Through treaties achieved in 1883, 1884, and 1885, all of Viet-Nam came under French control. For all practical purposes Vietnamese sovereignty simply ceased to exist. A number of armed revolts ensued, all essentially military in nature and based upon traditional Confucian concepts of the monarch at the head of social and administrative hierarchy. These uprisings were uniformly tragic and costly exercises in futility which served chiefly to demonstrate the impotence of the traditional establishment, which is to say the traditional mandarin-scholars, in the face of French power.

The despair which followed these military failures combined with several other factors at the turn of the century to provide a strong stimulus toward modernization in the twentieth-century Viet-Nam. During the late 1890’s, as the French consolidated their control, taxes grew daily more onerous and popular discontent grew apace. Then, in 1905, Japan’s victory over Russia gave a new bent to the thinking of Viet-Nam’s frustrated and desperate revolutionaries. In less than thirty years, following the Meiji Restoration in 1876, the Japanese had attained demonstrated military superiority over a major Western power, and the obvious keystone of their success had been modernization through mastery of Western technology. At the same time, growing numbers of Vietnamese intellectuals were for the first time gaining an awareness of the best of Western thought and culture, partly through those few Vietnamese who had mastered French and received some French education and partly through Chinese translations of European books which were being published in Shanghai.

As early as 1906 Phan Bội Châu, perhaps the most famous of the early Vietnamese revolutionary leaders, had organized an Organization for the Modernization of Viet-Nam (Viet-Nam Duy Tân Hội). In 1907 Vietnamese nationalists organized "a nationwide network of private schools which
popularized all kinds of Western ideas." This movement (Đặng Kinh Nghĩa Thúc) proved to be so successful that the French colonial authorities saw it as a threat to their rule and suppressed it, jailing many of the leaders. In reaction to this, popular demonstrations were organized in 1908 demanding tax and educational reforms. Demonstrators in central Việt-Nam wore short tunics and cut off their long hair "in reaction against traditional dress and hair styles" (Lê Thanh Khôi:392), thus symbolizing their desire for a new life. These demonstrations, however, led only to arrests, deportations and executions.

But the inspiration of events in China—where Sun Yat Sen was enjoying considerable success with his enlightened revolutionary doctrine, and with his headquarters in Canton, not far from the Vietnamese border—kept revolutionary hopes alive in Việt-Nam. In the years which followed many youths fled Việt-Nam to seek education and training abroad, mainly in China and Japan. Phan Bội Châu, who had been in Japan since 1902, traveled about Asia, uniting Vietnamese in exile into an Association for the Restoration of Việt-Nam (Việt Nam Quảng Phúc Hội), raising funds, securing scholarships, and developing an organization to get promising youths out of Việt-Nam and into such places as the Whampoa Political and Military Academy of China and the Japanese Military Academy, as well as into other schools and universities. This movement was known as the Đông Du, or Travel East movement, and it continued into the late 1920’s, although it suffered a crushing blow when Phan Bội Châu, who had shifted his base of operations to China in 1910, was betrayed to the French police in Shanghai in 1925, allegedly by Hồ Chí Minh and his communist collaborators who had infiltrated the nationalist movement (Hoàng Văn Chi:18).

Meanwhile, within Việt-Nam, desire for knowledge of the West became too great for the French to resist. In 1917 the French established the University
of Hanoi, with an all-French faculty, as the capstone of a standardized French elementary and secondary educational system. The last of the traditional mandarinate examinations were held in Hanoi in 1915 and in Hue in 1918. Also at this time, several journals which were to be of great influence came into being, with the primary goal of expanding intellectual horizons and introducing Western ideas into Vietnamese intellectuals circles, while during and after World War I, increasing numbers of Vietnamese traveled to France, as soldiers, workers, students, and tourists, and had an opportunity to view the Western world at first hand.

The aspirations of the Vietnamese for modernization and independence peaked again in 1932 with the return to Viet-Nam of Bao Dai, a direct descendant of the Nguyen dynasty, to assume the role of constitutional monarch under the terms of the treaty of 1884. At that time Bao Dai was 19 years old and had just completed his education in France. Filled with enthusiasm and fresh ideas, Bao Dai aroused considerable enthusiasm among most Vietnamese with his bold and hopeful approach to his reign. The following words from his initial address were singled out for uniformly high praise by all major newspapers, magazines and journals of the day.

"It is my desire to abandon outmoded political forms which are no longer appropriate for these times. I want Viet-Nam to progress with the times, to no longer be inferior to any other nation. This does not mean the violence of forced change, but orderly modernization. Something is wrong with a nation which does not adapt to the new. I want to activate this nation, and will devote all of my power toward our envolvement and civilization.

The fact that Bao Dai and his government, including Pham Quynh, editor and publisher of South Wind, as chief of cabinet, and Ngo Dinh Diem as Minister of the Interior, were frustrated in their programs by a French reluctance to grant in practice what they had promised in principle, did not negate the impact of their original aspirations, not the extent to which their intended reforms had reflected the prevailing spirit of the times.
Indeed, in 1932 a real revolution did take place in Vietnamese literature. Vietnamese poets, following the successful example of Phan Khôi in his poem "Tình Gia," or "Old Love," turned in amazing numbers to modern poetic forms based largely upon Western models, with a shift in content accompanying a shift in style, and Phạm Quỳnh and his cohorts yielded their dominant position, which had been unquestioned during the 1920's, to Nhất Linh (Nguyễn Tường Tâm) and his Self-Strength Literary Movement (Tự Lực Văn Đoàn), with its more radical official newspaper, Mores (Phong Noa). Novels flourished as a literary form for the first time during the 1930's, with the two most famous novels probably being Ðoàn Tuyệt (Breaking the Ties) by Nhất Linh, and Nhà Chông Xuân (In the Midst of Spring), by Khải Hưng, a close friend and collaborator of Nhất Linh. Both novels utilized as a major theme the oppressiveness of traditional family structure, arranged marriages, and the right and responsibility of the individual to seek individual happiness even if it meant direct opposition to accepted social norms. In 1938, in a well-known series of articles in Mores entitled "Ten Items to Ponder," later published as a book and still required reading in high schools throughout South Việt-Nam, Hoàng Đạo, a younger brother of Nhất Linh, selected as his first item, "Follow the new, follow the new completely, without any hesitation," in which he compared those who hesitated between traditional and modern ways with the ass in a fable by Buriden who died of thirst half-way between a barrel of water and a barrel of grain.

Thus by the outbreak of World War II, many of the people and all leaders of any stature were devoted to the causes of modernization and national independence, which had become inextricably linked with each other. The major and overriding question was, and remains, who could carry out most successfully "the revolution," which is a total one, social, and economic as well as political. It was against such a background that the Communists and
various nationalist factions vied for supremacy in the revolutionary movement of the 1940's, and that in the 1950's the country was split into two, with the Democratic Republic of Viêt-Nam (DRV) finally in control in the northern half of the country and while the Republic of Viêt-Nam (RVN) and the NLF struggled for political dominance in the southern half.

Neither side in the Southern struggle has been able to achieve complete success as the strengths of each in any one area have been offset by debilitating weaknesses in another. The GVN, with its far greater potential for rapid economic development and the provision of effective social welfare programs (thanks to U.S. support), failed to stress the concrete benefits which its programs were bringing and could bring to the people, and squandered its energies on petty political squabbles and vague ideological theories. The NLF, more closely attuned to the real priorities of the people's aspirations, was much more to the point in its propaganda, but in practice was far behind the GVN in meeting these aspirations. Both sides, however, at least verbally, recognized and stressed the desire of the people for a new life.

When the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) was formed in 1962 to facilitate the exercise of communist control over the NLF, an indoctrination booklet was issued to instruct cadres that although the ultimate goal was to achieve socialism and communism, in meetings and indoctrination sessions it should be stressed that the "urgent immediate tasks" were: having gained

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Sansom has argued to the contrary that the NLF initially won the support of the peasants by in fact bringing them more real economic advantages than the GVN but has recently forfeited much of this support as the Government has begun to offer the greater economic benefits.
control of Việt-Nam, "to set up a broad national democratic coalition government, to achieve national independence, freedom, and democracy, to improve the people's living standards, to provide land for the tillers, to develop industry, trade, culture, and education, bring a comfortable life to all people, and advance toward peaceful national unification" (Pike:138).

In the same year, Ngô Đình Nhu told strategic hamlet cadre that "The regime inside the strategic hamlet should be revolutionary, but the revolution should be inside each individual" (Pike:67). In 1963, he asked the following rhetorical question: "To build a new society, a new life with new values, to live by his own means, to work for his own security and with his own strength, starting from the infrastructure of the hamlets and quarters to pervade the superstructure of the State--is not this the profound and real aspiration of our people?" (Pike:66).

Both historically and from our data, the Vietnamese villagers, as well as their intellectual and political leaders, are revealed to be not only willing, but eager to adapt to changing conditions, to change with the times, and accept innovations that will facilitate the achievement of their basic goals. Even beyond the desire for peace, which seems to mean to the individual villager primarily physical security for himself and his nuclear family, the villager is most concerned with economic security, i.e., having a reasonable assurance that he and his family will have enough food to eat, an adequate house to live in, decent clothes to wear, and hopefully a little extra cash with which to purchase such items as lamps, radios, bicycles, motor scooters, motorized cultivators, etc., which will make life more comfortable and convenient. After this, the greatest concern is that the children will have an opportunity to get a good education and achieve an even better life in the future. To achieve these goals the typical villager is prepared to make temporary sacrifices and to be flexible in his means of production and all income-producing activities.
The two most detailed economic studies conducted in the Delta in recent years, those by Hendry and by Sanson, support this inference. Sanson's account of the way a new water pump which permitted the villagers to irrigate their land more efficiently and thus increase production spread rapidly throughout the Delta despite a lack of interest and sometimes even opposition by both the NLF and the CVN (and their U.S. advisors) demonstrates clearly the strong desire of rural Vietnamese to accept innovation which is of demonstrated worth (Sanson:164-179).

Since our findings indicate that most Vietnamese villagers share essentially similar attitude/value systems, including almost identical hopes and fears for the future, and that the leadership of both sides has historically emphasized concepts essentially in keeping with these shared values and aspirations, the key question remains: how is one to account for the differing degrees of success achieved by the Nationalists and the Communists in gaining and consolidating control over the peasantry?

Many responses have already been given to this question and many more are likely to come in the future. A definitive answer to this question cannot be given on the basis of data now available. Nor, in this study, can we even approximate a systematic analysis of the data which is already available. But there do appear to be certain specific key factors which must be taken into account in the development of any hypothesis which will account for the differential success of the CVN and the NLF in effectively organizing

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3A study made by Jamieson in 1967 of Buddhist, Catholic and Cao Dal villagers in the My-Tho area revealed no greater differences between these groups than were found between the Government and Front villagers in the current study.
the villages of Viêt-Nam, and it may be useful to review some of them as a first step toward developing some working hypotheses for use in further research. We would especially hope to stimulate a dialogue among our colleagues concerning the relative importance of some of these factors and the validity of some of the assumptions upon which they are based.

Three factors appear most significant to us:

1) A revolutionary organizational methodology or model
2) Widespread peasant discontent, and
3) Capable and motivated revolutionary leadership cadres.

No single factor can alone explain the revolutionary process in Viêt-Nam although many such attempts have been made. Thus, the initial obvious explanation of the Front's success is a structural one: the Communists have employed their "organizational weapon" to implement a revolutionary infrastructure in the villages. There is a certain face validity to this view as anyone who has ever compared a Catholic or Cao Đài hamlet to a typical Delta Buddhist settlement is probably aware. The inhabitants share common values yet display strikingly different socio-political behavior. Catholic villages generally have reputations for successful participation in self-help community development or self-defense project while many GVN Buddhist hamlets have poor records in these areas. Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo also tend to be more successful in these matters than Buddhists, while Front-controlled hamlets often seem to be most successful of all.

These differences in behavioral patterns between groups can certainly be explained in part in terms of social structural differences imposed by the organizational techniques and talents of the dominant organization, whether it be political, religious, or a combination of the two. Catholic, Cao Đài and Front communities are clearly more structured than the essentially acephalous Buddhist settlements in the Mekong Delta at the present time. Various sodalities and functional associations cross-cut family lines...
to tie the population into a corporate body. There are also socially recognized leadership roles (be it of priest or cadre) equipped with imposing sanctions to insure that members of the community participate fully in cooperative activities. But structural factors alone are not a sufficient explanation of the vitality of the insurgents. If organization was indeed the magic formula, all the government should have to do to win is to develop bigger and better counterstructures. The dismal history of such efforts in Viêt-Nam, starting with the Nationalist pacification teams in the Tonkin Delta in 1952-53 and continuing to the strategic hamlet cadre of 1962-63, speaks for itself on the universal efficacy of the organizational weapon. 4

This is not to discount the importance of organizing the population as a technique of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Clearly, if the revolutionaries are actively restructuring the villages while the government forces sit in the cities the organizational weapon is going to prove all powerful. But when, as has been the case in Viêt-Nam, both sides are seeking to implant their systems of control in the villages simultaneously, with both following essentially similar doctrines, then to argue that the winning side is successful because it has better organization becomes tautological—the question remains "why" it has better organization.

The second explanatory factor is one that has found great favor with American academics with little familiarity with Viêt-Nam who often claim

4The French pacification effort in Algeria provided an extensive test of the purely structural approach to counterinsurgency and demonstrated the limitations of the methodology. French revolutionary warfare doctrine is described in Lacheroy and Poirier. Its essential weaknesses are discussed in Paret.
that the Communists have had greater ideological appeal to the peasants than the Nationalists. While the popular desire for national liberation was clearly a strong factor in the favor of the Việt-Minh in the struggle against the French, there is at present little overt differentiation between the ideological slogans of the NLF and the various anti-communist elements. All factions verbally favor national independence and integrity, economic development, land to the tiller, responsive government and the rights and dignity of man. Available evidence suggests however that while ideology may be an important factor in determining the allegiance of the intellectual elite, particularistic local and individual concerns are of far greater movement to the peasants (see Chapter V of this report). These particularistic concerns may in reality often reflect large-scale changes in the overall society—and such appears to be the case in Việt-Nam—but

5 Even during the Resistance War, when national identity provided a clear-cut issue, many Vietnamese willingly fought on the side of the French because their particularistic interests conflicted in some way with the Việt-Minh. (There were as many Vietnamese as French soldiers at Điện Biên Phủ where they often fought with great valor. Fall:481,235)

6 Much Diemist propaganda on the evils of capitalism and Western individualism was virtually indistinguishable from standard Marxist fare.

7 Wolf (1969) provides a brief summary of the disruption of the Vietnamese rural order resulting from the impact of French colonialism.
the peasant rarely perceives this. Administrative breakdown may be a
general concomitant of colonialism but the villager is only aware of the
corruption or inefficiency of Mandarin X of village Y. Obviously however,
initially it is the government that is going to be the side with the great-
est opportunity to offend the peasants. Its administrators, its police and
its military are exercising power and making mistakes and committing injus-
tices which the insurgents are able to exploit. And it is here that the
third aspect of our explanation of Việt-Minh/NLF success is relevant, i.e.,
the kind and quality of leaders (cadre) who were deployed in the rural areas
by the contending forces.

The successful organization of Vietnamese villages is not the work of
the villagers themselves. Mekong Delta peasant society is characterized
by personal atomism of the sort associated with what Edward Banfield has
labelled "amoral familism." In such societies the individual views other
people with suspicion, distrust, and often hostility; and the maximum unit
of social and economic cooperation is the household or limited extended
family. In neither the Front nor the GVN hamlet in this study was evidence
found of any locally organized cooperative groupings larger than the extended
family. The lineage or clan (tộc), which provides cohesiveness to Northern
villages, has essentially atrophied in the South. In such an atmosphere of
mutual distrust it is difficult for members of the community, however well
meaning they may be, to organize cooperative activities beyond such tradi-
tionally sanctioned activities as repair of the pagoda.

In the contrast to this failure of local initiative, there are numerous
cases where leaders coming into the communities from the outside have suc-
ceeded in organizing cooperative activities. Peasant acceptance of extra-
community leadership appears to rest primarily upon two factors: 1) the
outside leader has sanctions at his disposal which are respected by the
peasants—the priest can refuse communion, the cadre carries a rifle;

2) the peasants recognize in the outsider qualities which are lacking among the villagers but which are stressed as desirable attributes in their ideal value system. If the outsider uses his power and prestige judiciously, he can proceed, using himself as the fulcrum, to organize cooperative organizations where none existed before. Thus, while neither the Communist nor Nationalist forces, at least in this generation, has been able to achieve a dramatic alteration of the values of the peasantry, it appears that the assignment of properly selected and properly trained leaders to rural areas can to a large degree overcome the organizational deficiencies associated with peasant character and personality.8

It is in the selection and training of cadre that the Communists have shown a decided superiority to the Nationalist regimes. The GVN has been largely dependent upon administrators drawn from the ranks of the colonial civil service, men deeply imbued with the traditional mandarin mentality (Jumper:1957). The Front, on the other hand, appears to have developed a new corps of administrators largely lacking the functionary mentality of the GVN elite.

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8Peasants rarely appear to provide the leadership of so-called "peasant revolutions." See in this regard North's study of Kuomintang and Chinese Communist elites, Newbold's data on political participants in the Guatemalan Revolution and Wolf's survey of six modern peasant revolutions. Wolf (1969: 294) concludes that "Marxists have long argued that peasants without outside leadership cannot make a revolution; and our case material would bear them out."
Thus, Douglas Pike reports that as he began his extensive study of the NLF he was struck by "the enormous amounts of time, energy, manpower, and money it spent on communication activities. It seemed obsessed with explaining itself to itself, to the other side, and to the world at large" (Pike:IX). The Diệm regime, on the other hand, ruled as if by divine right, and seemed reluctant to give the appearance of catering to public opinion. Not that the GVN was necessarily less genuinely concerned about the welfare and aspirations of the people than was the NLF, but its officials felt it to be both their right and duty to decide all matters of importance. To them explaining their decisions and attempting to persuade others of their correctness was worse than a waste of time, it was improper conduct, unbecoming to legitimate leadership.

Pike also notes (IX) the NLF "learned as they went, testing, rejecting, improving, painstakingly building an organizational steamroller." The GVN clung to a rigid authoritarian outlook. And while the NLF placed heavy emphasis upon building into its internal communication system circuits which would provide higher echelons with a wise variety of reliable information, including "negative feedback," on the GVN side communication tended too often to be a one way process with ideas, facts and opinions flowing freely only from upper to lower echelons. We have observed countless examples in the GVN of a reluctance to volunteer ideas or even information to superiors unless specifically told to do so. Denis Warner’s selection of The Last Mandarin as the title for his book about Ngô Đình Diệm highlights the major difference, one both of style and substance, between the GVN and the NLF in their initial approach to village administration and control.

Thus, while we agree with Joiner (1967) that the NLF out-administered the GVN, we believe that it did so not so much because of superior techniques
(although these played an important role) but because the Front cadres had a different model personality structure than the GVN cadres. We hypothesize that the NLF cadre exhibit what E.E. Hagen has termed an "innovative" personality configuration as opposed to the "authoritarian" personality configuration which he believes is typical both of peasants and traditional elite groups. We think that support for this assessment is implicit in much of the literature describing various attempts at political, social and economic organization in Việt-Nam, and in studies of revolutionary elites in other countries. The finding that the cadre sample in our study differed significantly from the peasant in terms of their values and attitudes offers empirical support for this hypothesis.

9 On both sides of the conflict the cadre of today appear to be quantitatively and qualitatively different than they were six or seven years ago, and these changes and their probable causes must be taken into account in analysis. On the NLF side, heavy combat losses combined with an increasing rate of defection seem to have resulted in a greatly accelerated and less effective program of cadre recruitment and training; while on the GVN side, the establishment of the National Training Center in Vũng Tàu and the impact of the dynamic Lt. Col. Nguyễn Ê since he assumed command of the center in 1966 appear to have resulted in GVN cadre who are much better trained and more deeply indoctrinated than were the old Strategic Hamlet cadre of 1962-1963 or the New Life Pacification cadre of 1964 and 1965.
In conclusion, then, while long-term Communist control appears not to have resulted in significant changes in the values or attitudes of the Delta peasants en masse we believe that study of the value orientation and overall psychological configuration of certain strategic sub-groups in Vietnamese society offer a key to understanding the differential success enjoyed by the Communists and the Nationalists in organizing the rural population. Properly selected and trained cadre provide both the expertise and, more importantly, the "moral cement" necessary to bind the multitude of discontented individual peasants into a viable revolutionary force. Discontented peasants and organizational methodologies have been equally accessible to both sides in the struggle--but for a variety of reasons, until recently only the Communists have succeeded in mobilizing suitable cadre to exploit these opportunities.
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WOLF, ERIC R.


APPENDIX A: ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF CENSUS CARD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hamlet</th>
<th>Household No.</th>
<th>Research Date</th>
<th>Interviewer No.</th>
<th>Interviewer Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Respondent Name</th>
<th>Head of Lineage</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Relationship to Head of Household</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Primary Education</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Ancestor Worship</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
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| | Head of Household | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | Household Members | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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APPENDIX B

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF HAMLET SOCIAL STRUCTURE QUESTIONNAIRE

Hamlet__________________ Household No. ___________ Research Date __/__/69
Interviewer No. ______________ Name of Respondent ____________________

Interviewer description of house type:

1. No. of rooms

2. Roof

   Thatch

   Metal

   Tile

   Other

3. Walls

   Thatch

   Wood

   Brick

   Cement

   Other

4. Floor

   Earth

   Wood

   Brick

   Cement

   Other

5. Estimated cost of house__________________
6. If you have children or a spouse not currently living in your house, please tell us about them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relation to Head of House</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Present Occupation</th>
<th>Present Residence</th>
<th>Reason for Departure</th>
<th>Date of Departure</th>
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7. If any members of your household have died please tell us about them (Include still-born babies):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Number</th>
<th>Relation to Head of Household</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Year of Death</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Circumstance of Death</th>
<th>Place of Death</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
8. Where is your home village?
   Hamlet ___________________________  Village ___________________________
   District __________________________ Province ___________________________

9. If not native of this hamlet, what year did you come here to live?
   ____________________________________________________________
   ____________________________________________________________

10. Where is your spouse's home village?
    Hamlet ___________________________  Village ___________________________
    District __________________________ Province ___________________________

11. If not native of this hamlet, what year did your spouse come here to live?
    ____________________________________________________________
    ____________________________________________________________

12. Where is your father's home village?
    Hamlet ___________________________  Village ___________________________
    District __________________________ Province ___________________________

13. Where is your father's father's home village?
    Hamlet ___________________________  Village ___________________________
    District __________________________ Province ___________________________