BRIEFING INFORMATION

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PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

I. Navy

A. Force Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Auth</th>
<th>On board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shore Establishment</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Forces</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>1052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Forces</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junk Forces</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainees</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>6161</td>
<td>3021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures taken from Force Structure Plan submitted for CINCPAC approval 1 April 62. They represent current, realistic thinking with regard to the population of approved, programmed units.

B. Weaknesses.

In-country Sea Force ships presently undermanned due to need to populate new ships. (LSM in June, LST in July, PCE in August). Overall shortage of PO's exists due to slow promotions.

II. Marine

A. Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Auth</th>
<th>On board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO &amp; EM</td>
<td>5840</td>
<td>4555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6161</td>
<td>4678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Input since 21 March 478 recruits.

B. Weaknesses.

Shortages of officers and NCO's. Officers approximately 45 per cent of authorized strength and NCO approximately 30 per cent of authorized strength.
**Personnel (Cont'd)**

**Desertion Rates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>VNN</th>
<th>VNMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
River Force Information

LCM's

28 February - The first 3 LCM's with armor installed arrived in-country from Subsc. 12 March - The remaining 3 LCM's arrived in-country from Subsc. These LCM's are being fitted out at the Saigon Shipyard. 4 LCM's are completed except for installation of 81MM mortars which are not available in-country. Expect to have the two remaining LCM's completed by 30 May.

LCVP's

3 April - 16 LCVP's arrive in-country from the U.S. with armor partially installed and the remaining armor precut. These LCVP's require conversion and the remaining armor must be installed. The conversion plans are drawn, material lists made up, job orders are written, and work will start this week.

22nd River Group

Establishment of the new (6th) River Group is currently dependent on the following:

(1) Decision as to where the 22nd River Group Base is to be. Cdr. Quyen has proposed that no fixed operating base be assigned to the new river group. Instead, he has proposed that an LSSL/LSIL be used as the support base. This would allow for greater flexibility and mobility for the new River Group.

(2) Completion of the boats scheduled to make up the River Group.

(3) Availability of personnel to man the boats of the 22nd River Group. The personnel to make up the 22nd River Group are not presently available. The Commander of the River Forces feels certain that personnel will be available when the boats are ready for operation.

(4) Availability of AN/VRC-34 Radios. BUSHIPS has stated that these radios will be available in September 1962. CHNAVSEC advised that this was not acceptable since the new River Group will be ready in all other respects considerably sooner than September (CHMAAG 280530Z APR). Communications is considered a valuable training opportunity will be lost.
From: A3.1, Commo Advisor
To: N-3

Subj: Forward Air Guides; information concerning

1. There is presently a school being conducted by personnel of the USAF and VNAF to train RVNAF officers in the proper control of aircraft when employed with ground or surface forces. The Forward Air Guide School, as it is called, is conducted at Ton San Nhut Military Airport. The school is for officers of all VN services, including CG and SDC, and lasts for two (2) weeks.

2. The school, as established, is to last six (6) weeks and provide 120 FAG, 40 per class. The first class started 16 April, the second, 7 May and third, 28 May. It was reported that no VNN or Marine Personnel attended this first class, nor is it known if the VNN or Marines know of this course and are going to send personnel to the second or third class. The USAF Personnel stated that they will try and get the school extended for additional classes if the services show enough interest.

3. It is recommended that the VNN and Marines send personnel to this class and provide the ships, River Force, bases and Marines, with FAG's. It would be a start to the air/ground use problem. Captain LoAn, VNAF, at JOC, Ton San Nhut, is the coordinating officer for this course.

Very respectfully,

D. T. LINCH
VNN Communications

The present VNN communications system consist of three major nets, the River Force net to the bases and boats in the Delta, the general broadcast net to ships and shore stations and the ship-shore station to NavCommSta Saigon. These nets provide the necessary communications between Naval H.Q. Saigon and all shore bases and deployed units. The present system is considered marginal in its reliability due to the use of obsolete equipment, poor procedure, and the low quality of trained communications personnel. In addition, no major communications improvement plan has ever been previously programmed for VNN communications. To improve this second rate system, Chief Navy Section MAAG, has submitted a detailed plan for the general improvement of the VNN system. This plan would realize a remote transmitter site with new and powerful transmitters and a torn tape relay linking naval shore station with a TTY net. This plan has been approved by OASD and INDMAN 14 has been designated as project authority. As such, INDMAN 14 will assemble all material, personnel and plans to effect this program at the PHNX; by 1 July 1962, all material and personnel will be in Vietnam for installation. By 1 August, the major equipment will be installed and the system will be operational. By 31 August, the system will be fully operational and INDMAN 14 will provide OJT for VNN personnel. INDMAN 14 will assist in improving the communications centers at the naval bases and districts.

1. What communications facilities for Junk Force?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>AN/PRC 10</th>
<th>AN/GRC 87</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Divs. operational at First Coastal Dist.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sets ready for divisions (on hand)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due in from ARVN by 15 May</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This will allow 9 - PRC 10's and 3 GRC 87's per division.

The Junk Force uses the Comm Center at the Naval Districts for long haul commo and the Comm Center at the ARVN unit nearest to the Junk division for relay from the Coastal District Commander.

The PRC 10 is a low power transceiver for communications between junks. The GRC 87 is a low power transceiver for communication between sub-division commanders and military or naval districts.

NOTE: In some cases the SCR 694 will be in use, but is of the same type as the AN/GRC 87.

2. What commo facilities for River Force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>TCS AN/PRC 10</th>
<th>AN/PRC 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 River Groups</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due in from ARVN by OCT 62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The above listed equipment is for boat/boat, boats/base, boat/ARVN
units, communications.

The River Bases have fixed land comm centers for boat/base and
base/Saigon communications. This includes 8 BC 191 transmitters of a
rated 75 watts CW output.

NOTE: In some cases, the SCR 300 will be in use, but it is of the same
type as the AN/PRC 10.


Each ship has the comm center as designed and the capability of
installed equipment will vary by construction and ship type. All
units are capable of communicating with Naval H.Q. Saigon, or relay
by one of the four coastal districts. Each ship has equipment installed
giving them the capability of communicating with other ships, Junk Force
Boats, River boats, ARVN, VNAF, Naval Districts and River Bases.

Weakness of VNN communications.

1. The major weakness of VN Naval Communications is in the personnel.
There are not enough to properly man the units ashore or afloat. In
addition, those presently assigned have not been properly trained in
communication procedure.

To overcome these quality and quantity weaknesses, the curriculum at
the Naval Training Center Nha Trang has been revised and will provide a
greatly improved RM class. The River Force has established a
special RM school in Saigon to train personnel for the River bases and
boats. The Army signal school at Vung Tau has set up a special class
for 100 VNN personnel of the Junk Force and regular Navy. MAAG has
increased the off-shore training to include communication-electronic
personnel.

2. The weakness of obsolete equipment will be phased out as the
communication improvement plan is put into effect 1 July 1962 by
Chief Navy Section and INDMAN 14.

3. Poor procedure will be off-set by the improved training and the
establishment of the TTY network between shore-station and NavCommSta
Saigon. This system will improve the reliability and speed with which
the traffic of the Navy can be handled.

4. Command levels within the VNN are becoming more aware of the
importance of effective communications.
Vietnamese Navy River Forces—ARE WE WINNING THE WAR?

1. While there has been considerable improvement in both the logistic support as well as increased numbers of personnel, I am most dubious that we are winning the war; holding our own perhaps but not really winning.

2. From a tactical point of view, the VNN River Forces have the upper hand over the Viet Cong in almost every situation, as do the other VN military forces. Why then a stalemate? From my level it simply boils down to a lack of strong aggressive determined leaders who really want to win. Our MTT has discovered that there is considerable technical talent available in most of the boat crews but little positive leadership anywhere. When things are done wrong, or not at all, the culprits have little cause to worry because discipline, as we understand it, does not exist. To win, the Vietnamese must have more competent leaders, particularly junior officers. To get these leaders, the Government must provide greater incentives than presently offered. The competent, aggressive leader should be recognized and rewarded and by the same token the opposite should apply to the mediocre or incompetent. Competent, willing leaders exist. They must be exploited and quickly.
1. The VNN Sea Force has a mission which does not allow a direct evaluation of success or failure of its contribution toward the prosecution of South Vietnam's counter-insurgency operation. Therefore success must be evaluated in terms of measurement of accomplishments which support the overall military effort.

A military campaign at sea has the primary purpose of denying the use of the sea to the enemy and keeping the sea open to use of friendly forces.

In accomplishing these primary tasks, the VNN Sea Force has maintained sea patrols, has provided sea transportation for combat troops as well as logistic resupply of bases, has supported small scale amphibious operations, and has maintained a limited training program for improving these fields of endeavor.

2. The most success of the Sea Force has been in maintaining sea lines of communications for friendly forces. Control of the sea to prevent its use by the enemy has not been so successful. Stepped up arrival of U.S. aid in the form of additional ships and increasing utilization of all ships is improving the VNN control of the coastal seas. Steaming miles per month increased from an average of 10,655 in 1960 to 17,400 in 1961 to 26,533 in 1962. Logistic support of bases is improving in that with a present maximum sea borne lift capacity of approximately 1000 tons per month the VNN has improved from an average of 335 tons per month in 1960 to 389 tons per month in 1961 to 760 tons per month in 1962 to date. The maximum required lift should all lines of communication except the sea be lost is 5000 tons per month. With arrival of LST type ship scheduled this figure can be realized by December 1962.

3. The VNN Sea Force is achieving success in its areas of responsibility in the war effort in varying degrees. This success is from a unit, however, that contributes only a small percent of the overall effort. The Sea Force is winning its share of the war slowly at present.
Are We Winning or Losing the War?

Junk Force

We are winning, but only gradually. The JF that is operational now has cut down infiltration by sea. This month, when 23 more junks become operational in the Gulf of Siam, the effectiveness will be increased. To measure exactly the effectiveness is difficult since the threat is virtually unknown in areas that are not covered. However, the fact that the VC is attempting to stop the expansion of the JF indicated that the JF is giving them cause for concern. The JF is basically a passive force so effectiveness cannot be measured in terms of offensive operations. As soon as the coast of Vietnam is entirely sealed by the JF, we will have taken a major step towards winning the war.

R. A. BRYER
I do not think we are winning the war.

Moral in the VNN is poor, and there is an under current of feeling that the communists will succeed in taking over the government is about two years.

A primary factor contributing to low moral is the schism existing in the Navy today. At least two significant groups, each headed by a senior naval officer oppose the present commander of the Navy. For reasons of personal ambition as avarice they have demonstrated their willingness to demoralize the entire naval service if, thereby, they can cause the present commander to be replaced. Other high placed persons outside the Naval service are sympathetic to one or more groups, and lend their prestige and influence to embarrass the incumbent CMD. Successful destruction of a unified foe is highly improbable when the "home" forces are torn with internecine strife.

A second factor is the increase in the number of cases of officers committing peculations against the government, and the reluctance on all levels to take stern measures against the perpetrators. The enlisted men, as well as the officer's, know of the nature and the extent of these peculations. The apparent condoning of such practices plays into the script of VC propaganda, and waters down the determination to fight.

The enemy is unified and determined. The Navy, at any rate, is divided and beset by avarice and ambition. Although it has not yet been called upon to make an all out effort, the Navy has met each challenge with less than the performance level that is expected.

[Signature]

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