NAVY SECTION
MAAG, VIETNAM

ADVISORY PLAN
001-62
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
SAIGON, VIETNAM

NAVY SECTION MAAG VIETNAM INSTRUCTION 005400.3

From: Chief Navy Section Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
To: Distribution

Subj: Preparation of a Three-Year Advisory Plan (S)

Encl: (1) Format for Navy Section Advisory Plan
(2) Basic Navy Section Advisory Plan (to be issued)

1. Purpose. To establish requirements for the immediate development of a plan for the advisory effort in order that the Navy Section effort may be applied in a purposeful and most efficient manner.

2. Discussion.

a. Over the period of the past several months, the Navy Section has been required to implement the advisory effort in an increasingly aggressive manner while expanding this effort into new areas including intelligence and operations in addition to the routine training and material programming mission that heretofore was the section's major responsibility. Prolonged delay in the receipt of necessary personnel of suitable qualification has led us to work in a random rather than planned fashion. Of course, much of the effort expended contributes to the desired end result; some could better have been expended at other tasks.

b. To accomplish the mission of the Navy Section with the greatest efficiency, a detailed and comprehensive plan for our efforts is obviously required. Such a plan should indicate the desired end result, and should provide sufficient detail for each phase of the effort to guide all personnel towards the accomplishment of significant goals. Accordingly, the development of such a plan is herewith directed.

c. As soon as the plan has been developed, it will be promulgated as basic guidance for the Navy Section advisory effort. Weekly SITREPS will report progress towards accomplishment.

3. Action.

a. Format desired and basic guidance for the advisory plan are provided in enclosures (1) and (2).

b. This plan will provide for the accomplishment of all matters necessary to complete the Navy Section advisory effort.
c. Tasks for the provision of programmed equipment and material and for the training of personnel are to be included.

d. Each staff officer and advisor will contribute annexes, appendices, and tabs appropriate to his area of knowledge and responsibility to expand the broad objectives into finite tasks to be accomplished. Tasks must be such that when the details are completed, the entire area may be considered complete, and the advisory effort in that particular area terminated. A target date for each specific task will be indicated.

e. It must be remembered that the Navy Section's task is two-fold: To ensure that the VNN is operated effectively now; at the same time, to develop the VNN's ability to operate at a high standard without advisory assistance.

f. First drafts of each Annex and associated appendices are to be submitted to CHNAVSEC prior to 14 September 1962.

J. B. DRACHNIK

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NAVY SECTION ADVISORY PLAN

FORMAT

1. Discussion.

   a. The basic plan is forwarded herewith as enclosure (2). This plan provides broad comprehensive guidance toward the development of detailed plans in each advisory area.

   b. An annex will be prepared for each advisory area. Each annex and its appendices and tabs will provide detailed guidance for the improvement of that area. Separate annexes will be provided for the following:

      (1) The Sea Force.
      (2) The River Force.
      (3) The Junk Force.
      (4) The VNMC.
      (5) The Shore Establishment, including VNN Headquarters, Administration, Personnel Matters, and the Construction of Facilities.
      (6) The Navy Supply Center and Supply System.
      (7) The Naval Shipyard.
      (8) Outlying Repair Facilities.
      (9) Schools and Training.
      (10) Naval Intelligence.
      (11) VN Naval Communications.

   c. Each annex to the basic plan will consist of the following three paragraphs:

      (1) Situation. State in broad, all-encompassing terms, the general problem areas which will be further detailed in the third, execution paragraph.

      (2) Mission. State imperatively the overall accomplishments to be completed to achieve the mission of the basic plan. This will generally be the major task assigned in the basic plan for each area.

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Page 1 of 2 pages
(3) Execution. Summarize, in the first sub-paragraph, the overall course of action intended. State, in subsequent sub-paragraphs, in the imperative tense and in terms of end results, the specific tasks to be executed in order to fulfill the mission as stated. State the time at, or conditions under which the task is to be completed.

d. Each annex will assign specific tasks under the below-listed headings or others as appropriate. Basic guidance is that provided in current planning documents or studies, such as the Force Structure, Force Objectives, Military Assistance Program, and Navy Section or higher level studies. New projects in any area not previously included in the above must, of course, be justified in the normal manner. If necessary, a task might be included such as: Correct the TO&E for the Sea Force to reflect actual needs.

(1) Doctrine Improvement. List doctrines or SOP required.

(2) Training. Include numbers, type of training, and rating specialty from which need for increase in training facilities or out of country training may be determined.

(3) Command and Coordination.

(4) Maintenance Improvement.

(5) Operational Improvement.

(6) Communications and Electronics Improvement.

(7) Personnel. Include justifiable numbers of officers and ratings required to effectively man the ship or station.

(8) Shore Construction. List, as tasks, the accomplishment of planned and programmed construction necessary for proper support. This should be a listing of construction already programmed or considered necessary. If new construction not previously considered is listed, then provide full justification.

(9) Standardization and Modernization of on-board Equipment.

(10) New Units and Equipment.

(11) Logistic Requirements.

e. Appendices should provide details, when necessary, to fully describe the current situation and to establish specific requirements which are of sufficient importance and too detailed in content to be included in a task assigned in the Annex.

f. Tabs may be utilized for material for which tabular presentation is appropriate.
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

NAVSEC MAAG VN 05400
MAGN-VNR-N36:gjo
25 January 1963

KIN (CONFIDENTIAL) (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure)

NAVY SECTION MAAG VIETNAM NOTICE 05400

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam

To: Distribution

Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)

Encl: (1) Revision of the Basic Plan of the Navy Section Advisory Plan

1. Purpose. To promulgate a revised Basic Plan of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. Action. The revised Basic Plan of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated. The Basic Plan promulgated on 12 September 1962 is cancelled and shall be returned to this office for destruction.

3. Cancellation. This Notice is cancelled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 14 April 1963.

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KIN (CONFIDENTIAL)
1. Situation.

As of late 1961, the Vietnamese Navy (which includes the Vietnamese Marine Corps) was not proficient in many areas. Particular mention had been made of the following conditions:

a. An inordinate number of craft were in an inoperative status in the Saigon Naval Shipyard, some for several months.

b. Saigon Naval Shipyard had never completed an overhaul on schedule.

c. An employment schedule had not been developed for use by ships of the operating forces; as a result, ship employment was far less than desired.

d. Shipboard maintenance was below minimum acceptable standards resulting in an excessive number of preventable machinery and equipment casualties.

e. Officers, petty officers, and enlisted men were inadequate both in numbers and experience. Manning levels were below the effective minimum.

f. The Saigon Naval Supply Center was not properly organized, administrative procedures were cumbersome, and a supply inspection concept had not been developed.

g. River Force boats and craft were inoperative in large numbers as a result of lack of preventive maintenance and of aggressive leadership; doctrine for the River Force was non-existent and an employment schedule had never been developed.

h. VNN communications were unreliable and insecure.
The Vietnamese Marine Corps was under strength, not properly employed, and lacked training in amphibious warfare.


Navy Section, J1/G, Vietnam, will assist the VN Navy to develop to a high standard in fulfilling its responsibilities for internal security, defeat of communist insurgency, and resistance to overt aggression, including naval operational and intelligence matters

IN ORDER TO

improve the VN Navy to U.S. standards in all areas to satisfy naval requirements for the GVN now and in the future and concurrently to support CHMI/G and COMUSMACV in the discharge of their responsibilities.

3. Execution.

Navy Section, M/JG, Vietnam, will, in an accelerated manner and by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop in the VN Navy the capability to discharge at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable naval responsibilities and tasks.

This will be accomplished by procedures in the nature of staff action including, but not limited to, the following:

By development of plans and procedures in all areas, concurrently with VNN and by independent action for submission to VNN.

By continuous observation of VNN performance at all levels and dissemination to VNN counterparts of appropriate, constructive comments and recommendations for improvement of procedures in line with U.S. Navy doctrine.
By direct staff assistance in areas where VNN does not yet have the necessary capability.

By direct liaison at each level between Navy Section personnel and their VNN counterparts, and with appropriate VNN, VNAF, and U.S. staffs and units, and GVN civil officials when necessary.

By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels.

The above will be effected by developing VNN components to the following indicated standards:

a. **Sea Forces.**

Operate effectively in all types of operations to which available ships might conceivably be assigned, including combat, logistic, administrative, and training operations, and for prolonged periods at sea. (Annex A)

b. **River Forces.**

Operate effectively over all inland waterways of South Vietnam in execution of independent missions and in support of, or jointly with, other units of VNAF. (Annex B)

c. **Junk Force.**

Provide an effective coastal surveillance system and an in-shore barrier to infiltration along the entire seacoast of South Vietnam. (Annex C)

d. **VN Marine Corps.**

Effectively conduct all types of operations to which available forces could conceivably be assigned, including amphibious assault. (Annex D)

e. **(Bases and Facilities) (The Shore Establishment).**

Provide effective shore support to the Operating Forces of the VNN. (Annex E)

f. **Naval Supply Center and Supply System.**

Provide effective supply support to VNN. (Annex F)
g. Naval Shipyard.

Repair and overhaul ships and craft of VNN, and perform other functions appropriate to a Naval Shipyard, to standards of workmanship, overhead cost, and timely completion equivalent to the performance of a U.S. Shipyard. (Annex G)

h. Schools and Training Activities.

Train ranks and ratings required by VNN to standards equivalent to similar U.S. schools and training activities. Provide training manuals to satisfy needs of VNN. (Annex I)

i. Naval Intelligence.

Collect, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence information consistent with VNN needs for counter-insurgency and war operations. (Annex J)

j. Naval Communications.

Provide effective, fast, reliable and standardized command and administrative communications among all units of VNN and between VNN units and other RVNAF units. (Annex K)

x. (1) Provide for:

(a) Doctrine Improvement.
(b) Training.
(c) Command and Coordination.
(d) Maintenance Improvement.
(e) Operational Improvement.
(f) Communications and Electronics Improvement.
(g) Personnel.
(h) Shore Construction.
(i) Standardization and Modernization of On-board Equipment.
ADVISORY PLAN
CHN/VSEC MAAG Vietnam No. 001-62

(j) New Units and Equipment.
(k) Logistic Requirements.
(l) Other appropriate matters.

(2) Specific tasks for the achievement of each goal are detailed in the appropriate Annex.

(3) This plan is effective upon receipt.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam

Annexes:

A - Concept
K - Sea Forces

E - River Forces
C - Junk Force
D - VN Marine Corps
E - Bases and Facilities
F - Naval Supply Center and Supply System
G - Naval Shipyard
I - Schools and Training Activities
J - Naval Intelligence
K - Naval Communications

L - Other appropriate matters

M - Naval Intelligence

5
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVESV MAAG VIETNAM NO. 001-62

ANNEX A

SEA FORCES

1. (KC) Situation.

26 ships and about 1,470 men presently comprise the VNN Sea Forces. VNN Sea Forces are not thoroughly proficient in operations associated with the counter-insurgency, and the tempo of operations and training must be considerably accelerated if VNN Sea Forces are to satisfy naval requirements for GVN in the near future. Noteworthy deficiencies are:

a. Sea Forces lack a sufficient number of ships to meet all requirements.

b. Sea Forces lack sufficient experienced officers and men to operate to full potential the ships presently assigned.

c. Doctrine and standard operating procedures do not exist in many areas.

d. Sea Forces staff and command structure requires defining and revision.

e. Shore facilities are inadequate for the needs of Sea Forces.

2. (KC) Mission.

Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, will assist the VNN Navy Sea Forces to develop to a high standard in operating effectively in all types of operations to which available ships might conceivably be assigned, including combat, logistic, administrative and training operations, and for prolonged periods at sea.

IN ORDER TO

improve VNN Sea Forces to U.S. standards in all areas to satisfy Sea Forces requirements for GVN now and in the future.

3. Execution.

(KC) Navy Section Sea Force advisors will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop in VNN Sea Forces the capability to discharge at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable Sea Force responsibilities and tasks, in an accelerated manner. By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:

a. (U) Doctrine Improvement. In accordance with Appendix I to this annex.

b. (KC) Training.
(1) Determine the optimum level of academic, functional training required by VNN Sea Forces for schools and training programming.

(2) Develop a schedule of training exercises and operations to be conducted by VNN Sea Forces in the period FY 63-66 on a Force basis, on a joint basis with other RVN-F units, and on a combined basis with SEVENTHFLT and SEATO forces or utilizing service units thereof.

(3) Prepare and promulgate a Training and Readiness Manual for VNN Sea Forces. Include therein all training and inspection requirements appropriate to VNN Sea Forces and establish procedures for review.

c. (U) Command and Coordination. In accordance with Appendix II to this annex.

d. (U) Maintenance Improvement. In accordance with Appendix III to this annex.

e. (U) Operational Improvement. In accordance with Appendix IV to this annex.

f. (U) Communications and Electronic Improvement. In accordance with Appendix V to this annex.

g. (U) Personnel. In accordance with Appendix VI to this annex.

h. (KC) Shore Construction.

(1) Develop ultimate requirements at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Tau/Cat Lo, Saigon and In Thoi for piers, anchorages, POL, fresh water, electrical power, and other necessary items for appropriate support of VNN Sea Forces.

(2) Construct the required facilities.

i. (U) Standardization and Modernization of On-Board Equipment. On a continuing basis, modernize and standardize on-board equipment.

j. (U) Units and Equipment. On a continuing basis, develop studies of projected requirements, plans for changes to units or items of equipment, and implement approved plans.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, NCG, Vietnam

Appendices
I - Doctrine Improvement
II - Command and Coordination
III - Maintenance Improvement
IV - Operational Improvement
V - Communications and Electronics Improvement
VI - Personnel
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX A

DOCTRINE IMPROVEMENT

1. Situation.

Certain areas of VNN Sea Forces operations require original doctrine or comprehensive improvement of current doctrine.

2. Execution.

By procedures in the nature of staff action, prepare and promulgate the following doctrines, and others as appropriate:

a. Patrol and scouting doctrine.

b. Gunnery and gunfire support doctrine.

c. A standard Engineering Casualty Control Manual for Sea Forces use with special enclosures for each class of ship and craft.

d. Amphibious doctrine.

e. Replenishment at sea doctrine.

f. AAW doctrine.

g. ASW doctrine.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M.I.A.G, Vietnam
Appendix II to Annex A

Command and Coordination

1. (KC) Situation.

a. Command doctrine and coordination procedures for and among Sea Force ships, commanders, staffs, and other RVN units is inadequate for full realization of the potential capabilities of the VNN Sea Forces.

b. No standard rules or procedures are in effect for operational and administrative command of the VNN Sea Forces.

2. (KC) Execution.

By procedures in the nature of staff action as outlined in the basic plan:

a. Prepare and promulgate a general directive type operation order setting forth policies and procedures for the guidance of the VNN Sea Forces commanders. Command relationships, training, and preparation for counter-insurgency operations will be given primary emphasis. This operation order will provide for transition from counter-insurgency to general war operations, and should contain at least the annexes and appendices listed in Tab A to this appendix.

b. Prepare and promulgate a general directive type Administrative Manual for VNN Sea Forces setting forth administrative policies and procedures for the guidance of the VNN Sea Force commanders.

c. Prepare and promulgate a standard, comprehensive shipboard Operations and Regulations Manual for Sea Forces use with special enclosures for each class of ship and craft.

J. B. DR. CHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAG, Vietnam

Tab A:

- VNN Sea Forces General Directive Type Operation Order
NAVSEG MA.G VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam
1 October 1962

ADVISORY PLAN
CHN-NAVSEC MA.G VIETNAM NO. CO1-62

TAB A TO APPENDIX L: TO ANNEX A

VNN SEA FORCES GENERAL DIRECTIVE TYPE OPERATION ORDER

(KC) At least the following Annexes and Appendices should comprise the VNN Sea Forces general directive type operation order:

Annex A Sea Forces Organization
Annex B Command Relations
Annex C Force Employment and Operating Policies
  Appendix I Emergency Actions
  Appendix II Territorial Seas
  Appendix III Employment Schedule
  Appendix IV Material Readiness
  Appendix V Movement and Casualty Reports
  Appendix VI Training
  Appendix VII Reporting of Incidents
  Appendix VIII Conditions
Annex D Logistics
Annex E Search and Rescue
  Appendix I Area of Responsibility Chart
  Appendix II S/R Reporting Procedure
  Appendix III S/R Communications
  Appendix IV S/R Action Check-off List
Annex F Medical
Annex G Public Relations and Information
Annex H Civic Action
Annex I Weather
Annex Z Records and Reports

Appendix I Reports Required
Appendix II Record of Changes
Appendix III Distribution

O. B. DR. CHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M.C., Vietnam
APPENDIX III TO ANNEX A

MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENT

1. (KC) Situation.
   a. Maintenance of equipment on board ships of VNN Sea Forces is in need of improvement. Too frequently casualties occur which are within the capacity of properly trained and experienced shipboard personnel to restore and are not restored.
   b. Operating and maintenance manuals and preventive maintenance check-off lists are either in the English language or are incomplete.
   c. Additional technically proficient personnel are needed to maintain installed equipment.

2. (KC) Execution.
   By procedures in the nature of staff action:
   a. Review maintenance materials currently available to VNN Sea Forces. Translate, print and distribute understandable directive and reference material for maintenance of shipboard equipment wherever deficiencies exist.
   b. Accelerate the current program to translate, print and distribute significant portions of operating and technical manuals listed in Tab 1 to this Appendix.
   c. Prepare and promulgate a set of Technical Instructions sufficient to meet the needs of VNN Sea Forces.
   d. Establish a Current Ship's Maintenance Program (CSMP) for Sea Forces.

3. (U) Coordination.
   a. Personnel and training in accordance with Appendix VI to this Annex, and Appendix I.
   b. PCMSEE in accordance with Annex K.

J. B. DRA. CHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MACV, Vietnam

Tab:
A - Maintenance Reference Material
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNIVSEC MAAG VIETNAM NO. 001-62

NAVSEC MAAG VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam
1 October 1962

1. USN BUSHIPS Technical Manual

52 chapters of the BUSHIPS Technical Manual pertain directly to VNN needs.

a. To date, the following seven chapters have been translated, printed and distributed:

(1) Drydocking
(2) Preservation of Ships in Service (painting)
(3) Preservation of Engines
(4) Hull Fittings (zincs)
(5) Shaft and Bearing Clearances
(6) Distilling Plant Operations and Maintenance
(7) Electronic Repair and Safety Precautions

b. Translate, print and distribute the additional 45 chapters of the BUSHIPS Manual.

2. Equipment Manuals.

Translate, print and distribute at least the maintenance portion of the following equipment manuals:

a. Main Engines

(1) GM 16-278A
(2) GM 16-258S
(3) GM 8-266A
(4) GM 6-71 6.051
(5) Morse 3BD 3/8
(6) GM 8-2.1
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(7) GM 6-71 64-65 YTL
(8) GM 6-71 64 HN 9 LCM/ICVP
(9) GM 6-27SA
(10) GM 6-71 6-071
(11) Cooper Bessemer
(12) Kalhenberg Model B.5

b. Generators
   (1) GM 4-71
   (2) Cummins HKS
   (3) Cummins L 1 600
   (4) Norberg Type 4 FS
   (5) GM 6-71 RC 7
   (6) GM 3-71
   (7) GM 3-268A
   (8) GM 2-71
   (9) Hercules DXXD (40 KW)
   (10) Hercules D000 (15 KW)
   (11) Sheppard Models 8 and 9

c. Auxiliary Engines
   (1) Air Compressor Worthing VD 2 N
   (2) Air Compressor Gardner Denver (Diesel Engine Starting)
   (3) Air Compressor Quincy Model P.222-230
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(4) Air Compressor Westinghouse LCU
(5) Motor Wisconsin Model AMN
(6) Pump Pacific NY
(7) Pump Johnson P 500 B, P 500 A
(8) Pump Worthington 2 UBI
(9) Bilge Pump Marine Product Model R.130G
(10) Transfer Pump Blackmer
(11) Water Pump Decatur 1415B (3500 RPM)
(12) Motor Windlass Hercules MLC 4" x 4 3/4"
(13) Motor Winch Continental
(14) Motor Chrysler T.118
(15) Refrigerator York F.12
(16) Oil Purifier De lu Val 55N-23
(17) Fuel Oil Purifier de Sharples (250 GPH)
(18) Distilling Plant Badgersons (1000G)
(19) Boiler Clayton BO. 2500
(20) Caterpillar Diesel D. 8.800

J. B. BRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M.A.G., Vietnam
OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX A

1. (KC) Situation.

a. Currently, VNN Sea Forces have the capability and willingness to participate in independent, joint and combined operations but the requirement for such participation has not been generated by higher authority. Only by actual participation in operations can capabilities be effectively utilized.

b. Comprehensive knowledge and appreciation of the operational capabilities of VNN Sea Forces does not exist within VNN Headquarters or JGS.

2. (KC) Execution.

By procedures in the nature of staff action outlined in the basic plan:

a. (1) Prepare and promulgate a manual indicating capabilities of VNN Sea Forces and comprehensively detail the following features:

   (a) Patrol and scouting
   (b) Amphibious lift
   (c) Logistic lift
   (d) Search and rescue
   (e) Gunfire support
   (f) Raid mobility.

(2) Indicate programmed capabilities.

(3) Distribute this manual widely within RWF and GVN.

(4) Promulgate corrections, supplements or revisions periodically to keep the manual current.

b. Provide for liaison with other RWF units.


J. E. DR. CHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M.A.G., Vietnam

KIN - CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS IMPROVEMENT

1. (KC) Situation.
   a. VNN communications and electronics equipment can, with proper maintenance and
      proper operating techniques, improve in performance and reliability.

2. (KC) Execution.
   By procedures in the nature of staff action outlined in the basic plan:
   a. Prepare and promulgate communications implementing instructions ensuring
      compliance with VNN Naval Communications Center operational and maintenance doctrine.
   b. Prepare and promulgate CIC and Radio doctrines.
   c. Establish and require participation in radio drill circuits.
   d. Enforce strict compliance with POMSEE program.

J. B. DRAGNINIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam
APPROXIMAM VI TO ANNEX A

PERSONNEL

1. (KC) Situation.
   a. Personnel allowance lists have not been prepared for VNN Sea Forces.
   b. Levels of desired training within Sea Forces have not been determined.
   c. A program for in-service advancement and promotions does not exist.
   d. Incentive and motivation to pursue a naval career requires emphasis, particularly for technically qualified personnel.

2. (KC) Execution
   a. Determine the optimum personnel organization (allowance) for ship, and craft, and staff of VNN Sea Forces.
   b. Determine the optimum level of formal academic and functional training for personnel of each staff, ship, and craft of VNN Sea Forces.
   c. Include in the VNN Sea Forces Administrative Manual discussed in paragraph 2.b of Appendix II to this Annex, a section establishing a program for in-service advancements and promotions.
   d. Prepare and promulgate a manual of practical and military factors for advancement in rate for all ratings in VNN Sea Forces.

J. B. DRACHNik
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

NAVSECHAGVN 05400
MAGNV-NA/N36:gjo
1 November 1962

KIN-CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

NAVY SECTION MAAG VIETNAM NOTICE 05400

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution

Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)
Encl: (1) Annex B of Navy Section Advisory Plan (KC)

1. (U) Purpose. To promulgate Annex B of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. (U) Action. Annex B of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. (U) Cancellation. This Notice is canceled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 1 January 1963.

J. B. DRACHNIK

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ANNEX B

RIVER FORCE

1. (KC) Situation.

Six River Assault Groups, a River Transportation Escort Group, an LCU Group, the Western Repair Facility at Can Tho and about 1099 men presently compose VNN River Force. VNN River Force is not obtaining maximum effectiveness from assigned craft. Command arrangements for the River Force are inefficient. Areas of concern are:

a. Operational control of River Force is vested in ARVN III Corps Commander who delegates control of River Assault Groups to Tactical Zone Commanders. Inefficient utilization and employment of Groups results from ARVN operational control.

b. The River Force preventive maintenance program requires improvement.

c. River Force lacks sufficient men to operate assigned craft to full potential.

d. Additional River Assault Groups or special craft may be required.

2. (KC) Mission.

Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, will assist VNN River Force to develop to a high standard of efficiency in execution of independent missions and in support of, or jointly with, other units of RVNAF.

IN ORDER TO

Improve VNN River Force in all areas to satisfy River Force requirements for GVN now and in the future.

3. Execution.

(KC) Navy Section River Force advisors will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop the VNN River Force to accomplish at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable River Force responsibilities and tasks. By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:
a. (KC) Effect, at an early date, the assignment and exercise of operational control of River Forces by Commander River Force vice Commander ARVN III Corps or Tactical Zone Commanders.

b. (U) Immediately develop and implement an employment schedule for the balance of CY 62 and thereafter on an annual basis, to provide for operations, training, maintenance and overhaul of VNN River Force.

c. (KC) Accelerate the use of organic troop units with River Assault Groups and implement their joint operational training.

d. (KC) Provide, implement, and utilize effective communication plans between River Assault Groups and aircraft in the theatre of operations.

e. (KC) Command and Coordination.

(1) Establish and maintain liaison with III Corps Commander. Participate in the planning of III Corps operations, exploiting every potential of VNN River Force.

(2) Ensure the effective use of and contribution by VNN River Force in the counter-insurgency.

(3) Promulgate and implement general directive type operation under setting forth policies and procedures for the guidance of River Assault Group Commanders and other River Force unit commanders. Command relationships, training, and counter-insurgency operations will be given primary emphasis. Include the following subjects and others as appropriate:

(a) Organization.
(b) Command relations.
(c) Force employment and operating policies.
(d) Logistics.
(e) Flood rescue.
(f) Medical.
(g) Public Relations and Information.
(h) Civic Action.
(i) Weather.
(j) Records and reports.
f. (KC) Doctrine. Improve doctrine in the following areas, and others as appropriate:

(1) Patrol and intercept.
(2) Gunnery and gunfire support.
(3) Tactical operations.

g. (KC) Training and Readiness.

(1) Emphasize training in night operations, and in the use of air support.
(2) Determine and implement, in coordination with the schools and training advisors, the requirements for training of River Force personnel by River Force Schools and by other training activities.
(3) Promulgate a manual to include all necessary readiness, training and inspection requirements.
(4) Establish and implement procedures for evaluation of readiness.

h. (KC) Maintenance.

(1) Translate, print, and distribute understandable directives and reference material for maintenance of equipment wherever deficiencies exist.
(2) Revise spare parts allowance lists, as required, and fill deficiencies.
(3) Train sufficient personnel in technical subjects to properly maintain equipment and machinery installed in River Force boats and craft.
(4) Prepare, promulgate and implement technical instructions adequate to the needs of River Force.
(5) Establish a River Force Machinery History Card and Engine Logbook Program.

i. (KC) Communications and Electronics Improvement.

(1) Prepare and promulgate communications implementing instructions in consonance with VNN Naval Communications Center operational and maintenance doctrine.
(2) Train River Force personnel in proper operation and maintenance of communications equipment.
j. (U) Personnel.

(1) Establish and implement a program for in-service advancements and promotions for River Force personnel.

(2) Review and up-date, on a continuing basis, personnel allowances for VNN River Forces.

(3) Promulgate a manual of practical and military factors for advancement in rate for all ratings in VNN River Force.

k. (U) Shore Construction. In accordance with Appendix I to this Annex.

l. (U) Standardization and Modernization of On-Board Equipment. On a continuing basis, modernize and standardize on-board equipment.

m. (U) Units and Equipment. On a continuing basis, develop studies of projected requirements, plans for changes to units or equipment, and implement approved plans.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam

Appendix

I - Shore Construction
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX B

SHORE CONSTRUCTION

1. (KC) Situation.

   a. Ultimate base-support requirements for the River Assault Groups
      and other River Force units have not been determined and existing facilities
      require rehabilitation and the installation of utility systems.

2. (KC) Execution. By procedures in the nature of staff action:

   a. Develop ultimate requirements at Saigon, Nha Be, My Tho, Vinh Long,
      Can Tho and Long Xuyen for piers, POL, fresh water, electrical power,
      barracks, warehouses, sanitation systems, and other necessary items for
      appropriate support of VN River Forces.

   b. Construct the required facilities.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

KIN

KIN (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure)

NAVY SECTION MAAG VIETNAM NOTICE 05400

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution
Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)
Encl: (1) Annex C of Navy Section Advisory Plan

1. (U) Purpose. To promulgate Annex C of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. (U) Action. Annex C of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. (U) Cancellation. This Notice is canceled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 13 March 1963.

J. B. DRACHNIK

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5500.1

KIN
1. (K) **Situation.**

Agreement has been reached between Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam, and VNN for the development of a Junk Force to operational status by end CY 1962. This Force will consist of 644 junk divided into 28 Divisions and located equally around the coast of SVN and the immediate off-shore islands. Four Coastal Surveillance Command Centers will be developed to coordinate and direct Junk Force operations.

M.I.P. support has been approved for new construction of 500 of the 644 junk, with VNN to contribute the remaining 144; and for M.I.P support of engines for M.I.P. constructed junk and for VNN constructed command junk. M.I.P. support has also been approved for all weapons, all communications equipment, and for certain other minor specified items of equipment. Continued support of all junk, personnel, and equipment, except parts and replacements for M.I.P. supplied engines, weapons, communications, and minor specified items, is the responsibility of GVN.

As of 9 December 1962, the Junk Force consisted of 278 junk of which 172 were M.I.P. supplied. Approval had been obtained for M.I.P. support of 459 military spaces. Spaces for 3640 paramilitary and for 120 commandos have been orally agreed to by NAVSEC MAAG. The commandos have been trained or are presently undergoing training.

An austere storage building at each of 24 Junk Division bases has yet to be developed. Coastal Surveillance Command Centers at Da Nang and Vung Tau are fully operational. The Command Center at Nha Trang, which is expected to be moved to Cam Ranh Bay, is partially operational. The Command Center at An Thoi, Phu Quoc Island, is in the planning stage.

To achieve timely readiness of Junk Forces and Command Centers, the tempo of approval of concepts, junk construction, base construction, training of personnel, and matters of equipping and supporting the Force, must be accelerated. Areas of concern are:
a. Contractors are late in delivering junks.

b. The program of training Junk Force personnel must be reviewed and refined.

c. Equipment for junks and Junk Force personnel must be provided in a more timely manner.

d. Concepts for operations and resulting SOP are not adequately established.

e. A proposed concept for the development of a commando force of about 1000 men, to provide one platoon to each of 23 Junk Divisions, has not yet been resolved.

f. A TE for the Junk Force has not been completed.

g. Reliable Junk Force communications must be provided.

h. The intelligence capability requires expansion.

i. Adequate support, including a minor repair capability, must be provided.

j. GVN funds for equipment, junk construction, repairs, and continuing support must be provided.

k. Surveillance patrolling by operational junks must be intensified.

2. (K) Mission.

Navy Section, M.M.G, Vietnam, will assist in the timely and efficient establishment of the VNN Junk Force and thereafter in its development to a high standard of efficiency in execution of the surveillance mission and in support of, or jointly with, other units of RVNAP.

IN ORDER TO

provide an effective coastal surveillance system and an inshore barrier to infiltration along the entire seacoast of South Vietnam.
3. (K) Execution.

Navy Section Junk Force advisors will provide incentive, encouragement, and assistance to VNN Junk Force to discharge approved missions, responsibilities, and tasks, in an effective manner.

a. By direct liaison with contractors, the contracting officer, and Chief Navy Section, expedite the delivery of M&P-contracted junks.

b. By close coordination with VNN Junk Force Assistant Commander, VNN officers, and all USN staff officers and advisors:

   (1) Expedite the construction of 24 command and 40 motor-only junks by VNN.

   (2) Provide all required equipment for junks and Junk Force personnel in a timely manner.

   (3) Expedite the activation of junk divisions.

   (4) Ensure the continued use of all available junks in coastal surveillance patrols.

   (5) Review and refine the program for training Junk Force personnel emphasizing seamanship training and surveillance tactics and deemphasizing land warfare.

   (6) Promulgate a directive-type operation order to include a comprehensive coastal surveillance plan, and policy for the command and coordination of the Junk Force.

   (7) Establish reliable communications among junks, junk division bases, coastal district headquarters, and sea patrols.

   (8) Conduct frequent operational inspections of junk divisions to ensure their conformance with approved concepts, doctrine, and procedures.

   (9) Expedite the completion and submission of a TO&E for the Junk Force. Implement the TO&E on receipt of approval.
(10) Provide for material and repair support for the junks. Follow-up on the availability of funds from GVN for support of the Junk Force.

(11) Develop austere requirements for POL, fresh water, electrical power, storerooms, repair shops, sanitation systems, and other necessary items for support of the Junk Force at approved bases, and construct the required facilities.

(12) Resolve problems regarding the need for, and use, billeting, and support of, the proposed Junk Force commandos and obtain concurrence of CHN.VSEC and CNO, VNN, prior to implementation.

(13) Develop and promulgate a directive-type administrative manual for administrative policies and procedures for the guidance of junk division commanders.

(14) Establish procedures for, and continually review the end-use of, all M.P-constructed junks and M.P-supplied major equipment.

(15) On a continuing basis, develop studies of projected requirements and plans for changes to units or equipment; and implement approved plan.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M&G, Vietnam
NAVSECMAGVN 05400
NAVNV-NA/M36:4jo
19 November 1962

KIN - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

NAVY SECTION NAVSECMAGVN NOTICE 05400

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution

Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)

Encl: (1) Annex D of Navy Section Advisory Plan (K)

1. (U) Purpose. To promulgate Annex D of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. (U) Action. Annex D of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. (U) Cancellation. This Notice is canceled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 1 January 1963.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD Directive 5500.10
ANNEX D

VN MARINE CORPS

1. (K) Situation.

The Vietnamese Marine Corps is a force-in-readiness consisting of one Brigade with a Brigade Headquarters, four infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and one amphibious Support battalion. Current authorized strength is 6109, actual strength is 5311. The mission of the Vietnamese Marine Corps is to be prepared to execute amphibious assault operations and other operations as may be directed.

To contribute effectively to the counter-insurgency, certain deficiencies in VNMC operations and training areas must be overcome. Areas of concern are:

a. Marine Brigade lacks sufficient officers and men for optimum accomplishment of its mission at this time.

b. Training to achieve proficiency in the various specialized requirements of the Brigade's mission is incomplete.

c. Base facilities are inadequate for the needs of the Marine Brigade.

2. (K) Mission.

Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, will assist the VN Marine Corps to develop a high standard of proficiency for all types of operations to which available forces could conceivably be assigned, particularly amphibious assault

IN ORDER TO

elevate VN Marine Corps to U. S. standards in all areas to satisfy Brigade responsibilities to GVN now and in the future.

3. (K) Execution.

Navy Section Marine Corps advisors will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop in the VN Marine Corps the capability to discharge effectively and without U. S. advisory assistance, all current and foreseeable Brigade responsibilities and tasks. By close coordination with VNMC commanders and staff officers at all levels, assistance will be provided in the following specific areas:

a. Equip and man units to achieve optimum combat proficiency.
b. Promulgate and implement doctrine, including, but not limited to:

(1) Fire-support in counter-guerrilla operations.
(2) Amphibious assault.
(3) Engineer support.
(4) Infantry tactics and techniques.

c. Prepare a long range objectives plan for the Marine Brigade, and develop ultimate base facilities.

d. Determine requirements for and implement academic and functional training of VNMC, both in-country and off-shore, including OJT with U.S. units as appropriate.

e. Procure required publications and training aids.

f. On a continuing basis, modernize and standardize on-board equipment.

J. B. DRAGNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution

Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)

Encl: (1) Annex E of Navy Section Advisory Plan

1. **Purpose.** To promulgate Annex E of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. **Action.** Annex E of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. **Cancellation.** This Notice is cancelled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 14 April 1963.

\[Signature\]

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1. Situation.

Operational, administrative, supply, and repair bases and facilities exist, are under construction, or are planned for construction throughout SVN to provide support for the Operating Forces of the VNN. Existing bases and facilities have not improved in capability or effectiveness consistent with the rapid build-up in the Operating Forces in the last year.

Construction to date has not been planned or accomplished in a coordinated manner.

Facilities do not exist outside of Saigon, with the exception of the Western Repair Facility at Can Tho, to provide maintenance assistance for the Operating Forces of the VNN.


Navy Section, MAgG, Vietnam, will assist the Vietnamese Navy to plan and develop adequate base facilities

IN ORDER TO

provide effective shore support to the Operating Forces of the VNN now and in the future.

3. Execution.

Navy Section staff officers and advisors will by imaginative and determined action develop, in an accelerated manner, bases and facilities capable of discharging at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable tasks to effectively support the Operating Forces of the Vietnamese Navy.

By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:

a. Develop, and review and revise on a continuing basis, a VNN Five-Year Long Range Facilities Plan to include all desired new construction and the improvement or replacement of existing base facilities.
ANNEX E

NAVAL BASES AND FACILITIES

1. Situation.

Operational, administrative, supply, and repair bases and facilities exist, are under construction, or are planned for construction throughout RVN to provide support for the Operating Forces of the VNN. Existing bases and facilities have not improved in capability or effectiveness consistent with the rapid build-up in the Operating Forces in the last year.

Construction to date has not been planned or accomplished in a coordinated manner.

Facilities do not exist outside of Saigon, with the exception of the Western Repair Facility at Can Tho, to provide maintenance assistance for the Operating Forces of the VNN.


Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam, will assist the Vietnamese Navy to plan and develop adequate base facilities in order to provide effective shore support to the Operating Forces of the VNN now and in the future.

3. Execution.

Navy Section staff officers and advisors will be imaginative and determined action develop, in an accelerated manner, bases and facilities capable of discharging at a high standard and without U. S. assistance, all current and forseeable tasks to effectively support the Operating Forces of the Vietnamese Navy.

By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:

a. Develop, and review and revise on a continuing basis, a VNN Five-Year Long Range Facilities Plan to include all desired new construction and the improvement or replacement of existing base facilities.
b. Determine the need for, and develop in a timely manner existing and additional base facilities throughout the Republic of Vietnam sufficient to provide effective support to the Operating Forces of the Vietnamese Navy, including support, repair, and maintenance of ships, craft, junks, and boats, where appropriate, and in consonance with the Long Range Facilities Plan.

c. Develop in the VNN a capability for performing nominal base and facility maintenance and rehabilitation to reduce dependence in these matters upon other RVNF agencies.

d. Institute effective procedures in VNN for originating, reviewing, monitoring, and accomplishing construction.

e. Accelerate the programming of base and facility construction.

f. Develop accurate TO & TE for all bases and facilities.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MfS, Vietnam
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

NAVSECMAGVN 05400
MAGNV-NA/N36:gjo
24 October 1962

KIN-CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

NAVY SECTION MAAG VIETNAM NOTICE 05400

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution
Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)
Encl: (1) Annex F of Navy Section Advisory Plan (KC)

1. (U) Purpose. To promulgate Annex F of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. (U) Action. Annex F of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. (U) Cancellation. This Notice is canceled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 1 January 1963.

J. B. DRACHNIK

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5500.10

KIN-CONFIDENTIAL
1. (KC) **Situation.**

The VNN supply system is centrally organized about the Administrative Center for Navy Material (ACNM), Saigon. VNN supply system is not thoroughly proficient in matters of supply operations. Administrative procedures must be improved and training must be accelerated if VNN supply system is to satisfy naval requirements for GVN in the near future. Areas of concern are:

a. Outlying supply support facilities lack central control and are inadequate in number and capability.

b. Standard operating procedures, doctrines, tables of organization and equipment, and allowance lists do not exist in many areas.

c. The VNN supply system lacks sufficient experienced officers and men to operate effectively and to full potential.

d. Trained supply personnel are being improperly assigned in VNN.

e. The concept of supply inspection requires development.

f. Inventory and financial inventory control procedures do not exist in VNN supply system.

2. (KC) **Mission.**

Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, will assist the VN Navy supply system to develop to a high standard in providing effective support to VNN.

IN ORDER TO improve VNN to U.S. standards in all areas to satisfy naval requirements for GVN now and in the future.

3. **Execution.**

(U) Navy Section supply and logistic advisors will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop in VNN Administrative Center for Navy Material and the supply system the capability to discharge at a
high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable VNN supply responsibilities and tasks, in an accelerated manner. By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:

a. (U) Doctrine Improvement.

(1) Promulgate a VNN supply manual. Use a quick review process for effective administration of the VNN supply system.

(2) Establish doctrinal review procedures.

b. (U) Training. In accordance with Appendix I to this Annex.

c. (U) Command and Coordination.

(1) Develop coordination procedures between JGS, VNN Logistics Officer and the Administration Center for Navy Material concerning joint service supply procedures which VNN is required to follow in matters pertaining to RVNAP common materials.

(2) Develop coordination procedures for internal command of VNN supply system. Determine command coordination between the Administrative Center for Navy Material and outlying supply support facilities necessary for effective administration of the VNN supply system.

(3) Develop coordination procedures pertinent to VNN supply system services to naval needs of Civil Guard.

d. (U) Personnel. In accordance with Appendix II to this Annex.

e. (U) Shore Construction.

(1) Develop VNN supply system ultimate requirements at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, Cat Lo, Phu Quoc Island and Saigon for warehouses, office buildings, freight depots and equipments for effective supply support to VNN.

(2) Determine shore construction requirements at Junk Force and River Force bases to provide space for effective supply support to VNN Junk and River Forces.

(3) Construct the required facilities.
f. (U) Standardization and Modernization of On-Board Equipment. On a continuing basis, modernize and standardize on-board equipment.

g. (U) Logistic Matters. In accordance with Appendix III to this Annex.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Capt, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam

Appendices

I  - Training
II - Personnel
III - Logistic Matters
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX F

TRAINING

1. (U) Situation.

Trained personnel are not available in sufficient numbers to meet VNN supply system needs. There is no designation for the storekeeper rate in VNN and personnel trained as storekeepers are frequently assigned to other duties. Officers have been provided off-shore supply training only to be assigned to non-supply duties on their return to Vietnam.

2. (U) Execution.

a. Train personnel in supply duties and responsibilities in sufficient numbers to meet the needs of the VNN supply system.

b. Create the rate of storekeeper in the VNN.

c. Assign supply-trained officers and men only to supply duties until such time as numbers of supply-trained personnel exceed requirements.

d. Determine the optimum level of academic, functional training required by personnel filling billets in the VNN supply system.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam
NAVSEC MAAG VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam
24 October 1962

ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSEC MAAG VIETNAM NO. 001-62

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX F

PERSONNEL

1. (U) Situation.

a. Personnel allowance lists have not been prepared for commands of the VNN supply system.

b. Personnel allowance lists for VNN commands other than supply system commands do not provide for storekeepers.

c. Provisions have not been made to provide adequate civilian personnel to fill needs of VNN supply system.

2. (U) Execution.

a. Determine the optimum personnel organization (allowance) for each command of VNN supply system.

b. Provide for storekeepers in the optimum personnel organization of VNN commands other than commands in the VNN supply system.

c. Determine the optimum civilian personnel force structure for VNN supply system.

J. B. DRACSNK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam
APPENDIX III TO ANNEX F

LOGISTIC MATTERS

1. (U) Situation.
   a. Supply facilities out of the Saigon area are inadequate to support the expanding VNN.
   b. Equipment allowance lists do not exist in many cases or are not adequately maintained.
   c. Excesses are rarely declared and returned to central storage.
   d. Packaging and preserving of material is not adequate.
   e. A VNN supply freight depot is not available in Saigon.
   f. Supply facilities out of the Saigon area have no representation in Saigon.
   g. Provisions have not been made for a supply inspection team.
   h. Issue and stock control procedures are inadequate.
   i. Existing management control reports and statistics are not adequate guides in program preparation and personnel assignment.
   j. The Supply Operations Assistance Program (SOAP) needs defining and implementation.

2. (U) Execution.
   a. Establish adequate supply facilities out of the Saigon area for supply support of VNN forces and bases. Outline their missions and functions.
   b. Assign responsibility for compiling and maintaining allowance lists.
   c. Establish sound issue and stock control procedures, declare and return excesses to a central location, and properly package and preserve all items stored.
d. Establish a Fleet Service Activity in Saigon to:

1. Provide effective liaison between the Administrative Center for Navy Material and customers.

2. Act as a stimulus to Administrative Center for Navy Material to give prompt supply action.

3. Provide all commands supply representation.

4. Reduce the number of persons required to order, follow-up on, and ship material.

5. Provide a receiving warehouse for the accumulation of material to be shipped to activities outside the Saigon area.

6. Plan and schedule routine logistic transportation and emergency shipments from Saigon to customers.

e. Establish a supply inspection team.

f. Establish sound issue and stock control procedures.

g. Define and implement the Supply Operations Assistance Program.

h. Develop useful management control reports and statistics to be used in program preparations and personnel assignment.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam