NAVY SECTION MAAG VIETNAM INSTRUCTION 05400.8

From: Chief Navy Section Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam
To: All Navy Section Advisors

Subj: "Criteria for release of Navy Advisors"

Encl: (1) Copy of subject paper

1. Purpose. The purpose of this instruction is to forward enclosure (1).

2. Discussion. "Criteria for release of Navy Advisors" is a broad statement of Chief Navy Section advisory policy and aims, and is furnished for study and guidance. A copy of enclosure (1) will be furnished to each advisor during his Navy Section indoctrination.

3. Action. All officers will familiarize themselves with the contents of enclosure (1) and will submit from time to time, an evaluation of the need for continuance of advisory billets for which they are responsible. Recommendations for changes to billets will be keyed to enclosure (1).

Copy to:
CHMAAG
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CH A&S DIV MAAG
1. Introduction. Before discussing a phase out of advisors, it is appropriate to look at the reasons the advisors were brought in in the first place. The establishment of an advisory billet, as well as its phase out, is a subjective evaluation. This evaluation is based upon a multitude of matters, some factual and some vague.

a. General considerations. An important general consideration is the size and organization of the Vietnamese Navy. This is a small navy with a small number of personnel (6500) and officers. With such a restrictive number of people, all keyed to individual billets, there is extremely limited flexibility for change. It is probably correct to say that this Navy will never reach a point of equality with an equal force of U.S. Navy ships, simply because the base is small and does not permit the selectivity for particular jobs that exist in a large organization. As long as the VNN organization remains fixed and its missions remain fixed, the Navy can function very well within its small framework. However, any change in organization, and more particularly, any change in assigned missions, is extremely difficult to absorb in such a small "unitized" organization. For the last two years, and extending at least one year into the future, the Vietnamese Navy has been adjusting and readjusting to changes. There have been changes in missions, a great expansion in number of units, facilities, and personnel, and significant changes in organization. A majority of the advisory effort has been directed at assisting the Vietnamese Navy over the bumps in these areas. When stabilization finally occurs, about July 1964, the need for continuous and direct advisory assistance will have decreased considerably.

b. Specific criteria for need for an advisor. In a particular area, the need for an advisor is indicated by many things, the most significant of which are probably the following:

1. Organizational framework and organizational effectiveness.
2. Reputation.
3. Complaints received.
4. The calibre of Vietnamese officers assigned, and the availability of additional and/or replacements.
5. Administrative complexities.
6. The need for information by U.S. forces: by Navy Section to determine the needs; and equally (if not primarily) to obtain the information necessary to keep senior commands informed. The latter is particularly true with respect to the reports required by COMUSNAV in order that progress of the war effort may be followed. In fact, the need for persons at various echelons for the primary purpose of getting at the facts of organization, administration, and operational efficiency is a major consideration in the assignment of advisors.
(7) As sufficient subjective reasons for the need for an advisor are determined, it becomes possible to delineate specific tasks to be performed. These tasks are established in the NAVY SECTION ADVISORY PLAN and they provide the basic foundation upon which the need for advisors is determined.

(8) Other considerations. Subjective evaluations of need for an advisor are supported by known information on the growth of the Navy and easily anticipated training and organizational problems. In May of 1955 the Vietnamese Navy was commissioned with a total of only six officers. Over the first seven years, Navy officer strength increased to 316. In the one year from May 1962 to May 1963, officer strength increased by 200 to a total of 516. In the next nine months, by June of 1964, the officer strength must increase 158 more to the ultimate TO of 674. A considerable amount of assistance in all areas is necessary if the organization is to function effectively while it expands at such a rapid rate. There is a great deal to be done by Navy Section to make the operation go satisfactorily, in addition to and separate from the occasional suggestion to his counterpart that we normally expect an "advisor" to do.

c. Basic functions of advisors. The functions of a new advisor are derived from the considerations expressed above for the need for the advisor. The most important function is to provide assistance, advice and guidance in the improvement of the organization, organizational directives, and administrative processes of a particular unit, all of which make up effective management. The advisor first must draw upon his experience, and especially his IMAGINATION, to recognize and detect areas wherein improvement should be initiated. He then must implement the improvement, just as he must implement directives, instructions, and ideas in any U.S. Navy duty. The people that he has in his "crew" are Vietnamese over whom he does not have command authority. Nevertheless, his duties are the same as if he were in a leadership position in his own service: He must accomplish results through people. These results are those improvements necessary in order that the organization run effectively. They are derived from his intelligence, experience, IMAGINATION, and the guidance he receives from headquarters and from his superiors. The basic guidance for this is given all advisors in the NAVY SECTION ADVISORY PLAN.

2. When is the job done? An advisor is phased out when the job is done. In any area of Naval activity, the advisory job can be considered completed when the following conditions have been met:

a. All operational commitments reliably met.

b. Operational rate consistently high: between 50 and 60% of total units in country effectively employed operationally.

c. When the organization, and the missions, of the particular units have stabilized and can be expected to remain stable for a considerable period. (If the mission or the organization is changed,
then advisory help is needed until it smooths out again.)

d. When adequate VNN officers are available for the particular area in question.

e. When adequate administrative and operational guidance directives are available, in use, and implemented by Vietnamese personnel.

f. When significant problem areas have been satisfactorily improved. These areas are defined in the ADVISORY PLAN and continuously monitored by seniors.

7. When all major required equipments are in place: communications, repair facilities, ships, boats, etc.

h. When reporting on the Vietnamese side is reliable and effective. This reporting must include the information needed by U.S. forces to follow the war, the operational information that senior commanders in VNN require to follow the conduct of operations; and the administrative reports required by administrative seniors in the Vietnamese chain of command to adequately supervise the effort and to detect, on their own, areas for improvement.

Very simply, the advisor's job is finished when the job that he is assigned has become routine. It becomes routine when the above conditions have been met. When the advisor can no longer find reason for further change, there is not much that his counterpart is not effectively doing, and no major problem areas exist, then his job is finished and he must be phased out.

i. A more concrete indicator that the job is done is when the tasks specified in the NAVY ADVISORY PLAN have been accomplished for that area.

j. It has been apparent to Chief Navy Section over the last two months that there has been enormous improvement in the major problem areas of the Vietnamese Navy. It has been most invigorating to watch this improvement. The correction of defects that were causing complaints frustrations, and poor operational effectiveness has involved several steps: Pointing out the area of difficulty, advertising this to Vietnamese officers at all levels, enlisting their aid while we assisted them in staffing necessary directives, and then assisting them in supervision and follow-up until the new procedures had become habit. It might be said that there exists at this time no major vital area in the Vietnamese Navy effort that is in any way comparable to the problems which existed twenty-two months ago. Based upon this generalization, it was determined earlier that a phase-out of advisors was in fact appropriate commencing in the not-too-distant future.
3. Concepts for future phase out. This paper would not be complete without a general concept for future change in the Navy Section advisory effort. Experience and logic indicate that withdrawal of advisors will progress generally from the bottom up: In the more distant future there will be a few senior, experienced advisors to the senior commanders and staff officers of the Vietnamese Navy. We should be able to depend on reports and information on problems coming up through the VN channels. At the present time, we have advisors at both the higher and the lower levels. Lower level advisors will be withdrawn first, leaving those at intermediate levels; then they too will be withdrawn. The need for junior advisors of LT rank is primarily to get the information at the small unit level. The correction of defects occurs through management procedures established at higher levels; not by the juniors at the lowest level. The advisory need is at the level where the thought and planning is done from whence directives are initiated for lower level personnel to carry out. If the directives and planning are satisfactory, there is no question but that the juniors will implement them.

4. Specific phase-out criteria for various functional areas of the Vietnamese Navy.

a. Sea Forces. Within the next nine months, the Sea Forces of the Vietnamese Navy will expand 20%, from 38 to 47 ships. Advisory activity must continue at the current level until about July 1964. This will be, in fact, a reduction in the advisory effort since units and personnel will increase 20% while the advisory numbers remain the same.

b. River Forces. If it were not for the assignment of a new ARVN Division to IV Corps, the recent reorganization of command channels, and particularly, the need for on-scene American personnel to observe and report the progress of the war, the advisory effort in the River Forces could be phased out now. The criteria of paragraph 2. above have been met. Recommendations have been submitted through the chain of command to reduce advisory effort in the River Forces by withdrawing advisors from individual River Groups, and assigning one vice two to the area of each ARVN Division which employs river boats.

c. Junk Force. The advisory effort in the Junk Force must continue at its present level until this organization is well-organized and its operational effectiveness brought up to the 60% level desired. An extreme amount of advisory assistance is necessary to provide the required facilities and operational concepts, and to gather information on problems and difficulties that need correction as this new concept of a military force develops. It is expected that the majority of these matters will have been accomplished during the next twelve months, at which time the junior and technical advisors can be expected to phase-out.

d. Shipyard. The level of advisory assistance must continue in the Shipyard until the number of Vietnamese workers has been brought up to strength: perhaps over the next nine months. The amount of advisory
assistance is also keyed to the increase in forces of the Vietnamese Navy because of increasing Shipyard work-load due to increasing forces. They should not be withdrawn until the Sea Force and River Force have stabilized.

e. **Supply Center.** About one-half of the current level (12) of advisory strength at the Naval Supply Center is engaged continually in U.S.-only effort. This is the receipt and turn-over of MAP materials to the Vietnamese Navy, and the processing of requisitions for MAP material to support the Navy. These advisors must continue as long as military assistance is provided the Navy. The other half of the advisory team is involved in developing doctrine and procedures through which the Vietnamese may operate their supply center by themselves. Their new supply manual was promulgated in only the Spring of this year. Advisors are to assist the Vietnamese in understanding and implementing, for a reasonable period, the directives of this manual. Reduction of advisors in this area must also be keyed to the build-up of personnel on the Vietnamese side. As the NSC TO is brought up to strength, fewer advisors are needed. At the present time, an officer of greater experience than a LT is required.

f. **Marine Corps.** Marine advisors will begin phasing out during the Spring of 1964. The phase-out here is gauged to the operational competence of the new VMCJ units established during the past year, providing no change in mission occurs.

g. **Headquarters Staff.** Advisors to the Vietnamese Navy Headquarters Staff should be the last to leave. Rather than sending home advisors as they are phased out of particular billets in the operating forces, it is appropriate that some of these should be phased into new billets at Naval Headquarters to cover a greater range of the operating forces, and to provide specialized Navy experience and advisory guidance for broad areas.

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