REGAPITULATIVE LIST OF THE FACTS
AND INFORMATION REGARDING VC INFILTRATION
BY SEA

I. FACTS:

1. On 5 April 1961, a fight between 5 junks of our junk group and 11 VC boats (each boat having from 10 to 15 men) at YD 370.780 (22 kilometers northeast of Dong Ha - Quang Tri).

2. On 5 June 1961, the Junk Force captured 5 VC (among them were 1 VC 1st Lt and 1 VC aspirant) in a boat at BT 053.813 (4 kilometers northeast of Da Nang).

3. On 4 July 1961, a VC ship captured 1 VC boat carrying 9 men, at about 33 kilometers northeast of Quang Tri.

4. On 9 July 61, our 11th Junk Group fought with the VC at YD 350.780 (27 kilometers north of Quang Tri) and YD 490.790 (30 km N-E of Quang Tri).

5. 11 July 1961, our 12th Junk Group captured 1 VC boat carrying 6 men with 16 kilos of opium at YD 773.350 (village of Dien Thai).

6. 13 July 1961, 10 VC boats appeared at YD 320.760. 2 VC large boats, from Con Co, came and moored at YD 450.820. 20 boats stood by at YD 270.835.

7. 14 July 1961, 1 junk of our 11th Junk Group, while pursuing 2 VC boats, sank at YD 300.780/6 km N-E of Ben Hai). Loss on our side: 1 SCR 300 was damaged.

8. 27 Aug 61, our junks at Da Nang captured 1 VC boat (this boat could carry 60 men, and those on board excepted) at BT 630.950 (Son Tra).

9. 31 Jan 60, Civil Guard and Self Defense men on Ly Son Isle captured 5 VC, of their 603rd Communications and Sea Transportation Group, the duty of which it was to carry weapons and materials to the South.

10. 17 Feb 60, we confiscated 250 tubes of Vitamin C made by the Communist Bloc (Hungary), along the Trung Long Ha coast (District of Long Toan, - Vinh Binh).

11. 25 July 61, the VC brought supplies by sea, using motor-boats to tow boats and concentrate them at Van Yanh Hao (U.Q.457.960 - Ranh An Xuyen Ba Xuyen).
II. INFORMATION:

a. 21 June 61, B/3 reported that in Dec 60, 1 VC battalion came to Phu Yen from the North and landed at Da Nang (278.338). But this information was not confirmed.

b. Local sources informed that the VC infiltrated by small groups at Thu Cat shore (Binh Dinh).

c. Local sources informed that many VC infiltrated from Minh Ma shore area to Binh Thien.

d. In Jan 61, information was received that 1 boat without passengerdrafted at Ke Ya Cape (Z.S. 270.850 - Binh Try). It was suspected to be VC.

e. 28 July 61, C/3 reported that 2 VC battalions crossed the sea from Kep (Cambodia) to Kien An (Kien Giang) and hid at Thay Quon area, village of Vinh Binh (district of Kien Long - Kien Giang). But this information was not yet confirmed.

f. 19 Jan 62, C/3 informed that 1 VC unit, about 500 fellows, calling itself battalion 205-206, forced 12 junks to enter Van Kinh Da Bac (VR 970.151 - An Xuyen), so that they may carry group to Vain Kinh Hoi.

g. 28 Jan 62, C/4 informed that many VC armed units were reported to be hiding at Canal Nizin (VR 900.636, VR 900.623 district of Kien An - Kien Giang).
ARVN reports: Source and eval unk: Mid Dec 1961, villagers reported estimated 70 VC with weapons and equipment debarked from junk vic (5-10km NE) Thuan Bien (YS 671581, Phuoc Tuy Prov. Group reportedly moved to area vic YS 7574. Investigation by District Chief revealed group to be about 50 with individual weapons and some equipment. Men spoke North NVN dialect. ARVN considers report confirmed. VC plat reported in area YS 7574 since early Nov 61. Area possible liaison or staging area for infiltraters.

INFO received 15 FEB 62
1. (C) Field Command G3 (Major NGUU) has been informed of the continuing need for detailed information on the infiltration of VC personnel and supplies from outside South Vietnam. Recently, in discussing VC infiltration by sea, Major NGUU gave the following information:

   a. The extent of infiltration of VC personnel by sea is not significant in comparison to the infiltration by land routes. This is due to present conditions in Laos which favor the movement of supplies and personnel by land routes to points of entry into RVN territory. If conditions in Laos were to become less favorable, use of sea routes could be expected to increase significantly.

   b. Infiltration of personnel by sea is believed to be confined generally to small groups or cadre personnel or individual agents. Personnel are normally disguised as fishermen in efforts to prevent detection.

   c. The use of sea routes for exporting supplies from RVN to North Vietnam is more extensive. In addition to the movement of significant quantities of rice, junks are used to move drugs and other critical items which are purchased locally by VC agents for export to North Vietnam.

   d. The principle points of entry for infiltration of VC personnel and supplies are the following:

(1) BO DIEN River (YB3770) North of QUANG TRI.

(2) POUIC Island located off the coast of QUANG NCAI Province at BT9801 is utilized as a water resupply point for movement of personnel by sea to points located on the coast of South Vietnam.

(3) HOA BA Area (EN7522). A small secret base area is located approximately 10 kilometers to the northwest where infiltrating personnel move after landing.

(4) Area vicinity PHAN THIET (EN5505).

(5) ZIEN MCG (THYAN Huyen) YB6859. A base (liaison station) is located in an area approximately 10 kilometers to the north of this infiltration area.

(6) BA LONG (XN7699) area. A depot and liaison station is reportedly located in the vicinity of this ingress area.
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(7) NAM GIANG RIVER and its estuarine.

(8) NHA HUYEN (WQ6895).

(9) Various points along the coast of CAY NAM.

2. (C) Major NGU has stated that he will pass on as priority information any reports received concerning VC infiltration by land and sea routes.

THOMAS A. MCCRARY
Colonel, Infantry
Senior Advisor
1. (C) At 0800 a preparatory conference this morning, 30 Jan, CHMA C asked for available information regarding subject. Personal query was made to J2, JGS, and J2, Field Command with results as follows.

2. (C) J2, JGS: the J2, Lt Col Phuoc stated that presently he has no confirmed information on sea infiltration into area of interest from outside country, however, strongly feels that some is taking place in the form of wepons and ammunition purchased by the VC from outside country - he indicated possibly Malaya. Col Phuoc readily agreed to have his section prepare a special study on overall sea infiltration along complete coastline which will include conclusions on degree of infiltration by area and the J2's recommendations on where patrol barriers should be strengthened - indicated this study can probably be completed within a week. The J2 did state that it is common knowledge that there is a considerable amount of near-shore coastal traffic; for example, transporting rice from Ha Xuen area to Sung Lat area in food deficit VC base south of Saigon.

3. (C) J2, Field Command reported same information as the J2. He further indicated it difficult for FNS to effectively interdict VC in-shore coastal traffic due to inability of VC sea-going ships to patrol closer than 8-10 kilometers low considerable portion of coast because of shallow depth.

4. (C) J2 will furnish CHMA C copy of J2, JGS report when received as well as any additional intelligence he received from all intelligence sources on a continuing basis.