"ARM THE REVOLUTIONARY MASSES AND BUILD THE PEOPLE'S ARMY"

By General Võ Nguyên Giáp

Part IV

Arm the Revolutionary Masses Strongly and Widely
And Build a Regular, Modern People's Armed Forces

Introduction

The peculiar fashion in which the previous installments of General Giáp's lengthy essay were published was recounted in the introductions to the first two parts of this issue of Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes. Part III was printed in the April issue of Học Tạp, the Viet-Nam Workers' Party's theoretical organ. Nothing more was heard of the essay until September 23 when Quân Đội Nhân Dân the daily newspaper of the Viet-Nam People's Army (VPA) began printing Part IV, which is reproduced here. Publication was completed by Quân Đội Nhân Dân on September 28.

Although the article was completely written by December 1971 when its first installment was published, or so Tạp Chí Quân Đội Nhân Dân implied at the time, Part III which appeared after the Viet-Nam People's Army had invaded the South showed signs of having been hastily put together. Part IV is more coherent, but the reader will note internal evidence of its having been revised since March 30 despite a footnote which asserts it was written in March. That it represents the views of the VWP Politburo and Central Military Affairs Party Committee may be assumed. Unlike the earlier installments, it was published in the relatively widely circulated daily Quân Đội Nhân Dân rather than in the theoretical journals which published the first three sections.

The central theme of Part IV is its recognition of the necessity for modernizing the VPA. Giáp notes (pages 3 & 4) that the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam (ARVN) is now the
VPA's "concrete combat target" and that it has been
"organized, equipped and trained by the Americans, with
their many modern weapons and war means supplied by
the Americans, with their modern military branches and
services."

Giap is confident that after Viet-Nam has been unified
under the VWP's leadership it "will become a wealthy and
powerful country" (page 5) of 50-70 million people, entirely
capable of supporting the thoroughly modernized, high techno-
logy, armed forces which he envisions. Meanwhile "to fulfill
the historic obligation of completely defeating the U.S. aggres-
sors, our people must have very large and strong political
forces and very large and strong armed forces to strengthen
comprehensively the political, economic and national defense
might of our country. We must hold fast to the Party's policy
of arming all our people and make every effort to develop the
masses' armed forces very strongly and broadly along with
intensively building a tremendously large and strong people's
army and mobilizing and developing our people's forces to the
highest degree on the military front so as, together with all
our people, to defeat the enemy under all circumstances."
Throughout the article Giap stresses the importance of simul-
taneously building "the people's army"--the VPA's regular
divisions--and the "mass armed forces."

It is, of course, the regular army that must be converted
into "a highly modern army consisting of a modern ground
force, a modern air force, and a modern naval force" (page 13)....
Relying on the ever increasing momentum of the building of
socialism in our country and at the same time making the
fullest use of the assistance by the fraternal countries of the
socialist camp and the latest scientific and technological achieve-
ments in the world, our Party and people are determined to
strive to continue building the people's army into a very power-
ful force with an invincible fighting strength...." (page 14).

Nonetheless the VPA will "forever be a truly revolutionary
army of the people," says Giap, who devoted several pages to
explaining the "dialectical unity" between "the material and
technical factors" and the "political and spiritual factors."
This "dialectical unity" is in fact guaranteed, as Giap notes,
by the Party's "correct leadership" of the army.
"Our Party has gained extensive experiences in building the army politically and ideologically, and in building an army that consists mainly of the infantry, and that has a given number of armed branches. Our Party is advancing towards solving satisfactorily problems arising from the building and development, for the present and the future, of regular and modern people's army that consists of many armed services and branches," in Giáp's opinion (pages 19 and 20). Battle-field experience however, in the first six months of the VPA's 1972 invasion of South Viet-Nam indicates that the Party has not "advanced" very far toward solving the problems of the more complex armed forces that it now leads. One of the key factors in the VPA's failure to obtain any of its principal military objectives was its inability to coordinate the use of its recently expanded armored units with the movements of its infantry.

Giáp next addresses the problem of "regularization," by which he means the "implementation of the army's unity in the organizational field based on the systems, ordinances, and statutes... bringing all the army's activities into a uniform pattern, improving its organizational, concentrating and scientific characteristics, and achieving unanimous and resolute actions and close coordination among all parts of the army in warfare," (pages 19 and 20). His implication seems to be that in the VPA, with its units directed by political officers and Party committees as well as by their military commanders, there is not sufficient uniformity of practice. The remedy he proposes is "the building of an increasingly better systems, order and regulation net-work to serve as a basis for stepping up regularizing in the future." (page 22).

Improved discipline is a part of "regularization." After paying tribute to his army's tradition of "revolutionary discipline", Giáp admits that it "does not only have strongpoints." After all, the VPA is the product of "an agriculturally backward country which has just begun to build socialism, where the old traces of small-scale production have had a very great impact on all human and social activities." Furthermore the army itself was expanded rapidly and has experienced both "protracted revolutionary war" and "conventional war" operating on "different battlefields... for many decades under
difficult conditions." Therefore it still does not have "a very rigorous military discipline consistent with new developments in the fields of organization and equipment..." (page 24).

"Regularization", Giap thinks, will make it possible to "harmonize...the relations between centralization and democracy, between the Party committees' leadership and the role of commanders, and the unity between cadres and combatants and between upper and lower echelons", assuming that the VPA continues "to link the ideological task closely to the organizational task." In other words "regularization" will narrow the range of topics on which Party committees make the decisions.

Giap then devotes several pages directly to the modernization of the VPA: "To speak of modernization is to speak of constant improvement of equipment and techniques for the army, development of technical branches and services, and improvement of our cadres' and combatants' knowledge of the use of new weapons and war equipment....Relying on the achievements of the technical revolution in socialist building in our North in past years, and thanks to the help of fraternal countries in the socialist camp, today our army has a material and technical base stronger than ever before."

Even so, Giap recognizes, "our army's level of modernization is not yet high," and that to obtain a truly modern army North Viet-Nam must build "a system of national defense industry and a system of communications suitable to our army's combat demands...on the basis of coordinating national defense requirements closely with economic requirements..." (page 27). He does not, however, discuss the destructive impact that the 1972 war has had upon North Viet-Nam's capacity to develop the kind of industrial and communications network which he knows is essential for the support of a modern army.

The "local forces" must be developed as well as the regular army, Giap continues. They too must be "regularized" but not "uniformly" in localities with differing needs and capacities.

Cadre training also receives attention. Cadres of the future VPA must be proficient in the skills a modern army
requires and at the same time must be "absolutely loyal to
the Party, the revolutionary undertaking of the proletariat,
and the communist ideal." (page 33). Giap implies that
promotions have not been granted frequently enough to "young
cadres who have matured in combat and work, who possess
revolutionary qualities and abilities, whose future is promising
and who can serve in the army for a long time." (page 35).
He notes (page 42) that in some cases assignment of groups
of men to the part-time local forces has taken advantage of
their civilian skills, but suggests that since 1968 this policy
has not been followed widely.

There is an indication in Giap's article that the complicated
system of recruitment for the VPA, which combines exhortation
with the assignment of quotas to villages, may soon be altered.
(page 39). "We advocate universal military training to enable
all strata of our people regardless of age and sex to receive
necessary, appropriate military preparations to fulfill the
aspiration to participate in fighting the aggressors and defend­
ing the country. We are determined that when the aggressors
recklessly wage a comprehensive war of aggression against
our country they will encounter counterattacks, not by a few
hundreds of thousands or a few millions but by tens of millions
of people, that is, all our people from the mountains to the
cities will simultaneously stand firm in their localities and
closely coordinate with the people's army to counterattack
them everywhere in every way and with all kinds of weapons."

This was not the first hint in September 1972 that the
Party-army leadership in Hanoi was rethinking its recruitment
procedures. Nhân Dân, the Party's daily, on September 4
called upon local Party organizations to devote more attention
to increasing the number of people in the regional forces
"while reserving the best combatants--the young and healthy
ones--for the regular army". The army's paper, Quản Đội
Nhân Dân the next day remarked that the management, training
and ideological indoctrination of the local forces was deficient
in a number of places. Maj. Gen. Lê Hiền Mai, deputy director
of the army's General Political Directorate and an alternate
member of the VWP Central Committee wrote a long article
in Tạp Chí Quản Đội Nhân Dân's August issue which was
broadcast on September 10. In it he advocated the mobili­
zation of all the people for both production and combat support
tasks. On October 9 Quán Đội Nhân Dân printed a Council of Ministers decree establishing allowances for militiamen and reserves when on either training exercises or active duty away from home. Militia units sent outside their home provinces were to come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. No formal announcement was made during September or the first half of October 1972 that a change in policy had been made but the publication of the Giáp and Mäl articles suggests that one is in the making.

Meanwhile, Giáp, while acknowledging (page 42) that the local forces must continue to make do with "rudimentary" weapons for the most part, he wants them to "step up the building and development of specialized cells, teams and units having the characteristics of various armed branches." They have, he asserts, done so to a limited degree, citing particularly anti-aircraft detachments. He pleads too for more "military study within the Party", and the enrollment of demobilized armymen in the reserve formations, and their assignments to jobs which will utilize their army-taught skills (page 46).

Finally, the Defense Minister cites as "a distinctive feature of Vietnamese military ideology" the principle of "Arming all the people, combining the people's army with the mass armed forces and conversely using the mass armed forces as the basis of the people's army, using the people's army as the core of the mass armed forces, and developing the three troop categories of the people's armed forces". This he says "we must firmly abide by under all circumstances."

Prior to Quán Đội Nhân Dân's publication of the article which follows, it announced that Giáp has written two more "treatises." One is entitled "Victory of the People's War Against the War of Destruction in the Towns and Industrial Centers of Socialist North Viet-Nam", the other "People's War on the River and Sea Battlefield." Both are published by the army's printing house. Neither have as yet been serialized by the press or broadcast. The publication notice, however, implies that both picture the war in which North Viet-Nam was engaged in September 1972 as a defensive war. It may be that the first title particularly throws additional light on Giáp's thinking about the further militarization of the DRV. Should the articles become available they will be reprinted in this series.
As was suggested in *Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes* No. 107 "Bases of Power in the DRV" the continuance of "main force" war by North Viet-Nam will almost certainly increase the influence of the military in the DRV's power mix.
"ARM THE REVOLUTIONARY MASSES AND BUILD THE PEOPLE'S ARMY"

PART IV: ARM THE REVOLUTIONARY MASSES STRONGLY AND WIDELY AND BUILD A REGULAR, MODERN PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES

by General Vo Nguyen Giap

[Hanoi Quan Doi Nhan Dan in Vietnamese 23 Sept. 1972 pp. 1, 3]

(Quan Doi Nhan Dan editorial note: Recently General Vo Nguyen Giap wrote an important article entitled "Arm the Revolutionary Masses and Build the People's Army." The article consists of four parts:

(Part 1: Marxist-Leninist theory on military organization of the proletariat.

(Part 2: Our people's traditions and experiences in building armed forces in the past.

(Part 3: Our Party's and people's creativity in arming the revolutionary masses and building the people's armed forces in the past 40 years.

(Part 4: Arm the revolutionary masses strongly and widely and build a regular, modern people's armed forces.

(The text of this article has been published in recent issues of Hoc Tap and Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan.

(Beginning with this issue, we introduce to our readers Part 4 of this article.)

We have studied Marxist-Leninist theory on the military organization of the proletariat in the struggle to achieve the proletarian dictatorship and to protect the socialist state. We have pointed out our ancestors' traditions and experiences in building the armed forces in our national uprisings and national wars. We have also analyzed our Party and people's creativity in arming the revolutionary masses and building the people's army in the armed uprisings and revolutionary wars in our country in the past several decades. We then derived the law governing the
organization of our people's revolutionary armed forces in the present struggle to oppose colonialist domination and the imperialist war of aggression in order to attain the revolutionary objectives set forth by our Party: independence, freedom and socialism.

A clear understanding and realistic application of this law to the new conditions will help determine the trend of development of the people's armed forces in order to fulfill our people's present historic mission of completely defeating the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen. This is also of great significance for the building of our people's revolutionary armed forces in both parts of our country in order to protect the socialist North and the independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral South in the future as well as to defend, in the long range, our unified fatherland from any war of aggression that may be waged by the imperialist enemies.

In both parts of our country our people's anti-U.S. national salvation resistance has achieved great victories and is entering a decisive period.

On the southern battlefield, though seriously defeated in the military and political fields, the Nixon administration has for the past many years stubbornly continued the "Vietnamized" war strategy. Along with pulling out most U.S. combat units, the U.S. imperialists have extensively tried to strengthen the puppet troops so they can replace the American troops in South Viet-Nam and assume part of the fighting in Indochina under U.S. command. The enemy has stepped up the "pacification plan," conducted people-herding sweeps and has established a dense network of posts and forts in an attempt to turn the South into a huge concentration camp in order to control our compatriots, destroy the revolutionary bases and seize manpower and material resources to serve his neocolonialist war of aggression. The enemy has tried to maintain the Nguyễn Văn Thiệu fascist lackey clique and has ruthlessly stamped out the southern people's aspirations for peace, independence, neutrality, national concord, freedom, democracy and improvement of the living conditions.

In the North the enemy has stubbornly continued his acts of war by repeatedly sending aircraft to fly reconnaissance missions and to bomb and strafe many populated areas, perpetrating more
crimes against our compatriots. Nixon and Laird also insolently threatened to use the air and naval forces to resume the war of destruction in order to prevent the vast rear base from assisting the great frontline, destroy the socialist North's economic and military potential and shake our people's determination to fight.

In Laos the enemy has intensified the "Special War" by sending aircraft to carry out extermination bombings of the Lao liberated area, by stepping up the "Laoization" plan and by introducing more Thai troops into Laos to rescue the heavily defeated Vientiane puppet troops and the Vang Pao bandits and to collaborate with them in launching counterattacks to ward off the offensive of the Lao revolution.

In Cambodia the enemy has carried out the insidious "Khmerization" plan, infused a breath of life into the Phnom Penh puppet administration, strengthened the puppet army, carried out "pacification" activities with a view to herding the people and has used the U.S. air force to support the Phnom Penh puppet troops in their criminal operations to oppose the Cambodian people. The Nixon administration also forced the reactionary Thai administration to send Thai troops to Cambodia to oppose the Khmer people.

It is clear that despite their losing posture, the U.S. aggressors still maintain the wicked intention of invading our country, are stubbornly prolonging and expanding the war to maintain the yoke of neocolonialist domination over the South and are implementing their role of an international gendarme in Southeast Asia by the so-called "sharing responsibility" under the "Nixon Doctrine," whose real nature is to exploit the bones and blood of others fighting in the place of the Americans with U.S. weapons and money for the filthy interests of the U.S. monopolistic capitalist cliques. Therefore our aggressor enemy is still U.S. imperialism, but the concrete combat target of our people, of the peoples in the three Indochinese countries on the battlefield, has undergone many changes. In the present phase of the "Vietnamization" strategy, the puppet forces, lackeys of the Americans, organized, equipped and trained by the Americans, with their many modern weapons and war means supplied by the Americans, with their modern military branches
and services, with the combat coordination of U.S. air and naval forces and with U.S. logistical support, have gradually become the key strategic force of the war of aggression and the key combat target of the revolutionary war. The U.S. imperialists have also tried to develop the might of their modern air and naval forces to attack the northern part of our country (Footnote: article written in March 1972).

With such a concrete combat target, all the people of our country are determined to defeat the war of aggression of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen. The PLAF in the South is facing the duty of coordinating with the masses' political forces in destroying and disintegrating the Saigon puppet forces—the "backbone" of the strategy of "Vietnamization" of the war—and at the same time smashing the "pacification plan"—the human and material base of this strategy. Our people's armed forces in the North must defeat the U.S. air and naval attacks, must stand ready to smash all of the U.S. imperialists' frenzied military adventure steps, must firmly and steadily protect the socialist North and must contribute toward fulfilling the great rear's duty to the great frontline. Our people have the duty to coordinate closely with the peoples of fraternal Laos and Cambodia to defeat the formula of "lackey reactionary military forces plus U.S. air power "of the Nixon Doctrine on the Indochinese battlefields.

On the path of continuing the socialist revolution and the building of socialism in the North, of carrying out the people's national and democratic revolution in the South and of advancing toward peace and national reunification, our people's struggle will have to endure still many tense and complex phases, but it will certainly succeed. The military organization of our people must not only respond to the urgent short-term duties but must also respond to all duties under all circumstances in the revolution's steps of advance, even after the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys have been defeated. The people's armed forces in the North must have adequate strength to protect the socialist North, must smash all acts of aggression and sabotage by imperialism and its lackeys, must act as a sharp tool of the proletarian dictatorship, must insure the building of a really firm and strong North in all aspects and must serve as a firm and steady basis
of the struggle for national unification. The liberation armed forces in the South must be strong enough to protect the revolutionary results already achieved, must firmly maintain the independence and neutrality of the South, must defeat all schemes of the imperialists and the reactionaries, must contribute toward advancing the revolution continuously and must build a peaceful, independent, unified, democratic, prosperous and strong Viet-Nam.

Because our country is situated in an area that has a very important strategic position in Southeast Asia, as mentioned in the first part, it has been an objective of aggression by many cruel enemies for countless generations. For only tens of years in the recent past, as many as three imperialisms have succeeded one another in invading our country. Even after the U.S. imperialists have been defeated, world imperialism will not run out of odious schemes against our country. Our nation is very eager for independence and freedom and loves and longs for peace to build the country and improve the people's living standards in all aspects. However, we must always stay very vigilant. We must always be firm and strong in the political, economic and national defense fields, must closely combine the building of the economy with the consolidation of national defense and must, under all circumstances, have a strong national defense system--with massive armed forces consisting of a strong permanent army and the armed forces of the numerous masses--to protect the people's labor movement for peace and to stand ready to conduct war victoriously to protect the fatherland against all enemy aggressors, protect the state administration and resist internal subversive elements.

On a long-term basis, after our country is unified it will undergo very great changes. Viet-Nam will become a wealthy and powerful country with modern industry, modern agriculture, advanced culture and science and a population of 50-70 million in the coming decades. Our people have sufficient bases for building a firm and strong national defense foundation and advancing the undertaking of building the people's army and arming the revolutionary masses to a new degree, thus having sufficient strength to protect the country and defeat any imperialist aggressor enemy.
If a war to protect the fatherland were to break out at present or in the future, it would be a just war of self-defense on our own territory. Therefore it would develop the strength of our entire people, our entire country, our entire nation to the highest degree in order to defeat the enemy. A number of conditions and circumstances, under which any future such war might break out would be similar to those today—for instance, the situation in which a small force fights a large force, geographic conditions and so forth. Because usually the enemy who dares invade our country must have larger and stronger forces than ours, the balance of forces between us and the enemy may vary, but the situation in which a small force fights a large force will remain unchanged. As for geographic conditions, although these are always being altered by our people's industrious hands, they generally will remain almost unchanged for a long time. If a future war to protect the fatherland breaks out, it will be developed under the geographic conditions of our country, which is a tiny, long country, mostly composed of jungles and mountains, split by many rivers and which has thousands of kilometers of coast line and a tropical climate.

All this permits us to conclude that we can inherit, use and develop many experiences from past wars to protect the fatherland, experiences from uprisings and liberation wars and the present and previous experiences in military organization in conformity with the new conditions and circumstances in order to build the all-people national defense foundation and to build the people's armed forces of the socialist North, the independent and neutral South and the unified Viet-Nam of the future. If a war to protect the fatherland breaks out in our country, it will be a highly developed people's war and the people's armed forces in our nation will develop tremendously and comprehensively in terms of personnel strength, the degree of comprehensive development of the ranks of cadres and combatants, the degree of equipment and technology, the organizational degree, combat methods and combat strength.

At present, to fulfill the historic obligation of completely defeating the U.S. aggressors, our people must have very large and strong political forces and very large and strong armed forces to strengthen comprehensively the political, economic and national
defense might of our country. We must hold fast to the Party's policy of arming all our people and make every effort to develop the masses' armed forces very strongly and broadly, along with intensively building a tremendously large and strong people's army and mobilizing and developing our people's forces to the highest degree on the military front so as, together with all our people, to defeat the enemy under all circumstances.

In the South, implementing the military struggle and political struggle guidelines simultaneously in order to defeat the U.S. "Vietnamization" strategy, the southern armed forces and people are vigorously developing the comprehensive offensive posture of the revolutionary war, closely combining armed struggle with political struggle, combining offensives with uprisings and concentrated combat with guerrilla warfare and annihilating the enemy along with gaining the right to ownership for the people, expanding it in all the three strategic areas, engaging in combat along with developing their military and political forces, positively expanding and consolidating the liberated areas and becoming stronger the more they fight.

As pointed out by the PRGRSV and the southern liberation armed forces' high command, to develop the masses' armed forces very strongly and broadly along with building a tremendously large and strong liberation army and strengthening the liberation armed forces' three troop categories are the basic contents of the undertaking of strengthening the present revolutionary armed forces in the South.

The Americans and puppets have retreated into a strategically defensive position on the battlefield. Through a tyrannical repressive and coercive apparatus from the central level to the local level, they have implemented an extremely barbarous fascist policy against our compatriots. Under these circumstances the southern people, relying on the people's continuously developed and increased political forces, have endeavored to outstandingly develop the mass armed forces throughout the three strategic areas.
forces and defeat the "Vietnamization" strategy militarily. The need to develop the mass armed forces is also closely linked with the need to accelerate the masses' offensive and uprising movement, conduct a three-pronged offensive against the enemy and smash his "pacification" program. The mass armed forces and guerrilla warfare—in which the regional troops play a core role and which are closely coordinated with the political forces—must successfully maintain firm footholds and fight the enemy on the spot with creative and flexible methods. The mass armed forces and guerrilla warfare must maul or annihilate the enemy very extensively, disperse him, pin him down and encircle and split him up, launch surprise raids against his vital positions, attack and destroy his rear service installations, cut his communications lines and land and along waterways and contribute to thwarting his combat maneuvers. The mass armed forces and guerrilla warfare must thwart the enemy's people-herding sweeps, protect our own political bases, annihilate or disintegrate the coercive apparatus of the village-hamlet puppet administration and the reactionary local armed forces and wreck the enemy military post network. The mass armed forces and guerrilla warfare must firmly maintain and comprehensively strengthen the resistance's potential and frustrate the U.S. imperialists' insidious scheme to "use Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese and use war to support war."

In the protracted revolutionary struggle of our people in the South, the mass armed forces have increasingly played an extremely important role in the revolution's advance. The masses' armed organizations exist anywhere the people's political bases exist. Relying on the revolution's political forces, which have developed ever more extensively on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, the southern people have strenuously strengthened the mass armed forces quantitatively, qualitatively and in line with appropriate organizational forms, have brought into existence armed forces fighting the enemy throughout the South—from the mountain areas to the delta, from the rural areas to the urban areas and from the liberated areas to the temporarily enemy-occupied areas—and have transformed the masses' political forces into a tremendous strength in each locality and throughout the battlefield.
Relying on the people's political forces and the mass armed forces, the southern armed forces and people have striven to build and develop the liberation army into a really big and powerful army. The need to intensively build the liberation army, including the main-force and regional troops, is closely linked with the need to step up the military struggle and simultaneously develop conventional and guerrilla warfare with a view to defeating enemy troops militarily and, in coordination with the political struggle, advancing the resistance to final victory.

The liberation main-force units have been developed quantitatively. Specifically, their quality and equipment have been improved. With necessary armed branches and powerful reserve forces, the liberation armed forces have gained high mobility, have been provided with adequate rear service and material and technical facilities and have become increasingly well versed in combat involving coordination among various armed branches on different scales and in different areas of activity. On the southern battlefield conventional combat has increasingly developed, has gained increasing strength, has been performed on an ever extending scale and has achieved increasing efficiency. The liberation main-force units have annihilated a substantial part of the Saigon puppet main-force troops by wiping out major puppet main-force units, have breached the enemy's defense lines, have foiled his combat measures, have enlarged the liberated areas and have won increasingly great victories. The liberation main-force units' great victories in defeating the puppet main-force units have exerted a very vigorous and adverse impact on the combat morale and organization of all the puppet armed forces and the entire puppet administration, have directed a strong blow at the U.S. imperialists' aggressive determination, have effectively supported guerrilla warfare, the political struggle and the mass uprising movement, have created tremendous possibilities for proselyting among the enemy's military and civilian personnel and have contributed significantly to changing the balance of forces and the war situation increasingly in our favor.

The liberation army local units are being developed to become mature and strong enough to serve alongside the militia and guerrilla units as the nucleus of the local people's war, to develop guerrilla warfare and the mass uprising movement to a
higher level, to smash the U.S. -puppets' "pacification" program and to coordinate effectively with the main force army in large-scale battles to defeat the "Vietnamization" strategy militarily. The local army units are being built in this direction: each district, province or city must possess a number of army units that are appropriately organized and that have a high combat ability and necessary technical units that can carry out many combat tactics proficiently. The local troops must be strong and well trained. They must fight well and motivate the people to operate in a concentrated or scattered manner to become thereby a strong offensive force of the local people's war. In close coordination with militiamen and guerrillas, many local army units in South Viet-Nam have neatly annihilated many civil guard and militia units, destroyed series of posts and camps, demolished series of strategic hamlets and people-herding centers, strongly supported the masses' political struggles and uprisings and effectively cooperated with the liberation main force troops in local battles.

On the South Viet-Nam battlefield, many provinces and localities have grasped the people's war line and the line of arming the entire people. By applying these lines resolutely and creatively, they have built not only broad and steadfast political forces but also strong local armed forces, including large numbers of strong militiamen and guerrillas and strong local troops who have a great combat strength and can fight the local enemy troops through good combat tactics. For this reason, they have stepped up the local people's war and advanced the offensive and uprising movement by new steps. They have gradually frustrated the enemy's "pacification" scheme, bankrupted his people-herding, pressganging and troop-upgrading schemes and maintained and developed the revolutionary forces in every respect.

Realities of the southern revolutionary war reveal that the popular masses are a steadfast basis of the entire revolutionary undertaking, while the masses' political forces are a solid foundation of the armed forces, and the masses' armed forces are a steadfast basis of the revolutionary army. For this reason, to secure powerful forces for the revolutionary war and to fully develop the great strength of people's war, it is necessary to build a political army of the revolution and on this basis build the people's armed forces, including the masses' armed forces and revolutionary troops, to develop the three troop categories in a balanced manner, to deploy the three troop categories
in a strategic offensive position on all battlefields and to closely coordinate concentrated combat with guerrilla warfare and the armed struggle with the political and troop-proselyting struggles. In this way we can create the greatest combined strength to annihilate and disintegrate the enemy army, smash the "pacification" program, defeat the "Vietnamization" strategy and advance toward defeating completely the U.S. imperialists' aggressive war.

In particular, because the U.S. imperialists have shifted to the "Vietnamization" strategy, carried out their shrewd plot to "use Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese" and tried to build a puppet army, including the main and local forces, serving as a tool to continue their aggressive war, the problem of grasping the rules on organizing the people's armed forces assumes a very important significance.

If we have a strong political force, we must have a strong armed force. If we have the strong and broad armed forces of the masses, we must have a seasoned liberation army with high quality and adequate numerical strength. If we have large and strong self-defense, militia forces and strong local troops to form strong, broad local forces, we must also have a very strong and mobile main force. If the two forces and the three troop categories coordinate closely, operate harmoniously, develop fully their strategic role in the revolutionary war and step up the armed and political struggles and the conventional and guerrilla warfares to a high level, our southern compatriots and combatants will surely defeat the puppet army, topple the puppet administration, frustrate the "Vietnamization strategy" completely and advance the anti-U.S. national salvation undertaking to final victory.

While persisting in prolonging the war of aggression in the South and expanding the war throughout Indochina, the Nixon administration has unceasingly intensified its war acts against the northern part of our country. It has concocted many insidious short-and long-term schemes against the socialist North, the great rear of the great frontline and the firm and solid base of the nationwide revolution. We must therefore constantly concern ourselves with developing the northern people's armed forces so that they, together with all the people, completely defeat the U.S. aggressors in order to firmly protect the socialist North at present as well as in the long run.
The North must be comprehensively powerful and firm politically, economically and in national defense. We must therefore intensively accelerate the socialist revolution and socialist construction, unceasingly heighten political and moral unanimity among the people, carry out economic and cultural construction and development and thereby consolidate and strengthen the all-people's national defense and closely coordinate economic development and national defense. Only by achieving a strong economy, which embodies the central economy and the local economy, can we have a strong national defense and wage people's warfare on a national scale as well as in each locality. It is necessary to work out combat readiness plans and ready the country in all respects to constantly hold the initiative under all circumstances.

To satisfactorily carry out the task of strengthening our people's armed forces in the North, we must know how to apply and develop all our people's experiences, as analyzed in Part 2, especially the experiences gained by our Party in the protracted revolutionary struggle, as analyzed in Part 3. These experiences include those gained in the August general uprising, in the resistance against the French colonialists and in the years of peaceful construction, the fresh experiences gained by the northern armed forces and people in the years of resistance against the war of destruction, and the extensive experiences gained by our compatriots and combatants in the South in waging the people's war against the U.S. imperialist war of aggression. We must, under all circumstances, firmly grasp the following rules governing the building of our people's military organizations: Arming all the people and simultaneously arming the revolutionary masses and building the people's army, and coordinating the people's army with the mass armed forces and vice versa.

We must positively build the people's regular and modern army and, at the same time, intensively develop strong and widespread mass armed forces and strengthen the three troop categories of the people's armed forces—the main-force units, regional troops and militia and self-defense forces. It is necessary to continue to consolidate the people's armed security forces. We must have both really strong regular combat forces and really powerful reserve forces. We must continue to satisfactorily implement the state's policies and statutes governing the building
and development of the people's armed forces and the consolidation of all people's national defense. We must at the same time continue to supplement and perfect these policies and statutes in accordance with future national development. Special importance must be attached to developing the cadre corps, which plays a core role in the building and development of the armed forces and in consolidation of national defense. We must gradually strengthen the armed forces' material, technical and rear service bases throughout the North and in each locality.

First of all it is necessary to continue to step up the development of our army into a new-type revolutionary army that actually belongs to the people and into a regular army that is modernized in accordance with our country's conditions and that plays a key role in all the people's military organizations to steadfastly protect our revolutionary achievements and our beloved country, defeat all aggressor enemies at present as well as in the long-run and fulfill all combat and production tasks and other tasks assigned by the Party and the people.

As pointed out earlier, the building and development of a regular and modern people's army is fully consistent with Lenin's concept of the building and development of a worker-peasant red army. Our Party pointed out this task in its Central Committee resolution on building the army and consolidation of national defense in 1957 and in the Third Party Congress Resolution in 1960. Realities emerging in the 1954-64 peaceful construction period and from the present anti-U.S. national salvation resistance testify to the complete correctness of these resolutions.

At present and in the near future we must build the people's army into a modern and regular socialist army, consisting of main force troops and local troops with permanent forces having a suitable numerical strength and a very high combat quality and with massive and well-organized and trained rear forces.

Our army must be a truly revolutionary and popular army, and at the same time must be a highly modern army consisting of a modern ground force, a modern air force and a modern naval force.
Our ground force must advance toward having adequate necessary armed branches, having a structure and organizational pattern suitable to its ever-developing combat duty, having strong firepower and attack strength and having high mobility in all topographical and weather conditions in our country, and must develop adequately its role as a force that decides victory on the battlefield.

Our air force must be further strengthened in accordance with the guideline of appropriate quantity and high combat quality and highly creative fighting methods in order to firmly and steadily protect the fatherland's airspace against the air force of any aggressor enemy and coordinate in fighting closely with the ground and naval forces.

Our naval force must be built ever stronger in accordance with the guideline of having adequate quantity and high combat quality, having an ever better organizational structure, having ever more modern equipment, having fighting methods suitable to the river and sea battlefield in our country and being capable of protecting the long shoreline and the thick river network of the fatherland.

Relying on the ever-increasing momentum of the building of socialism in our country, and at the same time making the fullest use of the assistance by the fraternal countries of the socialist camp and the latest scientific and technological achievements in the world, our Party and people are determined to strive to continue building the people's army into a very powerful force with an invincible fighting strength and capable of dealing iron blows, defeating all schemes of aggression by any enemy and protecting firmly and steadily the fatherland's sacred territory, airspace and seas.

Our army must first of all and forever be a truly revolutionary army of the people. This principle is a key problem of the Party's theory on building the army, and we must always maintain a firm grasp on this principle under all circumstances.

The fighting strength of a revolutionary army is the combined strength of the following factors: the degree of revolutionary enlightenment, the cadres' and combatants' fighting spirit, rational
organization and the standard of technical equipment of the army, the combatants' technical and tactical knowledge and the cadres' knowledge of military science and art, leadership and command ability. This strength is a product of the dialectical unity between man and weapons, between politics and technology, between military science and war means and between ideology and organization.

Both reality and theory show that the factors constituting the army's fighting strength play a very important role and have a very close relationship with one another. To create the greatest fighting strength for the army, each factor must be developed most adequately and combined closely with other factors.

Without a fighting spirit, or with a low one, we cannot have a creative revolutionary willpower; nor can we have active combat acts or a basis for development of the material and technical factors and the tactical art. Even though it is well organized, equipped and trained, an army can be defeated easily if its fighting spirit is low. Nonetheless, we cannot defeat the enemy purely with spiritual strength. With a high fighting spirit, but with an inferior standard of technical equipment, an irrational organization of forces or incorrect fighting methods, we will not be able to create a great fighting strength and the spiritual factor will not be developed really adequately to become a great material strength to defeat the enemy on the battlefield.

Lenin once stressed the great effect of the spiritual factor in warfare. He said: "In any war, victory is finally decided by the spiritual state of the masses fighting on the battlefield" (Footnote: Complete Works of Lenin, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1969, Vol. 31, p 165). Lenin also said: "Even the best army and even the men most faithful to the revolutionary undertaking will be quickly destroyed by the enemy unless they are equipped, supplied and trained adequately" (Footnote: Selected Works of Lenin, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1959, Vol. 2, Part 1, p 359).

So, when examining the armed forces' combat strength, we must maintain the dialectical unity of these factors. It is obviously wrong to stress only the material and technical factors
and consider them as decisive while disregarding the political and spiritual factors. On the other hand, it is also incorrect to pay attention only to the spiritual factor and to separate it from the material factor.

In assessing the importance of these factors, we hold that the most basic one is the political or spiritual factor or the troops' awareness of the revolutionary ideal, combat objectives and political objectives of the war, or the fighting spirit of the cadres and combatants. The war, "the masses' awareness of the goal and causes of the war is of great significance and insures its success" (Footnote: Lenin, Complete Works, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1969, Vol. 31, p 165). If they are aware of the interests of their class and the national interests, the cadres and combatants of the revolutionary army are ready to struggle and make sacrifices for independence, freedom and socialism. If they go to battle with a single desire and will to defeat the enemy, they will have extraordinary energy and strength. The history of the struggle and maturity of our armed forces, who have gone from "having nothing" to "having something" and from the position of weakness to the position of strength and defeated the cruelest imperialist aggressors of the era is eloquent proof of this argument of Lenin.

Armed struggle is a form of fiercest class struggle and national struggle. The characteristic of armed struggle is that it is connected with sacrifices and bloodshed. For this reason a revolutionary army must have a steel-like fighting will and high spirit of self-denial for the country. In this way it can stand firm before all trials, overcome all difficulties and trials of the war, develop the power of weapons, apply combat tactics creatively, and give full play to the organizational power to defeat the enemy.

Under our Party's correct leadership, through training and combat in a protracted, hard, and fierce revolutionary struggle, our armed forces have acquired a revolutionary nature, a very beautiful political quality and a very high combat spirit and have strongly manifested the thoughts, sentiments and ethics of the working class, the Vietnamese nation and the era. This is our absolute loyalty to our Party's and people's revolutionary
undertaking. This is our unshakable determination to fight for the fatherland's independence and freedom and "to sacrifice everything rather than lose the country and live as slaves." This is the warm love for the country and socialism and a spirit of genuine proletarian internationalism. This is our determination to fight and win, our will to assault and exterminate the enemy, our brave fighting spirit, our wonderful creativeness and resourcefulness, our sense of solidarity and close coordination and our organizational and disciplinary sense. This is our warm affection for our compatriots and comrades, our deep hatred for the imperialists and their henchmen and our great hate for all oppression and exploitation. This is our high revolutionary vigilance against the plots and maneuvers of all enemies of our class and nation under all circumstances. This political quality and brilliant spirit was described properly by beloved and esteemed Uncle Ho as follows: "Our armed forces are loyal to the Party, faithful to the people and ready to fight and sacrifice for the fatherland's independence and freedom and for the sake of socialism. They can fulfill any task, overcome any difficulty and defeat any enemy." This is the strongest point and a strong motive force in our armed forces' combat strength. This is an extremely valuable capital of our armed forces in our construction undertaking and our struggle at present and in the future. In building our army into a regular, modern army, we are determined to maintain and develop this precious capital and turn these noble qualities into steadfast virtues and beautiful traditions for all generations.

More than ever, faced with the U.S. imperialists' plot to prolong their aggressive war in our country and to expand it to all of Indochina, our armed forces, heightening their spirit of self-denial for the country, must fear no hardships and sacrifices, persist in and step up the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance and fully develop the role, effect and functions of a people's army. Our armed forces are determined to punish the U.S. aggressors appropriately for their military adventures against our country and to fulfill their sacred national duties and their noble international obligations and to fight the U.S. aggressors until complete victory.

To unceasingly enhance the army's revolutionary nature, it is necessary to constantly and firmly grasp and strictly implement
Leninist principles in building the army politically. This has become a fine tradition of our army.

We are consistently and deeply imbued with the Party's absolute, direct and comprehensive leadership over the army and regard this as a most fundamental principle.

We unceasingly consolidate the Party organization system and the political work system and constantly intensify the political task in the army.

We attach importance to disseminating the Party's lines, revolutionary tasks, guidelines and policies, enhancing the army's political enlightenment and consciousness of the nation and social class and heightening the army's determination to fight and win.

We attach importance to thoroughly understanding the Party's military line and ideology and the military science and art of the people's war.

We are active in training a cadre corps that is absolutely loyal to the Party's revolutionary cause and that possesses leadership, command and organizational capabilities.

We advocate extending democracy and intensively upholding strict voluntary discipline and the iron-like discipline of a revolutionary army.

We have satisfactorily built the relationship between the army and the Party, between the army and the revolutionary administration and between the army and the people, the army's internal relationship and the relationship between our army and the armies and peoples of the fraternal countries.

Regarding the Party, our army has consistently demonstrated its absolute confidence in the Party's lines and leadership, has voluntarily complied with the Party's leadership, has strictly implemented all the Party's lines, guidelines and policies and has struggled resolutely to protect all the Party's lines, principles and views and to successfully fulfill all tasks entrusted to it by the Party.
Regarding the revolutionary administration, our army has consistently demonstrated the spirit of respecting and protecting the revolutionary administration, has closely united with state agencies and has strictly implemented all the state's lines, guidelines, policies and laws.

Regarding the people, our cadres and combatants have wholeheartedly served, respected and helped the people, have fought self-denyingly to protect the people's interests and have strictly observed mass discipline.

Regarding the army's internal relationship, our cadres and combatants have brought into full play the spirit of unity, unanimity and single-mindedness at all levels, mutual love and the spirit of sharing weal and woe and sincerely helping one another. Our cadres and combatants have at the same time demonstrated the spirit of submitting themselves to their organizations, strictly implementing all orders, directives and resolutions of higher echelons and implementing all regulations, standing orders, statutes and rules of the army.

Regarding the armies and peoples of fraternal countries, our army has consistently demonstrated a genuine internationalist and proletarian spirit, has feared no sacrifices and hardships, has sincerely united with the fraternal countries' armies and peoples and fought shoulder to shoulder with them against the common enemy and has consistently regarded the fraternal countries' revolutionary cause as our own.

To develop the strength and effectiveness of Party leadership, it is necessary to improve the ability of Party organizations, cadres and Party members in the army to firmly grasp the Party's political and military lines and raise their practical organizational standards. It is also necessary to meet requirements arising from the building and development of a regular and modern people's army with a view to fulfilling all political and military tasks entrusted by the Party. Our Party has gained extensive experiences in building the army politically and ideologically and in building an army that consists mainly of the infantry and that has a given number of armed branches. Our Party is advancing toward solving satisfactorily problems arising from the building
and development, for the present and the future, of regular and modern people's army that consists of many armed services and branches and that is suitable to our country's practical conditions. Therefore, one of the present important tasks is to conduct comprehensive studies with a view to gradually and firmly grasping and correctly applying the development and combat rules of a regular and modern people's army in our country and developing a Vietnamese military science for the defeat of the Americans at present and for long-range defense of the fatherland. We will thereby continue to perfect, develop and materialize the Party's military line and its line for building a regular and modern revolutionary army.

On the basis of improving the army's revolutionary nature, it is necessary to step up the regularization and modernization of the army.

Regularization is the necessary step of all armies when their organization has developed to a certain degree of perfection. It is not just in the present era but occurred even in the past, in our country as well as in many other countries in the world, that the building of a regular army has been set forth and implemented. The more modern an army becomes, the higher its requirements for concentration and unification will become and the more strongly the problem of regularization will be stepped up.

Lenin pointed out that in conditions of fighting against a powerful enemy who might risk an adventure at any time and at a time when the army was using modern technical equipment ever more comprehensively and fighting in accordance with modern fighting methods that required very close and flexible coordination of combat activities, there would never be a unity of wills and acts without a high degree of concentration and unification. Tens of thousands or millions of men operating in a great area cannot quickly change their fighting formulas and methods or action guidelines in accordance with a uniform will that is suitable to the developments in the situation on the battlefield; therefore, combat duties cannot be resolved successfully in modern warfare.

Regularization is implementation of the army's unity in the organizational field based on the systems, ordinances, and statutes with a view to bringing all the army's activities into a uniform
pattern, improving its organizational, concentrating, and scientific characteristics, and achieving unanimous and resolute actions and close coordination among all parts of the army in warfare. Regularization is closely related to the promulgation of systems, ordinances, and statutes and to their implementation.

A revolutionary army can achieve regularization as well as the army of the exploiting class. However, because these two armies have a different political nature, their regularization is also different as regards objectives, content, and method of execution. The regularization of the army of the exploiting class is aimed at serving reactionary political objectives. All systems and orders of this army reflect its counterrevolutionary nature and the unequal relations among its troops, who are forced to observe discipline blindly and mechanically. On the contrary the regularization of a revolutionary army is aimed at serving the noble political objectives of the revolution. All systems and orders of this army reflect its revolutionary nature and its beautiful constructive principles as a new-style army. Its systems, orders, and regulations are implemented on the basis of its cadres' and combatants' political awareness, sense of self-conscious discipline, initiative, and creativeness. Because the regularization of a revolutionary army is achieved on an excellent political basis, this army is stronger than the army of the exploiting class.

In previous years the promulgation, amendment, and improvement of systems, orders, and regulations have had a great effect on the building of our army. The systems regarding military service, service of officers and noncommissioned officers, and military ranks, the orders regarding internal affairs, ranks, police, and discipline and the regulations on the rear services and political and staff tasks have contributed to strengthening the unity of our army, stepping up its regularization, and increasing its combat strength. Basically, all these systems, orders, and regulations properly reflect our army's revolutionary nature and a thorough awareness of the Party's thoughts, military line, military art, and principles regarding the building of our army consistent with the actual conditions of our army and our country. War realities help us make necessary improvements and remedy the irrational points and provide us numerous experiences in building and improving the orders.
We must base ourselves on the constantly developing situation and building and fighting mission of our army to continue to study and improve these systems, orders, and regulations in order to better serve the mission of stepping up the regularizing of our army at the present time. At the same time we must promote the building of an increasingly better system, order, and regulation network to serve as a basis for stepping up regularizing in the future. This system must advance toward covering activities in all aspects of our army, and must include the following:

--Major systems reflecting our Party and government policies and guidelines concerning the building of our army and strengthening of national defense which have a legal character vis-à-vis our army and people.

--Regulations concerning the organization and equipment of the army and armed services and armed branches, serving as a basis for unifying the organization of the army.

--Orders concerning the internal affairs, ranks, police, and discipline, serving as a basis for the organization of activities of the regulars.

--Combat orders of the army and armed services and armed branches aimed at determining basic fighting methods for the combatants, detachments, and corps.

--Regulations concerning staff, political, rear service, school and branch activities...

We should know that no matter how well established these systems, orders, and regulations are, they cannot cover all practical requirements. Orders can only set forth a basic trend for the activities of our army, but cannot solve all problems at every place and time. Therefore, while upholding correct implementation of these orders we must constantly develop the creativeness and resourcefulness of the cadres and combatants and avoid stereotyped and mechanical applications.

The content of these orders reflects the experiences and building and fighting requirements of our army in a fixed period
of time and under definite conditions. The building and combat realities of our army and its abilities in all respects—as well as those of the enemy army—such as military science and military art, are constantly changing. Therefore, orders should be constantly improved and developed so they always have a new vigor and can develop the effects of practical guidance over the activities of the army.

On the basis of gradually improving these systems, orders, and regulations we must continue to step up education and correct implementation of them. Implementation must be based first of all on the organizational ability and discipline observance of the cadres and combatants, and must be gradually stabilized to become a bearing, a new habit, a habit of the working class, which is closely linked with modernized production, but not the habit of small producers linked with the scattered, free way of doing business in handicraft.

In stepping up regularizing, a very important problem is to uphold the organizational and discipline consciousness of the army. Lenin emphasized that building a strict military discipline and the spirit of strictly implementing all orders and regulations is of extremely great importance, necessary to improve the level of regulars and the combat strength of the red army. He also pointed out: "The army must have the strictest discipline" (Footnote: Lenin, Complete Works, Vol 29, p 226, in Russian), and "We must transform the command apparatus, from the highest to the lowest level, into steel-like arms and implement combat orders at all costs." (Footnote: Lenin, Complete Military Works (1917-1920), Military Publishing House, USSR Defense Ministry, 1956, p 30)

Our army's discipline is the self-conscious, strict discipline of the revolutionary army. It reflects the revolutionary nature and ideological and organizational building principles of a working class army. It is a genuine discipline, a new-type discipline, a truly firm discipline that no exploiting class army can have.

In the long process of combat and building, under the leadership of our Party our army has forged a very fine tradition of revolutionary discipline. This tradition of discipline has always been an important contributory factor in our army's
victories. However, with regard to discipline, our army does not have only strongpoints. Our army was born and has grown up in an agriculturally backward country which has just begun building socialism, where the old traces of small-scale production have had a very great impact on all human and social activities. Our army has also matured through the difficulties and hardships of a protracted revolutionary war, has gone from having nothing to having something, from the few to the many, and from guerrilla war to conventional war, has operated on different battlefields, and has fought continuously for many decades under very difficult circumstances.... In such a situation, apart from their fundamental strongpoints, our cadres and combatants also have many thoughts, habits, ways of life, and behavior that are not in accord with rigorous organizational patterns of a modern army. We still do not possess a very rigorous military discipline consistent with new developments in the fields of organization and equipment to meet all our army’s increasingly heavy and complicated combat and construction missions.

Therefore, it is necessary to continue to make our troops understand clearly the role and necessity of discipline in a modern regular army. We must create a vigorous change in the organizational and disciplinary sense and the management of the army to make our entire army implement strictly all systems, orders, and regulations and obey unquestioningly all orders and instructions from higher echelons.

The regularization of our army is the problem of regularizing the people’s army and the revolutionary army. Therefore, in stepping up the regularization of the army it is necessary to harmonize very well the relations between centralization and democracy, between the Party committees’ leadership and the role of commanders, and the unity between cadres and combatants and between upper and lower echelons. It is necessary to link the ideological task closely to the organizational task, the task of educating and motivating closely with the training and managerial task, the sense of awareness with the necessity to fulfill common tasks, and to adopt proper punishment and reward measures. It is necessary to develop our cadres and combatants’ sense of responsibility and spirit of collective ownership regarding control over the implementation of discipline and other systems, orders, and regulations. Our cadres’ exemplary conduct and organizational and managerial capabilities are of great significance in this respect.
Along with regularizing our army we must continue to step up its modernization. The modernization of the army is a necessary requirement to improve our army's combat strength in a situation where our people are engaged in building socialism and have established many material and technical bases for large-scale socialist production. In particular, world science and technology has now developed to a very high degree. As a result, this has constantly brought about many great and rapid changes in the equipment and techniques of all armies in the world. Modernization will insure that our army possesses increasingly improved equipment and techniques in order to cope successfully with any aggressive enemies.

To speak of modernization is to speak of constant improvement of equipment and techniques for the army, development of technical branches and services, and improvement of our cadres' and combatants' knowledge of the use of new weapons and war equipment. To speak of modernization is also to speak of the establishment of a modern national defense industrial system and the expansion of a modern communications network in order to insure bases for our army to operate in modern war conditions. If our army possesses firm political enlightenment, scientific organizational patterns, and modern equipment and techniques, it must necessarily increase its combat strength outstandingly. The new men of the people's army must possess ardent love of their country, profound socialist enlightenment, high organizational and disciplinary sense, and modern military knowledge.

Relying on the achievements of the technical revolution in socialist building in our North in past years, and thanks to the help of the fraternal countries in the socialist camp, today our army has a material and technical base stronger than ever before. Our infantry is now equipped with very modern weapons. Our armed services and branches from the ground, air, and naval forces to the artillery, air defense, armored, engineer, chemical, signal, and transportation units are now equipped with modern weapons and war means. Together with the development of the services and branches, we have begun to build a system of installations to insure good techniques. Our cadres and combatants have clearly progressed in maintaining steadfastly and in using the modern weapons and means under the concrete conditions on
our country's battlefields. Obviously, compared with the end of the anti-French resistance, our army has now made a big stride on the path of modernization. Its great successes in the anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation are a part of this new development in equipment and techniques.

However, this is but initial progress. Actually, compared with armies of many countries in our camp and in the world, our army's level of modernization is not yet high. There still is an equipment and technical gap between our army and the enemy's. The present anti-U.S. national salvation resistance, as well as our long-range national defense, require that we make great efforts to modernize our army. This is both a duty and an aspiration of our army and people.

We must build a modern army suited to the concrete conditions and best fulfilling the demands of our country's national defense. Therefore we must always be aware of the Party's political lines, economic development lines, and military lines. We must creatively solve the problems of modernizing our army on the basis of the abilities and concrete conditions of our country, our combat objectives and the balance of forces between us and the enemy, the military art of the people's war, and the trends of development of military science and technology in the world...

In the present era a modern army must be an army with many branches and services. Therefore it is necessary to build the branches and services harmoniously and appropriately. At present, as well as in the relatively distant future, we consider the ground forces as the main armed service in the Vietnamese People's Army and consider infantry as the main armed branch and artillery as the main firepower in the ground forces. We will continue to strengthen the air, antiaircraft, and naval forces and the armored, engineer, signal, chemical, and transportation units, build rationally combat armed branches and combat support armed branches, and enable technical armed services and branches to have greater and greater importance in the army's organizational structure and to bring into full play greater and greater combat efficiency in combat involving many armed branches in modern
war. Our army must stand ready to defeat the enemy under conditions where the enemy uses ordinary weapons as well as when he recklessly uses nuclear weapons.

To bring its efficiency in a war into full play, a modern army must insure both satisfactory techniques and satisfactory communications systems. Therefore we must step up the building of a system of national defense industry and a system of communications suitable to our army's combat demands and to our country's practical conditions, on the basis of coordinating national defense requirements closely with economic requirements and coordinating the building of the state rear with building the army's rear organizations.

This network of national defense industries must satisfy the requirements for minor, medium, and major repairs, produce spare parts and goods used to improve the equipment so it can meet tactical requirements, and advance toward turning out a number of types of weapons and means according to its capacity. It is necessary to develop unceasingly the communications network, including land routes, railroads, waterways, and air routes, and to coordinate closely the communications lines of military importance, the communications lines of economic importance, and the central communications lines with the local communications lines in order to satisfy the modern army's need for mobility under all war circumstances.

The regularization of an army is a protracted struggle. It depends on the development of the building of the material and technical bases for socialism. Thus, on the basis of close coordination with the plan for economic and cultural development, there must be an army regularization plan for a relatively long period of time to determine the trend and major objectives as a basis for training cadres, doing scientific and technical research, and achieving basic construction. At the same time there must be a plan for each short period of time to solve the concrete problems and advance the army step by step.

The people's army comprises the main force and local force. As we have analyzed on several occasions, the local force plays an important strategic role in the people's war. For this reason,
in building our people's army we must concentrate on building the main force and the local force simultaneously.

With our Party's correct guidelines, during the years of the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle, our local forces, especially the forces in charge of struggling directly against the U.S. war of destruction such as the air defense, artillery, and engineer forces, have made new progress as regards organization, equipment, combat ability, and command ability. Many provinces, cities, districts, and industrial centers possess antiaircraft artillery units which have downed many U.S. aircraft, ground artillery units which have set ablaze U.S. warships, engineer units which have contributed greatly to insuring local communications and transportation operations, and army units which have quickly annihilated ranger teams and fulfilled their combat tasks. With a new combat strength the local force is making preparations to cooperate with other armed forces and defeat all military adventures of the U.S. imperialists, and to protect the locality steadfastly. It is clear that our local force has now made greater progress in some respects than the main force did during the anti-French resistance. This has contributed to increasing the power of the local people's war. This fact proves the correctness of the policy of strengthening the local force by building necessary armed branches for it, equipping it with modern weapons and war materiel, and turning it gradually into a modern, regular army.

The local army must be built according to the principles and trend for building a people's army. However, because the local army's combat tasks, activities, and combat tactics are different from those of the main force army, and because the local army's activities are connected with the locality, it is necessary to apply properly the principles and trend regarding the building of a people's army.

When building the regional forces, we must know how to base ourselves on each locality's characteristics, military position, and combat task within the scope of the general combat task, the capabilities of each locality in terms of manpower and economic resources, the topographical conditions in each locality, and the forecasts of the enemy situation in each locality. In each province,
city, district, or industrial area the regional forces must be built in accordance with a specific scale, a specific organization and equipment (TO/E), and specific combat methods. This should not be done in exactly the same way as is done in the regular armed forces, nor should it be done uniformly and mechanistically in all localities.

Even when effecting the regularization and modernization of the main forces, we maintain that it is still necessary to pay adequate attention to the characteristics of duties and the combat methods of different forces operating in different areas or on different battlefields, so as to determine appropriately their TO/E and pattern of activities and avoid effecting this plan in a uniform and mechanical manner.

With regard to regularization of the local forces, it is all the more necessary to pay adequate attention to the situation, specific conditions, and specific characteristics of the localities. Regularization must have a realistic content that can at the same time reflect the necessary requirement of concentration and uniformity and the necessary differences among various localities. It is a big mistake to base ourselves on the characteristics of localities to slight the requirement for concentration and uniformity and the spirit of organization and discipline, as well as to neglect the implementation of systems, ordinances, and regulations in the local forces. On the other hand, effecting uniformity and concentration in a duplicate and mechanical manner is also incorrect. While carrying out modernization it is also necessary to determine the specific requirements, learn to use weapons and suitable means, and at the same time know how to combine modern weapons and means with relatively modern or rudimentary one. Experience clearly shows that if weapons are not suitable to a locality they will have no effect despite their high modernity, and that, on the contrary, other types of less modern but more suitable weapons will be able to develop their high effect. Defeating the enemy, playing well the role of a core force—the powerful first of the armed struggle in the localities—and carrying out all duties successfully—these are the purposes of utilization of all principles to build the local forces.

At the present time the provinces as well as the big municipalities and industrial centers in the North cover a relatively
large area with a high population in some cases of as many as 1-2 million each. Along with developing the central economy our Party has set forth the policy of developing the local economy and building the provinces, big municipalities, and industrial centers into ever stronger economic units. It is necessary to combine the economy with national defense on a local basis, build comprehensively firm and strong provinces, municipalities, and industrial centers, and transform them into basic strategic units of the people's war in the localities. The success of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism in each locality, as well as throughout the North, has created and will create many, ever greater capabilities in all aspects for the localities to build and develop the local forces.

Faced with the present requirement of intensifying the local military task aimed at making an important contribution to the defeat of all the military adventure steps by the U.S. imperialists, firmly and steadily protecting the socialist North, and fulfilling the great rear's duty to the great frontline, it is necessary to actively develop the building of the local forces by a new step.

The local force must possess a reasonable permanent force and a well-trained and organized strong reserve force which can be developed rapidly when necessary. There must be strong infantry units and necessary armed branches, equipped with modern weapons and war material and possessing creative fighting methods, a high mobility, and an outstanding combat strength. The local force must be skillful in launching concentrated attacks and in guerrilla warfare, must closely coordinate with the militia and self-defense forces, and must at the same time cooperate with the main force army to exterminate the enemy and protect the locality.

With strong local forces suitable to the local situation and combat requirements, with powerful, broad militia and self-defense forces, and by closely coordinating with the constantly consolidated people's armed security force, the local people's armed forces in the socialist North will have a new vigorous combat strength and the local people's war will have very great capabilities.

To carry out properly the task of building local armed forces in particular and the local military task in general, it is