NAVY SECTION
MAAG, VIETNAM

ADVISORY PLAN
01-63
1. (K) Situation.

In late 1961, greatly increased emphasis was placed on the advisory effort to the Vietnamese Navy and Marine Corps in order to accelerate their development to effectively contribute to the defeat of the communist insurgency. A number of significant problems were apparent. The VNN consisted of 4,498 officers and men, 23 ships of LSM size and smaller, 197 boats, and 80 sail-only junks. The Marine Brigade consisted of 3,175 officers and men organised in two infantry battalions. No effective VNN command or support facilities existed outside of Saigon. An inordinate number of ships and boats were inoperative; the Naval Shipyard had never completed an overhaul on schedule; there was no employment schedule in effect for the Operating Forces; shipboard maintenance was unsatisfactory; operating units were inadequately manned; communications were unreliable and insecure; doctrine, SOP, and organisational directives were inadequate; and the VNMC was not properly employed and lacked training in amphibious warfare.

During 1962 and 1963, significant progress was made in all areas of VNN and VNMC, concurrent with an expansion of the Services. The VNN was increased to 6,467 men and the VNMC to 6,109. 270 VNN/VNMC officers and men completed off-shore training. In-country training was improved to U.S. standards, and 4,271 VNN/VNMC officers and men were graduated. Construction was programmed to provide command and support facilities in each Coastal District. Shipyard management improved to the point where ship overhauls were regularly completed on schedule. The Naval Communication Station, Saigon, was completely renovated and communications equipment in the Operating Forces standardized and modernised. The Marine Brigade was expanded to four infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and an amphibious support battalion. In 1963, Marine combat commitments more than doubled in number over 1962, and the Brigade has been committed to combat operations throughout RVN.
The VNN is now at 97% of authorized strength, with 6,270 officers and men on board. Offshore, in-country, and on-the-job training is producing adequate numbers of trained personnel. The Operating Forces have been increased to 40 ships, 205 boats, and 632 junks. One additional LST, 2 PCE, and 4 PGM are programmed but have not yet been received in country. 12 additional junks remain to be delivered by Vietnamese contractor. The VNMC is at 92% of authorized strength, with 5,607 officers and men on board. VNN command and support facilities have been established in each Coastal District. Ships and boats are in a good state of material readiness, with overhaul schedules consistently met by the Shipyard and shipboard maintenance improved through programs of formal and on-the-job training. A quarterly Sea Force employment schedule is maintained, and average daily employment of ships is over 60%. 74% of River Force boats are operationally available, and employment has improved. The VNN has a reliable and secure fleet broadcast communications system capable of handling over 5,000 messages per month. A VNN Basic Operation Order is in effect. The VNMC is in a high state of combat readiness for ground operations but requires additional attention to the amphibious capability.

Although much improvement has been made in the combat effectiveness of VNN/VNMC, areas which require further improvement and towards which emphasis is to be directed are expressed in this Plan.

2. (K) Mission.

NAVSECMAAGVN will assist the VNN and VNMC to develop to a high standard in fulfilling responsibilities for internal security, defeat of communist insurgency, and resistance to overt aggression IN ORDER TO improve VNN and VNMC to U. S. standards in all areas to satisfy naval requirements for RVN now and in the future, in support of CHMAAGVN and COMUSMACV responsibilities.

3. (K) Execution.

a. NAVSECMAAGVN personnel will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop in the VNN and VNMC the capability to discharge all current and foreseeable responsibilities and tasks at a high standard and without U. S. assistance.
b. The foregoing will be effected by developing VNN components and VNMC to the following standards of performance:

(1) **Sea Force Advisors.** Develop the VNN Sea Force to a high standard of material and operational readiness to discharge without U. S. assistance all current and foreseeable responsibilities and tasks to satisfy RVN requirements now and in the future. (Annex B)

(2) **River Force Advisors.** Develop the VNN River Force to a high standard of efficiency to accomplish without U. S. assistance all current and foreseeable responsibilities and tasks to satisfy RVN requirements now and in the future. (Annex C)

(3) **Junk Force Advisors.** Develop the VNN Junk Force to a high standard of efficiency to increase Junk Force effectiveness in its discharge of approved missions and responsibilities. (Annex D)

(4) **Marine Corps Advisors.** Develop the VNMC to a high standard of proficiency to discharge all current and foreseeable Brigade responsibilities and tasks without U. S. assistance. (Annex E)

(5) **The Shore Establishment (Bases and Facilities) Advisors.** Develop adequate VNN/VNMC bases and facilities capable of discharging at a high standard and without U. S. assistance all current and foreseeable tasks to effectively support the Operating Forces. (Annex F)

(6) **Saigon Naval Shipyard Advisors.** Develop the Saigon Naval Shipyard to a high standard of efficiency to discharge all current and foreseeable responsibilities and tasks without U. S. assistance. (Annex G)

(7) **Supply Center and Supply System Advisors.** Develop the VNN Supply Center and Supply System to a high standard to discharge all current and foreseeable responsibilities and tasks without U. S. assistance. (Annex H)

(8) **Naval Zone Command Advisors.** Develop the capability of Naval Zone Commands to carry out the VNN mission in each Naval Zone at a high standard and without U. S. assistance, now and in the future. (Annex I)
(9) **Training Advisors.** Develop in the VNN/VNMC the capability to discharge at a high standard all current and foreseeable training responsibilities and tasks without U. S. assistance. (Annex J)

(10) **Naval Intelligence Advisors.** Develop an efficient VNN intelligence organization to discharge at a high standard all current and foreseeable responsibilities and tasks without U. S. assistance. (Annex K)

(11) **Communications Advisors.** Develop an effective, fast, reliable, and standardized VNN communications system to discharge at a high standard all current and foreseeable responsibilities and tasks without U. S. assistance. (Annex L)

(12) **Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP) Advisors.** Develop the VNN/VNMC logistics system to a high standard of efficiency to discharge all current and foreseeable responsibilities and tasks without U. S. assistance. (Annex M)

x. (K) **Coordinating Instructions.**

(1) Require strict adherence to the VNN Basic Operation Order.

(2) Effectively implement the VNN reorganization plan.

(3) Meet commitments in a timely manner in all areas of operations, support, and administration, including:

   (a) Implementation of operation plans and orders.

   (b) Commencement and completion of overhauls and repairs.

   (c) Inspections.

   (d) Convening and completion of training courses.

   (e) Underway training.

   (f) Commencement and completion of shore construction projects.
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSECMAAGVN No. 01-63

(g) Security clearance, processing, and departure of students for scheduled off-shore training.

(h) Timely completion of all other projects and evolutions in accordance with established target dates.

(4) Emphasize aggressive conduct in operations and aggressive contributions by VNN and VNMC to the counter-insurgency.

(5) Employ all naval forces and resources at highly effective rates with emphasis on defeat of insurgency. Reduce unemployed time to the minimum necessary for good maintenance.

(6) Emphasize the development of operational plans for naval and joint operations by commanders and staff personnel at all levels.

(7) Maintain current and accurate statistical records against which operational effectiveness and advisory progress may be measured.

(8) Improve doctrine in all areas on a continuing basis. Effect necessary changes to standard publications.

(9) Aggressively implement the GVN Civic Action Program in all operations, and at all locations where naval forces are assigned or temporarily located.

(10) Conduct comprehensive and vigorous training programs on board all ships and shore stations.

(11) Monitor the need for increased MAP support of current Force Structure elements. Submit requirements for additional elements to CHNAVSEC in a timely manner.

(12) Ensure proper end-use of all MAP-supplied equipment.

(13) Monitor the assignment of graduates of formal courses of instruction to ensure proper utilization of these personnel.
(14) Standardize and modernize equipment inventories at each command.

(15) Ensure adherence to current USN maintenance and operating procedures.

Annexes:
A Concept
B Sea Force
C River Force
D Junk Force
E Marine Corps
F The Shore Establishment
G Saigon Naval Shipyard
H Supply Center and Supply System
I Naval Zone Commands
J Training
K Naval Intelligence
L Communications
M Country Logistics Improvement Plan
Y Distribution
1. Background. Chief Navy Section is charged with developing the efficiency of the VNN and VNMC to a high standard in order to enable these forces to defeat the communist insurgency and to fulfill other appropriate naval responsibilities. In early 1962, Navy Section was augmented and directed to accomplish the necessary improvement in an accelerated manner.

In order to coordinate the efforts of the advisors and to guide them into those areas wherein improvement was most needed, the Navy Section Advisory Plan was first issued in the Fall of 1962, based upon the experience of the advisors then present. This Plan will be reviewed and updated periodically.

2. Purpose. The purposes of the Navy Section Advisory Plan are:

a. To direct the efforts of advisors into the most productive areas.

b. To provide means of measuring progress in the improvement of VNN/VNMC.

c. To provide means for measuring the achievements of advisory detachments and individuals.

3. Concept. This Plan assembles in one document all of the matters requiring advisory action, both subjective and objective. These are expressed in the form of tasks to be accomplished and are arranged generally according to the administrative organization of VNN/VNMC. Functional areas for which an identifiable organization may not exist have been arranged in separate Annexes. Advisors are enjoined to familiarize themselves with the entire Plan; their individual responsibilities are not confined to one Annex. For example, it is the responsibility of Supply advisors to assist in the improvement of matters of Supply in the operating forces, shipyard, and bases, as well as to accomplish those tasks directed for advisory effort at the Supply Center.
4. Implementation. This Plan is directive in nature. Advisory effort will be directed to the early accomplishment of tasks directed herein. Primary responsibility for the accomplishment of tasks is assigned to the Senior Advisor for the appropriate functional area and/or administrative subdivision. Key advisors additionally have collateral responsibilities for functional matters of their specialty in other areas as discussed in paragraph 3 above.

J. B. DRACHNIR
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
1. (K) Situation.

In October 1962, the Sea Force was composed of twenty-six ships and 1,470 officers and men. This Force lacked operational experience, and the tempo of operations was not at the level required to carry out the VNN mission in support of the counter-insurgency effort. Since that time, the Sea Force has increased in size to forty ships and an authorized manning level of 2,270 officers and men. Seven additional ships will be received during Fiscal Year 1964, bringing the Sea Force to planned strength of forty-seven ships. Average daily employment of Sea Force ships has increased during the past year from less than 50% to over 60%.

a. The rapid expansion of the Sea Force created an urgent and immediate need for extensive training. To meet this need, U.S. Navy officers have been assigned to each type ship as shipriders.

b. Doctrine and standard operating procedures did not exist in many areas. Doctrine and operating procedures generally applicable to Sea Force are now contained in VNN Basic Operation Order, and doctrine in specific functional areas is now under preparation.

c. Sea Force staff and command structure required defining and revision. Sea Force TO, in conformance with current VNN organization, has now been drafted and approved by CHNAVSECMAGVN.

2. (K) Mission.

NAVSECMAGVN will assist the VNN Sea Force to develop to a high standard in operating effectively in all types of operations to which available ships might conceivably be assigned, including sea patrol, gunfire support, and amphibious, anti-submarine, anti-air, and mine countermeasures warfare

IN ORDER TO

improve VNN Sea Force to U.S. standards to satisfy RVN requirements now and in the future.
3. (K) Execution.

NAVSECMAGVN Sea Force advisors will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop in the VNN Sea Force the capability to discharge at a high standard and without U. S. assistance, all current and foreseeable Sea Force responsibilities and tasks in an accelerated manner. By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:

   a. Effect optimum employment of Sea Force units in support of Phase II of the National Campaign Plan.

   b. Effect strict adherence to the VNN Basic Operation Order. Ensure the submission of improvements in a timely manner.

   c. Command and Coordination.

      (1) Promulgate basic Sea Force directive-type operation order.

      (2) Promulgate general Sea Force directive-type Administrative Manual.

   d. Doctrine Improvement.

      (1) Refine sea patrol and counter-infiltration doctrine.

      (2) Develop and promulgate doctrine for PGM employment.

      (3) Promulgate gunnery and gunfire support doctrine for weapons up to 3 inch, to include plunging and indirect fire and communications.

      (4) Promulgate mine countermeasures doctrine to include the type mines which pose a threat to Sea Force units.

      (5) Promulgate amphibious doctrine including but not limited to combat loading, debarkation, ship-to-shore movement, boat control, salvage procedures, shallow water operations, and night landings.

      (6) Promulgate AAW doctrine to include air defense zones, warning media, target designation, and evasive tactics.
(7) Promulgate ASW doctrine (recognizing the limitations imposed by "searchlight-type" sonar in PC 02, PC 04, and PC 05) to include search patterns and maneuvers, contact identification, reporting, evasive tactics, and attack procedures.

(8) Develop and promulgate doctrine for MLMS employment.

(9) Develop CIC and radio communications doctrine to include procedures for:

(a) Contact reporting.
(b) Requests for air support.
(c) Requests for air evacuation.
(d) Casualty reports and requests for air evacuation.
(e) Authentication.

(e) Maintenance. Improve preventive maintenance procedures by:

(1) Investigating every significant derangement and implementing corrective action to prevent recurrence.

(2) Expanding and better defining requirements of present Sea Force preventive maintenance instruction.

(3) Developing system of preventive maintenance check-off lists and maintenance records.

(4) Standardizing shipboard preventive maintenance programs for each equipment type.

(5) Instituting a comprehensive material inspection program with a corrective follow-up system for all ships.


(7) Procuring instruction manuals for all major shipboard equipment.

(8) Raising spare parts level to 80 percent on all ships.
f. Personnel.

(1) Review and up-date, on a continuing basis, personnel allowances for Sea Force units.

(2) Monitor the assignment of personnel to ensure optimum utilization of school graduates.

g. Training.

(1) Acquire coastal target ranges for gunnery exercises.

(2) Schedule and conduct minewarfare training exercises.

(3) Schedule and conduct ASW training exercises with U. S. submarines on a quarterly basis.

(4) Conduct amphibious assault exercises with VNMC.

(5) Prepare and implement shipboard training programs.

h. Standardization and Modernization of On-Board Equipment. On a continuing basis, modernize and standardize on-board equipment.

i. Morale. Improve shipboard habitability by:

(1) Improving living conditions and sanitation standards.

(2) Procuring and distributing movie projectors to ships deployed for extended periods.

J. B. DRACHNICK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
As of 1 January 1962 the River Force was composed of five River Assault Groups, a River Transportation Escort Group of eighteen boats, an LCU Group, the Western Repair Facility at Can Tho, and about 1,099 men. Since that time the Mobile 22nd River Assault Group has been added, the River Transportation Escort Group has been expanded to thirty boats, and the present on-board personnel count stands at 1,224.

a. Operational control was inefficient with the River Assault Groups coming under the control of ARVN III & IV Corps Commanders. Operational control of the River Groups is presently vested in the Third & Fourth Naval Zone Commanders.

b. The River Force preventive maintenance program which was sketchy at best a year ago has been greatly improved. Preventive maintenance check-off lists have been prepared and promulgated. The preventive maintenance check-off lists are rigidly adhered to, resulting in an overall increase in the percentage of boats available for use.

c. A standard River Patrol Plan was not in existence last year. Today a detailed patrol plan originated by Commander River Force is being evaluated by the Fourth Naval Zone Commander. Implementation of this Patrol Plan will result in definite curtailment of Viet Cong waterborne traffic.

d. The past year has seen the inception of a River Force "Boat Skipper" school. This four-month course includes instruction in navigation, seamanship, supply, communications, engineering, damage control, and gunnery. The mission of this school is to raise the professional level of the River Force boat skippers.

2. (K) Mission.

NAVSECMAAGVN will assist VNN River Force to develop to a high
standard of efficiency in execution of independent missions and in support of, or jointly with, other units of RVNAF

IN ORDER TO

improve VNN River Force in all areas to satisfy River Force requirements for RVN now and in the future.

3. (K) Execution.

NAVSECMAAGVN River Force advisors will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop the VNN River Force to accomplish at a high standard and without U.S. assistance all current and foreseeable River Force responsibilities and tasks. By close coordination with VNN Commanders and Staff Officers at all levels:

a. Effect, at an early date, the assignment and exercise of operational control of River Forces by Naval Zone Commanders vice ARVN III and IV Corps Commanders or Tactical Zone Commanders.

b. Implement the employment schedule for the balance of CY 63 and thereafter develop and implement an employment schedule on an annual basis to provide for operation, training, and maintenance of VNN River Force units.

c. Accelerate the use of organic troops with River Assault Groups and implement their joint operational training.

d. Implement the use of existing communication plans to achieve effective communications between River Assault Groups and aircraft in the theater of operations.

e. Command and Coordination.

(1) Promulgate and implement general directive type policies and procedures for the guidance of River Assault Group Commanders and other River Force Unit Commanders in the following areas:

(a) Flood Rescue.

(b) Public Relations.

(c) Weather.
(2) Implement the following directives already promulgated and contained in the River Force Training Manual:

(a) Organization.
(b) Command Relationships.
(c) Force Employment and Operating Policies.
(d) Logistics.
(e) Medical.
(f) Civic Action.
(g) Records and Reports.

f. Doctrine. Improve doctrine as experience dictates in the following areas by timely changes to the River Force Training Manual and standard river patrol plan:

(1) Patrol and Intercept.
(2) Gunnery and Gunfire Support.
(3) Tactical Operations.

g. Maintenance.

(1) Revise spare parts allowance lists, as required, and fill deficiencies.

(2) Train sufficient personnel in technical subjects to properly maintain equipment and machinery installed in River Force boats and craft.

h. Communications and Electronics Improvement.

(1) Prepare and promulgate communications implementing instructions in consonance with VNN Naval Communications Center operational and maintenance doctrine.

i. Personnel. Review and up-date, on a continuing basis, personnel allowances for VNN River Force.
j. Shore Construction. Through continuous follow-up, effect the accomplishment of ultimate base support requirements which have been determined and programmed for the River Assault Groups and other River Force Units as follows:

(1) Saigon. Cuu Long pier, fresh water system, sanitation system.

(2) My Tho. POL facility, vehicle ramp.

(3) Vinh Long. Pier, electrical power, ammo stowage, vehicle ramp, 200 cubic meter water tank, fresh water system.

(4) Can Tho. Sea wall, 200 cubic meter water tank, fresh water system.

(5) Long Xuyen. Extend pier, ammo stowage, asphalt road.

k. Standardization and Modernization of On-Board Equipment. On a continuing basis, modernize and standardize on-board equipment.

l. Units and Equipment. On a continuing basis, develop studies of projected requirements, plans for changes to units or equipment, and implement approved plans.

J. E. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
1. (K) Situation.

In order to cope with out-of-country infiltration, a coastal surveillance force of 644 junks in 28 divisions equally spaced around the country was planned. MAP support was approved for the construction of 500 of the 644 junks, and for limited MAP support for engines, weapons, and communications equipment. Continued support of all junks, personnel, and equipment, except parts and replacements for MAP-supplied engines, weapons, communications, and minor specified items, is the responsibility of RVN.

As of 1 September 1963, the Junk Force consisted of 632 junks of which 500 were MAP supplied. The twelve remaining (MO) junks were to be provided by RVN. Approval had been obtained for MAP support of 4,022 military spaces and for 4,640 para-military spaces for FY 1964. On 1 September there were 425 military and 3,432 para-military personnel in the Force.

An austere storage building at each of twenty-three Junk Division Bases has yet to be constructed. Plans are near completion for a pre-fab building which can be taken down and transported to new site if required. Coastal Surveillance Command Centers at Da Nang, Vung Tau, and Phu Quoc are fully operational. The Command Center at Nha Trang is partially operational. Contracts for construction of permanent buildings for Command Centers at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Cat Lo (Vung Tau) have been let, and construction has commenced.

To improve the operational capability of the Junk Force, construction of Division Bases and Command Centers, recruiting and training of additional personnel, and matters of equipping and supporting the Force must be accelerated. Areas of concern are:

a. Surveillance patrolling by operational junks must be intensified.

b. The program of training Junk Force personnel in operation and preventive maintenance of equipment must be further developed and implemented.
KIN (CONFIDENTIAL)

ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSECMAAGVN No. 01-63

c. Repair parts, equipment, and personal gear for junks and Junk Force personnel must be provided in a more timely manner.

d. A TE for the Junk Force has not been completed.

e. Junk Force communications must be made reliable.

f. The intelligence capability requires expansion.

g. Adequate support, including a minor repair capability, must be provided.

h. RVN support for equipment, junk construction, repairs, and personal equipment must be expanded.

2. (K) Mission.

NAVSECMAGVN will assist in the timely and efficient development of the VNN Junk Force to a high standard of efficiency in execution of the surveillance mission and of support missions and joint operations with other units of the RVNAF.

IN ORDER TO

provide an effective coastal surveillance system and an inshore barrier to infiltration or illegal coastal movement along the entire seacoast of RVN.

3. (K) Execution.

The Navy Section Junk Force Advisor will encourage, assist, and provide incentive to the VNN Junk Force with a view to increasing Junk Force effectiveness in its discharge of approved missions and responsibilities. By close coordination with VNN Junk Force Assistant Commander, VNN officers, and all USN staff officers and advisors:

a. Maintain a minimum of sixty percent of the assigned junks of each division on surveillance patrols off seacoasts both day and night.

b. Emphasize the continuous training of Junkmen in marksmanship and other appropriate skills.
c. Provide for improved material and repair support for the junks. Follow up on the availability of funds from RVN for maintenance support.

d. Ensure that VNN commanders conduct frequent operational inspection of junk divisions to ensure their conformance with approved concepts, doctrine, and procedures.

e. Establish fully reliable communications among junks, Junk Division Bases, Coastal District Headquarters, and sea patrols.

f. Expedite approval and implementation of Junk Force TO&E.

g. Obtain more aggressive and timely support by RVN to provide required equipment for junks and Junk Force personnel.

h. Further develop Junk Division Bases to provide needed support for maximum operating force.

i. Expedite the construction of the twelve remaining motor-only junks by RVN.

j. Promulgate a directive-type operation order to include a comprehensive coastal surveillance plan, and policy for the command and coordination of the Junk Force.

k. Develop and promulgate directive-type administrative manuals setting forth administrative policies and procedures for the guidance of junk division commanders.

l. Continually review the end-use of all MAP-constructed junks and MAP-supplied major equipment. Report discrepancies to CHNAVSECMAAGVN when occurring.

m. On a continuing basis, develop studies of projected requirements and plans for changes to units or equipment and implement approved plans.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam

D-3 KIN (CONFIDENTIAL)
KIN (CONFIDENTIAL)

ANNEX E

MARINE CORPS

1. (K) Situation.

On 19 November 1962, when the initial draft of this Annex was prepared, the strength of the VNMC was 5,311. The Brigade was understrength in all ranks. Although it possessed a functioning Headquarters and four combat-experienced infantry battalions, only one battery of the Artillery Battalion was operationally qualified, and the Amphibious Support Battalion was only partially organized and trained.

Since that time, the Brigade has attained T/O strength in officers. The entire Artillery Battalion is qualified for combat, and each of its batteries has participated in two or more operations against the Viet Cong. The Amphibious Support Battalion has trained and expanded, and each of its companies is fully operational. The Reconnaissance Company has completed parachute and submarine training. The Medical Company has demonstrated adequate ability to minister to Marine casualties and assist civic action programs.

The VNMC is a force-in-readiness with an authorized strength of 6,109, of which 5,655 are actually on board. Its mission is to execute amphibious operations and such other operations as may be directed.

To increase its effectiveness in the counter-insurgency, the following deficiencies in VNMC operational capabilities and training must be overcome:

a. Although up to strength in officers, the Brigade is still about 500 enlisted personnel short of T/O requirements.

b. Training in some combat and specialized requirements of the Brigade's mission is incomplete. Areas wherein concentration of training and advisory effort are most warranted are marksmanship, small unit leadership and tactics, swimming and small boat handling, motor transport convoy organization and discipline, care and maintenance of equipment, amphibious warfare, and some aspects of communications.
c. Base facilities are inadequate to needs.

2. (K) Mission.

USMC advisors of NAVSECMAAGVN will assist the VNMC to develop a high standard of proficiency for amphibious assault and all other types of operations to which available forces could conceivably be assigned

IN ORDER TO

elevate the VNMC to U. S. standards in all areas to satisfy Brigade responsibilities to RVN now and in the future.

3. (K) Execution.

USMC advisors of NAVSECMAAGVN will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop in the VNMC the capability to discharge effectively and without U. S. advisory assistance all current and foreseeable Brigade responsibilities and tasks. By close coordination with VNMC commanders and staff officers at all levels, assistance will be provided in the following specific areas:

a. Continue to provide active, on-the-spot advisory assistance, particularly during combat operations in the field.

b. Continue advisory efforts to ensure proper care and utilization of equipment. Assist in recruiting, training, and equipping personnel to meet authorized T/O strength.

c. Promulgate and implement doctrine, including, but not limited to:

(1) Fire-support in counter-guerrilla operations.

(2) Amphibious assault.

(3) Engineer support.

(4) Infantry tactics and techniques.

d. Upon approval by DOD, render all possible assistance in expediting construction and occupation of a consolidated base at Vung Tau.
e. Improve self-training capability in academic and functional areas to reduce dependence on off-shore training to a minimum.

f. On a continuing basis, modernize equipment.

g. Emphasize the use of VNMC in amphibious assault operations and/or amphibious exercises at least quarterly.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
ANNEX F

THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
(BASES AND FACILITIES)

1. Situation.

Operational, administrative, supply, and repair bases and facilities exist, are under construction, or are programmed for construction throughout RVN. This construction will provide the required support consistent with the rapid build-up in the VNN Operating Forces in the last year.

Construction to date has been planned and programmed in a coordinated and timely manner.

New construction will provide repair facilities at Da Nang, Cam Ranh, Cat Lo, and Phu Quoc. These repair facilities will provide maintenance assistance for the Operating Forces of the VNN. At the present, repair facilities do not exist outside of Saigon, with the exception of the Western Repair Facility at Can Tho.


NAVSECMAAGVN will assist the VNN to plan and develop adequate base facilities

IN ORDER TO

provide effective shore support to the Operating Forces of the VNN now and in the future.

3. Execution.

Navy Section staff officers and advisors will by imaginative and determined action develop, in an accelerated manner, bases and facilities capable of discharging at a high standard and without U. S. assistance, all current and foreseeable tasks to effectively support the Operating Forces of the Vietnamese Navy.

By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:
a. Review and revise, on a continuing basis, the VNN Five-Year Long Range Facilities Plan to include all required new construction and the improvement or replacement of existing base facilities.

b. Develop in a timely manner existing and additional base facilities throughout RVN in consonance with the Long Range Facilities Plan to provide effective support to the Operating Forces of the VNN, including support, repair, and maintenance of ships, junkas, and boats. Make revisions to the Long Range Facilities Plan when necessary to reflect modified requirements.

c. Continue to develop VNN capability to perform nominal base and facility maintenance and rehabilitation with reduced dependence upon other RVNAF agencies.

d. Accelerate the construction of bases and facilities planned, and develop in VNN firm and effective procedures for monitoring and accomplishing in timely manner construction planned in the Long Range Facilities Plan.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
SAIGON NAVAL SHIYARD

1. (K) Situation.

Saigon Naval Shipyard is the only naval shipyard in RVN and is the only facility in RVN capable of performing major repairs and overhauls of VNN ships and river craft. Although a Western Repair Facility, Can Tho, is now in operation and certain other facilities are planned to provide minor repairs to ships and craft, the major repair and overhaul requirements of VNN will remain the task of Saigon Naval Shipyard.

At end CY 1961, Saigon Naval Shipyard had never completed a ship overhaul on schedule. River boat overhauls and repair availabilities were completed at an average rate of fourteen boats per month. A backlog of over eighty boats, of a total VNN complement of 200 boats, was deadlined in the yard. Ship and boat hulls were corroded or worm-eaten; and cleaning and preservation techniques were primitive. The Shipyard was unable to overhaul sonars and evaporators of ships of the fleet.

Low production was the result of ineffective labor management. In the final quarter of CY 1961, only 37.8% of the yard's labor force was applied to productive work, at a cost to customer of 58.1$VN per productive man-hour. Budgeting provided no control or incentive.

Waterfront facilities were totally inadequate at Saigon Naval Shipyard as were fire protection and power distribution systems throughout the yard.

In CY 1962, ship overhaul schedules were consistently met, boat backlog was reduced to about thirty-five, and boat output averaged fifty-six boats per month. Hull preservation was brought up to U. S. standards. Wood hulls were teredo-proofed by anti-fouling paints or glass-plastic sheathing. Power hand tools were introduced on the waterfront. Some engineering training was given. A command junk was designed, constructed, and analyzed. Productive labor ratio increased to 53.1%, and the overhead rate was reduced to 21$VN for each productive labor hour.
ADVISORY PLAN
CHINAVSECMAAGVN No. 01-63

In CY 1963 the increased schedule for ships and boats to be overhauled and the difficulties in procuring employees have caused overhaul and availability periods of ships and boats to be extended. For the first half of the year boat output has averaged nine per month for overhauls and twenty-four per month on restricted availabilities.

In June 1963 the Civil Guard LCVP were scheduled in the yard for overhauls at a rate of eight per month. Hull preservation has been improved by the introduction of sand blasting equipment on the waterfront. Cold Vinyl Plastic is now applied to steel-bottom hulls, and other zinc base types of paint will be introduced. Twenty-three command junks were constructed by the Shipyard, the project being completed in May 1963. The Engine Shop Store was established during May, and other such stores are planned.

Waterfront facilities will be improved by construction of two quay walls. The number one quay wall is under construction and scheduled to be completed by 1 January 1964; construction of the second is to start in CY 1964. The Shipyard fire protection system will be incorporated in the number two quay wall construction.

The productive labor rates have continued to improve during the first half of 1963, with a productive labor rate of 53.9% and an overhead rate of 18.1$VN per productive manhour.

The program to improve the Saigon Naval Shipyard evolves into four major areas: shipyard management; industrial and technical methods and procedures; facilities improvement; and increasing the labor force to full allowance.

2. (K) Mission.

Saigon Naval Shipyard, assisted by NAVSECMAAGVN, will develop to a high standard

IN ORDER TO

repair and overhaul ships and boats of VNN and perform other functions appropriate to a Naval Shipyard to standards of workmanship, overhead cost, and timely operation equivalent to the performance of a U. S. Naval Shipyard.
3. Execution.

(K) NAVSECMAAGVN Saigon Naval Shipyard advisors will, by aggressive and determined action, develop in Saigon Naval Shipyard in an accelerated manner the capability to discharge, at a high standard and without U. S. assistance, all current and foreseeable shipyard responsibilities and tasks.

(U) By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:

a. Improve Shipyard management (See Appendix I).

b. Improve and/or refine industrial and technical methods and procedure (See Appendix II).

c. Improve facilities (See Appendix III).

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam

Appendices:
I - Management Improvement
II - Industrial and Technical Methods and Procedures
III - Facilities Improvement
1. (K) Situation.

The management inadequacies of the Saigon Naval Shipyard are centered in the middle-management echelons of planning, accounting, design, shops and waterfront. Middle management billets are largely occupied by young and inexperienced officers who have not yet gained the experience in management techniques required in an industrial activity. This lack of experience also exists in material and maintenance billets in Navy Headquarters and on operating force staffs. The transfer of fiscal responsibility for management of funds necessary to pay for their repair requirements to the operating commands in 1963 has transferred some control of the Shipyard workload to those commands. Present liaison between the Shipyard and the operating forces in matters of repair planning, overhaul scheduling, repair list screening, and financial controls is extremely poor and reflects the inexperience of the officers charged with these responsibilities. The Shipyard's primary problem has been an inability to increase the labor force to full allowance due to slowness of security clearance processing.

2. (K) Execution.

By direct liaison with Saigon Naval Shipyard officer and civilian management, and with VNN Headquarters staff and other offices and agencies as appropriate:

a. Cost Control.

(1) Continue development and refinement of shop performance reporting to reflect not only individual shop performance but also to indicate management capabilities of shop officers/masters.

(2) Establish monitoring and reporting systems in Shipyard which will indicate budget excess trends due to lack of manpower, lack of materials, and/or revisions or reductions in ship and boat overhaul and repair programs.

(3) Establish procedures whereby these reports, as occurring, are made available to VNN CNO, Comptroller, and Force Commander concerned.
Develop methods to withhold excess funds from Force Commanders by revisions to existing budget or by control of these excess funds by VNN CNO.

b. Internal Budget.

Assist Shipyard Comptroller in policing overhead expenses.

c. Personnel.

(1) Conduct informal day to day indoctrination of VNN officers on the assigned mission of the Shipyard. Point out problem areas to VNN officers and instruct them in proper procedures for resolving them. Encourage Shipyard Commander to inform VNN Headquarters on a continuing basis of the need for sufficient officers to fill required billets.

(2) Obtain approval of DOD and/or other appropriate agencies for pay scales competitive with the civilian economy.

d. Material and Procurement.

(1) Instruct engineers and planners in techniques of preparing advance material requirements including items not normally carried by Supply Center in quantities or types required, and of material substitution when overhaul schedules and material delivery dates are not compatible.

(2) Improve liaison between Supply Center and Saigon Naval Shipyard to obtain better supply support which is responsive to fleet maintenance needs by improving Shipyard techniques in:

   (a) Ordering long-lead-time material sufficiently in advance to allow delivery in accordance with production schedule.

   (b) Maintaining current listing of Supply Center load lists and stocking levels and recommending necessary changes.

   (c) Limiting priority orders to the minimum required to meet schedules.

(3) Further develop the refit program of the VNN by recommending additional items to be included in the Master Repair List.
(4) Provide guidance to and assist Supply Center in developing stocking lists for shop stores to service Shipyard shops. The primary effort in this task must come from the Supply Center advisors. As the shop store program is expanded, ensure that assistance and information requested by Supply Center is furnished in a timely manner and ensure that the customer (Shipyard) respects the operating procedures established.

(5) Deplete shop stocks of material and discontinue practice of stocking in the shop. Return stocks not required for immediate use to Supply Center.

e. Customer Relations.

(1) Inculcate habits of respect for ship schedules in the Shipyard and develop awareness of the priority of fleet needs over Shipyard convenience by:

(a) Having Shipyard negotiate schedule difficulties with the operating force involved.

(b) Establishing a workload forecasting system in the Shipyard Planning Department as recommended in Senior Shipyard Advisor Memorandum 4701 of 29 July 1963.

(c) Shipyard reviews of overhaul schedule to ensure workload is even and within the limits of available manpower.

(d) Developing of Production Department scheduling and manpower assignment procedures to ensure that schedules are met and that work accepted can be completed on time.

(2) Promulgate and implement Navy-wide directives outlining effective procedures to be followed by customers and Shipyard to achieve a satisfactory fleet maintenance program, including:


(b) Developing 1964 and 1965 overhaul schedule to achieve combination of balanced Shipyard workload and adequate maintenance of ships and boats.
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSECMAAGVN No. 01-63

(c) Implementing Force Commander responsibility to screen and assign priorities to all work requests.

(d) Insuring satisfactory Shipyard repair performance by providing guidance to Force Commanders and ships' officers in inspection and tests of Shipyard work.

(e) Revising CNO Memorandum No. 134/ETM/HQ/4/F.T. of 24 August 1962 ("method applied for ships and boats repaired by Shipyard") to cover restricted and technical availabilities.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX G

INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL METHODS AND PROCEDURES

1. (K) Situation.

The inadequacies of the industrial and technical methods and procedures utilized by the Saigon Naval Shipyard involve primarily three areas. These are related to hull preservation methods, repair parts, and manhour economy. There is a lack of qualified professionals in billets requiring technical knowledge.

2. (K) Execution.

By direct liaison with officers of the Saigon Naval Shipyard, VNN Headquarters staff, and appropriate officers and agencies, and by other procedures in the nature of staff action:


(1) Expand the use of sand blast equipment to include underwater hull cleaning of all steel hull ships and boats.

(2) Complete the change-over from plastic to vinyl underwater hull preservation systems for VNN ships and boats. Correlate this with the expanded use of sand blast equipment.

(3) Complete teredo-proofing of all wood hull boats by suitable preservatives or coverings, with special emphasis on low cost and minimal man-hours.

(4) Continue development, implementation, and discipline in use of wear limit charts for engine, pump, shafting, and bearing repairs.

(5) Investigate the need for and if necessary program additional equipment to introduce tub and machine molding in the Shipyard foundry.

b. Trouble-shooting and Inspection.

(1) Continue indoctrination of officers, planners, and shop supervisors in the following procedures to achieve necessary repairs at minimum labor and material cost:
(a) Pre-arrival inspection procedures to estimate and define repair work list.

(b) Arrival inspections of systems such as ordnance and electronics to determine repairs required.

(c) Open and inspect criteria for determining repairs necessary to machinery components.

(d) Drydocking inspection to determine necessary underwater hull repairs.

(2) Assist VNN in obtaining labor-saving devices as appropriate where improvement in efficiency will ensue.

c. Engineering and Design.

(1) Program graduate engineering training for suitable VNN Officers and make appropriate assignment on their return.

(2) Develop and organize an adequate technical library and plan files by:

(a) Inventorying and indexing existing plans, including microfilms and technical publications.

(b) Determining additional plans and technical publications which should be added and requesting from BuShips.

(c) Determining if additional equipment is required to efficiently utilize plans now on hand.

(3) Replace Japanese Engineers with VNN officers as they complete their engineering training, by end FY 66.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
1. (a) Situation.

The facilities inadequacies of the Saigon Naval Shipyard primarily concern a lack of pier space and the lack of an effective utility system. Production shops require additional modern equipment for labor saving and increased mission effectiveness. The industrial laboratory lacks the capability to fully support the needs of the Shipyard.

2. (b) Execution.

By procedures in the nature of staff action:

a. Waterfront.

(1) Complete south quay wall and install associated facilities.

(2) At such time as the work load permits, accomplish rebuilding of the marine railway cradles, one railway at a time, in accordance with plans developed by the Shipyard Design Division.

(3) Construct a north quay wall and install associated facilities, including automatic fire pumping system and necessary utilities.

(4) At such time as the work load permits, accomplish rebuilding of the spare drydock caisson in accordance with plans developed by the shipyard Design Division.

b. Utilities.

On completion of the north and south quay walls and the associated improvements to the fire protection system, improve the Shipyard fresh water system by:

(1) Increasing storage capacity by converting the present fire standpipe to fresh water storage when it becomes surplus to the fire system.
(2) Implementing a program of regular inspection and main­tenance of the distribution system.

c. Shops.

Provide all shops with additional modern equipment where major labor saving or increase in mission effectiveness will be obtained.

d. Industrial and Chemical Laboratories.

(1) Procure metallurgical test equipment, install in Industrial Laboratory, and train personnel in physical testing.

(2) Establish and outfit a Chemical Laboratory, to include:

(a) Hiring a competent chemist.

(b) Procuring chemicals necessary to do an organic quantitative analysis.

(c) Hiring necessary apprentices.

J. B. DRACHMIR
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
SUPPLY CENTER AND SUPPLY SYSTEM

1. (K) Situation.

The VNN Supply System is centrally organized about the Administrative Center for Navy Material (ACNM), Saigon. During the past twelve months much progress has been made in the areas of training and administrative procedures which has added to the overall effectiveness of ACNM. The first wall-to-wall inventory ever held is 94% complete. A Ready Shop Store with rapid issue procedures has been established to support the shipyard engine shop. A VNN Supply Manual has been promulgated. CO, ACNM, now publishes an annual supply inspection schedule for ships and units. Further improvement is still required, however. Those areas of concern in which improvements must be made in order to provide effective supply support to VNN are listed below:

a. Further refinement of doctrines and allowance lists is needed.

b. Numbers of experienced PO's and the assignment of trained Supply Corps personnel requires improvement.

c. Responsiveness of the supply system in accordance with the customer's need and urgency of requirements needs improvement.

d. No system exists for the delivery of items to customers in the field.

2. (U) Mission.

NAVSECMAAGVN will assist the VNN supply system to develop to a high standard in providing effective support to VNN in order to improve VNN to U.S. standards in all areas to satisfy naval requirements for RVN now and in the future.
3. (U) Execution.

Navy Section supply and logistics advisors will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop in VNN Administrative Center for Navy Material and the supply system the capability to discharge at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable VNN supply responsibilities and tasks in an accelerated manner. By close coordination with VNN commanders and staff officers at all levels:

a. Doctrine Improvement. Establish systematic and continuing doctrine review by VNN.

b. Training. Give priority to the assignment of personnel trained in supply to supply duties only, until such time as the number of supply-trained personnel meets requirements.

c. Command and Coordination.

(1) Promulgate and implement procedures at VNN N-4 level for technical control and reporting in VNN supply system.

(2) Expand internal guidelines to include stock and inventory control responsibilities and procedures at outlying activities.

d. Personnel. Determine storekeeper requirements in the optimum personnel organization of VNN commands (other than commands in the VNN Supply System) and implement.

e. Shore Construction. Complete bin storage for repair parts at Coastal District and River Group bases.

f. Standardization and Modernization of On-Board Equipment. On a continuing basis, modernize and standardize on-board equipment.

g. Logistics Matters.

(1) Assign responsibility for compiling and maintaining allowance lists.

(2) Ensure that existing procedures for stock and issue control, excess property, packaging, preservation, and inventory are followed.
(3) Provide space for, and assign personnel to implement ACNM Traffic Branch as provided for in A-7 Memo of 20 August 1963.

(4) Expedite completion of the SOAP program on all ships.

J. B. DRAECHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
ANNEX I

NAVAL ZONE COMMANDS

1. (K) Situation.

In early 1963, the ARVN and VNAF were reorganized to conduct counter-insurgency operations in four Corps Tactical Zones in support of the National Campaign Plan. Because of delay in Presidential approval of the VNN Reorganization Plan, originally submitted by VNN CNO to JGS on 31 December 1962, the VNN was unable to similarly reorganize in a timely manner to effectively carry out its mission in support of the National Campaign Plan. Operational command of VNN units was exercised by the Sea, River, and Junk Force Commanders under the overall operational control of CNO. This operational chain of command resulted in certain difficulties in effectively carrying out the VNN mission:

a. The CTZ Commander often was unable to obtain timely VNN support of CTZ operations because of necessity to request assignment of naval forces from VNN Headquarters in Saigon.

b. Coordination between various naval elements in an area of operations was unsatisfactory because operational control of these elements was at times exercised by more than one Commander at VNN Headquarters.

c. Coordination between naval and ground and air forces in a CTZ was unsatisfactory because of the absence of a VNN commander whose operational command of naval forces paralleled the command of CTZ ground and air forces exercised by ARVN and VNAF Commanders.

On 16 October 1963, GVN DOD Directive No. 9358/QP/DL/5 directed reorganization of the VNN to establish four Naval Zone Commands corresponding in area to the four Corps Tactical Zones. Naval Zone Commanders are under the military command and operational control of Commander Vietnamese Navy. NZC, in turn, exercise operational control of all naval forces assigned in direct support of Corps Tactical Zones including all Coastal Force units, all River Force units except those units specifically assigned to the operational control of CNO, and designated Sea Force units when specifically assigned in direct support of CTZ
All direct support forces under the operational control of NZC are chopped to the overall commander of operations in which they participate for the duration of the operation or for a specific time period. When the overall commander is other than a VNN officer, naval forces are first chopped to a VNN officer in tactical command who in turn reports with these forces to the overall commander. Operational requirements from the overall commander are then levied on the VNN OTC who exercises direct military command over individual naval units involved.

2. (K) Mission.

NAVSECMAAGVN will assist VNN Naval Zone Commanders to develop operational employment of assigned naval units to an optimum level in order to effectively carry out the assigned mission of the VNN within each Naval Zone.

3. (K) Execution.

NAVSECMAAGVN advisors to Naval Zone Commanders will, by enthusiastic, positive, and imaginative action, develop the capability of Naval Zone Commands to carry out the assigned VNN mission within each Naval Zone at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, now and in the future. By close coordination with the Naval Zone Commander:

a. Increase VNN participation in joint operational planning at all levels to ensure utilization of VNN units in all operations where appropriate.

b. Maintain optimum employment of assigned naval forces in direct support of CTZ Commander to:

   (1) Conduct combat-support, inland-waterway operations including combat lift, logistic and gunfire support, patrol, escort, and minesweeping.

   (2) Prevent infiltration from sea and interdict enemy inshore and inland waterway supply lines and movement routes.
(3) Repel enemy forces from Delta areas by amphibious raids.

c. Develop patrol and operation plans for effective utilization of assigned naval forces in accomplishing the objectives set forth in paragraph 3b.

d. Establish effective and continuous liaison between Naval Zone Commanders and CTZ Commanders to ensure that CTZ Commanders are advised as to availability, capabilities, and limitations of naval forces for support of CTZ operations.

e. Fill all authorized Naval Zone Command TO billets and on a continuing basis monitor the effectiveness of Naval Zone Command organization in supporting the CTZ Commander and in carrying out the VNN mission.

f. Develop and implement a TE for each Naval Zone Command.

g. Monitor the programming and construction of shore facilities within the Naval Zone to ensure that requirements of the Operating Forces are met.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
ADVISORY PLAN
CHNAVSECMAAGVN No. 01-63

ANNEX J

TRAINING

1. Situation.

VNN training conducted includes officer, recruit, functional, petty officer, Class "A" and Class "B" training, underway training, Junk and River Forces special training, and English-language training. Beginning in late 1961, and continuing through 1962 and 1963, all schools were remodeled from the French lecture system to U. S. systems and standards, including use of demonstration, student participation, handouts, and training aids. Four Class "A" schools were added. Class "B" curricula were revised. Detailed lists of discrepancies for follow-up of inspections were instituted. A VNN Bureau of Training was organized for coordination of training needs and facilities.

Training problem areas which still exist in the VNN are as follows:

a. Although the number of qualified instructors is now adequate, there is a shortage of experienced and qualified replacements.

b. The value of continuous training to maintain combat readiness is not well understood.

c. There are insufficient translations of U. S. Navy technical manuals and correspondence courses.

d. English-language facilities must be increased to improve comprehension of students in off-shore training.


NAVSECMAAGVN will assist the VNN to raise the professional and technical educational level of VNN personnel, utilizing methods and standards of instruction and drill equivalent to those employed by similar U. S. Navy training activities IN ORDER TO increase combat readiness of the VNN.

J-1
3. Execution.

NAVSECMAAGVN advisors will, by imaginative, positive, and enthusiastic action, develop in the VNN/VNMC in an accelerated manner, the capability to discharge at a high standard and without U. S. assistance, all current and foreseeable training responsibilities and tasks.

By close coordination with VNN commanders, staff officers, and particularly schools and training personnel at all levels, and by direct liaison with the Operating Forces:

a. Maintain at U. S. standards the curricula of all schools, the quality of instruction, and academic and military requirements at the Naval Academy.

b. Improve English-language proficiency of all potential off-shore trainees and other personnel to increase comprehension of training. Train VNN English-language instructors and provide, install, and put into use an English-language trainer at NATC.

c. Improve effectiveness of refresher training by VNN adherence to exercise schedules and by the use of imagination in their execution.

d. Increase type training and independent ship exercise periods. On a continuing basis, emphasize the importance of frequently exercising ships' crews at general drills.

e. Provide reference libraries for the Naval Academy and technical schools; improve sanitary facilities in living quarters and classroom areas; and add new facilities including 2 classrooms, 3 barracks, and 1 mess hall, to improve training facilities at Nha Trang.

f. Instruct VNN personnel in proper maintenance and operating procedures.

g. Effectively utilize VNN Bureau of Training for close and direct liaison between the Operating Forces and schools and training commands to ensure that operational needs of VNN are satisfied by schools and training plans and projects.

J. B. DRACHTK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
ANNEX K

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

1. (K) Situation.

Development of the first VNN intelligence organization commenced in February 1962. At the present time, a small intelligence organization operates in VNN Headquarters. It is composed of six officers, eight petty officers, and eight non-rated men. This group conducts staff intelligence planning and study, evaluates and disseminates intelligence, prepares and delivers intelligence briefings, and has prisoner-of-war interrogation and photo-interpretation capabilities. However, growth of the VNN intelligence organization has not kept pace with either the growth of the other branches of VNN or with the increased activities of the VNN. Areas of concern are:

a. Intelligence functions outside VNN Headquarters are performed as a collateral duty. Full-time intelligence personnel are not yet assigned to field activities.

b. The Intelligence Division (N2) at VNN Headquarters has an insufficient number of personnel assigned to perform such functions as continuing evaluations, liaison, technical intelligence, training, and administration. Eight of thirty TO billets are vacant.

c. Increased coordination in intelligence matters between VNN, JGS, and other RVN agencies is necessary. Two authorized VNN billets in J-2 JGS are not yet filled.

d. Intelligence doctrine and SOP in some areas have not been standardized and officially promulgated.

e. There is need for a continuous program of intelligence orientation and training for VNN personnel to apprise them of the role of intelligence, its requirements and procedures.

2. (U) Mission.

NAVSECMAAGVN will assist in the timely development of an efficient intelligence organization within the VNN.
IN ORDER TO satisfy naval intelligence requirements for RVN now and in the future.

3. (K) Execution.

Navy Section advisors will, by positive, thorough, and aggressive action, and in an accelerated manner, develop the capability of the VNN to discharge at a high standard and without U.S. assistance, all current and foreseeable intelligence responsibilities and tasks.

a. Doctrine Improvement. Promulgate evaluation and dissemination doctrines, and implement and expand existing doctrines including, but not limited to, collection, reporting, evaluation, dissemination, and operational intelligence.

b. Intelligence Training.

(1) Refine and implement the intelligence training program to include RVNAF schools, technical intelligence instruction, and on-the-job training for present and future VNN N2 personnel. Establish in writing an intelligence training curriculum and the criteria for future reactivation of the VNN intelligence MTT.

(2) Provide VNN operational units with revised and updated operational and training manuals for intelligence so they may effectively fulfill intelligence responsibilities.

(3) Continue the development of the VNN intelligence library.

(4) Develop and publish a manual concerning intelligence in amphibious operations.

c. Improve liaison between the VNN intelligence organization and other RVNAF and RVN intelligence organizations at all levels.

d. Establish continuous participation in intelligence aspects of operational planning.

e. Obtain and assign authorized numbers of personnel to billets allowed in the T.O.

K-2
f. Establish a field photographic capability responsive to the needs of the VN intelligence organization.

g. Establish a continuous program for compiling beach studies of the entire RVN coast.

J. B. DRACHNIK
Captain, U.S. Navy
Chief Navy Section
Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam