1. On 15 May 1955 the INDOCHINA evacuation known as the "Passage to Freedom" was completed. A report of operations of the U. S. Navy's sea lift during the first three months (8 August 1954 through 15 November 1954) is contained in reference (a). This report is a continuation of reference (a), and covers the remainder of the operation. COINHIBGRU ONE's recommendations are summarized in enclosure (8).

2. For administrative reasons, on 1 April 1955, the task force numerical designator of the forces involved was changed from TF 90 to TG 50.1. This report is limited to the participation of TF 90/ TG 50.1 and does not include the activities of other U. S. agencies such as HAAG INDOCHINA, USIA, USCIN, etc., which presumably will be covered by their reports.

3. During the entire operation, the U. S. Navy evacuated 310,848 persons 68,757 tons of military cargo, and 8,135 military vehicles. There were 124 births and 66 deaths aboard ships under U. S. Navy control.

4. The operations specifically covered by this report have served to reaffirm the conclusions set forth in paragraph 6 of reference (a).
and hence will not be repeated here.

5. The INDOCHINA evacuation again emphasized the absolute necessity for the closest possible coordination and mutual, cooperative effort between participating forces. The orderly and highly successful accomplishment of this evacuation was in no small part due to the excellent teamwork achieved by the commands and agencies involved.

IRVING T. DUKE

Copy to:

SIO
CINCPACFLT
CINCPEV
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COMSC
COMSPAC
COMAMPHIB 3
COMNAVPHIL
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COMSEACMPAREA
COMAIRCMP 3
COMSIPACSUBAREA
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COMNAVPHIL 1, 3, 5, 7
COMAIRCMP 1, 3, 5, 7
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ALUSI'TA SAIGON
COMYCO SAIGON

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NAVHISTDIV FCOO.1

By: OP-093326
Passage To Freedom

Covering the Period
16 Nov. 1954-18 May 1955

Commander Amphibious Group One
PART I

NARRATIVE

1. Background. First Phases of INDOCHINA Evacuation.

a. A great many factors underlay the U. S. decision to provide shipping to assist in the evacuation of NORTH VIETNAM, in implementation of the Geneva Conference Agreement of 21 July 1954. These factors, existing against a background of almost certain inadequacy of available FRENCH shipping formed the basis for the determination of the missions of Task Force 90 shipping deployed in INDOCHINA waters and of CTF 90. Briefly, they may be set down:

(1) The humanitarian desire to provide transportation for those civilian residents of NORTH VIETNAM who desired to live under the government of SOUTH VIETNAM rather than the VIET MINH conquerors and who otherwise might not be able to achieve this goal.

(2) The desire to prevent military equipment, most importantly military equipment purchased through U. S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program funds, from falling into the hands of the VIET MINH.

(3) The desire to demonstrate to the people of SOUTHEAST ASIA the U. S. determination to assist them in combating and escaping Communism wherever it appeared.

(4) The need to maintain close liaison with FRENCH and VIETNAMESE authorities in order to accomplish the above aims.

The U. S. position in regard to the Geneva Conference Agreement was somewhat anomalous; the U. S. was not a signatory power; and yet, once the Agreement was in effect, the accomplishment of the above goals which fell within its purview was clearly in the best interests of the United States. U. S. authorities in INDOCHINA, however, remained in a purely advisory and assisting position, necessarily so because of the de facto political relation which the U. S. government had toward the Geneva Conference Agreement.

b. Perhaps the most important provisions of the Agreement with respect to the effect on the employment of U. S. shipping, were those which established evacuation zones and evacuation schedules. At the time of the signing of the Agreement virtually the whole of the industrial and heavily-populated TONKIN DELTA was in FRENCH-VIETNAMESE hands. The Agreement provided that by 10 October 1954, FRENCH-VIETNAMESE military forces must withdraw from the greater portion of this area, including the city of HANOI; and that by 30 October 1954, a further withdrawal of FRENCH-VIETNAMESE military units must be made behind a new line which excluded the city of HAIPHONG. The remaining, or third zone, which became known as the HAIPHONG perimeter, was a relatively small area.
averaging 15 to 20 miles in radius, which was to be evacuated prior to 10 May 1955. It was implicitly understood by all parties, that concurrently with the withdrawal of military units, the totality of FRENCH-VIETNAMESE influence would disappear; while the treaty provided for the free passage of civilians at numerous designated points between the FRENCH and the VIET MINH zones of influence and looked toward the continuance of reasonably normal trade relations, the degree to which these provisions would be implemented remained in doubt until the actual withdrawal.

c. In the earliest days of the evacuation, therefore, the emphasis was on the rapid movement of as many personnel and as much military equipment as possible—if movement all the way to SOUTH VIETNAM was impossible, then at least movement into the next evacuation zone. Estimates of the numbers of persons and amount of equipment requiring removal ran high. This resulted in the movement to INDOPHINA of more U. S. shipping than actually was required; nonetheless, the numbers of persons and amount of equipment moved in the earliest days exceeded anything that came after; and to some extent left little time or opportunity for overall coordinated planning. Thus, by 30 September 1954, U. S. shipping alone had moved over 1,239,600 passengers. Very little in the way of evacuation of civilian cargo, or civilian equipment was to be seen on the HAIPHONG docks. Evacuation of military cargo, which remained throughout the operation primarily a FRENCH shipping problem, proceeded at a regular pace, though the movement of vast amounts of military cargo into the HAIPHONG perimeter from the more distant zones presented inventory problems that did not appear as operational difficulties until some months later.

d. Refugees throughout this period were primarily VIETNAMESE peasants—rice farmers. It is true that large numbers of the residents of urban areas, principally HANOI, also emigrated to SOUTH VIETNAM, but most of these moved by purchased transportation or by taking advantage of the FRENCH airlift. All of these persons were able to leave their respective zones without any great restraint on the part of the VIET MINH. In brief, the problems of refugee movement in those days were problems of escape, evasion, and restraint. Atrocities were to appear later.


a. With the closing of the HANOI and the HAIDUONG withdrawal areas, the unrestricted influx of large numbers of refugees, from inland areas into HAIPHONG dwindled to the near stopping point. It began to become clear that the VIET MINH were taking a firm stand in opposition to the movement of civilian personnel to SOUTH VIETNAM. Methods used to restrict overland movement were not violent, especially in the days immediately following 10 October. The denial of "laissez passer" (written permission to proceed from one village to another), frequent political harangues, currency and other economic restrictions, and other forms of administrative restraint were employed. By and large they were effective. In turn, however, they caused the opening of a new evacuation route. Commencing in late October, and extending into the first 10 days of November, approximately 20,000 refugees came to HAIPHONG by sea. These people had literally escaped the VIET MINH by proceeding to FRENCH naval vessels

2 ENCLOSURE (1)
lying off the coast of NORTH VIETNAM in the vicinity of NOI CHIN and VAN LY in small canoes and bamboo rafts. This technique was amazingly successful, partially because of the close co-operation between the FRENCH naval forces and the CATHOLIC Church underground. In several instances, FRENCH ships of landing ship type actually beached in the area; and in one case, a U. S. TAP acted as "hotel ship" off the VAN LY coast to receive refugees arriving via this route. During this period, therefore, refugee influx rose and fell erratically but maintained a fairly high level.

b. The evacuation of regular military personnel continued to proceed at about the same daily rate. The FRENCH Army was organized to include a substantially larger number of vehicles than would normally be organic to a force of similar size. For this reason, the FRENCH authorities had a great predilection toward the use of LST in the movement of their units; the LST allowed them to move units intact with their vehicles and to offload them easily at the city of TOURANE, which is without normal pier facilities for deep-draft vessels. This movement of organized units constituted one of two important military movements going on at this time; the other had to do with the movement of "depot stocks." As each unit moved into the HAIPHONG perimeter, it turned in its excess equipment and supplies to Base Operations, TONKIN, the FRENCH Army Quartermaster and Engineer Depot situated in HAIPHONG. These goods, plus those already in the logistic stockpiles at HAIPHONG, at the close of the war, were regularly evacuated. This was the primary mission of the U. S. cargo type vessels assigned to the operation; the major burden of this movement however, was borne by FRENCH commercial shipping specifically committed to this mission.

c. In connection with the military evacuation, two matters are worthy of special mention. U. S. authorities had earlier proved, it was thought, to FRENCH Army authorities, that vehicle loading aboard cargo type ships was far more practical than aboard LST. Nonetheless, throughout the operation, FRENCH Army authorities desired to obtain U. S. LST, or to retain those that were already committed. Secondly, the principal offloading port for all personnel, military and civilian, and for all cargo throughout the operation was HAIPHONG. On occasion, minor ports in the HAIPHONG area, principally HON GAY and CAMPHA PORT, were used to load refugees and military units by small craft. Principal offloading port was SAIGON; until approximately 1 December 1954, however, most FRENCH military units (though no depot stocks) were transported to TOURANE. (On a few occasions, other SOUTH VIETNAM ports, such as CAPE ST. JACQUES, FAM THIET, and HMA TRANG were used.) In December 1954, however, FRENCH military build-up at TOURANE ceased, concurrently with the commencement of plans for a revised and reduced FRENCH Expeditionary Force. From that time on virtually the only offloading port used was SAIGON, a factor which additionally complicated LST employment.

d. It was during this period also, that the matter of the evacuation of civilian goods and civilian capital equipment first assumed importance. The industrial potential of NAM DINH, HANOI, and other large cities of the first two withdrawal zones had been largely abandoned, primarily through the lack of time, but perhaps also because some business firms and individuals felt that a "business as usual" policy with the VIET MINH could
be effectuated. After 30 October, however, with the closing of the HAIXUKHAI sector, the attention of civilian and military officials was naturally drawn to the possibility of removing the maximum possible amount of equipment of potential use to the VIET MINH. As noted above, however, the matter first became one of importance during this period. In early November, a survey was made of the heavy mining equipment, especially the extremely large trucks, regularly employed in the mines at BON OAI. The equipment was obviously of both military and industrial value; in addition, much of it was U.S. funded. Every effort was to be put forward to move this equipment south. It was during this same period that the proposal of U.S. movement of approximately 150 fishing families, and their boats, from HAIX D'ALONG to SOUTH VIETNAM was first presented. This proposal, attractive as it was in overall objective, proved on close examination not to be feasible.

e. By 15 November 1954, a total of 159,654 civilian passengers, 13,697 military passengers, 5,791 vehicles and 28,102 short tons of cargo had been evacuated by U.S. ships. These figures constituted approximately one-third of all personnel and materials that had been moved from the TONKIN DELTA. Refugee influx had dwindled to the point where it was believed that one TAP would be sufficient to meet U.S. shipping commitments in that area. The remaining two TAP still under the operational control of Commander Task Group 90.8 had been profitably employed in transporting the large group of sea escapees that had come from BUI CHU and VAN LY. Increased VIET MINH vigilance and beach patrol had effectively closed that route, however. These two TAP were temporarily retained beyond 15 November 1954 in view of recurring reports of an extremely large group of VIETNAMESE civilians (estimates ranged from 20,000 to 40,000) that had congregated in the vicinity of the city of PHAT DIEM. These people reportedly had originally come to PHAT DIEM to present specific complaints to the INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION that had been created to enforce the Geneva Conference Agreement; reports further indicated, however, that now their intent was to emigrate to SOUTH VIETNAM. When the influx from PHAT DIEM did not take place, the remaining two TAP were released from the INDOCHINA operation. Ultimately, approximately 11,000 persons came from the PHAT DIEM pool to HAIPHONG for further evacuation, but arrivals were fairly evenly spaced and did not commence until 24 November.

f. The FRENCH Army had evacuated the majority of the vehicles and organic units that were to be evacuated until the final months of FRENCH occupation. FRENCH Army authorities in HAIPHONG joined, therefore, in the view that the further employment of U.S. Navy LST was unnecessary, although they requested the privilege of re-call on short notice. Emphasis in November, December and January was therefore to be placed on the evacuation of "depot stocks"; this consideration warranted the retention of 4 CIHAI type vessels in the INDOCHINA theater. As a result of the above analysis, Commander Task Force 90 determined that the composition of Task Group 90.8 after 15 November should consist of one TAP, 4 CIHAI types, no LST, no LSD, and 1 APD for flagship purposes. This organization went into effect shortly after 15 November. U.S. authorities fully realized that the final months of the evacuation would probably require the commitment of additional U.S. shipping, but the task organization outlined above was deemed sufficient for the intermediate months; in the
main, this conclusion was justified by events as they developed. On
15 November 1954, Commander Amphibious Squadron ONE assumed command,
as Commander Task Group 90.8, of local sea operations. Commander Task
Force 90 departed the INDOCHINA area, while retaining overall command
of the INDOCHINA evacuation under the operational control of Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet.


a. Throughout this period, refugee influx from outside the perimeter
remained fairly constant, averaging about 300 persons per day during the
early part of the period, and gradually mounting to about 500 persons per
day toward the end. These refugees were those who, by some device or means
managed to reach HAIPHONG overland, generally through the use of false or
re-used passports. The most common device was to proceed to HANOI or
HAIDUONG, obtain in some fashion legitimate or illegitimate permission
for rail travel, and ride the train into HAIPHONG. Grimly enough, it
was now for the first time that refugee influx from outside the per­
imeter could be predicted with reasonable certainty. The factor that
ensured some certainty was the strictness of the VIET MINH measures to
prevent large scale overland movements. There were, however, three
separate incidents during this period which affected the refugee influx
picture. The first of these was the arrival of approximately 12,000 of
the "PHAT DIEU GROUP" who reached HAIPHONG over a period of 10 days
commencing 24 November 1954. This group would have been
assimilated into refugee camps, and into the TAP schedule without undue difficulty.

b. The third and most important occurrence in the refugee picture,
was the beginning, about 1 December 1954, of an "evacuation spirit" in
HAIPHONG. Prior to that time, very little of either personnel or
material permanently in HAIPHONG had been moved. On that date, however,
H. CONRIGN, who formerly had exercised all civil authority of the FRENCH
government in NORTHERN VIETNAM, relinquished his powers to General COGNY,
who thereafter was both civil and military head of FRENCH interests. On
the same date, General COGNY announced that the FRENCH government would
not guarantee the security or the orderly evacuation of any civilian in
HAIPHONG after 1 February 1955; prior to that date, they would assist
in every way possible. The result was a new kind of "refugee"—the per­
manent HAIPHONG resident, or permanent resident of the territories re­
main ing within the HAIPHONG perimeter. A great many of these were

ENCLOSURE (1)
CHIANG. On 29 December, the GENERAL HOWZE carried a passenger load that was largely made up of this group. Estimates varied as to the number of persons in this group who would desire to emigrate, but the figure of 100,000 was accepted by many conservative officials having to do with the refugee movement. Coupled with the steady influx from outside the perimeter, the total number of expected refugees exceeded the capacity of one U. S. TAP. It was for this reason that Commander Task Group 90.8 recommended to Commander Task Force 90 in early January that an additional TAP be made available for INDOCHINA operations. This recommendation was approved by Commander Task Force 90 following personal conference with Commander Task Group 90.8 on 22 January and CHMAAG INDOCHINA on 26 January 1955.

c. Evacuation of intact military units with organic equipment proceeded at a regular pace by means of FRENCH merchant shipping during the early part of the period. Original FRENCH plans called for the maintenance in the HAI PHONG perimeter of a force of 22,000 men and about 3,500 vehicles from 1 February 1955 until the final months of the evacuation. On 22 November U. S. authorities were informed that plans had been revised to provide for the evacuation of an additional 1,500 vehicles prior to 1 February, reducing the number of vehicles to be retained correspondingly. (However, one of the most uncertain factors about military evacuation in INDOCHINA was the fact that at virtually every inventory of vehicles, the number of vehicles on hand in NORTH VIETNAM increased by substantial numbers.) On the basis of this additional evacuation requirement, imposed by General ELY, over-all FRENCH commander in INDOCHINA, FRENCH military authorities requested, on 24 November that four MSTS LST (JAPANESE manned) be deployed to INDOCHINA for a period of six weeks, commencing about 15 December 1954. The use of this type of shipping was initially opposed by CTF 90 because of logistic and language difficulties, but most importantly because the INDOCHINA evacuation, administrative in character, was simply not suited to a profitable employment of LST. On the other hand, FRENCH authorities had good reasons for the request; LST were the most convenient form of shipping for evacuating their vehicles with the units to which the vehicles were regularly assigned, and since the offloading port was TOURANE, the problem of offloading was considerably simplified. The FRENCH request was favorably endorsed by Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, INDOCHINA, and approved by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The first MSTS LST arrived in HAI PHONG on 14 December 1954, and all four had loaded and sailed by 17 December 1954. Language barriers were eliminated by virtue of the fact that Commander Military Sea Transportation Service, Western Pacific Area, had provided three shore-based liaison officials of the American Shipping Company, all of whom spoke English and performed their function most competently; and three English-speaking radio operators per ship. Very little in the way of communications difficulties was experienced.

d. Rumor persisted for many weeks that the FRENCH intended to cut drastically their forces remaining after 1 February 1955, far below the 22,000 figure. Eventually, U. S. authorities learned that the revised plan called for a reduction to 18,000. The evacuation of military personnel never posed a problem.
e. Major military evacuation emphasis during the period, as noted, was on the removal of depot stocks. The over-all plan called for the evacuation of 1,500 tons per day during November, 2,000 tons per day during December and 1,000 tons per day during January. No difficulty was encountered in meeting this schedule; November goals were exceeded, which reduced the amount of material evacuated during December. By the end of December, FRENCH authorities indeed were in the position of digging for cargo. Other than specific loads of cement and asphalt (3 each), it was clear by the beginning of December, that if the FRENCH would not accept the proposition of vehicle loading on CINMAYI type vessels, only 2 of these ships could be profitably employed. During December and the early part of January, U. S. CINMAYI ships were employed in the lifting of available remaining military equipment, plus the cement and asphalt that belonged to the FRENCH Army or VIETNAMESE government. On the completion of these latter missions, Commander Task Group 90.8 recommended to Commander Task Force 90 that the number of CINMAYI types be reduced to two. By the end of January, "depot stocks" other than those required for the support of the troops to remain after 1 February 1955, were for all practical purposes evacuated. The issue of military evacuation from that time on was therefore primarily a matter of vehicles.

f. During December, the term "evacuation" took on a new significance. The TONKIN DELTA operation was proceeding satisfactorily. The overriding consideration at this time, however, grew to be the question of how much military material should remain in INDOCHINA itself to suit the needs of the revised and re-organized FRENCH Expeditionary Force and the new VIETNAMESE Army. Some reduction was required. U. S. authorities were forced in the main to await the completion of both FRENCH organizational planning and FRENCH inventory of available equipment. Directives to the Task Force commander indicated that this issue of "excess stocks" was of highest import. Designated vessels being released from evacuation duties were made available for this assignment, that is, the removal of U. S. title equipment declared excess by the FRENCH to some other area in which a military assistance advisory program was in effect. This basic problem of course was quite distinct from the mission of Task Force 90 units in INDOCHINA; in late December, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet assigned the sea transportation aspects of the removal of such excess stocks from SOUTH VIETNAM, where virtually all were located, to the Military Sea Transportation Service.

g. Commander Task Force 90 did become concerned with this issue, however, with respect to specific cargo still remaining in HAIPHONG, in connection with the employment of the time chartered SS DIDDLE, which arrived at HAIPHONG on Christmas Day, 1954 to outload excess Air Force ammunition from INDOCHINA.

h. Throughout the period, the movement of civilian cargo from the HAIPHONG perimeter assumed increasing importance. The degree and manner in which U. S. shipping should participate was the cause for some confusion in the early part of November. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet established the basic policy on 11 November 1954. This policy was that the use of U. S. controlled ships to evacuate civilian material was authorized, when necessary as a last resort, to prevent material of...
value from falling into the hands of the VIEt MINH. However, the purpose of this authorization was not to provide free transportation to civilian concerns nor to compete with FRENCH shipping activities but to provide a means for evacuation of such material as would be beyond the capability of FRENCH sea lift and that payment of standard U.S. shipping charges was desired from all concerns able to pay. Under no conditions, was civilian owned property to take priority over HAIPHONG material. Various authorities concerned with the evacuation adopted slightly differing interpretations of this policy message. Differences were resolved upon the issuance of Chief MAAI, INDOCHINA letter of 30 November 1954. Thereafter, no civilian cargo was to be accepted unless: (1) It was specifically established that the cargo was offered to the FRENCH who had to declare it beyond the capacity of normal FRENCH shipping facilities; and (2) The shipment was specifically approved by Chief Military Assistance and Advisory Group, INDOCHINA, representatives; and (3) CIF 90 delegated authority to CENNAV 90.8 to give final approval as to meeting the requirements of CINCPACFLT. These measures were regarded as necessary to prevent antagonism on the part of regular FRENCH shipping companies, with attendant unfavorable reflection on the U.S. The end result was that only a very negligible amount of civilian cargo, other than the barges which constituted LSD loads, was ever offered to be carried by U.S. ships. U.S. ships continued to be available, for actual use, and as stimulants to the FRENCH, to load any and all military cargo; FRENCH shipping of commercial nature was thus free to handle civilian cargo under normal procedures.

1. The shipment of civilian cargo involved of course, the matter of the two most important industrial facilities of the HAIPHONG perimeter; namely, the coal mines at HONGAY and the cement plant at HAIPHONG. Equipment in these two establishments was of both military and industrial usefulness. It should be noted, however, that to some extent its employment in its primary purpose was necessarily limited to the places where it was in fact located; thus, there are no substantial coal deposits in INDOCHINA other than along the HONGAY - CAMPHA coast. These questions involved, naturally, the entire future of FRENCH business interests in the VISTI MINH zone, and were the subject of lengthy conferences between FRENCH and VIEt MINH officials and businessmen. The direction toward which negotiations were tending to move appeared to be that U.S. funded equipment at the coal mines would be evacuated; and all other equipment would be left in place. This proved to be the case. The cement plant was left intact, and the coal mining equipment was evacuated in March. The VIEt MINH naturally opposed removal, not only of this equipment but of any capital producing goods or technical equipment in the HAIPHONG perimeter. The manner of opposition was propaganda on potential unemployment, and the organization of demonstrations; these became not infrequent occurrences in HAIPHONG. It should be noted, however, that at no time was there anything approaching civil or military disturbance in HAIPHONG, for this cause or for any other. In many ways it may be said that HAIPHONG during this entire period was one of the safest places in INDOCHINA.

j. U.S. forces were intimately concerned with the removal of certain floating equipment that was civilian owned. Concurrently with their request for LSD, FRENCH authorities requested the deployment of one U.S. Navy LSD for the lift of this equipment. The request was concurred in
by local U. S. commanders, and approved by Commander Task Force 90. The USS CODINGTON HALL (LSD 5) arrived in HAIPHONG 10 January 1955, and remained until 28 February 1955, completing all her scheduled runs.

b. The overall situation at that time can be summarized as follows:

During the period 16 November 1954 through 23 January 1955, U. S. shipping lifted a total of 622 military passengers, 38,861 civilian passengers, 952 vehicles, and 31,054 short tons of cargo.


4a. On 23 January 1955, Commander Amphibious Squadron ONE was relieved as Commander Task Group 90.8 by Captain A. R. ST. ANGELO, U. S. Navy, this change of command took place during the lull accompanying the Chinese New Year. The lull in the evacuation extended for several days beyond the original four day celebration period, however, by the end of the month the HOWZE was able to depart HAIPHONG on her final trip with 4,253 passengers among which was the 50,000th passenger evacuated aboard that ship. During February the only ship to carry passengers was the MARINE SERPENT and she made two trips carrying 5266 refugees on 8 February and 5170 on 16 February.

4b. Although registrations remained high, refugees actually ready to depart were few. On 18 February the Refugee Committee officially closed registration for the sea lift until 1 March. The president of the committee gave as reasons: (1) Psychological effect - it was hoped to induce persons registered for evacuation to depart, and (2) time was necessary to process the 17,256 local and camp refugees already registered for the sea lift. The tent camps were gradually closed and the refugees were moved into vacant public buildings in HAIPHONG proper.

4c. On 20 February the CODINGTON suffered a main engine casualty and was towed by the PICTOR into TOURAHE BAY where temporary emergency repairs were effected. By the end of February, CODINGTON was sailed for SUBIC BAY for permanent repairs. The CODINGTON was released to COMSTSTRPAC on 3 March.

4d. On 6 March Governor LE QUANG LUAT presided at ceremonies celebrating the 500,000th civilian refugee to be evacuated from NORTH VIETNAM by both FRENCH and U. S. lifts.

4e. Refugee camps continued to close until by 20 March only CAMP LACH TRAY remained. The population of CAMP LACH TRAY at this time was 2,165 with no one ready to leave. The camp population remained fairly constant and on 13 April was closed but maintained in a state of readiness to accommodate any overflow from the newly opened CAMP MARINE. It was again reopened on 14 April to accommodate 1,300 escapists from VINH area. CAMP LACH TRAY was closed on 24 April due to unsanitary conditions and the population moved to CAMP 9 HUE DONAL. Finally on 9 May all refugees were evacuated from the camp and all camps were closed.

4f. On 1 April the numerical designators of forces engaged in the ENDOCHINA evacuation were changed for administrative reasons from TF 90 to TG 50.1. CTF 90 became CTG 50.1, CTG 90.8 became CTU 50.1.1, and CTU 90.8.2 became CTE 50.1.1.1. No change in personnel or composition of forces was involved.

ENCLOSURE (1)
On 11 April Captain WALTER C. WINN, USN, relieved RAOM L. S.
SARIN, USN, as CTG 50.1.

A turn around schedule of eight days was maintained by the MARINE
SHREwright and MARINE ADDER throughout April. GENERAL BREWSTER joined TU
50.1.1 on 22 April and was assigned the same type schedule. By the end
of April camp population had dropped to 1300 and the total registered
for sea lift was under 10,000. Throughout the month the FRENCH con­
tinued to air lift 200 refugees a day so the total registered for air lift
at the end of April was just under 16,000. In late April four T-LST
joined TU 50.1.1 to assist in the evacuation of FRENCH security forces
and organic equipment from the HAIPHONG perimeter to TOURANE and SAIGON.
On 28 April units of TU 50.1.1 were refueled and replenished for the
final phase of the operation.

On 2 May CTG 50.1 received orders at YOKOSUKA, JAPAN from
CINC PACFLT to proceed to INDOCHINA and assume on the scene command of
the evacuation forces. On 3 May DIACHEMKO relieved COOK as flagship
for CTG 50.1.1. CTG 50.1 with an operational staff departed YOKOSUKA
by air on 5 May. On 6 May CTG 50.1 broke his pennant in COOK at SANOLEY
POINT, P. I. and proceeded to HAIPHONG, arriving 8 May. Following a
brief orientation by CTG 50.1.1 and a physical reconnaissance of the
refugee situation, CTG 50.1 assumed local command of sea operations.
After conferences with RAINFOOT and General LUNDY, CTG 50.1 in COOK
de parted for SAIGON on 9 May. By this date three TAP had sailed with
less than 2,000 passengers each since 1 May. All refugee camps were
closed. No U. S. funded equipment remained in HAIPHONG.

On 11 and 12 May CTG 50.1 conferred in SAIGON with ALUSNA SAIGON,
CINMAC INDOCHINA, and the commander of the FRENCH naval forces in INDO­
CHINA, VADN JOZAN, regarding U. S. naval assistance for a possible sea
rescue of refugees prior to the evacuation deadline, 18 May

On 13 May the last U. S. ship departed HAIPHONG and the evac­
uation scene was shifted to DO SON. On 14 May CTG 50.1 arrived at DO
SON to observe the final loading. During the embarkation of FRENCH
security forces and equipment, ten refugees including a man and his in­
fant daughter arrived for evacuation. Barefoot, hungry, and with the
clothing on their backs as their only worldly possessions, these refugees
had fled the city of HANOI at the last possible moment. The father with
his baby daughter had chosen freedom despite the fact that his wife re­
fused to accompany him. They were the last official refugees of the
"Passage to Freedom" in U. S. transportation and were embarked in the
GENERAL BREWSTER.

On 15 May CTG 50.1 assumed operational control of all U. S.
ships present. Final plans were made for the sea rescue operations to
be conducted 16-18 May. One TAP and one LST in excess of requirements
were released. The remaining ships; COOK, DIACHEMKO, and MARINE ADDER
shifted to BAIE DE LANHA where they were joined by the FRENCH naval units
still in the area.

On 16 May all ships took stations in international waters off the
coast of INDOCHINA seaward of VINH and THANH NOA. Essentially, the plan
was to rescue any refugees who were able to escape the limits of territ­
orial waters. By the morning of 18 May no refugees had appeared for

ENCLOSURE (1)
transportation and all ships departed NORTH VIETNAM. Release orders were issued to U.S. ships; ships with loads were released on completion of offloading, those without loads were released on departure. CG 50.1 proceeded to SAWWILY and on arrival 20 May dissolved TG 50.1, terminating U.S. participation in Operation "Passage to Freedom".

II. Final evacuation totals for the entire operation by U.S. shipping were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian passengers</td>
<td>293,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military passengers</td>
<td>17,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total passengers</td>
<td>310,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (tons)</td>
<td>66,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>8,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barges</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Births</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
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</table>


CHAPTER XI

CHRONOLOGY

14 November 1954

CTF 90 turned over local command of the sea phase of the INDOCHINA evacuation to CTG 90.8 but retained overall command of the sea operations under CHRONOLOGY. Additional organizational changes were as follows:

All ships and units engaged in INDOCHINA evacuation were assigned to the operational control of CTG 90.8; CTU 90.8.1 designated Commander Embarkation Unit, HAIPHONG; CTU 90.8.2 designated Commander Debarkation Unit, SAIGON. All other task designations and functions were abolished. The Command structure was established as follows: CTF 90, HAIM L. S. SABIN in ESTES. CTG 90.8, CAPT W. J. FRANK, Jr., in USS BALDUC. CTU 90.8.1, CDR J. H. DAVIS, on temporary additional duty from the staff of COMNAVFORPAC, Pacific Area, CTU 90.8.2, LCDR W. MURRAY, Commanding Officer, MSTSOFFICE, SAIGON, VIETNAM.

Composition, Task Group 90.8 as of this date:

USS BALDUC (APD 132)
USS IST 855
USS IST 772
USS IST 840
USS IST 1159
USNS GENERAL HOWZE (TAP 134)

USNS MARINE LYNX (TAP 194)
USNS MARINE ADDER (TAP 195)
USNS PENTRESS (TAK 180)
USNS BRENDA (TAK 200)
USNS HENDON (TAK 187)

Summary of evacuation totals as of this date: (U.S. shipping only)

13,657 Military passengers
153,807 Civilian passengers
5,792 Vehicles
27,977 Short tons cargo
92 Deaths
92 Births

Total refugees, HAIPHONG Camps: 11,127

15 November 1954

CTF 90 in ESTES departed INDOCHINA area. CTG 92.3 (Logistics Support Group) released by CTF 90 and disestablished.

IST 855 embarked remaining beachmaster and boat unit personnel attached to COMNAVBCGIR 1, and was released. Departed HAIPHONG with these personnel plus helicopters and crews from Marine Air Group 16. MARINE ADDER was released and departed area. HBBGR (APD 127), former flagship of CTG 90.9, departed SAIGON for SINGAPORE.

16 November 1954

IST 772 was released and departed INDOCHINA area. First refugees from group, congregated at PHAT DIEN, arrived in HAIPHONG after circuitous journey.

ENCLOSURE (1)
in VIETNAM boat and truck. The total refugee influx was very small with only 61 persons in this group. USS REDECKER (TAK 186) arrived in VIETNAM waters and reported to CTG 90.6. REDECKER commenced repatriating other JAPANESE named TAK in Tank Group 90.6 with fresh provisions from JAPAN.

17 November 1954

CTG 90.6, after conference with FRENCH and MAO representatives, recommended release of HAINING LYNX and FRENCHES. Three ODANI and one TAP were considered sufficient. Only one loading berth was available for the G1 W1 and the influx of refugees was less than anticipated because of VIETNAM interference.

CTG 90 occurred in release of HAINING LYNX, but not FRENCHES until recapitulation.

LST 1159 cleared PHANPHAT, after clearing fouled line from screw with assistance of USS ASKAN (AGI 30) former member Logistic Support Group. ASKAN departed IEDOCHINA area.

19 November 1954

200 PHAT DIEN refugees embarked at PHAT DIEN for transport to HAI PHONG via a circuitous inland water route. LST 840 was released. Population of camp SHELL and PASOKE is 5,000 with only 1,700 willing to go.

19 November 1954

LST 1159 released. 140 PHAT DIEN refugees arrived HAI PHONG. Each refugee paid 250 VIETNAMESE piastres for transportation to HAI PHONG via VIETNAM facilities.

20 November 1954

Two FRENCH fishing contractors, acting as spokesmen for fishermen in the BALE D'ALONG area, arrived HAI PHONG seeking AMERICAN assistance in the evacuation of approximately 100 fishing families, with their boats, to the south. They were placed in contact with MAO and USN personnel. This was the first notice U.S. authorities had of any desire on the part of the fishermen of BALE D'ALONG, almost all of whom were CHINESE, to move to the south. They conditioned their desire to move on being allowed to bring their boats with them.

Initial plans were discussed by FRENCH Navy and local CATHOLIC authorities to effect coastal refugee pick-up in the vicinity of VEDN, similar to the BALE D'ALONG operation. VEDN operation was scheduled to be last major effort of CATHOLIC authorities who, as of this date, regarded PHAT DIEN incapable, because of VIETNAM restrictions, of producing more than a token number of refugees. VEDN operation scheduled to begin about 30 November 1954, expected to produce less than 6,000 refugees. Refugees report constant propaganda and intimidation along the circuitous VIET NAM route. Also difficulty in obtaining VIET NAM passports and
having to pay 7,000 piastres for transportation, which allegedly is free, has effectively hampered the effort.

21 November 1954

USS BALDUC proceeded to HENRIETTE PASSÉ for recreation of the crew and to await instructions from the NAVAL LINE.

CGT 90.8 arrived HAI PHONG for SÀI GÒN via FRENCH military aircraft on 3 days temporary additional duty for conferences with FRENCH and U.S. authorities, and to supervise special operational planning directed by SÀI GÒN.

22 November 1954

Workers at a HAI PHONG caledon plant struck when FRENCH tried to remove equipment. Workers claimed removal of equipment would destroy their jobs. RED inspired strikes are expected wherever FRENCH attempt to remove machinery from HAI PHONG plants.

USS BALDUC remained in HENRIETTE PASSÉ. Only ship loading in HAI PHONG was the USS FIBBINA.

23 November 1954

USS MACINE LYNX arrived HENRIETTE PASSÉ, fueled and replenished BALDUC.

24 November 1954

USS MACINE LYNX released from INDOCHINA operations and sailed for JAPAN. BALDUC returned to HAI PHONG from HENRIETTE PASSÉ.

CGT 90.8 returned from 3 days temporary additional duty in SÀI GÒN, in company with Chief NAAC, INDOCHINA.

Long expected influx of large number refugees from PHAT ĐIEN commenced with arrival of 800 via VIET MINH boat transport to boundary line at BAC GIU on SONG VAN UG. Temporary refugee camp established at ĐIEN an church, 7 miles southwest of HAI PHONG.

Fishing colony representative stated that solution to fishing boat problem proposed by FRENCH Navy, which was to sail boats south in company and under escort in April, was unsatisfactory in view of growing VIET MINH infiltration of fishing communities. CGT 90.8.1 was directed to ascertain state of junks and feasibility of loading them on CNAVY type vessels.

Chief NAAC, INDOCHINA, in conference, expressed desire for the following: (1) Maximum effort to move fishing community; (2) Reduction to three CNAVY type vessels. At the same conference, FRENCH representatives gave first indication that they will request employment of 4 U.S. LST for use commencing about 15 December on the HAI PHONG-TOURANE run. Request will be

3

ENCLOSURE (1)
based on a recent directive from General ELY that 3500 more vehicles than originally planned must be moved out of the perimeter by 31 January, and on marked FRENCH preference, especially when TOUSADE is offloading point, for LST as opposed to cargo types for vehicle movement.

Recent refugee arrivals from PHAT DIEN related VIET MINH tactics to the CONTROL COMMISSION. They said they received LST lectures on the horrors of HAIPHONG refugee camps and were told that the young men would be forced into the VIETMINH Army and sent to HOROODOO.

A refugee CATHOLIC priest told of his torture and degradation in which CHINESE Army officers jammed shop sticks in his ears and beat him with bamboo poles after accusing him of telling lies to the people.

HUSBAND completed transfer of JAPANESE provisions to all TAK with reprovisioning of FRENCH at HAIPHONG.

25 November 1954

Conversations with late arrived refugees disclose they want to leave RED-dominated TONKIN DELTA less for religious reasons than because of hard work without pay, higher taxes, constant anarchy and lawlessness, and intense indoctrination in communist philosophy.

Many refugees now in HAIPHONG camps gave reasons for not wanting to leave as "they are waiting for families and to exchange VIET NAM money for VIETNAM". CEMAG believes there may be many other significant reasons.

26 November 1954

FRENCH cargo-liner, ST NICHEL, unloaded 700 refugees in conformance to FRENCH policy of placing refugees on shipping capable of carrying them after conclusion of cargo or troop loading.

Refugee arrivals at KIEN AN church from PHAT DIEN reached 1,000 mark for one day on this date.

A DOMINICAN priest at HAIPHONG has been ordered by his superior to depart the city permanently along with all other DOMINICANS in the area. DOMINICANS have played a major role in the evacuation, being especially helpful in refugee camps.

27 November 1954

FRENCH completed loading and sailed to SAIGON with cargo containing miscellaneous equipment of CATHOLIC church authorities in HAIPHONG. CID 950 protested the character of the cargo to senior MACV representative HAIPHONG. Material was mostly junk and did not make for good storage.

CEMAG recommended all U.S. shipping now in IO area remain and that A HUS35 LST be made available from 15 December to 31 January or possibly later.

FRENCH are losing some of their shipping to redeployment of troops to PHAKK, and General ELY has ordered an acceleration of rolling stock.

ENCLOSURE (1)
and depot stock lifts.

23 November 1954

CTG 90.8 concurred with CUBNAV's recommendation to retain 4 CUBAVI providing FRENCH assigned berths in HAI PHONG without unnecessary delays.

CTG 90.8 stated the increase in influx of refugees warrants retention of GENERAL AGS.

Slowdown by longshoremen offloading FRENCH at TOURANE required utilization of FRENCH Army personnel. This proved very satisfactory, however, the 14 days required to offload this ship is excessive.

FRENCH promised that HEMERPHIH, next scheduled to offload TOURANE, would be the last CUBAVI to use TOURANE as offloading port.

CTF 90.8.1 visited villages of BAIE DE ALONG fishermen to discuss the problem of moving their fishing boats south. After survey, he concluded it was impossible to lift boats by CUBAVI, but that the fishermen must be evacuated soon, as they fear retribution after they do not trade now with the VIETMINH. Construction and size of boats precludes hoisting or profitable deck or hold storage. LSD regarded only vessel capable of making lift. CTF 90.8 recommended LSD not be employed because he did not consider the situation warranted the use of such critical type shipping.

29 November 1954

Typhoon TILDA passed HAIPHONG without damage and continued toward NHA TRANG.

Sanitary conditions in HAIPHONG camps now rated good, due in part to LINDANE spraying and DDT dusting by U.S. Navy medical unit.

Among yesterday's arrivals at HAIPHONG was a patriarch of 102 years who traveled 22 months on foot to bring his family from THANH HOA home to PHAT Dinh and then to freedom. His family numbered 42 and consisted of 5 generations, the 5th represented by a 2 day old infant.

An attempt by VIETMINH officials to remove government owned dental and X-ray equipment from the dental clinic of the HAIPHONG city hospital had to be abandoned. City police broke up a gathering of nurses, technicians, other employees, and hundreds of friends demonstrating against the loss of jobs. This is second known incident of demonstration protesting removal of “capital” goods from area. No question but what VIETMINH sympathizers are attempting to induce as many demonstrations as possible.

COMSUBINWESTPAC approved the request by CTG 90 to sail 4 MTBs LST to HAIPHONG to report to CTG 90.8 at earliest date. COMSUBINWESTPAC also approved the request for FRENCH interpreters for HAIPHONG, TOURANE and any other offloading port.

5  ENCLOSURE (1)
Emergency refugee camp set up in kindergarten in center of HAIPHONG, and used intermittently past several weeks, are now being abandoned by VIETMINH officials on strong recommendation of U.S. Navy medical officers, HAAG and USCG representative HAIPHONG. Refugees are moving to new camp situated in ideal location near the cement plant on outskirts of HAIPHONG.

CTC 90.8 reported that the problem of moving the VIETNAMESE fishing fleet to the south could be practically solved by either or both of two methods listed below:

1. A FRENCH fishing contractor had expressed a desire to arrange transportation for about thirty to FRENCH where he would establish a badly needed fishing fleet.

2. The FRENCH have refused to transport any but have agreed to escort the seafaring fishing boats south between the monsoons. This would leave an indeterminate number to be lifted. In any event CTC 90.8 recommended the U.S. not transport them because it would set a precedent not hitherto afforded others. He recommended the entire matter be left up to the FRENCH and that HAAG carefully follow the negotiations.

2 December 1954

General GOCUY announced via press, radio and bulletin boards that FRENCH government will not be responsible for the military security or orderly evacuation of FRENCH nationals who choose to remain within HAIPHONG perimeter after 1 February 1955. 

Evacuation atmosphere is beginning to permeate HAIPHONG with the closing of many shops.

General GOCUY assumed all functions of FRENCH civil government (except consular functions) from M. COMPAGN, delegate to NORTH VIETNAM. COMPAGN expected to depart shortly.

At present the population in camps at HAIPHONG is 10,423. Of these only 3,550 are willing to leave.

CTC 90.8 reported that many young men entering the VIETNAMESE Army and others being assimilated into the HAIPHONG population have caused somewhat of a decrease in camp population.

2 December 1954

Monsieur COMPAGN, former FRENCH delegate to NORTH VIETNAM, informed HaAG officers of negotiations then in progress between VIET MINH and FRENCH businessmen and officials. M. COMPAGN stated purpose of negotiations was to attempt to reach a financial settlement that would allow FRENCH to salvage some value from business properties falling under VIET MINH control.

ENVELOPE (1)
Refugees in Cam extended at 150 per day as backlog of refugees who had congregated at Phat DIEN became exhausted. INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION published figures of 10,000 refugees that had been brought from Phat DIEN last 10 days through COMMISSION efforts.

5 December 1954

Only ships loading in HAIPHONG are HERMION and HERKEMER.

Refugees in very small numbers continue to arrive from Phat DIEN.

5 December 1954

HERKEMER completed loading cement, the first ship during the period to carry this type load. Cement had been purchased by FRENCH Army for delivery in SAIGON.

6 December 1954

CTG 90.8 reported that the FRENCH have only 3 LST loads ready for the 4 LSTS LSTs scheduled to arrive the middle of the month. Majority of FRENCH LST are reported to be in overhaul status.

No loading this date.

7 December 1954

CTG 90.8 departed HAIPHONG by air for 3 days temporary additional duty in SAIGON.

BALDUCk refueled and replenished from GENERAL HOWZE at HENNEPIT PASS.

8 December 1954

BALDUCk enroute SAIGON.

9 December 1954

PENZINA released. To be replaced by ALLO OLSON arriving HAIPHONG 13 December.

The problem of fishing boats came up again. CHINA, SAIGON informed CINCPAC that the owners of about 180 registered vessels at APCAN will not be ready to leave until the end of the April monsoon. He further stated that transporting them aboard ship was not practicable.

10 December 1954

BALDUCk arrived SAIGON and reembarked CTG 90.8.

11 December 1954

GENERAL HOWZE arrived SAIGON, offloaded refugees, and sailed for SUBIC

ENCLOSURES (1)
BAY for logistics. Scheduled refueling of BALDUCK from GENERAL HOWZE cancelled because of delay in arrival of GENERAL HOWZE in SAIGON.

12 December 1954

The scheduled pick-up of refugees off VINH again failed to produce results, due primarily to rough weather along coast which precluded lift by napans to anchored vessels and prevented beaching of landing ship types.

13 December 1954

No loading this date.

Air evacuation from HAIPHONG has slowed, the intention is to use TAP as primary means of evacuation.

14 December 1954

CTG 90.8 departed SAIGON by air for HAIPHONG in order to be present when MTLS LST arrive from JAPAN.

HENNEPIN finally received dockside off-loading berth after 3 days delay in SAIGON. Reason for delay was short-lived strike of stevedores against one shipping company partially tying up SAIGON docks, including one scheduled for HENNEPIN.

LST 47, 176, 546 arrived HAIPHONG, reported to CTG 90.8 for operational control.

After conferences with FRENCH Army and Navy, CTG 90.8 recommended that the U.S. furnish 1 LSD from 10 January to 1 March and have 1 LSD available about 1 May if required. Also there was a possible requirement for not more than 1 AKA about 1 May.

15 December 1954

LST 520 arrived HAIPHONG, reported to CTG 90.8 for operational control.

Recommendation for LSD and AKA approved both by CTF 90 and CINC PACFLT.

16 December 1954

BALDUCK underway for HAIPHONG from SAIGON.

GENERAL HOWZE departure from SUBIC BAY delayed until 23 December 1954 because of delay in the arrival of the provision ship until that date.

CTG 90.8 reported that if agreements are reached between private VIMHANCO and FRENCH companies and the VITH MINH Government, there will be a considerable reduction in the amount of civilian equipment to be evacuated.

17 December 1954

MTLS LST 176 completed first MTLS LST evacuation loading, destination

ENCLOSURE (1)
SAIGON. LST 546 and 520 loaded for TOURANE.

As a result of the reduction in refugees reaching HAIPHONG only 800 are ready to depart.

19 December 1954

LST 147 loaded and sailed for TOURANE.

Refugee arrivals averaging 500 per day. VINH operation again postponed because of heavy seas. Most arrivals this period utilizing false and re-used "false passes".

CHGAAG, SAIGON recommended that since the FRENCH Government intends charging 400 piastres per square meter to move civilian barges from HAIPHONG to SAIGON, the U.S. should apply similar rates for the use of LSD.

19 December 1954

CG 90.8 reported evacuation totals to date as: 6125 vehicles, 43,598 tons of cargo and 306,930 passengers.

2900 refugees, of a total of 10,223 in HAIPHONG camps, are ready to leave.

The majority of recent arrivals filtered through the VIET MINH border on their own initiative using false or re-used passports.

FRENCH Army authorities informed MAAG that loading of cargo first 15 days of December averaged 1,527 long tons of depot stocks. Original goal was 2,000 long tons per day; however, FRENCH far exceeded November unloading goal of 1,500 long tons per day.

ALRO OLSON completed first load and sailed SAIGON. Load was principally cement. This was second TAK load of cement moved by U.S. ships.

20 December 1954

FRENCH Navy had 2 coastal pick-up ships off VINH coast. No pick-up was effected the night of 20 December.

The FRENCH estimate 18,000 permanent residents of the present NORTH VIETNAM perimeter will want to move south before May.

The FRENCH are attempting to persuade all possible to move prior to CHINES 1ST Year, 25 January.

21 December 1954

CG 90.8 departed HAIPHONG by air in order to be present during Admiral HAIPOF'D's visit to SAIGON.

First arrivals of refugees from VINH reached HAIPHONG. 525 persons picked up off coast by FRENCH ship night of 19 December.

9 ENCLOSURE (1)
GENERAL HOWZE reported departure SUBIC cay for further delayed due to needed repairs. GENERAL HOWZE directed to employ 24 hour working day to expedite all repairs as camp population this date reached 11,161 persons with 3,050 ready to go.

22 December 1954

FRENCH authorities assured CTU 90.8.1 that 167 loads could be available for 1ST ETO throughout their prospective period of employment.

23 December 1954

HEMPDEN released from INDOCHINA operations on completion of offloading in SAIGON.

GENERAL HOWZE departed SUBIC BAY for HAIPHONG.

2,350 refugees arrived HAIPHONG from VINH. FRENCH offloading about 300 refugees by air per day to keep camp population down.

About 100 refugees per day are joining the VIETNAMESE Army and another 200 are reentering the VIET MINH zones in search of their families.

Security has noticeably tightened at HAIPHONG military installations due to rumors of possible RED demonstrations.

24 December 1954

After 3 days in SAIGON CTG 90.8 returned to BALDUC at HAIPHONG with 1,100 pounds Christmas mail for U. S. personnel in HAIPHONG. Mail delivery made possible by special effort CONNON of Mr. Leland BARKHOUS, Chief, HQS, INDOCHINA.

HAIPHONG streets presented appearance of armed camp. Special military policemen patrolled all downtown area in large groups. Personnel CTU 90.8.1 directed to remain near billets ashore; radio jeep made available to other U. S. personnel ashore for emergency communication with flagship during hours of darkness.

25 December 1954

SS DIZDO arrived HAIPHONG for special load, and reported to CTG 90.8 for operational control.

No VIET MINH demonstrations developed 24 or 25 December.

26 December 1954

FRENCH Navy dispatched one frigate to VINH area for possible pick-up but all authorities agreed virtually all refugees from that area have already reached HAIPHONG. Beacon was not exhaustion of refugee pool but increased VIET MINH surveillances.

VIETNAMESE authorities delayed loading of GENERAL HOWZE until 29 December despite urging for earlier loading by U. S. and FRENCH authorities. VIM-10

ENCLOSURE (1)
During the stage special demonstration 26 December for VIET refugees

27 December 1954

CARGO HOUSES arrived HAIPHONG. BALDWIN fueled and replenished from CARGO HOUSES.

VIET converted cargo holds in November, continue requirement for

26 December 1954

SOUTH KOREAN arrived HAIPHONG as relief for MIDWAY and

20 December 1954

FEMINITY released from INDOCHINA operation.

SOUTH KOREAN commenced loading drums of asphalt purchased through USOIN funds. COMINGTON commenced loading cement.

27 December 1954

Refugees loaded on CARGO HOUSES included about 500 of CHINESE descent from SID GAY region and about 600 permanent HAIPHONG residents. This is first real exodus of these groups whom VIET are urging to depart early.

VIET Army intelligence sources stated on excellent authority that

26 December 1954

VIET LEUTH have formulated definite policy toward evacuation of capital enterprises from HAIPHONG enclave. Policy will be to oppose removal, but methods to be used are heavy propaganda, strikes, peaceful demonstrations, however no violence.

HAAG representative, HAIPHONG reported the early January sailing of 4 cargo ships will leave only 16,000 tons of depot stocks to be moved the remainder of the month. Also that an estimated influx of 30,000 refugees during the next two months may necessitate two TAP Vice one.

30 December 1954

Thorough check of all available FRENCH and VIENTHANE authorities in

HAIPHONG by the Assistant U.S. Army attaché indicated that while the potential for civil or military disturbance within the perimeter will continue high, VIET LEUTH policy of no violence has been so well established that probability of serious incidents are virtually non-existent.

CTO 90.6, representative of HAAG, SAIGON at HAIPHONG, and USOIN all discount the optimistic prediction by the VIENTHANE chairman of the EVACUATION COMMISSION that 200,000 people will be ready for evacuation by the end of February if the CONTROL COMMISSION can do an effective job of preventing VIET LEUTH opposition.
31 December 1954

Year's end analysis of total evacuation picture revealed that through 31 December 1954, U.S. shipping had lifted 127,527 civilian passengers, 14,069 military passengers, 6,308 vehicles, and 30,238 short tons of cargo. 5, deaths and 111 births have occurred aboard U.S. ships. As of this date, 1 U.S. Navy and 10 U.S. Navy controlled ships were engaged in the evacuation. U.S. participation had equalled approximately one-third of all civilian personnel, military cargo and military vehicles transported from the Hanoi Delta. Evacuation of military cargo was virtually complete as of this date. Evacuation of military personnel was proceeding according to schedule. Refugee influx continued an indeterminate factor, a category into which military vehicles were tending to fall. The picture on the HAI PHONG docks was becoming increasingly one of evacuation of civilian cargo.

1 January 1955

DIDDO continued loading despite general stoppage of work over this holiday.

2 January 1955

Last VINH pick-up ship returned HAI PHONG with no refugees aboard. VINH operation considered ended due to effective VIET MINH restraint.

3 January 1955

Refugee arrivals continued to average 500 per day, including about 200 per day from HON GAY region.

CTU 90.8.1 advised FRENCH Army authorities that CONFLITINGTON load, now enroute SAIGON, was final of three cement loads, and that when HERMION and ARLO OLSON complete asphalt loads (second and third of three loads), all asphalt will have been evacuated.

4 January 1955

CTG 90.8 departed HAI PHONG by air for 5 days in SAIGON during visit of Cardinal SPELLIAN to that area.

GENERAL HERMION loaded refugees this date, completing record 6 day turn around from load to load. 500 of refugees aboard GENERAL HERMION were members of the VIETNAMESE Confederation of Christian Workers, the largest labor union in VIETNAM. Union officials estimated a total of 25,000 of their members within the perimeter would desire to move south and were planning special reception for this first contingent of 500.

A FRENCH frigate dispatched to VINH coast on 26 December to embark refugees reported desiring evacuation returned empty to HAI PHONG. FRENCH Navy attributes reason for failure due increased activity of VIET MINH.

6.7 January 1955

Loading continued in DIDDO and HERMION.
9 January 1955

CTG 90.8 returned to HALIFAX at HAIPHONG. DXDO completed loading and sailed to first designated offloading port.

LSI 546 suffered crack in main deck due to heavy weather.

The refugees departing the HOWZE on 4 January were an unusually mixed group. In addition to the normal farming families, there were HUNGS, trade union members, and merchants (principally CHINESE).

The trade union members and merchants posed another of the always occurring problems when they made it known they did not feel they should clean their own compartments. The EVACUATION COMMITTEE has been requested, in the future, to insure full understanding on the part of all refugees that cleaning of own compartments is necessary due to large number of refugees carried.

Reports have been received of severe clashes between VIETMINH troops and several hundred VIETNAM peasants in THANH HDA area the past few days. The peasants had congregated in the area to seek CONTROL COMMISSION assistance in traveling to HAIPHONG for evacuation, and when the CONTROL COMMISSION team failed to arrive the peasants determined to escape by force.

10 January 1955

GUNSTON HALL arrived HAIPHONG area and reported to CTG 90.8 for operational control. Intended period of employment is through 28 February 1955.

LSI 47 suffered crack in hull (engine room plating). Rough weather forced LSI 47 and 176 to return to CAP ST JACQUES, delayed GENERAL HOWZE 1 full day and forced ARLO OLSON to anchor vicinity PAULO CECIR DE MEDEIROS. LSI 546 required repairs to radio equipment and gyrocompass in addition to hull repairs.

FRENCH estimate 100,000 refugees remain who wish to be evacuated, but President DIEN places the figure at 200,000.

HAIPHONG police have seized some 20 VIETMINH agents posing as BUDHIST monks and using BUDHIST pagoda, containing communications equipment, as headquarters.

LSI 47 returned to SAIGON for hull repairs.

Ambassador COLLINS arrived HAIPHONG for tour of refugee camps.

Chief Staff Officer and 2 additional officers of the staff of CONTRANSDIV 32 arrived in HAIPHONG and commenced relieving CONTRANSDIV 1 staff.

13 January 1955

HOWZE sailing scheduled for today delayed until tomorrow due to CHINESE bringing a great number of large boxes. HOWZE crew working on 24 hour basis in order to secure for sea. Task is difficult due to flimsy construction of boxes of which there are about 200 long tons.
MAAG and USOM have been requested to again ask the REFUGEES COMMITTEE to instruct refugees that HOWZE is not a cargo ship.

Seven large junks that were proceeding up the SONG RIA have been seized by FRENCH and returned to HAIPHONG. Junks were enroute to VIET MINH and were carrying cement, gasoline, and lube oil loaded at HAIPHONG. Event considered important because it implicated large number of CHINESE merchants and some VIETNAMESE government officials.

About 300 nine to fifteen year old children of CHINESE descent departed HAIPHONG for PEKING. CHINESE REDS and VIET MINH arranged transportation and have promised free education in PEKING.

The clash reported 9 January turned out to be between 10,000 peasants and 4000 VIET MINH regulars. The peasants armed only with sticks were dispersed and the CONTROL COMMISSION apparently accepted VIET MINH version that the incident was one of suppression of illegal uprising.

FRENCH resumed their intermittent air lift of refugees.

14, 15 January 1955

Continued high winds and heavy seas delayed TG 90.8 ships enroute HAIPHONG from SAIGON. LST 176 became third MSTS LST to suffer crack in hull and was directed to return to SAIGON for repairs by FRENCH Navy. LST 520 anchored in lee of CAP ST JACQUES for 48 hours. SWORD FISH was delayed 30 hours in reaching HAIPHONG. ARLO OLSON, underway since 9 January had made only 80 miles good after leaving CAP ST JACQUES, and after anchoring for 65 hours in lee of PAULO CECIR DE MIR.

16 January 1955

U.S. authorities in HAIPHONG received their first notice of a letter dated 28 December 1954 from CHARBONNAGE du TONKIN Company to Commander FRENCH Naval Forces TONKIN requesting shipment on FRENCH Naval vessels of approximately 100 pieces of very heavy equipment during March, April and May. Director of company has stated that the negotiations which continue in HANOI between FRENCH business and government representatives, and the VIET MINH, carry the stipulation that U.S. funded equipment will be evacuated from the HON GAY and CAMPHA PORT regions without incident. All the equipment for which shipping requests have been made is U.S. purchased, but the total list did not include all U.S. purchased equipment at the mines.

Proposed schedule for GUNSTON HALL included lift of barges owned by Cement Company at HAIPHONG, which is owned by same interests at CHARBONNAGE du TONKIN.

17 January 1955

LST 47 entered FRENCH Naval dry dock at SAIGON.

GUNSTON HALL reported starboard engine inoperative but that repairs could be effected by ship's force in two days in HAIPHONG.
18 January 1955

Commander FRENCH Naval Forces TONKIN advised CTG 90.8 that the Cement Company at HAI PHONG had received message orders from PARIS to leave barges at HAI PHONG.

19 January 1955

USS TALUGA (AO 62) arrived HENRIETTE PASSES for purposes of replenishing Task Group 90.8.

LST 47 completed repairs. South CHINA Sea gale conditions abating, allowing more regular movement of units returning from SAIGON.

Loading of HOWZE and MARINE SERPENT, scheduled for 20-21 January, will take an extra day due to FRENCH landing craft being committed to training exercises at Island of CAGBA.

FRENCH LSM picked up 4 refugees off BA LANG coast and brought them to HAI PHONG. Refugees were participants in the peasant-VIET MINH troop clash reported earlier. VIET MINH now have mortars placed along the shore making further pick ups in that area impossible.

20 January 1955

USS COOK (APD 130) arrived HAI PHONG, reported to CTG 90.8 for operational control as relief of BALDUCK.

GENERAL HOWZE and GUNSTON HALL fueled and provisioned from TALUGA. GENERAL HOWZE loaded refugees from SAIGON.

Captain A. R. ST ANGELO, U. S. Navy, arrived HAI PHONG as prospective relief of Captain N. J. FRANK, Jr., U. S. Navy, COMPHIBRON 1 as CTG 90.8. All staff personnel transferred to COOK. BALDUCK underway for HENRIETTE PASSES and released.

MARINE SERPENT arrived HENRIETTE PASSES and reported to CTG 90.8 for operational control. It was fueled and replenished from TALUGA.

GENERAL HOWZE passenger list included the 200,000th person carried in U.S. ships during operation Passage to Freedom.

21 January 1955

BALDUCK fueled and replenished from TALUGA.

FRENCH stepped up air lift. Almost 10,000 refugees HAI PHONG camps despite air lift and two TAP sailings.

Remainder of staff personnel of COMTRANSDIV 32 arrived HAI PHONG and embarked COOK.

Confirmed reports from several sources indicated an increasing
restlessness among civilian population in the VIET MINH zone. BUDHISTS are joining CATHOLICS in resistance to new government and desire evacuation.

Sailing of MARINE SERPENT delayed due to refugees continuing to arrive with excessive baggage. Size of bundles has been cut down but quantity has increased accordingly.

WYNDHAM HALL completed repairs to engine; reported BFS.

CTG 90.8 informed that FRENCH authorities desire extension of period of employment of MSTS LST to allow completion of all originally planned loads.

22 January 1955

LST 176 completed hull repairs in SAIGON. All units of Task Group 90.8 operationally ready.

HENRINETTE released on completion of offloading at SAIGON.

USS ESTES (AGC 12) arrived HENRIETTE PASSE with CTF 90 embarked. COOK proceeded to HENRIETTE PASSE for rendezvous with ESTES.

Planning and evaluation conference held aboard ESTES. CTF 90 and staff, CTG 90.8 and staff, officer in charge MAAG HAI PHONG, prospective CTG 90.8 present. Conference was for purpose of supplying preliminary estimates of future shipping needs to CTF 90, to form basis for conferences between CTF 90 and FRENCH and VIETNAMESE government officials leading to final evaluation of U.S. shipping needs.

COOK fueled and replenished from TAWUGA.

FRENCH air lift reached 500 per day.

23 January 1955

TAWUGA fueled and replenished LST 520 and 546. Task Group 90.8 replenishment concluded. TAWUGA departed HENRIETTE PASSE.

CHINESE New Year holiday commenced throughout VIETNAM. All activities suspended for 4 day period, except offloading of MARINE SERPENT.

Captain A. R. ST ANGELO, U.S. Navy, relieved Captain N. J. FRANK, JR., U.S. Navy, as CTG 90.8. Captain FRANK and staff enroute KOBE, JAPAN, by air to rejoin flagship.

CTF 90 in ESTES departed HAI PHONG for SAIGON.

Overall evacuation totals as of this date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military passengers</td>
<td>14,479</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian passengers</td>
<td>192,668</td>
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<td>Short tons cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Births</td>
<td>123</td>
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<td>Deaths</td>
<td>60</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Naval Historical Center - Operational Archives
Command File, Post 1 January 1946
Box 141 - PHIBGRP1 Serial: 055, June 15, 1955
Composition, Task Group 90.8 as of this date:

- USNS MARINE SERPENT (TAP 202)
- USNS GENERAL HOWZE (TAP 134)
- USNS ARLO OLSON (TAK 245)
- NS SWORD KNOT
- NS CODINGTON
- USNS LST 47
- USNS LST 520
- USNS LST 546
- USNS LST 176
- USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5)
- USS COOK (APD 130)

26 January 1955

CTF 90 in ESTES arrived SAIGON. Conference was held with CHINAAG, ALUSNA, SAIGON and FRENCH military representatives.

28 January 1955

Although there are an estimated 10,373 refugees in HAIPHONG camps, only 100 appeared to embark in HOWZE 27 January. Conferences with FRENCH and REFUGEE COMMITTEES indicate holidays as prime reason for non-readiness.

30 January 1955

HOWZE departed HAIPHONG with 4253 passengers, among them the 50,000th carried on board. This represents about one fourth total carried by U.S. ships. This is HOWZE's last trip prior to phase out.

MARINE SERPENT sailing delayed in order to get an acceptable load. Although there are over 7600 refugees in HAIPHONG camps SERPENT is still short about 1500.

CTF 90 in ESTES departed SAIGON for KESLING to confer with VAIM PRIDE in preparation for the TACHENS evacuation.

1 February 1955

Totals evacuated by U.S. ships to date: 14,748 military passengers, 199,255 civilian passengers, 61,456 short tons cargo, 7,112 vehicles.

There have been 129 births and 60 deaths in U.S. ships.

Present total remaining in HAIPHONG camps 7214.

5 February 1955

2000 local refugees have registered at HAIPHONG for evacuation, making a total of 8077 in camps, with 1353 ready to go.

8 February 1955

MARINE SERPENT sailed from HAIPHONG with 5266 refugees, after delay of
24 hours in order to load last 1230 who were in FRENCH LCM unable to re-

tract from beach.

10 February 1955

Approximately 100 military and quasi military VIET MINH deserters arrived
HAI PHONG. A spontaneous demonstration took place at city hall, high lighten-
by speeches detailing suffering under VIET MINH and shouts of praise for
the evacuation. Several deserters claimed to have fought in the VIET MINH
Army alone 1946. All had grievances against the VIET MINH regime and de-
cided to leave when they learned escape was possible through HAI PHONG.

General COCNY published in the press an official proclamation stating
that FRENCH civilians must evacuate HAI PHONG by 15 April. After that date
they will be considered as desirous of staying past 18 May.

16 February 1955

MARINE SERPENT sailed with 5170 refugees.

CDR J. H. DAVIS (CTU 90.8.1) detached and CTG 90.8 assumed additional
duty as CTU 90.8.1.

18 February 1955

REFUGEE COMMITTEE officially closed registrations for sea lift until
1 March. President of committee gave reasons as follows: (1) Psychological
effect; (2) Afford time to process 17,256 local and camp refugees already
registered for sea lift.

20 February 1955

CODINGTON suffered main engine casualty and was towed by FIGCTOR to safe
anchorage in TOURANNE BAY.

24 February 1955

MARINE ADDER arrived HAI PHONG for duty with TG 90.8.

PFIZER pharmaceutical company donated 100,000 magnesycin tablets to
DR. DOOLEY for use in refugee camps.

26 February 1955

CAMP PAGODE closed and refugees moved to CAMP CEMENT and city. This
is part of REFUGEE COMMITTEE plan to close tent camps and move refugees to
vacated city buildings.

FRENCH commenced moving AMERICAN aid machinery and material from HON
GAY and CAM PHA coal mines.

CODINGTON departed TOURANNE BAY for SUBIC BAY for repairs to main engine.

Totals evacuated to date by U.S. ships: 14,637 military passengers,
220,515 civilian passengers, 63,250 short tons cargo, 7362 vehicles. There
have been 147 births and 61 deaths in U.S. ships.
3 March 1955

COXINGTON released and enroute YOKOHAMA to report COMWESTPAC.

7 March 1955

CAMP SHELL closed. There are three approved camps remaining: (1) CAMP CEMENT (tents); (2) CAMP 173 HUE BONAL (ex-military barracks); (3) CAMP LACH TRAY (ex-military barracks).

Total camp population about 6500.

GOVERNOR LE QUANG LUAT presided yesterday at ceremonies celebrating the 500,000th civilian refugee to be evacuated from NORTH VIETNAM. Official ceremony with full guard and band opened with VIETNAMESE, FRENCH and AMERICAN National Anthems. VIETNAMESE, FRENCH and AMERICAN officials presented gifts to honored family.

15 March 1955

Total refugee camp population now 447 with none ready to go. However, the REFUGEE COMMITTEE reports 25,157 local refugees registered for sea lift, and 24,783 for air lift.

Camp 173 HUE BONAL now closed.

20 March 1955

MARINE SERPENT departed HAIPHONG with 5,076 refugees embarked. Also embarked was Robert S. ELEGANT, AMERICAN accredited DOD correspondent representing AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE, N.Y.C, who is obtaining material for refugee story.

Camp CEMENT closed and all tents dismantled. CAMP LACH TRAY is now the only camp remaining. Camp population is 2,165 with no one ready to leave.

28 March 1955

MARINE SERPENT departed HAIPHONG with 3,976 refugees embarked. Among these was the 100,000th refugee to be evacuated from NORTH VIETNAM in 1955.

Population of CAMP LACH TRAY is 2,626 with none ready to depart.

31 March 1955

MARINE ALDER departed HAIPHONG with 1,981 refugees embarked (poor load).

Population of CAMP LACH TRAY is 2,620 with none ready to depart.

Totals evacuated to date by U.S. ships: 14,837 military passengers, 252,216 civilian passengers, 65,510 short tons cargo, 7,448 vehicles. There have been 166 births and 61 deaths among refugees evacuated in U.S. ships.
1 April 1955

For administrative reasons the task force numeral designator of US naval evacuation forces was changed from TF 90 Commander Sea Operations INDOCHINA to TF 50.1 (Commander INDOCHINA Evacuation Group). CTG 90.6 (Commander Evacuation Group) became CTU 50.1.1 (Commander Evacuation Unit).

3 April 1955

USS CHIKASKIA (AO 54) arrived BAIE DE LANHA to replenish and fuel TU 50.1.1.

Population CAMP LACHTRAY is 5,112 with 2,000 ready to depart.

There are 31,099 and 22,061 refugees registered to depart HAIPHONG by sea and air respectively.

5 April 1955

MARINE SERPENT departed HAIPHONG with 5,721 civilian passengers.

SWORD KNOT departed HAIPHONG with 67 short tons cargo and 118 vehicles.

Population CAMP LACHTRAY is 2,800 with none ready to depart.

8 April 1955

MARINE ADDER departed HAIPHONG with 4,006 civilian passengers.

Population CAMP LACHTRAY is 2,300 with none ready to depart.

There are 24,691 and 20,829 refugees registered to depart HAIPHONG by sea and air respectively.

SWORD KNOT and MARINE ADDER completed replenishment from CHIKASKIA at BAIE DE LANHA.

6 April 1955

CHIKASKIA, having completed replenishment of TU 50.1.1, departed BAIE DE LANHA.

10 April 1955

Population CAMP LACHTRAY is 2,337 with 800 ready to depart.

There are 25,010 and 19,955 refugees registered to depart HAIPHONG by sea and air respectively.

11 April 1955

CAPT W. C. WINN relieved RADM L. S. SABIN as CTF 90, CTG 50.1 and
COMMHIU ONE.

USS REGULUS (AF 57) arrived HAIPHONG to reprovision 50.1.1.

12 April 1955

REGULUS completed provisioning 50.1.1 and departed HAIPHONG.

13 April 1955

MARINE SERPENT departed HAIPHONG with 6,289 civilian passengers.

CAMP LACHTRAY closed but being maintained in state of readiness for possible overflow from newly established CAMP MARINE. Population of CAMP MARINE is 1,005 with 500 ready to depart.

There are 22,248 and 18,785 refugees registered to depart HAIPHONG by sea and air respectively.

14 April 1955

Refugee arrivals, including 1,300 escapees from VINH area, made it necessary to place some in recently closed CAMP LACHTRAY.

Total population both camps is 2,490 with 250 ready to depart.

16 April 1955

MARINE ADDER departed HAIPHONG with 4,966 civilian passengers.

SWORD KNOT departed HAIPHONG with 31 military passengers, 84 vehicles and 870 short tons of cargo.

Population of camps is 3,526 with 1,500 ready to depart.

18 April 1955

Population of camps is 4,134 with 2,000 ready to depart.

There are 18,239 and 18,084 refugees registered to depart HAIPHONG by sea and air respectively.

19 April 1955

Population of camps is 4,559 with 3,100 ready to depart.

There are 18,634 and 17,642 refugees registered to depart HAIPHONG by sea and air respectively.

20 April 1955

6,120 refugees loaded in MARINE SERPENT at HAIPHONG.

21

ENCLOSURE (1)
Camp population is 1,425 with none ready to depart.
There are 13,060 and 17,508 refugees registered to depart HAI PHONG by sea and air respectively.

FRENCH have been air lifting from 150 to 300 daily.

21 April 1955

MARINE SERPENT departed HAI PHONG with 6,120 civilian passengers.
Camp population is 2,100 with 500 ready to depart.

22 April 1955

USNS GENERAL A. W. BREWSTER arrived HAI PHONG and reported for duty in TU 50.1.1.

23 April 1955

MARINE ADDER departed HAI PHONG with 2,636 civilian passengers.
Camp population is 1,556 with none ready to depart.
There are 11,769 and 17,071 refugees registered to depart HAI PHONG by sea and air respectively.

FRENCH continue to air lift an average of about 200 per day.

24 April 1955

T-LST 535 and 548 arrived HAI PHONG and reported for duty in TU 50.1.1.

CAMP LACHTRAY closed due to unsanitary conditions and population moved to CAMP 9 RUE BONAI.

Population of camps is 2,553 with 1,200 ready to depart.

25 April 1955

T-LST 578 and 629 arrived HAI PHONG and reported for duty in TU 50.1.1.

GUADALUPE (AO 32) arrived BAIE DE LANHA to fuel and replenish TU 50.1.1.

26 April 1955

GENERAL BREWSTER departed HAI PHONG with 2,526 civilian passengers.
Camp population is 1,573 with none ready to depart.

COOK replenished from GUADALUPE at BAIE DE LANHA and returned to HAI PHONG.

22

ENCLOSURE (1)
27 April 1955

Departed HAI PHONG for TOUR ANE - T-LST 548 with 71 vehicles and 100 military passengers and T-LST 535 with 60 vehicles and 100 military passengers.

SWORD KNOT and MARINE SERPENT replenished from GUADALUPE at BAIE DE LANHA.

28 April 1955

MARINE SERPENT departed HAI PHONG with 2,772 civilian passengers.

Camp population is 425 with none ready to depart.

There are 9,187 and 16,109 refugees registered to depart HAI PHONG by sea and air respectively. FRENCH air continues to lift about 200 daily.

GUADALUPE completed replenishment of TU 50.1.1 and departed BAIE DE LANHA.

29 April 1955

T-LST 578 and 629 departed HAI PHONG for TOUR ANE with 78 vehicles and 116 military passengers, and 55 vehicles and 200 military passengers respectively.

30 April 1955

No departures from HAI PHONG.

Totals evacuated to date: 15,464 military passengers, 287,262 civilian passengers, 66,935 short tons cargo, 7,914 vehicles, 15 barges, 66 deaths and 182 births.

Camp population is 1,200 with 900 ready to depart.

There are 9,569 and 15,474 refugees registered to depart HAI PHONG by sea and air respectively.

1 May 1955

MARINE ADDEN departed HAI PHONG with 1,941 civilian passengers.

Camp population is 992 with none ready to depart.

There are 8,176 and 15,474 refugees registered to depart HAI PHONG by sea and air respectively.

2 May 1955

No departures HAI PHONG.
CAMP MARINE closed leaving CAMP 9 RUE BONAI only camp open. Camp population is 1,750 with 350 ready to depart.

2 May 1955

No departures HAIPHONG.

Among 250 refugee arrivals were 90 escapees from VINH area. All 90 arrived in 2 junks.

DIACHENKOV (APD 123) arrived HAIPHONG to relieve COOK (APD 130) as flagship for CTU 50.1.1.

COOK released.

4 May 1955

No departures HAIPHONG

Camp population is 200 with 150 ready to depart.

5 May 1955

No departures HAIPHONG.

Camp population is 448 with 200 ready to depart.

There are 8,078 and 14,180 refugees registered to depart HAIPHONG by sea and air respectively.

FRENCH airlift increased to about 275 daily.

CAPT W. C. MINN, USN, CTG 50.1 and COMPHIBRON ONE with operational staff departed YOKOSUKA via air to embark in COOK at SANGLY POINT and proceeded HAIPHONG.

6 May 1955

GENERAL BREWSTER departed HAIPHONG with 1,549 civilian passengers.

Camp population is 274 with 100 ready to depart.

There are 8,328 and 13,900 refugees registered to depart HAIPHONG by sea and air respectively.

7 May 1955

SWORD KNOT departed HAIPHONG with 3 vehicles and 2,510 short tons cargo including 3 escapee junks.

Camp population is 429 with 200 ready to depart.
8 May 1955

CAPT W. C. WINN USN, CTG 50.1 and staff arrived HAIPHONG in COOK and assumed on scene command of sea operations. CAPT WINN conferred with RADM QUESVILLE and CAPT ST ANGELO.

Estimate 3,000 to 4,000 refugees remaining desiring evacuation. Additional reluctant to leave because of current unstable situation in South and rumors in circulation of 3,000 refugees returning North via communist shipping.

"Committee of Experts", official VIET MINH vanguard arrived in HAIPHONG for indoctrination in operation of public utilities.

CHINESE still in HAIPHONG indicate they intend to remain.

Local merchants manufacturing and displaying VIET MINH flags.

FRENCH sector is deserted and sanitation conditions are deteriorating.

VIET MINH demonstrations contribute to tension as deadline draws near.

No MDAF or US funded equipment remains on docks or in warehouses.

Local refugee committee terminated formal administrative procedures and most officials departed.

FRENCH naval base is completely stripped and closed.

9 May 1955

CTG 50.1 departed HAIPHONG in COOK for SAIGON.

MARINE SERPENT departed HAIPHONG with 1,778 civilian passengers.

All camp refugees evacuated and camp closed.

10 May 1955

No departures HAIPHONG.

11 May 1955

CTG 50.1 arrived SAIGON in COOK at 1230H.

CTG 50.1 conferred with ALUSNA SAIGON, CEMAAG SAIGON and VADM JOZAN.

No loading, no departures HAIPHONG.

100 refugees arrived via road from BUI CHU all bearing VIET MINH
LAISSEZ-PASSER papers. Refugees reported VIET MINH would allow 2 more groups through, one on 12 and one on 15 May.

12 May 1955

CTG 50.1 conferred with ALUSNA SAIGON, CHMAAG SAIGON and VADM JOZAN.

CTG 50.1 departed SAIGON for DOSON in COOK at 1530H.

LTG DOOLEY, MC awarded medal "OFFICER DE L'ORDRE NATIONAL DE VIETNAM" by PRESIDENT DIEN, for his outstanding work with the refugees the past 10 months.

13 May 1955

T-LST 548 departed HAIPHONG for SAIGON with 65 vehicles and 126 military passengers.

14 May 1955

CTG 50.1 in COOK arrived DOSON.

Ten refugees, including infant girl, arrived DOSON from HANOI at 1400H. Refugees had no baggage or personal belongings. Mother of infant girl chose to remain under VIET MINH and was deserted by husband. Father and child last official refugees to leave NORTH VIETNAM and were embarked in GENERAL BREWSTER.

FRENCH stated they had shipping to evacuate any later arrivals.

T-LST 576 departed DOSON for SAIGON with 69 vehicles and 189 military passengers. T-LST 629 departed DOSON for SAIGON with 75 vehicles and 134 military passengers.

15 May 1955

CTG 50.1 and CTU 50.1.1 had luncheon conference with RADM QUERVILLE aboard the JULIUS VERNE at DOSON.

Evacuation of DOSON and NORTH VIETNAM completed with the embarkation by the FRENCH of 707 military passengers and 120 vehicles.

GENERAL BREWSTER departed DOSON for SAIGON with 1,933 military and 472 civilian passengers.

All US and FRENCH ships moved to BÀIE DE LANHA from DOSON upon completion of evacuation.

MARINE SERPENT and T-LST 535 released.

16 May 1955

US ships COOK, DIACHENKO, and MARINE ADDER departed BÀIE DE LANHA.
to assist FRENCH forces in the evacuation of refugees at sea.

17 May 1955

CTU 50.1.1 in DIACHENKO detached and sailed for SANGLEY POINT.

18 May 1955

Special operation terminated, no refugees embarked. CTG 50.1 in COOK departed for SANGLEY POINT. MARINE ADDER sailed to SAIGON.

20 May 1955

TG 50.1 dissolved.
### PART III

**STATISTICAL SUMMARY**

1. Total personnel and material evacuated by U. S. shipping from 15 November 1954 through 18 May 1955:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15-30 Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Passengers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>627</td>
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<td>4189</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian Passengers</td>
<td>13983</td>
<td>7437</td>
<td>24028</td>
<td>21260</td>
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<td>35036</td>
<td>5740</td>
<td>139195</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL Passengers</td>
<td>13983</td>
<td>7869</td>
<td>24687</td>
<td>23449</td>
<td>31711</td>
<td>35663</td>
<td>8122</td>
<td>143384</td>
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<td>Vehicles</td>
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<td>558</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>221</td>
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<tr>
<td>Short Tons Cargo</td>
<td>5558</td>
<td>16703</td>
<td>10842</td>
<td>2374</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>2263</td>
<td>1184</td>
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<tr>
<td>Births</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>92</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. Daily averages of personnel and material evacuated during period 15 November 1954 through 18 May 1955:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15-30 Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Overall Average</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Passengers</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Passengers</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>1168</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>757</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL Passengers</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>451</td>
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<td>Vehicles</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Tons Cargo</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>235</td>
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<tr>
<td>Births</td>
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<td>.5</td>
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<td>.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
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<td>.2</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

ENCLOSURE (1)
3. Total personnel and material evacuated by U. S. shipping from 17 August 1954 through 18 May 1955:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Military Passengers</th>
<th>Civilian Passengers</th>
<th>TOTAL Passengers</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Short Tons Cargo</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 Aug-15 Nov 54</td>
<td>13,657</td>
<td>153,807</td>
<td>177,464</td>
<td>5,791</td>
<td>27,977</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov 54-18 Mar 55</td>
<td>4,189</td>
<td>139,195</td>
<td>143,384</td>
<td>2,344</td>
<td>40,780</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Totals</td>
<td>17,846</td>
<td>293,002</td>
<td>310,848</td>
<td>8,135</td>
<td>68,757</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Complete Tabular Data of Ship Employment, Task Group 90.8, period 15 November 1954 through 18 May 1955:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sailing Date</th>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>Loading Date</th>
<th>Loading Location</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/16</td>
<td>MARINE LYNX (TAP 194)</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>5,847 Civ Pax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/17</td>
<td>FENTRESS (TAK 180)</td>
<td>15-16 Nov</td>
<td>Tourane</td>
<td>630 S/T/15 Veh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/21</td>
<td>GEN HOWZE (TAP 134)</td>
<td>12-20 Nov</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>3,109 Civ Pax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/27</td>
<td>PEMBINA (TAK 200)</td>
<td>17-27 Nov</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>2,652 S/T/24 Veh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/30</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/18</td>
<td>LST 546</td>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>39 Mil Pax/67 Veh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/18</td>
<td>LST 520</td>
<td>18 Dec</td>
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<td>45 Mil Pax/68 Veh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>LST 47</td>
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<td>Saigon</td>
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<td>LST 47</td>
<td>23 Dec</td>
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<td>61 Mil Pax/72 Veh</td>
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<td>LST 520</td>
<td>23 Dec</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>61 Mil Pax/71 Veh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>LST 176</td>
<td>30 Dec</td>
<td>Tourane</td>
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<td>LST 520</td>
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<td>90 Mil Pax/38 Veh</td>
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ENCLOSURE (1)
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<th>Cargo</th>
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<td>28 Jan</td>
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<td>Saigon</td>
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<td>Saigon</td>
<td>472 Civ Pax/1,933 Mil Pax</td>
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5. Utilization of Shipping: Utilization of U.S. shipping approached 100% of statistical expectations subject to the following limitations:

a. Extended employment of LST types required a number of availabilities for the accomplishment of emergency repairs. It is considered that in ships of this type such breakdowns are normal and should be anticipated in computing shipping requirements.

b. CMAVI type vessels were delayed on the average 1 day per month per ship in obtaining an offloading berth in SAIGON.

c. Heavy weather during the northeast monsoon season increased turn around time significantly on several occasions.

ENCLOSURE (1)
1. Map - AMS 5202

2. INDOCHINA Situation

   a. General Military and Political

      (1) The political situation in South VIETNAM continued to deterio­rate throughout the final period, reaching a critical low in late April, when the tension between the religious sects and the government erupted into open violence. Throughout this period, CTF 90/CTG 50.1 kept abreast of the rapidly changing situation, taking into consideration possible effects on the assigned mission. Close attention was given to such aspects as possible incidents in the transfer of refugees in U.S. shipping and possible damage to ships or injury to personnel at the debarkation point in SAIGON. Close liaison between CTF 90/CTG 50.1 and CHMAAG, SAIGON, greatly aided in maintaining an uninterrupted flow of refugees to the South, in spite of VIET MINH pressures in the North and internal conflicts in the South.

      (2) Communist capabilities remained essentially the same as those contained in the initial report.

3. Intelligence Collection

   a. Subsequent to the transfer of local area command to CTG 90.8/CTU 50.1.1 on 15 November 1954, one intelligence officer from the staff of COMNAVFE was attached to COMEVACOR with the specific duties of collecting information from all sources regarding numbers and movements of refugees, threats toward the evacuation operation by VIET MINH activity, and material of continuing intelligence value to the Navy. This officer was returned to his permanent duty station in mid-March 1955, and no intelligence officer was with the Evacuation Forces from that date until 8 May, when CTG 50.1 arrived at HAIPHONG and assumed command of sea operations.

   b. While CTG 90.8/CTU 50.1.1 held local area command, photographic intelligence collection was handicapped by a lack of experienced photographers. However, after the return of CTG 50.1 to HAIPHONG in May additional ground photography was obtained of the following subjects on the DO SON Peninsula:

      (1) Detail of French landing craft embarking troops at the beach­ing ramp on BLUE BEACH, BAIE DE CLATEAU.

      (2) Detail of the interior of the DO SON airfield and fuel storage area.

      (3) Detail of hospital area.

This material was forwarded as Information Report 5-55, a supplement to Enclosure (3)
c. On 7 June an information report was forwarded to CNO by COMPHIBGRU ONE concerning photography and activity of an unidentified merchant ship observed in the South China Sea on 18 May 1955.

d. On 12 May OTG 50.1 forwarded an information report to CINCPACFLT (DTG L210932Z) concerning the political situation in VIETNAM.

4. Interpreters

a. As shipping requirements lessened, interpreters assigned from COMNAVFPE were phased out and in the final month of operations only one remained with COMEVACFOR.

5. Recommendations

a. In view of the continuing opportunity for collection of information of intelligence value to the Navy, it is recommended that in any future operations of this type at least one intelligence officer be retained on the staff of the Commander Evacuation Forces at all times.

b. Photographic material to supplement information reports is invaluable to intelligence collection. It is recommended that at least one photographer with necessary equipment be assigned to assist in the collection effort.