I. Information received:

A. Information from J-2, Gen Staff

February 1960 - VC activities have increased in 5th Mil Region, especially in Kien Phong, Kien Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces. It was relatively calm in the southern provinces.

From the above contrast one can draw the following conclusion: On one hand they foment trouble in Kien Phong and Kien Tuong with a view to besieging these 2 provinces in order to regain security for their bases in the Plains de Jonces. On the other hand they will not be hampered in reinforcing their military bases in An Xuyen and Tnatien (Haien District) at the same time a reception center can be set up for reinforcements from across the Cambodian border or from the north by way of sea.

March 1960 - On 1 Mar Hon Khoai (VQ 812.308), An Xuyen, was under VC attack.

Within 5th Mil Region there were indications of VC increased activities in Camau, Ba Xuyen, U-Ninh. In future VC will be capable of gathering more troops with increased firing capabilities and therefore will become a matter of great concern.

April 1960 - It was reported that 2 new VC units were activated in 5th Mil Region:

- The 10th U-Minh Ranger Battalion operating in Kien Long District (Kien Giang).
- The Tay Do Battalion operating in Kien Hung and Kien Binh District.

In An Xuyen VC planned to organize territorial platoons for each district. In Dam Don District 4 platoons were already activated consisting of 30 men, one AR, 10 rifles and swords.

May 1960 - VC attack on Thuan Hoa Agroville in An Xuyen resulted in heavy losses on our part.

June 1960 - According to captured documents VC project was to seize the district of Nam Can, Dam Doi, Cai Nuoc. Their firststep would be destroying bridges on the Ca Mau - Nam Can Road and building a barrage on the Bay Hap and Muong Dien Rivers in order to isolate the southern zone of An Xuyen Province.
July 1960 - In Quang Binh, the VC were reported to have activated a joint transportation service. In June 1960, Hqs 4th Mil Region, VC had repeatedly reinforced this service with personnel, finance and material. This joint transportation service is composed of 2 divisions and subordinate sections:

- Division for border crossing by way of sea;
- Division for border crossing via highland;
- Radio section;
- Code section;
- Message section.

In early July, VC have apparently transferred ammunitions from Con Co Island (on the Ben Hai River) to the south on small boats camouflaged as fishing boats.

In An Xuyen and Ba Xuyen Provinces VC have strongly opposed to us and have inflicted significant losses to our forces.

August 1960 - VC captured Tan Loc Village (Quang Long District, An Xuyen Province) without regard of losses to use it as military base.

October 1960 - In Song Ong Doc and Dam Doi Districts, An Xuyen Province, VC used their tactic of "deserted house and arden" against our operations. On the other hand they attempted to obtain reinforcements from their main forces to fight our Rangers in Quang Long District. This indicates VC determination to liberate Cam Au and use it as a base.

Local units were also utilised to delay our forces to permit their main units to build up and reorganize.

From a military standpoint VC armed forces will be expanded to the extent of organizing guerrilla units for each village in order to effectively isolate the rural areas.

January 1961 - After a period of relative calmness the southern provinces again registered increased VC activities in late January with several surprise attacks (An Xuyen).

April 1961 - As a result of the Laotian war VC infiltration into Vietnam might be intensified.

May 1961 - VC have, on several occasions, used explosives in their ambushes.
December 1961 - In neighboring Cambodia it was crystal clear that Sihanonh decided to side dangerously with the Communist bloc and Cambodia now becomes an operating site for the Communists in SE Asia.

However, from a military standpoint, our greatest concern now is to prevent a possible infiltration from Cambodia into Kien Giang and An Xuyen Provinces via the Bay of Thailand.

B. Information from Army Field Command Period 13-19 Dec - In coastal villages of Rach Doc, Hon Da Bac, Muoi Ba Quan and Nuie On Trang, VC have organized their own financial committee having control over the fishing business. Sea food was dispatched on motor boats and disposed on in Kien Giang. Moneys deriving from these sales were used to buy needed medicines and supplies.

Period 2 Jan 1962 - 9 Jan 1962 - Incidents most worthy of attention were the attack of Khanh Binh Tay Outpost (VR 503.933) 25 km NW of Cai Nuoc on 1 Jan 62 and the ambush of the rescue forces at VR 873.007, 9 km SW Cai Doc River on 3 Jan 62.

1 - 16 Jan 1962 - On the morning of 11 Jan 62 from 0200 to 0500 a VC Company of the U Minh Battalion launched an attack on an outpost in Khan Lan development center VR 921.379 held by Civil Guard and Self Defense forces.

17-23 Jan 62 - In An Xuyen VC organized a self supported financial committee specializing in fishing throughout the coastal areas of Camau. All sea products were transported to and sold in Kien Giang. This financial committee has a turnover of as much as 5 million piastres a year.

In An Xuyen VC launched two simultaneous attacks on Khan Klain outpost, 15 km NW Thoi Binh and on Self Defense outpost, 1 km on the west side of foregoing. In this attack VC made use of the POM boat which was captured from us in October 1961.

One can guess that VC are now concentrating their activities both military and political towards An Xuyen Province with a view to expanding and strengthening their base zone.

C. Information from C-2, 3rd Tactical Zone

- 31 Dec 61, Report, C/2, Chief of Thoi Binh District. Approx a VC Company was reported at WR 060.234.

- 5 Jan 62, 1 VC Battalion, major part Chinese, was reported going from VR 944.075 to VR 958.053 (C2).

- 6 Jan 62, U Minh Battalion reported at WR 062.237 and WR 040.270 (C3).
15 Jan 62, 90 VC possibly of Company 3, Dinh Tien Hoang, equipped with 4 AR reported at WR 221.296 (C2).

VC invited inhabitants of Hoa Thanh, Tan Hung and Quang Long villages to attend the ceremony introducing a committee of the Front for Liberation of the Camau Province conducted at Nha Tham Hamlet WR 116.055 on the nights of 22 and 23 Jan 62 (F3).

32nd Regiment reported a VC Company at WR 069.229, possibly 2nd Dinh Tien Hoang Co (C3).

18 Jan 62, approx 500 VC gathered at Hon Da Bac WR 783.152 where they requisitioned 10 junks to move 2/3 of their men to the north and landed at VR 811.370. The rest remained at Hon Da Bac until late 19 Jan 62 for lack of transportation (B2).

Report from our underground agent: 23 Jan 62, 1900 hrs, I Hau Phu Loi Battalion, and a company of the U Minh Battalion proceeded from Khanh Lam to V Va May, WR 893.113 - 863.122 - 884.136. Strength: Approx 30, completely armed. Villagers were forced to supply them with rice cakes. They are now streamlining preparations with intention of attacking the Self Defense outpost at Khanh Binh Dong and Song Ong Duc District. In addition over 200 guerrillas are regrouped at VR 846.117 (B2).

Report from Chief of Dam Doi district (C3): A VC platoon is now hiding at WR 252.058 to intercept boats on the Ganh Hao River.

Report on 33 Tactical Zone says on 28 Jan 62 approx 600 VC gathered at VR 790.010 with intention to launch an attack on Khanh Binh Tay outpost on the night of 29 Jan 62.

D. Information from Navy Ships

13 July 61, 1140, HQ 327 captured at Pirate Roche Dedure a fishing boat of Cambodia. 3 men were aboard.

23 July, above ship seized a motor boat near Ganh Hao. 3 men aboard. Questioning revealed one man was a VC militaryman who stated that in June 61 he noticed a boat sailing from Ganh Hao towards Bo Do. Boat of approx 3 ton, not loaded to capacity. 3 men were aboard. Questioned about suspected boats landing on the coast of An Xuyen subject stated having heard that VC boats arriving from North VN often used Rach Goc as means of entrance.

3 Aug 61, HQ 06 captured 4 motor boats North of Doi Moc Island because of lack of official papers.

9 Aug 61, 1120, HQ 06 captured a motor boat bearing Cambodian registration No 136K, 4 miles from Pic Kwala. 7 men on board with 12 tons of rice, 8 tons of salt, 1000 cartons of cigarettes, wine and drinking water.
- 17 Oct 61, HQ 06 arrested 5 men at Bai Dai for lack of ID papers.

- 22 Oct 61, HQ 225 reported 10 VC at Bai Rang (E Tamassou) they dispersed when Self Defense men conducted a search. Captured sleeping gears, documents, 1 Communist flag, 30 kg rice and medicine.

- 4 DEC 61, HQ 04 seized and transferred to the Phuoc Quoc Naval Division 1 newly built sail boat, 5 ton, loaded with planks for construction.

- 12 Dec 61, HQ 04 arrested and transferred to Phu Quoc Naval Div 6 suspected motor boats. On board were 5 men from Bac Dao, 5 from Bai Dai, 3 men and 1 boy from Hon Bau.

- 18 Dec 61, HQ 327 arrested 2 suspected boats with 2 men and 1 woman. They were all turned over to Phuoc Quoc Naval Division.

- 7 Jan 62, HQ 328 seized boat No 146/3, 21.5 miles SE Tamassou Island. On board were 5 persons with legal papers, one did not possess papers and claimed to be of Military Security Service, Rachgia. All were turned over to Phuc Quoc Naval Division for questioning.

D. Information from Phu Quoc Naval Division

- 20 Mar 61, 1900, VC distributed anti-government leaflets at Duong Dong market and ramsacket information offices at various hamlets.

- Late April 61, VC attacked Ham Ninh outpost.

- In same month vehicle transporting chief of district was ambushed south of Duong Dong.

- 8 Nov 61, 0815, a water truck of the Naval Div was ambushed at Gieng Tien.

- 25 Jan 62, VC surrounded sea boats, south of Phu Quoc Island.

- 29 Jan 62, VC intended to ambush a Navy GMC at Ham Ninh.

E. Information from Sea Forces

Vung Tau - Period 10-20 Dec 61 approx 80 armed VC clad in blue uniforms debarked at Ho Tram. All are North Vietnamese, aged 19 to 20.

II. Comments:

From above information one can see that VC have and will increase their activities in Camau (An Xuyen) in an effort to create liberation zones in the coastal areas bordering the Bay of Thailand.

VC develop a special interest in these areas because of the following advantages:
Lack of government representation in the areas.

Terrain is favorable to guerilla warfare.

If control can be exercised over these coastal areas VC will have a frontier base from which to launch their feint attacks and divide our forces from the highland (Pleiku, Kontum).

Looking at the present situation one can see clearly the VC intention to take over South Vietnam with the new political tendency of Cambodia leaning to the Communists. Their subversive activities have increasingly accentuated with the hope to thwart our effort to protect the harvest in the past months.

III. Possible Infiltration by Sea

VC will infiltrate into VN from Cambodia via the Bay of Thailand in order to build up their bases in An Xuyen?

1/ Reports on VC movements along the coast of An Xuyen and their infiltration into the Islands of Phu Quoc, Tamassou, Hon Da Bac are confirmed by activities outlined in para I.

2/ Further an infiltration by sea is easy to realize and has many advantages:

Troops can be transported in small groups on boats and this will facilitate the infiltration and help escape our patrols. The time involved in sea transport is less than on land or by river boat. They do not have to travel through areas controlled by our government and infested with intelligence agents. Heavy equipment and material, if transported by sea, will pose no problem.

3/ Out short coming can be exploited:

- Our patrol ships are not sufficient to cover a relatively large bay.

- Navy ships cannot circulate in those swallow zones.

- Ships are easy to spot and therefore the enemy can either escape or destroy incriminating material a/o documents before they are caught.

- Most of our islands in the Thailand Bay are not under strict control by the government, and as a result, will provide ideal refuges or liaison points for VC.

- It is not easy for our ships to single out VC boats merged with the people's fishing boats.

CONCLUSION

As in the coastal area of Central VN, the possibility of VC infiltration
by sea is not to be ignored. If this danger is to be faced we will have much difficulty in spotting their landing points if we do not immediately initiate a "patrol bell" (this means increasing our patrolling facilities) and improve our intelligence net along side the coast.