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REVIEWED, RETAIN CLASSIFICATION
NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1
By: OP-09B92C Date: 9/20/74

COMMANDER TASK FORCE NINETY
and
COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE

OPERATION ORDER
2-54

SECRET

Copy No. 8

Naval Historical Center - Operational Archives
Command File, Post 1 January 1946
Box 141 - PHIBGRP1, Indo-china Op. Order 2-54 Ser: 11 August 1944 - Amphibious Groups
Annex C - "Intelligence" (Pages C-1 through C-14) retains higher classification and has been removed from this Op-Order for adequate security stowage. Appendices to Annex C follow:

I - Aerological Plan

II - Climatology:

Change No. 2
Task Organization (See Annex A for detailed task organization)

90 Amphibious Task Force

a. 90.0 Special Operations Group
   RADM L. S. SABIN
   (COMPHIBGRU 1)

b. 90.0.1 Flagship Unit
   CAPT J. W. WATERHOUSE
   (CO ESTES)

c. 90.0.2 Tactical Air Control Unit
   CDR A. TRUSSO
   (CO TACRON 1)

d. 90.1 Embarkation Group
   CAPT W. C. WINN
   (COMTRANSDIV 13)

e. 90.2 Debarkation Group
   CAPT B. M. RITTENHOUSE
   (COMTRANSDIV 14)

1. General Situation

French Union Forces have concluded negotiations for a truce with Viet Minh Forces and are in the process of evacuating their forces with organic equipment, selected civilians and refugees desiring transportation; and MDAP equipment from the HAIPHONG area of FRENCH INDOCHINA to SAIGON and other ports south of the seventeenth parallel. The French Government and Viet Nam leaders have requested that the U.S. furnish forces to accomplish an evacuation.

This order provides for the conduct and support of an evacuation of French Union Forces with equipment, selected civilians, refugees desiring transportation and MDAP equipment by sea from the TONKIN area of INDOCHINA to SAIGON and/or other designated debarkation points in INDOCHINA. This plan is derived from CINCPACFLT secret message 080259Z of August 1954.

a. Enemy Forces
   See Annex C, Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces
   (1) French ground, naval, and air forces.
   (2) U.S. naval and air forces as assigned.

2. This force will establish liaison with French Union Forces and will embark, transport, and disembark designated personnel and equipment by means of administrative lift.
in order to assist in the redeployment of French Union Military Forces with organic equipment, selected French and Viet Namese civilians, and MDAP equipment; and to evacuate civilian refugees desiring transportation from the TONKIN area to SAIGON or other designated points in SOUTH INDOCHINA.

3. a. Special Operations Group and
   b. Flagship Unit
      Operate as directed by CTF 90.
   c. Tactical Air Control Unit
      (1) Be prepared to establish and operate an Air Control Center (ACC) aboard the assigned flagship.
      (2) Be prepared to establish and operate a Control and Reporting Center, (CRC), or to furnish air control elements to operate from other ships as directed.
      (3) Be prepared to furnish mobile communications equipment if directed.
   d. Embarkation Group
      (1) Control and coordinate the loading and embarkation of personnel and equipment from HAI PHONG and the DO SON PENINSULA in accordance with Annex I, Shore-to-Ship Movement.
      (2) Utilize assigned shore-based embarkation control organization to the maximum extent for the conduct of embarkation and loading.
      (3) Load and embark designated personnel and equipment as directed by CTF 90 and as provided in Annex I, Shore-to-Ship Movement.
      (4) Sail ships with embarked personnel and equipment to SAIGON or other points designated by CTF 90 in SOUTH INDOCHINA.
      (5) Assign anchorages and control the movements and scheduling of embarkation shipping.
      (6) Provide liaison personnel ashore to assist in coordinating embarkation and loading.
      (7) Conduct UDT surveys and beach reconnaissance in accordance with Annex F, Beach Reconnaissance.
   e. Debarkation Group
      (1) Effect close liaison with French authorities and MAC personnel at SAIGON and other points designated by CTF 90 in SOUTH INDOCHINA for planning details of debarkation and unloading.
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(2) Establish necessary control units ashore to assist in the expeditious unloading and clearance of incoming vessels.

(3) Control and coordinate all unloading and debarkation in SAIGON and other designated ports in accordance with Appendix VI to Annex I.

(4) Be prepared to establish and operate alternate debarkation points if required. Submit request for necessary ships and personnel to CTF 90.

(5) When unloaded, sail ships to HAIPHONG unless otherwise directed by CTF 90.

(6) Assign anchorages and control the movements of debarkation shipping.

x. (1) This order is effective for planning on receipt and for implementation when directed by Commander Amphibious Task Force (CTF 90).

(2) For concept of this operation see Annex B.

(3) Maintain readiness for war status at all times and defend against air, surface, and sub-surface attack while in and enroute to and from the INDOCHINA area.

(4) In event of submarine contact, operate and report in accordance with CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 03360.2B of 14 April 1953.

(5) Be alert to avoid mines. Destroy mines sighted. Degaussing installations must be energized in areas where the danger of magnetic mines exists. They need not be energized if the ship is in a harbor that has been declared safe by local port authorities, in depths greater than 300 fathoms (unless magnetic torpedo attack is a possibility), at a dock, or when moored bow and stern to prevent swinging. Observe precautions outlined in OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03371.1A when operating in mineable waters.

(6) In event of air or surface attacks, take immediate and aggressive, measures in self defense. Make reports concerning action, or threat of attack, to CTF 90, info CINCPACFLT.

"(7) U.S. Military personnel will not be allowed ashore in the HAIPHONG Area except that certain individuals may be designated to confer with the French Authorities relative to embarkation and/or other pertinent problems."

4. COMM. RELATIONSHIPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX A AND ANNEX B, CONCEPT.

5. c. Use zone time -8 (HOW) for operations.
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\[d.\] Commander Amphibious Task Force (CTF 90) in assigned flagship. Commander Embarkation Group (CTG 90.1) second in command.

L. S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

ANNEXES:
A - Task Organization
B - Concept
C - Intelligence
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D - Movement
  Appendix I - Cruising Instructions
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  III - Availability, Employment and Control of Lighterage
IV - Naval Beach Group Plan
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K - Administrative
  Appendix I - Reports
    Tab A - Reports Summary

L - Logistics

M - Medical

N - Communications
  Appendix I - MSTS Communications

O - Electronic Warfare

X - Distribution

AUTHENTICATED:

E. L. WELLS,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary.

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
Yokosuka, Japan
11 August 1954; 1200I

ANNEX A

TASK ORGANIZATION

90 Amphibious Task Force

a. 90.0 Special Operations Group

b. 90.0.1 Flagship Unit

c. 90.0.2 Tactical Air Control Unit

d. 90.1 Embarkation Group

90.1.1 Transport Unit

WENLOCK (APA 125) (F) KILOUG (APD 107) (F) HUDDSON (APD 107) (F)
CALVERT (APA 32)
TENAJA (APA 210)
MACOFFIN (APA 199)
MONTROSE (APA 212)
ANDROMEDA (LKA 15)
SKAGIT (LKA 105)
BAYFIELD (APA 33)
MENARD (APA 201)
MOUNTRAIL (APA 213)
OKANOGAN (APA 220)
ALOOL (LKA 54)
MONTAGUE (LKA 98)
EPPLING FOREST (LSD 4)
COMSTOCK (LSD 19)
WHETSTONE (LSD 27)
TORTUGA (LSD 26)

90.2.MSTS Transport Unit

MSTS Ships Assigned

CAPT P. W. MOTHERSILL
(COMLSDRON 1)
SECRET

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90.2.3 Landing Ship Unit

JUNIPER (APD 101) (F)

- APD -

LST 516
LST 758
LST 772
LST 803 (H)
LST 854
LST 855
LST 692
LST 822
LST 825
LST 845
LST 846
LST 1123
LST 887
LST 901
LST 902
LST 1080 (H)
LST 1096
LST 1118

18 LST

ATLAS (ARL 7)
SPHINX (ARL 24) (F)

90.2.3.1 LCU Element

LCU 539
LCU 877
LCU 1236
LCU 1421
LCU 1446
LCU 1451
LCU 531
LCU 810
LCU 1273
LCU 1374
LCU 1378
LCU 1396

12 LCU

90.4.4 Embarkation Control Unit

Shore Party (-)
Naval Beach Group ONE (-)

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90.2.5 Control Unit

CAVALLARO (APD 128) (F)
UDT 12

1 APD
1 UDT

e. 90.2 Debarkation Group

BERG (APD 127) (F)
WANTUK (APD 125) (F)

Ships Assigned

L. S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

AUTHENTICATED:

E. L. WELLS
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
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1. Mission

This order provides for an administrative amphibious evacuation of French Union Military Forces with organic equipment, selected civilians and refugees desiring transportation, and evacuation of MDAP equipment from the HALIPHONG Area of FRENCH INDOCHINA, redeployment by sea, and debarkation at SAIGON or other designated ports in SOUTHERN INDOCHINA.

Although the total number of personnel to be evacuated is not definitely known, the number may run as high as several hundred thousand. Estimates range from 200,000 to 700,000. An initial rate of 100,000 per month has been requested with an anticipated increased rate.

CTF 90 (Commander Amphibious Group ONE) has been designated as commander of the sea operation.

2. Forces Available

a. All ships of the Amphibious Group Western Pacific and such MSTS shipping as required to accomplish the move have been made available for the operation. Naval fire support, air support, and ASW forces are not included in the Task Organization. Ships will be sailed independently as loaded.

b. Shipping schedules will be arranged to provide for maintaining a minimum number of transport types in the objective area at any one time consistent with rapid and efficient embarkation operations. Loading operations will be conducted on a 24 hour a day basis.

c. Transport types will primarily be loaded in anchorages off DO SON PENINSULA by means of LST, LCU, landing craft, and available local lighterage.

3. Embarkation Control

a. Commander Embarkation Group (CTG 90.1) is directly responsible to CTF 90 for control of embarkation operations and his authority is extended ashore through the Embarkation Control Unit (CTU 90.1.4). The Naval Liaison Section of the Embarkation Control Unit will contain one or more officers from the staff of CTG 90.1. The duties, responsibilities and organization of the Embarkation Control Unit are prescribed in Annex I.

b. If it becomes necessary to establish alternate embarkation points, COM OQG will designate, from forces assigned, Embarkation Element...
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Commanders, allocate required shipping, and direct attachment of necessary personnel from subordinate shore-based commanders.

4. Debarkation Control

a. Commander Debarkation Group (CTG 90.2) is directly responsible to CTF 90 for debarkation operations. Marine Corps personnel from the Embarkation Control Unit (90.1.4) will, on request to CTF 90, be attached to assist in coordinating debarkation operations with the French at the port of SAIGON.

b. If it becomes necessary to use alternate or emergency debarkation points, CTG 90.2 will submit request to CTF 90 for necessary ships and personnel to establish and operate these alternate debarkation points.

5. Command Relationships

CINCPAC will function as the overall military coordinator.

CHMAAG, INDOCHINA under CINCPAC will be local coordinator between French and Vietnamese authorities and U.S. Commanders.

CTF 90 has been designated to conduct sea operations.

CG, F'EAf will be responsible for the conduct of air evacuation if employed.

L. S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU I

AUTHENTICATED:

L. L. WELLS
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary.
Maps and Charts: See paragraph 6.

1. Summary of the Enemy Situation

   a. General

   The cease fire agreement concluded at Geneva 20 July 1954 has made provisions for the termination of hostilities as of the following dates:

   Northern Vietnam (Tonkin) 0700 on 27 July 1954: Central Vietnam (Anam) 0700, 1 August 1954; Southern Vietnam (Cochin China) 0700, 11 August 1954.

   Under the terms of the agreement Vietnam will be divided into two zones by a provisional line running up to Son Ben Hai river as far as Bo Ho Su and thence due west to Laos Frontier. (Generally along the 17th parallel). Those forces which compose the Viet Minh (Peoples Army of Vietnam, title assigned to the Viet Minh at the agreement) are to withdraw to the north of this provisional line and those forces under command of the French are to withdraw to the south of the provisional line. Movement of all forces into their respective zones is to be completed in 300 days.

   b. Specific

   (1) Political

   For a detailed analysis of the political situation, see CONNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA, Volume II.

   (2) Naval Forces

   (a) The Viet Minh have no naval forces as such. Various sizes and types of junks, both sail and motor powered, and a small number of fast vedettes make up the entire composition of VIET MINH vessels and craft. The preponderance of French naval strength in comparison to enemy naval forces available in the INDOCHINA Area of operations is too great to encourage any VIET MINH naval operations other than mining, reconnaissance, and logistical support operations. It is known that the VIET MINH possess vedettes but thus far their sole function has been to bring certain vital supplies through the French coast patrols. The characteristics of the vedettes in the hands of the VIET MINH are not known other than the fact that they are small motor-
boats of varying sizes and speeds and that their number is believed by the French to be small. The pattern of movement of VIET MINH junks and craft may be characterized as clandestine merchant marine operations, and not logistical operations of a naval nature. See COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study on INDO-CHINA, 7 June 1954, Volume III.

(b) **Logistics and Operating Methods**

The principal naval need of the VIET MINH is for effective waterborne logistical support, and it is to this purpose that all available junks and small craft have been assigned. Sea-borne logistic movements by VIET MINH small craft fall into three general patterns: (1) Movements from Chinese Communist ports along the Gulf of Tonkin and HAINAN Island to VIET MINH bases in North and central VIETNAM; (2) Movements from ports in Thailand and Malaya to VIET MINH bases in South VIETNAM; (3) "Distribution traffic" along the coast of VIETNAM between VIET MINH bases.

(c) **Mine Warfare**

As of the 1st of August 1954 no floating mines to seaward have been reported. However VIET MINH forces are believed capable of employment of floaters (downstream) against friendly forces. The VIET MINH have depended on the use of controlled mines almost exclusively, and have had some success with this type of weapon. These mines are found in rivers, canals and in shallow water areas along the coast. Native junks, sampans and other small craft may be employed by VIET MINH in mine laying operations.

(3) **VIET MINH Air Power**

(a) As of this date no VIET MINH air activity has been reported over INDOCHINA. No aircraft are known to belong to the VIET MINH forces. A detailed study may be found in Special Intelligence Study on INDOCHINA of June 1954, Volume III, Part IV, Section D, regarding enemy air facilities and forces in the area.

(4) **Ground Forces**

See COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study of INDOCHINA, Volume III for complete discussion of VIET MINH Ground Forces Order of Battle.

(5) **Special Weapons: (Nuclear, Bacteriological Warfare)**

(a) The VIET MINH are believed not to have atomic weapons and any employment of these weapons is considered unlikely.

(b) The employment of any bacteriologic agents is improbable.
c. Enemy Capabilities

(1) Enumeration

Based on the existing situation, it is considered the enemy can:

(a) Conduct air attacks on our naval forces, including merchant shipping enroute to or deployed in the objective area, employing light bombers (including IL 28's), torpedo bombers, jet and piston fighters from bases in SOUTHERN CHINA, HAINAN Island and VIET MINH held territory.

(b) Conduct submarine attacks on our forces enroute to and while in the objective area, employing a limited number of coastal type submarines based in Chinese ports at anytime in the Gulf of Tonkin, SOUTH CHINA SEA, EAST CHINA SEA and PHILIPPINE SEA.

(c) Mine the waters of the EAST CHINA SEA and FORMOSA STRAIT at any time employing aircraft, submarines, junks, sampans and other craft.

(d) Conduct small-scale surprise attacks on our forces including merchant shipping, approaching, departing or deployed within the objective area, employing a limited number of light naval craft including motor torpedo boats.

(e) Mine the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin, using planes, submarines, junks, sampans, or a combination thereof.

(f) Launch floating mines in rivers and in the coastal waters in the Tonkin Delta area.

(g) Destroy navigational aids and emplace waterway barriers, controlled mines, and booby trap mechanisms in and along all principal waterway routes in the objective area.

(h) Conduct small scale amphibious operations in and near the Tonkin Delta area over short distances from the coasts of INDOCHINA, HAINAN Island and SOUTH CHINA during periods of darkness, employing junks, sampans and other small craft.

(i) Overwhelm or destroy French and VIET MINH forces in the objective area, employing up to six VIET MINH infantry divisions and six independent infantry regiments supported by two artillery-engineer divisions and such Chinese Communist forces as may be committed.

(j) Prevent deliberate and orderly withdrawal by the use of created incidents, sabotage, strikes, infiltration of agents in a refugee status.
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propaganda drives, demonstrations and passive resistance to traffic and personnel.

(k) By continuing or increasing guerrilla activity, harass friendly forces in the process of withdrawing from the objective area.

(l) Conduct sabotage and other subversive activities, and land agents and guerrillas, in friendly held territory.

d. Conclusions

The relative probability of adoption by the enemy of the capabilities enumerated above is believed to be:

**MOST PROBABLE**

Capabilities (j) and (k), separately or together with any or all of capabilities (f), (g) and (l).

**NEXT PROBABLE**

Capabilities (a), (c), (e) or (i) in conjunction with any or all of capabilities (f), (g), (k) and (l).

**LEAST PROBABLE**

Capabilities (b), (d) and (h).

2. General Characteristics of the Area of Operation

a. Weather

See Appendix I to this Annex.

b. Topography

Terrain studies of the HANOI and SAIGON Areas are contained in Part 1-C of Commander Naval Forces Far East Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA of June 1954.

c. Hydrography and Oceanography

Details of Hydrography and Oceanography are contained in Part 1-D of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA of June 1954.

d. Port and Beach Studies

Part I-F, I-G, and I-H of Commander Naval Forces Far East Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA of June 1954 contains detailed information on landing beaches, ports, harbors, anchorages and special landing sites, cities, towns and villages in the area of operations.

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e. Transportation and Communications

Studies of transportation and communications are contained in Part II of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA of June 1954.

f. Political

The current political situation is essentially that given in Part III A of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA of June 1954. See paragraph 1 of this Annex for changes occurring subsequent to the information contained in the above study.

g. Sociological

Sociological factors involved in this area are found in Part III C of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA of June 1954.

h. Economic

The economic situation is included in Part III B of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA of June 1954.

PART II - Intelligence Collection

3. Essential Elements of Information

a. Will the enemy conduct air attacks on our forces, including merchant shipping, approaching or deployed within the operation area? If so, when, where, and with what number and types of planes? How will such planes be armed and equipped? Where will they be based?

Indications:

1. Concentration of aircraft, particularly IL-28 jet bombers, on fields in SOUTHERN CHINA.

2. Rehabilitation and/or construction of additional fields in SOUTHERN CHINA.

3. Flights of CCF aircraft over the Gulf of Tonkin.

4. Air attacks against French and VIET NAM: land or naval units.

b. Will the enemy conduct submarine attacks on our forces approaching or departing from the operation area? If so, when, where, and with what number and type of submarines? Where will they be based? How will they be equipped?
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Indications:
(1) Presence of enemy submarines at SOUTH CHINA ports or HAINAN Island.
(2) Presence of enemy submarines in the Gulf of Tonkin or adjacent waters.
(3) Submarine attacks against friendly naval units.

a. Will the enemy mine the waters of the EAST CHINA SEA and PHILIPPINES STRAIT? If so, when, where, and from what numbers and types of aircraft, naval ships and craft? What number and types of mines will be laid and in what patterns?

Indications:
(1) Sighting of enemy aircraft, surface vessels or submarines apparently engaged in laying mines.
(2) Sighting of mines, moored and/or drifting.
(3) Friendly mine casualties in those waters.

d. Will the enemy conduct small scale surprise attacks with light naval craft on our forces, including merchant shipping, approaching or deployed within the operation area? If so, when, where, and with what number and type of naval craft? Where will such enemy craft be based? How will they be equipped?

Indications:
(1) Concentration of enemy light naval and other small craft at HAINAN Island or SOUTH CHINA ports.
(2) Attacks against picket and unescorted ships by light naval units including motor torpedo boats.
(3) Night radar surface contacts in the Gulf of Tonkin, particularly with speeds of from 20 to 45 knots.

e. Will the enemy mine the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin? If so, when, where, and from what planes, ships or craft? What will be the number, type, and equipment of the planes, ships and craft so employed? What number and types of mines will be laid, and in what patterns?

Indications:
(1) Flights of enemy aircraft over the Gulf of Tonkin.
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(2) Presence in the Gulf of Tonkin of enemy naval units, junks, sampans and other minelaying craft.

(3) Presence of floating and/or moored mines.

(4) Incidence of friendly mine casualties.

(5) Stockpiling of naval mines at ports and airfields in SOUTH CHINA and on HAINAN ISLAND.

f. Will the enemy launch floating mines in rivers or in the coastal waters of the Gulf of Tonkin? If so, when, where and in what number? What types of mines will be so launched?

Indications:

(1) Sighting of floating mines in the rivers and coastal waters of INDOCHINA.

(2) Presence of suitable mines in enemy held areas of INDOCHINA.

(3) Casualties to friendly craft and ships operating in the rivers and coastal waters of INDOCHINA.

g. Will the enemy destroy navigational aids or emplace waterway barriers, controlled mines, or booby trap mechanisms in and along the principal waterway routes in the operation area? If so, when and where? What number and types of waterway barriers, controlled mines, or booby trap mechanism will be emplaced? How effective will they be?

Indications:

(1) Navigational aids destroyed, altered or moved out of position.

(2) Activity of enemy craft in the waterways.

(3) Discovery of electric cables extending from shore into waterways.

(4) Activity of enemy personnel along banks of waterways.

(5) Presence of obstructions and/or mines in waterways.

h. Will the enemy conduct small scale amphibious operations? If so, when, where, and in what strength? How will enemy forces employed be armed and equipped? What types of craft will be employed?

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Indications:

1. Concentration of small craft and enemy ground forces on the SOUTH CHINA coast, HAINAN ISLAND and areas of INDOCHINESE coast under VIET MINH control.

2. Radar contacts or sighting of a considerable number of small craft in a large group or groups.

3. Training of enemy forces in amphibious operations.

i. Will the enemy overwhelm or destroy French and friendly VIET MINH forces in the operation area? If so, when, where, and with what forces? How will such enemy forces be armed and equipped?

Indications:

1. Maximum concentration of VIET MINH forces in TONKIN DELTA.

2. Introduction of substantial number of Chinese Communist ground and air forces.

j. Will the enemy prevent a deliberate and orderly withdrawal of French and friendly VIET NAM forces from the TONKIN area? If so, by what means and employing what forces? How will such enemy forces be armed and equipped?

Indications:

1. Increased pressure of enemy forces against friendly defense perimeter.

2. Increased guerrilla and sabotage activity in friendly rear areas.

k. Will the enemy, by increasing guerrilla activity, harass French and VIET NAM forces attempting to withdraw from the TONKIN DELTA area? If so, when, where, and by what means? What forces will be employed? How will they be armed?

Indications:

1. Increase of guerrilla activity including sabotage in TONKIN DELTA area.

2. Observation of unusually large guerrilla forces in or near the TONKIN DELTA area.

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(3) Increased boldness in guerrilla attacks.

1. Will the enemy conduct sabotage or other subversive activities against friendly installations employing agents infiltrating or landing in friendly held territory?

Indications:
(1) Damaging of vital equipment and machinery, disruption of communications.
(2) Assassination of friendly military and civilian personnel.
(3) Occurrence of riots and demonstrations within friendly held areas.
(4) Agents being landed in friendly held territory.

4. Reconnaissance and Observation Missions
a. No requests to higher or adjacent commands are anticipated.
b. Orders to subordinate and attached units.
   (1) Underwater Demolition Teams
      (a) UDT reconnaissance missions will be in accordance with Annex F the Beach Reconnaissance and Underwater Demolition Plan.
      (b) No other photographic or reconnaissance missions are contemplated.

PART III - Supplemental Instructions

5. Captured Personnel, Material, and Documents
a. It is not anticipated that enemy personnel will be directly involved.
b. Captured Material and Documents
   (1) All documents belonging, or formerly belonging to the VIET MINH forces, falling into the hands of personnel of Task Force 90 will be delivered to CTF 90 by most expeditious means available.
   (2) All military material and equipment belonging to the VIET MINH forces acquired by personnel of Task Force 90 will be referred to CTF 90 as soon as practical. Material and equipment so referred will be tagged with the name of the ship, unit, or organization.
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(3) All personnel will be thoroughly indoctrinated regarding the
collection of souvenirs and will be warned against the commission of any
act which might be considered looting. Personnel legitimately obtaining
items for retention as souvenirs will have these articles immediately
cleared in writing through the CTF 90 Intelligence Officer. For current
policies concerning souvenirs see OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5800.4 of 11 January
1952.

6. Graphic Intelligence Aides
   
a. Maps, Charts and Photographs
   
   (1) All units are directed to procure and maintain on board mater­
   ials required by List CHARLIE to CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 03840.1B. It
   should be noted that these are the minimum requirements. AMS maps may
   be drawn from the Air Navigation Office at Naval Air Station, ATSUGI,
   JAPAN. There is a Branch Hydrographic Office located on the Naval Sta­
   tion, YOKOSUKA.

   The AMS coverage for INDOCHINA consists of the following series:
   
   AMS 5202 (1:2,000,000)
   AMS L502 (1:250,000)
   AMS L605 (1:1,000,000)
   AMS L701 (1:50,000)
   AMS L802 (1:25,000)
   AMS L805 (1:25,000)

   H.O. charts for this area are contained in Portfolio No. 63. In
   addition H.O. Misc 15551-25 series and H.O. Misc 15551-50 series have been
   recently published.

   (2) Except where other specific instructions are given, locations
   at sea shall be indicated by geographical coordinates.

   (3) The Target Area Designator Reference System (TAD) overlaid on
   the Universal Transverse Grid Reference system will be used for locations
   ashore except where other specific instructions are given.

7. Counter-Intelligence
   
a. General

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SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

(1) The aim of counter-intelligence is to deny the enemy information of friendly organization, mission and plans. The necessity for guarding against sabotage, espionage, and subversion is a command function that cannot be over-emphasized. Commanding officers must insure that security measure directives within their command provide adequate protection against the threat of sabotage, espionage and subversion. A message report will be made to CTF 90 of all acts or attempted acts of sabotage, espionage and subversion.

(2) Commanding officers exercise every precaution to prevent classified material from falling into unauthorized and enemy hands. Thoroughly indoctrinate all personnel against the dangers of discussing projected operations. The doctrine of "need to know" disclosure of classified information will be rigidly applied.

b. Captured Personnel

Personnel captured by the enemy when undergoing interrogation must give only their full name, rank or rating, date of birth and file or serial number. This information is contained on the Geneva Conventions Identification Card (DD Form 528). It is essential that no additional information be given. Commanding officers instruct all personnel accordingly.

c. Classified Material

(1) Carry only classified material absolutely necessary for the conduct of operations ashore or in aircraft. Closely safeguard all such classified matter. In event of danger of compromise or capture destroy such material immediately. Make reports of compromise or destruction in accordance with current instructions.

(2) Ensure that all personnel flying over, or travelling within or adjacent to, unfriendly or enemy territory are briefed only on items essential to accomplishment of their mission. Personnel with access to highly classified matter or broad knowledge of theatre plans or operations are not to be placed in a position where risk of capture by the enemy conceivably exists.

d. Personal Correspondence and Personal Diaries

(1) Personal correspondence is not subject to censorship at present. However, all personnel will be cautioned against mentioning in personal correspondence current or projected operations, classified ship movements, or identification of ground or air units.

(2) Subsequent to a declaration of war by the United States or an armed attack upon the United States, its territories, possessions, or areas

SECRET

C-11
d. Personal Correspondence

Personal correspondence is not subject to censorship at present. However, all personnel will be cautioned against mentioning in personal correspondence any item which is classified. Mention may be made by individuals of the fact that they and the ship in which serving are engaged in the evacuation of Viet Namese citizens.

e. Measures for Handling Evacuated Friendly Personnel

(1) General

No firm figures are available as to the number of French and Viet Namese personnel who may be expected to be evacuated. It is estimated that 750,000 persons may be evacuated.

(2) Relationship of Task Force Personnel with evacuees

(a) Insofar as possible, all evacuated friendly personnel, will be segregated from personnel of TF 90, including personnel assigned to transporting ships, and contact between friendly personnel being evacuated and personnel of TF 90 will be kept to a minimum.

(b) All commanders will keep under observation all personnel being evacuated, in order to insure that security provisions are met, and will be especially alert to the possibility of VIET MINH infiltration and inspired incidents.

(c) It should be anticipated that agents of the VIET MINH may adopt certain tactics to impede and disrupt orderly evacuation. These may appear in the following forms:

1. RUMORS

This is a tool used by subversives to incite panic, riot, and other forms of violence. Rumors must be stopped at their source. Liaison personnel can effectively control them by close supervision and prompt dissemination of information or instructions to evacuees.

2. DEMONSTRATIONS

These could be a very effective means of hindering the mission of TF 90. Well organized and led, demonstrations involving men and women could be difficult to control if allowed to culminate. Groups who initiate song fests should be made to cease and disperse immediately. Such groups could be organized for the sole purpose of interfering with the issuance of instructions or information via the public address system.
Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

b. Incidents involving arguments, heated discussions or fighting must not be allowed to continue after detection. French liaison personnel are embarked for the purpose of controlling evacuees and should take immediate action. U. S. personnel must not attempt to interfere and/or settle disputes, unless so directed by the commanding officer of the ship.

2. FIRES

Sabotage by fire is a favorite method of saboteurs and it should be remembered that arson is comparatively safe, simple and easy. It is convenient to handle and conceal incendiary devices and material. Care should be exercised to be alert for the following evidence:

(1) ACCELERANTS

Gasoline, kerosene, alcohol, benzine, turpentine, lighter fluid and similar products to accelerate a set fire are easily transported by individuals. These items will be removed from evacuees prior to embarkation but extra precautions should be taken due to their portability.

(2) MECHANICAL DEVICES

Any articles of a suspicious nature in the possession of evacuees should be confiscated immediately by French liaison personnel. Matches, candles and lighters should not be allowed to remain in personal possession of evacuees. Innocent appearing articles when properly assembled will create an effective time device which will ignite a fire hours or even days after emplacement.

4. EXPLOSIVES

Special care will be exercised to prevent any explosives from coming aboard. Although evacuees will be thoroughly searched prior to embarkation smuggling aboard of explosive charges is a distinct capability. Guards and watchs should be instructed to be alert for evidence of grenades, mines, bombs or other devices.

2. THEFT OR DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

Thief or malicious destruction of property must be closely guarded against. Current instructions are contained in COMNAVFE Instruction 5511.2 relative to thefts of government property.

8. Interpreters, Translators and Specialists Teams

a. It is intended that a minimum of one U. S. military linguist will be assigned to each ship and major unit of TF 90. Commanders are to
interchange these personnel within their commands in any manner which will best suit their needs and expedite the evacuation.

b. If made available by French forces CTF 90 will assign to each APA and AK five interpreters. Four will be French-Viet Namese and one a French-English linguist. One French-Viet Namese interpreter will be assigned to each LST. These personnel will act in liaison between the commanding officer of the ship and the embarked evacuees. They will be responsible for the control and discipline of the evacuees.

9. Reports

a. Special reports will be forwarded as requested by CTF 90.

b. Subordinate commanders will make FLASH reports to CINCPACFLT, COMNAVFE and CTF 90 in plain language in the event of:

1. Attack by hostile aircraft.
2. Atomic attack.
3. Biological or chemical attack.
4. Submarine attack or initial contact with a submarine not identified as friendly (CINCPACFLT Instruction 03360.2B).
5. Surface attack, amphibious attack or a combination of both.
6. Mines or minefields not previously reported.
7. Serious incidents created by embarked evacuees.

C. Amplifying details of these events will normally be classified and made as directed in paragraph 1400 - 1490, USF 70(B).

L. S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

APPENDICES

I - Aerological Plan (Confidential)
II - Climatology (Confidential)

Authenticated:

E. L. NELSON
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy
Flag Secretary

CHANGE NO. 2
SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
11 August 1954; 12001

APPENDIX I to ANNEX C

AEROLOGICAL PLAN

Ref: (a) Chapter 3E, USF 70(B), Paragraphs 3400, 3410, 3430, 3432, 3435
and 3450 (NWFP (16-1) when effective)
(b) H.O. Pub 206
(c) COMNAVFE Current Instructions
(d) Typhoon and Hurricanes, Aerology Series 10, NAVAR 00-80U-21
(e) Surf Manual COMPHIBPAC INSTRUCTION 3840.3

1. SOURCES OF GENERAL WEATHER INFORMATION

a. Fleet Weather Central, SANGLEY POINT, P.I. (NPO) and Radio, SAIGON
(XVS) are primary sources of weather information for the operation.

b. Secondary sources of weather information are radioteletype and
weather facsimile broadcasts of surface and upper air charts made by Fleet
Weather Central, GUAM (NPN), TOKYO (AIF-JPNZ) and YOKOSUKA (NDT).

b. Reference (b) contains schedules of transmissions for above broad­
casts, available to ships with aerological personnel. Partic­
lar attention is invited to section 370205, 360902, 380402, 380403,
361306, 361307, and 361308.

2. WEATHER FORECASTS BY COMMANDER TASK FORCE (CTF 90)

a. Twenty-four hour forecasts of weather, sea and surf as applicable
will be issued daily by CTF 90 at 1000 and 2200 Zebra time to all ships
in company. Surf forecasts will be made in accordance with reference (e),
sec IX, Dl. Forecasts valid 24 hours from 0000 and 1200 Zebra.

b. Special forecasts and advisories will be made as required by
operations or the weather situation.

3. TRANSMISSION OF FORECASTS

a. Forecasts made by CTF 90 will be transmitted in the clear to all
ships in company by visual or radio.

b. Forecasts will be transmitted to movement groups only when weather
or sea conditions threaten the safe navigation of the group.

c. Forecasts will be transmitted to units ashore as requested.
4. WEATHER FORECASTS BY ACTIVITIES AShORE

Forecasts and advisories in plain language are issued by Fleet Weather Central, SANGLEY POINT, P.I., (NPO). For schedules, frequencies and areas covered see Article 370205 of reference (b).

5. WEATHER REPORTS TO ACTIVITIES AShORE

a. CTF 90 will make weather reports for ships in company in accordance with reference (a) and (c).

b. The senior commander of individual units or tactical groups will make weather reports in accordance with references (a) and (c).

c. Attention is invited to paragraph 3432 of reference (a) which directs commanders of individual units or tactical groups to break radio silence and make weather reports when encountering unmistakable signs of a tropical storm. CTF 90 will be made information addressee on all such weather reports.

6. SMALL CRJ.FT AND STORM WARNINGS IN OBJECTIVE AREA

a. Small craft warnings will be issued by CTF 90 to all ships in company in the objective area whenever winds of over 20 knots occur. Storm warnings will be issued whenever winds greater than 30 knots occur or are expected to occur.

b. These warnings will be effective for a six hour period and will be either renewed or cancelled at the end of each six hour period after original time of issue.

7. TYPHOON WARNINGS

a. Navy Weather Central, SANGLEY POINT, P.I., is charged with the issuance of typhoon warnings in the area covering 5°S to 25°N and 100°E to 130°E.

b. These warnings are transmitted to NERK on the appropriate FOX schedule and also on the weather schedules given in section 370205 of reference (b).

c. All commanders and commanding officers will maintain a six hour plot of all typhoon and tropical storm warnings received. Reference (d) contains valuable information on determining the danger sector of typhoons and maneuvering to avoid this danger sector.
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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

8. LIASON WITH FRENCH FORCES

A French meteorologist with forecasting experience in INDOCHINA will be requested for assignment to CTF 90 for the duration of the Operation.

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Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

Authenticated:

E. L. WELLS
LGDR, U. S. Navy
Flag Secretary

SECRET

C - I - 3

Naval Historical Center - Operational Archives
Command File, Post 1 January 1946
Box 141 - PHIBGRP1, Indo-china Op. Order 2-54 Ser: 11 August 1944 - Amphibious Groups
Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
Yokosuka, Japan
11 August 1954; 1200I

APPENDIX II to ANNEX C

CLIMATOLOGY

Ref: (a) COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA, Volume I of
June 1954

1. Climatology (General)

a. The weather of INDOCHINA is dominated by the monsoon circulation. The southwest monsoon with its attendant high temperatures and humidity occur from June to September. The dry northeast winter monsoon is felt from October to March.

b. The climate of the entire INDOCHINA area may be classified as tropical with high temperatures and humidity. Rainfall at certain times of the year is great enough to hinder military operations with a large part of the country under extensive cloud coverage, but in contrast there are periods of fair weather when operating conditions are favorable. These extremes follow a definite pattern and are seasonal. Horizontal visibilities are seldom poor enough to limit operations seriously, except in heavy rainfall or during a fog, drizzle conditions known as the "crachin" that occurs in the Gulf of TONKIN and TONKIN DELTA area from mid-January to mid-April and on the CENTRAL VIETNAM coast south of VINH from late October to February. Restrictions to visibility such as smoke, morning fog and haze are present in all seasons. Aircraft operations may be hindered by haze especially when it is worst over TONKIN from October to January.

c. The most frequent wind speeds throughout INDOCHINA are between 4 and 14 knots. In the morning and during the night there is usually no wind, except for light offshore breezes along coast. Strong winds, more than 28 knots, usually occur during the northeast winter monsoon, in thunder storms, or during a typhoon.

d. Cloudiness and precipitation varies directly with the monsoon seasons. The rainy season commences in May in SOUTH INDOCHINA and TONKIN DELTA. October marks the end of the rainy season.

e. Typhoons strike INDOCHINA with a maximum occurrence between the months of July and November.

APPENDIX II to ANNEX C

CLIMATOLOGY

Ref: (a) COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA, Volume I of
June 1954

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e. Typhoons strike INDOCHINA with a maximum occurrence between the months of July and November.
Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

f. Details and statistics of regional climatology and military aspects of weather are contained in reference (a).

L. S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

Authenticated:

E. L. WELLS
Executive, U. S. Navy
Flag Secretary
1. General

No specific or detailed task organization for this movement is prescribed herein. Normally, ships will be sailed on an individual basis by CTF 90 or when in the objective and operating areas by the cognizant Group Commander.

2. Operating Areas

Operating areas extend from the TONKIN GULF Area as far south as SAIGON.

3. Objective Area

HAIPHONG is designated as the objective area. (See H.O. Chart No. 6407)

4. Anchorages

a. Transport and LST anchorages for normal use in the objective area are shown in Tab A, Appendix I to Annex I.

b. Heavy weather anchorages in the objective area shown in Tab A, Appendix II to Annex J.

5. Sortie and Movement from Objective Area

a. It is envisioned that all embarkation shipping will be sailed independently as soon as loaded to SAIGON or other designated debarkation points.

b. In the event enemy air or submarine intervention makes it necessary to resort to the convoy system, air and/or surface escort as available will be furnished.

c. Cruising instructions for naval vessels are contained in Appendix I to this annex.

d. CTF 90 will exercise control of MSTS ships and MSTS controlled shipping when assigned. This control will be exercised through Commander Embarkation Group, HAIPHONG and Commander Debarkation Group, SAIGON (or alternate Debarkation Unit Commanders if established).

e. Ships enroute to SAIGON or other points south, move via usually travelled coastal route, but remain outside the 50 fathom curve as far south as possible.
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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

6. Hydrographic and Port Information

a. Data with reference to navigational hazards, tides and currents are contained in H.O. Pub No. 125, Sailing Directions for the Western Shores of The China Sea.

b. Port information on embarkation and debarkation ports appear in Annex C, Intelligence.

7. Movement Reports

Movement reports will be made by ships proceeding independently and by OTCs of ships proceeding in company in accordance with USF 70(B). Movement reports will be unclassified.

L. S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

APPENDIX

I - Cruising Instructions

AUTHENTICATED:

E. L. WELLS
E. L. WELLS,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary.
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX D

Cruising Instructions

1. General

   a. Instructions contained in this appendix apply to naval ships steaming independently or in company with other naval ships.

       b. Provision of Allied Naval Maneuvering Instruction (ATP 1) are applicable at all times unless specifically modified herein.

2. Readiness

   a. Maintain minimum General Degree of Readiness III at all times when at sea.

       b. All ships maintain minimum Engineering Condition II unless otherwise directed by the OTC.

3. Cruising Formations and Speed

   a. Formations and speeds will be in accordance with ATP 1 for ships sailing in company.

       b. Speeds of ships sailing independently will be the best possible speed based on the capabilities of the particular ship.

4. Miscellaneous

   a. Conserve fuel and water.

       b. All ships prepare to tow or to be towed.

       c. Heavy ships be prepared to fuel smaller ships.

       d. Use navigational lights with caution as they may be extinguished, have altered characteristics, or be changed in location.

L. S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

AUTHENTICATED:

E. L. WELLS,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy,
Flag Secretary

SECRET D-I-l
SECRET

Operation Order
CMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

UNited States Pacific Fleet
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and CMPhIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
Yokosuka, Japan
11 August 1954; 1200I

ANNEX F

BEACH RECONNAISSANCE AND UNDERWATER DEMOLITION

Map Reference: H.O. 3161

Task Organization (Detailed Task Organization in Annex A)

90 Amphibious Task Force

a. 90.1.5 Control Unit

1. General Situation

As in basic operation order.

2. This unit will conduct beach reconnaissance in the HAIPHONG and DO SON areas

in order to:

a. Determine reliability of information on beaching areas,
b. Obtain hydrographic information on designated beaches,
c. Prepare the beaches for landing of amphibious craft.

3. a. Reconnaissance Unit

(1) Upon arrival in the HAIPHONG/DO SON area, Reconnaissance Unit conduct reconnaissance in accordance with the following instructions:

(a) Conduct administrative hydrographic reconnaissance of the seaward approaches of the landing beaches on the DO SON PENINSULA from the three fathom line inshore to the high water mark as shown in Appendix I to this Annex. Location of potential LST slots and sites for causeways is of particular importance in the DO SON beach area. Priority should be given to BLUE Beach (BAIE DE CLATEAU) and then to the remaining beaches on the east side of the peninsula. YELLOW Beach and PURPLE Beach on the west side of the peninsula should be lowest priority. See COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study INDOCHINA of June 1954, Volume I for detailed information on the DO SON beaches.
Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

(b) Conduct administrative reconnaissance of the landing site located at 20-59-55N, 106-43-00E on the north bank of the SONG DA BACH south of the town of BI CHO. See COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study INDOCHINA of June 1954, Volume I, page 28, para (2) for a detailed description of this site.

(c) Conduct administrative reconnaissance of the landing site at PORT REDON, 20-59-12N, 106-54-36E on the north bank of the SONG DA BACH approximately 8.5 nautical miles above the southern entrance to the CANAL MARITIME. See COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study INDOCHINA of June 1954, Volume I, page 28, para (3) for a detailed description of this site.

(d) Conduct administrative reconnaissance of the landing site located on the SONG BACH DONG, west of QUANG YEN. This landing site was planned by the French in mid-1952 and is presently reported as being suitable for LSU. For detailed description of the site, see COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study INDOCHINA of June 1954, Volume I, page 30, para (4) for a detailed description of this site.

(2) Be prepared to conduct demolitions as directed.

(3) Be prepared to conduct mine clearance as directed.

4. Logistics in accordance with Annex L.

5. a. Communications in accordance with Annex N.

   b. Commander Control Unit in CAVALLARO (APD 128).

L. S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

APPENDIX:

I - UDT SURVEY AREA, DO SON PENINSULA
(Overlay to HO 3161)

Authenticated:

E. L. WELLS
LCDR, U. S. Navy
Flag Secretary

SECRET

F - 2
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX F

(UDT SURVEY AREAS DO-SON PENINSULA)
SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

UDT SURVEY AREA, DO SON PENINSULA
(OVERLAY TO H.O. 3161)

KEY:

\[\square\] UDT SURVEY AREA

BEACH

\[\text{20°40′}\]

\[\text{106°40′}\]

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F

Naval Historical Center - Operational Archives
Command File, Post 1 January 1946
Box 141 - PHIBGRP1, Indo-china Op. Order 2-54 Ser: 11 August 1954 - Plans - Amphibious Groups
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
11 August 1954; 12001

L.S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander Amphibious Group ONE

SECRET
Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

ANNEX I

SHORE-TO-SHIP MOVEMENT

1. General.

   a. This annex with its attached appendixes provides information and instructions for the Shore-to-Ship Movement phase of operations involving evacuation of French and Viet Nam Forces, civilians and material from the HAIPHONG area, INDOCHINA.

   b. This evacuation involves the loading, transporting and unloading of unknown quantities (estimated in annex C) of French and Viet Nam civilians, military personnel, vehicles, ordnance and general cargo.

2. Embarkation and Loading Areas.

   Embarkation and loading will be conducted primarily from the port of HAIPHONG and from beaches on the DO SON PENINSULA. During the course of the operation, other embarkation and loading areas may be utilized. In this event CTF 90.1 will activate alternate or emergency embarkation control elements.

3. Debarkation and Unloading Areas.

   SAIGON will be the primary port of debarkation and unloading. Other secondary ports in South INDOCHINA may also be designated as unloading points.

4. Hydrographic Information.

   a. Depth limitations in the channel will not permit maximum loading of APA/AKA type cargo ships at piers. Ships will be loaded in anchorage area by shuttle craft consisting of LOU, landing craft, lighterage and possibly LST.

   b. Hydrographic information on ports, channel approaches, and beaches, and information on port facilities is contained in annex C.


   a. In order to provide a rapid and efficient means of conducting this evacuation, an Embarkation Control Unit (90.1.4) will be organized to represent Commander Embarkation Group (90.1) ashore. This control unit will provide elements at the outloading ports and beaches to control and supervise loading operations. The organization and functions of this unit are prescribed in detail in Appendix II to this annex. The Commander Shore Party reports to and will be under the operational control of Commander Embarkation Control Unit.
Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

b. Close coordination must be effected between the controlling agency ashore and the controlling agency afloat in order to obtain and maintain maximum efficiency of operations. In order to accomplish this, liaison personnel from forces afloat will be assigned to the Embarkation Control Unit to effect the necessary coordination.

L. S. Sablin
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

APPENDIXES:

I - Transport Areas
   Tab A - Transport Area Diagram
   B - Beaches, DO SON PENINSULA (Diagram)
II - Loading and Embarkation Plan
   Tab A - Embarkation Control Plan
   B - Ship Loading Capacities
   C - Functions of Shore Based Embarkation Organization
III - Availability, Employment and Control of Lighterage
IV - Naval Beach Group Plan
V - Light Salvage Plan
VI - Debarkation Port Operation
    Tab A - Unloading Facilities S. I. G. O. N.

AUTHENTICATED:

E. L. Wells
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary.
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX I

TRANSPORT AREAS

1. This appendix contains diagrams showing the transport area which will be used and the beach sites on the DO SON PENINSULA. Tab A depicts the transport area from which the majority of loading, by lighterage, will be conducted. Tab B indicates beach areas on the DO SON PENINSULA, which will be used for outloading.

Tab A to Appendix II to Annex J (Heavy Weather Anchorage Diagram) depicts alternate transport area. The latter may be used for anchoring shipping in excess of that required in the area in which loading is being conducted. This area will be used by all shipping in the event sea conditions require that a more protected anchorage be used for loading operations.

L. S. BIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

TABLES:

A - Transport Area Diagram
B - DO SON Beaches

AUTHENTICATED:

[Signature]
E. L. WELLS,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary.
SECRET
Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

SECRET

HAIPHONG

DOSON
BEACH RED 2
BEACH RED 1
BEACH GREEN
BEACH PURPLE
BEACH BLUE
BEACH YELLOW

PORT EDON
QUANGYEN

Operational Archives
1946

Op. Order 2
Ser: 11 August 1946
Ams - Amphibious Groups
TRANSPORT
TRANSPORT AREA DIAGRAM

LST-LSM ANCHORAGE CHARLIE
ANCH. NO. 1
20-41-54N
106-50-55E

TRANSPORT ANCHORAGE BAKER
ANCH. NO. 1
20-41-09 N.
106-56-55 E.

TAB A TO APPENDIX I TO ANNEX I

L.S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander Amphibious Group ONE

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SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
11 August 1954; 12001
TAB B TO APPENDIX F TO ANNEX I
BEACHES, DO SON PENINSULA (DIAGRAM)

L.B. RABIN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander Amphibious Group ONE
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX I

LOADING AND EMBARKATION PLAN

1. General.
   a. This plan provides for loading and transporting French and Viet Nam forces and civilians from the HAIPHONG area of French INDOCHINA to SAIGON and for other ports in French INDOCHINA.
   b. Commander Embarkation Group, through the Embarkation Control Unit Commander, will coordinate embarkation functions with the French and Viet Nam officials.

2. Responsibilities.
   a. Commander Embarkation Group has overall responsibility for, and control of, all embarkation and loading operations.
   b. Commander Embarkation Group is responsible for:
      (1) Loading and embarkation of designated troops, equipment and civilians.
      (2) Transporting embarked personnel and equipment to port of debarkation.
      (3) Having a representative present during the searching and screening process conducted by the French officials.
      (4) Movement to and control of all civilians to be embarked, and control of all other civilians in order that they will not interfere with redeployment operations.
      (5) Providing troop personnel as required to Commander Shore Party Unit to assist in loading operations ashore.
      (6) Providing available lighterage and stevedores for unloading vessels at port of debarkation.
      (7) Providing Commander Embarkation Control Unit with passenger lists and cargo manifests for each ship loaded.

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d. Commander Embarkation Control Unit is responsible for:

(1) Representing the Embarkation Group Commander ashore in the coordination and control of embarkation and loading of all personnel and cargo.

(2) Control and supervision of loading and embarkation at all beaches and other embarkation points (see Tab A).

3. Loading Instructions.

a. Administrative loading will be employed.

b. Ships will be loaded to maximum capacity consistent with the safety and seaworthiness of the vessels.

c. Employment of U.S. Merchant Ship Crews and Special Authorizations

Therefore:

U.S. merchant crews will be employed as stated in their charter. Emergency variation in employment of these orders may be ordered to meet the exigency of the situation in which case a separate letter of authorizaton will be issued to the masters of merchant vessels by the Commander Embarkation Group. In each case, Commander Embarkation Group obtain prior approval by CTF 90.

d. Ships Loading Capacities.

See Tab B to this appendix.

e. APAs, AKAs and merchant ships may be required to use hold spaces, and LST may be required to use tank deck, to berth personnel. Ships will conserve water and construct temporary top-side sanitary facilities as required to maintain minimum acceptable sanitary conditions.

4. Cargo Handling Equipment and Dunnage

a. In addition to ship's cargo handling equipment and dunnage, ship's Combat Cargo Officer (cargo officer on merchant ships) will obtain additional requirements from Embarkation Control Unit.

b. Commander Embarkation Control Unit in conjunction with French Embarkation Representative will establish a pool of equipment and stock pile of dunnage as practicable. Institute measures to conserve and control cargo nets and other related equipment.

5. Shipping Assignments.

As directed by Commander Amphibious Task Force (CTF 90).
Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54

6. Miscellaneous.
   a. Functions of shore-based Embarkation Control Unit.
      See Tab C to this appendix.

7. Reports.
   a. All ships loading personnel vehicles or other cargo will make reports to Commander Embarkation Group (CTG 90.1) information to CTF 90, at four hour intervals on even hour during loading, i.e., 0400, 0800 etc., and on completion of loading giving the following:

      PETER - Number personnel embarked
         (1) Military
         (2) Civilian

      VICTOR - Number vehicles loaded

      CHARLIE - Measurement tons other cargo loaded

      TONE - Estimated time loading completed. (Delete from final report.)

   b. Commander Embarkation Group (CTG 90.1) submit to Commander Amphibious Task Force (CTF 90) daily at 0700, consolidated report as of 2400 the previous day, giving the following:

      (1) For each ship

         PETER - Number of personnel embarked
            (1) Military
            (2) Civilian

         VICTOR - Number of vehicles loaded

         CHARLIE - Measurement tons other cargo loaded

L. S. Sabin
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

TABLES:
A - Embarkation Control Plan
B - Ship Loading Capacities
C - Functions of Shore Based Embarkation Control Unit

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