7. Mail

Mail service was a difficult problem in the INDOCHINA area and in general was poor. Initially, CTG 92.3 established a mobile navy post office in TOURANE BAY, midway between HAIPHONG and SAIGON, which received mail by air and surface from the PHILIPPINES. Distribution was made to all ships stopping for logistics, to northbound ships for further delivery to those based or waiting in the HAIPHONG area, and to southbound ships for delivery to SAIGON units. CTG 90.8, who controlled the movements of ships in HAIPHONG area, kept the MNPO at TOURANE advised as to ships for which mail should be forwarded to HAIPHONG, CTG 90.9 kept the MNPO advised as to ships in SAIGON. Air service to TOURANE was frequent (2 to 3 flights per week) and generally satisfactory except for lack of firm schedules. On 28 September the logistic support group, including the MNPO, shifted to HAIPHONG where the largest concentration of ships was; however, air deliveries were reduced to about one per week due to operational commitments of fleet aircraft and only one air delivery was received during the three week period from 22 September to 14 October.

A survey conducted by CTG 92.3 among the ships in the area showed delays of from three weeks to six weeks in the receipt of official and registered mail, and similar delays in receipt of checks and money orders by dependents. Several ships reported no receipt of any mail for periods in excess of thirty days. Others reported only three deliveries within the past two months. Mail was also reported received out of sequence and instances occurred where mail was apparently carelessly routed at SANGLEY. For example, several bags were received on the 10 November flight marked "MSTS Mixed" that contained nothing but mail for ships of all types, destroyers and carriers included, none of which had ever been involved in the INDOCHINA operation. All of these complaints resulted in mail-tracer requests, thereby adding to communication traffic, and created additional work and further delays.

The transportation situation and inherent difficulties in delivering material to specific ships has been discussed in paragraph 6. However, on the general subject of transportation CTG 92.3 stated that at no time could either air or surface transportation be anticipated. In many instances actual departures of planes or ships to the INDOCHINA area were the first indication that transportation was scheduled. The shuttle AKLs departed from SUBIC under the operational control of CTG 92.2. Air transportation departed from Naval Station, SANGLEY under the operational control of COMNAVPHIL. Part of the difficulties appeared attributable to lack of coordination of transportation between SANGLEY and SUBIC.
CTG 92.3 considered that the nub of the mail problem was the failure to establish and adhere to a firm flight schedule. This caused the imprudent routing of air mail via surface transport and the resulting paradox of mail flights being cancelled for want of a payload of air mail, which only the day before had started a four-day trip via surface transport. A further effect of uncertainty in air schedules was that outgoing mail was frequently loaded in the AKL return trip in order to ensure delivery but thereby causing an overall delay of eight days.

CTG 92.3 further reported that the mobile post office was handicapped by lack of facilities. In AJAX (AR 6), only space on deck exposed to the weather was assigned. In the fleet oilers, sheltered space was available, but was cluttered with many oil lines, valves, and hoses. As a result, mail processing was made unnecessarily difficult, and was always subject to the vagaries of weather and underway operations.

In a remote area, with infrequent or no liberty at all, such as was the case in this operation, maintenance of adequate mail service both to and from the units involved assumes such enormous importance to the morale of personnel and their families as to transcend normal considerations of efficient payload use of aircraft and connecting ships. No effort should be spared to secure prompt mail deliveries. Good mail service also assists expeditious conduct of official business, and indirectly provides fast transportation for passengers and high priority cargo.

8. Cost of Operation for Period 8 August - 1 November

A study prepared by CTF 90 indicates that the total overall cost of the Navy participation in the INDOCHINA evacuation operation for the period 8 August - 1 November is approximately $16,000,000. This figure was arrived at by using per diem rates (furnished by COMSTS for MSTS shipping and estimated by CTF 90 for PACFLT units) times ship days (from port of deployment to final port after release), and includes the costs of the logistic support group ships, all special materials furnished by supply activities, miscellaneous expenditures by individual ships properly chargeable to the operation and special installations such as hold ladders and augmented sanitary facilities for time-chartered ships. To 1 November the average overall cost was $71 per passenger and $166 per ton cargo carried.

The above cost figures are of course tentative only since they are based on estimates and incomplete information available to CTF 90 and furthermore are subject to interpretation depending upon the definition of cost as applied to this operation. The CTF 90 study

ENCLOSURE (4)
considers the "true" cost from the standpoint of a commercial operation.

9. **Summary and Evaluation**

   a. Logistic support of ships and units participating in the operation was prompt and adequate. The support group, being mobile, was sufficiently fluid to meet the changing demands of the force being supported with respect to location, type and amount of supplies issued and services rendered.

   b. Mail service in general was poor. This situation was attributable in part to inherent difficulties in distribution to ships within the INDOCHINA area and in part to lack of firm and frequent air schedules plus occasional apparent improper routing of mail.

   c. The material condition of those ships assigned to the operation for long periods deteriorated in varying degrees due to continuous running, insufficient upkeep time and lack of adequate repair facilities. LST proved unreliable due to the high incidence of main engine casualties. However, in all but two instances necessary repairs were accomplished within the INDOCHINA area and without appreciable effect on the efficiency of the operation.

ENCLOSURE (4)
1. NARRATIVE SUMMARY

In a similar manner to the planning for other aspects of this operation, medical planning was begun at once on 8 August 1954 when word was received that CTF 90 would conduct the evacuation of VIETNAMESE refugees from the TONKIN DELTA area of NORTH VIETNAM to SAIGON and other areas south of the 17th parallel. This planning was done with very little specific information as to the actual health and medical problems which would be encountered among the evacuee passengers.

From the limited amount of general information available in INDOCHINA area intelligence studies, it was evident that the over-all health, hygiene and sanitation conditions among the evacuee groups would be far below United States average standards. It was also apparent that many communicable diseases potentials existed in the area with very little local preparation or ability to deal with epidemic disease outbreaks, should such outbreaks occur.

With this in mind, the planning was directed toward maintenance of health and prevention of infectious, communicable and epidemic disease among personnel of our force, as well as to assist in insuring that reasonable means be employed by the FRENCH and VIETNAMESE authorities to establish acceptable preventive medicine and sanitation measures in the embarkation area evacuee camps; also, that they be prepared to cope with any contagious or epidemic disease outbreaks which might occur in these camp areas.

It was planned, further, that the medical departments in ships of the force carrying evacuees should render all possible emergency aid and treatment to the many responsive acute and chronic illnesses among them, at least in a palliative degree, during the short period they were in our custody on board ship. The medical officers and hospitalmen in ships of the force have done an excellent job of sympathetic emergency and preventive medical aid to the evacuees, as well as protection of the health of the military personnel of the force.

In order to meet communicable and epidemic disease factors which might become a major problem through evacuee passenger vectors, a Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Unit was established in the HAIPHONG evacuee camp and embarkation area early in the Operation. This unit consisted of Medical and Medical Service Corps officers and enlisted
hospitalmen. This unit furnished extensive assistance to the FRENCH and VIETNAMESE authorities in instituting basic sanitary and health screening measures in the large evacuee camps. Although the VIETNAMESE were eager for this assistance, initially the FRENCH Army representatives were somewhat indifferent to health and sanitation measures for evacuees in the embarkation area. Eventually, excellent liaison was established with the FRENCH Navy command at HAIPHONG with good cooperation and much interest. The FRENCH Naval Base furnished room space in one of their base buildings for our epidemic disease control laboratory as well as providing light and water in the laboratory.

The Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Unit supervised sanitation measures, ground drainage, insect control and health screening in the camp areas. This unit also conducted health screening at the embarkation points. They conducted DDT dusting operations on all passengers before embarkation because of a significant incidence of lice and other body vermin among the evacuees. All evacuees received cowpox and cholera immunizations, administered by FRENCH and VIETNAMESE medical technicians, prior to embarkation.

Among other functions performed by the Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Unit were the following: Operation of a field type water purification unit at the main HAIPHONG camp DE LA PAGODE, with Lister bags for distribution of the purified and chlorinated water spotted about the camp, (this water was obtained from a rice paddy pond which was the only immediate source of water in the area); performance of chlorine level and water potability tests on U.S. Ship's tank water storage; rodent control inspections and instructions in our ships; collection of objective epidemiologic information in the operation area, including insect vector studies, blood studies and stool examinations, which will be the subject of a separate report to BUMED. This epidemiologic and medical intelligence information will have a continuing value as regards the areas of VIETNAM in which our force has operated.

A combat camera team was assigned to the Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Unit for a few weeks. This team made extensive movie and still picture coverage of medical aspects in the evacuee camp and embarkation area. This film coverage and its accompanying narrative script will be reviewed, edited and sound-tracked by BUMED.

All personnel of the force received current immunizations against smallpox, typhoid, typhus, cholera and tetanus, and all units were

ENCLOSURE (5)
directed to stock adequate plague vaccine, diphtheria toxoid and Schick test material to cover their entire complement should immunization against plague or diphtheria later become indicated based on epidemiologic information within the area.

Chloroquine malaria suppressive therapy was administered to all personnel of the force throughout their stay in the INDOCHINA area. This action was considered indicated on the basis of widespread endemic incidence of malaria in INDOCHINA with many mosquito vectors present. Mosquitoes were frequently found aboard ship, even when anchored at considerable distance off shore. Only two cases of malaria (Plasmodium falciparum) have been reported among personnel of the force. These were enlisted men stationed ashore for several weeks in the off-loading area at TOURANE. These men took their chloroquine suppressive therapy while on board ship but failed to do so when ashore although existing instructions required that this be done. Their clinical malaria was rapidly controlled by routine therapy aboard CONSOLATION (AH 15) which was then stationed in TOURANE BAY.

The CONSOLATION (AH 15) was assigned to the Logistic Support Group between 4 and 27 September. The need for this hospital ship was justified early in the operation due to the large number of personnel in the force with no U.S. military hospital facilities available in the area. CONSOLATION (AH 15) was phased out on 27 September when greater apparent need for its services was established in the KOREA area. On phasing out of CONSOLATION (AH 15) the MSTS T-AP were designated for hospital type care of patients as required by units of the force. These ships have large, well equipped, air conditioned sick bays. Their medical personnel had been augmented by MSTS to 3 medical officers and 15 hospitalmen because of the large passenger capacity of these transport type ships.

During the first month of the operation there were 4 partial mobile surgical teams in the 4 LST(H)s participating in the operation. These teams and their equipment were phased out on 28 September for return to their permanent duty station at the U.S. NAVAL HOSPITAL, YOKOSUKA. This was done because of the unwieldiness of utilization of these teams which are set up, trained and equipped for combat type operations and are not readily transferrable from unit to unit on short notice in this type non-combat operation.

From the beginning of the operation through 15 November, there were 90 births and 48 deaths reported among evacuee passengers on board U.S. ships. The births were generally uncomplicated and did not become the source of any specific difficulties. All but 4 of the births were born on board U.S. ships.
deaths were infants and children. The major causes of these child
deaths were terminal toxic diarrhea, bronchopneumonia and gross
malnutrition and dehydration. Most of these cases were moribund
when received on board and were beyond saving by the most assiduous
medical measures. Three of the adult deaths were from obvious
medical causes. The 4th was a 30 year old woman who died following
an accidental fall down a ship's ladder which resulted in a fractured
skull with massive intra-cranial hemorrhage.

Extensive shipboard refugee care of chronic pyodermic infections,
eye infections (mainly trachoma), and acute illnesses by our ship's
medical departments, assisted by the medical members of the
VIETNAMESE control teams, greatly alleviated the evacuee's physical
ills and kept deaths to the surprisingly low level indicated above.

Specific instructions were promulgated for the sanitation of ships
messes to prevent food borne infections or toxic illness. These
instructions were directed particularly at hygienic control and medical
screening of food handlers. Only one sporadic shipboard episode of
diarrhea (traceable to a food handler) was reported. This was quickly
controlled by removal of the responsible individual from food handling
duties and treatment of the diarrhea patients with sulfadiazene and
terramycin.

Shipboard potable water supplies were routinely checked to insure
that contaminated water was not introduced into the tanks through water
evaporated from contaminated harbors or received from questionable
municipal water sources ashore. Ship's water supplies were regularly
checked for proper chlorine content and enteric pathogens. No water
borne diseases have been reported traceable to ship's water supplies.

Rodent control measures aboard ship were directed and pursued.
In the event individual ships were not able to cope adequately with the
rodent situation, ship fumigation was to be accomplished if indicated
after such ships have been phased out of the operation and prior to
return to their normal operational duties.

The VIETNAMESE and FRENCH medical, nurse, midwife, social
service and Roman Catholic priest members of the control teams
assigned to the evacuee passenger groups were of great assistance
in handling the medical and personal problems of the passengers. The
Catholic priests were of especially great assistance because most of
the passengers were Roman Catholic and the priests had very profound
report and deep influence with them.
The personal hygiene of the average passenger group was of a very low order. This was an obvious heritage of centuries, of lack of concept of hygiene and sanitation. This fact required most ardent watchfulness of such simple things as proper use of the special heads constructed of oil drums cut in half and made into troughs for passenger use. Indiscriminate depositing of human excrement and refuse almost anywhere was a factor requiring continuous supervision and sympathetic instruction and explanation.

The general health of U.S. military personnel of the force remained good, with only such general medical situations occurring as might be expected in a force this size. One accidental death occurred on 26 August to an enlisted man in ANDROMEDA (AKA 98), resulting from his having been struck on the head by an LCM ramp, causing a severe compound fracture of the skull.

One enlisted man from TOLOVANA (AO 64) was reported to be severely ill with an intractable dysentery of as yet undetermined etiology. Because his condition would not permit further sea or air transport, he was transferred to the GRALL HOSPITAL, SAIGON under excellent FRENCH military medical care. His illness has recently been complicated by pneumonia. This man is on the critical list and his prognosis is guarded, although his condition has shown some recent improvement. He will be transferred to a U.S. shore based military hospital if and when his condition permits.

The over-all medical situation among evacuee passengers and among personnel of the force, from the start of the operation up to this time, is considered to have been better than might have been anticipated. No major epidemic disease outbreak has occurred among evacuees or personnel of the force in this area where epidemic potentials are an ever present "Sword of Damocles" for all.

2. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

(1) There was a lack of immediate definitive information available as to the general health, sanitation and epidemiologic status of the areas and populations to be dealt with in the operation. This rendered difficult the early planning to provide for such specific factors as were to be encountered.

Solution: The best available information on these matters was extracted from COMNAVFE and DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY area intelligence studies on INDOCHINA. "Playing by ear" and medical
deduction, planning was based on this data. Only minor changes
were subsequently required in the operation order and these were
based on information rapidly collected by the preventive medicine
personnel on arrival in the area.

(2) The problem of civilian evacuee deaths on board U.S. ships
was without available known precedent. It was deduced that the
cultural mores and religious beliefs of the evacuees would strongly
influence acceptable procedures in disposition of remains of the dead.

Solution: On arrival in the area, information was quickly
determined in this regard and the operation order was modified to
cover the indicated factors. The majority of the evacuees were
Roman Catholics who, with the most valuable assistance of their
priests, generally consented to the committal of their dead to the
sea with appropriate religious services. The Buddhists and persons
of other oriental religious, of which there were a small number among
the evacuees, required that their dead be buried ashore. It was
provided, in all cases, that the desires of the next of kin on board or
the next responsible cognizant party be followed with regard to dispo­sition of the remains of the dead. These matters were resolved between
the next of kin and the commanding officer of the ship concerned, and
prescribed significant details were reported to CTF 90 by message.
For those who required that the remains of their dead be retained for
burial ashore, a few plain mahogany wood caskets were provided by the
VIETNAMESE on board each ship carrying evacuees. In addition to this,
prefabricated, impervious, sealable barrier paper field type bags for
temporary encasement of the dead were secured and distributed to ships
for encasement of the dead prior to placement of the body in the casket.
The caskets were then stowed in the coolest possible feasible area
until debarkation. There were no reported difficulties from the use
of this procedure.

(3) The unique situation of numerous foreign civilian national
births on board U.S. combat ships was also without known precedent.
The deliveries, recording of births and question of nationality of the
new-born infants of foreign nationals aboard U.S. ships in internation­al
waters presented a new problem within a combat type organisation.

Solution: The actual deliveries were well handled within ship's
medical facilities, and by our medical personnel assisted by the control
team physicians, nurses and midwives. There were no significant
complications encountered. Pertinent details of time of birth,
geographical location, sex of infant, name and national locale of origin

ENCLOSURE (5)
of parents and condition of mother and infant were reported by message to CTF 90. A written and signed record tabulating similar information was given to the parents of the infant so that they might register the birth ashore on debarkation. On advice from the U. S. Embassy, SAIGON, it was directed that the question of citizenship of the infant not be entered into at all on board ship. If this question is raised at a later date by the VIETNAMESE or FRENCH authorities, the matter will be taken up through the proper diplomatic channels.

(4) The problem of necessary immunizations for personnel of the force was a matter of special concern because current exact epidemiologic information for the INDOCHINA area was not available during the planning phase.

Solution: Immunization requirements were based on information in Chapter 22, Manual of the Medical Department and general information available in area intelligence studies. The immunizations required were:

- Cowpox: Vaccination within 4 months
- Cholera: Completed course or booster within 6 months
- Typhus: Completed course or booster within 6 months
- Typhoid: Completed course or booster within 6 months
- Tetanus: Completed course or booster within 4 years

In addition to the foregoing, all ships assigned to the INDOCHINA evacuation operation were directed to stock plague vaccine, diphtheria toxoid and Shick diphtheria toxin diagnostic in quantities sufficient to cover the on board complement. This provision was made in the event that immunization against plague and diphtheria should later become indicated. The foregoing provisions have covered the situation adequately up to this time and no changes have been required.

(5) The endemic nature of malaria in INDOCHINA was not well defined area-wise in studies available during the hurried planning phase. Medical personnel aboard the flagship enroute to INDOCHINA deduced that it would be wise to direct chloroquine prophylaxis for all personnel of the force while in the area of operations.

Solution: Chloroquine malaria suppressive therapy (1 half-gram tablet of chloroquine diphosphate once weekly for all personnel of the force) was directed to be started (if possible) 3 weeks before entry into the area, continued throughout the time in the area and for three weeks after leaving the area. Only two cases of malaria have been reported within the force and these were in individuals who failed to take the chloroquine as directed.

ENCLOSURE (5)
3. RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) If time allows, it is recommended that specific, current medical and epidemiological information be secured when planning for an operation of this nature. Such information may generally be secured from the national public health studies or from U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT or other U.S. agency groups within the country concerned.

(2) In an operation of this nature, it is well to plan as far in advance as possible for handling and disposition of the remains of the dead. It is important, also, to consider the social and religious customs of the people involved when making plans for disposition of the remains of their dead. If priests and religious leaders form a part of the group, CTF 90 experience has shown that their assistance is of great value in resolving these matters with their people.

(3) Make adequate provisions for reporting and recording births on board.

(4) Based on the best available area information, provide for all the indicated immunization protection for personnel of the force.

(5) Provision for a preventive medicine and sanitation organization ashore in the evacuee concentration and embarkation area is believed to be important; not only for aid to the evacuees but also as protection for the personnel of the force involved in the evacuation.
INSTRUCTIONS

INCORRECT WAY

CORRECT WAY

PULL DOWN TO FLUSH

PRACTICAL LOGISTICS

A sample Visual Aid used by transports of Task Force Ninety during evacuation of Tonkin Delta, North Vietnam, 1954
PUBLIC INFORMATION
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. NARRATIVE SUMMARY

At the beginning of operation "Passage to Freedom" CINCPAC-FLT established the following policy guidance in public information matters:

(1) Utmost publicity was desired;

(2) American news media representatives with DOD clearance could embark in Navy evacuation ships;

(3) Daily news releases of progress of operation was requested by dispatch to CINCPACFLT and CHINFO, plus local releases as desired;

(4) CTF 90 was the only naval commander authorized to hold press conferences; these to be held aboard ship if possible;

(5) Government transportation for newsmen was authorized where commercial facilities were unavailable;

(6) Military communication facilities were authorized for transmission of correspondents' news, consistent with directives.

In addition, CINCPACFLT ordered combat photographers from Combat Camera Group, FEU, as well as a PIO specialist to report to CTF 90. At the same time, COMNAVFE was requested to provide two journalists and a radio team for CTF 90. Four combat photographers boarded the flagship before departure from Japan on 10 August.

CTF 90 held his first press conference on 15 August at the American Embassy in MANILA. His statements conformed to the policy defined by CINCPACFLT and CHINFO regarding releasable material. On the evening of 15 August, CTF 90, with CINCPAC-FLT ASST PIO and his journalists and photographers, boarded flagship ESTES at SUBIC BAY. Mr. Don Huth, of the MANILA AP Bureau, also accompanied them, and filed many evacuation stories for AP in the following three days.

On 16 August, CTF 90 prepared a public information directive for inclusion in the operation order as Appendix II to Annex K, the administrative annex. A copy is appended to this report.

ENCLOSURE (8)
On 17 August, CINCPACFLT stated that CINCPACFLT and CHINFO should be made info addees on civilian as well as Navy news releases; this was interpreted as justification for sending all stories filed by civilian correspondents on Navy ships as Class "A", or official, messages, without charge for transmission. They were normally sent to COMNAVPHIL or CHINFO for commercial refile.

By 22 August, news coverage was well underway. CINCPACFLT PIO, who had just arrived from Pearl Harbor, his assistant, and enlisted specialists, were in BAYFIELD (APA-33) for a trip to SAIGON, and combat photographers were at HAIPHONG embarkation sites.

On 25 August, CINCPACFLT PIO informed CINCPACFLT and others by dispatch that "Pub info aspects this operation require three officers run properly. Two to ride evac ships... one to administrate. Transportation, comm, and looking after personnel considerably harder and more complicated than in normal activities... This operation contains every opportunity and every classic difficulty a PIO will ever encounter..."

CINCPACFLT PIO left SAIGON for Pearl Harbor on 26 August, taking with him stories, pictures, film, and tapes collected since 18 August. His assistant went to TOURANE where he covered the logistic support group activities. On 1 September, he boarded MACOFFIN (APA 199) for more photographic, movie, radio, and story coverage of the evacuation.

CINCPACFLT expanded PIO policy by authorizing foreign newsmen to travel in U.S. ships for the operation provided they were non-Communist, represented non-Communist media, and were not allowed access to classified information. CINCPACFLT requested that all applications, either U.S. or foreign, for passage in Navy ships be submitted with CTF 90's recommendation to CINCPACFLT for approval.

On 3 September CTF 90 urged all ships and staffs to prepare a roster story for FHTNC; a sample story was included for guidance. One journalist from CTF 90's staff was ordered to SAIGON, and later to TOURANE, to contact personally as many ships as possible and help them prepare the roster stories.

CINCPACFLT approved the organization of IC tours for any interested U.S. and Asian correspondents then covering the "MANILA Pact" conference and instructed COMNAVPHIL on arrangements. CTF 90 submitted three proposed itineraries for the tours. This "media rep project" was later modified to include correspondents of any friendly nation.
By 12 September it was evident that the "media rep project" would be unsuccessful, although some twenty correspondents were interested, because of the difficulty and delay (30-90 days) in obtaining visas for Vietnam. ALUSNA SAIGON tried to expedite the matter by having visas issued at SAIGON. However, local Vietnamese officials would agree only on condition that correspondents had "political and security clearance by the U.S. Government."

This was unacceptable to ALUSNA SAIGON and the media representative project was dropped. However, two French and one Swiss correspondent who did have visas made the trip to TOURANE and HAI-PHONG in LST 1148, and to SAIGON in MSTS refugee ships. One of the Frenchmen, Pierre Brissard, filed two stories with FRANCE Presse Agency that were very favorable to the UNITED STATES.

On 18 September, a recommendation was made to CINC PACFLT that PIO coverage not be considered for MSTS ships (then replacing Navy ships) due to the limited number of Navy personnel involved. CINC PACFLT concurred and recommended to CTF 90 that public information and combat camera group personnel be returned to their normal duties.

On 21 September, the 100,000th refugee to be transported by TF 90 was embarked with his family in ESTES at HAIPHONG. They were landed at SAIGON on 24 September with an impressive ceremony attended by President Diem, Ambassador Heath, and other prominent personages, including representatives of the foreign diplomatic corps.

On that same day CTF 90 directed all public information and combat camera group personnel on TAD to report for release.

Thus, by 25 September, because of the decreasing tempo of the evacuation and phase out of most Navy ships, public information activity outside of the flagship had nearly stopped.

At the request of USIA SAIGON, CTF 90 held a press conference aboard ESTES on 29 September, which was well attended. Approximately twenty news representatives (American, British, French, Nationalist Chinese and Vietnamese) were there. Fact sheets and press packets were distributed, and were very well received. Questions asked were comparatively mild; their greatest interest seemed to be in human interest material and in the future of the operation.

On 7 October CTF 90 conditionally accepted a Presidential Citation from President Diem of the State of VIETNAM, at the Presidential Palace in SAIGON. A news release was made, with pictures to follow.

ENCLOSURE (6)
CINCPACFLT suggested a "letter home" over the signature of commanding officers to be sent to dependents of crews; CTF 90 directed this for ships which had participated. Later, this suggestion was also adopted by COMSERVRON 3 for the logistic support group.

On 16 October COMPHIBPAC PIO arrived with other members of COMPHIBPAC staff on an inspection tour. He inspected CTF 90 PIO files of the operation, including this report. He stated that metropolitan newspapers in the U.S. had given little space to this operation, except during the early days. He also said Mr. Rembert James, military editor of San Diego Union, stated that there was nothing on the wires about the operation. Further, since all releases were sent to CHINFO and CINCPACFLT for action, COMPHIBPAC PIO did not feel he was authorized to make local release of the material he had received, but he thought "someone had dropped the ball." Although CHINFO had received considerable news material, apparently little had emanated from that office, since only three messages and no other direct correspondence have been received since the beginning of the operation in August. This is difficult to understand, because of the uniqueness, international significance, potential dramatic impact, and eminent suitability of the operation as a vehicle for favorable publicity for the UNITED STATES Navy.

A letter from Officer-in-Charge, Fleet Home Town News Center stated that roster stories on 2551 Navy men had been received; 7779 news releases had been distributed to newspapers and radio stations throughout the country. Further, "all indications are that home town news coverage of 'Operation Passage to Freedom' has been excellent." A copy of this letter is appended.

FHTNC suggested that in future large-scale operations involving many ships, one "master" story be prepared for use by all the ships. This would result in more efficient handling from the FHTNC point of view.

This seems a good suggestion and should be followed if possible. One practical objection, however, is that inevitably, either due to the vagaries of mail service or to delay of some ships in submitting their roster, there would be some hold-up while waiting for the last of the ship's rosters.

2. Summary of Public Information Material.

Best available statistics of the amount of news material submitted by or channeled through CTF 90 during the period 8 August - 9 October follow:

ENCLOSURE (6)
a) Message Navy news releases prepared by CTF 90 (including TAD personnel) 19
b) Message Navy news release prepared by ships of TF 90 12
c) Civilian press messages transmitted by TF 90 radio facilities 14
d) USIA press messages transmitted by CTF 90 6
e) Feature stories prepared and mailed by CTF 90 10
f) Feature stories prepared by ships of TF 90, processed and mailed by CTF 90 4
g) Picture stories prepared and mailed by CTF 90 3
h) Roster stories by units of TF 90 28
i) Radio homeowners (approx) 80
j) TV homeowners 20
k) Newsreel and TV film 5200'
l) Miscellaneous radio material (hr.) 2

3. Problems Encountered and Solutions

(1) Inability to determine the immediate results in the U.S. of our PIO effort. Newspapers or clippings were at least 10 days old when received. Wire-service press received on board was sketchy and often garbled.

Solution. Unknown. A request to CHINFOR periodic evaluations of public interest and guidance and information on the use of our material may have been helpful.

(2) Clearance for correspondents to embark in Navy ships. CTF 90 had little or no information upon which to base his recommendation for approval or disapproval in individual cases.

Solution. A working agreement with the SAIGON Office of USIA was established whereby all cases were referred to USIA, who, in turn, made recommendations to CTF 90 based upon its knowledge of individual correspondents. This seems to be a satisfactory arrangement in areas where no Navy public information office exists. USIA was at all times helpful and eager to cooperate.

(3) Language barriers. Interpretation usually was a two-step process: Vietnamese to French and French to English, so that interviewing was quite difficult. Practically no Vietnamese-to-English interpreters were available, and very few Navy personnel spoke French.

Solution: None, except the obvious one of more interpreters.

ENCLOSURE (6)
(d) Administration of personnel. A bewildering variety of TAD PIO's, journalists, radio teams, photographers, correspondents, and USIA or FOA employees was constantly coming and going. Technical difficulties with equipment, film, cameras, stationing of personnel, and coverage as well as administration of pay records, mail, orders, examinations, and transportation plagued us daily.

Solution: An experienced PIO, stationed continuously in the flagship, for administrative purposes.

4. Recommendations

(1) Seek guidance and evaluation from cognizant public information offices ashore.

(2) Get recommendations from local public information offices for approval or disapproval of correspondents who do not have theatre or DOD accreditation; in their absence from local U.S. Government agencies, such as USIA or armed force attaches.

(3) For operations in which public information is sufficiently important, a PIO specialist continuously in the flagship is desirable.

(4) Write orders for photographer's and radio teams who must travel widely and associate with many commands in terms which will not require frequent endorsement, reporting and detaching, forwarding of personal records, requests for transportation, etc.

4. Effectiveness of Public Information Effort

CTF 90 has little information upon which to estimate the effectiveness of public information during "Passage to Freedom." In evaluation, the following items are pertinent:

(1) CINCPACLFT message 102025Z September stated the fueling-at-sea film taken outside TOURANE had been used on a network TV show; that the BAYFIELD (APA 33) refugee movies had been used nationally, both for TV and newsreel; and that the Department of Defense had praised our coverage.

(2) CTF 90 received several "fan" letters during September from different parts of the United States.
(3) A letter was received from Mr. Gaynor Pearson of American Education Publications, requesting "details and photographs concerning the great job you and your command are doing there. . . . This material. . . . will be offered to the editors of our 10 school newspapers. These newspapers are used in schools all over the U.S. and in some 40 foreign countries, and their total circulation runs into the millions." The material was sent.

(4) Practically all naval ships and staffs that participated have submitted roster stories, which total about 10,000 possible home-town stories.

(5) A seaman on CTF 90's staff reported he had received 20 letters in a single mail from friends and relatives, expressing interest in or inquiring about the refugee operation, as a result of a hometowner in Helena, Montana "Independent."

(6) The "Amphibian", a service paper published by COMPHIBPAC, prominently featured many articles and pictures of the operation. This excellent coverage was gratifying to Amphibious Force personnel because almost everyone in the Amphibious Force reads this paper. "Navy Times" has also printed stories and pictures; however, they were relegated to the back pages.

All in all, it is felt that the national coverage as a Navy feature was disappointing and not in keeping with the importance of the event. After the first few days, very little interest in the evacuation was shown by civilian news media. To illustrate, on 20 August, only three days after the first load of refugees had left HAIPHONG, the MANILA AP Bureau informed Mr. Don Huth that a correspondent in the flagship was not warranted because "the evacuation story is not getting sufficient continuing play to justify manning all exits." Only two American newsman rode in Navy ships during the operation. All the news services seemed much more interested in the political intrigue in SAIGON and the approaching evacuation of HANOI than in our sealift.

While it is obvious that the Navy cannot "make news" of an event that is not newsworthy, nevertheless the evacuation appeared to have publicity possibilities that were only slightly exploited. It is possible that the Navy public information program may not be geared to obtain the maximum benefit when a golden opportunity such as "Passage to Freedom" presents itself.
From: Officer in Charge, Fleet Home Town News Center
To: Commander Amphibious Force Western Pacific, c/o FPO, San Francisco
Commander Service Squadron THREE, c/o FPO, San Francisco

Subj: Home town news coverage of "Operation Passage to Freedom;" information concerning

1. Fleet Home Town News Center has processed home town news information about 2,551 men participating in "Operation Passage to Freedom." A total of 7,779 news releases have been distributed to newspapers and radio stations throughout the country. Each roster FHTNC has received from a ship or staff has been acknowledged by a comment sheet; tear sheets have been forwarded to ships as they have been received by FHTNC.

2. All indications are that home town news coverage of "Operation Passage to Freedom," has been excellent. Editors are interested in knowing about sailors from their home towns who are taking part in such an important headline-making event. FHTNC believes that obtaining home town recognition for these men has resulted in highly favorable public relations for the Navy.

3. FHTNC has one suggestion which it believes will result in even better home town news coverage of future large-scale operations involving a large number of ships. It is recommended that the command coordinating the operation prepare a master story. If possible, all ships' rosters should be forwarded to FHTNC before the operation begins, or as soon afterward as practicable. FHTNC will then be able to consolidate stories— in other words, to send an editor one story about the event, with the names of all men from his community who are participating. If FHTNC cannot consolidate its stories, it must send the same general information to an editor repeatedly in several stories. Each story contains the same data, differing only in the name of the individual and his ship. Editors prefer to have all this information in one story.

Copy to: CHINFO CINCPAC CINCLANT and DIRINFO

E. R. HALLORAN

ENCLOSURE (6)
APPENDIX II TO ANNEX K

PUBLIC INFORMATION

1. It is desired that maximum publicity be given the Navy's part in the evacuation of refugees.

2. All units are encouraged to originate Navy releases of newsworthy events in which they play a primary or unique role, such releases to be relayed to CTF 90, CTG 90.8, or CTG 90.9 for review and final release. All such Navy originated press releases will then be transmitted to CINCPACFLT and CHINFO.

3. News media representatives will be given all possible consideration and assistance. News media representatives who are American citizens and accredited to the Department of Defense may make trips with evacuees in U.S. Navy ships. They should be briefed on the friendly and humanitarian efforts being made. If it appears particularly advantageous to have foreign correspondents ride certain evacuating ships, advise CTF 90, CINCPACFLT and CHINFO immediately. All media representatives are required to sign waiver in accordance with U.S. Navy Public Information Manual Art. 0516. Keep CTF 90, CHMAAG Saigon, CINCPACFLT and the Chief of Information, Navy Department, advised regarding correspondents receiving transportation. Only CTF 90 is authorized to hold press conferences.

4. Accredited American correspondents undoubtedly will ride from time to time in U.S. Navy ships engaged in the operation. All correspondents are to be treated, in the matter of messing and berthing, as equivalent to the rank of Lieutenant Commander, if practicable.

5. All ships at sea are authorized to transmit civilian press traffic to shore naval radio stations by class A message, info to CINCPACFLT and CHINFO, and action to the naval command in the Pacific as designated by the correspondent, with instructions in the text for the PIO of that action-command to refile with appropriate wire service. If the correspondent prefers to send his press by commercial message, do so, and then relay the contents by separate message, info to CINCPACFLT and CHINFO. No censorship is to be imposed on civilian originated releases. However, the commanding officer will be responsible for reviewing such releases for security purposes only. Commercial press traffic will not be transmitted via Navy circuits in any port where adequate commercial facilities exist.

ENCLOSURE (6)
COMMUNICATIONS

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. GENERAL

During the planning phase of the IC operation, desired frequencies were presented to COMNAVPHIL and CHMAAG, INDOCHINA for clearance in the NAVPHIL and INDO CHINA areas. Clearance was received, with exception of three frequencies not cleared by the French; however satisfactory substitutions were made. Arrangements were made for COMNAVPHIL to screen all CTF 90 and Admin CTF 90 traffic and pass to RADM SABIN during his tour of IC area prior to the start of the operation. NAVCOMFACPHIL facilities were used extensively; communications on existing circuits proved reliable, rapid, and secure between CTF 90 (RADM SABIN) and Admin CTF 90.

With the commencement of operations a tremendous increase in traffic load occurred. With limited personnel and equipment in participating units, an immediate request for declassification of messages on embarkation and debarkation and ship movements in IC was initiated by CTF 90 and approved by CINCPACFLT. Time delays were considerably reduced, resulting in better handling of traffic by CTF 90 and subordinate commanders.

A liaison officer working with NAVCOMMFACPHIL set up a Hi-Command Duplex HF Ratt circuit for use between CTF 90 and NAVCOMM FACPHIL. Besides handling the increased traffic load this net also acted as a link between CTF 90 and CHMAAG, INDOCHINA. In the absence of this net, delays in traffic handling would have resulted in poor communications.

Throughout the operation CTF 90 also handled CHMAAG INDOCHINA CHMAAG Det HAIPHONG, Embassy, STEM, FOA, USIS, and press traffic which added to the already over-taxed communication facilities of units of TF 90. It was gratifying to note how the few communication personnel of CTG 90.8, 90.9, and 92.3 employed extremely limited equipment to the utmost of capabilities.

Communications between CTF 90 and CHMAAG were conducted through NAVCOMMFACPHIL and CLARK FIELD, which had a direct circuit to CHMAAG headquarters at SAIGON, CTF 90 tried to establish direct RATT communication with CHMAAG but was unsuccessful because of interference by FRENCH stations in VIETNAM, CW communications were not possible since CHMAAG did not have CW operators. However, when CTF 90 was present in SAIGON, direct telephone and teletype circuits were successfully utilized with AN/TRC-3 equipment.

ENCLOSURE (7)
2. VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS

Used extensively at BAIE D'LONG and HENRIETTE PASSE for inter ship traffic. Also used at TOURANE and SAIGON when units of Task Force 90 were present. When in visual contact with MSTS and Time Chartered vessels, this was the only rapid means of communication.

3. CW COMMUNICATIONS

Task Force 90 CW Common was the most reliable means of passing traffic between CTF 90, CTG 90.8, CTG 90.9 and ships of TF 90. A direct CW link with the logistic support group commander (CTG 92.3) was established. These were in continuous use and provided CTF 90 with reliable communications in the FIC area. (See ANNEX ABLE)

4. RATT COMMUNICATIONS

High Command net between CTF 90 and NAVCOMMFACPHIL provided essential circuit for clearing and receiving traffic which had increased over 700% from traffic load prior to this operation. (See ANNEX BAKER)

The GUAM RATT fleet broadcast was reliable most of the time. However, smaller ships unable to copy several frequencies simultaneously, had difficulty in maintaining a complete file. As a result, there were frequent requests for repetitions or screening, both to Radio GUAM and to ships in company. Despite these problems, the RATT broadcast was indispensable, because all available CW operators were needed for manual task force nets.

5. MSTS and MERCHANT-SHIP COMMUNICATIONS

Frequencies, call signs, and communication instructions were distributed to all MSTS ships. The largest ship (T-AP) were able to guard the TF Common so that communications with them were reasonably rapid and reliable. Other MSTS ships (T-AK, time-chartered) could not guard the TF Common, although they normally entered the net to pass traffic to CTF 90, CTG 90.8, or CTG 90.9. Outgoing messages to these ships were transmitted via ship-shore or Hi-Comm RATT for broadcast on the GUAM Mercat.

Communications with MSTS ships were satisfactory on the whole.

ENCLOSURE (7)
6. **COMMENTS**

Units were capable of handling increased communication loads with existing personnel and equipment, and of maintaining communications for prolonged periods of time.

Although reliable during this operation, RATT communications cannot solely and dependably clear high volumes of traffic as were experienced frequently during the evacuation. CW must help clear traffic when back logs occur, and during the not infrequent outages in the RATT net. As usual, RATT proved to be vulnerable to atmospheric and man-made interference.

Continued training of CW operators is necessary, particularly high speed operators for clearing large volumes of traffic. This will insure a ready pool of qualified operators which are required for this kind of operation.

Circuit discipline was excellent and reflects the training of communication personnel. Equipment failures were at a minimum and indicate a high degree of maintenance and upkeep.

The major radio nets used are shown in diagramatic form in Annex ABLE. Communications throughout the operation were excellent.

**Annexes:**

ABLE - Major Radio nets used in INDOCHINA operation

BAKER - Traffic Analysis charts.
MAJOR RADIO NETS USED IN IC OPERATION

NOTE 1. ACTIVATED IN SAIGON AREA ONLY
NOTE 2. ENTERED BY TF 90 SHIPS ONLY TO PASS LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS DIRECT TO OTG 92.3
NOTE 3. GUARDED BY OTG 90 WHEN IN HAIPHONG OR SAIGON AREAS

ENCLOSURE (7)
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

999 - TOTAL MSQS. HANDLED
628 - INCOMING
371 - OUTGOING
31+ COMBINED DAILY AVERAGE
20+ INCOMING DAILY AVERAGE
11+ OUTGOING DAILY AVERAGE

ENCLOSURE (7) - 1 -

JULY 1954

ANNEX BAKER
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

7720 - TOTAL MSGS. HANDLED
4034 - INCOMING
3686 - OUTGOING

248+ COMBINED DAILY AVERAGE
130+ INCOMING DAILY AVERAGE
118+ OUTGOING DAILY AVERAGE

ENCLOSURE 171
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

9098 - TOTAL MSGS. HANDLED
4340 - INCOMING
4758 - OUTGOING
303+ COMBINED DAILY AVERAGE
144+ INCOMING DAILY AVERAGE
158+ OUTGOING DAILY AVERAGE

INCOMING
OUTGOING

SEPTEMBER 1954

ENCLOSURE (7) - 3 - ANNEX BAKER
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

7244 - TOTAL MSGS. HANDLED
3901 - INCOMING
3343 - OUTGOING
233+ - COMBINED DAILY AVERAGE
125+ - INCOMING DAILY AVERAGE
107+ - OUTGOING DAILY AVERAGE

ENCLOSURE (7)
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

2801 - TOTAL MSGS. HANDLED
1751 - INCOMING
1050 - OUTGOING
187 - COMBINED DAILY AVERAGE
117 - INCOMING DAILY AVERAGE
70 - OUTGOING DAILY AVERAGE

INCOMING
OUTGOING

NOV. 1954

ENCLOSURE (17)
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM

INCOMING
OUTGOING

ENCLOSURE (7) -- 6 -- ANNEX BAKER
STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. Accomplishments. During the period 17 August 1954 through 15 November 1954 the following numbers of personnel and quantities of material were evacuated from Northern VIETNAM:

Personnel:

- Civilian: 159,654
- Military: 14,657
- Total: 173,311

Material:

- Tons cargo: 28,102
- Vehicles: 5,791

2. Ships and personnel participating. A summary of all Task Force 90, Task Force 92, MSTS, and Time Charter ships and all personnel (based on personnel allowances) that participated in this operation is presented in Appendix I. The period that each unit was present in the INDOCHINA Area is indicated.

3. Operational effectiveness. The percentage of utilization of shipping has been adopted as the measure of effectiveness of the operation. This measure of effectiveness is termed utilization in the analysis which follows.

By definition,

\[
\text{Utilization (for passengers)} = \frac{\text{Passengers actually embarked}}{\text{Passenger lift capability}}
\]

Utilization for cargo and vehicle lifts are computed in a corresponding manner.

In the data which appears in Appendix II the lift capability, quantities actually lifted, and utilization are given for each category of load for each week of the operation and for the total period. Utilization and quantities actually lifted are presented graphically in Appendix II following the data table. The lift capability for each category is computed on a theoretical basis based on the assumptions also given in Appendix II. Less than 100% utilization in each case resulted from non-availability of passengers, cargo, or pier space for ships waiting to load in HAIPHONG. Therefore, non-utilization represents deadtime.
The overall utilization in each category for the entire period, as taken from Appendix II, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIFT CAPABILITY</th>
<th>ACTUALLY EMBARKED</th>
<th>UTILIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>338,210</td>
<td>173,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons Cargo</td>
<td>97,943</td>
<td>28,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>9,549</td>
<td>5,791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Able Bodied Males. It was noted at the start of the operation that there were relatively small numbers of civilian males of military age in the groups of VIETNAMESE being evacuated. Due to the paucity of information on the ages of the passengers a detailed analysis of the number of able bodied men transported is not possible. However, local officials charged with evacuation responsibilities did have limited information on ages and sex of passengers, and on the basis of several samples of data the below percentages were computed. Extrapolation was employed. Able bodied males were considered to be those males between the ages of 17 and 35. The number of such males is given in percentage of the total number of civilian personnel evacuated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Able Bodied Males (Civilians)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
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ENCLOSURE (8)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>ARRIVED</th>
<th>DEPARTED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOUNTAIN (APA 213)</td>
<td>12 Aug</td>
<td>11 Sep</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANTOCK (APD 125)</td>
<td>13 Aug</td>
<td>4 Sep</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTAGUE (AKA 98)</td>
<td>11 Aug</td>
<td>9 Sep</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCOL (AKA 34)</td>
<td>15 Aug</td>
<td>9 Sep</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENARD (APA 201)</td>
<td>15 Aug</td>
<td>5 Sep</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELRAFT (APA 210)</td>
<td>15 Aug</td>
<td>16 Sep</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAXOR (APD 129)</td>
<td>16 Aug</td>
<td>13 Nov</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTROSS (APA 212)</td>
<td>16 Aug</td>
<td>16 Sep</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BESNOS (AGC 12)</td>
<td>18 Aug</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>BATTFIELD (APA 33)</td>
<td>21 Aug</td>
<td>9 Sep</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>TORTUGA (LSD 26)</td>
<td>21 Aug</td>
<td>27 Sep</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCU 1736, 1446, 1451</td>
<td>21 Aug</td>
<td>21 Oct</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGOFFIN (APA 199)</td>
<td>22 Aug</td>
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<td>CALIENTE (APA 32)</td>
<td>22 Aug</td>
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<td>ANDECHDA (AKA 15)</td>
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<td>16 Sep</td>
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<td>SAGIT (AKA 105)</td>
<td>22 Aug</td>
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<td>KEPING FOREST (LSD 4)</td>
<td>22 Aug</td>
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<td>KNOXON (APD 101)</td>
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<td>2 Oct</td>
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<td>LCU 531, 1387, 1396</td>
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<td>WESTSTONE (LSD 27)</td>
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<td>LST 758</td>
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<td>26 Sep</td>
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<td>LST 516</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td>LST 816</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>ATLAS (ARL 7)</td>
<td>28 Aug</td>
<td>26 Sep</td>
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<td>SPHINX (ARL 24)</td>
<td>28 Aug</td>
<td>25 Oct</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>LST 1248</td>
<td>29 Aug</td>
<td>26 Sep</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>LST 1096</td>
<td>29 Aug</td>
<td>14 Nov</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>LST 1080</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>BALBOA (APD 132)</td>
<td>14 Oct</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>LST 902</td>
<td>17 Oct</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>LST 840</td>
<td>29 Oct</td>
<td>18 Nov</td>
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<td>LST 1197</td>
<td>29 Oct</td>
<td>17 Nov</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>ASKARI (ARL 30)</td>
<td>29 Oct</td>
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<td>28 Oct</td>
<td>14 Nov</td>
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| I-1 ENCLOSEMENT (6) |
### Staffs and Other Units

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff/Unit</th>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th>Departed</th>
<th>Total Days</th>
<th>Off</th>
<th>FL</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>202</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSTDIV THREE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSTDIV THIRTY-ONE</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>78</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>LSTDIV THREE</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>LSTDIV TWELVE</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>PREVENTIVE MEDICINE UNIT</td>
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### Ships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th>Departed</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Off</th>
<th>FL</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FENTRESS (TAK 165)</td>
<td>7 Sep</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<td>MUSKINGM (TAX 198)</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<td>GEN BRENTSTER (TAP 155)</td>
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<td>GEN HENKIE (TAP 434)</td>
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<td>MARINE ADLER (TAP 193)</td>
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<td>11 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARINE LINX (TAP 194)</td>
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<td>GEN BLACK (TAP 135)</td>
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### Time Charted

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<td>SEABONE</td>
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<td>14 Sep</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>SEA SPLENDOR</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>HURRICANES</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOLDENES</td>
<td>8 Sep</td>
<td>27 Oct</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>HAWAIIAN BEAR</td>
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<td>14 Sep</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOS MARTI</td>
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<td>11 Nov</td>
<td>60</td>
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*Includes civilians*
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<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>ARRIVED</th>
<th>DEPARTED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>MFL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>AJAX (AR 6)</td>
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<td>ALUMRA (AP 55)</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONCESSION (AK 15)</td>
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<td>27 Sep</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>650</td>
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<tr>
<td>CALIENTE (AO 53)</td>
<td>23 Aug</td>
<td>6 Sep</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>241</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASTOR (ARS 1)</td>
<td>9 Sep</td>
<td>19 Sep</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHARRON (AO 22)</td>
<td>5 Sep</td>
<td>17 Oct</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>241</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLUMBIA (ARS 23)</td>
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<td>17 Nov</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESTERO (AKL 5)</td>
<td>18 Sep</td>
<td>12 Nov</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>DERRICK (AK 59)</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARIBAULT (AK 179)</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAPPLE (ARS 7)</td>
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<td>4 Sep</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>690</td>
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<td>HAVEN (AH 12)</td>
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<td>10 Sep</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>KARIN (AF 33)</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>PERAP (AF 38)</td>
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<td>PACIFICIFIC (AO 107)</td>
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<td>PISCATAQUA (TAOG 80)</td>
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<td>230</td>
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<td>PASIG (TAN 3)</td>
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<td>15 Nov</td>
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<td>RECLAIMER (ARS 42)</td>
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<td>SHARDS (AKL 10)</td>
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<td>TOLOVANA (AO 64)</td>
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<td>15 Nov</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>241</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTE (ATP 76)</td>
<td>9 Sep</td>
<td>11 Sep</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>UVALDE (AKA 88)</td>
<td>28 Aug</td>
<td>16 Sep</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>225</td>
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<td>ZELEMA (AP 49)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>TW 130</td>
<td>28 Aug</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>110</td>
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**TOTAL DAYS OFF:**

- **TOTAL:** 288
- **TOTAL:** 70
- **TOTAL:** 0
- **TOTAL:** 42
- **TOTAL:** 11
- **TOTAL:** 10

**TOTAL:** 325

**ENCLOSURE (8)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEEK</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/17-8/23</td>
<td>18360</td>
<td>17007</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/21-8/30</td>
<td>21058</td>
<td>24570</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/31-9/6</td>
<td>25503</td>
<td>28109</td>
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<tr>
<td>9/7-9/13</td>
<td>37088</td>
<td>16716</td>
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<td>9/14-9/20</td>
<td>33603</td>
<td>10622</td>
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<td>9/21-9/27</td>
<td>29294</td>
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<td>9/28-10/4</td>
<td>28574</td>
<td>10310</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/5-10/11</td>
<td>28154</td>
<td>6605</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/12-10/18</td>
<td>28094</td>
<td>10791</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>10/19-10/25</td>
<td>27884</td>
<td>10134</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>10/26-11/1</td>
<td>20758</td>
<td>9339</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>11/2-11/8</td>
<td>17920</td>
<td>11652</td>
<td>82</td>
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<td>11/9-11/15</td>
<td>17920</td>
<td>7201</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>338210</td>
<td>173311</td>
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ENCLOSURE (8)
ENCLOSURE

II-3

- TONS CARGO EMBARKED (IN THOUSANDS)

- UTILIZATION (%)

TIME (WEEK TERMINAL DATE)

EVACUATION CARGO

EVACUATION OF VEHICLES

VEHICLES EMBAKED (IN HUNDREDS)

TIME (WEEK TERMINAL DATE)
2. Assumptions that were made in the detailed analysis above are as follows:

a. That the capacity and turnaround times of each type are indicated below. Since LSD and LST carried passengers, cargo, and vehicles, the capacity is taken as the average of that which was actually lifted in these types per trip. This average is computed for each month since the emphasis was to what was loaded on these types changed as the operation progressed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Turnaround time (days)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>AKA/APA</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>T-AP</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMAVI (T-AK)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Charter (C-2)</td>
<td>1700 or 4000</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD - 1st Month</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2nd Month</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 3rd Month</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD - 1st Month</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 2nd Month</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 3rd Month</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The short turnaround time for LSTs was due to the fact that these ships usually made the shorter trips (to TOURANE and NHA TRANG). Loading and unloading rates of 300 tons/day were assumed in the case of Time Charter and CIMAVI types.

b. That no ships arriving in INDOCHINA would have been phased out of the operation prior to their originally scheduled phase out date if port capacity and availability of loads had been sufficient to utilize them. Thus the load capacity of the Time Chartered ships appears in the tons cargo capability column from their time of first arrival in HAIPHONG through 15 November even though some of these
ships departed from the area as early as mid-September due to non-utilization.

c. That the first six Time Charter ships in the area would have loaded cargo commencing with their second trips. These ships made an initial trip carrying passengers. At the time for their second trip, an ample number of T-AP type vessels had arrived to lift passengers.

3. Only those ships which actually arrived in the area were considered in computing theoretical lift capability. Therefore if those ships enroute to the area and those ships in Far Eastern ports whose sailing was held in abeyance were considered the utilization would be markedly lower. The capacity of each ship per trip was taken as that of a normal load. If the capacity had been assumed as that which could be loaded under emergency conditions, the utilization would also be lower. In a few cases ships were loaded to emergency capacity.