate such damage. Certain steps, such as the use of nuclear weapons, would of course do so. So might also an accumulation of minor escalations. There would be a number of specific actions which might, but would not necessarily, push some nations over the edge toward open disavowal of US actions. These include not only conceivable steps in military escalation, but circumstances surrounding efforts to achieve a political solution.

15. Whatever might be the reaction to the play of events while the conflict is in progress, much will depend upon its outcome. A long and intense conflict would intensify fears of Chinese involvement, would be widely regretted, and would bring heavy and direct criticism upon the United States, including criticism from new quarters. But if the outcome were
such as to encourage people to believe that East Asia had been stabilized and Communist expansion blocked, many people and most Asians would conclude that the effort had been justified.

16 On the other hand, if finally the US terminated the conflict on terms which clearly constituted an abandonment of its objectives, the US would suffer very serious losses of prestige. If the US withdrew from South Vietnam on the basis of an ambiguous solution, the reaction would be mixed: in Europe there would be approval that the US had found a "face-saving" way out, but in Asia there would be much apprehension and a considerable loss of respect for the US. The final Asian reaction would depend fundamentally upon what followed in terms of the actual relations of power in Asia. If the Communists were able to utilize the solution to obtain a dominant influence in the neighboring states of the area, the US position in Asia proper would be severely strained, if not permanently damaged. It should be recognized, however, that events in China, actions taken by the US to shore up other countries, and the capacities and interests of the threatened states would also play important roles in the ultimate outcome.

17 In sum, the problem presented to the US is not only the immediate one of dealing with responses to particular phases in the military conflict and its political surroundings, but with the less immediate and less concrete effects upon the future US role in the world and the fortunes of its friends abroad. Nearly all international actions evoke support in some quarters and opposition in others. In this case the principle underlying the US action has become submerged by ambiguities and doubts regarding the wisdom and correctness of the specific action. Some damage to the US has already been done. How much more damage will occur and how much is recoverable will depend upon how long the war lasts, how we fight it, and how it comes to an end.
B. Agriculture

Rice production in North Vietnam fell about 300,000 metric tons in 1966, or about 7 percent. The decline resulted from the indirect effects of the bombing and from unfavorable weather conditions. Problems in the distribution of fertilizer and the diversion of farm labor to military and war-related work also contributed.

The food situation has not, however, become critical. There have been large increases in imports of food through April of 1967; known seaborne imports of food totaled 108,500 tons, compared with 77,000 tons in all of 1966. The regime has for some time been calling for an increase in the acreage devoted to secondary crops such as sweet potatoes and manioc, which are more resistant to weather conditions and require less labor and processing. The production of these food crops may have increased in 1966.

There has been no indication of a cut in food rations. The minimum rice ration remains at about 13 kilograms per person per month. In some areas, however, a portion of the rice ration is actually made up of less palatable substitutes, and in 1967 these substitutes may have accounted for a larger part of the diet. While the official meat ration has probably not been cut, the supply of meat has apparently declined, especially in urban areas, and prices have risen. The production of fish has declined, and the price has risen, probably because the bombings interfered with fishing operations.

C. Industry

Industrial output in 1966 appears to have increased in some sectors and declined in others; the data for estimating the overall change are lacking. In 1967 the bombing has had a direct effect on the output of some industries and has probably indirectly affected the output of most modern plants. Handicraft and local factory industries, however, which account for almost half of industrial output, were probably affected little if at all.
North Vietnam's industry still makes little direct contribution to the war effort. It provides tools, some spare parts, and repair equipment. Cement is produced for military as well as civilian construction, and uniforms are made by the textile industry. The chemical industry may produce small quantities of explosives. Coal, apatite, and pig iron are important exports. They have been earning about $23 million annually in foreign exchange since 1964, which has been used to purchase goods in the Free World.

It is estimated that the output of electric power in 1966 declined some 9 percent, to about 550 million kilowatt hours. One-fourth of total output is normally used by non-industrial consumers, who absorbed part and perhaps all of the decline. Thus far in 1967, there has been a substantial further reduction of output, with a serious impact on many consuming industries. Out of a national capacity of 187,000 kilowatts (kw), 131,000 kw were out of operation as of the end of April. About 104,000 kw of the capacity destroyed was in the main electric power network which serves most of the urban areas and the modern industrial sector. Only one electric power plant in Hanoi remains intact; it accounted for about one-fourth of the capacity of the main network before the bombings. North Vietnam has imported an estimated 2,000 diesel generators of varying sizes over the past few years. The estimated capacity of these generators is about 15,000 to 20,000 kw, or some 10 to 15 percent of the capacity destroyed to date. The output of these generators is consumed primarily by agriculture and small local industries.

The output of North Vietnam's two largest textile plants -- the Nam Dinh Plant and the Eighth of March Plant in Hanoi -- is believed to have fallen in 1966. The Nam Dinh Plant has received bomb damage and both plants have been dispersed to some extent. Fragmentary data show that imports of cotton in 1966 were only one-third those in 1965 but that the import of textiles almost doubled, which suggests that the output of textiles fell in 1966.
Exports of apatite dropped from about 118,000 tons in 1965 to 10,000 tons in 1966, of coal from 1,150,000 tons to 906,000 tons, and of pig iron from 47,000 tons to 40,000 tons (see Table 1). Since much of the output of these goods is exported, the fall in exports strongly suggests a fall in production. The recent bombing of the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex may further reduce the output of pig iron, and a shortage of electric power may adversely affect the output of coal.

The machine building industry, although partially disrupted by dispersals during 1966, probably maintained or expanded output with the help of greater foreign aid. The major contribution of the machine building industry to the war effort is in the repair and maintenance of transportation and construction equipment. An increasing number of small metal workshops are engaged in this work. Some of the machinery required is produced by the Hanoi Engineering Plant, the Tran Hung Dao Engineering Plant, (also at Hanoi), and the Duyen Hai Machinery Enterprise in Haiphong. Although the loss of electric power in 1967 will restrict the output of some of the modern machinery plants, particularly the Hanoi Engineering Plant, it will have little effect on regional machine shops that utilize small generators.

There was a three-fold increase in known imports of steel sheet and plate, metal tubes, bars, and wire in 1966. This large increase probably reflected a growth in the output of fabricated metal products, but could have been the result of a decision to stockpile the items against the time when seaborne imports might be unobtainable.

The output of cement probably increased in 1966. Cement is used for constructing airfields, military fortifications, civil defense shelters, and the like, but the fact that seaborne exports of cement rose about 25 percent over 1965 indicates that it was in good supply. The bombing of the Haiphong Cement Plant, which provides about 95 percent of total production, and of the electric powerplant which serves it, will almost certainly reduce domestic supplies of cement during 1967.
D. Transportation

North Vietnam's transport system remains adequate for current military and economic needs. The railroads have suffered some damage from the US bombings, including the destruction of the rail bridge at Viet Tri, the Hanoi Railway/Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides, and other rail facilities at Hanoi and Thai Nguyen. At the same time, some of the bombed lines have been partially reconstructed, and one of the lines leading to the Chinese border is being converted to dual gauge to facilitate the movement of goods from China.

The bombing of the highway network has caused extensive cratering, but quick repairs and the availability of alternate routes have prevented any sustained effect on motor truck operations. The truck inventory is estimated to total about 11,000 to 12,000 made up of over 30 different models. Maintenance is a serious problem, primarily because of the lack of skilled mechanics and spare parts. In some cases it has been easier to get new trucks than the parts needed to put vehicles back into service. Imports of trucks in 1965 and 1966 totaled about 7,000. About 1,200 trucks are known to have been imported in the first four months of 1967.

The waterway system does not appear to have been seriously affected by US bombing or by the mining of rivers in some parts of North Vietnam.

E. Construction

Construction activity has increased considerably since 1965. The construction and repair of bridges, highways, and railroads has required at least 72,000 full-time and from 100,000 to 200,000 part-time Vietnamese workers. Improvements in the transportation network have mainly a military purpose but have also contributed to the civilian economy. Some war-related construction such as civil defense shelters and shelters for vessels along inland waterways has been observed. Construction is continuing on projects not related to the war. Dams are being built, and Communist aid projects for industry are continuing.
P. Foreign Aid and Trade

As a result of declining food production, declining output in some industries, and the greatly increased demands produced by the war, North Vietnam has become increasingly dependent on assistance from Communist countries. Foreign aid deliveries exclusive of military goods are estimated to have increased to about $275 million during 1966, compared with about $150 million in 1965.

Before the bombing, aid projects included a number of large industrial complexes. New aid agreements were negotiated with most of the Communist countries in 1965 and 1966. Most of the new economic aid is made up of industrial materials, manufactured goods, and machinery for small light industrial plants, small electric powerplants, and machine shops. In addition, the regime appears to be continuing forward-looking aid projects, such as those for mineral exploration and exploitation. Some new economic aid projects contribute more or less directly to the war, particularly those pertaining to truck repair, machine shops, and pier construction, as well as the dredging of the Red River and the harbor at Haiphong. Most of the construction activity on Soviet aid projects in 1966 was focused on the Thac Ba electric powerplant, small irrigation pumping stations, state-farm projects, and mining. Economic aid from Eastern European countries during 1966 included food-processing and refrigeration plants, truck repair or machine shops, and small electric power projects. Little is known about Chinese Communist project aid.

The USSR and Communist China have since 1953 provided military equipment and supplies valued at about $947 million, including deliveries in 1966 estimated at $445 million. The USSR provided $720 million of this total. Soviet military assistance has been mostly in the form of surface-to-air missiles, aircraft (including helicopters and MIG

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"Then there are the larger Soviet foreign trade prices for equipment sold to less developed countries, which are believed to more closely approximate the true value of this equipment."

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fighters), armor, trucks, artillery, radar, small arms, and ammunition. Communist China has provided a small number of MIG fighters, naval craft, artillery, radar, small arms, and ammunition. In addition, both countries have sent military technicians to maintain equipment and to assist in training.

Petroleum products, imported almost entirely from the USSR, are essential to the war effort. Estimated imports during 1966 exceeded 200,000 tons. Military and civil transport together consumed 150,000 tons in 1966, industry consumed about 20,000 tons, and the remainder went to agriculture and household use.

The North Vietnamese trade deficit grew in 1966. Identified seaborne imports rose more than 30 percent over 1965, while identified seaborne exports fell more than 30 percent. The same trend has continued during the first four months of 1967, with imports rising about 52 percent and exports falling by about 37 percent as compared with the corresponding period in 1966. In 1965, the DRV was running a large trade deficit with other Communist countries — about $100 million out of total imports of $180 million — but had a small trade surplus with Free World countries. In 1966 the decline in seaborne exports of apatite, coal, and pig iron reduced the trade surplus with the Free World. Exports to Communist countries, almost half of which are textiles and processed foods, also declined, while imports rose sharply. All of the trade deficit has been made up by credits or grants from the Communist countries, and there have been no apparent limitations on imports because of the adverse trade balance.
III. Prospects

The North Vietnamese economy has not yet fully felt the effects of the bombings already undertaken in 1967. Production from modern plants is sure to fall considerably. Nevertheless, even if further bombing were to eliminate modern industry entirely, the economy could still function at levels adequate to supply the bulk of the population's simple needs and to service and repair lines of communication.

The elimination of modern industry would leave unaffected the half of the country's industrial capacity which is in small factories and handicraft shops capable of supplying simple farm tools, some machinery and spare parts, and processed foods and textiles. The domestic output of cement, fertilizer, chemicals, pig iron, and machine tools would be virtually eliminated, with some effect on low-priority construction and possibly on agriculture. High-priority needs could be met from imports, which would have to be vastly increased, but not beyond the ability of the Communist countries to supply. Imports of bulk products would rise sharply, and imports of finished metal products, vehicles, and machinery would have to be increased. At present, North Vietnam's ports and railroads have ample capacity to handle any foreseeable need for imports.