NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

10 December 1962

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution

Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)

Encl: (1) Annex G of Navy Section Advisory Plan (K)

1. (U) Purpose. To promulgate Annex G of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. (U) Action. Annex G of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. (U) Cancellation. This Notice is canceled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 1 January 1963.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD Direction 5500.10
1. (K) Situation.

Saigon Naval Shipyard is the only naval shipyard in SVN and is the only facility in SVN capable of performing major repairs and overhauls of VNN ships and river craft. The Western Repair Facility, Can Tho, and certain other facilities are planned to provide minor repairs to ships and craft. The entire repair and overhaul requirements of VNN will remain the task of Saigon Naval Shipyard.

At end CY 1961, Saigon Naval Shipyard had never completed a ship overhaul on schedule. River boat overhauls and repair availabilities were completed at an average rate of 14 boats per month. A backlog of over 30 boats, of a total VNN complement of 200 boats, was deadlined in the yard. Ship and boat hulls were corroded or worm-eaten and cleaning and preservation techniques were primitive. The shipyard was unable to overhaul sonars and evaporators of ships of the fleet.

Low production was the result of ineffective labor management. In the final quarter of CY 1961, only 37.3% of the yard’s labor force was applied to productive work at a cost to customer of 58.1 VN per productive man hour. Budgeting provided no control or incentive.

Waterfront facilities were totally inadequate at Saigon Naval Shipyard and were fire protection and power distribution systems throughout the yard.

In CY 1962, ship overhaul schedules were consistently met; boat backlog was reduced to about 35 and boat output averaged 56 boats per month. Hull preservation was brought up to U.S. standards. Wood hulls were teredo-proofed by anti-fouling paints or glass-plastic sheathing. Power hand tools were introduced on the waterfront. Some engineering training was given. A command junk was designed, constructed, and analyzed. Productive labor ratio increased to 53.1% and the overhead rate was reduced to 21 VN for each productive labor hour.

The program to improve Saigon Naval shipyard evolves into three major areas: shipyard management, industrial and technical methods and procedures, and facilities improvements.
ADVISORY PLAN
CHN.VSEC M.J.G VIETNAM NO. 001-62

2. (K) Mission.

The Saigon Naval Shipyard, assisted by Navy Section, M.J.G, Vietnam, will develop to a high standard

IN ORDER TO

repair and overhaul ships and craft of VNN and perform other functions appropriate to a Naval Shipyard, to standards of workmanship, overhead cost, and timely operation equivalent to the performance of a U. S. Naval Shipyard.

3. Execution.

(K) Navy Section Saigon Naval Shipyard advisors will, by aggressive and determined action, develop in Saigon Naval Shipyard, in an accelerated manner, the capability to discharge at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable shipyard responsibilities and tasks.

(U) By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:

a. Improve shipyard management. (See Appendix I).

b. Establish, improve, and/or refine industrial and technical methods and procedures. (See Appendix II).

c. Improve facilities. (See Appendix III).

J. H. DR. CHNIK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M.J.G, Vietnam

Appendices:
I - Management Improvement
II - Industrial and Technical Methods and Procedures
III - Facilities Improvement

G-2
1. (K) Situation.

The management inadequacies of the Saigon Naval Shipyard are centered in the middle-management echelons of planning, accounting, design, shops, and waterfront. All shipyard middle-management billets are occupied by young and inexperienced officers, Vietnam having neither Naval traditions nor a civilian recruiting source in industry. The inadequacy in experience and training of shipyard officers mirrors like inadequacies in the headquarters and operating forces; the latter, in turn, contributing to shipyard troubles in areas of budgeting, procurement, repair planning, and scheduling. Particular areas which require management improvement are cost control, budget, personnel, material and procurement, and customer relations.

2. (K) Execution.

By direct liaison with Saigon Naval Shipyard executives, VNN Headquarters staff, and other offices and agencies, as appropriate, and by procedures in the nature of staff action:

a. Cost Control.

(1) Establish and implement a cost control system which will develop cost consciousness and maintain motivation toward overhead cost reduction among junior officers and middle-management civilians. This is to be accomplished by presenting each supervisor with a targeted goal, informing him of his performance against the goal, and providing management with an index of cost performance for each supervisor upon which his rating can be based.

(2) Develop cost consciousness in operating commands to produce customer pressure on shipyard costs.

b. External Budget.

Establish and implement a system to finance fleet repair requirements by assignment of fiscal responsibility to the operating commands for management of funds necessary to pay for their
requirements. Assignment of material readiness responsibility will thereby be accompanied by firm access to resources needed to discharge that responsibility.

c. **Internal Budget.**

Establish and implement a shipyard expense guide for their planned operations for each budget year. This guide will establish the shipyard overhead budgets. The overhead budget will become a management aid to measure supervision of performance and provide discipline over shipyard costs.

d. **Personnel.**

1. Indoctrinate VNN officers in motivation and leadership by on-the-job example and by instruction.
2. Enact pay scales competitive with the civilian economy. Provide supervisor incentive pay.

e. **Material and Procurement.**

1. Train engineers and planners in material selection and stock catalog use.
2. Establish effective liaison between ACGM and Saigon Naval Shipyard to obtain support from ACGM which is responsive to fleet needs in areas of issue lead time, inventory control, and expanded load list.
3. Establish and implement a refit program.
4. Establish and implement effective economical material planning in consonance with USN methods.
5. Establish and properly utilize shop stores.
6. Return all stocks to ACGM.

f. **Customer Relations.**

1. Inculcate habits of respect for ship schedules in shipyard; develop awareness of the priority of fleet needs over shipyard convenience; initiate negotiation of schedule difficulties with the operating force involved, and insistently demonstrate to operating force representatives by appropriate tests and by engineering trials, the competence of repairs performed.
(2) Promulgate and follow-up on Navy-wide directives outlining effective procedures to be followed by customer and shipyard to achieve the following, especially for boats:

(a) Proper repair and overhaul work scheduling.

(b) Delivery and acceptance on schedule.

(c) Customer inspection that will require and achieve satisfactory shipyard repair performance.

G. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M/WG, Vietnam
Industriah and Technical Methods and Procedures

1. (K) Situation.

The industrial and technical problem areas in the Saigon Naval Shipyard concern methods, engineering competence, and waterfront tooling. Industrial methods are generally deficient in areas of underwater body cleaning and preservation, engine overhaul, hull surveying, wood hull shipbuilding and repair, and electronics testing. Molding equipment in the foundry requires modernization. Hand tools must be procured and personnel trained in their use. The shipyard lacks a chemical laboratory. There is a lack of qualified professionals in billets requiring technical knowledge.

2. (K) Execution.

By direct liaison with Saigon Naval Shipyard executives, VNN Headquarters staff, and appropriate offices and agencies, and by other procedures in the nature of staff action:


(1) Locate a suitable source of blasting sand and standardize major hull cleaning to sand blast method.

(2) Evolve hull preservation systems from the newly introduced plastic paint systems to eventual standardization on the hot-spray vinyl system.

(3) Complete teredo-proofing of all wood hull boats by glass-plastic sheathing system.

(4) Rebuild marine railway carriages to provide adequate working clearance under boat bottoms.

(5) Procure portable power tools and implement their use to replace hand tools on the shipyard waterfront for carpentry, hull painting, hull cleaning, and the driving of screwed fastenings in all trades.

(6) Introduce non-destructive supersonic hull testing.
(7) Perfect inert gas expendable electrode welding of non-ferrous metals.

(8) Develop, implement, and discipline use of wear limit charts in engine, pump, shafting, and bearing repairs.

(9) Perfect techniques of structural wood gluing.

(10) Introduce tub and machine molding in foundry.

b. Industrial Equipment.

(1) Program, acquire, train in, and use austere selection of equipment, primarily power tools, in execution of tasks outlined in paragraph 2.c. above.

(2) Modernize molding equipment in foundry.

c. Trouble-shooting and Inspection.

(1) Restore to service all shipboard auxiliaries and equipage vital to operation.

(2) Indoctrinate officers and planners in the following policies:

   (a) Minimum adequate repair.

   (b) Spare part and man-hour economy.

   (c) Operational check of repairs.

   (d) Assignment of priorities based on operational necessity.

(3) Procure field-metering equipment for radio communications.

(4) Establish and outfit a chemical laboratory.

(5) Procure calculators.

d. Engineering and Design.

(1) Program graduate engineering training for suitable members of VNN officers.

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ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSEC MAG VIETNAM NO. 001-62

(2) Increase pay for civilian shipyard engineers.

(3) Procure and develop adequate library and microfilm plan files.

(4) Replace Japanese civilian shipyard engineers with American contract or loan civil service engineers.

C. H. DR. CHNIK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAG, Vietnam
1. (K) Situation.

The facilities inadequacies of the Saigon Naval Shipyard primarily concern a lack of pier space and of an effective utility systems. Shops lack modern equipment. The industrial laboratory lacks the capability to fully support the needs of the shipyard.

2. (K) Execution. By procedures in the nature of staff action:

   a. Waterfront.

      (1) Complete south quay wall and install associated facilities.

      (2) Rebuild marine railway cradles.

      (3) Construct a north quay wall and install associated facilities.

      (4) Restore spare drydock caisson.

      (5) Complete the beaching ramp.

   b. Utilities.

      (1) Complete 60 cycle, 450 volt systems on both the north and south quay walls.

      (2) Provide waterfront with dry rectifier supplied 240/120 volt DC electrical system.

      (3) Complete new automatic fire pumping system.

      (4) Improve fresh water distribution by a rehabilitation campaign. Increase storage by diversion of fire standpipe when it becomes surplus to the new fire protection system.

      (5) Complete 6600 volt overhead power system.
c. Shops.

(1) Train and indoctrinate personnel in the use of installed modern equipment.

(2) Provide all shops with additional modern equipment where major labor saving or increase in mission effectiveness will be obtained.

d. Industrial Laboratory.

(1) Provide for fundamental metallurgical testing to include capability in hardness, tensile strength, magnaflux, dye check, and X-Ray testing, and in standard inorganic quantitative analysis.

(2) Train personnel in physical testing.

(3) Provide an austere chemistry capability.

(4) Recruit a competent chemist.

J. B. DR. CHNIK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M.I.G., Vietnam
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

NAVY SECTION MAAG VIETNAM NOTICE 5400

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution
Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)
Encl: (1) Annex I of Navy Section Advisory Plan

1. Purpose. To promulgate Annex I of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. Action. Annex I of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. Cancellation. This Notice is canceled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 1 February 1963.

J. B. DRACHNIK

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1. Situation.

Training currently conducted in the Vietnamese Navy includes: recruit training, officer training, functional training, petty officer training, Class "A" and "B" schools, underway training, Junk and River Forces special training, and training in the English language.

Until CY 1962, most training within the Navy was conducted according to the French system with the lecture as the primary instrument of instruction. Student participation in practical work was minor or non-existent. The only functional training was a firefighting school at Saigon which met infrequently. Refresher training was conducted primarily in port, with only three days at sea in the five week period. Material readiness of ships was poor, and end-use inspections, conducted at long intervals, did not result in improved conditions, since reports were not explicit and no follow-up action in correcting discrepancies was enforced.

Beginning in late CY 1961, and continuing through CY 1962, all schools in existence were remodeled to U.S. systems and standards. Demonstration, student participation in practical work, the use of student handout material, and dynamic and static training aids were introduced as instructional techniques. Four Class "A" schools were added to the nine in existence. Class "B" school curricula were revised. English language training was improved and accelerated. Formalized inspections were instituted to improve operational and material readiness of the Navy. Detailed lists of discrepancies are now submitted to all echelons of command to encourage thorough follow-up. Underway training procedures were revised to provide for four weeks of actual underway training and one week of in-port drills.

At the present time, about 25 percent of the enlisted personnel of the Navy are in training, and 7 percent of the officers are in off-shore training.

I-1
Training problem areas in the Vietnamese Navy are centered around:

a. Shortage of experienced and qualified instructors.

b. Improper instruction techniques.

c. Improper understanding at all levels of the value of continuous training to maintain combat readiness.

d. Lack of emphasis on the necessity to establish and to maintain courses current with the latest information and equipment.

The shortage of experienced instructors stems from the overall shortage within the VNN of experienced officers and petty officers. English-language facilities must be increased to provide students for off-shore training with sufficient competency in the language to enable them to comprehend their courses of instruction and to enable students to use U.S. texts. Refresher training requires added emphasis.

Training is currently carried out in two principal locations, at the Naval Training Center, Nha Trang, and at the Navy Training Center, Saigon. Inadequacies in these Training Centers include insufficiency of training aids, classroom facilities, libraries, space for individual study and poor sanitary facilities. Saigon lacks an English-language training capability.


Navy Section, M/LG, Vietnam, will assist the Vietnamese Navy to raise the professional and technical education level of naval personnel, utilizing methods and standards of instruction and drill equivalent to those employed by similar U.S. Navy training activities,

IN ORDER TO

increase combat readiness in the Vietnamese Navy.

3. Execution.

Navy Section advisors will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop in the VNN, in an accelerated manner, the capability to discharge at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable training responsibilities and tasks.
By close coordination with VNN commanders, staff officers, and particularly schools and training personnel at all levels, and by direct liaison with the Operating Forces:

a. Implement close and direct liaison between the Operating Forces and schools and training command in order to ensure that the operational needs of VNN are satisfied by schools and training plans and projects.

b. By thorough and continuous review of course content, by monitoring classroom lectures and practical instruction, and by providing professional and technical assistance, improve to U.S. standards the curricula of all schools including the Naval Academy, Class "A", "B", and "C" schools, and fleet and special schools.

c. Maintain instructor quality at the highest attainable level by establishing instructor qualifications, providing technical assistance in instruction techniques, and by training personnel in sufficient numbers to meet future instructor needs.

d. Review requirement for new training and implement new and advanced training. Prepare curricula and lesson plans where non-existent. Train and assign qualified instructors for new courses.

e. Develop high standards, both academic and military, in the VN Naval Academy.

f. Improve the level of English language proficiency of all potential off-shore trainees and other personnel to increase their comprehension of training. Train VNN English-language instructors.

g. Improve the effectiveness of refresher training by establishing a comprehensive schedule of drills, exercises, and problems which realistically reflect the probable combat situations for VNN ships under conditions most likely to be encountered.

h. Provide refresher training for Sea Force ships annually. Increase type training and independent ship exercise periods. Intensify the exercise of crews in emergency drills.

i. Improve training facilities at Nha Trang by providing reference libraries for the Naval Academy and technical schools, by providing necessary training aids to assure high quality of training, and by improving sanitary facilities in living quarters and classroom areas.
j. Improve training facilities at Saigon:

(1) Provide an English-language laboratory.

(2) Provide additional classroom space and areas for individual study within existing buildings by better utilization of available floor space.

(3) Provide classroom equipment as required.

(4) Provide additional training aids to assure high quality of training.

(5) Improve reference library for fleet schools.
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

NAVSECMAGVN 05400
MAGNV-NR/N36: gjo
14 January 1963

KIN (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure)

NAVY SECTION NAAG VIETNAM NOTICE 05400

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: DISTRIBUTION

Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)

Encl: (1) Annex J of Navy Section Advisory Plan (K)

1. (U) Purpose. To promulgate Annex J of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. (U) Action. Annex J of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. (U) Cancellation. This Notice is cancelled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 14 April 1963.

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NAVSEC MAAG VIETNAM
Saigon, Vietnam
14 January 1963

ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSEC MAAG VIETNAM NO. 001-62

ANNEX J

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

1. (K) Situation.

Prior to 1962, GVN had no capability for collecting and processing naval intelligence and was restricted from developing such a capability by Presidential decree. A VNN intelligence system was approved in early CY 1962 and a VNN naval intelligence office was established on 16 February 1962.

The Intelligence Division (N2) of VNN Headquarters currently (Dec 62) consists of five officers and fourteen enlisted men. Considerable progress has been made but the intelligence organization does not yet satisfy all requirements of VNN. Areas of concern are:

a. The organization does not have sufficient personnel to collect and process intelligence both at VNN Headquarters and in the field, and concurrently to maintain VNN representatives in joint RVN/RF intelligence agencies.

b. Personnel serving in intelligence billets do not yet have sufficient training or experience to adequately carry out assigned responsibilities.

c. Because of the late beginning of the VNN Intelligence Office, commanding officers and others have limited appreciation of the field of intelligence, its importance and procedures.

d. Duplication of effort exists with RVNAF; effective dissemination of information of joint interest has not been achieved. Additional intelligence coordination by VNN with other agencies is needed.

e. Intelligence doctrine and SOP have not been developed in many areas.

f. Covert agent and contact nets to obtain information, especially of coastal infiltration and VC use of coastal and inland waterways have not been developed.
2. (U) Mission.

Navy Section, MACV, Vietnam, will assist in the timely development of an efficient intelligence organization within the VNN in order to satisfy naval intelligence requirements for GVN now and in the future.

3. Execution.

(U) Navy Section advisors will, by positive, thorough, and aggressive action, and in an accelerated manner, develop the capability of the VNN to discharge at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable intelligence responsibilities and tasks.

a. (K) Doctrine Improvement. Promulgate and implement intelligence doctrines including, but not limited to:

(1) Collection.
(2) Reporting.
(3) Evaluation.
(4) Dissemination.
(5) Operational Intelligence.
(6) Counter-Intelligence.

b. (K) Intelligence Training.

(1) Schedule training exercises, situations, and operations to be conducted by VNN intelligence personnel on a navy-wide basis, jointly with other RVN/F units, and on a combined basis with USN intelligence teams.

(2) Prepare, review, and refine program for the training of VNN intelligence personnel and of other personnel who require a knowledge of intelligence requirements. Develop realistic training programs for CY 1963, and annually thereafter, to
encompass all academic and operational phases of intelligence training. Eliminate the need by FY 65 for additional off-shore intelligence training.

(3) Train sufficient personnel in technical specialties to effectively interpret information collected.

(4) Provide VNN operational units with revised and updated operational and training manuals for intelligence so they may effectively fulfill intelligence responsibilities.

(5) Establish and develop an intelligence library.

(6) Develop and implement a combat intelligence course for unit commanders to enhance their knowledge of capabilities, limitations and responsiveness of the intelligence organization to operational needs.

(7) Develop and organize a VNN mobile training team to visit bases and facilities to train personnel in current intelligence functions and to ensure the awareness of all appropriate personnel to the needs and requirements of operational intelligence.

(8) Develop and initiate a training course for VNN and VNMC senior officers detailing intelligence requirements prior to and during amphibious operations.

(9) Establish an intelligence correspondence course for VNN and VNMC officers and senior enlisted personnel who are not scheduled for or have not completed formal intelligence training.

c. (U) Establish effective liaison between the VNN intelligence organization and other RVNAF and GVN intelligence organizations at all levels.

d. (U) Participate in intelligence aspects of planning for joint operations.

e. (U) **Operational Improvement.**

(1) Promulgate a guide for the employment of operational intelligence teams outlining composition, material requirements, capabilities, limitations, procedures for collecting and reporting information gained, and other matters of operational importance.
(2) Promulgate a guide for establishing, developing, and implementing agent nets within each Naval District responsible for collecting and reporting intelligence information to the respective Coastal District Commander.

(3) Implement the Counter-Intelligence Plan developed in the VNN Intelligence organization.

f. (U) Obtain and assign authorized numbers of personnel to billets allowed in the TO.

g. (K) Establish and implement an intelligence network within Junk Divisions, and develop informer nets throughout fishing communities specifically to thwart VN sea infiltration and coastal sea movement.

h. (U) Establish and outfit an operational photographic laboratory responsive to the needs of the VNN intelligence organization.

i. (U) Establish a weather study section to provide weather support to VNN.

j. (U) Compile beach studies of the entire coast of VN.

J. B. DRA.COMNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MACG, Vietnam
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

NAVY SECTION MJG VIETNAM NOTICE 05400

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution

Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)

Encl: (1) Annex K of Navy Section Advisory Plan (K)

1. (U) Purpose. To promulgate Annex K of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. (U) Action. Annex K of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) here­to and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promul­gated.

3. (U) Cancellation. This Notice is canceled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 1 January 1963.

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DOD DIR 5500.10

E. DR. CHKNIK
1. (K) Situation.

The VNN communications system is centrally organized about the Naval Communication Station, Saigon. The VNN communications system requires additional guidance to effectively support command in operational and administrative matters. Doctrine, procedures, and equipment must be improved to satisfy requirements incumbent upon naval communications. Noteworthy deficiencies are:

a. Communications, as a tool of command, lacks emphasis and appreciation at the higher echelon.

b. The VNN communications system lacks sufficient experienced and trained officers and men to operate effectively and to full capability of installed equipment.

c. Standard operating procedures, doctrine, directives, tables of organization and equipment, and allowance lists do not exist in many areas.

d. Communications and electronics equipment requires modernizing and standardizing.

2. (K) Mission.

Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam, will assist the VN Navy to develop effective, fast, reliable, and standardized command and administrative communications internally in VNN and between VNN units and other units of RVNAF.

IN ORDER TO

improve VNN communications in all areas to U. S. standards, and to satisfy naval communication requirements now and in the future.

K-1
3. Execution.

(U) Navy Section communication advisors will, by direct, aggressive, and thorough action, and in an accelerated manner, develop capability of the VNN communications system to discharge at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable VNN communication responsibilities and tasks.

(U) By alert and timely assistance to VNN commanders, staff officers, and particularly communications personnel at all levels, and by direct liaison with other advisory elements of M.J.G, Vietnam, and other units of RVN:F:

a. Review and up-date VNN communications doctrine to include: concept, organization, command responsibility, security, personnel, and records.

b. Promulgate standard operating procedures for effective operation and administration of the VNN communications system.

c. Train communications and electronics equipment personnel (RM, ET, RD, SO) in communication and electronic equipment operational, maintenance, repair duties, and responsibilities in sufficient numbers to meet the needs of the VNN communications system.

d. Ensure the assignment of officer and enlisted personnel trained in operations, maintenance, and repair of communications and electronic equipment to these duties.

e. Establish firm chain of command for the shore communication organization under the Director of Naval Communications, and develop reporting procedures.

f. Develop effective coordination procedures between JGS, the Director of Naval Communications, and RVN Chief Signal Officer concerning joint service communication procedures necessary for prompt and positive operation of the VNN communications system.

g. Improve maintenance. (See Appendix I).

h. Improve operating procedures. (See Appendix II).
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSEC MAAG VIETNAM NO. 001-62

i. Develop VNN communication system ultimate requirements for shore construction of equipment, power sources, and buildings to provide effective communication support to VNN at Saigon, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Tau, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, and An Thoi, Phu Quoc Island.

j. Determine and implement communications support requirements for Junk Force units and bases.

k. Determine and implement communications support requirements for River Force units and bases.

l. Standardize and modernize on-board equipment on a continuing basis. (See Appendix III).

J. B. DRA/CHNIK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam

Appendices
I - Maintenance Improvement
II - Operating Procedures Improvement
III - Standardization and Modernization of On-Board Equipment
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX K

MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENT

1. (U) Situation.
   a. The VNN concept of communication equipment maintenance is inadequate. Trouble-shooting, tests, tuning techniques, and other practices within the capability of the ship's force are frequently neglected.
   
   b. Technical manuals and preventive maintenance check-off lists are in English and therefore not understandable by the average technician, or are non-existent.
   
   c. The Preventive and Operational Maintenance Standards of Electronics Equipment Program (POMSEE) and the Current Ships Maintenance Program (CSMP) are not established.

2. (U) Execution. By procedures in the nature of staff action:
   a. Ensure maintenance of on-board equipment is accomplished to the fullest extent possible by ship's force personnel, by frequent inspection and review of reports.

   b. Review communications and electronics maintenance materials currently available to VNN. Translate, print, and distribute understandable directives and reference material for maintenance of electronics equipment wherever deficiencies exist.

   c. Promulgate technical instructions for maintenance and repair of electronics equipment sufficient to meet the needs of the VN Communications System.

   d. Establish, and by frequent inspection, ensure implementation of POMSEE and CSMP procedures for all electronics equipment provided VNN.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M.I.G., Vietnam

K-I-1
OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. (U) Situation.

   a. Current VNN communications operating procedures are a combination of French and ARVN procedures which do not meet naval standards or needs.

   b. Communication operating procedures are lacking in many required areas.

   c. The RPIO system does not provide for timely distribution of crypto aids or corrections to publications.

2. (U) Execution. Promulgate operating procedures commensurate with VNN requirements encompassing the following subjects or topics:


   c. Station and address designators.

   d. General naval operating procedures.

   e. Radio-telephone procedures.

   f. Visual signalling procedures.

   g. R.TT procedures.

   h. Broadcast, ship-to-shore, and shore-to-shore circuits.

   i. Movement reports.

   j. S:R communications.

   k. ASW communications.

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ADVISORY PLAN
CHN/USSEC M/J.G VIETNAM NO. 001-62

1. Aircraft communications.

m. Harbor communications.

n. RPIO procedures.

[Signature]

[Name]

Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M/J.G, Vietnam

K-II-2
STANDARDIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF ON-BOARD EQUIPMENT

1. (U) Situation.

VNN ships, and VNN communication facilities outside of Saigon, currently have a mixture of French, \textsuperscript{1}RVN and USN communications equipment installed. The French equipment is not supportable because of the inability to obtain repair parts. The \textsuperscript{1}RVN equipment is, for the most part, old equipment excess to \textsuperscript{1}RVN's needs and is rapidly becoming obsolete and difficult to maintain because of a paucity of spare parts. The logistic support for the installed equipment is further complicated by the absence of a program to standardize communications equipment in ships and at outlying bases.

2. (K) Execution.

Modernize and standardize communications equipment in VNN ships and shore facilities as follows:

a. Naval Communications Station, Saigon.

6 \textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{3}N/URT-17 high frequency transmitters with RATT capability

- 17 TT5 teleprinters
- 17 TT7 reperforators
- 2 Wheatstone perforators
- 2 Boehme keyers
- 6 R390/URR high frequency receivers
- 2 \textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{3}N/URW-17 frequency shift converters
- 1 TCS high frequency transmitter
- 1 TED ultra high frequency transmitter

\textsuperscript{1}RVN

\textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{3}N
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNM.VSEC M&G VIETNAM NO. 001-62

1 AN/URR-35 ultra high frequency receiver
1 AN/TCC-4 troposcatter terminal equipment
1 TH5 troposcatter terminal equipment
1 AN/TCC-7 troposcatter terminal equipment

b. Coastal District Headquarters.
1 T36SE/URT high frequency transmitter
2 R390/URR high frequency receiver
1 TMD high frequency-low frequency transmitter
1 TMD ultra high frequency transmitter
1 AN/URR-35 ultra high frequency receiver
1 AN/PRC-10 very high frequency transceiver
4 TCS high frequency transceivers
1 TT5 teleprinter
1 AN/TCC-4 troposcatter terminal equipment
1 AN/TCC-3 troposcatter terminal equipment
1 AN/GRC-10 very high frequency transceiver

c. Sea Force Ships.
1 TDE high frequency-low frequency transmitter
1 TCS high frequency transceiver
1 TMD ultra high frequency transmitter
2 AN/URR-35 ultra high frequency receivers
2 R390/URR high frequency receivers
1 AN/SRR-11A low frequency receiver

K-III-2
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSSEC M/LG VIETNAM NO. 001-62

1. /N/URC-8A frequency shift converter

d. Sea Force FGM.
   1. /N/PRC-10 very high frequency transceiver
   1. TSD ultra high frequency transmitter
   1. R390/URR high frequency receiver.
   2. TCS high frequency transceivers
   1. /N/CRT-3 emergency transmitter
   1. /N/URR-35 ultra high frequency receiver

e. Sea Force MSML and River Force LOU.
   2. TCS high frequency transceivers

f. River Force Bases.
   1. TDE high frequency-low frequency transmitter
   4. TCS high frequency transmitters
   1. TSD ultra high frequency transmitter
   1. /N/URR-35 ultra high frequency receiver
   1. TT5 teleprinter
   1. TH5 troposscatter terminal equipment
   1. /N/TCC-3 troposscatter terminal equipment
   1. /N/GRC-10 very high frequency transceiver

g. River Force Boats.
   1. /N/PRC-10 very high frequency transceiver
   1. /N/PRC-34 high frequency transceiver

K-III-3
h. Coastal Surveillance Command Centers.
   1. TDE high frequency-low frequency transmitter
   2. TCS high frequency transceivers
   3. R390/URR high frequency receivers
   1. AN/SRR-114 low frequency receiver

i. Junk Division Bases.
   2. TCS high frequency transceivers
   1. AN/GRC-87 high frequency transceiver

j. Junks.
   1. AN/PRC-10 transceiver
   1. AN/GRC-87 high frequency transceiver

J. B. DR. CHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, M.A.G, Vietnam
NAVY SECTION
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
Saigon, Vietnam

KIN - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

NAVY SECTION MAAG VIETNAM NOTICE 07400

From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution

Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)

Encl: (1) Annex H of Navy Section Advisory Plan

1. Purpose. To promulgate Annex H of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. Action. Annex H of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. Cancellation. This Notice is cancelled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 30 April 1963.

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CIVIC ACTION

1. (K) Situation.

Civic Action is that activity by Military (or Para-Military) Forces designed to improve relations with the civilian populace by providing assistance, necessities, or recreation in order to win the confidence of the people and with it their help. Civic Action is of prime importance in counter-insurgency operations and, because of the importance of isolating the people from the Viet Cong, may become the primary mission of specified units. Areas for improvement are:

a. The absence of a tradition of Civic Action in past governments of Vietnam; however, VNN and VNMC have already displayed a favorable awareness of the need for Civic Action.

b. The lack of well-established procedures or programs for Civic Action by VNN and VNMC.

c. A paucity of funds for Civic Action.

d. A lack of appreciation at all levels of VNN of the need for and of the benefits to be achieved through a well-planned and continuously well-executed Civic Action Program.

2. (K) Mission.

Navy Section, M&G Vietnam, will assist the Vietnamese Navy to develop and implement a comprehensive and effective Civic Action Program IN ORDER TO

gain the support of the civilian populace and sustain high morale of military and para-military personnel.

3. (K) Execution.

Navy Section advisors will, by alert and positive action, develop in the VNN and VNMC the employment of Civic Action in all operations and at all locations where naval forces may be assigned or visit.

By timely and judicious assistance to naval commanders and staff officers, commanding officers, and particularly GVN PSYWAR personnel
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSEC MAAG VIETNAM NO. 001-62

at all levels, and by direct liaison with other advisory elements of MAAG, Vietnam, and other units of RVNAF:


c. Thoroughly orient all naval personnel on the importance of good civil-military relations and its direct bearing on the accomplishment of the military mission.

d. Provide the GVN budget for Civic Action projects and operations; provide, through MAP, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and other sources, equipment and materials for Civic Action which the GVN budget cannot support.

e. Incorporate in ship and unit allowance lists materials which can be utilized in Civic Action projects.

f. Implement the use of a small ship of LSIIL or similar type for medical assistance to coastal villages in conjunction with CARE and AID (USOM).

g. Coordinate naval Civic Action projects and operations with those planned by other units of RVNAF and civilian agencies.

h. Utilize naval resources, as available and as practicable, for constructive civilian activities; assist in health, welfare, and public works projects; and improve living conditions, alleviate suffering, and improve the economic stability of the country.

i. Encourage and exploit the initiation and imagination of Vietnamese naval personnel in matters associated with or pertaining to Civic Action.

J. B. DR. CHNIK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam
From: Chief Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
To: Distribution
Subj: Navy Section Advisory Plan (U)
Encl: (1) Annex L of Navy Section Advisory Plan

1. Purpose. To promulgate Annex L of the Navy Section Advisory Plan.

2. Action. Annex L of the Navy Section Advisory Plan is promulgated herewith as enclosure (1). Remove enclosure (1) hereto and attach to the Navy Section Advisory Plan previously promulgated.

3. Cancellation. This Notice is cancelled when the action in paragraph 2 has been completed and for record purposes on 31 May 1963.

J. B. DRACHNIK

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File
1. (K) Situation.

CINCPAC has directed the attention of U.S. Military Advisory personnel and country military officials toward the establishment of a sound logistic base in each PACOM country receiving Military Assistance. The Country Logistic Improvement Plan (CLIP) provides a coordinated program of major objectives and tasks for improving country logistic operations. The CLIP identifies the action which must be emphasized in the advisory effort. The CLIP will be used as a basis for measuring and recording progress toward objectives and for keeping successive generations of advisory personnel informed as to the status of logistic capability of country forces.

The Vietnamese Navy, including the Vietnamese Marine Corps, has an excellent foundation on which to build an effective logistic organization. There is a shipyard in which to overhaul and repair VNN ships and boats and Civil Guard boats; however, there is inadequate waterfront berthing to accomplish repairs and the boat repair shed has no access ramp. Shops are required in coastal districts to repair junks and service craft, and to repair ships and craft in an emergency. The Naval Supply Center requires command and management emphasis in every phase of its operation in order that it may develop efficiently and in consonance with the needs of the naval service. The Vietnamese Marine Corps must extend its logistic capability to meet imposed requirements.

To contribute effectively to the counter-insurgency and to support a comprehensive and sound logistic base on which to build in anticipation of future requirements, certain deficiencies in the VNN logistic organization must be overcome. Areas of concern are:

a. Insufficient command emphasis in matters of logistics at the highest level and extending down through the chain of command.

b. Logistic training, both academic and functional, must be intensified throughout the Vietnamese Navy.

c. The VNN logistic organization is not geared to satisfy imposed requirements of an ever-expanding naval operating force.
d. Utilization of civilian manpower must be expanded to meet increasing needs of the VNN logistic organization.

e. Procurement of materials and supplies through other than MAP sources is not being exploited.

f. Actual supply requirements for the Vietnamese Navy have never been documented with sufficient justification to warrant issue of supplies in the quantities requested.

g. The inventory control system and procedures require complete revising and up-dating to meet current needs.

h. Excesses are stocked at most activities resulting in inaccurate and misleading usage data.

i. Warehouse storage facilities are inadequate, space available is incorrectly recorded, and proper storage practices require implementation.

j. Improvement in progressive and preventive maintenance procedures and repair programs is not proceeding at the rate desired to promote optimum operational readiness.

k. Cross-servicing of supplies requires extensive study by the Vietnamese Navy to eliminate duplication of logistic facilities and personnel and to increase the rate of response to RVNAF needs.

l. The water-transportation logistic system requires development of additional modern facilities and improved material-handling equipment and procedures.

The situation described in this Annex has, in part, been described elsewhere in this Advisory Plan, and tasks to correct deficiencies have been delineated; however, certain information is repeated in this Annex to consolidate logistic system improvement requirements in one Annex.

2. (K) Mission.

Navy Section, M/L/G, Vietnam, will assist in the development of the VNN and VNMC logistic system to a high standard of efficiency to adequately support VNN, VNMC, and joint RVNAF logistic requirements

IN ORDER TO

encourage the VNN and VNMC to achieve self-sufficiency in naval, marine, and joint logistic matters.
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSEC MAG VIETNAM NO 001-62

3. (K) Execution.

Navy Section advisors will, by positive, thorough, and aggressive action, and in an accelerated manner, develop the capability of the Vietnamese Navy to discharge at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable naval logistic responsibilities and tasks.

By close coordination with VNN and VNMC commanders, staff officers, and particularly logistic personnel at all levels, and by direct liaison with other units of RVNAF and agencies of GVN, and in coordination with other sections of MAG:

a. Emphasize, at each level of command, the necessity for effective supply operations, supply discipline, and attainment of maintenance standards. Command emphasis must begin at the highest level and extend down through the chain of command.

b. Train command personnel in their responsibilities for supervising and directing all aspects of naval logistics; train technicians in their logistic specialties. Ensure that maximum benefit from logistic training programs is realized by implementing a personnel policy that provides for continued assignment of trained personnel within their specialties.

c. Develop a strong VNN logistic organization sufficient to satisfy naval needs and sufficient in scope and breadth to ensure qualified naval representation in joint RVNAF logistic organizations.

d. Utilize civilian manpower in the VNN logistic organization in administrative, clerical, technical, artisan, apprentice, and non-skilled billets; develop standards of qualifications and establish pay scales for civilian personnel competitive with private industry.

e. Phase out the procurement by M&AP of commercial consumable items and other supplies when these items are available in-country in sufficient quantities and can be procured from other than M&AP sources.

f. Promulgate Tables of Equipment for each unit and facility of the VNN; ensure that adequate documentation and justification exists for each item in the Table of Equipment in the quantity indicated; and implement management control reports and statistics to be used in preparation of annual budget and material requirements.

g. Physically inventory all supply stocks annually at every unit and facility of the VNN; review all stock record cards monthly; promulgate information on substitute items; develop requisitioning guidelines; establish a Fleet Service Activity in Saigon; refine the Soap Overhaul Assistance Program; and support the Civil Guard for Navy-procured items.
h. Accelerate elimination of excess material in the Naval Supply System and implement guidelines to prevent recurrence.

i. Determine and record area and volume of all usable storage facilities in the VNN logistic system; implement proper storage practices including a maintenance-in-storage program; establish supply distribution points at Da Nang, Cam Ranh, Cat Lo, and An Thoi.

j. Implement and closely supervise progressive and preventive maintenance procedures and repair programs throughout the Vietnamese Navy; establish repair shops at Da Nang, Cam Ranh, Cat Lo, and An Thoi capable of performing repairs to boat and junk engines and hulls; implement fiscal and accounting control, and management and technical control procedures in the Western Repair Facility, Can Tho.

k. Extend cross servicing to include all supply commodities and services which are utilized by more than one service and develop cross servicing procedures to increase the rate of response to RVNAF needs and to eliminate duplication of services in the RVNAF logistic system.

l. Develop the water-transportation logistic system to meet current and anticipated requirements; provide adequate material-handling equipment in sufficient quantity for rapid and efficient handling of supplies; and make optimum use of the water-transportation logistic system in RVN.

J. B. DRAGNIK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section, MAAG, Vietnam