DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

GGA: HMc:

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Dated: 1st June, 1954.

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FROM:--

Australian Delegation,

GENEVA.

GC150.

TOP SECRET AND GUARD.

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram GC147, 4/5

Indo China.

Eden saw Bidault on 31st May alone. He told him that United Kingdom Ambassador in Paris had reported having been informed by Schuman of considerable progress in the talks between French and Americans about conditions for possible United States intervention. He asked if Bidault could tell him the position.

2. Bidault said he thought this was correct. In response to questions, he said that United States had adapted its requirements in respect of the right of Associated States to secede from the French Union and admitted that American help in the event of failure of Geneva Conference was contemplated to the extent of three American Divisions. He added that he regarded this mainly as distant thunder which might help consider Eden said that Schuman had suggested to United Kingdom Ambassador that when this help came, United Kingdom might participate in it. Eden reminded Bidault that there could be no question of any commitment by the United Kingdom for intervention in Indo China. Bidault said he perfectly understood this.

3. Eden referred to Schuman's suggestion that a warning might be given to the Russians or Chinese that the event of a breakdown, United Kingdom might have to join with America's and French to intervene in Indo China. He added that he could not say this because it would not be true; but that he had warned both the Russians and Chinese in general terms of the consequences of breakdown. Bidault said he knew that had been done and was grateful for the language used.

4. On the subject of the Five Power Talks, Eden said he was troubled by one aspect of the work. He understood that the understanding between the French and Americans was to be examined. Bidault would remember that while all possibilities were to be considered by the Staffs, it was not their duty to concentrate exclusively on this aspect. Bidault agreed, and added that one of the first tasks of the Staff Talks must be to examine action which would have to be taken should an agreement be reached at Geneva. He still felt it difficult to measure the chances of such a result, but hoped that the coming talks between Military representatives at Geneva would show the position more clearly.

5. After more general discussions, Bidault undertook to look through all the reports he had of Paris discussions and let Eden have within a day or two a detailed account of the present state of the French Governments conversations with the United States.
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6. Eden has instructed United Kingdom Ambassador Paris to see Schuman and make sure that he understands United Kingdom position as set out above.

7. Eden has also elaborated to Selwyn Lloyd some of his views on the Five Power Talks. He considers that if the Geneva Conference fails there are various possibilities into China such as:

(a) The French might regroup or go on fighting alone.
(b) They may decide to pull out.
(c) Americans may intervene alone or with others.

He has re-emphasised that C.I.O.S. should ensure that the talks cover other contingencies and courses than failure at Geneva and American intervention. In particular, he has referred to the need to consider security of other neighbouring countries such as Siam.

Prime Minister
Min. for E.A.
Min. for Defence
Mr. A. H. Tange
Mr. A. S. Brown
SIR. F. SHEDDEN.

2nd June, 1954.
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