COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

LOGISTICS

1. General comments.
   a. After the departure of CTG 92.3 with the mobile logistic support force on 15 November 1954, and USS ASKARI (ARL 30) on 17 November, the nearest U.S. logistics and repair activity was at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, about 960 miles from Haiphong. From this time on, Task Group 90.8/TU 50.1.1 was in most respects logistically self-supporting. Almost all ships attached to the task group at the time, and those subsequently reporting, were capable of extended periods of operation without logistic support or repair facilities. The two principal exceptions were the APD flagship stationed at Haiphong and the T-LST. The limited fuel and refrigerator capacity of the forces made frequent replenishment necessary. It was expected the T-LST would require frequent repair after several weeks of operation. These expectations were amply fulfilled. No trouble was experienced with the 4 T-LST which reported for the final phaseout operations in April and May.

2. Specific problems encountered.
   a. Efforts were made at every opportunity to refuel and replenish the APD stationed at Haiphong. Ample fuel was considered mandatory because of the ever present possibility that a civil or military disturbance would require emergency evacuation of U.S. personnel by the APD. Between tanker trips the APD was replenished and refueled from a Task Group TAP. The TAPs were most cooperative and effective in supplying interim needs.

   b. After the departure of the mobile logistic support forces it was decided that the one TAP then present, the USNS General Howze, should after discharging at Saigon be diverted periodically to Subic. At Subic it was planned that the Howze would expeditiously replenish and load limited supplies for other ships of the Task Group. Refugee influx was carefully analyzed and a period in mid-December was selected for the diversion. This method of replenishment would probably have worked satisfactorily had it not been for a delay in arrival of a necessary supply ship in Subic. This delay coupled with an unexpectedly large influx of refugees resulted in such employment of the TAP being unacceptable. Other replenishment possibilities were examined. In a conference with Mobile Logistics Force representatives it was decided to send an AO to Haiphong monthly and an AF occasionally when one could be spared.

   c. The CLMVL vessels presented little difficulty with logistics. They were relieved at frequent intervals by ships from the Japan/Korea area in order to preclude serious supply shortages. Special attention was given to the question of Japanese food for the Japanese crewmen.

Enclosure (4)
Where necessary, relieving HSTS CIMAVI vessels brought such food into the area for all similarly operated ships. Replenishment of the two General Agency Agreement vessels (MS CODINGTON and MS SWORDKNOT) from the TALUGA (AO 62) presented only the difficulty of obtaining adequate accounting procedures. On request the necessary data was promptly furnished by COMSTSWESTPAC. Two machinery casualties listed in Table I occurred in General Agency Agreement vessels.

On April 1955, depleted steward supplies were reported to the Operating Agency in Tokyo by SWORDKNOT. These were replenished from REGULUS (AF 57) 11-14 April 1955.

d. T-LST logistics problems. The principle logistics problems of the T-LST assigned from the middle of December to the last of January were breakdowns and emergency repairs. Three of the four ships assigned suffered hull damage in mid-January as a result of heavy seas. Each was expeditiously repaired by the French Naval forces either in Saigon or Haiphong. In one case dry-docking was required. Miscellaneous material difficulties included radio and gyro compass equipment casualties. APD personnel were helpful in effecting several of these repairs. French Naval forces accomplished repairs beyond the capacity of U. S. personnel. It was desired to hold the T-LST beyond the original 6 week period. The replenishment of Japanese type food for the Japanese crews, however, was a problem. This contributed to the decision to release the 4 T-LST. The 4 T-LST assigned during the closing phase of the operation created no logistical problems because of the short period that they were employed.

e. Refugee food. The Vietnamese refugee organizations continued supplying food for refugees embarked on U. S. ships. This was supplemented by supplies carried in TAP. No logistical problems arose in this respect.

f. Charges for repairs to U. S. ships. On 24 February, 1955, CTU 90.8.2 reported that the French Navy presented eight bills for repairs to TF 90 ships accomplished at Saigon by the Naval Arsenal from September to December, 1954, in the amount of $1,968. It was directed, with concurrence of CINCPACFLT, that these bills be turned over to the American Embassy for payment and to be charged to FOA funds. This procedure was to be followed in any future billing.

g. Medical supplies. In general, medical supplies for use of the Medical team operating in Haiphong were obtained from TAP assigned to the Task Group. Materials not available aboard the TAP were obtained from sources in or through replenishment channels from Subic Bay.

h. Mail. Mail service for U. S. personnel afloat was poor throughout the operation. During one period of 11 weeks there were only four deliveries of first class mail. CTG 90.8 took an active
interest in improving this situation. Several messages were sent inviting the attention of COMNAVPHIL and COMSVPAC to the situation. Apparently the difficulty was due to the remote location of the task group. Despite the efforts of these commands and the fact that there was at least one regularly scheduled Philippine/Saigon flight per week, the situation was never wholly satisfactory.

3. Pilotage, tug and wharfage fees. The Chief, Military Assistance and Advisory Group had primary cognizance of such matters. CTF 90 had been officially informed by French authorities that U.S. sources were not responsible for the payment of these fees. Apparently, however, the liable agency was never satisfactorily determined between the French and Vietnamese Governments.

4. Overall solution to logistics problems.

a. AO monthly and an AF occasionally provided adequate logistical support. Sufficient advance notice was given of replenishment ship schedules to enable the Task Group ships to requisition needed supplies. AO supplied, in addition to fuel, limited quantities of fresh and dry provisions and ship's store stock, and brought fleet freight from Subic Bay. The following replenishment trips were made:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TALUGA (AO 62)</td>
<td>19-23 Jan 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASHTABULA (AO 51)</td>
<td>11-13 Feb 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICTOR (AF 54)</td>
<td>22-23 Feb 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACAPON (AO 52)</td>
<td>9-12 Mar 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIKASKIA (AO 54)</td>
<td>3-8 Apr 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGULUS (AF 57)</td>
<td>11-14 Apr 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUADALUPE (AO 32)</td>
<td>26-27 Apr 1955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Material casualties suffered by ships of the Task Group for the period of this report are listed in Table I.

5. Overall recommendations.

a. That accounting and supply instructions for MSTS ships be promulgated, by the cognizant MSTS Commander, to the Commander with operational control prior to deployment of such ships from their usual command channels.

b. That where a task group is relatively small in size and operating at a considerable distance from normal supply bases, replenishment be effected at regular intervals by means of U.S. Navy tankers carrying a maximum of supply items in addition to fuel. The fleet replenishment type tanker (ACR) would be ideal for this type operation.

c. That T-LST not be employed out of their primary area of operations for periods in excess of one month.
d. That no LST be regularly employed for periods longer than six weeks at distances greater than 500 miles from adequate repair facilities.

e. That a definite mail delivery schedule be established and maintained for operations of this type. Because of the high morale factor of personal mail this is recommended even if it is necessary to reduce schedules to other areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>CASUALTY</th>
<th>DATE OCCURRED</th>
<th>DATE REPAIR COMPLETED</th>
<th>WORKDAYS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LST 1159</td>
<td>Screw fouled with line.</td>
<td>16 Nov</td>
<td>17 Nov</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cleared with assistance from ASKARI (ARL 30).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL HOWZE</td>
<td>Engine room vent set burned out.</td>
<td>17 Dec</td>
<td>23 Dec</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Repaired at Subic. Ship delayed by late arrival of supply ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 546</td>
<td>Crack in main deck. Radio. Gyro compass.</td>
<td>8 Jan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Repaired by French Naval Forces at Haiphong and APD personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 47</td>
<td>Hull crack in engine room.</td>
<td>10 Jan</td>
<td>19 Jan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Drydocked in Naval Arsenal at Saigon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 176</td>
<td>Hull crack.</td>
<td>15 Jan</td>
<td>22 Jan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Repaired by Naval Arsenal at Saigon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUNSTON HALL (LSD 5)</td>
<td>Starboard main engine.</td>
<td>17 Jan</td>
<td>21 Jan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Repaired by ship's force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 520</td>
<td>Bow door hinges.</td>
<td>31 Jan</td>
<td>4 Feb</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Repaired by Naval Arsenal at Saigon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 176</td>
<td>Leak in ballast tank.</td>
<td>31 Jan</td>
<td>6 Feb</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Repaired by Naval Arsenal at Saigon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWORDKNOT</td>
<td>No. 1 SS generator bearing.</td>
<td>8 Feb</td>
<td>22 Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td>Repaired by private concern at Saigon after authorization by operating company and CRG 90.8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIP</td>
<td>CASUALTY</td>
<td>DATE OCCURRED</td>
<td>DATE REPAIR COMPLETED</td>
<td>WORKDAYS</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODINGTON</td>
<td>Main engine main bearing</td>
<td>20 Feb</td>
<td>26 Feb</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Main engine disabled. Ship towed into Tourane by PICTOR (AP 54). While ship unloaded cargo, temporary repairs made by ship's force with spare parts from SWORDKNOT and assistance of NMZ from COOK (APD 130). No. 5 piston disconnected and blocked up in cylinder. Permanent repairs could not be made in IndoChina. It was planned to send ship to Subic Bay for permanent repairs. However, services of ship were no longer required and she was released to COMSWEWPAC. Ship proceeded to Yokohama for permanent repairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINE ADDER</td>
<td>Stbd gangway damaged by French LCT</td>
<td>20 Feb</td>
<td>20 Mar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>French Navy at Haiphong manufactured new gangway and delivered to ship at no cost to U. S. Navy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MEDICAL

1. Narrative Summary.

The U.S. Naval Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Unit continued its mission at Haiphong until the last day of refugee embarkation at the Briquetterie on 12 May 1955. As reported in the earlier phase of the operation, the principal medical effort continued to be focused on the prevention of infectious, communicable and epidemic disease among our own personnel, as well as assisting the local VIETNAMESE refugee camp authorities to organize, maintain and administer effective preventive medicine and sanitation measures in the HAIPHONG area refugee camps. Careful daily liaison was maintained with the VIETNAMESE medical aid units established in camps and with the FRENCH and VIETNAMESE public health authorities. Organizational advice and directional assistance was given whenever health and sanitation problems became apparent.

In the preparation of refugees for embarkation for the trip south, a continuing effort was maintained to insure that all refugees received the planned cowpox and cholera immunizations prior to loading. Health screening was done regularly at the beginning of each embarkation, and those persons critically ill or with potentially dangerous communicable disease were detained for medical care until such time as their condition would permit embarking for the trip without undue medical risk. An important factor in pre-embarkation routine continued to be the DDT dusting of refugees directed at the elimination of louse and flea borne disease vectors.

Operation of U.S. field type water purification units, producing potable water for refugee use, was continued at the large tent camps as long as these camps remained in operation. At the peak of refugee camp population, water was processed at the rate of about 11,000 gallons a day. When the tent camps were closed and the refugees were housed in former military barracks, their water source was from the municipal supply. In January VIETNAMESE personnel appointed by the refugee committee were trained in the operation of the water processing machines at the camps and performed this function under the supervision of the naval medical unit until mid-March when all the tent camps had been disestablished and dismantled.

The supervision and direction of sanitation measures within the refugee camps remained a continuing function of the naval medical unit. This included thorough spraying with lindane, chlordane or other insecticides weekly in order to eliminate flies and other insect pests in the camp areas. Garbage dumps were laid out in two separate outlying areas in the camps. These garbage dumps were burned over twice a week, using diesel oil and gasoline furnished for this purpose by the FRENCH. Pit type latrines were treated with lime as required.

Enclosure (5)
During the months of February and March there was a threat of smallpox epidemic among the refugees in the camps. A few sporadic cases occurred among refugees just arrived from the interior who apparently had been exposed prior to vaccination. With the appearance of the first case all personnel of TG 90.8 were revaccinated. No cases occurred among naval personnel. Special reemphasis was made to insure entire camp populations and refugees processed for embarkation had been successfully vaccinated. Immediate apprehension and effective isolation was accomplished on the few cases which appeared among the refugees. This procedure achieved effective control and the smallpox threat did not become an epidemic problem.

Medical care as required was afforded all American personnel in the Haiphong area by the medical officer of the naval unit there. Instructions and guidance were also given to ships of TG 90.8/TU 50.1.1 when in the Haiphong port area, on such matters as insect and rodent control, malaria control and water chlorination.

In early March, following the spring rainy season, there was a marked increase in the number of mosquitoes, and new cases of malaria began appearing among the native population in the area. Insecticide spraying and dusting inside refugee quarters was undertaken as a control measure for the mosquito malaria vector. All naval personnel continued throughout the operation to take the one tablet of chloroquine malaria prophylaxis each week. One case of malaria was reported among naval personnel.

The medical departments aboard the MSTS transports which were engaged in civilian refugee passenger lifts during this period reported no specific medical or infectious disease problems among passengers or among ship’s personnel. Evacuees received as much medical aid and assistance as it was possible for ship’s medical departments to provide during the short period of the voyage.

During the period 16 November through 18 May 92 births and 18 deaths occurred among refugee passengers. Reports of two births which occurred prior to 15 November were received after that date and are included in the final total. No specific obstetrical problems were reported. Childbirth among refugee women was relatively uncomplicated. Of the deaths reported, 14 were infants and children, and four were adults. The major cause of child deaths was acute respiratory conditions. Cardiovascular conditions were the cause of three adult deaths, and acute leukemia was the cause of one adult death. Passenger births reported on board ships under U. S. Navy control totaled 184, and deaths 66.

The overall medical situation among evacuee passengers and among U. S. Navy personnel is considered to have remained very good throughout the operation. No major infectious or epidemic disease outbreak occurred among evacuees or among personnel of our force. Although potentials for serious medical problems abounded in the IndoChina area, it is felt that personnel of the U. S. Naval Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Unit and ship’s medical department personnel, by their alert
and diligent attention to duty, met potential medical problems well and prevented serious medical events in a most satisfactory manner.

2. Recommendations.

Recommendations made in enclosure (5) of reference (a) remain the same. Medical problems and solutions previously reported were common to the entire operation. No new comprehensive medical factors were encountered.
Comments and Recommendations - Communications

1. GENERAL

a. During the period 15 November 1954 to 18 May, 1955, CTG 90.8/CTU 50.1.1 APD flagship was moored in the CUA CAM opposite the French Naval Station, Haiphong.

b. A continuous watch was maintained on the TG90.8/TU50.1.1 common circuits, 5435 KC (CW) and 2280 KC (V).

2. FLEET BROADCASTS

Reception of Guam RAITT in the INDO CHINA area was not satisfactory since frequencies frequently became nearly or entirely unreadable. This necessitated copying Guam CW Manual broadcast which proved reliable and satisfactory.

3. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HAIPHONG AND SAIGON

After departure of the station ship (APD) from Saigon, communications with the debarkation Unit Commander were conducted through NAVCOM/FAOPHIL and Clark Field, which had a direct circuit to CHMAAG Headquarters at Saigon. This resulted in unavoidable delays in delivery of messages from the Embarkation Unit Commander to the Debarkation Unit Commander.

COMMENTS

a. Communications would have been more rapid between units at Saigon and Haiphong if direct communications could have been established between CTG 90.8/CTU 50.1.1, CHMAAG and the Debarkation Commander. This was not possible, however, due to CHMAAG's facilities already being overtaxed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In future operations of this nature it is recommended that two APD or one larger type ship, be assigned to provide space and equipment accommodations for communication functions. Single destroyer type proved inadequate to handle increased traffic loads experienced during the operation.

Enclosure (6)
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - PUBLIC INFORMATION

1. General Comments.
   a. At the outset of the operation both AMERICAN and foreign news services disseminated information concerning U. S. naval participation in the INDOCHINA evacuation. With the passage of time, however, press interest in the evacuation itself diminished and throughout the period covered by this report (16 November through 18 May) particular effort was made to obtain adequate coverage of "spot" news events. Included among these were: (a) the escape of a group from VINH who had been under communist rule for eight years; (b) the visit on 8 January 1955 of CARDINAL SPELLMAN; (c) the evacuation of the 200,000th refugee aboard a U. S. ship on 20 January 1955; and (d) the evacuation of the members of the Confederation of Christian Workers, commencing in mid-January. In each such instance, unless the event was considered adequately covered by civilian news releases, a press story was forwarded to the Chief of Information with copy to CINCPACFLT.
   b. Requests of civilian correspondents to accompany the refugees aboard U. S. Navy evacuation ships were approved except in the case of one definite pro-communist. Some excellent feature stories resulted. Two journalists, because of the wide dissemination given their material, are worthy of special mention: Mr. Homer BIGART of the N. Y. Herald Tribune (who accompanied the refugees aboard the USNS GENERAL HOWZE departing HAIPHONG 8 December 1954) and M. Michele ARBEILLE, representing the French national picture magazine "PARIS MATCH" (aboard the HOWZE commencing 13 January 1955). Embarkation of correspondents on U. S. ships presented no problems.
   c. The evacuation was covered more thoroughly by VIETNAMESE and FRENCH media than by the AMERICAN press.
   d. During early February CTF 90 (Rear Admiral SABIN) participated in the TACHEN ISLANDS evacuation as second in command under Vice Admiral PRIDE. The immediate interest of the press in this new operation with potential international implications of the most serious nature afforded CTF 90 an opportunity to publicize the "Passage to Freedom" as well as the Tachens operation. Twenty one reporters and photographers were aboard the flagship. Excellent relations were established with media representatives, and the opportunity for acquainting the public with both operations was exploited to the utmost.
   e. As the final days of the INDOCHINA operation approached, the outbreak of violence in SAIGON again focused public interest on the area. Media representatives covering INDOCHINA made frequent mention of the "Passage to Freedom".

ENCLOSURE (7)
f. Roster stories were filed concerning U. S. Navy personnel. Throughout most of the period this included only the staff of Commander Task Group 90.8 and personnel of USS BALDUCk.

g. CTG 90.8 originated or was responsible for the following number of news releases of the commands or agencies indicated:

- Commander Task Group: 3
- U. S. Information Service: 10
- Civilian Press: 4
- Fleet Home Town News Center roster stories covering 200 officers and men.


a. Several correspondents were scheduled to make the journey from HAIPHONG with the last ship load of refugees. Unfortunately, however, a misunderstanding with the FRENCH authorities resulted in some missing connections. Larry ALLEN of Associated Press, Father O'CONNOR of the Catholic News Service and Norman AUS'IN of USIS accompanied the last of the refugees.

b. Several informal conferences were held with permanent U.S. media representatives in the INDOCHINA area. All civilian correspondents were fully cooperative except for one independent columnist with a general attitude of suspicion and fault finding. Every effort was made to assist correspondents in their work.

c. On a few occasions, press traffic caused congestion of available communication facilities.

3. Recommendation.

a. As pointed out in the initial report of the "Passage to Freedom" operation it is considered that the Navy public information coverage was excellent and afforded adequate on-the-spot coverage. However, based on letters received from parents, wives, and friends of the personnel in the task force, national coverage by news media was disappointing. While it is difficult to set forth a recommendation that would remedy this situation in the future it is felt that in any operation of this nature and scope, too much emphasis cannot be given to public information. This was a golden opportunity for the Navy to receive favorable nation-wide publicity. To provide adequate assistance to the task force commanders in taking full advantage of such an opportunity it is recommended that in such operations in the future at least one fully qualified public information officer be assigned to the Commanders' staff whose primary duty is PIO work. The present tendency is to assign this task as a collateral duty to an officer not specifically trained for the job, and who is normally absorbed in his primary duties.

ENCLOSURE (7)
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations listed below are in addition to those set forth in Part III of enclosure (1) to reference (a). The period covered by this report further substantiated earlier recommendations:

1. In an operation involving the evacuation of foreign nationals from a country having or about to be dominated by a hostile ideology, at least one intelligence officer and one photographer primarily responsible for the collection of intelligence should be assigned to the staff of the local sea commander. (See enclosure (3)).

2. When other than MSTS commands are to be assigned operational control of MSTS vessels, deployment should be preceded by accounting and supply instructions for MSTS vessels. (See enclosure (4)).

3. When a task group is relatively small and operating at a considerable distance from normal supply sources and in the absence of regular logistic support, replenishment should be accomplished at frequent intervals by a U.S. Navy tanker carrying a maximum of supply items in addition to fuel. (See enclosure (4)).

4. Employment of the T-LST beyond primary logistic support areas should not be attempted for periods in excess of one month. (See enclosure (4)).

5. Employment of the LST beyond 500 miles from primary logistic support areas should not be attempted for periods in excess of six weeks. (See enclosure (4)).

6. For operations such as the INDOCHINA evacuation, adequate methods and procedures for insuring prompt and regular mail service to naval personnel should be determined in advance.

7. The local sea commander of an operation having forces equivalent to those involved in the INDOCHINA evacuation and expected to provide similar press message service, should have communications facilities equal to that provided by two APDs. (See enclosure (6)).

8. To provide adequate news media coverage for an operation such as the "Passage to Freedom", at least one fully qualified public information officer should be assigned to the staff of the local sea commander. The primary duty of the officer should be public information. (See enclosure (7)).

ENCLOSURE (8)
Another sampan loaded with refugees comes alongside.

Some refugees escaped from Communist territory by using crude rafts of bamboo.

Enclosure (9)
Four Vietnamese maidens carry their belongings to the ship.

The refugees also brought their meager belongings by night.
Vietnamese happy to reach the big U. S. Navy ship that will take them to freedom.

Refugees disembark from their water-filled craft.

Enclosure (9)
The USS LEMNARD (APA-201) receives a load of refugees aboard for the journey south.

Refugees cluster alongside, eager to come aboard.

Enclosure (9)
A little refugee finds his new surroundings strange and frightening.

The refugees sought comfort from the heat on any open deck space.
A Vietnamese mother and her sons stare inquisitively at the strange surroundings.

An LSM carried the refugees to the open sea, where they were put aboard a ship for the journey south.
The last official refugee to embark on a U.S. Navy ship was Nguyen Van Lang, pictured with his two-year-old daughter boarding a French LCM on 14 May for transportation to the GENERAL BREWSTER. Mr. Le Quang Luat, Government Delegate for North Vietnam, watches the embarkation.

Seven of the last official refugees to flee Viet Minh rule await transportation on 14 May. Holding the child is LTJG T.A. Dooley III, MC, USN, who participated in Operation Passage to Freedom as officer-in-charge of the Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Unit at Haiphong.