A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION

Elements of the Plan

(U) Combining all of the above, it would seem possible to formulate an alternative proposal for action in Southeast Asia.

This proposed action would have two purposes: first, to deal with the external aspect of counterinsurgency in South Vietnam; and second, to establish the limits of expansion of Chinese Communist influence, this stabilizing the area. The concept would be to achieve these purposes by the limited actual commitment of U.S. forces to the SE Asia mainland, backed by full readiness to engage in a conventional mainland war against North Vietnam and Communist China if necessary.

This proposal is based on two critical elements: first, the detailed development of the new concept for land-air action, coupled with a program of information designed to change the image at home and abroad of U.S. land warfare in SE Asia. The sought-after image is one in which the U.S. soldier is fully able to cope with the Communist guerrilla in his own habitat, and the technological superiority of the U.S. makes this infantryman even more effective in a new concept of air mobile and air supported operations.

Second, a fundamental judgement of the part of the United States that the commitment of U.S. troops to the mainland is acceptable,
if this is necessary to achieve U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. This change of attitude is made possible by the increased U.S. conventional capabilities and the changed nature of operations.

What follows is an outline plan for one scenario in which U.S. power might be employed. In this particular scenario, E-day (for Execute) has been set in advance and detailed military and political planning has been conducted in the utmost secrecy. On the appointed day, strong conventional U.S. and allied forces are concentrated swiftly and by surprise in Southeast Asia, an allied command is set up, and at the same time a strong international force is used to cut the DRV infiltration lines in Laos.

This scenario has the advantage of strategic surprise and a consequent political initiative. Another scenario can be developed in which the forces are concentrated openly, before the overt action to cut the infiltration routes. Although more desirable in some respects, this would leave the U.S. open to political and military countermeasures as the operation was being readied.

Sequence of Action

The proposal for action, in outline, is as follows:

Public attention is drawn to the Army's adoption of new air mobile tactics and organization, to the Air Force and CINCESTRIKE achievements in improving air-ground operations, and to similar developments in Navy/Marine Corps capabilities. It is made clear
that it is now possible to achieve a major breakthrough in concepts of land-air operations, especially in areas with poor road nets and bad terrain. It is stated that further tests will continue.

It is later announced that a Joint Task Force will continue the tests of the Army's new air mobile division and associated Army and Air Force units. To achieve realism, to show U.S. interest in Southeast Asia, and to provide air mobility training for local armed forces, these tests will be conducted in Thailand.

The JTF is moved to Thailand, and on E-day, after all political and military arrangements have been made, major forces are rapidly concentrated by surprise in Southeast Asia. The 173d Airborne Brigade is moved from Okinawa to Da Nang. The 101st Airborne Division is moved from the CONUS to the Philippines. The 25th Division is moved from Hawaii to Thailand. The 3d Marine Division and its associated air wing is moved into the South China Sea. Headquarters and supporting forces, and air and naval forces, are moved. These moves are initiated in secrecy, under a previously established cover plan of field exercises. Concurrently, a U.S. commander assumes command of Allied Forces, Southeast Asia. (It is visualized that CINCPAC would also be the CINC of a new U.S. unified command directly under the JCS, and including USMAGY. However, the proposal does not hinge on a particular command arrangement.)

As these actions are taking place, an international force moves by surprise into position north of Route 9 in Laos. The first
deployment is a one division force built around the U.S. air mobile division, in which several allied battalions are brigaded with three or four U.S. battalions. This force would be built by 2 plus three days to two divisions. The mission of this international force would be to occupy and control a band of territory and thereby to cut the DRV infiltration routes in Laos.

Operations to Cut Infiltration Routes

Map 4, Appendix, shows the terrain and the 1 October 1964 enemy dispositions in the area. The terrain is mountainous, cut by streams, sparsely populated, generally wooded, and crisscrossed by trails. In the immediate vicinity of the area of operations there are six Pathet Lao and 3 PAVN (Peoples Army of Vietnam) battalions. The nearest enemy battalion to the north is a Pathet Lao battalion about 50 miles northwest of Tchepone.

The objective of the operation would be to occupy and establish control over a band of territory about 10-20 kilometers in depth and 100-110 kilometers wide astride the infiltration routes and north of Route 9 (shown in blue on the map). The eastern flank of this band would tie in with RVN forces controlling the area of South Vietnam south of the line of demarcation. The western flank would tie in with RLG forces controlling the Laos plain area west of the mountains.

The international force would move by surprise into the area, occupying key terrain "where the enemy was not." Its first objective
would be to close all routes and halt infiltration. It would then
reconnoiter and organize the area so as to be prepared to destroy
by guerrilla tactics and other means any PAVN and Pathet Lao forces
which might move into the area. After firm control has been estab-
lished over the area, action could then be taken by the international
force and other forces to operate against PAVN and Pathet Lao forces
south of the cleared zone and gradually to remove the enemy presence
in the southern Laos panhandle, thereby taking the enemy off the
exposed flank of South Vietnam.

The basic element of this international force would be U.S.
and allied infantry battalions employing guerrilla and counter-
guerrilla tactics. These units would establish control over routes
and other critical terrain by means of outposts, ambush positions,
patrols, and defended localities, as appropriate. The infantry
forces would be supported by air mobility, artillery, air reconnais-
sance, air fire support, air logistics, mines, demolitions, defo
tion, and whatever other means were useful and available (mustard
gas could be considered, for example). Drop zones, airstrips, and
base camps as necessary would be prepared on high ground. As organ-
ization of the area proceeded, all civilians would be moved out,
all movement would be prohibited, anything that moved would come
under attack, and the control of infiltration would become increas-
ingly effective. The PAVN and Pathet Lao forces to the south would
find themselves progressively weaker. U.S. and allied air would
dominate the skies over this and adjacent areas. If the DRV
chose to use air logistics to support the PAVN and Pathet Lao forces to the south, the aircraft could be intercepted, turned back, or shot down.

Detailed analysis of typical trail networks in this mountainous area indicates that one infantry brigade of three battalions could occupy and adequately control 20-25 kilometers of this band of territory. On this basis, 4 or 5 brigades (or about 12 to 15 battalions) can establish adequate control over the full 100-110 kilometer band. If a reserve force of 3 to 5 battalions were also provided locally, the total force would amount to some 15 to 20 battalions. This is essentially a two division force. Of this force, it is suggested that 5 or 6 battalions would be U.S. and the remainder allied, from whatever source they could be obtained—Lao, RVN, Philippine, Australian, Thai, and other possible battalions.

Announcement of the Action

The U.S. announcement of this action would make clear the U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia, would describe the recent history of Vietnam, including the DRV campaign to undermine the RVN, and U.S. assistance, and would build the case for the U.S. action by describing the events leading to the 1962 Geneva accords on Laos, the accords themselves, and the manner in which the DRV has for three years been systematically and deliberately violating these accords to undermine the RVN.
The two division force could be called the "International Peace Keeping Force." The deployment of the international force to cut the infiltration routes would be described as an action of restraint in the use of force, taken with the cooperation of the government of Laos, with the sole purpose of ensuring compliance with the 1962 Geneva accords. It might be appropriate to quote directly from these accords, signed by the DRV and 13 other nations, in which each of the signatory nations:

"Solemnly declare ... that they will recognize and will respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos ...

... they will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos ...

... they will refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos ...

... they will not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever ...

... they will not establish nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any ... foreign military installation of any kind ...

... they will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 15

It would be emphasized that this force has no aggressive purpose and specifically that it does not threaten North Vietnam. It would be important, however, to warn that the DRV should not intervene with additional forces in Laos. For example, it could be stated that the DRV now has some 14 battalions in Laos - if these
are removed under international inspection, the "International Peace Keeping Force" will be removed under the same inspection; if these are reinforced by the DRV, North Vietnam cannot be considered a sanctuary.

The object of the announcement of this action would be to portray a condition in which the United States, after displaying great patience, was finally in the interests of, and with the cooperation of, the free nations of Southeast Asia forced to act to put an end to the undermining of a friendly government from beyond its borders, that the only other choice was to allow this government to be slowly destroyed, and that the U.S. is standing by, strong, fully committed, and ready for developments. The U.S. strength in the area would be clear evidence that the U.S. is prepared for mainland war with the DRV and Communist China, which it would be in the best interests of Communist China and the DRV to avoid.

Feasibility

(U) Is this proposal militarily and politically feasible?

The timely concentration of forces appears feasible provided E-day is set well in advance, the utmost secrecy is maintained, detailed plans are made, suitable cover and deception are used, advantage is taken of the pre-deployment of the JTF to Thailand, and light forces consistent with the new operational concept are introduced first.

(U) The operations of the two division force to cut the infiltration routes appear feasible provided DRV strength in the area is not greatly increased prior to E-day and the DRV does not intervene in
in the area with an additional division or more. If, despite the
president's warning, the DRV does intervene, its territory would be
attacked and the land-air operational concept for Southeast Asia
would come into play as required for this level of escalation,
which would be, in effect, a mainland war with the DRV, and which
it would be important for the DRV to know would be disastrous to
them.

Feasibility of the proposed land-air operational concept
involves two considerations: First, is the air mobile concept itself
valid in a joint Army-Air Force framework; and second, using this
concept and additional tactical air, can conventional action achieve
U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia?

Professional men will obviously differ on the first point.
Answers to some important questions, such as the feasibility of air
logistics and the vulnerability of aircraft to ground fire and enemy
air, will never be "proven" except in combat. However, based on
the Army's tests and the CINCPAC comments, it seems probable that
the concept is feasible. One way to give this new idea a chance would
be to set up a JTF immediately in the CONUS, with the mission of
developing the concepts in detail.

As to the second point, a very high level of conventional
war seems to be feasible today. Whether it would be adequate to
deal with full DRV and Communist China intervention would depend
on the objective beyond the war. This paper proposes that the U.S.
political objective in a war with Communist China would be limited —namely, after achieving full command of the air over Southeast Asia and South China, and after punishing Communist China and halting on the ground her military expansion, to establish, along the lines of the Korean settlement, a limit to the territory under Communist control behind which the free peoples of Southeast Asia could achieve stability and the development of free institutions. It appears that this limited objective can be achieved by conventional action of acceptable type and duration, using available forces. It is essential to the concept that, if Communist China enters the war on the ground, there is no sanctuary in South China, and, in fact, no target in China is ruled out.

Politically, the proposal appears feasible. It should be possible to gain essential allied support in advance, and to present an adequate case to the rest of the world upon execution. The most troublesome problem would be to convince Souvanna Phouma that his best interests are served by this action.

As a rationale for securing Souvanna Phouma acceptance, the U.S. could use the following: First, the U.S. is committed and prepared to go ahead; second, he can count on U.S. strength and prudence; third, the force is strong but the action itself is very limited; fourth, the Allied Forces, Southeast Asia, including U.S. forces if necessary, will assist Phouma in holding the present line in northern Laos; fifth, the DRV will be attacked if they add more
battalions to Laos; sixth, this action promises to return the southern panhandle of Laos to RLG control; and seventh, if the free nations of Southeast Asia stand firm, it is not likely that the Chinese will elect to raise the level of the conflict, especially in view of U.S. readiness and the character of the action being undertaken.

As to the possible Chinese reaction, the proposed action incorporates a number of measures which will combine to inhibit Chinese intervention. These include: great force concentrated swiftly in the immediate area; restraint in the use of this force; the actual commitment of U.S. forces on the ground at a great distance from Chinese territory; an evident capability and willingness to move very effectively to higher stages of escalation without using nuclear weapons; an obvious U.S. ability to destroy the Communist Chinese Air Force; a local and worldwide posture of readiness for nuclear war if this becomes necessary; evident U.S. commitment and determination to see the action through; a U.S. initiative gained through strategic surprise; the possibility of a later conciliatory move toward Communist China, in the United Nations and elsewhere; the maintenance of continuing private communications with the Chinese through third country or other channels; and a minimum outright challenge to Communist China's power and prestige. Experience with the Communist Chinese in other crises indicates that under these circumstances the likelihood is that they would take the longer view and would not choose to raise the ante at this time.
Would this operation deal effectively with the Cambodian
sanctuary and other possibilities of infiltration? As to Cambodia,
one would expect that, if successful, this action would create a
situation in which the "realist" Sihanouk would be very likely to
reconsider his position. Measures might then become possible with
respect to Cambodian territory which are not possible today - hot
pursuit, for example. To assist Sihanouk in agreeing to such
measures, the U.S. should consider providing some sort of guarantees
that Cambodian boundaries with Vietnam would remain as they are when
the RVN defeats the Viet Cong. As to coastal infiltration, improved
measures would have to be taken to make this unprofitable to the DRV.
It seems reasonable to conclude that, with this proposed action and
complementary actions to deal with Cambodia and with coastal infiltra-
tion, the level of effectiveness of denial of outside support could
be raised from its approximately "2" at present to something like
"7" and that this aspect of counterinsurgency would be reaching
the zone of "success." (See Figure 3, p. 15)

Would this course of action, however, even if successful,
save South Vietnam? It would meet only the external problem. The
internal problem must also be solved. The RVN government must plan
and put into effect a systematic and working program to gain control
of its territory, root out the Viet Cong who are entrenched in the
countryside, and provide security and good government to its people.
While the proposed action would not of itself save Vietnam, it would
make it possible for that country to be saved.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusions

It is concluded that:

(U) To defend against revolutionary war as practiced today, the defender must cope effectively with both the internal and the external aspects. This is true in South Vietnam.

- External support to the Viet Cong is provided primarily by way of adjacent Laos and Cambodia. If this external support continues without marked reduction, there is little likelihood that the U.S. can achieve its objectives in South Vietnam.

- At end-1964, as the U.S. considered alternatives for coping with this situation, the commitment of significant U.S. troops had not been proposed as an alternative. This derived largely from U.S. experience in the past and from the current visualization of land warfare in Southeast Asia.

- Modern technology makes it possible to visualize a new concept for land-air action on the mainland of Southeast Asia. This new concept, coupled with great increases in U.S. conventional strength since 1961, makes possible proposals for action in Southeast Asia of a type which has not previously been considered.

- There are many possible specific proposals. As one example, it appears that the proposal outlined in this paper would deal effectively with external support of the Viet Cong, would make
possible the achievement of U.S. objectives in South Vietnam, and would establish the forward limits of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia thereby achieving stability in that area.

While this specific proposal appears feasible, the larger proposition is the more important - namely, that it appears possible to take advantage of modern technology and forces on hand to fashion a military capability for land-air action on the Southeast Asia mainland which brings to bear the technological superiority of the United States, and which gives some promise of being acceptable to the people of the United States and usable by their President toward a satisfactory solution in Southeast Asia.

Recommendations

It is recommended that an agency or group be designated as proponents to examine the larger proposition stated just above and to develop one or more proposals for action based on this proposition; that the proposal(s) then be subjected to careful analysis and war gaming; that the proposal(s) with the analysis, be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and, if such action is considered justified, that they be forwarded as alternative courses of action in Southeast Asia.
FOOTNOTES - UNCLASSIFIED


9. See classified footnotes.

10. See classified footnotes.


12. See classified footnotes.

13. See classified footnotes.


15. See classified footnotes.

16. The author has found no specific documentary evidence of this key point. The judgement derives from review of available documents and interviews with responsible officials.

17. See classified footnotes.


20. See classified footnotes.
21. See classified footnotes.
22. See classified footnotes.
23. See classified footnotes.
24. See classified footnotes.
26. See classified footnotes.
27. Interview in Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), 3 March 1965.
31. See classified footnotes.
32. See classified footnotes.
33. See classified footnotes.
34. See classified footnotes.
35. See classified footnotes.

10. MACV, Infiltration Study, pp. 5-7. (Confidential)


12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for Secretary Gilpatric, subject: Briefs of JCS OPLANs, CM-58-60, (23 March 1961). (Top Secret)

13. ASD(ISA), Memorandum ... attachment "Analysis," p. 5. (Top Secret)


15. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Briefs of Agenda Items for SecDef/ICS Meeting of 3 April 1961, (undated). (Top Secret)

16. MACV, Infiltration Study, pp. 1-2. (Confidential) Also compare order of battle in Laos in U.S. Pacific Command, Weekly Intelligence Digest, Number 21-61, pp. 6-7, with Number 18-62, pp. 6-7. (Secret)

17. Chief, MAAG-Vietnam, Outline, Chief MAAG-Vietnam, (undated), pp. 3-4. (Secret)


19. MACV, Infiltration Study, pp. 6-7. (Confidential)

32. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: Air Force Tactical Air Relationship Study (Southeast Asia), with attachments, (4 September 1964). (Top Secret)

33. 

34. Briefing by Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Department of the Army, to Office of ASD(Comptroller), 17 February 1965. (Secret)

35. U.S. Pacific Command, Weekly Intelligence Digest, Number 45-64, pp. 6-7. (Secret)
BIBLIOGRAPHY - UNCLASSIFIED

Books


Excellent insight and detail on developments in Laos since 1954.


Comprehensive analysis of Vietnam, past and present.


Of particular use in developing the reasons for the decision of the United States not to intervene with combat forces in Indochina in 1954.

Newspapers


Documents


An interesting short booklet which leaves little doubt that North Vietnam was engaged in a systematic and major effort to destroy the Republic of Vietnam by directing and providing resources to the Viet Cong insurgency.


This "White Paper" describes in detail the external support from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong.
BIBLIOGRAPHY - CLASSIFIED

Documents

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Viet Cong Infiltration. APO 143, San Francisco: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, MACV. 20 March 1963 (Confidential)

A resume of Viet Cong infiltration from January to August 1962.

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Viet Cong Infiltration. APO 143, San Francisco: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, MACV. 20 April 1964 (Confidential)

A resume of Viet Cong infiltration during the period 1960 to April 1964.

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Viet Cong Infiltration. APO 143, San Francisco: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, MACV. 31 October 1964 (Confidential)

Describes Viet Cong infiltration during the period 1959 to October 1964. This is the main source of information on infiltration through Laos in the preparation of this paper.

U.S. Pacific Command. Weekly Intelligence Digest. 1961 - 1964 (Secret)

These weekly digests are very useful sources for detailed information on Southeast Asia. Indexed at six months intervals.


An excellent analysis of the nature and significance of North Vietnam's support of the Viet Cong. The best single document found on the overall subject.
Personnel Infiltration

Sanctuaries

Cambodia

External Support

Map 3
Annex A

EVALUATION OF 14 SELECTED COUNTERINSURGENCIES

This appendix is a brief evaluation of a selected sample of 14 counterinsurgencies since World War II (Table 1). In seven of these, the counterinsurgency was successful. In the other seven, the counterinsurgency was unsuccessful, or resulted in a "draw" or stalemate, from which the insurgents achieved their goals.

The purpose of this evaluation is to determine such general relationship as may exist between the internal and the external aspects of an insurgency and counterinsurgency.

In each of the 14 cases, the external and the internal aspects are given a separate subjective rating, indicating by a number on a scale 0-10 the degree to which the counterinsurgency was advanced in that particular aspect.

The external rating indicates the degree to which the insurgents did not receive external support.

The internal rating indicates the effectiveness of internal measures, relative to the insurgent opposition.

Obviously, each insurgency has its own distinct set of circumstances. Within these 14, for example, external support varied widely. In the Philippines and Tibet, for example, external support was not provided at all. In Indochina, external support was massive and flowed essentially without interference. Internal measures also varied widely. In Hungary, highly efficient and brutal repression crushed the 1956 uprising. In Cuba, Batista attempted police state measures and failed miserably. The effectiveness with which the defender combined military and non-military measures differed greatly among the 14 cases.

Algeria is a noteworthy case. Here, the French measures to cut external support were effective, and the French Army's military action gained a slight
upper hand internally, bringing about a stalemate. However, the necessary 
non-military content of counterinsurgency was not provided by the French, 
the stalemate persisted, and the insurgents eventually achieved their ob-
jectives.

The ratings are summarized in Table 2, and are also plotted on a graph 
(Figure 1).

From these 14 cases, the following general principle is derived:

In order for a counterinsurgency to succeed, there must be both 
an internal effort substantially superior to that of the insurgents, 
and an effective restriction of (or an absence of) external support 
to the insurgents. Neither action alone is sufficient to success. 
Both are necessary.

Revolutionary war being a social, rather than a physical, phenomenon, 
there may be exceptions to this general principle. However, this brief exami-
nation of 14 cases indicates that a defender against insurgency would disregard 
the general principle stated above only at very substantial risk to his even-
tual success.
Table 1
A Selection of Insurgencies since World War II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterinsurgency Successful</th>
<th>Insurgency Successful (or a draw)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Table 2

<table>
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<th>Internal Rating</th>
<th>Insurgency</th>
<th>Insurgency Successful (or draw) Rating</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Burma</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>a. Algeria</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>b. China</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>c. Cuba</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>d. Indochina</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Malaya</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>e. Indonesia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>f. Israel</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>g. Laos</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 1

Legend:
- ○ - Counterinsurgency Successful
- □ - Insurgency Successful (or a draw)

Effectiveness of internal measures, relative to opposition

Degree to which insurgents did not receive outside support
BURMA (1948-1960)

External Support. - Independent in 1948, Burma had been greatly damaged in World War II and its poorly organized new government faced a chaotic internal situation in which five separate and rival factions were, by mid-1948, in open revolt. These were the Red Flag and White Flag Communists, the pro-Communist Peoples Volunteer Organization, separatists of the ethnic Karen minority, and regular army mutineers - a total of 20,000 to 40,000 armed insurgents. At this time arms and ammunition of World War II Japanese origin could be easily obtained. The Burmese government feared possible Chinese and Soviet support of the insurgents. However, apart from advice from Peking and the acceptance of 50-100 Burmese for training in Communist China, there is no evidence of substantial aid to the insurgents from either China or the USSR. Rating: 8.

Internal Measures. - Between March 1948 and early 1950, the major counterinsurgency effort was military - aimed, first, at eliminating the threat to Rangoon and the government itself, and second, at breaking the hold of the insurgents over large sections of the countryside and transportation routes. This was largely successful, and by 1952, the government was able to move to economic and social development. Amnesty offers, psychological warfare, improvement of economic conditions, mass education, and similar measures were used with fairly good effect. General Ne Win, after his bloodless coup of November 1958, stepped up both the military and psywar campaign, and pressed with the disarmament of civilians, including insurgents. By 1960, the country was sufficiently stable for elections to be held. (Insurgency in Burma, however, remains a problem to this date.) Rating: 6.

GREECE (1946-1949)

External Support.- The Greek Communist guerrillas (KKE) had the support of neighboring Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, which provided a sanctuary for retreat, recuperation, and training. Substantial arms and ammunition for the KKE also came across these borders. In July 1948, Tito broke with the Cominform, and Yugoslav aid began to taper off; by January supplies through Yugoslavia were reduced to a trickle. There is evidence that before the 1949 summer Greek offensive, shortages in small arms and artillery ammunition were felt by the guerrillas. Since the Yugoslavs had taken the lead in support of the KKE, their defection broke down the mechanism of support, and creation of a new mechanism was difficult because of the key geographic position of Yugoslavia. However, the Albanian and Bulgarian borders remained open until almost the end of the insurgency. Rating: 6.

Internal Measures.- The KKE began operations with hit and run raids and terror. This tied down the Greek defenders, whose tactics were initially poor, but did not succeed in holding any large areas of the countryside. While the KKE had a narrow popular base and the KKE insurgency had little social content, the Greek government had broad popular support. In late 1948, the KKE mistakenly changed from guerrilla to more conventional tactics and organization. Meanwhile, in 1947 and 1948, the Greek Army improved in quality and strength, and retrained and reshaped its strategy and tactics. By the end of 1948, the Greek Army had begun an effective gradual expansion of control from south to north, concentrating on selected areas one at a time. By August 1949 they had sealed the Albanian border, and by the end of 1949 organized KKE resistance had ceased. Rating: 8.

HUNGARY (1956)

External Support.— This revolution began 23 October. It was a great popular uprising—spontaneous, unplanned, and initially unorganized. Except for humanitarian supplies from charitable agencies in West Europe, the Hungarian "freedom fighters" received no outside aid. From the first, the Soviets were sensitive to the Austrian frontier. They quickly established control over the main road to Budapest, searching eastbound travelers and vehicles. Other Soviet forces reinforced the Hungarian border guards, who were unreliable during the revolution. On 31 October, when the Soviets moved back into Hungary completely, in force, they moved quickly to seal the border, accomplishing this on 2-3 November. Rating: 9.

Internal Measures.— The revolution took the Hungarian and Soviet authorities by surprise. Initial measures were ineffective. Hungarian troops joined the insurgents, and even Soviet troops did not have their hearts in the suppressive action. By 28 October, the revolution had actually succeeded. On 30 October, the end of the Communist government was announced and the Nagy coalition government was established, pledging free elections. On 30 and 31 October Soviet troops left Budapest. However, on the evening of 31 October, Soviet tank formations began entering Hungary in great strength. On the night of 3-4 November the Soviets struck and, with an estimated 100,000 men and 2,500 tanks and armored vehicles, brutally crushed the revolution. Although Kadar replaced Nagy, as the Soviets crushed the revolt they executed all government functions directly. By 15 November all fighting had stopped, mass deportations had begun, and the revolution was ended. Rating: 9.

Source: Hungary (1956), Pre-publication working paper (Washington, Special Operations Research Office, 1965)
**KOREA (1948-1954)**

**External Support.** From August 1948 when the Republic of Korea was formed and insurgency began to June 1950 when the North Koreans attacked south, the Communist insurgents in their mountain base areas in South Korea were supported from the north by the infiltration of at least 1000, and possibly 2000, trained guerrillas, mostly southerners sent north for training. However, only a trickle of supplies, if that, came from the north. From September 1950 when the United Nations forces drove the North Koreans out of South Korea until 1954 when the insurgency was defeated, the infiltration of personnel and supplies from the north to the insurgents was negligible. **Rating:** 9

**Internal measures.** Local ROK countermeasures against the guerrillas were generally ineffective up to December 1948, when the ROK Army opened operations with three of the eight ROK divisions. This operation was not particularly effective, either; troops used conventional tactics, and there was only a rudimentary psychological warfare effort. By June 1950, there had been no decline in the 7,000 man guerrilla force. Beginning in December 1951 a vigorous counterinsurgency campaign was conducted. Two divisions of regular troops, plus one of security troops, pressed a coordinated and well-organized military campaign, killing 11,000 and capturing 5,700 guerrillas, including 50 major leaders. From March 1952 to November 1953, two division-sized operations were conducted, using security and police troops. By this time guerrilla strength had been reduced to about 1,000. From December 1953 to mid-1954, the final two-division operation took place, at the end of which there were only 200 guerrillas, scattered and leaderless, and the guerrilla threat was eliminated. **Rating:** 2

MALAYA (1948-1957)

External Support.- After World War II, the Chinese of Malaya, about 40% of the population, were discriminated against and, with the continuing social and economic unrest, conditions were good for the insurgency which began in 1948. The Malayan Communist Party which directed the insurgency was small and 95% Chinese. About 20,000 guerrillas were supported by the Chinese mass civil organization Min Yuen. At first the guerrillas received an unknown amount of military goods via the Thai border and by sea, but countermeasures essentially shut off these sources of supply and there is no evidence of substantial external support, although Communist China is thought to have provided doctrinal and moral support, plus possibly some infiltration. Use of Thailand by the insurgents was inhibited by distance and terrain and by the 1949 agreement by which the Thai government permitted Federation police to pursue guerrillas for 10 miles inside the Thai border. Rating: 3.

Internal Measures.- Guerrilla action initially consisted of raids, ambushes, murder, robbery, terroristic activity, and attacks on police stations and government forces. The guerrillas had some initial success. After 1951 the British took well conceived countermeasures, including: unified direction of civil and military forces; increasing and reorganizing the police force; formation of home guards; and very effective military tactics. The British built up a regular and paramilitary force of 360,000, cut the logistic support of the guerrillas through resettlement of 500,000 Chinese, pursued the guerrillas relentlessly, granted amnesty to those who surrendered, and operated with very good intelligence. By 1957, the British were successful enough for Malaya to become independent, and by 1960 the insurgency was over. Rating: 8.

PHILIPPINES (1946-1954)

External Support.- The Communist guerrilla, or Huk, organization was formed in January 1942, fought the Japanese during the war, and by 1945 had a trained and experienced guerrilla army which eventually rose to 100,000 men. In 1945 and 1946, the Huks re-equipped themselves with stolen or misappropriated American arms. Huk sources of funds included gifts from wealthy Chinese supporters, taxes from areas under Huk control, and the proceeds from raids, holdups, and train robberies. Arms and ammunition were stolen or captured. Food and medical supplies were acquired through gift or confiscation. There is no evidence of external support. Rating: 9.

Internal Measures.- In 1945 the Huks controlled large rural areas and had a wealth of experience in organizing the population. From 1946 to 1950, Philippine government countermeasures were inadequate and the Huk movement gained strength. In September 1950, Ramon Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense. In October 1950, most of the Communist Party leadership was seized in raids in Manila. Led by Magsaysay, the armed forces were reorganized and reformed; an effective and vigorous military action was undertaken; social and economic reforms were instituted to win the people to the government side; effective psychological warfare accompanied military action; honest elections were held; guerrilla strength was eroded by offers of amnesty and support to those wishing a new start; and hard core leaders and units were relentlessly pursued. In 1953, Magsaysay was elected president. In May 1954 the Huk forces were reduced to a handful and their chief leader surrendered. Rating: 8.

Source: Alvin H. Scafl, The Philippine Answer to Communism, (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1955)
TIBET (1951-1960)

External Support.- The insurgency in Tibet after 1951 was directed against the occupation forces of the Chinese Communist regime, which contended that Tibet was an integral part of China and that its occupation by Chinese forces and the suppression of the resultant rebellion were purely internal matters. Despite the fact that from 1912 to 1950, China had exercised virtually no influence over Tibet's internal or external affairs, the Chinese point of view was tacitly accepted by India, Great Britain, the United States, and even the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan. Thus, there was essentially no outside aid available to the Tibetan insurgents, who were forced to rely upon limited and ancient arms and ammunition on hand, and on materiel captured from the Chinese Communists. Rating: 9.

Internal Measures.- From 1951 to 1956, Chinese Communists measures were relatively restrained and aimed primarily at preventing insurgency. However, Chinese occupation and repression led to armed Tibetan insurgency in 1957. Increased Chinese terror, desecration of religious institutions, and resettlement of Chinese in Tibetan territory intensified Tibetan resistance. The Chinese took even more drastic measures. From 25,000 in 1952, troop strength rose to 100,000 in late 1958 and finally, almost 200,000 in 1959. When the Dalai Lama escaped, forestalling Chinese plans to use him for their own purposes, very severe action was taken by the Chinese, including ruthless execution of suspected insurgents and mass reprisals against families and villages. By the end of 1960, the Chinese Communists, with their overwhelming numbers, brutal measures, superior weapons, and the mobility gained from their new roads, had ended the insurgency. Rating: 9.

ALGERIA (1954-1962)

External Support.- Beginning before 1954, but especially after 1956, the Algerian rebels (FLN) received very substantial outside support from other Arab countries, plus moral support from the Communist and Afro-Asian blocs and sympathizers elsewhere. In 1957 the FLN set up training and staging bases in Tunisia and Morocco. The French finally took strong measures to restrict external support. They interdicted arms shipments by sea and at great cost they built hundreds of miles of physical barriers along the Tunisian and Moroccan borders, with multiple barbed wire entanglements, electrified and alarm fences, minefields, radar coverage, and roads for movement of reserves. These barriers effectively closed the border to significant infiltration of supplies and personnel. Rating: 7.

Internal Measures.- By mid-1956, through indiscriminate attack and other action the French had driven most of the rural population to the FLN. The French Army then began the use of quadrillage, a grid-type garrisoning of urban and rural areas, and assumed most of the functions of government in the countryside. Special control tactics were devised for Algiers and other cities. Army units for government and psychological warfare became active. Effective military action forced the FLN to operate in ever smaller units. Despite great effort, the French Army’s political action measures did not "take" with the Algerian native population. No meaningful social or economic reforms were implemented. By mid-1958, with 500,000 troops, the French had through great effort achieved a slightly favorable military situation, but could gain no further advantage. In end-1957, the FLN shifted from general insurrection to maintenance of the stalemate and pressure on the French to negotiate and recognize Algerian independence. DeGaulle came to power in mid-1958, and the FLN objectives were achieved in 1962.

**CHINA (1927-1949)**

**External Support.** - The support which the Chinese Communists received from the USSR from 1927 to the end of World War II is not clear. Certainly there was doctrinal support and some training of cadres. Support was difficult early in this period because the Chinese Communists were isolated in remote rural areas. During the 1940-1945 war, the Chinese Communist expansion in Northwest China evidently received no significant Soviet material support. After 1945 the Chinese Communist received major indirect aid in the form of captured Japanese war materiel from the Soviet forces in Manchuria. This was of substantial help to the Communists and directly affected their strength in the final stages of the revolution. Rating: 5.

**Internal Measures.** - Beginning in 1931, Chiang was initially successful and forced the Communists on their "Long March" to Yenan in 1934. The Mao-Chiang truce of 1937 set up a joint war effort against the Japanese; however, Mao used the Japanese war to establish Communist control over great areas of the countryside and build his rural bases. With the Japanese defeat, the Nationalists moved north garrisoning the cities and towns but neglecting the countryside and making no efforts to create efficient local administration. The Nationalist effort was not well organized and suffered from U.S. attempts to unite the Nationalist and Communist armies. Nationalist troops, numerically superior in 1946 and 1947, overextended themselves in Manchuria, while the Communists conducted guerrilla warfare against their lines of communication and strengthened Communist control in the countryside. In mid-1947, the Communists began their north to south offensive and in two years their more disciplined, better led, and more effective forces defeated the Nationalists. Rating: 3.

CUBA (1953-1959)

External Support. In November 1956, Castro returned to Cuba from exile and after a near disastrous landing retreated to the Sierra Maestra with only 12 of his original party. During 1957, his movement gained publicity, attracted recruits, secured its mountain base, began guerrilla warfare, and became the foremost of the various revolutionary movements. Supplies were short, and many arms shipments were intercepted by Batista. Castro's leaders claimed that 95% of their arms and ammunition were captured from government forces. By the beginning of 1958, Castro began receiving substantial support from friends in the U.S. and Latin America. For example, arms shipments from Mexico and Costa Rica in mid-1958 permitted the formation of new guerrilla units. By this time, Batista's effectiveness was deteriorating and with it the effectiveness of his anti-smuggling efforts. Rating: 5.

Internal Measures. Batista used highly suppressive measures to stay in power. Despite some concessions, his regime was highly unpopular and open insurrection began in 1956. Batista countered with further repression, police state rule, and irrational terror. The morale and loyalty of the Cuban armed forces then deteriorated. Batista was ineffective against Castro, after Castro reached the Sierra Maestra. A 4,000 man infantry force was completely unsuccessful in early 1957. Containment operations in the rest of 1957 succeeded only in allowing Castro to build a secure base area in the mountains. In mid-1958 the Cuban Army launched a massive ground attack into the Sierra Maestra; this, too, was a failure. From this point, the military and political situation deteriorated sharply and by 1 January Batista was out and Castro was in control of Cuba. Rating: 1

Source: Cuba (1953-1959), Pre-publication working paper (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1965)
INDOCHINA (1946-1954)

External Support.- Before the insurgency began in 1946, the Viet Minh had gained control of villages along the China-Indochina border. In 1950, the Viet Minh destroyed the French border forts, eliminating further interference with support from Communist China. After the war, the Viet Minh had obtained substantial arms and equipment from Japanese, Chinese Nationalist, and even U.S. sources. In 1950, the Red Chinese assisted in training and equipping 26 Viet Minh battalions in China. Chinese logistic support grew each year: 10-20 tons per month in 1951; 250 tons per month by end 1952; 400-600 tons per month by 1953; and 1,500 to 4,000 tons per month between January and June 1954. Rating: 1.

Internal Measures.- Initial Viet Minh tactics were conventional and in early actions the French met with success. French military tactics fluctuated between the defensive establishment of forts, securing of routes, and control of towns to the offensive use of mobile forces. Some effective use was made of deep airborne thrusts. Air and inland naval forces played a major role. However, against increasingly effective guerrilla tactics and growing Viet Minh strength, the French, while causing heavy losses, were unable to make progress. Politically, they suffered because of late adoption of a policy of decolonization, the absence of respected indigenous leaders on their side, and a series of ineffective premiers under the inept leadership of the unpopular monarch Bao Dai. By 1949 the political struggle was in effect lost, and the various techniques the French used thereafter to win the population had little practical effect. Beginning in December 1953, the military situation deteriorated, culminating in the loss of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. The cease fire was signed in July 1954. Rating: 3.

INDONESIA (1946-1949)

External Support.- World War II ended with the Netherlands East Indies in the hands of Indonesian nationalists who, with Japanese concurrence, proclaimed the independence of the Indonesian Republic in August 1945. The Dutch, with limited transport, were forced to re-enter Indonesia and wrest control from this nationalist movement. Indonesian armed forces although not well organized amounted to some 120,000 men and eventually grew to between 200,000 and 400,000 paramilitary and regular. They started with poor supplies and equipment, initially of Japanese and pre-war Dutch origin. The Indonesians were helped by foreign aid, including loans from the Philippines, Canada, Australia, and the Export-Import Bank, and food from Burma and India. World opinion condemned the Dutch were generally unable to prevent outside aid from reaching Indonesian guerrilla forces. Rating: 4.

Internal Measures.- The Dutch eventually introduced more than 100,000 troops into Indonesia, of which about half were Indonesians with Dutch officers. The Dutch underestimated the nationalist strength and popularity and overestimated their own position. Through military action they gradually gained some control over the territory. In two "police actions" they attempted to reduce the control of the Republic of Indonesia and to establish a federation of states associated with the Netherlands. Dutch military actions were fairly effective, but their political actions were not and their position became increasingly untenable. The prospect of prolonged guerrilla war against the effective Indonesian forces, plus worldwide adverse reaction to the Dutch campaign, finally through the U.N. led the Dutch to negotiate in 1949, and Indonesia eventually became fully independent. Rating: 3.

External Support: Substantial stocks of weapons and ammunition had been collected in World War II and cached in the countryside by the Jewish insurgents before they began operations against Great Britain's mandate rule in Palestine in 1946. These stocks were augmented by some local production and by capturing and stealing from British forces. The insurgents were also supported by the world Zionist organization, which was able to purchase arms abroad and which was assisting the displaced Jews of Europe in migrating to Palestine. The British took strong measures to interdict external support. Through a naval blockade they were able to prevent large scale immigration. However, despite their measures, they were able neither to prevent the entry of individuals and small groups, nor to prevent the clandestine entry of sizeable amounts of arms and ammunition. Rating: 6.

Internal Measures: From 1946 to 1948 the British committed between 80,000 and 90,000 troops against approximately 35,000 armed Jewish insurgents. The British tactics were good. However, they were faced by a very intelligent and dedicated opponent, who had the complete support of the highly cohesive Jewish community, who operated with near perfect intelligence, and who skillfully combined terror and propaganda with military action. The British were unable to make much progress. By late 1947, the Palestine problem had gone to the United Nations and the British were operating more as peacemakers between the Jews and the Arabs contesting for Palestine. The British withdrew in May 1948, the independence of Israel was proclaimed, and the fighting turned into the Arab-Israeli War. Rating: 3.

Source: Israel (1946-1948), Pre-publication working paper (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1965)
External Support.- The Communist Pathet Lao had from pre-1954 days been supported and even manipulated by the North Vietnamese under Ho Chi Minh. Beginning in July 1959, with North Vietnamese support, Pathet Lao military forces moved to expand their control in the northeastern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. For a year they combined military action with grass roots political activity to undermine Royal Laotian Government (RLG) control. From August 1960 to May 1961, the Pathet Lao expanded eventually to control about two-thirds of the territory of Laos, operating throughout with North Vietnamese units, advisors, and logistic support. Beginning in December 1960, the Pathet Lao received substantial Soviet airlift support, which brought in Communist bloc arms and equipment. There was no significant interference with external support throughout this two year insurgency. Rating: 1.

Internal Measures.- Effectiveness of the RLG counterinsurgency measures was severely hampered by poor organization, factionalism in the RLG, frequent changes in government, shifting U.S. policy and support, and the inability of the RLG to take effective political and other counterinsurgency action at the district and village level. RLG military action left much to be desired. By early 1961, the Pathet Lao had clearly gained the upper hand and were prevented from overrunning the entire country only by the restraining influence of the US-UK-USSR negotiations which led to the Geneva Conference and eventually to the neutralization of Laos under a coalition government. (Pathet Lao insurgency continues in Laos) Rating: 2.