CULTURAL CHANGE IN RURAL VIET-NAM

A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF LONG-TERM COMMUNIST CONTROL ON THE
SOCIAL STRUCTURE, ATTITUDES, & VALUES OF THE PEASANTS OF THE MEKONG DELTA

by

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PREFACE

This study is about Viêt-Nam. It is thus of necessity a political work, although the authors' intent is to present an objective scientific assessment of the impact of the war on Vietnamese peasant culture. For in the current intellectual milieu of the United States, anything published on Viêt-Nam is going to be interpreted in a political context and, more likely than not, employed as propaganda either for or against American involvement in the war. While we deplore such distortion of science, we can not control the use by others, for whatever ends, of the materials presented here. And we have rejected a suggestion made in all seriousness by one of our academic colleagues that we refrain from publication because some of our data might provide useful arguments to those who favor continuing the war, as we would reject any similar argument from war supporters that our findings would be useful to anti-war propagandists. We do this not because we believe science to be value-free or the scientist to be without responsibility for the social effects of his work, but because we believe that, regardless of specific current political considerations, the primary need of the American public with regard to Viêt-Nam is to face honestly, if painfully, the realities of our involvement there. For us, the true tragedy of Viêt-Nam is not that the United States has lost its first major war, committed and condoned brutality in the process, or suffered major loss of internal cohesiveness as a nation: The real tragedy is that we, government and military, hawks and doves and silent center alike, have not learned much about ourselves and how we function in Asia in the process. Yet it is we Americans and not the Vietnamese, whatever their deficiencies, who are responsible for the disaster. The Vietnamese didn't create the present shape of this war—we did; the Vietnamese didn't lose it either—we did. Correction of faults must start at home, not in Saigon. But part
of such correction involves developing a full and realistic knowledge of
the development of the Vietnamese revolution. Meaningful reform of American
political and military doctrine, improvement in our systems of gathering and
evaluating intelligence, and of making and implementing policy, is not likely
to result from faulty assessment of the nature of our failings in Viêt-Nam.
As long as there are military officers who sincerely believe that they were
denied victory because they weren't allowed to bomb Hải Phòng and Hành dĩ or
as long as there are civilian policy makers who explain our loss in terms
only of our failure to initiate a massive land reform program (to mention
just two of the many simplistic explanations advanced for our failure), then
we are going to continue to avoid honest confrontation with the complex prob-
lems of revolutionary processes and the inherent limits of American power to
influence events in Asia. Instead we will continue investing millions of
dollars in developing counterinsurgency airplanes or computerized land dis-
tribution schemes--"gadgets for guerrillas" as they have been called--rather
than grappling with the far harder task of reforming our defective foreign
policy implementation system.

This report does not constitute that full assessment of the Vietnamese
revolution called for above. No American Paul Mus has yet appeared to write
our "sociologie d'une guerre." And given the size and complexity of the task
it is unlikely that such an encompassing synthesis will soon appear. But it
is not too soon to start laying the monographic foundations for such an
analysis. This report, then, should be viewed as a preliminary effort to
explain one aspect of an incredibly complicated war--the relationship between
changes in social structure, values and attitudes and revolutionary activity.

In a work of this nature, we feel it essential for the authors to violate
the usual norms of scholarly publication by making some highly personal state-
ments: It must be clear to the reader where we stand politically on the war
and what the potential biases influencing our research and writing are. First, it should be stated that this study was financed by a grant from the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG) administered by the Asia Society. The money for this grant was given to SEADAG by the Agency for International Development (AID) of the U.S. Department of State with the clear intent that SEADAG-funded research have operational relevance to the needs of the U.S. Mission in Viêt-Nam. Our research proposal was evaluated and approved by both the U.S. Mission and AID Washington, and was funded only because these bodies perceived it as being in some way useful to implementation of American programs in Viêt-Nam. Both in Washington and Viêt-Nam we received full support from U.S. and Vietnamese Government agencies in carrying out our investigations; but at no time, either formally or informally, was any attempt made to change our proposal or to influence the conduct of our research. The findings presented here have not been "cleared" with any official agency in advance of publication nor are they to be taken as representing the official policy of SEADAG, the Asia Society or AID. They represent only the authors' views on war-related social change in Viêt-Nam, based upon as honest and as objective an appraisal as we have been able to make of our field data.

However well we may have succeeded in achieving objectivity in the present analysis of data, we wish to make clear that we are not personally neutral about the war in Viêt-Nam. Both authors have in the past actively supported the non-communists in their struggle against the National Liberation
Front (NLF), both in operational and research capacities for AID and the Department of Defense, and we continue to sympathize with the Nationalist forces.¹

We do not, however, perceive the war as a struggle between the forces of pure good and unmitigated evil. We recognize that, especially under the Diệm regime, the NLF often represented legitimate popular grievances against an inefficient and frequently repressive regime. Even today, in many communities allegiance to the GVN or the Front appears to be a function of which side better responds to needs of the particular set of villagers rather than of any larger ideological identifications. We also have great admiration for the personal courage and dedication of the Việt Cộng soldiers and the intelligence and ability of the Front Cadre. There are even aspects of the Front system that we wish the Nationalist Vietnamese and the U.S. would emulate—among others the priority they place upon political-psychological considerations above military ones, and the fact that, in contrast to the

¹A note on terminology: as Douglas Pike (facing p.1) has shown there are no labels for the contesting parties in Việt-Nam which are universally acceptable. The various anti-communist elements are most frequently referred to in this report as the "Nationalists," which is what the Sai-gon-based Government of the Republic of Việt-Nam (GVN) and its allies are usually called by the peasants. "Government" and "Anti-Communist" are terms used interchangeably with "Nationalist" however.

The insurgents and their allies are referred to as the Front, shorthand for the National Liberation Front (NLF). Communist and Việt Cộng (short for Việt-Nam Cộng-S.binary, i.e., Vietnamese Communists) are used as synonymous. This may offend the sensitivities of those who seek to draw fine lines of distinction between the overt Communist Party (the People's Revolutionary Party) and the supposedly mass-based NLF but at this point in history there is no reasonable doubt that the Front and the more recently established Provisional Revolutionary Government are wholly-controlled subsidiaries of the Communist Party. All personnel and supporters of the NLF are not Communists however just as all adherents of the Việt-Minh were not party members.
allies, the Front does not permit or condone the maltreatment of the civilian population at the whim of its individual personnel. 2

On the whole, however, we believe that despite its past failings and its present inadequacies the Nationalist Government today offers to both the peasants and the urban populations a better way of life, in terms of those things that concern the Vietnamese, than does the National Liberation Front. This is not because the Nationalists are inherently morally better than the Communists 3—there are, as Francis Fitzgerald has so aptly observed, no liberals in Việt-Nam, and it is a continuing error of both war supporters and war opponents to continue to seek them in a nation that lacks the very concepts of intrinsic individual rights and limited government sovereignty. Nguyễn-Cao-Ky is not the only Vietnamese on either side of the conflict to admire Hitler.

2Terrorism and mass murder such as occurred at Huế in 1968 are ordered by the high NLF command for political reasons; they do not reflect personal brutalization of the individual Việt Cộng combatants. See Davison:39-41 for a discussion of NLF behavior towards the peasants.

3It is true that in 1945 the Communists ruthlessly slaughtered the Nationalists, but as Buttinger has observed, if the power positions had been reversed the Nationalists would just as readily have slaughtered the Việt-Minh, as they later demonstrated whenever they were given the opportunity. General Loan, who so shocked American sensibilities by his public shooting of a captured Communist during the Tết Campaign was operating in the pattern established by Tam, "The Tiger of Cái Lay," the head of the Vietnamese Sureté who broke the Việt-Minh terror apparatus in Sài-gòn in 1950 by what Bodard (179) calls "the traditional methods of Asia...so cheerfully horrible that they are hard to describe." General Loan and Tam, however, are fighting against men of like persuasion. The Việt-Minh commander who told a French Union prisoner to cross a mined area by stepping on the body of a wounded Việt-Minh soldier saying "you can step on him. He has done his duty for the People's Army" (Fall 1967:152) was no more concerned with individual human rights than are the Front commanders who continue to fire rockets into the slums of Sài-gòn or who ordered the mass executions of civilians in Huế.
But for structural reasons the Nationalist Government is less capable of continuous mass oppressive action than would be the case with a Communist-controlled government. The need to maintain a coalition between numerous interest groups places a real limit on the freedom of action of the Saigon government and forces it to show a certain, albeit limited, responsiveness to popular needs. Individual student or Buddhist leaders can be drafted or jailed, but the demands of students or Buddhists as groups cannot be wholly ignored. At the very least the GVN has to grant some of the demands of other groups in order to assure their support for action against any particular set of dissidents. The legislature and the press, while admittedly fragile institutions, do in fact serve as checks on the exercise of power by the central authorities, restraints that would be totally lacking under a Communist regime. Finally, there is the fact that the GVN has issued weapons to large numbers of civilians. Nearly one million Vietnamese are enrolled in the People's Self Defense Force (Nhấn Dân Phòng M). While the PSDF is intended to protect the population from the Việt Cong, it is well known that a rifle can be pointed in many directions, a reality that should temper the actions of the central government in its dealings with the villages.4

4Writing of another country, a vocal critic of the GVN, David Dellinger (36-37) noted that "the distribution of arms among the people...provides...a far more potent check on the government than elections provide in the United States...If the people of Cuba were as regimented, deprived of civil liberties, and ready to revolt as the United States claims Castro would not answer the threat of invasion by widely distributing machine guns." One can only wonder why Dellinger has been so reticent in applying his earlier insight to his analyses of the political situation in South Việt-Nam.
Of course, even under optimum conditions, Viêt-Nam is unlikely to become the Switzerland of Southeast Asia. There are too many hatreds, too many scars of war, to allow such a transformation to occur, even if the Vietnamese were so oriented. But in politics, all conditions are relative, and while Viêt-Nam will not become a Switzerland it does not have to become a Communist China either. The peasants, who have suffered so much and have gained so little from the war, deserve a better fate than awaits them if the Communists achieve total control.

In the final analysis, however, despite our massive military intervention in Viêt-Nam, we cannot determine the political future of the Vietnamese. But we are deeply involved, and for our own sake as well as for the sake of the millions of Vietnamese whose lives are effected by our actions, we must strive to observe more closely what is happening and to understand more clearly what we see—a formidable task in our own society and a perhaps hopeless one in a culture as different from our own as Viêt-Nam. But both as scientists and citizens we must try.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many persons and institutions, Vietnamese and American, have contributed to the writing of this report; unfortunately we can only acknowledge here those who have had a major involvement.

This research was funded by the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (Grant 69076). The Grant was administered by the Asia Society. Mr. John Quinn, SEADAG Coordinator for the Asia Society, proved a helpful and understanding monitor.

In Viet-Nam, field research was conducted jointly with the Behavioral Division of the Vietnamese Armed Forces Combat Development Test Center (CDTC). Colonel Nguyễn Quy Toan, CDTC Commanding Officer, and Major Lê Văn Trưởng, Director, Behavioral Division, provided valuable assistance to the project, including the assignment of Aspirant Hồ Hữu Hạnh to work in Cà-Mau with the authors. Aspirant Hạnh, a graduate of Hue University with a deep interest in social science, shared responsibility with the authors for the field work in the villages. We regret that we have been unable to write a joint report as originally planned but much of the present document is an outgrowth of our discussion with Aspirant Hạnh while in the field. Mr. Nguyễn Dịch Nha, Mr. Nguyễn Văn Nhăng and Mr. Phạm Hưng Dũng served as research assistants at various stages in the project.

In An Xuyên (Cà-Mau) Chief of Province Colonel Lê Chí Cường and his Chief-of-staff, Lt. Nghĩa extended full cooperation to the researchers. Lt. Nguyễn Tân Phất, Commanding Officer of Regional Forces Company 250 at Tân Lộc, went to considerable trouble to assure the security of our interviewer team while we worked in his tactical area.
Miss Le Hoa and Miss Monica Boyle provided clerical support at USAID-Sai gon. In Honolulu, John and Ann Parsons and Philip Estermann have aided with processing the attitudinal and values-orientation data and Professor Naomi Quinn has offered useful advice on statistical analysis.

Miss Sharon Sakaguchi has typed the various drafts of the manuscript.

ATR
NLJ

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Chapter I: Study Aims and Methods

1. Research Goals and Approach

This report presents the findings of the authors' field study conducted in An Xuyen Province in the summer of 1969 to measure the effects of long-term insurgent control on Vietnamese peasant culture. Several social scientists had suggested that a new form of rural social organization has emerged in those areas of Viet-Nam which have been under insurgent control for extended periods.1 This new social structure is believed to rest upon peasant acceptance of revolutionary values differing from both the traditional values of the rural population and the neo-Western values of the urban elite which dominates the Saigon government (McAlister & Hus:160ff).

Gerald C. Hickey, probably the only American social scientist to enjoy any real empathy with the Vietnamese peasants, has written (1967:8-9), for example, that, "in those places where the Viet-Minh-Viet Cong have long held sway, their influence has permeated deeply and affected most aspects of the society...In these areas it is...common for the Viet Cong to organize many of the economic activities--rice marketing, land reform, and taxation. Most important, however, is that their influence has penetrated the attitude-value system. The net result of these innovations is that, after a long period they have developed localized Viet Cong societies." Since such modification of traditional Vietnamese peasant society and culture by

the insurgents, if it has in fact occurred, has obvious profound implications for future political developments in Viêt-Nam, regardless of which forces should end up in control of the country, it was felt worthwhile to carry out a pilot field investigation in the attempt to measure the nature and extent of culture change resulting from Viêt-Minh-Viêt-Constant control.

This research employs what Eggan has called "the method of controlled comparison" in which two groups known to have essentially similar cultural backgrounds but which have undergone different historical experiences are compared on the assumption that any differences between the two are reflections of changes resulting from these particular historical experiences. In this study, two hamlets in the Western Delta province of An Xuyên, one which had been under long-term insurgent control, the other which had never experienced Viêt-Minh or NLF control, were selected for comparison. No assumption need be made that the culture of the Government controlled population has remained static—in all probability it has not—for assuming that the two hamlets shared a similar culture in the pre-war period, discovery of any differences at present in the cultures of the two hamlets constitutes demonstration of insurgent effect on the relevant population, even if this effect should have been conservative rather than innovative (as appears to have been the case in certain specific value areas).

Constraints upon time, resources and the nature of field methods applicable in insecure areas, led to a narrowing of research focus to three basic areas of cultural change; social structure, value orientations and attitudes towards living conditions, which were amenable to study by survey research means employing standardized questionnaires.
2. Study Area and Selection of Research Sites

An Xuyên\(^2\) is notorious as a province where the Communists have had things their own way. This was as true during the Resistance War (see Map: "Cochinchina in 1949" in Bodard:30) as it was during the present war until the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) of 1969. (See map: "South Vietnam, Areas of Control and Influence as of 30 January 1966" in Kahin and Lewis:239.) The APC radically altered the balance of control in Cà-Mau however and GVN figures for July 1969 show 66% of the province’s population of 176,343 persons under Government control, with 18% contested and 16% under \(\text{Việt Cộng}\) control. These percentages were achieved, however, only after province officials "revised" their figures for the total population of An Xuyên by reducing previous estimates of the number of inhabitants of Front-controlled zones by nearly 75,000. (The 1964 census lists 223,800 persons for An Xuyên while an American source in 1967 lists 248,100 persons in the province.) Calculation with the earlier population estimates shows the province population as 40% Front controlled, which appears a more realistic assessment to the authors. An Xuyên was thus an ideal province from which to select a peasant village which had experienced long-term insurgent control; in fact, the major difficulty was to find a village which had not been under Communist control at some time. The two hamlets that were finally selected for study were both in Quan Long District, the district which surrounds the provincial capital.\(^3\)

\(^2\)Although officially named An Xuyên, the province is referred to by nearly all Vietnamese as Cà-Mau, and will usually be designated as such in this report.

\(^3\)The Front-controlled hamlet was selected from among several recently pacified hamlets in Cà-Mau because it was fully rural, Buddhist, and had experienced the longest period of complete insurgent control. Also, security conditions at the time permitted our interview teams to range throughout the hamlet in reasonable safety. The Government-controlled hamlet was selected despite its slightly atypical characteristics because it was the only easily accessible non-Catholic rural hamlet in the province which had never been under direct insurgent control.
Tân Lộc Two Hamlet, the insurgent controlled hamlet, will for the reader's convenience be referred to throughout this report as the Front Hamlet. It is located by Provincial Route 12, approximately 12 kilometers north of Cà-Mau City. One of 7 hamlets comprising Tàn Lộc Village, it has a population of 636 persons residing in 108 households. Front Hamlet appears to be a relatively typical representative of hundreds of hamlets in the Western Delta, in that it is ethnically Vietnamese, its religious orientation is primarily Mahayana Buddhist, and its economy is almost entirely agricultural. It is distinguished from many hamlets, however, by its political history. It was solidly Việt-Đình from 1945 until 1954, experienced renewed insurgent activity starting in late 1956 and came under complete Front control in 1960. It was not returned to CVN control until the Accelerated Pacification Campaign of January 1969 but is now considered to be a pro-government hamlet, with a Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) rating of "C", an elected hamlet chief, and a functioning People's Self Defense Force (Nhân-Đan Ty Vệ). Guerrilla harassment continues however (an NDTV outpost had been attacked the week before research commenced in the hamlet) and the insurgent infrastructure still poses a threat to the safety of local officials. 4

Cây Trâm Hamlet (referred to hereafter as Government Hamlet), in Dinh Thạnh Village, straddles National Route 4 approximately 12 kilometers east of Cà-Mau City and one kilometer west of the Quán Long District capital. Although never insurgent controlled, it has been subject to guerrilla attacks, propagandizing, and has covert Front cadre among its inhabitants. Overall

4A threatening letter that a Tàn Lộc hamlet chief had received from the Front is reproduced in Appendix II.
physical security is considered good however and the District Advisor was considering shifting Government Hamlet from a "C" to a "B" HES rating. From a population consisting of only about 200 people in 1960, the hamlet has grown greatly in recent years due to the immigration of refugees from less secure neighboring hamlets. Government Hamlet now has a population of 1,874, consisting of 272 households. Although the hamlet is primarily agriculural and predominantly Buddhist, it is somewhat atypical of hamlets in the Western Delta because of the ease of access to urban centers and the frequency and intensity of contact with the modernized sectors of Vietnamese society.  

3. **Data Collection Methods**

The data for this study were collected by means of oral interviews with peasants conducted by a team of Vietnamese teachers and students. Considerations of time, security, and the need to amass a large amount of readily comparable information on the two hamlets dictated the choice of method. While serious objections have been raised to the use of surveys in Viet-Nam (White:78-83) the authors believe that on the whole such criticisms have been shown to be unfounded (Rambo, Tinker and LeNoir:43-45, 174-175). The ideal, of course, would be to have restudies, using standard anthropological observational techniques, of some of the communities that have been described on the basis of survey data, but security problems are likely to preclude achievement of the ideal for the foreseeable future.

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5See Appendix I for a brief history of "Cây Trâm" written by a Vietnamese researcher.
4. **Data Collection Instruments**

Five standardized Vietnamese language questionnaires were employed in this study. Each instrument will be discussed in greater detail in the relevant data section of the report. Translations of the instruments are found in Appendices A to G.

1) The Household Census Card (HCC) was used to elicit information on the name, age, sex, kinship status, occupation, physical condition, education, religion and ethnicity of each person in residence in a hamlet household.

2) The Social Structure Questionnaire (SSQ), consisting of 55 basic items, was designed to generate information on extended kinship ties, land tenure patterns, economic behavior, extra-familial social organizations and political affiliations.

3) The Self-Anchoring Attitude Scale (SAS) is a translated version of the standard SAS developed by F. P. Kilpatrick and Hadley Cantril.

4) The Taxonomy of Concerns (TCQ) is an instrument designed to measure the Time, Man-Nature and Relational value orientations as defined by Florence Kluckhohn and her co-workers. The TCQ utilizes more and shorter items than the original Kluckhohn instrument, however, and separates the items into three broad content areas: Economics and Business, Personal and Social, Government and Community.

5) The Selected Respondent's Questionnaire (SRQ) elicited information on the social and demographic characteristics of each respondent included in the sample. Also included were questions on travel experience and exposure to mass media. Special annexes were administered to the Revolutionary Development cadre sample and the Hội Chánh sample to collect information on their respective experiences with the GVN and the National Liberation Front.

Only minimal pretesting and revision of questionnaires was required because with the exception of the Social Structure Questionnaire all schedules...
had been employed in Viet-Nam by the authors in earlier studies. The SSQ was itself a composite of questions used on earlier studies, so it too required minimal pretesting.

5. Sampling Plan

The hamlets were first mapped, and each household received a control number which appeared on all protocols relating to that household. Then each house was visited by an interviewer, who explained the purpose of the interviewer team in visiting the hamlet and made an effort to establish a friendly and cooperative relationship. At this time, a Census Card and Social Structure Questionnaire (SSQ) were filled out for each household. Every individual reported in the census was then assigned a special identification number.

After all residents who had established residence in the hamlet after 1961 were excluded, four separate lists were made, consisting of (1) all males between the ages of 14 and 30; (2) all females aged 14 through 30; (3) all males aged 40 and older; and (4) all females aged 40 and older. Twenty-five respondents were selected from each list using a table of random numbers, giving a total of 100 respondents from each hamlet. In the few cases where it was not possible to interview a designated respondent, substitutes were randomly selected from the appropriate name list. All these individuals were then interviewed with the TCQ, SAS, and SRQ.

There were a number of reasons for employing a stratified sample for the values and attitudes aspects of the survey. Age and sex were known, based upon earlier work and experience, to be major socio-demographic variables relating to differences in value orientations. Education was considered an equally important variable, but the size of the populations under study was too small to permit control of this dimension through sample stratification.
were chosen to ensure that the younger cohort in Front Hamlet would have received the maximum period of socialization under insurgent rule and that any formal education would have been in Front-run schools, while the lower limit of the older age range was established as high as possible in order to maximize the effect of the age variable on value differences. Refugees who had settled in a hamlet after 1961 were excluded to insure that all respondents from a hamlet had had essentially the same amount of exposure to the Front.

Along with the samples drawn from Front and Government villagers, samples of fifty respondents each were drawn from what can be viewed as parallel elite groups of Front and Government cadre. The Front cadre were recent ralliers resident at the provincial Chiêu Hôn Center. The Government cadre sample was selected from members of two Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams assigned to An Xuyên Province. Both sets of respondents completed the SRQ, the TCQ and the SAS as well as special background questionnaires on their respective experiences in the Front and with the GVN.

5. **Interviewing**

Twenty primary school teachers and senior high school students from Cà-Mau City were recruited as interviewers. The 18 males and 2 females ranged in age from 16 to 35. Unlike urban, university trained interviewers who have been known to treat the peasants with overbearing arrogance, these locally-hired personnel tended initially to be shy and reticent in their questioning, especially when interviewing older people. Considerable practice was required before this limitation was overcome.

The interviewers were all trained for at least five days, both in classroom sessions and by doing practice interviews in hamlets near Cà-Mau City. These practice sessions were monitored by two research assistants (experienced interviewers from Saigon who have worked with the authors over a four year period) and each protocol was corrected and mistakes and problems
discussed with the interviewers. Upon completion of training every interviewer had made 5 to 10 practice interviews with each of the questionnaires.

Interviews were conducted in the villagers' homes. Full privacy was impossible but normally only members of the respondent's family were present during the course of the interview. The principal difficulties encountered were in interviewing young girls and very old people. The girls suffered from shyness and were reluctant to talk with the interviewers. The elderly often claimed to have difficulty in understanding the questions, using their lack of formal education as an explanation. In the case of the old men and women, the frequently discussed reluctance of Vietnamese peasants to get involved with anyone in authority (Hus in Hickey 1964:XV-XVI) may have been a contributing factor in their refusal to respond. This is the only group interviewed, however, which has to any extent displayed this supposedly universal Vietnamese peasant characteristic.

Because of the length of time required for the values and attitude questionnaires, small presents (soap, cigarettes, candy, etc.) were given to the respondents. No money payments were made however.

6. The Problem of Generalization

In oral presentations of their preliminary findings, the authors have frequently been asked to what extent they believe that data collected in Cà-Mau can be safely projected to conditions in the rest of Việt-Nam. The obvious answer is that, as social scientists, we do not believe that such projections can be made with any degree of confidence at all. However, given the realities of the research environment in Việt-Nam and the scarcity of relevant community studies, there is no doubt but that generalizations will be made (regardless of any qualifications made here), from the specific data on Tấn Lộc and Cây Trăm to the whole of Việt-Nam.
First, it should be noted, before attempting to generalize from these two hamlets to other rural Vietnamese populations that An Xuyên Province is an extreme case of what is in the Vietnamese context a recently settled, frontier society, and for this reason both the social structure and the attitudes and values of the populations studied differ to some extent from those of rural populations in other parts of the country, especially Central Việt-Nam. This province was selected for study because it was felt that social change attributable to insurgent control would be most clearly defined there, not because it was a typical province. Data obtained in this study is intended primarily to indicate areas in which such change is taking place and the direction of this change. It is probable that the rate of change and the relative position of villagers upon any of the several continua being studied will vary significantly from region to region in Việt-Nam.

The real concern, however, is not to what degree An Xuyên is a "typical" province, but the extent to which Cây Trâm and Tân Lộc are typical hamlets in An Xuyên which differ only in the fact that the one was never under Communist control while the other was under almost continuous insurgent control. The question, while vital, is, given our current state of knowledge of rural Việt-Nam, unanswerable. But the reader is asked to bear it in mind whenever he feels the urge to project the following findings from two hamlets in An Xuyên to the millions of peasants in the thousands of hamlets that compose Việt-Nam.
This chapter presents data on the social and demographic characteristics of the populations of the two hamlets studied. It is based upon information collected about the members of every household using a standardized census card (see Appendix A for an English language version of this schedule) and presents considerable detail because such information is generally unavailable for the rural Vietnamese population, despite its clear relevance to any sort of planning for postwar development. Wherever possible, data for Government and Front Hamlets has been compared with available information on other Vietnamese rural populations (particularly with Khánh Hûn in the Upper Delta) in order to obtain an idea of the extent to which the Cà-Mau settlements conform to a more general pattern.

Both hamlets are predominantly composed of ethnic Vietnamese. In Government Hamlet there are a few Khmer (Cambodian) or mixed Vietnamese-Khmer people and a slightly larger number of Sino-Vietnamese (Minh Hùng) while in Front Hamlet there are a few Sino-Vietnamese individuals (see Table 2-1). In all cases individuals of other ethnic origin have assimilated Vietnamese cultural patterns, speak Vietnamese and are intermarried with the ethnic Vietnamese. Thus, as is the case with most villages in the Delta, the two hamlets studied are culturally homogeneous.1

1 Khánh Hûn is exclusively ethnic Vietnamese. Two Chinese shopkeepers who live in the center of town are not considered as members of the village (Hickey 1964:233).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Government Hamlet</th>
<th>Front Hamlet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>1,811 (96.6)</td>
<td>620 (97.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Vietnamese (Hinh-Ruong)</td>
<td>36 (1.9)</td>
<td>16 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer and Vietnamese-Khmer</td>
<td>20 (1.1)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Khmer</td>
<td>7 (0.4)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,874 (100.0)</td>
<td>636 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2-1: ETHNIC AFFILIATION OF VILLAGERS**
3. Religious Composition

Vietnamese patterns of religious affiliation differ from those of the West. Except in the case of Catholics and Cao Đài (and recently, the urban Buddhists) people do not belong to a specific church congregation or consider themselves as members of a particular faith with a prescribed doctrine. Rather, the peasants hold beliefs derived from a variety of sources and follow whatever ritual (Buddhist, Taoist or animist in origin) suits their pressing needs of the moment. However, in recent years, the rise of Buddhist self-consciousness has led to an increasing awareness on the part of all Vietnamese of their religious identity and consequently most peasants can express preference for a particular belief system as representing their predominant affiliation (although they continue to be eclectic in their actual ritual practice). Well over half of the inhabitants in both hamlets state that they are Buddhists of the Mahayana persuasion, while a few claim to be Theravada, perhaps reflecting the strong residual Khmer influence in the Lower Delta (see Table 2-2). Followers of the Cao Đài faith are the next most numerous grouping (see Table 2-2) although the individuals in Government Hamlet are members of a different sect from those in Front Hamlet.

2 Cadiere (1958:1-23) the greatest scholar of Vietnamese folk religion, has cogently argued against speaking of the religion of Viêt-Nam in favor of referring to the religion of Viêt-Nam which he saw as basically an animist system with more or less profound overlays of Confucian ancestor worship, Buddhism and Taoism.

3 The Cao Đài faction in Front Hamlet (known as the Hậu Giang or Rear River faction) sided with the Viêt-Minh and later with the NLF. The faction in Government Hamlet, the Tiền Giang or Forward River sect, initially sided with the Viêt-Minh but began to fight them in 1945 (reputedly in reaction to the extent of Communist influence in the Resistance Movement) and accepted French arms and advisors. It is because of this Cao Đài presence that Government Hamlet was never controlled by the insurgents. (Information collected in an interview with a Cao Đài Regional Forces commander in Front Hamlet who had served in the Viêt-Minh and then rallied to the French).
TABLE 2-2: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF VILLAGERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT HAMLET</th>
<th>PROUNT HAMLET</th>
<th>KHÂNH-HÂU VILLAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist (Mahayana)</td>
<td>1,237 (66.0)</td>
<td>491 (77.2)</td>
<td>2,811 (86.7)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cao Đài</td>
<td>458 (24.4)</td>
<td>92 (14.5)</td>
<td>350 (10.8)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancestor Worship</td>
<td>88 (4.7)</td>
<td>35 (5.5)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>36 (1.9)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>80 (2.5)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>36 (1.9)</td>
<td>1 (0.1)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist (Theravada)</td>
<td>6 (0.3)</td>
<td>11 (1.7)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoa Hao</td>
<td>1 (0.1)</td>
<td>3 (0.5)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion, No Response</td>
<td>12 (0.6)</td>
<td>3 (0.5)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,874 (100.0)</td>
<td>636 (100.0)</td>
<td>3,241 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hickey, 1964:58
**Source: Ibid: 67
***Source: Ibid: 58
Ancestor worshippers without any formal religious affiliation form the next most numerous grouping while the remainder of the population is reported as Protestant, Catholic and Hòa Hảo. Khánh Hậu Village shows a similar pattern with Buddhism the majority faith and Cao Đàiism the second most prevalent persuasion.

4. Demographic Structure

Examination of the population pyramids (Figures 2-1 and 2-2) for the two hamlets reveals that the hamlet populations display two major deviations from a "normal" distribution for a developing population: (1) a deficit of children under 5 years of age and (2) a deficit of young adults in the 15 to 34 year age range. Both deficits can be explained as results of the disruptions of war, the loss of young adults to the guerrillas and the army and as casualties, as well as the reduced number of young adults currently of child bearing age resulting from the fall in birthrate 20 years ago during the Resistance War. Both sexes of the same age cohorts conform to the same general distribution patterns but there are also certain anomalies in the sex ratios of the hamlet populations. While both hamlet populations have the same overall ratio of 94 males per 100 females, males outnumber females in the 0-14 age cohort by a considerable proportion (see Table 2-3). Government Hamlet has a sex ratio of 106 and Front Hamlet of 110 in this age cohort while a normal ratio for this age group would be approximately 101 boys for 100 girls.

4 Hendry reports that the birthrate fell considerably in Khánh Hậu during the period of most intensive fighting during the Resistance War (13).

5 This is the same sex ratio reported by Hendry for Khánh Hậu village in the Upper Delta and is considerably higher than the ratio reported for a refugee population surveyed in 1966 in Bình Tướng in the same area (Tinker 1967).

6 Other Southeast Asian countries report a better balance of sexes in this age group. Thailand has a sex ratio of 102, Cambodia of 103, and Malaya of 104. (Calculated from data in United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1962:166-170.)
FIGURE 2-1: POPULATION PYRAMID GOVERNMENT HAMLET

Males = 907 (48.4)
Female = 967 (51.6)
Total = 1874
FIGURE 2-2: POPULATION PYRAMID
FRONT HAMLET

Male = 308 (48.4%)
Female = 328 (51.6%)
Total = 636
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE COHORT</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT HAMLET</th>
<th>FRONT HAMLET</th>
<th>KHÁNH HÂU VILLAGE *</th>
<th>ĐỊNH TUỔNG REFUGEES **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-34</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-59</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and older</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hendry:14, Figure 2.1
**Source: Tinker:23
The two hamlets in Cà-Mau resemble Khánh Hậu's demographic structure in this regard as the latter village has a ratio of 111 boys to 100 girls in the 0-14 age cohort. The causal factors operating to produce this sexual imbalance in the Vietnamese population have not been determined. There is universally a higher proportion of live male than female births but it is doubtful that this natural differential could be as great as that reported in the census data on living children. 7 Female infanticide is specifically interdicted in Việt-Nam but the strong desire for male heirs and the generally high valuation placed on boys as compared to girls may lead to certain differences in the care that infants of the two sexes receive with a consequent higher survival rate for boys. 8

In the adult population women outnumber men by a considerable margin. Government Hamlet has a sex ratio of 61 males per 100 females ages 15 to 34 and 94 males per 100 females ages 35 to 59 while Front Hamlet reports sex ratios of 45 and 92 for the same age cohorts. Similar trends appear in the Khánh Hậu and Dinh Tường refugee population although the former shows somewhat better balance between the sexes and the latter is considerably more imbalanced. This suggests that while a certain deficit of adult males would be expectable in any case in peacetime (due to outmigration to urban areas) the war is the primary factor contributing to the sexual imbalance in the rural population both because of recruiting and conscription of males into the armed forces of both sides, the holding of many prisoners both by the

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7This attitude is exemplified by the Vietnamese folk saying that "a single boy, that is positive; ten girls, that is still negative" (Coughlin: 224).

8 Sex ratios for the 0-4 age cohort are 110 for Government Hamlet, 116 for Front Hamlet and 115 for Khánh Hậu.
CVN and the NLF, and due to the relatively high war death rate among adult males compared to other sectors of the population.

The sex ratio for persons 60 years and older shows great variation from hamlet to hamlet probably because the numbers of individuals involved are so small that unique local events can easily influence the demographic balance in these age cohorts.

5. Population Dynamics: Fertility

Despite frequent charges of "genocide" being committed in Việt-Nam by the United States all available data suggest that the rural population in the Delta has continued to increase at a rapid rate throughout the war and is likely to increase at an even more accelerated rate in the next decade. Direct fertility measures are unavailable but the number of children ages 0-4 per 1000 women ages 15 to 49 provides a rough indirect index of the fertility of the population. Government Hamlet has a fertility index of 1000 and Front Hamlet an index of 1155 compared to a fertility index of 669 for Khánh Hậu village and 779 for the Dinh Tường refugees. The two hamlet populations thus appear to exhibit great fecundity which if continued unchecked is going to lead to extreme overpopulation of the limited cultivable land of the Lower Delta within a decade as the current group of children reach adulthood and begin to reproduce. Some checking of the rate of population increase has occurred in the last five years as the number of children age under 5 years of age is smaller than the number age 5-9 but this is the

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The rural population in Central Việt-Nam has suffered much greater losses as a result of the war than is the case with the Delta people, especially losses of life due to bombing and military operations and the disruption of families resulting from refugee movement and enforced evacuation. Consequently, it is expectable that the rate of population increase in Central Việt-Nam has been lowered appreciably if not reversed. No non-classified empirical studies have been conducted on this topic however.
result of temporary disruption of rural life by the war and the relatively small number of women in the prime child bearing age group of 20-39 (the result of the lowered birthrate during the Resistance War). Once the large number of girls now below marital age reach adulthood, however, the population can be expected to again show a rapid rate of increase.

6. Population Dynamics: War Losses

Although both hamlet populations have been exposed more or less continuously to war hazards since 1944 there have been relatively few deaths (either civilian or military) due to the war. Forty-eight persons in Government Hamlet and 10 in Front Hamlet have been killed in the course of the Resistance War and the current insurgency. This represents a total loss of approximately two percent of the present populations of the hamlets, but spread over a 25 year period. Losses have not been felt evenly by all households as only 10.7 percent of households in Government Hamlet and 9.3 percent in Front Hamlet report the death of a member due to the war. In Government Hamlet losses have hit certain families particularly hard with three households reporting three deaths each and one reporting two deaths. In Front Hamlet, no household has lost more than a single member.

Losses in the current insurgency have occurred at a steady rate in Front Hamlet but show a sharp rate of increase in Government Hamlet from 1963 to 1968, the period of heavy losses to GVN forces in Cà-Mau (Most war casualties from Government Hamlet were soldiers serving in the Nationalist forces.) (see Figure 2-3).

The majority of war deaths in Government Hamlet were caused by the guerrillas while the majority of deaths in Front Hamlet were caused by the Government forces\(^{10}\) (see Table 2-4). Overall, however, 72 percent of war

\(^{10}\)Four out of five deaths attributed to activities of the Nationalist forces in Front Hamlet were civilians killed by allied aircraft. In two cases, the victims were under ten years of age.
FIGURE 2-3: YEAR OF OCCURRENCE OF WAR DEATHS

Government Hamlet
Front Hamlet

YEAR

NUMBER OF WAR DEATHS

1959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 1969
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSE</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT HAMLET</th>
<th>FRONT HAMLET</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Military Activity</td>
<td>5 (13.2)</td>
<td>5 (50.0)</td>
<td>10 (20.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Military Activity</td>
<td>20 (52.6)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20 (41.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Terrorist Activity</td>
<td>5 (13.2)</td>
<td>3 (30.0)</td>
<td>8 (16.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Terrorist Activity</td>
<td>1 (2.6)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>7 (18.4)</td>
<td>2 (20.0)</td>
<td>9 (18.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38 (100.0)</td>
<td>10 (100.0)</td>
<td>48 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
deaths of known cause are attributable to the activities and operations of
the Việt-Minh and Việt Cộng. Young adults, especially males, have suffered
the heaviest war casualty rate in both hamlets with 54 percent of war deaths
occurring in the group age 15-34 (see Table 2-5). Children under 15 years
of age account for 17 percent of all deaths. Males account for 88 percent
of the deaths.

Overall, unfortunate as these war losses have been for the individual
families of Government and Front Hamlets, they do not appear to have had a
significant effect on the demographic situations of the two populations.
No unclassified studies have been made of casualty rates in other rural
villages in Việt-Nam so that it is impossible to state to what extent the
situation in Cà-Mau is representative of the country as a whole. The death
rate reported here is probably lower than in the Upper Delta however and is
undoubtedly much lower than the war casualty rate in Central Việt-Nam.

7. Conclusions

Government and Front Hamlets display essentially similar demographic
patterns in all respects. Such statistical differences as occur are the
type of variations expectable when relatively small populations are studied
and do not reflect any significant differences between the two hamlets.

Communist influence on the demography of Front Hamlet is clearly
reflected only in the small number of young adults present in the hamlet.
At the time of interviewing many youths from the hamlet were not counted
in the census because they were at the Provincial Chieu Hoi Center—the
local guerrilla company having rallied en masse to the Government shortly
before this time.

Both Hamlets appear to have, on the whole, demographic characteristics
similar to other Delta Vietnamese settlements. It would thus appear that
the hamlets described in this study, despite their locations in a frontier
area are not atypical examples of the southern peasantry.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT HAMLET</th>
<th>FRONT HAMLET</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-59</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and Older</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Data On Age</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

This chapter describes household, family, and clan organization in the two hamlets. The kin-based social structures of the two hamlets are compared and differences related to the specific experiences of Cây Trâm and Tân Lộc. Violating anthropological tradition, an extended description of the Vietnamese kinship "system" is not presented. Kinship terminology has already been adequately covered by Spencer, Benedict, and Hickey (1964), among others. More importantly, the authors are in agreement with Service's view that anthropologists have too often confused the presence of linguistic patterns in a culture's kinship terminology with actual social structure. A list of kin terms is just that and no more, it does not necessarily represent the social system (Service 1962:185-195).

2. Household Composition and Organization

The basic descriptive unit for purposes of this study is the individual household. A household is defined as a group of individuals living under the same roof and engaging in joint production and consumption of food. Thus there can be two or more households occupying a common house if they maintain independent commissaries. Household is not to be confused with the family which is composed of affinally and consanguinely related individuals regardless of place of residence. In fact, most Vietnamese households are also families or groups of families but they do on occasion include non-related members, and there are often family members living in other residences.

There are six types of households represented in the two hamlets. These have been classified using a modification of the typology developed by Nurge (1965:48-49) for the Philippines. The types are:
1) **Intact Nuclear**: Married or common-law spouses living with their own or adopted children. No other kin or non-related persons are resident in the household.

2) **Extended Horizontal**: One or more siblings of either spouse and/or a non-related adult is a household member. Children may be present.

3) **Extended Vertical**: A household composed of members of three or more generations. May include adult siblings and non-related adult members.

4) **Skipped-Generation Extended Vertical**: Composed of an elderly person or persons, usually grandparents, and one or more of their own or someone else's grandchildren.

5) **Truncated Nuclear**: A household in which one of the spouses is not present due to death, divorce or desertion. A household where the man is absent on army service or with the Front forces is classified in this category also.

6) **Truncated**: A household composed of one or two elderly persons.

Table 3-1 presents data on the distribution of the various household types in the two hamlets. While there are slight apparent differences such as a higher frequency of truncated nuclear households in Front Hamlet and a higher frequency of extended vertical households in Government Hamlet, these are non-significant statistically. The most striking finding is the predominance in both hamlets of households composed only of a nuclear family. As Table 3-2 shows approximately 70% of all households are nuclear or sub-nuclear in composition. While this is in agreement with Hickey's findings in Khánh Hậu in the Upper Delta (1964:92, Table 10), it is contrary to the prevalent American stereotype of Asian social organization. When it is considered that many of the extended vertical households are in fact nuclear families augmented by the presence of an aged parent of one or other of the spouses it becomes apparent that Vietnamese peasants may not be in practice as kin-group centered as they are commonly represented.
**TABLE 3-1: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD TYPES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSEHOLD TYPE</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT HAMLET</th>
<th></th>
<th>FRONT HAMLET</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) INTACT NUCLEAR</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) EXTENDED HORIZONTAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) EXTENDED VERTICAL</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) SKIPPED-GENERATION EXTENDED VERTICAL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) TRUNCATED NUCLEAR</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) TRUNCATED</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3-2: NUCLEAR VS. EXTENDED HOUSEHOLDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSEHOLD TYPE</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT HAMLET</th>
<th></th>
<th>FRONT HAMLET</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUCLEAR OR SUB-NUCLEAR</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXTENDED</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. **Household Size**

Figure 3-1 and Table 3-3 present data on the sizes of household in the two hamlets. The mean size of household for Government Hamlet is 6.8 persons compared to 5.9 persons in Front Hamlet. This reflects the greater frequency with which extended households occur in Government Hamlet.

4. **The Peasant Family**

"Family" as employed in social anthropology at present is a loosely defined concept. While the basic determinant of membership is the existence of kinship relationships between all of the individuals included in the group, it is still often difficult to determine where one family ends and another begins. This especially the case in societies organized on the clan or lineage principle, where one can speak of the lineage as the family as well as applying that term to the smaller functional groupings within the lineage. For purposes of this study, the term "family" is reserved for the minimum socio-legal unit presently recognized by Vietnamese, the unit based on the marital relationship between man and wife (and including their children, if any). Larger aggregates of such dyads will be referred to as "extended families," where the familial units are coresident and as "kin groups" where they are not.

Following a system developed by Hanne1 (1961:990) families are described referent to each married and/or procreative woman in the household. Thus a household composed of an elderly couple and their son and his wife is described as consisting of two families. Hanne1 presents the following classification scheme for these ego-centered family types:

1) **Nuclear (N).** A nuclear family consists of a woman and spouse, with or without children. Any children present must be those of one or the other—or of both—spouses or must have been adopted. If grandchildren or the children of siblings or other children have been taken to raise in the absence of their parents and without recognition of adoption, the family is not classed as a nuclear one. (See Type 2, below)
FIG. 3-15 DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS, BY SIZE

NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNMENT</strong></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HAMLET</strong></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=27 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRONT</strong></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HAMLET</strong></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=108</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"2) More-than-nuclear superordinate (\(N_{sup}\)). These are families in which the woman concerned has a coresident spouse but in which the nuclear base is extended by the addition of persons of the first or second descending generation, e.g., a woman's child and child's spouse or child's child are coresident with her.... The essence of these relationships is that the family is more-than-nuclear and that the woman is in a nominally superordinate position to the extensions in the household.

"3) More-than-nuclear lateral (\(N_{l} \)). These are families in which the woman concerned has a coresident spouse, but in which the extensions to the nuclear base are achieved by adding an adult or another family to the household of the woman concerned. The essence of this category is that the woman under consideration is nominally a peer of the other adult or adults who constitute the extensions to her own nuclear family....

"4) More-than-nuclear subordinate (\(N_{sub}\)). These are families in which the woman concerned has a coresident spouse but is in a nominally subordinate position in a larger family, that of her parents or of her husband's parents.

"5) Less-than-nuclear nondependent (\(N_{non-dep}\)). These are families in which the woman concerned does not have a spouse and is not in a subordinate or dependent position in a household, although she may be living with another woman as a peer, or with her own grandchildren, children, or other subordinate persons....

"6) Less-than-nuclear dependent (\(N_{dep}\)). These are families in which the woman concerned have offspring but no coresident spouse and are in nominally dependent positions in the home of their parents or grandparents. Since these women are the subordinates in an extended family, it is clear that their own ego-centered family groups are more-than-nuclear in some respects. As in Type 5, however, the crucial feature for their classification is the absence of a spouse, and here, their dependent position."

Table 3-4 presents data on the distribution of these family types in the two hamlets. Nearly one-quarter (24.2%) of families in Government Hamlet are headed by women, either widows or wives whose husbands are semi-permanently absent from the hamlet, most often on ARVN or other GVN military service. Only 16.9% of families in Front Hamlet are headed by women, in most cases widows but in a few cases wives of men detained at the Chieu Hoi Center.
TABLE 3-4: DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES BY TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAMILY TYPE</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT HAMLET</th>
<th></th>
<th>FRONT HAMLET</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUCLEAR</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE-THAN-NUCLEAR SUPERORDINATE</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE-THAN-NUCLEAR LATERAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE-THAN-NUCLEAR SUBORDINATE</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESS-THAN-NUCLEAR NON-DEPENDENT</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESS-THAN-NUCLEAR DEPENDENT</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. The Family Development Cycle

Employing Hamzel's method of inferring dynamic patterns from static census data, it is possible to project the probable developmental cycle of individual families by examining the status of existing families in various stages of development measured in terms of the ages of the women involved. As Table 3-5 and Figures 3-2 show, the cycle of family development is essentially the same in the two hamlets.

The developmental cycle is as follows:

First Decade (age 15-24). Half of the families of women 15 to 24 years of age are of the more-than-nuclear-subordinate type, i.e., newly married couples residing with one or the other spouse's parents. More than one-quarter are nuclear and the remaining families are distributed in the other categories more or less evenly.

Second Decade (25-34). Half of the women in this age range in Government Hamlet and nearly three-quarters in Front Hamlet live in independent-nuclear families. More-than-nuclear-subordinate families now account for under 20 percent of the total. In Government Hamlet nearly fifteen percent of the women are living in less-than-nuclear-dependent families (compared to under five percent in Front Hamlet), reflecting the large number of war widows and wives of soldiers in this age group.

Third Decade (35-44). Nuclear families remain the dominant family type, comprising 66 percent of the women in 35-44 year age range in Government Hamlet and 70 percent in Front Hamlet.

Fourth Decade (45-54). Independent nuclear families become less common as extended families develop as the children of women in this age group mature and marry. Less-than-nuclear-nondependent families also begin to increase in number as the high adult male mortality rate leaves many women of this age as widows leading their own households.
# Table 3.5: Number of Family Types by Age of Women

| FAMILY TYPE                      | GOVERNMENT HAMLET |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|                      |
|                                  | AGES              | 15-24                | 25-34                | 35-44                | 45-54                | 55-64                | 65+                  | 15-24                | 25-34                | 35-44                | 45-54                | 55-64                | 65+                  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 1. NUCLEAR                       |                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                                  |                   | 10                   | 40                   | 65                   | 19                   | 14                   | 8                    | 156                  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                                  |                   | 27.6                 | 53.3                 | 66.3                 | 33.0                 | 33.3                 | 18.6                 | 45.4                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 2. MORE THAN                      |                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| NUCLEAR-SUPERORDINATE            |                   | 2                    | 3                    | 3                    | 11                   | 13                   | 12                   | 44                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                                  |                   | 5.6                  | 4.0                  | 3.1                  | 22.0                 | 31.0                 | 27.9                 | 12.8                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 3. MORE THAN                      |                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| NUCLEAR-LATERAL                  |                   | 0                    | 3                    | 0                    | 1                    | 0                    | 1                    | 5                    |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                                  |                   | 0.0                  | 4.0                  | 0.0                  | 2.0                  | 0.0                  | 2.3                  | 1.4                  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 4. MORE THAN                      |                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| NUCLEAR-SUBORDINATE              |                   | 18                   | 14                   | 13                   | 5                    | 0                    | 0                    | 55                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                                  |                   | 50.0                 | 18.7                 | 18.4                 | 10.0                 | 0.0                  | 0.0                  | 16.0                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 5. LESS THAN                      |                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| NUCLEAR-NON-DEPENDENT            |                   | 1                    | 4                    | 10                   | 14                   | 15                   | 22                   | 66                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                                  |                   | 2.8                  | 5.3                  | 10.2                 | 28.0                 | 35.7                 | 51.2                 | 19.2                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| 6. LESS THAN                      |                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| NUCLEAR-DEPENDENT                |                   | 5                    | 11                   | 2                    | 0                    | 0                    | 0                    | 18                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                                  |                   | 13.9                 | 14.7                 | 2.0                  | 0.0                  | 0.0                  | 0.0                  | 5.2                  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| TOTALS                           |                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                                  |                   | 36                   | 75                   | 90                   | 50                   | 42                   | 43                   | 344                  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                                  |                   | 100.0                | 100.0                | 100.0                | 100.0                | 100.0                | 100.0                | 100.0                |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |

AGE EXPRESSED AS \( \% \)
FIG. 3-2: WOMEN IN FAMILY TYPES BY AGE OF WOMEN

GOVERNMENT HAMLET

FRONT HAMLET
Fifth Decade (55-64). The trends of the Fourth Decade are extended. Less-than-nuclear-nondependent families account for more than one-quarter of all women in this age range.

Sixth Decade (65 and older). Nearly half of the women in this age range live in less-than-nuclear nondependent families while more-than-nuclear-superordinate and independent nuclear families account for most of the remainder.

The average village girl then, can expect to pass through four stages in her family life. Initially she will establish housekeeping with her husband as a subordinate member either of his or her own parents' household. By the second decade of her marriage she can expect to be living as an independent nuclear family with her husband and children, although in Government Hanlot there is some tendency to remain longer as part of the extended family. By the fourth decade of her marriage the woman will again be part of an extended family but this time in a superordinate role over her now married children and their spouses and offspring. By the sixth decade the woman will most probably be a widow living in the household of one of her married children. She may still function as head of the household but as she and her children age they will most likely displace her in the decision making role. Clearly, not every woman passes through the identical family cycle—a significant number live their entire married lives in independent nuclear families—but the majority do follow this general pattern.