From: Commander Task Force NINETY
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Subj: Evacuation Operations in VIETNAM; report of
Encl: (1) Part I - Narrative
                  Part II - Chronology
                  Part III - Conclusions and Recommendations
(2) Command Structure
(3) Summary and Recommendations - Intelligence (classified)(SC)
(4) Summary and Recommendations - Logistics
(5) Summary and Recommendations - Medical
(6) Summary and Recommendations - Public Information
(7) Comments and Conclusions - Communications
(8) Statistical Summary
(9) Photographs
(10) Chart of Area of Operation

1. Forwarded herewith is Commander Task Force NINETY's initial report on the U. S. Navy's participation in the INDOCHINA evacuation operation popularly known as "Passage to Freedom". This report covers the period from 8 August through 15 November 1954, the latter date being that on which CTF 90 turned over local area command to CTG 90.8, Captain N. J. FRANK, USN, while retaining overall command of the sea lift. A final report covering operations subsequent to 15 November 1954 will be submitted when appropriate.

2. Enclosures (1) to (10) contain details of the operation under headings as listed. It is considered that a study of these enclosures by pertinent staff divisions of interested commands will prove profitable.

3. Overall command of the operation was vested in the Commander-in-Chief Pacific. The Chief of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, INDOCHINA, LTGEN John W. O'DANIEL, then Major General, was designated as overall military coordinator. Rear Admiral L. S. SABIN, USN, Commander Task Force 90 was in command of the sea lift, under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Felix E. STUMP. Close liaison and coordination was effected between CTF 90 and Chief MAAG, INDOCHINA.
4. A total of 78 ships and 16,488 personnel participated in the operation. Eighteen of the ships were provided by the Military Sea Transportation Service. During the period of this report the U.S. Navy evacuated 173,311 passengers, 28,102 tons of military cargo and 5,791 vehicles. These totals will be considerably exceeded prior to completion of the operation with a predicted passenger lift in excess of 200,000 and a cargo lift of over 50,000 tons.

5. By 15 November the evacuation rate had decreased to such an extent that the decision was made to phase out all ships except 4 MSTS cargo ships, 2 MSTS troop transports and one small attack transport (APD) which was retained for command and communication purposes. Plans were also made to further reduce this force if practicable or to provide additional ships on short notice should an increase in the evacuation rate warrant such action. Concurrently with the reduction of the evacuation force on 15 November, CTF 90 departed from the area to resume his duties as Commander Amphibious Group, Western Pacific under COMNAVFLE while retaining overall command of the sea lift under CINCPACFLT.

6. An overall appraisal of this operation to date brings to light a number of facts which should be specifically mentioned:

   a. The officers and men of this Task Force made an invaluable contribution to the fight against communism by making thousands of new friends and allies. By their exemplary conduct, and the interest shown in the welfare and well being of these Southeast Asian people, our men gave eloquent proof to the refugees of the falseness of Communist hatred propaganda.

   b. The maintenance of large numbers of ships in almost continuous operations over long periods of time away from shore based facilities again demonstrated the soundness of mobile logistic support. Particularly valuable was the ARL as an LST tender.

   c. The successful protection of the health of the personnel of the task force in an area containing a high prevalence of disease and the provision of needed medical care to the refugees attest to the effective capability of navy medical personnel.

   d. The versatility of the U.S. Navy was again demonstrated by the sudden withdrawal of large numbers of ships from their assigned tasks and the successful accomplishment of a mission foreign to their normal duties.
d. (continued)

Although preliminary plans were under preparation for an INDOCHINA operation the concept of those plans was entirely different from the concept of this evacuation. This necessitated the preparation of a completely new operation order, a task which was accomplished by the staff of CTF 90 in three days. It is noteworthy that this operation order based primarily on assumptions and conjectures proved fundamentally sound and required few modifications.

c. The presence of large numbers of U.S. ships in this critical area of Southeast Asia proved highly beneficial in bolstering the will of freedom loving people to resist Communist aggression. The presence of our ships also provided physical proof of the interest of the United States Government in the people of small nations whose personal liberty was threatened by Communist aggression. It also had a very definite psychological effect on the Communists themselves in the form of proof of our determination to assist suffering humanity where ever and when ever such assistance was requested by the governments concerned.

f. Navy public information coverage was excellent and afforded adequate on-the-spot coverage. However, despite this excellent Navy PIO coverage, it is the opinion of CTF 90, based on letters received from parents, wives and friends of the personnel in the task force, that national coverage by news media was disappointing. It is believed that the Navy's part in this dramatic operation was not fully exploited. Not only does it appear that the general public was not well informed as to the humanitarian principle behind our participation but also as to our determined efforts to evacuate all MDAP and other U.S. origin equipment, the latter being an item of certain interest to the American taxpayer. The United States Ambassador to INDOCHINA personally told CTF 90 that he thought the U.S. Navy was missing a golden opportunity to tell the people of our country a very gripping and powerful story which would not only redound to the credit of the U.S. Navy but would bring home to the people the efforts of our government in its continued opposition to Communist aggression and its interest in the principles of humanity and personal freedom. CTF 90 is in no position to evaluate the apparent lack of success in national news media coverage. He cannot escape the conclusion, however, that whatever the reason, the full potential of this opportunity for constructive public information was not realized.

7. The Government of VIETNAM expressed its gratefulness for the assistance provided by the United States in this effort in the form of a Vietnamese
7. (continued)
Presidential Citation with ribbon of friendship presented to the personnel of MAAG and TF 90 through LTGEN O'DANIEL and Rear Admiral SABIN. In accordance with existing regulations the award was conditionally accepted by CTF 90 on behalf of the officers and men of the task force pending approval by higher authority.

8. This report covers only the participation of Task Force NINETY and does not include the activities of other U.S. agencies such as MAAG, USIA, USOM, etc., which presumably will be covered in reports by those agencies.

9. Appended hereto as part III to enclosure (1) is a list of conclusions and recommendations summarized from enclosures (4) through (8) for ready reference. The details leading to these conclusions and recommendations plus other pertinent information are contained in the enclosures.

10. This report would be incomplete without specific mention of the following:

   a. The outstanding conduct and performance of duty of all personnel of Task Force NINETY and MSTS under very difficult and trying conditions of climate, sanitary conditions, improvisation, political intrigues and delicate situations.

   b. The fine personal relations, cooperation and coordination existing between the United States Embassy, MAAG INDOCHINA and other U.S. Agencies and Task Force NINETY.

   c. The complete grasp of the problems and the full support on the part of higher authority given to CTF 90 in the execution of his duties and responsibilities.

11. Enclosure (3), Summary and Recommendations - Intelligence, is classified and will be issued under separate cover.

   L. S. SABIN.
Copy to:

CNO
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVFE
COMPHIBPAC
CHMAAG SAIGON
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COMSTSPA CAREA
COMSTSWESTPACAREA
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COMSERVDIV 31
COMSTSMIDPACSUBAREA
COMSTSNORPACSUBAREA
COMPHIBRON 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
COMLANSHIPRON 1, 3, 5, 7, 9
COMNA VBCHGRU-1
OINC WESTPAC DET NBG-1
COMLCURON 3
ALUSNA SAIGON
COMSTSO SAIGON
CO TOLVANA (AO 64)
HMR 163

Serial: 4
3 January 1955

FF3/1/A4-3
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PART 1

NARRATIVE

PASSAGE TO FREEDOM was an outgrowth of the Geneva Conference agreement signed 21 July 1954 by FRANCE and the VIET MINH. Many staunch anti-Communists would be left under VIET MINH domination by the partitioning of VIETNAM unless they could migrate below the 17th Parallel prior to 15 May 1955. Since French sea and air transportation was not adequate to meet evacuation demands, the French and Vietnamese Governments formally requested assistance from the United States Government.

The United States Government approved the request for assistance and on 8 August the organization for PASSAGE TO FREEDOM took form. LTGEN J. W. O'DANIEL, then MAJGEN, USA, Chief of MAAG, INDOCHINA was assigned by CINCPAC as the overall military coordinator ashore under Ambassador Donald R. HEATH. Command of U.S. sea operations was assigned to RADM L. S. SABIN, USN, under operational control of CINCPACFLT. Elements of COMSERVRON 3 under RADM R. A. GANO, USN were ordered to provide logistic support for CTF 90.

The French estimated 100,000 people per month would be available for evacuation, plus thousands of tons of military and economic assistance material in the TONKIN DELTA area which it was desired to keep from Communist hands. Based on this information 5 APA, 2 AKA, 2 LSD, 4 LST, and 2 APD were sailed to HAIPHONG to meet initial shipping requirements. The first refugees boarded the MENARD (APA 201) on 16 August.

During the next three months 173,311 refugees, 28,102 tons of cargo, and 5,791 vehicles were transported by U.S. ships to ports south of the 17th Parallel.

Upon assuming command of the sea operation in INDOCHINA, CTF 90 prepared an operation order complete from embarkation to debarkation. It provided for Marine Shore Party and Naval Beach Group personnel who were well trained in Amphibious loading and unloading techniques. Although these personnel were considered essential by CTF 90 for maximum utilization of U.S. shipping, French officials would not authorize their landing except in small numbers for liaison purposes. The French contended that additional U.S. personnel might be construed as a violation of the Geneva Agreement. As a result our forces were dependent on French and Vietnamese organizations ashore.

From the beginning it was apparent that we could not render the assistance equal to our capabilities since the French and Vietnamese Governments were not geared for the speed and complexity of such an operation.

ENCLOSURE (1)
Early in the operation MSTS provided 5 USNS troop transports and 13 cargo ships for use by CTF 90. Their participation made it possible to return most of the amphibious ships to their regular tasks in WESTPAC. Navy logistic channels were utilized to replenish MSTS ships throughout the operation.

The presence of this number of U.S. ships in an area surrounded and infiltrated by Communists necessitated a forceful security program. Precautions were taken in an effort to prevent Communists posing as refugees from bringing grenades and other weapons aboard our ships. Security watches were intensified and alerted to the possibility of swimmers from sampans attempting to set off mines or other charges against moored and anchored ships. As a result of precautions taken, no damage resulted to U.S. shipping or equipment from subversive action.

Since the original French estimates of personnel and material to be moved proved to be high, there was more than adequate shipping available at all times.

Somewhat exasperating to Americans was the tropical custom of the three hour mid-day siesta, and the lethargic nature of native stevedores.

Throughout the operation, indications increased that the VIET MINH were exerting pressure, and sometimes force, to prevent the migration of people south, especially able-bodied men. Late in October, the flow of evacuees almost stopped. Then a new escape route was found as some of the Vietnamese took to the sea in sampans and bamboo rafts. Slipping past VIET MINH guards at night, these people braved the elements at sea in order to escape the Communists. Many were reported to have drowned when their flimsy rafts broke up in rough water.

French patrol craft went to the assistance of these people inside territorial waters making systematic sweeps along their escape route to pick them up before they reached the open sea. For awhile, a French ship stood by to transfer the refugees from the patrol craft. Later, as the numbers of these desperate people increased, a U.S. transport was directed to anchor outside the 3-mile limit to receive refugees direct from the French patrols. These refugees were a most determined lot and there was a much higher percentage of males than had previously been encountered. They reported that the VIET MINH had deprived them of all transportation and that escape by sea seemed the last resort.

The ships of this force have carried thousands of troops and made scores of landings. Last year in the Korean POW exchange, the sick half-starved prisoners returning from Communist captivity evoked our deepest sympathy and helpless anger. The "Passage to Freedom"
has been and continues to be a unique experience in the lives of those Americans who participate in it. Here is the way it appeared to a member of the crew aboard the USS ALGOL (AKA 54):

"About noon on the 20th of August, a converted French LSM drew along our port side, Chinese fashion, with its central well packed with humanity. It was a sea of wide straw hats. There were naked babies astride their mothers hips; pitifully small bundles clamped in wordless terror by ones who until that moment had never seen a ship so large and high. These people are of golden brown complexion, their height an average of 5 feet, with eyes not slanted. Under their wide straw hats, the women wear their very black hair, twisted in braids about their crowns, and a black half turban wound about. No skirts in the crowd - trousers of black or brown - usually bare of foot. In spite of their difficult journey they looked reasonably clean, as if they would be cleaner if they could.

Topside a fire hydrant has been turned on to help cool the decks and instantly it is surrounded by people with their laundry at the ready. Shipfitters had built showers to be hooked into the salt water system, and they were now turned on sending a spray of water from a pipe seven feet off the deck. No passengers used them; the interpreter explains the water comes from too high up. Out come the hack saws and the pipe is dropped to 3 feet above the deck. Now the children rush to wash their feet. More laundry and mess gear appear and a procession starts up and down the ladders into the holds. Soon even the very young are splashing around under the cooling water. The decks are constantly wet and running with water, but this is as nothing to the comfort the water gives.

The morning after the first night sees a great change. Now they have found there is no terror here. They stand around in groups, around the hatch guard, grinning, laughing, and chattering among themselves, very much at home."

The officers and men taking part in this operation have been rewarded in many ways for their efforts. In their own fashion the refugees themselves have from time to time expressed their gratitude. One of the simplest but most effective tributes came in the following letter, received by the Commanding Officer of the USS ALGOL (AKA 54):

"27 August 1954

My Dear Captain
All Officers,
and Men:

In the name of all refugees I wish to extend my thanks for the aid towards
the point of view of the "Passage to Freedom".

During our stay aboard we missed nothing. You gave us more than we needed. We are very happy.

Before we leave you I ask and pray that you extend to Rear Admiral L. S. Sabin and the American Government the thanks for all refugees.

My best wishes,

CAPTAIN PHUNG /s/
LIEUTENANT CAN /s/
DOCTOR DUONG /s/
NURSES NHUAN AND HOI /s/
INTERPRETER THU /s/!

In addition to the many expressions of gratitude from the refugees to the personnel of the United States ships, the Task Force Commander has received many expressions of appreciation from various sources, both official and personal.

Because the evacuation slowed considerably during the first part of November, the U.S. Navy ships except BALDUC (APD 152) and six MSTS ships were phased out of the operation. On 15 November CTF 90 turned local command of the sea operation over to CAPT N. J. Frank, Jr., USN, to act as CTG 90.8. CTF 90 retained overall sea command. According to plan CTG 90.8, the Evacuation Group Commander, will remain in INDOCHINA until there is no further need for U.S. assistance. If additional assistance becomes necessary at any time before the deadline date of 18 May 1955 ships of the Amphibious Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet and/or MSTS ships may return to INDOCHINA and resume their part in operation "Passage to Freedom".

As a result of this operation, tens of thousands of Vietnamese came to know AMERICA through the genuine kindness displayed by U.S. Navy, MSTS Civil Service and Merchant Marine crews. During the three or four days spent on board our ships a great many people became our friends. Gifts of rice, chopsticks, cigarettes, candy and soap were presented to the refugees. Frightened hungry, weary children were washed, fed and entertained by our bluejackets. One ship held a beauty contest and elected "Miss Passage to Freedom" during the trip south. These natural expressions of goodwill on the part of American sailors toward the Vietnamese people, may well be one of the most significant and rewarding results of our aid and assistance to a beleaguered people. Certainly the operation has been spiritually rewarding to those who participated in it. PASSAGE TO FREEDOM exemplifies the Christian spirit.
that motivates the actions of our country toward all oppressed peoples of the world. Ambassador HEATH expressed it in the following message when CTF 80 departed from INDOCHINA:

"Upon occasion your departure from SAIGON would like to reiterate my admiration for the way in which you have carried out mission connection evacuation refugees from north. Conduct your officers and men both afloat and ashore deserves highest commendation. Their kindness and thoughtfulness towards refugees have left impression of individual Americans which will not soon be forgotten. Mission has been carried out in best tradition of naval service. Signed DONALD R. HEATH."

ENCLOSURE (1)
PART II

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

8 August

The Chief of Naval Operations informed the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet that the United States Government intended to participate in the evacuation of Vietnamese civilians from Communist-held northern INDOCHINA. MAJGEN J. W. O’DANIEL, CHMAAG, INDOCHINA, was designated overall military coordinator ashore, to be responsible to the American Ambassador to VIETNAM, Mr. Donald R. HEATH. RADM L. S. SABIN, CTF 90, was designated the commander of U. S. sea operations. Elements of the Western Pacific Amphibious Group augmented by ships of the Military Sea Transportation Service were made available for employment in this operation as requested by CTF 90.

Upon agreement between the Commander in Chief Pacific and Commander in Chief Far East, Commander Task Force 90 was released from the Far East Command and directed by Commander Naval Forces Far East to report to the Commander in Chief United States Pacific Fleet for operational control.

Based on French estimates of 100,000 evacuees and 50,000 to 60,000 M/T of equipment per month with a possible increase in personnel rate after the first two months, CTF 90 requested following ships by type from COMNAVFE:

1 AGC, 8 APA, 4 AKA, 4 LSD, 4 APD, 2 ARL, 18 LST, 12 LCU including unit commander, TACRON 1, UDT 12, and NAVBCHGRU 1.

RADM SABIN and advance party departed JAPAN to confer with MAJGEN O’DANIEL at SAIGON.

9 August

Orders were issued to 5 APA, 2 AKA, 2 LSD, 4 LST, 2 APD when RFS to proceed to HAIPHONG. CTF 90 planned to use amphibious shipping in the initial phase of the operation and then to substitute MSTS shipping as required. Amphibious ships were to be phased out as soon as practicable. CTF 90 submitted a request to PACFLT to establish a logistic support group at TOURANE BAY.

10 August

Flagship ESTES departed YOKOSUKA, JAPAN for HAIPHONG, INDO-
CHINA, via OKINAWA and SUBIC BAY.

Full press coverage was agreed upon by RADM L. S. SABIN, MAJ-GEN J. W. O‘DANIEL and U.S. Ambassador Donald R. HEATH. This recommendation was approved by CINCPAC, and as a result CINCPAC-FLT ordered PIO personnel to CTF 90 staff to cover the operation.

11 August

CINCPAC-FLT ordered COMNAVF to provide logistic support. COMNAVF designated CTF 92 (RADM R. A. GANO) as logistics agent for CTF 90 and directed the activation of Mobile Logistic Support Group (TG 92.3) to provide direct support in INDOCHINA.

CTF 90 Admin was directed by RADM SABIN to send COMTRANS-DIV 14 in BEGOR (APD 127) to HAIPHONG to take over initial command of loading and embarkation.

MENARD (APA 201) arrived off of TOURANE having been ordered to the area from her HONG KONG station.

12 August

CTF 92 promulgated by message his Operation Order 2-54 for the activation of TG 92.3 to consist initially of 1 AR, 1 AO, 1 AF, 1 AKL, 1 AH and 1 ARS.

RADM SABIN departed SAIGON enroute to flagship ESTES.

13 August

CTF 90 requested that COMSTSWESTPAC make available 4 T-AP.

15 August

RADM SABIN embarked in flagship ESTES at SUBIC BAY and flagship departed for HAIPHONG.

16 August

COMTRANS-DIV 14 assumed command of HAIPHONG embarkation as CTG 90.8. MENARD (APA 201) began loading first refugees. PASIG (T-A W 3) was ordered activated.

17 August

MENARD (APA 201) loaded 1024 refugees and sailed HAIPHONG for SAIGON.

ENCLOSURE (1)
BEGOR (APD 127) assumed station ship duties, HAIPHONG.
WANTUCK (APD 125) assumed station ship duties, DO SON.

18 August
Flagship ESTES arrived HAIPHONG.

It was decided that the phasing out of amphibious ships could best be accomplished as each unit becomes eligible for return to CONUS.

MONTROSE (APA 212), second ship to load refugees, departed HAIPHONG with 2100 refugees.

19 August
CHMAAG, INDOCHINA reported that he was attempting to resolve the many problems arising at the embarkation and debarkation sites, such as sanitation, mass feeding, transportation, tents, inoculations, organization of control teams to act as interpreters and to assist with the care of refugees on board ship during the trip south.

20 August
RADM SABIN departed for SAIGON for a conference with ADM FELIX B. STUMP, CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT.

21 August
RADM SABIN returned from the SAIGON conference.

22 August
CAVALLARO (APD 128) relieved WANTUCK (APD 125) as station ship, DO SON.

23 August
First logistic support ships of CTG 92.3 (AJAX (AR 6) and CALIENTE (AO 53)) arrived TOURANE BAY and prepared for fleet issue.

French submitted plans to load a battalion plus organic equipment in TF 90 LSD. Since up to this time CTF 90 had considered his task and authority permitted transporting of only refugees and equipment, the matter was referred to CINCPACFLT.

3 ENCLOSURE (1)
24 August

CINCPACFLT clarified Navy policy on evacuation of French and Vietnamese military units. This policy permitted such units to be lifted in U.S. ships at the discretion of CTF 90 and CHMAAG, INDOCHINA, provided that the lift of refugees and MDAP equipment would at no time be sacrificed to such employment.

COMTRANSDIV 13, CAPT W. C. WINN, embarked in WANTUCK (APD 125) relieved COMTRANSDIV 14, CAPT B. N. RITTENHOUSE, as CTG 90.8 at HAIPHONG. COMTRANSDIV 14 embarked in BEGOR (APD 127) proceeded SAIGON to assume duties as CTG 90.9 (Debar-kation Control Group).

CNO approved the evacuation of French POW patients from SAIGON to FRANCE. CINCPACFLT ordered COMNAVFE to deploy the HAVEN (AH 12) to INDOCHINA for this evacuation.

25 August

An analysis of the evacuees to date revealed that approximately sixty per cent were young children and old people.

26 August

Flagship ESTES departed HAIPHONG for TOURANE BAY.

French requested U.S. ships to evacuate 40,000 Chinese now living in Northern VIETNAM. CINCPACFLT approved.

CTU 90.8.6, Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Unit, was established at HAIPHONG to coordinate with French and Vietnamese officials through U.S. MAAG representative all medical matters relative to embarkation.

27 August

Flagship ESTES visited TOURANE and departed for SAIGON.

RADM SABIN conferred with RADM GANO regarding logistic support of U.S. shipping including MSTS, USNS, and Time Charters.

CHMAAG, INDOCHINA established a refugee debarkation site at CAP ST JACQUES at the entrance of the SAIGON RIVER. This relieved congestion in the SAIGON camps and decreased Navy problems.

ENCLOSURE (1)
encountered transiting the SAIGON RIVER.

COMTRANSDIV 14 assumed duties of CTG 90.9, SAIGON, BEGOR (APD 127) Flagship.

28 August

EPPING FOREST (LSD 4) assumed duties of Station ship at CAP ST JACQUES.

EPPING FOREST reported the estimated final completion date of the CAP ST JACQUES debarkation site would be 11 September and at that time the capacity of 15,000 refugees.

29 August

Flagship ESTES arrived SAIGON.

30 August

CTF 90 was informed that the pilot fees for traversing the SAIGON RIVER amounted to about $750 for each ship per round trip. This was referred to CHMAAG, INDOCHINA for resolution with French, Vietnamese and U.S. Embassy. CINCPACFLT was informed.

COMNAVFE directed HAVEN (AH 12) to transfer Fleet Epidemic Disease Control Unit 2 to CTF 90 upon its arrival SAIGON.

31 August

A typhoon in the vicinity of HAIPHONG destroyed almost half of the refugee staging area. However, MAAG had sufficient tents after typhoon had passed to increase the camp capacity to 10,000 refugees.

1 September

Camp sites at HAIPHONG cleared of debris and back in operation.

Ships of TG 90.8 were directed to be alert for possible sabotage aboard evacuation ships.

3 September

MAAG representative HAIPHONG, reported to CHMAAG, INDOCHINA that through 1 September approximately 153,000 refugees had been evacuated; 106,000 by French air and Navy, balance by the U.S. Navy.
The French unofficially made it known that they did not intend to pay pilot fees for ships traversing the SAIGON RIVER. CHMAAG, INDOCHINA recommended that bills be presented to STEM for U.S. payment if the Vietnamese Government refused to pay the bill.

4 September

WANTUCK (APD 125) became first TF 90 ship to phase out of the INDOCHINA operation.

5 September

Flagship ESTES departed SAIGON for NHA TRANG.

A shortage of control teams continued to be a serious problem.

6 September

Flagship ESTES arrived NHA TRANG.

CTG 90.8 reported a drastic reduction of refugee registrations and that his efforts to get U. S. MSTS cargo ships scheduled for loading had so far been unsuccessful.

CHMAAG, INDOCHINA reported that refugee camps in the SAIGON-CAP ST JACQUES areas were becoming overcrowded because refugees were arriving at a faster rate than the Vietnamese Government was able to relocate the families. As a result, CHMAAG, INDOCHINA requested that only one ship with no more than 2500 passengers per day arrive in this area during the period 11 – 25 September.

HMS WARRIOR loaded 1200 refugees at HAIPHONG.

7 September

Flagship ESTES arrived TOURANE.

CTF 90 was informed by CINCPACFLT that he would continue in his capacity as commander of U.S. sea phase of the INDOCHINA evacuation until evacuation was completed.

8 September

CDR A. E. TEALL, COMPHIBCONDIV 12, in CAVALLARO (APD 128) arrived SAIGON.
CTF 90 informed CINCPACFLT that conflicting reports were being received on the estimated number of refugees and amount of material in the TONKIN DELTA to be evacuated by U.S. ships and that he would attempt to get reliable figures upon arrival HAIPHONG.

2 September

Flagship ESTES departed TOURANE for HAIPHONG.

CTF 90 was informed that the French were reluctant to make dock space available for U.S. cargo ships. Their reasons were that 21 French cargo ships were under contract for the operation; limited port facilities available; and that each U.S. cargo ship employed would displace one French cargo ship with a resultant loss of revenue for the French.

CTG 92.3 (RADM GANO) shifted his flag to CALVERT (APA 32) from AJAX (AR 6) for a trip to SAIGON.

10 September

Flagship ESTES arrived HAIPHONG.

CTF 90 conferred with MAAG representatives at HAIPHONG, CTG 90.8, and FOA representative relative to idle U.S. ships in INDOCHINA. Estimates for refugees were approximately 10,000 per week and cargo for MSTS ships undetermined. CTF 90 recommended to CINCPACFLT that if after thorough investigation it is still evident that increased loading facilities will not be made available, U.S. shipping should be withdrawn or drastically reduced.

HMS WARRIOR embarked 1743 passengers. No loading of U.S. ships.

11 September

CTF 90 conferred ashore with MAAG and FOA representatives, French and Vietnamese officials. As a result of these conferences new firm estimates for U.S. participation was established. The estimate included 50,000 refugees per month and 15,000 to 20,000 tons of cargo. As a result, CTF 90 recommended the release of all MSTS ships except 5 troop transports, 4 small (2000 ton) shallow draft cargo ships and 2 Liberty/Victory type cargo ships. He also submitted a revised recommendation for the phase out of amphibious ships.

LST 692 collided with French ship DOCTEUR LAVERAN at Poste 6.

ENCLOSURE (I)
HAIPHONG. Slight damage sustained by both ships, no personnel injured. CTF 90 ordered investigation.

12 September

CTF 90 reported the following reasons for sudden decrease in number of refugees:

1. Poor planning and organization at relocation centers in south caused lack of faith in government.

2. VIET MINH countermeasures such as false propaganda and forcible detention were very effective.

3. The approach of the rice harvesting season.

4. Many remain to transact business during the Tonkinese festival season. Vietnamese official requested U.S. lift private industrial material. CTF 90 declined stating it was not possible under the agreement by which U.S. ships were participating.

13 September

CINCPACFLT concurred with CTF 90's recommendations regarding phasing out of amphibious and MSTS ships but desired that CTF 90 remain prepared to handle any unforeseen increase.

Five MSTS Time Chartered ships released.

CTG 92.3, RADM GANO, returned to his flagship AJAX (AR 6) at TOURANE.

TACRON 3 relieved TACRON 1 aboard CTF 90's flagship, ESTES.

16 September

ALUSNA, SAIGON informed CINCPACFLT that CDR MENON, Indian Navy, President of International Control Commission team at SAIGON had informally asked permission for the committee to visit U.S. ships for inspection. CINCPACFLT advised CTF 90 and ALUSNA, SAIGON that no foreigners will be allowed to inspect U.S. Naval or merchant ships under PACFLT OpControl without specific authority of CNO.

CTF 90 informed COMPHIBPAC that the imminent detachment of key officers, due to PHIBPAC reorganization, will seriously hamper current INDOCHINA operations. COMPHIBPAC authorized CTF 90 to promul-
gate delayed detachment dates for the subordinate commanders concerned.

TRANSDIV 13, less CALVERT (APA 32) and SKAGIT (AKA 105) departed the area.

17 September

Imminent onset of the northeast monsoon season necessitated ordering the relocation of the Logistic Support Group (TG 92.3) from TOURANE to HAIPHONG (move about 28 September).

CTF 90 informed CNO that his present organization and ships provide capabilities greater than the predicted number of refugees and equipment.

CTF 90 submitted the following recommendations for improvement of evacuation:

1. Utilization of staging areas for handling equipment, general cargo and vehicles.

2. Additional stevedores or French soldiers to stage and load on 24 hour basis.

3. Establishment of traffic control of routes to loading sites.


5. Dockside berths in addition to two now available.

6. Additional French lighterage to load cargo in ships at buoys.

7. Greater use of other debarkation centers such as TOURANE and NHA TRANG.

8. Adequate and rapid relocation of refugees in South INDOCHINA.

9. More effective help on part of Vietnamese and French to assist refugees through VIET MINH lines, including transportation to camp sites and appeals to International Commission to prevent forced detention of refugees.

10. Early initiation of more vigorous Passage to Freedom propaganda effort.

ENCLOSURE (1)
18 September

CTF 90 informed CTG 90.8 that he intends to release mobile surgical teams and return them to COMNAVFE about 27 September.

Refugees refused to use matting issued them. Matting was too loosely woven and of poor quality. Ships also consider them a fire hazard. It was decided to turn the mats over to Refugee Commission in SAIGON to be used at debarkation centers.

CTF 90 informed CNO that French had commenced using military personnel as stevedores on the docks at HAIPHONG to load U.S. ships.

19 September

As a result of the reduction in the number of U.S. ships participating in the evacuation, the number of logistic support ships were reduced. The Commanding Officer of CIMARRON (AO 22) relieved RADM GANO as CTG 92.3 and RADM GANO departed the area in AJAX (AR 6).

It was reported by CTG 90.9 that MSTS ships were maintaining the high standard of conduct already set by amphibious ships.

CTF 90 received a report that the British had released the HMS WARRIOR from INDOCHINA evacuation and ordered her to SINGAPORE.

CHMAAG, INDOCHINA recommended to CTF 90 that publicity be given the lifting of the 100,000th refugee. He requested the name of the ship nominated for this lift. It was decided that the flagship, ESTES (AGC 12), would transport the refugee.

A new estimate of evacuation established the following:

French estimate 100,000 civilian refugee would be available for evacuation through 1 January.

CTF 90 was informed by CHMAAG, INDOCHINA that the French air lift would end 1 October and that the estimated U.S. sea lift requirements would be about 6000 refugees per week.

20 September

CTF 90 outlined to CINCPACFLT his recommendations for further cut back in MSTS shipping and the phase out of U.S. shipping when the French show ability to handle the remainder of passengers and cargo.
21 September

Flagship ESTES departed for TOURANE with 100,000th refugee and family embarked. CTF 90 informed CINCPACFLT that MARINE LYNX (I/AP 184) discovered opium and smoking equipment aboard during the last trip. French explained the use of opium is not an offense in VIET-NAM. CTF 90 informed CINCPACFLT that introduction of narcotics aboard U.S. ships will be prevented if possible, through knowledge of Navy Regulations and U.S. law by French and Vietnamese, and by dock search.

22 September

Flagship ESTES arrived TOURANE.

CTG 90.8 reported that U.S. Navy medical technicians in HAIPHONG are collecting valuable information on Indochinese diseases. They also extracted a 10 foot beef tapeworm from a native.

CHMAAG, INDOCHINA reported to the State Department that HANOI was practically clear of MDAP equipment and the French had assured him that all equipment would be removed by 10 October.

23 September

CTG 90.8 informed CTF 90 that a U.S. Navy medical officer at HAIPHONG recently conversed with a Vietnamese refugee who wished to report a violation of the Armistice Agreement to Geneva officials. This refugee reported that approximately 5000 refugees were not permitted to leave their village due to VIET MINH pressure.

24 September

Flagship ESTES arrived SAIGON. Ceremony for 100,000th refugee held at Catmat Wharf. Vietnamese and American diplomatic representatives were on hand to greet the 100,000th refugee and his family.

25 September

French reported they had allocated 8 - 10 ships to lift VIET MINH to the north. This commitment should be completed by 1 November. French will then have capacity to move all cargo south.

French request for retention of U.S. LST as recommended by CHMAAG, INDOCHINA was not concurred in by CTF 90 for the following reasons:

ENCLOSURE (1)
1. LST scheduled to phase out are due for rotation to the United States.

2. Holding these ships beyond return date is contrary to CINCPACFLT and CNO directives.

3. French ships that return VIET MINH can also lift cargo on return trip.

4. U.S. can absorb with available shipping what French lose in other commitments.

26 September

RADM A. P. STORRS, Chief of Staff to CINCPAC, CTG 90.8, and MAAG representatives, HAIPHONG, lunched with the American consul at HANOI and afterwards visited the refugee reception center, depots and camps.

It is apparent to all that the VIET MINH have halted the refugee movement at HANOI. As a result, a downward revision of weekly evacuee rate to 4,000 was made. Cargo loading and discharging was still painfully slow and considered unsatisfactory. CTF 90 continued to urge CHMAAG, INDOCHINA to exert all possible effort to improve this situation which was resulting in uneconomic use of American shipping.

27 September

LST 772 collided with French LSM 9012 at Poste 6 HAIPHONG with minor damage sustained by both ships. No personnel injuries. CTF 90 ordered an investigation.

28 September

Upon departure TG 92.3 from TOURANE for HAIPHONG, the Mayor made a call upon CTG 92.3 to express his regret at the American departure and extended his highest respects.

29 September

CTG 90.8 reported that a Roman Catholic priest, who escaped from THAI BENH, believed that 20,000 people in that district wish to leave while an estimated 50,000 people desire evacuation from other towns and districts under VIET MINH control.

12 ENCLOSURE (1)
CTF 90 informed CNO that the new Vietnamese Minister of Information, THAI, stated that GENERAL HINH, Minister of Defense, is very capable, dynamic and popular, making him so indispensable that soon a more important post in the government may be offered him. THAI criticized the government for allowing many useless people to arrive (very old, women and babies) from the North while the VIET MINH retained really productive elements.

French arrested 12 civilians in SAIGON for possessing concussion type hand grenades in the downtown area most frequented by Americans.

30 September

CTG 90.8 visited HANOI for final equipment and refugee check before 10 October deadline. No additional refugees had arrived in last 24 hours. Tents at staging line were struck for transportation to HAIPHONG. French were removing airstrip matting, asphalt, jerry cans, and empty drums from the air fields. The French have relieved the Vietnamese police in the city. HANOI took on an abandoned look except for white cars of the Truce Commission and armed troops at every intersection.

1 October

Twenty-seven sampans carrying 2,000 refugees arrived at Camp Pagode, HAIPHONG after fleeing their parishes about 70 miles south of HAIPHONG. Fifty more sampans were reported enroute.

2 October

CINCPACFLT released the MSTS ships MARINE SERPENT, GEN STURGIS, SS JOHN C and SS CANADIAN BEAR. These ships had been held in abeyance to be used if required.

MAAG representative HAIPHONG released statistics on the evacuation through 27 September:

- 373,239 people (all methods of transportation)
- 62,239 vehicles
- 55,248 tons of cargo.

3 October

CDR A. E. TEALL relieved CAPT B. N. RITTENHOUSE as CTG 90.9 at SAIGON.

ENCLOSURE (1)
5 October

CHMAAG, INDOCHINA reported to the State Department that in his opinion all moveable equipment will be lifted from HANOI by 10 October deadline. All material worthwhile is being removed, including unserviceable, but repairable spare parts. Anything else having possible salvage value to the VIET MINH has or will be destroyed.

Vietnamese customs officials inspected refugees that arrived SAIGON embarked in the GENERAL BLACK. They confiscated the U.S. gift packages. The same treatment was given the crew of the GENERAL BLACK, whose personal effects were confiscated. U.S. Consul was able to have the crew's personal effects returned prior the ship's sailing.

6 October

CTF 90 informed CNO that no interference by Vietnamese customs officers or police occurred during the debarkation of refugees this date.

7 October

CTG 90.9, CDR A. E. TEALL, reported that the Chinese refugees transported to SAIGON aboard the GENERAL HOWZE (T-AP 134) were required to pass through customs inspections upon debarkation. U.S. representatives present were unable to determine what items were confiscated, however it is believed the customs officials were searching for opium and gold leafs.

RADM SABIN was presented the Presidential Citation with Ribbon of Friendship by President of VIETNAM, NGU DINH DIEM, in a surprise ceremony at the presidential palace in SAIGON. RADM SABIN accepted the award subject to approval by higher authority.

8 October

CTF 90 reported to CNO that he was favorably impressed with the new Commander French Forces, Extreme Orient, VADM JOZAN, who seems vigorous, intelligent, able and gives impression that he will insist on the utilization of maximum French shipping capacity.

9 October

U.S. ships in HAIPHONG area were required to seek shelter in heavy weather anchorage in HENRIETTE PASSE or sortie and take evasive action at sea due to typhoon NANCY.

ENCLOSURE (1)
10 October

The evacuation of HANOI was completed on this date.

11 October

Typhoon NANCY passed the HAIPHONG area.

12 October

CINCPACFLT concurred in CTF 90's delay in recommending final phase out date of U.S. ships. CINCPACFLT suggested the use of MSTS LST if needed after 20 November in order that all PHIBPAC units might resume their NAVFE duties.

13 October

Flagship ESTES underway from SAIGON to HAIPHONG via CAMRANH BAY and NHA TRANG.

CTF 90 received message from Mr. Donald R. HEATH, U.S. Ambassador to VIETNAM in which he praised the officers and men of TF 90 for the splendid way in which they carried out their mission.

CDR Daniel DILLON, USNR, relieved CAPT P. W. MOTHERSILL as CO, MSTS Units (CTU 90.8.2) at HAIPHONG.

14 October

CTF 90 embarked in Flagship ESTES stopped at CAMRANH BAY, enroute to HAIPHONG, for a few hours and then proceeded to NHA TRANG. CAMRANH BAY was used by the Japanese during World War II. It is a small, but well protected harbor.

15 October

Flagship ESTES departed NHA TRANG for HAIPHONG.

CTG 90.8, CAPT W. C. WINN (COMPHIBRON 5), shifted from BEGOR (APD 127) to BALDUCK (APD 132).

CTF 90 reported to COMNAVFE on the condition of readiness of

ENCLOSURE (I)
TF 90 ships. CTF 90 pointed out the particular seriousness of having the Flagship isolated from the normal area of operation. Inability to schedule minimum upkeep and availability periods, lack of repair facilities and continuous operations all of which reduce the readiness of TF 90 ships in the INDOCHINA area particularly LST. In contrast, the TF 90 units in the Far Eastern Command area have been able to maintain a much higher degree of readiness.

16 October

Flagship ESTES arrived HAIPHONG and anchored in HENRIETTE PASSE.

CTG 90.8 reported reasons given by the senior Vietnamese official at HAIPHONG, Mr. LUAT, why many people choose to remain in Northern VIETNAM:

1. To await developments in HANOI after the Reds take over.
2. To await the outcome of the political dispute in Southern VIETNAM.
3. Await the completion of the rice harvest in mid-November.
4. Hold off the liquidation of business interests until late January.

CTF 90 made plans to conduct a conference, attended by U.S., French, and Vietnamese officials in the next few days. The subject being to determine the requirements for U.S. shipping in INDOCHINA, so that recommendations can be made for the phasing out of U.S. ships.

CAPT J. D. CROWLEY, CO TOLOVANA (AO 64) relieved CAPT W. W. WALKER, CO CIMARRON (AO 23) as CTG 92.3.

18 October

CTG 90.8 reported that 150 refugees arrived by sea in two sampans and two rafts under the leadership of an 85 year old patriarch. They were greeted by the Mayor of HAIPHONG and then transported to Camp Pagode.

In reply to CTF 90 request for order of release of MSTS T-APs, COMSTSWESTPACAREA recommended the release of the T-APs BLACK and BREWSTER in that order and no preference for the remainder.

18 ENCLOSURE (1)
CTG 92.3 reported to COMNAVPHL that the INDOCHINA mail service is still unsatisfactory and recommended the establishment of a firm air mail delivery schedule on a weekly basis.

19 October

COMLANTSHIPRON 5, CDR L. W. SEDGWICK, USN and staff, arrived SAIGON in preparation to assume the duties of CTG 90.9.

BEGOR (APD 127) relieved the CAVALARO (APD 128) at SAIGON as flagship of CTG 90.9.

A Vietnamese nationalist boarded the MARINE LYNX (T-AP 194) by climbing a mooring line while the ship was at SAIGON. Caught in the act of stealing by Vietnamese soldiers, he was severely beaten and turned over to the French authorities. He died a short time later of internal injuries. The French made an investigation of the incident. The U.S. Government did not become involved.

CTF 90 discussed the entire evacuation situation individually with the French and Vietnamese officials at HAIPHONG. The French attitude was one of wholehearted cooperation, unity of purpose and maximum effort.

20 October

A decision was reached by the French in regard to pilot and port fees at SAIGON. The French declared that in recognition of aid so generously extended, all U.S. ships engaged in the INDOCHINA evacuation are exempt from all port and pilot fees.

CDR Daniel DILLON, USNR, CO MSTS Unit (CTU 90.8.2) was detached and ordered to return to his permanent duty station. CTG 90.8 assumed the function of CTU 90.8.2.

21 October

Test loading of the SS CULUCUNDIS, MSTS Time Charter'd ship, was completed in less than 22 hours elapsed time. 359 vehicles were loaded. This loading was accomplished by American bluejackets, American merchant seamen and French Foreign Legion stevedores. This load of vehicles is equivalent to 6 LST loads.

CTF 90 was informed that the French are prepared to provide an additional battalion of legionnaires for future stevedoring.
LTGEN J. W. O' DANIEL, CHMAAG, INDOCHINA, spent the night aboard the flagship ESTES.

CTF 90 sent his recommendations on the phase out of Amphibious Force ships to CINCPACFLT.

23 October

French LSIL evacuated refugees from beaches off VAN LY area (50 miles south of HAIPHONG) in VIET MINH territory and transferred them to a French ship. CTF 90 agreed to use a T-AP to relieve the French ship due to its greater capacity. The T-AP to remain outside the 3-mile limit.

CDR L. W. SEDGWICK, USN, relieved CDR A. E. TEALL as CTG 90.9, SAIGON.

24 October

Refugees continued to arrive from the BUI CHI area via French LST, LSM and the French ship PIMODON. The International Control Commission Team at HAIPHONG interrogated these refugees concerning their escape. It was reported that the refugees were required to pay 15,000 VIET MINH Piastres which is about 500 VIETNAM Piastres for their passage in sampans and rafts.

LTJG T. A. DOOLEY, MC, USN relieved CDR S. O. BRITTEN as CTU 90.8.6, HAIPHONG.

25 October

LST 1096 departed HAIPHONG for TOURANE with the 55th U.S. LST load. This marked another milestone in the achievements of the workhorses of the Amphibious Force.

CDR J. H. DAVIS, USNR, relieved CAPT W. C. WINN, USN as CTG 90.8.

26 October

CAPT W. C. WINN, COMPHIBRON 5, and partial staff embarked in CALVERT (APA 32) departed the area for YOKOSUKA.

27 October

Mr. Michael ADLER, FOA representative, reported that HAIPHONG

ENCLOSURE (1)
officials are collecting VIET MINH Piastres from refugees and giving receipts for reimbursement in VIETNAM Piastres upon their arrival SAIGON.

French LST arrived HAIPHONG with 1800 refugees from VAN LY. These refugees were rescued from sampans and bamboo rafts. Many of them reported that they had been detained by the VIET MINH and in some cases beaten with rifle butts.

28 October

MAAG representative, HAIPHONG reported that he has reconnoitred the HAI DUONG sector. The final stages of the evacuation was found to be satisfactory. Everything has been evacuated from the abandoned forts, barrack expanded, airstrips were abandoned and thatched roofs burned. The French units have only a minimum of equipment and are prepared to move out on 28 - 29 October.

The French have rescued a total of 10,000 refugees from the sea and transported them to HAIPHONG.

29 October

Flagship ESTES underway for CAP ST JACQUES.

Helicopter dusted the HAIPHONG refugee camps with Lindane Insecticide with excellent results reported.

GENERAL BLACK (T-AP 135) loaded 5,224 refugees. This being the largest load to date for any one ship.

30 October

Flagship ESTES enroute CAP ST JACQUES.

GENERAL BREWSTER (T-AP 155) embarked 1209 refugees off VAN LY and returned to HAIPHONG to complete loading.

31 October

Flagship ESTES enroute CAP ST JACQUES.

MAAG representative HAIPHONG reported that the French withdrew their tactical units from HAI DUONG sector and turned over the city without incident. The French withdrew to about 24 km west of HAIPHONG.
1 November

Flagship ESTES enroute SINGAPORE.

CTG 90.8 reported that two refugees were wounded by VIET MINH while attempting to escape by raft from BUI CHU area. These refugees were treated by LTJG DOOLEY, MC, USN, and Roman Catholic priest (Vietnamese) Father KHUE VIETNAM at the hospital in HAIPHONG. Pictures of the wounds were taken to be presented to the International Control Commission.

2 November

Flagship ESTES enroute SINGAPORE.

GENERAL BLACK (T-AP 135) released from the INDOCHINA operation.

LST 855 entertained Vietnamese orphans aboard at HAIPHONG.

Approximately 2000 refugees are being housed temporarily in a warehouse at HAIPHONG. USN Preventive Medical Detachment Mobile Sick Bay has arranged with the VIETNAM public health service to make daily visits to the warehouse.

3 November

Flagship ESTES enroute SINGAPORE.

International Control Commission went into session to consider the complaints of the two refugees allegedly wounded by the VIET MINH. The proceedings, declarations and results were not made available to U.S. authorities.

Due to the possibility of an increase in the number of refugees and the general state of confusion, the MARINE LYNX (T-AP 194), MARINE ADDER (T-AP 193), and the GENERAL HOWZE (T-AP 134) delayed the phase out of these units until the situation is clarified.

4 November

Flagship ESTES arrived SINGAPORE.

Entire crew of HENNEPIN (T-AK 187) was reported as being infected with scabies. Arrangements were made for treatment at Bâ'ILONG.
CAPT N. J. FRANK, COMPHIBRON ONE, arrived HAIPHONG for indoctrination and will proceed SAIGON about 12 November.

COL SHAW, USMC, CINCPACFLT Staff and CAPT COLLETT, USN, CHMAAG, INDOCHINA Staff arrived HAIPHONG.

5 November

Flagship ESTES at SINGAPORE.

Typhoon PAMELA caused TF 90 ships to sortie from HAIPHONG area.

CAPT N. J. FRANK, COMPHIBRON ONE, broke his pennant in the BALDUC (APD 132).

Crew members of the ASKARI (ARL 30) donated clothing for distribution to the VIETNAM refugees.

5 November

Flagship ESTES at SINGAPORE.

CTF 90 requested from CTG 90.8 information necessary to adjust the phasing out of U.S. shipping.

Most of loading at HAIPHONG terminated due to Typhoon PAMELA.

7 November

Flagship ESTES enroute to SAIGON.

TF 90 ships returned from typhoon evasion to HAIPHONG and resumed loading.

8 November

Flagship ESTES enroute to SAIGON.

The International Control Commission has heard the case of the two wounded refugees referred to on 1 and 3 November. The files on this case were sent to HANOI.

9 November

Flagship ESTES arrived SAIGON.
Refugees at camps in HAIPHONG sent a note of sincere appreciation and thanks to the officers and crew of the ASKARI (ARL 30) for their generous gift of clothing.

CAPT N. J. FRANK, COMTRANSRON ONE, arrived SAIGON.

Ambassador J. Lawton COLLINS arrived SAIGON.

10 November

CAPT U. S. G. SHARPE, CINCPACFLT Staff arrived aboard Flagship ESTES. CTF 90 and Staff conducted a briefing on the sea lift situation.

CTF 90 and CTG 90. 8 made a courtesy call on Ambassador Donald R. HEATH and newly arrived Ambassador J. Lawton COLLINS. CTF 90 presented a brief resume of the sea lift situation to Ambassador COLLINS.

13 November

CTF 90 informed CINCPACFLT that the requirements for MSTS LST have been re-examined and they should not be needed unless political considerations are overriding.

14 November

It was reported that the VIET MINH would allow refugees to depart via circuitous water routes by VIET MINH transportation. The first arrivals are expected not earlier than 17 November 1954. The French plan to embark refugees at the transfer points. Lack of transportation is not anticipated.

CTG 90. 8 assumed command of local area of the sea lift. CTF 90 will remain the overall commander of the INDOCHINA operation.

15 November

Flagship ESTES departed SAIGON for HONG KONG.

Logistic Support Group (TG 92. 3) released by CTF 90.

22 ENCLOSURE (1)
CONCLUSIONS

1. Logistic support of ships and units participating in the operation was prompt and adequate.

2. Mail service in general was poor.

3. The material condition of the ships and units assigned to the operation for long periods deteriorated in varying degrees due to insufficient upkeep time and lack of adequate repair facilities.

4. LST proved not as reliable as other types due to high incidence of main engine casualties.

5. In an operation of this nature, specific area epidemiologic information is of marked importance in planning to meet preventive medicine and sanitation requirements.

6. Births and deaths were a factor requiring definite considerations, instructions and records.

7. Civil and religious leaders within the evacuee groups proved most valuable in assisting in solving the many problems confronting the officials in charge of the evacuation.

8. Navy public information coverage was excellent and afforded adequate on-the-spot coverage. However, national coverage by news media was disappointing.

9. Close liaison in any Joint or Combined Operation is essential to insure a successful completion of the assigned task.

10. Task Force NINETY ships demonstrated capabilities for successfully conducting a great increase communication traffic with existing personnel and equipment limitations.

11. The lack of material failures of the communication equipment indicated a high degree of maintenance and skill among the responsible personnel.

12. The best possible utilization of U.S. shipping was not realized in this operation because of the short time allotted for planning, which

ENCLOSURE (1)
resulted in the necessity to rely almost entirely on French and Viet­namese for initial estimates.

13. Full capabilities of Task Force NINETY were not used. Had CTF 90 been permitted to employ his full capabilities the operation could have been conducted in a much more orderly and expeditious manner.

14. Cargo capacity of U.S. shipping far exceeded actual cargo carried. Limited berth space, shortage of stevedoring and non-availability of cargo all contributed to the inability to fully utilize assigned shipping.

15. The lack of able bodied men (17 - 35 age group) among the early refugees indicated that the VIET MINH were using force and any other means to retain these productive elements of personnel.

16. Security measures placed in effect by CTF 90 including inspections of refugees, ship patrols and harbor patrol boats proved successful in preventing sabotage and effective communist propaganda despite the almost certain infiltration of communist agents with the refugees.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All available information concerning medical and epidemiological information should be secured in the planning stage for an operation of this nature.

2. In planning this type of operation make provisions for handling and disposition of the remains of the dead. This planning should include instructions conforming to the social and religious customs of the people involved.

3. Make adequate provisions for reporting and recording births on board U.S. ships.

4. Based on the best available area information, provide for all the indicated immunization protection required.

5. Provision for a preventive medicine and sanitation organization ashore in the evacuee concentration and embarkation area should be an initial planning requirement.

6. A public information officer specialist should be attached to the Commander’s Staff, and should remain in the flagship.

ENCLOSURE (1)
7. Communication liaison should be established prior to commencement of the operation and continued between all echelons participating until the operation is completed.

8. Maintain a high standard of training of communication personnel to insure continued reliable communications at all times.

9. Insure supervised maintenance of communications equipment at all times so as to maintain desired operating standards.

10. In future operations of this nature an advance on-the-spot study by cargo specialists should be made to determine the amount and type of shipping that will be required, some of the factors to be considered are:

   a. Arrival rate at embarkation port of personnel and material.
   b. Capacities of refugee camps at the embarkation and debarkation ports.
   c. Transfer rates from debarkation camps to resettlement locations.
   d. Port capacities at embarkation and debarkation points.
   e. Type and amount of material to be transported.

11. Every effort should be made and if possible in advance of governmental agreement to assist in an operation of this nature to insure that the full capabilities of the United States forces assigned can be utilized. Such elements of an amphibious unit as shore parties, Beach Groups, heavy equipment and other related amphibious echelons would have been invaluable in INDOCHINA.

ENCLOSURE (1)
U.S. IC SEA EVACUATION AND SUPPORT FORCES
PRIOR TO 15 NOV. 1954

CINC PAC

CINC PACFLT

CTF 90
COMMANDER
SEA OPERATIONS

CHIEF MAAG IC
MILITARY COORDINATOR

CTG 90.8
COMMANDER
EMBARKATION
GROUP

CTG 90.9
COMMANDER
DEBARKATION
GROUP

CTG 92.3
COMMANDER
MOBILE LOGISTIC
SUPPORT GROUP

CTU 90.8.1
TRANSPORT
UNIT
SHIPS ASSIGNED

CTU 90.8.2
MSTS
TRANSPORT
UNIT
SHIPS ASSIGNED

CTU 90.8.3
EMBARKATION
SHIP UNIT
SHIPS ASSIGNED

CTU 90.8.4
EMBARKATION
CONTROL UNIT
NAV/BOCHGRUDET

CTU 90.8.5
CONTROL
UNIT
APD & UDT DET

CTU 90.8.6
MEDICAL
UNIT
PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED

CTE 90.8.3.1
LCU
ELEMENT
CRAFT ASSIGNED
US I C COMMAND ORGANIZATION
EFFECTIVE 15 NOV 1954

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

CTF 90 COMMANDER SEA OPERATIONS

CHIEF MAAG I C MILITARY COORDINATOR

CTG 90.8 LOCAL I C SEA OPERATIONS

CTU 90.8.1 EMBARKATION UNIT HAI PHONG

MED DET.

CTU 90.8.2 DEBARKATION UNIT SAIGON
LOGISTICS

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. LOGISTICS CONCEPT

Logistics planning requirements and assumptions were established at the outset of the operation as follows: (1) Complete mobile logistic support would be provided in the INDOCHINA area for all vessels assigned, including MSTS shipping, and no direct reliance would be placed upon any other base except for major repairs. This was deemed necessary due to the remoteness of the operating area from established bases, the large number of ships to be employed and the need for short logistics periods in order to efficiently utilize and continuously operate the available shipping in carrying payloads; (2) All logistic support would be furnished from U.S. Navy stocks and facilities since commercial and French Navy sources in INDOCHINA were either unavailable, unsuitable or too costly; (3) Underway replenishment would not be required due to the relatively long endurance of the type ships to be employed and the decision to maintain a logistic support group; (4) Assigned shipping might be required to remain indefinitely; (5) Large ships would support small ships which might act as station ships and therefore not have opportunity to replenish from the logistic support group; (6) Upwards of 150,000 refugees would be carried per month to a grand total of about 700,000 persons; and (7) The refugees would be of all ages, both sexes, would have varying degrees of health, language ability, religious preference, knowledge of western sanitation and customs, and would require food and medical assistance while embarked in vessels of the force.

As the evacuation operation progressed it soon became apparent that the assumed total of 700,000 refugees required drastic revision downward and this was accordingly reflected in shipping phaseout and cutbacks or non-reordering of materials peculiar to the refugee lift. The other requirements and assumptions noted above remained valid for all practical purposes.

2. LOGISTICS SUPPORT GROUP OPERATIONS

In order to implement the basic logistic plan as set forth in paragraph 1, on 9 August Commander Task Force NINETY requested that a logistic support group be established at TOURANE BAY to consist of an AR, a T-AW, an AKS, an AF, an AK, an AO with one third diesel and two thirds NSFO, an ATF or ARS, an AH, and complete mail and motion picture exchange facilities. TOURANE BAY was selected as the most desirable location due to its strategic position approximately halfway between the embarkation port of

ENCLOSURE (4)
HAIPHONG and the principal debarkation points at SAIGON, CAP ST
JACQUE and NHA TRANG. While more efficient support could have
been obtained by locating the support group at the HAIPHONG end,
this would have resulted in an unacceptably high concentration of
shipping and was therefore not considered sound. TOURANE possessed
a further advantage in that it was below the 17th parallel demarca-
tion line and was itself likely to see considerable use as a debarkation
point. Thus TOURANE was designated the replenishment center,
distribution point for mail, fleet freight, etc., and waiting area for
ships proceeding up the coast on their return trip to HAIPHONG.

On 11 August COMNAVFLE designated CTF 92 as logistics
agent for CTF 90 and directed the activation of mobile logistic
support group TG 92.3 to provide direct support in INDOCHINA.
On 12 August CTF 92 promulgated his Operation Order 2-54
for the establishment of TG 92.3. Support group opera-
tions commenced at TOURANE on 23 August with AJAX (AR 6),
CALIENTE (AO 53) and with COMSERVRON THREE as CTG 92.3 in
AJAX (AR 6). KARIN (AF 33) and SUSSEX (AK 213) arrived
TOURANE 25 August and were joined by GRAPPLE (ARS 7),
RECLAIMER (ARS 42), and YW 130 on 26 August. UVALDE (AKA 88)
arrived TOURANE from JAPAN on 28 August with supplies of epidemic
control material, rice and other indigenous material for distribution
to passenger-carrying ships. CONSOLATION (AH 15) arrived
TOURANE 4 September direct from CONUS, USNS PISCATAQUA
T-AOG 80) from SASEBO on 10 September with 900,000 gallons of
water. DERRICK (YO 59) on 9 September, and SHARPS (AKL 10) and
ESTERO (AKL 5) made their first shuttle runs from SUBIC arriving
TOURANE 10 September and 16 September respectively. The initial
mail flight (R4D with 1700 pounds) was made to TOURANE on 24
August and beach recreation facilities were established 25 August.
The first fleet issues to a TF 90 vessel were made 24 August to
MONTROSE (APA 212) which received mail and fuel. The first
emergency repairs were commenced also on 24 August when ANDRO-
MEDA (AKA 15) went alongside AJAX (AR 6) to replace a wiped main
spring bearing.

The composition of the logistic support group remained sub-
stantially at strength in types of ships on station and variety of
services offered throughout the operation except that AJAX (AR 6)
was released on 20 September and CONSOLATION (AH 15) on 27
September due to more pressing need for their services elsewhere.

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CALIENTE (AO 53) was relieved by CIMARRON (AO 22) on 5 September. CIMARRON (AO 22) was in turn relieved by TOLOVANA (AO 64) on 16 October. In addition, on-station replenishment of the TOURANE tankers was made several times. SUSSEX (AK 213) was relieved by FARRIBAULT (AK 179) on 19 September and KARIN (AF 33) was relieved by MERAPO (AF 38) on 7 October. Replenishment of the on-station refrigerated cargo ship was made by ALUDRA (AF 55) during 21-23 September and by ZELIMA (AF 49) during 6-8 October. PISCATAQUA (T-AOG 80) departed 26 September but was replaced by PASIG (T-AW 3) on 13 October. One ARS was maintained in the area at all times.

Due to the onset of the fall northeast monsoon season which frequently renders TOURANE BAY untenable because of heavy ground swells, the logistic support group was moved to HENRIETTE PASSE, HAIPHONG on 28-29 September. The smaller number of ships in the operation at this time also reduced the likely concentration of shipping at the HAIPHONG end to an acceptable level, thus obviating the original important objection to providing logistics at this location. The deployment of the support group from TOURANE to HAIPHONG was accomplished smoothly and with the loss of but one day in readiness to supply logistics requirements. Command of TG 92.3 passed from COMSERNRON THREE to CO, CIMARRON (AO 22) on 19 September and to CO, TOLOVANA (AO 64) on 16 October. The personnel of the small staff remained fixed however and provided the necessary continuity. The logistic support group was finally released by CTF 90 on 15 November after topping off all ships to capacity on the last visit of each vessel to HAIPHONG.

The successful employment of the large number of ships of this force over an extended period of time in the relatively remote INDOCHINA area of operations was made possible only by the effective presence of the logistic support group. It is significant to note that but two ships were forced to leave the area for any reason, both being sent to SUBIC for repairs beyond the capacity of local forces. This operation is considered a striking vindication of the soundness of the policy of placing primary reliance in WESTPAC on mobile logistic support.

COMSERNRON THREE is preparing a separate report to CTF 90 on the operations of TG 92.3. This report will be forwarded when received.

ENCLOSURE (4)
3. SHIP MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS AND CASUALTIES

Initially AJAX (AR 6) was stationed at TOURANE and ATLAS (ARL 7) and SPHINX (ARL 24) at HENRIETTE PASSE, HAIPHONG to provide tender services. Since very few material casualties occurred during the first month of operations and the pressure of the refuge backlog in the HAIPHONG area precluded scheduling alongside availabilities, AJAX (AR 6) received very little work during this period but served primarily as insurance in the event emergency repairs were needed. This low work load, combined with the pressing need for an AR to supplement facilities in the COMNAVFE area, resulted in release of AJAX (AR 6) on 20 September. SPHINX (ARL 24) was deployed to TOURANE to replace AJAX (AR 6) but was shifted again to HAIPHONG upon phaseout of ATLAS (ARL 7) on 27 September. SPHINX (ARL 24) was phased out 25 October and replaced by ASKARI (ARL 30) which arrived on station at HENRIETTE PASSE, HAIPHONG on 25 October. ASKARI (ARL 30) remained at HAIPHONG until final phaseout on 18 November. The ARLs at HAIPHONG were placed under the operational control of the Embarkation Port Commander (CTG 90.8) who was authorized to assign availabilities and upkeep periods as his loading schedule permitted. In spite of their limited repair facilities, spare parts stocks and men, the ARL proved invaluable in the accomplishment of emergency voyage repairs. At the SAIGON end, the French Naval Arsenal was extremely cooperative in assisting with repairs at that port and was particularly valuable in supplying diesel engine parts not available elsewhere. All French Navy personnel were extremely cordial and efficient whenever assistance was requested on repair problems. Replacement of repair parts furnished by the French is being made in kind with CH-MAAG, INDO-CHINA arranging final delivery.

The material condition of those ships assigned to the operation for long periods deteriorated in varying degrees due to continuous running, insufficient upkeep time and lack of adequate repair facilities. Ships with steam propulsion proved reliable as expected and were able to meet their operating schedules with the exception of ANDROMEDA (AKA 15) which wiped a spring bearing but was repaired by AJAX (AR 6) at TOURANE, and KNUDSON (APD 101) which sustained a boiler casualty and had to be sent to SUBIC for repairs. The LSTs sustained repeated main engine failures and were a constant source of worry. It is significant, however, that only LST 772 had to be sent out of the area and in her case due to collision damage rather than breakdown. Fortunately, in every case of LST breakdown it was possible to obtain the required repair parts from other ships or the FRENCH Navy without prolonged waiting time and repairs were accomplished locally by ARL and/or ship’s force.

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The relatively high incidence of LST main engine casualties is believed due to a combination of the following factors: increasing age of propulsion plant, inherent lack of ruggedness in the high speed diesel type engine, insufficient or improper upkeep, heavy operational demands and the reduced capability of engineering personnel currently available in the Navy. Judging by the experience of this operation, the World War II LST cannot be considered completely reliable and will continue to cause concern to operational commanders.

Appendix I to this enclosure lists all significant casualties to TF 90 vessels. No significant casualties affecting operational status were reported by MSTS ships.

4. SUPPLY NOTES

a. Initial Supplies

From a supply standpoint the first concern was the determination of supplies and equipment necessary to care for the evacuees and the establishment of an adequate logistic support group in the immediate area of operations. Complicating factors were lack of knowledge of the number of evacuees and to what extent the evacuees would be self-supporting. Previous experience of CTF 90 in lifting Korean prisoners of war under somewhat similar circumstances was reviewed and utilized where considered applicable.

In the absence of specific information as to numbers to be lifted and specific supplies required, estimates were made on the basis of the full lift capacity of all MSTS and TF 90 shipping assigned with 700,000 passengers maximum for the entire evacuation. Initial requests were submitted to NSD YOKOSUKA for 3,000,000 pounds of rice, 85,000 rice sleeping mats, 17,000 buckets for sanitation, 700,000 chopsticks and 1,500,000 paper cups together with a scaled down estimate for the first month's requirement for immediate shipment. In addition all ships assigned to the operation were alerted to load to capacity in all categories of supplies with special emphasis on those materials necessary for health, comfort and feeding of evacuees. Stress was placed on such items as cleaning gear, disinfectants, toweling, toilet paper, mess bowls, berth bottoms, etc. Extensive lists of medical equipment and supplies for preventive medicine and epidemic control were also requested. Included were items such as insecticides, spray guns, delousing powder, water purification tablets, water purification kits, chloroquine tablets and various other special supplies and equipment required for an operation of this nature. In addition, life jackets of Japanese manufacture, maintained in a special COMNAVYFE pool at NSD YOKOSUKA for such purposes, were obtained and furnished to TF 90 vessels on the basis of the expected lift capability of each type ship and 75 ventilation blowers with hose were drawn for use by AKA when carrying
passengers in their otherwise unventilated holds. The initial requirements of the above supplies peculiar to the evacuee lift were transported to INDOCHINA in UVALDE (AKA 88) which arrived at TOURANE on 28 August. The balance of the special materials arrived TOURANE on 17 September in FARIBAULT (AKA 179). Distribution was made by CTG 92.3 to all ships stopping at TOURANE for logistics and no particular difficulties were encountered in this regard.

From the outset of the evacuation it was found that the Vietnamese refugee organization at HAIPHONG in fact supplied adequate basic rations of rice, tea, and canned fish and meats to the ships transporting each group of evacuees. Except in a few instances it was therefore not found necessary to utilize the rice brought from JAPAN and consequently all but about 500,000 pounds was returned to the Army Quartermaster Depot at PUSAN in late September by SKAGIT (AKA 105) and ANDROMEDA (AKA 15). However, the basic rations furnished with the refugees were supplemented to varying degrees by each ship from on board stocks according to the needs of the group embarked and the capability of each ship.

Unfortunately, the rice sleeping mats received for refugee use were of such cheap construction and poor quality that the refugees for the most part refused to use them. It was also found that the majority of the refugees already possessed fair quality mats in their personal belongings brought on board ship. Consequently, the surplus mats were given to the Refugee Commission in SAIGON for use as ground cover in the refugee tent camps. Chopsticks in excess of gift package and passenger requirements were also turned over to the Refugee Commission late in October.

b. Gift packages

As a humanitarian gesture, and to help tide the refugees over for the period immediately after debarkation, gift packages consisting of about two pounds rice, soap, candy, cigarettes, chopsticks, and fresh fruit where available, were distributed to all evacuees by the individual ships. This presented problems in procurement and distribution of the gift items to each ship and problems within each ship on packaging and distribution to the evacuees. Initially each ship was requested to improvise gift package from available stocks and in most instances the spirit of the gift package plan was successfully carried through. Stickers were provided for stapling to each package inscribed in Vietnamese "From the Officers and Men of the United States Navy with Best Wishes for Good Luck". This expression was selected upon the advice of local USIS and STEM representatives as

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being typically Vietnamese, polite and sincere. The gift packages were well received and proved effective in demonstrating the genuine interest of the United States in the difficulties each refugee personally faced while in transit.

c. MSTS Vessels

MSTS T-AP assigned to the lift were provided with special items of food for feeding evacuees in addition to the basic ration of fish and rice furnished by the Vietnamese. The cost of the food and materials used by MSTS vessels was charged to the Naval Industrial Fund, with COMSTSWESTPACAREA accumulating charges. Final adjustments with charges to foreign aid appropriations were to be made at departmental level.

Difficulty was experienced in making payments to Japanese nationals manning MSTS T-AK cargo vessels since by contract these personnel are paid by the Japanese government in yen. Since yen could not by law be brought into VIETNAM and exchanged for piastres, Japanese personnel were without means of purchasing necessary health and comfort items ashore. Solution of the problem was undertaken by COMSTSWESTPACAREA by transferring credit to the Bank of INDO-CHINA with adjustment of pay records being affected in JAPAN so that a monthly amount of ten dollars equivalent in piastres could be paid to each man beginning with the October payroll.

Resupply of MSTS vessels was accomplished by CTG 92.3 with charges being made to the Naval Industrial Fund. Complete logistic support was provided for POL, provisions, general stores materials and spare parts in the same manner as for USS ships. Special Japanese-type balanced rations for the crews of the MSTS T-AK were obtainable only in JAPAN and were loaded by the relief cargo ship HERKIMER (T-AK 188) to the capacity of her refrigerated cargo hold for resupply of the T-AK remaining in INDO-CHINA. This problem of the special ration for Japanese crews constituted the only major item which could not be supplied through regular U.S. Navy supply procedure.

d. Accounting

Accounting for issues and usage of materials in direct support of the INDOCHINA evacuation operation was solved by CINCPACFLT directing that issues be charged against foreign aid.

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subheads with adjustments to be made at departmental level. All special material and provisions furnished by NSD YOKOSUKA were so charged and were loaded in logistic support group vessels on memorandum invoices. Issues by TF 90 ships were covered by instructions promulgated by CTF 90 on 21 August which in turn were based on CINCPACFLT instructions. Basically, all issues were to be accumulated under Ships and Facilities, Navy, and an automatic augmentation of allotment taken up at the end of each month covering the total value of such issues. The accumulated charges were to be charged to foreign aid subheads with CTF 90 accumulating invoices and forwarding to BUSHIPS for final adjustment of charges to foreign aid appropriations. Effective 1 October these instructions were changed at the direction of the Navy Comptroller General to provide that ships would not take automatic augmentation of allotments but would instead request augmentation from the Type Commander as required and that ships would submit invoices covering issues of material in support of the INDOCHINA evacuation operation to the Type Commander for forwarding to COMSERVPAC for accumulation.

e. Japanese and HONG KONG merchandise procurement

Due to the isolated area operations, the lack of adequate shopping facilities and the generally exhorbitant prices obtaining for local merchandise, it was proposed to COMSERVPAC that Japanese and HONG KONG merchandise be shipped to vessels of Task Force NINETY in order that personnel might have an opportunity to send Christmas packages to their families. COMSERVPAC authorized this procedure on a one-time basis and directed NSD YOKOSUKA and NAVPUR HONG KONG to provide contract bulletins. After receipt of the bulletins, distribution was made and requisitions were being accumulated for transmission to NSD YOKOSUKA and NAVPUR HONG KONG when the program was abandoned due to the decision to phase units of Task Force NINETY from the operation by 15 November.

f. Pilotage fees

It was learned that ships were signing receipts for pilotage fees for transit of the SAIGON RIVER although no bills were, at the time, being submitted for payment. The question of pilotage fees was explored at departmental level with the result that at a later date the French advised that no pilotage fees were to be charged.

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sessed U.S. ships engaged in evacuating Vietnamese personnel and equipment due to the generous assistance offered by the United States.

g. **Currency**

U.S. currency was forbidden as a medium of exchange in VIETNAM and only VIETNAM piastres were authorized (at an approximate rate of 35 piastres to one U.S. dollar). Prices in VIETNAM were generally exorbitant at the current rate of exchange.

h. **Special purchasing**

Some few items of special material not available from the logistic support group were purchased from commercial sources in SAIGON.

i. **Supply Shortages**

Logistic support was inadequate with respect to general stores material, medical and dental material, clothing and ship's store stock. This condition was brought about by the unavailability of an AKS which could be maintained on station with the logistic support group, the lack of GSM, CkSS, SSS, medical and dental load lists in other ships of the support group, the long lead time (four weeks plus) necessary to requisition from the logistic support group at SUBIC, and the occasional lack of such material even at SUBIC. CASTOR (AKS 1) reported to CTG 92.3 for general issue at TOURANE and HAIHPONG from 9 to 19 September and was of tremendous assistance in supplying items otherwise unobtainable in the area. CASTOR (AKS 1) however was in high demand elsewhere and it was felt that her return to INDOCHINA was not justified in view of phase out plans and the availability of AKL shuttle runs from SUBIC. Had the operation continued longer the weekly shuttle service from SUBIC might have eventually stabilized the situation on critical items as each individual ships requisitions were filled and delivered.

Fortunately no cases occurred where serious delays were encountered due to unavailability of repair parts since the critical items were in every instance located in ships of the force or from the French. However, had such not been the situation, the limited experience encountered with priority ABLE parts requisitions indicated that the lead time would have been unacceptably long. Adequate supplies of POL, water and provisions were maintained with the exception of 9370 lubricating oil for LST main engines which proved to be an unexpectedly high usage item, and one short period

ENCLOSURE (4)
of water shortage which occurred when PISCATAQUA (T-AOG 80) had been emptied and PASIG (T-AW 3) was not due on station for two weeks due to a revised ETA. Water supplied by PISCATAQUA (T-AOG 80) was of disagreeable taste and under other circumstances would have been considered unacceptable, the taste resulting from inability to completely remove all petroleum residues from her tank surfaces prior to use as a water carrier although extensive cleaning measures were resorted to in JAPAN.

Paint was another item in short supply which at times was completely unobtainable although ships cooperated in sharing available supplies. This resulted in cases where ships could not carry out badly needed preservation and appearance painting although time and manpower were available during cargo waiting periods, in some instances for the first time in many weeks.

5. Boats

The logistic support group relied upon loan of boats with crews from APA and AKA until those types were phased out. Boats for replenishment, garbage runs, picket duty, mail, general transportation, etc., then became a critical problem in the anchorage areas at TOURANE and HAIPHONG. Further aggravation was caused by the fact that MSTS T-AP carried only gasoline-driven lifeboats, and MSTS T-AK only pulling boats. Three LCM with crews were brought from the Mobile Boat Pool No. 1 at SUBIC and these together with the two LCM tugs from the Boat Unit No. 1 (NAVBCHGRU) permitted minimum operations to continue after phaseout of the APA and AKA but thereafter the boat situation was never satisfactory. Maintenance of boats was a continuing problem, primarily because their heavy operating schedules prevented adequate upkeep time and resulted in almost continuous use. Approximately 25 percent of the available boats were inoperative at all times due to material casualties.

Measures to augment the available boats were not instituted due to early phase out plans, difficulties in transporting boats to the area and difficulties in maintaining the boats and their crews when in the area. In future operations of this nature it is considered imperative that provision be made by the logistic support group for sufficient boats (both in type and number), crews with petty officer supervision, spare parts, and proper maintenance so as to ensure adequate boat service without placing undue reliance on boats organic to the ships being supported.
6. Transportation Notes

Transportation both within and to and from VIETNAM posed problems which were never satisfactorily solved to the point where passengers, freight and mail could be expeditiously and reliably distributed throughout the area. Part of the difficulty was attributable to the nature of the operation in that long delays were frequently inherent in reaching certain ships due to their continuous movement relative to other units which might have served as intermediate carriers, widely scattered unloading ports, lengthy cargo unloading periods and inability to firmly preschedule logistic stops. A complicating factor was introduced by the fact that no reliable land transportation existed between ports in VIETNAM and therefore entire reliance had to be placed on air and water transport available within the force itself. Since the logistic support group functioned as the receiving and distribution center for all units, the establishment of frequent and scheduled air and water transportation to and from VIETNAM to the support group was of paramount importance but unfortunately was for the most part neither sufficiently frequent nor reliably scheduled. The fact that aircraft might and did often fly without carrying maximum payloads is considered definitely secondary in importance to the maintenance of regular and frequent flights on firm schedules. Further back along the pipeline there appeared at times to be a lack of coordination between transportation and personnel and mail activities as evidenced by occasional instances where mail planes were well under their weight limitations but carried no passengers although there was a backlog in the Philippines.

SAIGON deliveries posed the least problem since MATS maintained a schedule of two R6D flights a week from Clark AFB in the Philippines and satisfactory arrangements for handling mail, passengers and other priority cargo were made through US Naval Liaison Officer, SAIGON. However, only a few ships regularly unloaded in the port of SAIGON and no intermediate transportation was available to ships unloading at CAP ST JACQUE some 50 miles distant. Hence the MATS service could not be used extensively. Flights to the logistic support group while stationed at TOURANE BAY were made by P5M and R4D from SANGLEY in the PHILIPPINES on the basis of two to three flights per week. This arrangement was generally satisfactory although instances occurred where flights arrived unannounced or on extremely short notice and firm schedules were not established which in turn precluded optimum utilization of the lift. When the logistic support group deployed to HENRIETTE PASSE, HAIPHONG on 28 September, no flights were established until 12 October and thereafter service was reduced to an average of but one flight per week which did not provide satisfactory transport. Seaplane service was the ideal solution for lifts to the HAIPHONG area since all shipping was concentrated in

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HENRIETTE PASSE some 40 miles from the nearest landing field. However, seaplanes were not available due to overriding commitments elsewhere and R4D lifts were provided.

Transport within VIETNAM could be made only by air. Frequent but generally unscheduled flights by CHMAAG INDOCHINA and STEM aircraft were utilized for lifts between SAIGON, TOURANE and HAIPHONG. This arrangement proved generally satisfactory but could not be relied upon as a means of connecting HAIPHONG with the MATS flights to SAIGON. In addition French military aircraft were occasionally used for passenger lifts within VIETNAM when available.

Due to the 40 mile separation of the main shipping anchorage at HENRIETTE PASSE from the Embarkation Port Commander at HAIPHONG, the use of helicopters to bridge this distance proved indispensable. River currents plus the isolation of the area prohibited the use of single screw boats for this run. LCM were occasionally used but required 6-8 hours for a one way trip and were in heavy demand for other purposes. Four helicopters, 3 HRS type and one HO3S, were initially available to CTF 90. The HO3S proved unsatisfactory due to its limited lift capacity and was returned to OPPAMA, JAPAN in September. Of the three HRS helicopters, an average of two were maintained in operational status at all times. Helicopters lifted approximately 525 passengers and 7500 pounds of mail and cargo in the HAIPHONG area with an average of three passengers or weight equivalent per flight. LSTs were utilized as landing platforms at both HAIPHONG and HENRIETTE PASSE.

The shortage of spare parts available in the area plus the long lead time required for procurement from JAPAN presented serious problems in maintaining the helicopters. In future operations it is recommended that all major component parts be closely checked for remaining operating time and that low time parts be changed prior to departure on detached duty. Careful planning is also mandatory to ensure that adequate spares accompany the helicopters.

Water transportation to and from the area was in general limited to the two small AKL of the logistic support group which were placed on irregular shuttle service to the logistic support group stationed at SUBIC. Use of the shuttle AKL on regular scheduled service would have in time proved satisfactory for low priority cargo but the ships were too slow for mail and high priority items and could carry only a few passengers.