5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)
1st SPECIAL FORCES

OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD
ENDING 31 OCT 67

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS BY AUTHORITY OF
CO, 5TH SF GA 15 NOV 67

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
Subject: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67, from HQ, 5th Sp Forces Gp (ULC: WA4XAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APG San Francisco 96658 14 FEB 68

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

10. Incl.

Copy furnished:
MH Br, Ops Div, G-3

12 Feb 68
MFR:

1. Summary:
   b. Analysis: All problem areas have been adequately covered by previous ind.

2. Basis for Act & Act: 2d Ind to DA.


4. Coord:
   Concur G1 (by lineout on Cmt 1, 15 Jan 68)
   Concur G5--(Cmt 2, DF, C. L. JACKSON, COL, GS, dtd 10 Jan 68)
   Concur G3 Op (by lineout on Cmt 1, 25 Jan 68)
   Concur G4 (Cmt 4, DF, 7 Feb 68, D. GOWER, LTC, GS)

APPROVED FOR SIGNATURE AND DISPATCH

FOR V. G. OBERG
COL, GS
Ch, SA Br, DT Div, G3

64

BEN STERNBERG
Major General, GS
Assistant Chief of Staff, GS
1. References:
   a. AR 1-19.
   b. Paragraphs 4c(1) and (2), USARPAC Reg 1-19, dated 22 Sep 1967.

2. Subject report, with forwarding indorsements, is transmitted herewith for action required by reference lb, above.

3. Your comments will form the basis for the indorsement of subject report to DA from this headquarters per paragraph 5f of USARPAC Reg 1-19. Accordingly, it is requested that such comments include:
   a. USARPAC actions taken or projected which will solve or alleviate problems or correct deficiencies noted in the ORLL.
   b. Developments affecting the report which occurred subsequent to its forwarding indorsements.
   c. Appropriate recommendations to DA for correction of deficiencies beyond the capability of this headquarters.
   d. Concurrence with report, as indorsed, or non-concurrence and specific reasons therefor.

4. In order for this office to meet the required suspense date to DA, it is requested that each addressee make every effort to reply by the date indicated in parenthesis.
GPCA (4 Jan 68)
SUBJECT: ORLL for the Pd End 31 Oct 67, HQ 5th SP Forces Gp (Abn), 1st Sp Forces
TO: G5 FROM: G3 DATE: 20 Jan 68 CMT 2 (U)
5th SP Forces Gp (Abn) 1st Sp Forces

G5 concurs in subject report as indorsed, with recommendation it be routed to G4 Procurement Office for comments in that area (ref para 2c, 1st Ind).

CHARLES L. JACKSON
Colonel, GS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G5

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED When Separated
From CLASSIFIED Inclosure(s).

GPOP-DT (4 Jan 68)
SUBJECT: ORLL for the Pd End 31 Oct 67, HQ 5th SP Forces Gp (Abn), 1st Sp Forces
TO: G4 FROM: G3 DATE: 5 Feb 68 CMT 3 (U)

COL Oberg/86-2468

Request comment as suggested by Comment 2, above.

BEN STEINBERG
Major General, GS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G3

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED When Separated From CLASSIFIED Inclosure(s)
TO: G3
FROM: G4
7 Feb 68
LTC Wyatt/Ph/86-2436

1. Reference is made to para 2c, 1st Ind.

2. The situation expressed here is strictly an in-country problem, which must be resolved between USARV and MACV. The procurement programs in Vietnam are managed by MACV and are intricately tied in with the economy of the country.

3. The recommendation by USARV, para 2c, 1st Ind, is intended to correct the situation, and is regarded as being the correct approach. A copy of the USARV indorsement has been forwarded to the reporting unit (para 4, 1st Ind).

4. Believe that no specific mention of this item need be made in the USARPAC indorsement to DA.

VINCENT C. GUERIN
Colonel, GS
Acting ACoS, G4

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE (S)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco, 96240

AVGB-C

15 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375

THRU: Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
APO San Francisco, 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

SECTION 1 (S) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) During this quarter CIDG operations throughout the country were again characterized by aggressive pursuit of enemy units in the field. There has been a definite drop, however, in contacts with the enemy on a small unit level. This reduction in enemy contact was especially noticeable in I CTZ and IV CTZ during the months of August and September. Contacts with the enemy in both I CTZ and IV CTZ increased sharply in October. In conjunction with the decrease in enemy activity there was also a general decrease in both enemy and friendly casualties and is reflected in the statistical data for this reporting period. The 1,624 VC/NVA KIA reflect a decrease of 15% from the 1,931 KIA reported during the previous quarter. There was a 33% decrease in the number of USASF killed and almost a 40% decrease in CIDG killed. It was noted in the last report that the VC and NVA were showing increasing willingness to accept severe losses in order to accomplish limited objectives.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U) 15 November 1967

This trend has continued throughout this reporting period as evidenced by the large scale enemy attack on 7 August against Camp Tong Le Chon (See After Action Report at Inclosure 10) in which the enemy suffered 152 confirmed killed and the series of attacks launched against Loc Minh, the first of which took place on 29 October. A complete report of the Loc Minh attack will be included in the next ORL. It is believed that during this period of elections the VC/NVA were desperately seeking victories for propaganda purposes and the normal small unit operations could not achieve this purpose. Enemy mortar attacks of a harassing nature were numerous, especially in II CTZ and III CTZ. Also during the month of October detachments in IV CTZ were subjected to several mortar attacks.

In order to eliminate confusion caused by the use of special names such as Mike Force and Mobile Guerrilla Force, etc., when used in reporting to higher headquarters, a new policy was adopted. For reference purposes only, three unit types are authorized. The three types are Mobile Strike Forces (previously referred to as Mike Forces and Mobile Guerrilla Forces), Camp Strike Forces, and Combat Reconnaissance Platoons.

Special operations continued to penetrate enemy base areas and interdict routes of infiltration. Four mobile guerilla operations conducted by mobile strike forces were completed in II CTZ and one in the Nui Coto Mountains of IV CTZ. Detachments B-50 (Omega), B-52 (Delta), B-56 (Sigma), and B-36 (Provisional) conducted a total of nine special operations in all corps areas except IV CTZ. The most significant of these operations in terms of enemy casualties was Operation Shortstop conducted by detachment B-56 in southwest Long Kanh Province, III CTZ during the period 8-25 October. Enemy casualties were 117 KIA. An operation was conducted by Camp Trung Dung A-502 on 10 August with the combined forces of one company of ARVN Rangers from the LLDB High Command and one company of National Police. This was the first time that USAF and CIDG had participated in an operation of this type with the Rangers and National Police in the Nha Trang area.

One CIDG camp, Luong Hoa, was closed and camps were opened at Sa Huynh and Bu Prang. A parachute assault by a 59 man pathfinder team and 296 Pleiku Mobile Strike Force troops with their USAF and VNSF advisors was conducted in conjunction with the opening of the camp at Bu Prang on 5 October. Four camps were converted to VNSF control in conjunction with the program designed to conserve USAF manpower and facilitate the opening of camps in other locations.

In the field of intelligence the emphasis has been on developing mutually supporting intelligence programs. The 5th SFAG Concept of Operations for CY 68 was approved by COMUSMACV, on 12 August.

Revolutionary Development Support Activities were highlighted by the completion of 60 day trial periods to test the feasibility of providing a commissary system for CIDG and dependents. Another plan to establish PX canteens at each CIDG camp was developed and tested in I CTZ.

A project was initiated during this reporting period to immunize over 113,000 CIDG, dependents, and VN civilians in the immediate areas of CIDG camps against plague. Approximately 65,000 were immunized by 31 October.
2. (C-NCFORIN) Intelligence.
   a. During the reporting period the MI augmentation personnel became established in the 5th Special Forces Group and conducted a background study of intelligence problems peculiar to Special Forces in Vietnam. This study conducted on an informal basis has resulted in better targeting of intelligence efforts by Special Forces personnel.

   b. Emphasis has been placed on the various branches of the S-2 section of the 5th SFGA for developing mutually supporting programs. The purpose of these programs is to improve and strengthen intelligence operations already in existence in the field as well as establishing new sources of information. The training of indigenous personnel utilized in intelligence gathering has improved resulting in more reliable information being received. Additional security for the 5th SFGA has been achieved by a strengthening of counterintelligence programs. Specific significant activities accomplished are listed by branch of the S-2 as follows.

   (1) Counter-Intelligence Branch.

   A systematic series of announced, unannounced, and courtesy counter-intelligence inspections was initiated. Additional CI nets were formed and a large number were planned for implementation in the near future. A large number of CIDG were investigated and cleared. Viet Cong infrastructure files were established which are 20.2% completed to date. Blacklists have been compiled and will be used on a continuing basis. Investigations were conducted involving sabotage, espionage, and subversion. Finally a number of installations were oriented to use CI questions in the interrogation of Viet Cong suspects.

   (2) Collection Branch.

   (a) The collection branch has made significant progress during the period in the field of source control. At the beginning of the quarter the source control program was relatively unsophisticated and 5th SFGA was forced to rely on MACV J2 source control section for any file checks that were run on prospective agents. Presently the collection branch has accumulated on file over 1000 names of agents. The branch can check these files on prospective agents prior to sending the name of the agent to MACV. Additionally the collection branch has files on all agents that are of operational interest to 5th SFGA, all agents that are coded by 5th SFGA, and all agents that have been terminated, plus the reason for termination.

   (b) The collection branch has been made the office of record for all Information Reports published by 5th SFGA coded sources and has established an active file of all such reports to include the evaluation of these reports. The branch is able to determine the reliability of most of the agents working for 5th SFGA by monitoring this file. This permits more timely reaction to reports submitted by reliable sources and also permits the termination of those sources who are unproductive or who have been submitting false or insignificant reports.
c. Reporting procedures have been established for the expenditure of CIDG code 912 funds at the various companies and detachments. These expenditures are reported on a monthly basis and allow a comparison with the production of the agent nets. Prior to the establishment of this program the amount of funds spent was not controlled or monitored. With the establishment of the collection nets and the monitoring of the expenses the amount spent has been reduced while the volume and value of the information has increased.

The S-2 section has initiated a program of timely reaction to intelligence. As material is fed into the order of battle branch, it is rapidly evaluated for information that could be reacted upon by assets of the 5th SFPA. When such an item comes to the attention of the OB analyst, a memorandum for record is forwarded to the appropriate staff section. The memorandum includes all known data on the target along with suggestions as to the weaknesses or vulnerabilities that might be exploited. The results of each effort of this type are given to the S-2 for evaluation of the program.
3. (S) Operations and Training:

a. Plans:

(1) On 12 August, COMUSMACV was briefed on the 5th SFGAs Concept of Operations for CY 68. The plan was approved with the exception of the portion pertaining to III CTZ. General Westmoreland directed that a study be made with a view toward moving camps in War Zone "C" to locations in the Katum, Elephant Ear and Bo Tuc areas. This study has been made and forwarded to MACV. In addition to relocations cited above, the study called for relocation of camps on the eastern edge of the Plain of Reeds in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces.

(2) On 27 September, MTOE 31-105E (Airborne Special Forces Group) and TDA for Special Operations were forwarded from USARV to USARPAC. These two documents are presently being reevaluated in order to bring the Group organization in line with present and anticipated requirements.

(3) Plans are being made for a quarterly review of the 5th SFGA CY 68 Concept of Operations to be made during the month of November 1967.

b. Operations.

(1) Summary of significant operations by Corps Tactical Zones.

(a) I CTZ: From 7 - 12 August two companies of the Danang Recon Force with six USASF and one AATTV, while on a joint operation with elements of Task Force Oregon in Quang Ngai Province, accounted for 11 VC killed, two captured, eight suspects detained, nine individual weapons and nine Chicom grenades seized; six tons of rice, 2,000 pounds of assorted foodstuff, 20 sampans, 115 structures, 165 pounds of tabacco, and four tunnel complexes destroyed. One USASF was wounded. On 13 August a platoon size heliborne operation with two USASF from Camp Tra Bong, A-107, in Quang Ngai Province, found a VC weapons cache and seized eight Soviet rifles, two Chicom grenades, and assorted ammunition. On 19 August, a search and destroy operation with two USASF from Camp Ha Thanh, A-101, in Quang Ngai Province, made contact with two enemy squads. Four VC were killed; four weapons, two mines, and one grenade were captured, without incurring any friendly casualties.

On 2 September at 0200 hours an RF/FF outpost near Thuong Duc, Det A-109, was attacked by a VC company. Camp Thuong Duc fired 105mm artillery in support and sent a reaction force at first light. Airstrikes were called and resulted in one secondary explosion. Results were five VC killed, five weapons captured; 13 Chicom grenades, one shaped charge, two satchel charges, one box 7.62mm LMG ammunition, and two sets of wire cutters seized. There were no friendly casualties. On 19 September the 11th Mobile Strike Force Company, Det A-113, Danang, Quang Nam Province, taking part in Operation Wheeler, initiated contact with an estimated company of NVA. The friendly element remained in contact with the enemy for eight hours after which it was reinforced by a recon element of the 502d Inf, 101st Abn Div. Results of the contact were eight NVA killed, two CIDG killed, 13 CIDG and one USASF wounded. The friendly element lost one BAR and one 60mm mortar.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

On 6 October, an operation from Ha Thanh, A-101, Quang Ngai Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF, and 80 CIDG made contact with one VC platoon. Results of the encounter were three VC killed and one US carbine captured. There were no friendly casualties.

On 15 October a security operation from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF, and 75 Camp Strike Force personnel were providing security for elements of the 101st Airborne Division when they came under attack by an unknown number of VC. The VC were firing 81mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, and throwing satchel charges. After a brief fire fight the VC broke contact and withdrew, leaving behind six VC killed, one pistol, one AK-47, and 30 Chicom grenades. Friendly losses were six Camp Strike Force personnel killed and five wounded. On 19 October a recon operation from Camp Thuong Duc, A-109, Quang Nam Province, consisting of two VNSF and 40 Camp Strike Force troops initiated contact against 20 VC. A short fire fight followed and the VC broke contact. The friendly element called in artillery on the suspected withdrawal route. The patrol lifted the fire and made an immediate sweep of the area. Results of the encounter were two VC killed, two separate blood trails were found along with two grenades and one anti-personnel mine. There were no friendly casualties. On 20 October a search and destroy operation from Camp Gia Vuc, A-103, Quang Ngai Province, consisting of two USASF and 85 Camp Strike Force personnel initiated contact against 30 heavily armed VC. TAC air was called and upon completion of the air strike the patrol made an immediate sweep of the area. Results of the action were six VC killed and two bolt action rifles captured. One Camp Strike Force soldier was wounded. On 20 October, an operation from Camp Tra Bong, A-107, Quang Ngai Province, consisting of four USASF, 50 Camp Strike Force personnel and 25 Popular Force made contact with four VC who immediately withdrew to a cave and bunker complex. The patrol assaulted the complex but was unable to regain contact. Results of the contact were two bunkers, eight structures, 350 kilos of salt and 30 kilos of rice destroyed. There were no friendly casualties.

On 23 October an operation from Camp Ba To, A-106, Quang Ngai Province, consisting of two USASF, 25 Camp Strike Force personnel and 25 PF initiated contact with seven VC. Results of the action were four VC killed, three VC wounded, one MAS 36 rifle and one Chicom grenade captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 26 October a recon operation from Camp Tien Phuoc, A-102, Quang Tin Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF, and 85 Camp Strike Force personnel received light sniper fire. There were no casualties. At 1300 hours on the 26th the patrol observed 300 VC moving in a southeasterly direction. The patrol immediately called 450 rounds of 155mm artillery from elements of the 101st Airborne Brigade located in the camp. A FAC was on station and directed airstrikes into the area. There were 71 VC killed by the airstrikes and artillery. There were no friendly casualties.
At 1100 hours the patrol received two rounds of 60mm mortar fire which resulted in no friendly casualties. On 27 October the patrol was ambushed by an enemy force of undetermined size resulting in one camp Strike Force soldier killed. Enemy casualties for this contact are unknown. The patrol had been reinforced and continued the search and destroy operation. On 26 October a recon patrol from Camp Thuong Duc, A-109 Quang Nam Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF and 10 Camp Strike Force personnel made chance contact with two VC. The patrol opened fire on the VC at a range of 100 meters. Results of the contact were one VC killed, one VC captured, and one AK-47 seized. There were no friendly casualties.

(b) II CTZ: On 3 August at 1000 hours, a search and destroy operation from Camp Dak Seang, A-245, in Kontum Province, was ambushed and surrounded by an estimated two companies of NVA. The contact lasted for approximately four hours. Gunships were on station at 1030 hours, and the camp supported the operation with 4.2 inch mortar and 105mm howitzer fire. At 1045 hours a reaction force was dispatched from the camp. Contact was made with one company of NVA in the vicinity of the first contact, followed by a ten minute fire fight. At 1500 hours one ARVN regiment consisting of two airborne battalions, one infantry battalion and one artillery battery arrived at Camp Dak Seang. At 1700 hours the three ARVN battalions departed to conduct search and destroy operations west, southwest and northwest of the camp. On the 4th at 0100 hours, the camp received four rounds of 82mm mortar fire. All rounds landed outside the camp's perimeter. There were no casualties or damage. At 1000 hours the ARVN Task Force recovered five bodies, two USASF and three CIDG. Total results of the contacts were 16 NVA killed and two captured, two USASF and 11 CIDG killed, two USASF and 11 CIDG wounded, and six CIDG missing. On 10 August, a cordon and search operation from Camp Trung Dung, A-502, Khanh Hoa Province, combined forces with one company of ARVN Rangers from the VNSF High Command and one company of National Police with a Chieu Hoi who pointed out known VC. The village of Vinh Thanh and two others were searched, resulting in the apprehension of 19 VC, one VC suspect, 15 ARVN deserters, and 27 civilians without proper identification. This was the first time that USASF and CIDG had participated in an operation of this type with the Rangers and National Police in the Nha Trang area. On 23 August a search and destroy operation consisting of two USASF and one company of CIDG from Camp Nhon Co, A-235, Quang Duc Province, initiated contact with four VC moving southeast along a trail. A brief fire fight ensued during which the four VC were killed and three rifles captured by the friendly element. On 24 August at 1015 hours a recon element from Camp Trang Phuc, A-233, in Darlac Province made contact with 12 NVA. Three NVA were killed, one AK-47 rifle and three rucksacks were captured. There were two CIDG wounded.

On 7 September, a search and destroy operation consisting of six USASF, three VNSF and 226 CIDG was engaged by intense automatic weapons fire. The operation consisted of troops from Camp Dong Tre, A-222, and Camp Van Canh, A-223, was taken under fire by an estimated platoon. At the time of contact, friendly forces were attempting to encircle the village of Phu Xuan, located three kilometers north of Camp Dong Tre. Contact was initiated by the enemy at a distance of 200 meters. Friendly casualties were one USASF, and one VNSF killed; one USASF and four CIDG wounded. On 4 September, a hamlet security element from Camp Trung Dung, A-502, Khanh Hoa Province, ambushed a squad of VC with the aid of a starlight scope.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

The ambush element took the VC under fire from a range of 20 meters. The VC immediately broke contact and withdrew. Results were four VC killed, and four weapons captured. On 10 September, a reconnaissance operation consisting of 30 CIDG from Camp Trung Dung, A-502, Khanh Hoa Province, ambushed 15 VC 10 kilometers east of Nha Trang. The friendly ambush opened fire on the VC at a range of 30 meters. A short fire fight followed. The VC broke contact, leaving behind four dead, and two small arms. On 15 September, a search and destroy operation consisting of two USASF, two VNSF, and 100 CIDG from Camp Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province, made contact with an estimated platoon of VC 25 kilometers east of Tuy Hoa. The CIDG engaged the VC at a range of 300 meters causing the VC to break contact and withdraw. Results of the contact were two VC killed; two Chicom 56 rockets, 60 rounds of 7.62 ammo and a bag of malaria pills captured. On 25 September, a search and destroy operation from Mang Buk, A-246, Kontum Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF, and 120 CIDG made contact with an estimated 200 NVA, 65 kilometers north northeast of Kontum. On the 26th, eight USASF, two VNSF, and 11th Mobile Strike Force from Pleiku linked up with the Mang Buk operation. The operation continued on the 27th and contact was made with the NVA at a range of 200 meters. Air strikes were called throughout the day. On the 28th a sweep of the area was made and numerous blood trails were found. The NVA had withdrawn to the northwest. On 27 September, a search and destroy operation from Trang Phuc, A-233, Daklak Province, consisting of two USASF, one VNSF, and one company of CIDG made contact with a company of NVA attempting to cross a rope bridge 40 kilometers north northwest of Ban Me Thuot. The NVA were taken under fire at a range of 15 meters. Three NVA were killed instantly. The NVA withdrew with the CIDG in pursuit. A sweep of the area revealed that it had been used as a base camp. Thirteen caves were found along with one SKS carbine, four bags of rice, eight field packs, two grenades, 200 rounds of assorted small arms ammunition, 1,235 pounds of TNT and a quantity of medical supplies. The operation withdrew across the bridge and set up an ambush. On the morning of 28 September, a platoon of NVA again attempted to cross the bridge. The CIDG opened fire and three NVA were killed. The CIDG crossed the bridge in pursuit and swept the area to reestablish contact. Eight graves were found. The graves contained eight enemy bodies. There were no friendly casualties.

On 5 October, a 59 man pathfinder team made a parachute assault 70 kilometers west southwest of Ban Me Thuot. The pathfinder team secured the area and 30 minutes later a mass jump was made by the Pleiku Mobile Strike Force (MSF) consisting of 296 NSF personnel and their USASF and VNSF advisors. No enemy contact was made. Two companies of Camp Strike Force (CSF) personnel were brought into the area by CH-47 helicopters to start construction on a new Special Forces fighting camp. The new camp will be named Bu Prang, A-236. Local civilians from a nearby village were detained for questioning. The civilians stated that they knew nothing of the airborne assault, and that they feel safe knowing that a camp is being constructed in their area.

On 10 October the Special Forces Operational Base in Nha Trang came under 82mm mortar attack fired from 2,000 meters east of the SFOB by an unknown number of VC. Nine mortar rounds landed inside the SFOB compound causing slight damage to the supply storage area. There were no casualties. On 8 October, a search and destroy operation from Camp Luong Son, A-237, Binh Thuan Province, consisting of one Camp Strike Force platoon, made contact with two squads of VC, 53 kilometers southwest of Phan Rang.
AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

15 November 1967

A brief fire fight ensued from a range of 50 meters. The VC broke contact, leaving behind ten dead. A reaction force from Camp Luong Son reinforced the operation with two USASF and one Camp Strike Force platoon. A sweep of the area revealed four small arms and the 10 VC dead. On 12 October a search and destroy operation consisting of five USASF, and one Mobile Strike Force Company, operating at Camp Bu Prang, A-236, Quang Duc Province, made contact with an unknown number of NVA, 10 kilometers northeast of Camp Bu Prang. After a short fire fight at close range the NVA broke contact and withdrew in an unknown direction. Four NVA were captured and one killed in the action. There were no friendly casualties.

On the 19th of October, Camp Duc Lap, A-239, Quang Duc Province, came under mortar attack by an unknown number of VC, using an estimated three 60mm mortars. The VC fired 20 rounds into the camp perimeter, wounding one USASF. Camp Duc Lap fired counter mortar on the suspected enemy positions causing the enemy to cease fire and withdraw. A reaction force was immediately dispatched. The reaction force swept the enemy mortar positions without contact.

On 25 October a search and destroy operation from Cung Son, A-221, Phu Yen Province, consisting of one platoon of CSF made contact with an estimated squad of VC 30 kilometers southwest of Tuy Hoa. A fire fight ensued from a range of 50 meters, after which the VC fled west. Eight VC were killed; two Mauser rifles, one US Carbine and one VC flag was captured. There were no friendly casualties. On 25 October a combat recon platoon from Camp Trung Dung, A-502, Khanh Hoa Province, ambushed 30 VC 12 kilometers west of Nha Trang. After a short fire fight from a range of 15 meters the VC broke contact. A search of the area revealed 13 VC killed; one VC wounded; one VC captured along with 12 small arms, seven hand grenades, 21 AK-47 magazines and 300 pounds of rice. There were no friendly casualties. On 25 October a search and destroy operation from Camp Polei Kleng, A-221, Kontum Province consisting of two USASF, one VNSF and 30 CSF troops made contact with an estimated company of NVA 20 kilometers northwest of Kontum. A fire fight ensued and the USASF directed two air strikes on the NVA positions. The operation was reinforced by two USASF, one VNSF and 75 CSF troops from the camp. When the reinforcing element linked up with the element in contact, a sweep was conducted to assess the area. Four NVA were killed and two SKS carbines captured. There were no friendly casualties.

(c) III CTZ: On 1 August a search and destroy operation consisting of two companies of CIDG, two USASF and two VNSF from Ben Soi, A-321, Tay Ninh Province, made contact with an estimated company of VC eight kilometers northwest of camp. Results were seven CIDG killed, two wounded, and four small arms missing; five VC killed, one US carbine captured. On 3 August a Mobile Strike Force operation consisting of 370 Mobile Strike Force, four USASF and two VNSF from Detachment A-302 at Bien Hoa made contact with a VC company in a base camp complex eight kilometers northwest of camp Loc Minh, Binh Long Province. After a 50 minute fire
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fight; with artillery, a light fire team, and tactical aircraft in support, the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results of this operation were one USASF, two MSF killed, two MSF wounded, 11 VC killed; five AK rifles, two 40mm grenade launchers, one Soviet rifle, 15 anti-tank mines w/fuses, 2,000 feet of firing wire, 15-20 grenades, documents, food and ammunition captured; and assorted clothing destroyed in the base camp. On 4 August a heliborne search and destroy operation consisting of 100 CIDG, two USASF, one VNSF from Minh Thanh, A-332, Binh Long Province, engaged in a one hour fire fight with a company of VC four kilometers southwest of camp. Two CIDG were slightly wounded and 15 VC were killed. On 7 August at 0019 hours Camp Tong Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long Province, began receiving mortar fire just outside of the southern wire perimeter. Counter mortar and 105mm artillery fire from the camp as well as 175mm artillery fire from Quan Loi was initiated. At 0039 hours the mortar fire increased and small arms fire was received in the southeast portion of the camp. By this time a FAC, an AC-47, a flare ship, and two light fire teams had been dispatched in support. At 0050 a reinforced NVA company began firing mortars, small arms, 40mm anti-tank rockets and 75mm recoiless rifles at the city of Hon Quan. The intensity of mortar and small arms fire directed at Camp Tong Le Chon steadily increased. At 0122 hours mortar rounds began falling on the camp's inner perimeter, and the command bunker took a direct hit. The firing continued unabated until 0157 hours, when the NVA assaulted and penetrated the southeast portion of the perimeter. Within 10 minutes the enemy had been pushed out of the camp. Although the small arms fire diminished after this, the mortar fire continued, and at 0222 hours small arms fire was again received in the southern portion of the camp. At 0311, even with an increase in airstrikes, the NVA assaulted the south and east walls of the camp. The assault was driven back by fire from the camp's defenders and several effective airstrikes. One hour later the NVA again attacked the east wall, with one squad accomplishing a breakthrough. After a continuous fire fight which lasted until 0535 hours, two NVA had been captured and the rest of the squad killed. At 0948 hours, while evacuation of casualties was in progress, small arms fire was received from the west, but was silenced by tactical aircraft and light fire teams. Evacuation of the casualties was completed at 1010 hours. Total enemy losses were 152 NVA killed, two NVA captured (one of whom later died of wounds); 55 small arms, 15 crew served weapons, one Chicom radio, and assorted munitions captured. Friendly casualties were 21 CIDG and one VNSF killed, five USASF and 69 CIDG wounded, and 19 CIDG missing. Camp facilities were heavily damaged and much equipment was destroyed, including two 4.2 mortars, two 81mm mortars, and one light machine gun.

On 13 August Task Force Rapid Fire, consisting of Mobile Guerrilla Force 957 and 966 (one Mobile Strike Force company, one CRF, and USASF advisors in each MGF), departed Trang Sup, Tay Ninh Province, to conduct raids on known VC base areas west of Tay Ninh City. At 1000 hours MGF 957 discovered fresh brush cuttings, punji stakes, and other signs of enemy activity in the area. Shortly thereafter, one platoon sighted a bamboo gate and heard voices in the area beyond it, apparently a VC camp. The platoon assaulted and overran a command post bunker containing eight VC who were all killed. The enemy quickly mounted a counterattack, forcing the platoon to withdraw and take up defensive positions just
outside of the bamboo gate. Meanwhile, the other three platoons of MGF 957 arrived in the area, continued the attack and overran the camp. This action was followed by a series of skirmishes as the enemy tried to maneuver against the friendly forces. MGF 956, which had been ordered to link up with the other force, met determined resistance from an estimated company of enemy while moving toward the camp. The enemy finally withdrew after light fire teams were employed in close support. Results of this engagement were one USASF and four Mobile Strike Force soldiers killed, eight USASF and 17 Mobile Strike Force soldiers wounded; 15 VC killed, 50 Chinese rifle grenades, forty magazines of 5.56mm ammunition, one pair of field glasses, a commercial radio, 25 rounds of 40mm HE ammunition, two rucksacks full of documents and a typewriter captured. On 23 August in Hau Nghia Province a heliborne search and destroy operation consisting of two companies of CIDG from Hiep Hoa, A-351, one company of CIDG from Tra Cu, A-352 and a command and control group from Duc Hoa, B-35, located a VC cache 15 kilometers northwest of Duc Hoa. The following materials were seized: 50 small arms, assorted munitions, tools, spare parts, one radio receiver-transmitter and five pounds of documents. Also three structures and three bunkers were destroyed.

On 7 September a search and destroy operation from Prek Klok, A-322 Tay Minh Province, initiated contact at a range of 25 meters with a platoon of VC, eight kilometers northeast of camp. A one hour fire fight at close range followed. Results of the contact were two CIDG killed, five CIDG wounded; 10 VC killed, assorted equipment and documents captured.

Operation Rapid Fire I, B-36 (Prov) Trang Sup, Tay Minh Province: On 7 September a platoon size reaction force initiated an ambush at less than 100 meters, causing the VC to break contact and flee without returning fire. Results of this ambush were six VC killed, two VC captured (both wounded, one of which died of wounds). The remaining seven VC were believed either killed or wounded (confirmed by blood trails). Six SKS carbines, five rucksacks, two plastic gas masks and documents were captured. On 9 September, a search and destroy operation from Camp Minh Thanh, A-332, Binh Long Province, came under heavy attack from an estimated three squads of VC, six kilometers southwest of camp. The VC initiated contact at a distance of 70 meters. A fire fight at close range followed, after which the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results of this contact were one USASF, two CIDG killed; four CIDG wounded; three CIDG missing; one PRC-25 radio, two carbines and one M-79 grenade launcher lost. VC casualties were unknown. On 12 September, an airmobile search and destroy operation from Camp Hiep Hoa, A-351, Hau Nghia Province, consisting of one Camp Strike Force Company, one VNSF, and two USASF, landed on a preplanned landing zone, six kilometers northwest of camp. Upon touchdown, friendly elements initiated contact with nine VC from a distance of 250 meters. The VC attempted to break contact, but were killed by a heavy volume of small arms fire from the friendly element. A thorough search of the area
revealed three VC bunkers, which were destroyed. One hour later, in the
same general area, seven VC suspects were observed hiding in a woodline
and were captured without a fire fight. This operation terminated on
12 September without further contact. On 20 September, a search and
destroy operation consisting of two Camp Strike Force Companies, one
VNSF, and two USASF from Camp Hiep Hoa, A-351, Hau Nghia Province,
initiated small arms and automatic weapons fire against two squads of
VC at 75 meters. Results were one VC killed, two VC wounded, and three
VC captured. No friendly casualties were sustained. On 21 September a
campaign search and destroy operation from Luong Hoa, A-352, Hau Nghia
Province ambushed six VC riding in three sampans. Friendly elements
initiated fire from 30 meters. Results were six VC killed; three sampans
with motors, assorted clothing and food captured. During the
period 17-23 September operation Rapid Fire from Trang Sup, B-36 (Prov),
Tay Ninh Province, conducted seven team operations in an area north and
east of camp. Results were one US LRRP and one Mobile Strike Force
soldier wounded; 15 VC killed, three VC wounded; one VC captured, one
AK-47, one RPG and 14 rucksacks captured.

On 4 October Camp Tra Cu, A-352, Hau Nghia Province was probed by a
company of VC. Mortar and small arms fire was directed against the camp.
Ten rounds of 82mm mortar landed inside the inner perimeter. After 20
minutes the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results of this probe were two
CIDG killed, five CIDG wounded and two bunkers destroyed.

On 18 October a search and destroy operation consisting of two USASF,
one VNSF and two Camp Strike Force companies from Hiep Hoa, A-351, Hau
Nghia Province, opened fire from ambush on an estimated company of VC. 
After a seven minute fire fight the enemy broke contact and withdrew east.
Results of this contact were seven VC killed, 10 VC wounded, one M-16
rifle, one .45 caliber pistol, one M-26 grenade, four loaded AK-47 magazines,
one pistol belt, assorted uniforms and five pounds of documents captured.
On 20 October at 1130 hours a search and destroy operation
consisting of two USASF, three VNSF, and one company of Camp Strike Force
personnel from Tra Cu, A-352, Hau Nghia province, found a cache of five
new rockets (similar to the 3.5 inch US type rocket) OD in color, with
Chinese markings, and six sealed 360 round containers of type M13, 7.62mm
ammunition. At 1318 hours the operation sighted 20 VC southeast of the
camp. The friendly element opened fire and the VC withdrew. Results
were five VC killed, and two AK-47 rifles captured. At 1550 hours an
additional 20 VC were sighted hiding in a tree line and under water
breathing through bamboo. The friendly element engaged the enemy at a
distance of 200 meters. A short fire fight followed, after which the
enemy broke contact and fled northeast. Results of this contact were 10
VC killed, two AK-47 rifles and one US carbine captured.
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On 27 October, Camp Song Be, B-34, Phouc Long Province, came under mortar attack from three VC mortar squads. The camp returned mortar fire and after nearly three hours, the enemy broke contact and withdrew. This attack on Camp Song Be resulted in three USASF and three Camp Strike Force personnel wounded. On 21 October Camp Tong Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long Province, came under mortar attack from an unknown size VC force. The camp returned 105mm artillery fire and called for tactical air support. During the 20 minute attack, the camp received 30 rounds of 75mm and 82mm mortar rounds. Tactical air support started dropping napalm and CBU's on the suspected enemy positions which caused the VC to break contact and withdraw. This attack resulted in five USASF, two US engineers, eight CIDG and two ARVN wounded.

On 29 October a search and destroy operation from Camp Tong Le Chon, A-334, Binh Long Province, consisting of two USASF, two VNSF and one Camp Strike Force company made contact with an estimated VC company. The friendly elements opened fire with small arms, and called artillery and air strikes in support. The enemy returned fire and after a two hour fight, the enemy broke contact and withdrew. This contact resulted in one CIDG wounded and seven VC killed.

(d) IV CTZ: The month of August was relatively quiet as a result of marked decrease in enemy activity throughout IV CTZ. On 1 August a task force consisting of nine CIDG companies, under the control of Detachment B-41 at Moc Hoa in Kien Tuong Province, made a sweep through the "Pocket", a VC stronghold in northern Dinh Tuong Province. The operation was conducted in conjunction with the 7th ARVN Division. The operation terminated on the 3d with no major contact by the CIDG but with the following results from minor contacts. Friendly losses were one CIDG killed and seven wounded; VC losses inflicted by the CIDG were six VC killed and six weapons captured. On 7 August, operation Dong Thap IV was conducted by Detachment B-41. The operation was conducted in southern Kien Tuong and northern Dinh Tuong Provinces in the area known as "The Pocket", and involved nine companies of CIDG assembled from all the detachments under the control of Detachment B-41. Results of Dong Thap IV were one CIDG killed and nine wounded; four VC killed by air, one VC killed by ground action, one VC captured, and one AK-47 rifle captured. On 13 August at 0045 hours military facilities located within the town of Gao Lanh, Kien Phong Province, came under attack by an estimated reinforced VC company supported by heavy weapons. The attack was directed at the ADS&L Company's compound and the 1/16 ARVN Regiment, which was in a perimeter around the ADS&L compound. The attack was initiated by 82mm and 60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, B-40 rockets and small arms fire on the B-43 compound and other military facilities, followed by a ground assault which penetrated the ADS&L compound's defenses. Neither the B-43 compound nor the air boat facility received a ground attack. Friendly units returned fire with 81mm and 4.2 inch mortars, 105mm howitzers, and small arms, and were supported by an
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AC-47 which arrived on station at 0120 hours. After a two hour and five minute fire fight the VC broke contact and withdrew. Friendly losses were eight PF and 28 ARVN killed, five PF, 31 ARVN, one USASF and 17 civilians wounded, plus six ARVN missing. Equipment losses were 21 carbines, five BAR's, one M-79, two AN/PRC-10 radios and one telephone missing. The B-43 compound received only minor damage, and the air boat facility was not touched. Enemy losses were four VC killed. On 19 August a platoon size search and destroy operation with two USASF from Tuyen Nhon, A-415, Kien Tuong Province, initiated contact with an estimated eight VC approximately 12 kilometers east of Tuyen Nhon. VC were caught totally unaware and did not return fire. One VC escaped leaving behind seven VC killed and six small arms captured. There were no friendly losses. On 24 August a company size search and destroy operation with four USASF from Tuyen Nhon, A-415, Kien Tuong Province, initiated contact with seven VC approximately 10 kilometers east of Tuyen Nhon. A short fire fight ensued resulting in three VC killed with no friendly casualties.

On the 3d of September a company size search and destroy operation from My Da, A-433, Kien Phong Province, was ambushed by an estimated squad of VC, approximately six kilometers northwest of camp. The VC were firing small arms, including one light machine gun from 150 meters, and after a short fire fight the VC broke contact leaving behind two VC killed and one wounded. Friendly losses were one CIDG and one civilian wounded. On 11 September at 0800 hours, six airboats with three USASF, one VNSF, and 26 Mobile Strike personnel departed Thuong Thoi, A-432, Kien Phong Province, on a recon operation. The operation was to sweep north to within one kilometer of the Cambodian border and turn west to the Mekong River. For an undetermined reason, possibly changes in the terrain appearance due to the flood conditions, the lead boats passed their intended turning point and proceeded to the river which forms the Cambodia/VN border. When the lead boats reached the VN edge of the river border eight kilometers northwest of the camp, they came under heavy crossfire from an unknown number of VC located in bunkers on both sides of the river. Two of the lead boats were heavily damaged, with the exception of the driver of one boat are believed to have been killed almost immediately. Both boats were later observed from the air being pushed and pulled across the border. Results of the contact were one USASF killed, one wounded, and one missing; one CIDG killed, three wounded, and four missing. Equipment losses were three M1919A6 MAG's, four M-79 grenade launchers, four M-16 rifles with M-148 attachments, one M-16 rifle, seven US M-2 carbines, three PRC-25 radios, 20 flack jackets, 28 steel helmets, 30 sets of web gear, two pistols cal .45, and 8,000 rounds of .30 cal ammunition. Enemy losses were one VC killed. On the 21st at 1100 hours, one platoon of Chieu Hois and two USASF departed on a search and destroy operation from Detachment A-412, Kinh Quan II, Kien Tuong Province. On the 22d at 0930 hours the friendly element initiated contact with an estimated five VC from a distance of 100 meters approximately eight kilometers east of the camp. Results of the contact were five VC killed, one rifle, five sampans, one sampan motor, one kilo of medical supplies, one kilo of documents, and six hand grenades captured. There were no friendly losses.
On 7 October at 1150 hours an RF outpost approximately ten kilometers
northwest of Cao Lanh, Detachment B-43, Kien Phong Province, initiated
contact with an estimated platoon of VC from a distance of 200 meters.
Results of the contact were: Three RF wounded; 27 VC killed (14 of which
were USASF confirmed) five VC and eight small arms captured; and three
 sampans destroyed. On 12 October at 0145 hours an estimated two companies
of VC attacked the Chau Doc, B-42 compound, Kien Phong Province. The VC
were armed with 57 mm R & R, B-40 rockets, 60mm mortars, and small arms. The
fire came from 250 meters northeast of the compound. Air support was
requested and arrived at 0215 hours. Results of the attack were: One
US killed (from the 52d Signal Battalion), nine US wounded (five of which
were USASF); two RF and two PF killed; three RF wounded; one VC captured.
On 16 October at 0500 hours a combined operation from Detachment
B-43, Cao Lanh, Kien Phong Province was initiated. At 1230 hours the
friendly element captured one VC in a sampan with one hand grenade and
one Chicom claymore type mine. At 1415 hours the Camp Strike Force
element initiated contact with two VC from a distance of 100 meters,
resulting in two VC killed. At 1500 hours the airboat element while
making a sweep, initiated contact with an unknown number of VC, result-
ing in four VC killed, 10 sampans destroyed, assorted ammo, three ponchos,
20 kilos of rice, cooking utensils, a gas stove, and assorted documents
captured. On 17 October at 0630 hours the RF element initiated contact
with an estimated 30 VC, After a 30 minute firefight the VC broke contact
and withdrew northeast. Results were: one RF wounded, four VC killed, one
VC wounded, one .45 caliber pistol captured, and one sampan destroyed.
At 0915 hours the gunships that were supporting the operation initiated
contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in four VC killed, 26
 sampans and nine structures destroyed. At 1100 hours the airboat
element received sporadic fire and called in the gunships. Gunships made
a sweep of the area and the RF element was sent in to assess the strike.
Results of the sweep were 10 VC killed, three sampans and five structures
destroyed. At 1350 hours the gunships again made a sweep of the area with
the following results: Seven VC killed; 15 sampans and 20 structures
destroyed. A total of 31 VC were reported killed by air during the
operation. The overall results of the two day operation were one RF
wounded; 62 VC killed; three VC captured; one sampan, six weapons captured;
and a quantity of equipment and documents captured; 58 sampans and 34
structures destroyed.

On 22 October at 0800 hours an operation from Det A-401, Don Phuoc,
Kien Phong Province, consisting of one airboat section and four USASF
departed on a search and destroy operation. On 23 October the friendly
element called in gunships in support of the operation. A sweep of the
area revealed ten VC killed and six sampans destroyed. At 1130 hours the
airboat element initiated contact with two VC with the following results:
Two VC killed, and two Chicom carbines captured. One airboat was slightly
damaged from small arms fire. At 1230 hours the airboat element again
initiated contact with ten VC in four sampans. After a five minute fire
fight the VC broke contact and fled. Results were two VC killed; two
sub-machine guns, one carbine, one home made pistol belt captured; and
four sampans destroyed. One airboat was damaged from a mine however it
remained operational.

(2) CIDG Camps: In I CTZ, FOB Sa Huynh was opened
on 10 October 1967 with one MSF Company from Detachment A-113. Camp Lac
Thien in II CTZ was converted to RF on 1 October. The USASF/LLDB assets
were redeployed to establish Bu Prang on 5 October. In III CTZ, the
Company A Mobile Strike Force moved permanently from Bien Hoa to Chien
Thang I on 2 September 1967. Detachment B-36 (Provisional) moved from
Trang Sup to Chien Thang II on 2 September 1967. Luong Hoa was closed
on 25 October 1967. The 51st ARVN Ranger Battalion occupied the facilit­
ties remaining. Tanh Linh was converted to RF on 31 October 1967. Camps
Ha Tien and Tinh Bien in IV CTZ were converted to RF on 31 October 1967.

C. Special Operations.

(1) Blackjack 27 - (Operation Goethals). Conducted by
Detachment A-219, Mobile Strike Force, this operation took place in
northwestern Kontum Province, II CTZ, from 11 July to 20 August. It
consisted of one long range mobile guerrilla operation, and had two
contacts. One airstrike was called. The operation resulted in one CIDG
wounded; one VC killed, and one wounded; one AK-47 captured.

(2) Blackjack 28 - (Operation Winfield Scott). This
was a mobile guerrilla operation conducted by the 25th Mobile Strike
Force Company. The operation was conducted in northwest Kontum
Province, II CTZ, from 30 July to 22 August. Seventeen contacts were
made and two airstrikes called on the enemy forces. Friendly losses
were five USASF and 30 CIDG wounded. Enemy losses were 21 killed, two
wounded, and five weapons lost.

(3) Blackjack 41: Task Force 588 and 399 conducted a
mobile guerrilla operation from 15 August to 9 September in the Nui
Coto Mountains, IV CTZ. There were 17 contacts and two airstrikes called.
Results of the operation were three USASF wounded; six CIDG killed and
11 wounded; 10 VC killed, one wounded; four suspects detained; one weapon
captured.

(4) Blackjack 29 - (Operation Sill). Conducted by the
Company "B" mobile strike force, this was a mobile guerrilla operation
conducted in northern Binh Dinh Province, II CTZ. The operation began
on 15 September and ended on 11 October. Seven contacts were made and
two airstrikes called on enemy positions. Results of the operation were
three CIDG killed and two wounded; one VC wounded and five captured.
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(5) Blackjack 21A - (Operation Hickey). During the period 6 October to 30 October, Company "B" Mobile Strike Force conducted a mobile guerrilla operation in northern Kontum Province, II CTZ. There were nine contacts, and six airstrikes called on enemy positions. One USASF was wounded during the operation. Enemy losses were eight killed, two captured, and 51 weapons seized.

(6) Operation Rapid Fire I: Detachment B-36 Prov. conducted 41 reconnaissance operations during the period 5 Sep to 22 Sep in northeastern Tay Ninh Province, III CTZ. There were 14 enemy contacts, and three airstrikes called on enemy positions. Friendly losses were three CIDG wounded, one USLRRP soldier killed and one wounded. Enemy losses were 31 killed, four captured, and seven weapons captured.

(7) Operation Rapid Fire II: Conducted in Tay Ninh Province from 21 October to 26 October by Detachment B-36 (Prov), the operation consisted of seven long range reconnaissance missions. There were two enemy contacts. Results were one USLRRP soldier wounded, two CIDG wounded, and 12 enemy weapons captured.

(8) Operation March I - (Op Ord 4-67). Thirty-one reconnaissance operations were conducted by detachment B-50 (Omega) in southwest Kontum Province from 8 Jul to 3 Sep. There were four enemy contacts and 27 airstrikes were called. Results were 24 VC killed, two wounded, and two captured. One enemy weapon was captured. There were no friendly casualties.

(9) Operation March II - (Op Ord 4-67). Thirty-eight reconnaissance operations were conducted by detachment B-50 (Omega) in southwest Kontum Province, II CTZ, from 16 Sep to 30 Oct. There were 10 enemy contacts. Results were one CIDG killed, four VC killed, one VC captured, and one weapon captured.

(10) Operation Samurai I - (Op Ord 7-67). This operation, conducted by detachment B-52 (Delta) in northwest Quang Nam Province I CTZ consisted of 25 reconnaissance missions, 15 enemy contacts, and 154 airstrikes called in reaction to intelligence. Results were one USASF killed, and four wounded; three VNSF wounded; seven ARVN Rangers killed, 27 wounded and one missing. Enemy losses were 60 killed, four wounded, 13 captured, and six weapons captured.

(11) Operation Samurai II - (Op Ord 8-67). Detachment B-52 (Delta) conducted 31 reconnaissance operations in southwest Quang Nam Province, I CTZ, during the period 16 Sep to 16 Oct. There were 15 enemy contacts. One hundred fifty-four airstrikes were called in support. Results were one USASF wounded; two VNSF wounded and four missing; 29 VC killed one wounded, 14 captured and 27 suspects detained.
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(12) Operation Samurai III - (Op Ord 8-67). Conducted in northeastern Quang Nam Province, I CTZ, during the period 17 Oct to 31 Oct by detachment B-52 (Delta), this operation consisted of 25 reconnaissance missions, 10 enemy contacts and 45 airstrike in support. Results were four CIDG wounded; 11 enemy killed, and four wounded.

(13) Operation Warm Up - (Op Ord 11-67). Conducted by detachment B-56 (Sigma), during the period 21-19 September, in Phuoc Long Province, III CTZ, this operation consisted of nine reconnaissance missions with six contacts. Results were one USASF wounded; one CIDG killed and three wounded; five enemy killed, four wounded, three captured, and two weapons captured.

(14) Operation Shortstop - (Op Ord 12-67). Conducted by detachment B-56 (Sigma), this operation consisted of 24 reconnaissance missions and had 10 enemy contacts. The operation was conducted during the period 8-25 October in southwest Long Kanh Province, III CTZ. Results were two USASF wounded; eight CIDG killed three wounded, and three missing; 117 enemy killed, twelve weapons captured and three 2½ ton trucks destroyed.

d. Training:

(1) Recondo School

(a) General

1. Average assigned and attached strengths were as follows during the month indicated:

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<th>Month</th>
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<th>EM</th>
<th>ATCH (OFF)</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1 ROK 1 AUST</td>
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2. During this reporting period the MACV Recondo School received students for three-week Recondo Classes R-2-68 through R-6-68. Class R-6-68 graduated on 7 Oct 67, at which time the three-week course of instruction was suspended until 1 Dec 67 in order to teach four (4) two-week Long Range Patrol courses to personnel from the newly formed I and II Field Force Vietnam IRR companies. The following is a breakdown of students by units and corps areas for the Recondo Classes:
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ENTR  DRPD  GRAD  COMP

I CORPS
ROK Marines
1  0  1  0

II CORPS
1st Cav Div (AM)  33  12  21  0
4th Inf Div (-)  29  12  16  1
1/101 Abn Div  10  4  6  0
ROK Forces VN  26  10  14  2
HQ TNG Div MACV  1  0  1  0

III CORPS
1st Inf Div  48  26  21  1
25th Inf Div (-)  21  5  15  1
173d Abn Bde (Sep)  24  2  22  0
196th Lt Inf Bde  10  4  6  0
199th Lt Inf Bde  16  10  6  0
9th Inf Div  43  11  29  0
11th ACR  5  1  4  0
I PHIL CAGV  17  3  14  0

2. The following is a breakdown of students by Field Force for the LRP classes:

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<th>COMP</th>
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<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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</table>

* NOTE: LRP-2-68 is in session at the end of this quarter.

4. The normal mission of the MACV Recondo School is to train selected personnel from US/TFMAF units specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operations in the Republic of South Vietnam.

(b) Operations:

1. Number/type operation conducted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Night</th>
<th>Recondo</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Attacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Blocking Actions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Escort Action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Combat Patrols</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Recon Patrols</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Ambushes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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2. Number of friendly initiated contacts: None

3. VC Losses (Confirmed):
   (a) Killed 0
   (b) Captured 0
   (c) Wounded 0
   (d) Suspects 3
   (e) Weapons 0

4. Friendly Losses:
   
   USASF | RECONDO STD | CIDG
   -------|-------------|------
   (a) Killed | 0 | 0 | 0
   (b) Wounded | 1 | 0 | 0
   (c) Missing | 0 | 0 | 0
   (d) Weapons Lost | 2 | 0 | 0

(c) Training: Future Recondo Classes will receive a 286.5 hour POI. IRP special classes receive a 131.5 hour POI.

(d) Logistics: The MACV Recondo School is supported administratively and logistically by the 1st Logistical Command.

(2) Dong Ba Thin VNSF Training Center

(a) Courses graduated or in progress during the reporting period:

   CLASS # | STUDENTS
   -------|--------
   CRP #23 | 130
   BAC #5  | 126
   CIDG Ldr #25 | 122
   CIDG Ldr #26 | 120
   LLDB #10 | 130
   CIDG RTO #1 | 36
   LLDB J/M #1 | 23
   CRP #24-25 | 386
   LLDB BAC #1 | 104
   BAC #6 US | 13
   BAC #7 MSF | 142
   SPECIAL BAC | 2
   CIDG Ldr #27 | 132
   LLDB #6-7-11 | 304

(b) Combat Operations (20) Platoon and Company size, duration 1 to 14 days. Negative contacts.

(c) The Camp deploys nightly 2-3 squad size ambushes or security patrols.
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(3) Replacement Instruction (SFOB Replacement Detachment)

(a) During the reporting period, classes were conducted for all USASF replacements to familiarize them with the staff operations in SFOB, USASF advisor relationships, mines and booby traps and firing of assigned weapons.

(b) Breakdown of the classes are as follows:

In-processing S-1, Personnel, Finance, Dispensary, Motor Pool, CIDG Funds, S-1 Briefing, S-4 Briefing, S-5 Briefing, S-3 Briefing, Mess Association, Lessons Learned, Mines and Booby traps, Surgeons Briefing, Communications, PSY/OPS, JAG, Chaplain, weapons, S-2, USASF advisor relationships, and Air Support.

(c) During the reporting period, a total of 102 officers and 463 enlisted personnel, were processed thru replacement detachment.

e. Aviation: During the quarter reported, there were two significant accomplishments in the field of aviation within the area of responsibility of the 5th Special Forces Group as follows:

(1) In order to effectively use the U-1A aircraft assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group, the aircraft is assigned a regular schedule route. This system as opposed to planning missions for individuals has greatly increased the efficiency of the transportation effort.

(2) The Air Force developed Ground Radar Air Delivery system (GRADS) has been tested throughout the country in support of Special Forces activities. It is expected that this system will provide the answer to resupply "A" detachments during periods of bad weather or while the camp is under attack. Experience with the system to date has been favorable.

f. Combat Developments: See inclosure number four, for a summary of all projects currently under evaluation.
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4. (U) Logistics

   a. General: From 1 July through 31 October 1967 the Logistical Support Center continued to provide the 5th Special Forces Group's widely dispersed companies and detachments with all classes of supply and up to 5th echelon maintenance. Over 10,000 tons of supplies were delivered by the LSC to supported units. Over 100 tons of food, clothing, ammunition and general supplies were air dropped by the Logistical Support Center to isolated camps and special operations.

   b. Supply:

      (1) A study was conducted concerning conversion to a single line requisition system. The system is now being implemented.

      (2) A conference was held with all company S4's to explain the new single line requisitioning system.

      (3) A review of the PEM forecast was conducted with representatives of the Counter-Insurgency Support Office.

   c. Movements and Storage:

      (1) Three new warehouses were constructed to reduce outside storage and to reduce supply loss during the monsoon season.

      (2) Two ammunition storage pads were renovated to allow warehouse forklift operations. Prior to renovation only rough terrain forklifts could be utilized.

      (3) A new access road was built to the Air Force Base.

      (4) A new R & U warehouse was constructed.

      (5) Steel matting was placed in lumber yard number one.

      (6) A drainage system was built in the storage yard of the LSC.

      (7) New chain link fencing was built behind the warehouse area.

   d. Maintenance: A new grease rack and wash rack was built.
5. (U) Revolutionary Development Support Activities

a. On 1 October 1967, a consolidation of the Revolutionary Development Section and the Psychological Operations Section was made. This new S5 (RDSA) organization has resulted in a mutually supporting combined effort in the Civil Affairs, Civic Action, Psychological Operations, and Revolutionary Development fields. An organization chart for this office is depicted at inclosure #6.

b. The 60 day trial period to test the feasibility of providing a commissary system for CIDG soldiers and their dependents has proven that this definitely raises the morale of the CIDG and provides a higher standard of living for them. The selected camps for the trial period were Tong Le Chon, Prek Klok, and Luong Hoo. All three camps recommended that the commissary system be extended to all other CIDG camps.

c. The S5, Company C, 5th SFCA, has developed and tested a plan to establish PX type canteens at each CIDG camp. The rules and an approved price list of commodities are attached as Inclosure #7.

d. The field evaluation (Confidential, NOFORN) of the entire S5 (RDSA) program, mentioned in the last quarterly report, has been completed. The recommendations are now being implemented. A report on successful innovations made as a result of this evaluation will be included in the next ORLL.

e. Civic action success stories are attached as Inclosure #8.

f. A report of the progress and problems of the Tra Bong sawmill is attached as Inclosure #9. The installation of this sawmill was discussed in 5th SFCA ORLL dated 15 August 1967.

6. (U) Psychological Operations

a. An inventory and evaluation of all psyops peculiar equipment now in use in the field is being conducted. An effort will be made to provide standard items of equipment to all detachments, and a standard table of allowances for this type equipment will be published by this headquarters. This evaluation, when completed, will provide data necessary to determine what items are essential to the psyops personnel at detachment level. Equipment not being used by one detachment will be re-located if a need for it exists at another detachment. A complete report will be included in the next quarterly report.

b. A magazine entitled "Four Directions" is now being published jointly by S5, 5th SFCA, and LLDB High Command. The magazine is written and edited for the CIDG. A contract has been signed with a publisher in Saigon, whereby his firm will print 15,000 copies of the sixty (60) page four color magazine monthly, at a cost of 12$ VN per copy. The lay-out of the magazine is done by the Political Warfare Division of LLDB High Command. The Commanders of 5th SFCA and LLDB must approve the contents of each issue before releasing it to the publisher. At this time, one issue has been distributed to the field and no feedback on the effectiveness is available. Comments will be included in future ORLL's.
c. Close coordination between Psyops Officer, 5th SFGA and units of the 6th Psyops Battalion, has resulted in increased support for all 5th SFGA Psyops efforts. It is now possible to request and receive aerial loudspeaker broadcasts and quick reaction leaflet drops almost anywhere in the Republic of Vietnam in 8 hours, and many times much quicker. Continued cooperation and mutual planning with all support psyops companies will result in improved relationships and further improvement of psyops capabilities.

7. (U) Personnel and Administration

a. Command Strength:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period:

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{OFF} & 481 \\
\text{WO} & 17 \\
\text{EM} & 2239 \\
\hline
\text{Total} & 2737 \\
\end{array}
\]

(2) At the end of the reporting period:

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{OFF} & 586 \\
\text{WO} & 27 \\
\text{EM} & 2522 \\
\hline
\text{Total} & 3135 \\
\end{array}
\]

b. This command conducted a study on the personnel requirements of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) as a result of notification from DCG, USARV that the 5th Special Forces Group would be required to reduce its strength to the authorized level by 31 December 1967. The purpose of the study was to address the current and projected personnel strength of the Group and its relationship to currently assigned missions and to the campaign plan for CY 1968. This study is included in this report as Inclosure #5.

c. Assignment Instructions upon DEROS: This command is still experiencing late receipt of assignment instructions for officers. The delay may be caused by method of transmission of assignment instructions by higher headquarters.

d. An aggressive program for requisitioning blank forms and various military publications was initiated during this reporting period with outstanding results. Numerous essential publications have been received with an average delivery time of only two weeks from the date of requisition.

e. Awards and Decorations:

(1) The following awards and decorations were approved during the reporting period:
f. Judge Advocate Section:

(1) The function of the JA section has been expanded to include liaison with the local CID, Military Police, and other Staff Judge Advocates offices.

(2) The 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) Regulation 27-1 pertaining to Military Justice was revised and delegates Summary Court jurisdiction down to commanders at the C Detachment level.

g. A&R and Special Services: The Special Services program continues to expand with the receipt of additional athletic and recreational equipment. Especially noteworthy is this command's receipt of an outboard motor and boat which is used for water skiing and fishing. The tape club which was established in May continues to increase in popularity as evidenced by its increased membership.
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8. (U) Medical

a. Medical care of CIDG: Hospital benefits supplemental to those offered by CIDG Hospitals were obtained from USARV and from the USS Repose during this reporting period. These benefits include more sophisticated general surgery, complex laboratory procedures, and specialized medical treatment. CIDG requiring hospital treatment not available at CIDG hospitals are now being hospitalized at US army hospitals throughout Vietnam. In addition, open heart surgery is now available to CIDG from the USS Repose, stationed off Da Nang.

b. Expansion of CIDG hospital facilities: The proposed expansion of the CIDG hospital at Ban Me Thout was approved and construction began on 21 October 1967. The hospital will expand from its present 15 beds to 40 bed capacity with concurrent expansion of professional capabilities.

c. Preventive Medicine: On 1 October 1967, the 5th SFG(Abn) plan to immunize 113,000 CIDG, dependents, and VN civilians in the immediate areas of CIDG camps against plague was implemented. Rather than utilizing US manufactured vaccine, which would commit this organization to re-immunizing the target population every six months, an impossible project, locally made plague vaccine, which requires only one dosage, was purchased from the Institute Pasteur, Da Lat. The disadvantage of the indigenous vaccine is that it is not standardized and has a very short life from manufacture to expiration date. However, it is felt that the target population will be protected significantly. As of the end of the reporting period, approximately 65,000 personnel were immunized.

d. Narcotics and Sensitive Drug Accountability: Plans are currently being coordinated to institute a simpler and more effective system of accountability of narcotics and sensitive drugs. (See paragraph 6a, Section 2, Part I - Observations)

9. (C) Signal:

a. The signal section reviewed and completed the Fema budget forecast for FY 1969.

b. A liaison visit was made to CISO on Okinawa for the purpose of verifying all outstanding requisitions. The visit resulted in over a $100,000.00 saving in cancellation of equipment no longer required.

c. Citizen band transceivers were issued and tested by Detachment B-52 during October. Tests have indicated a use for this type of radio at forward operational bases. The testing continues and an evaluation will be made at a later date.

d. Five early warning transmitters are being built by the 5th Special Forces Signal Maintenance Facility, and will be ready for evaluation by mid-november. The transmitters will be used with a directional antenna on the TR-20. Proposed test site for evaluation is the "A" detachment at Dak Pek, II CTZ.
The deconsolidation of Signal Augmentation Teams from direct command and control by the signal company commander to attachment to the supported unit has been accomplished on 20 October 1967. This action was taken to eliminate conflict as to who controlled the signal augmentation personnel and establish definite unity of command. The Signal Company Commander will continue as usual to direct the operations of the Base Operations Platoon. The Group Signal Officer will recommend and monitor the transfers of signal personnel between companies.

10. (U) Engineer:

During this reporting period the 539th Engineer Detachment was replaced by the 31st Engineer Detachment, the latter being assigned to the 5th SFDA on 22 Sep 67. A change over in the field took place in which five man KB teams from the 31st replaced similar teams from the 539th on site. Equipment was exchanged and construction continued without pause. Two KB teams were committed to new camp construction at Bu Prang and Ban Hat. The two camps were pre-stocked, structural members pre-cut to plan and moved to the site ready to assemble. This procedure resulted in a considerable time saving during the critical initial phase of new camp establishment. Continued emphasis was placed on programming construction projects, preparation of standard bills of materials and forecasting equipment requirements.

11. (C) Comptroller/CIDG Finance: Following significant actions were completed during the reporting period 1 August - 31 October 1967:

a. Plaster Purchase Rate: Effective 1 October 1967 the rate of plaster exchange for official users was increased from 80 piasters per each US dollar to 118 piasters. This change represents a monthly increase to the budget for incountry expenditures of $1,287,000.00.

b. Government of Vietnam Withholding Tax: Effective 1 June 1967, the Republic of Vietnam, Directorate General of Taxation, stated that the salary tax and general income tax of servicemen, civil servants and private enterprise employees as defined in Ordinance Number 10, 13 April 1953, will be computed on their salary and income of the current year and will be withheld monthly. This action was to be retroactive to 1 January 1967. However, collection will not be made of Government of Vietnam withholding tax from personnel employed by the 5th SFDA and paid from CIDG Parasol Switchback funds because of security and administrative reasons. Suspension of collection of withholding tax was disseminated to this headquarters per first endorsement, file AVHFG-F, Headquarters United States Army, Vietnam, subject: "Government of Vietnam Withholding Tax", dated 25 August 1967.

c. Subsistence Rate: Effective 1 October 1967, II CTZ received an increase in subsistence rate from 45$VN to 50$VN per man per day. This increase was necessitated by the high cost of subsistence in II CTZ.
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d. CIDG Pay Raise: Effective 1 October 1967 CIDG soldiers were given a raise in family allowances. This raise was implemented because ARVN received a pay raise in June 1967. Grades Second Lieutenant through Corporal I received a monthly increase of 50$VN for each child; Corporal received a monthly increase of 250$VN for wife plus 50$VN for each child; and Privates I and II received a monthly increase of 200$VN for wife and 100$VN for each child.

e. Burial Expenses Pertaining to Death Gratuity: Corps areas experienced difficulty with interment of CIDG soldiers without exceeding the 2,000$VN limitation prescribed in Group Regulation 37-1, December 1966, as changed. The following changes were authorized:

(1) Expenditure of 2,000$VN for burial expenses of CIDG when interment is accomplished by ARVN.

(2) Expenditure of 2,000$VN when requirement exists for a metal container to transport remains of CIDG on USAF aircraft to place of interment.

(3) Expenditure of 2,000$VN for interment of CIDG not under purview of paragraphs (1) or (2) above.

f. Annual CAS Audit: During the period 10 - 12 October 1967, the annual audit of financial and supply management procedures was conducted by a team of CAS auditors. They audited finance and supply records, counted cash, inventoried sensitive supply items, checked management directives and policies, and visited an "A" Detachment site. At the exit interview a report of "no findings" was rendered. Auditors were: Mr Ralph Sipes, Mr Joe Dysart and Mr Wally Robinson.