The Medical Section was finally able to properly staff its forward aid station with the arrival of Capt. Harold HANKIN. With the aid station properly operated, evacuees were stabilized there, and more complicated medical cases could also be handled at a lower level.

The number of medical specialists at Co. D increased during the quarter, and the subordinate detachments medical staffs were finally brought up to par. Capt. Harold HANKIN arrived at Co. D at the end of the quarter and he assumed the role of assistant Company Surgeon. With two medical officers, medical visits could be made to the 'A' and 'B' detachments. A dental clinic was started at Anderson dispensary, when completed, it would be able to perform all restorative and prophyactic procedures. Maj. HANKIN, the Group Dentist planned to spend every other month at Co. D, and, with his portable equipment, he was expected to be able to treat patients at the 'C' detachment.

The medical care saw the development of an intensive care unit at the CHU Hospital (3rd Surgical Hospital), to treat the more complicated cases encountered among the wounded. The centre was located near the resident surgeon's quarters, and a nurse was left on duty in the ward at all times; she was capable of administering special dressings and also monitor vital signs.

In the medical supply field, it was found advantageous to label all packets of medication with the expiration date in order to facilitate medication control. In addition, a program of quarterly inventory was instituted to ensure that outdated medicines were removed.

An unusual incident occurred on 15 April 1970, when some wounded Cambodian troops were medevaced to the 3rd Surgical Hospital. On 15 April, at 1200 hours, a Cambodian outposts near Thin Bia, at VS 902 718, was abandoned by estimated 80 NVA moved in and seized the nearby school and markets. On the 16th, but at an unspecified time, a Cambodian Army Company moved south and around the base of Phnom Da Mountains, on its eastern side, near VS 905 726, the Cambodian element engaged in a firefight, but suffered no casualties.

On the 16th, the Cambodians moved into the marketplace, which the NVA had stationed earlier, and they made contact with the full enemy force. 30 Cambodians were wounded in the fight that ensued, and 10 of these were seriously enough wounded to warrant a medvac. The Cambodian unit, however, had no medical or communications equipment, so the 10 wounded men were driven to the Vinh Te Canal and ferried across it, but from there, they were further moved to Bu Kaoi FOB #2, at VS 902 678, one group arrived at the FOB at 1000 hours, and the other at 1300 hours. At 1130 Co. D requested permission to medevac the wounded personnel, and Maj. GILLETTE, commander of the 2nd 522, gave the authorization through the deputy commander, Lt. Col.keh. Upon return, notified Maj. GILLETTE at 1130. At 1230 hours, the wounded were evacuated from Bu Kaoi's dispensary; a total of eight personnel were involved. At 1215 hours, Maj. GILLETTE authorized the Cambodians to be moved to an ARVN hospital, but at 1300 hours, the medevac helicopter took the personnel to the 3rd Surgical Hospital. Because in the judgment of the medical personnel, the patients could die in the ARVN hospital, was evacuated. Capt. HANKIN, the 3rd at 1615 gave approval to the transfer to the 3rd Surgical Hospital.
(G-Ops. 3) In conclusion, the Cambodians were evacuated to the 3rd Surgical Hospital out of humanitarian considerations, because the medevac personnel felt sincerely that the Cambodians would die, were any other course of action taken. The Cambodians had crossed into South Vietnam of their own volition, so no border crossing violation on the part of Americans was involved, and as Col. Hicky, the Group Commander, pointed out in justifying the American action taken, to have refused the Cambodians medical aid would have been an inhumane act; therefore, the USAF involved in the decision deserved credit for a wise and humanitarian action.

(C) Co. D's signal facilities at the Forward CP at Chi Lang operated smoothly. Members of Co. D Signal were present at Chi Lang to make coordination and provide technical assistance as requested. Communications, including FM radio and telephone, were completely operable in five hours.

(C) During March, two 'A' detachments, A-441, My Phuoc Tay, and A-416, My Dien II, were converted to RF/PF, and the equipment back-loaded and personnel reassigned to Co. D, benefited Co. D's own Signal operations.

(C) Secure Voice communications became a regular feature of Co. D's signal setup. Both 'B' detachments received 24 hour secure voice capability, and the 'A' teams received secure voice to the TQP for almost a full 24 hours daily. The VNSF also received authorization to utilize secure voice communications.

(C) O5B radio operators were received from Group personnel office, but they were needed to serve in an O52 teletype operator role. An extensive retraining program had to be undertaken by Co. D Signal to prepare these personnel as O52 operators. Once the individual had completed the training, he was prepared to utilize JANAP 125 message preparation formats, message handling and first echelon maintenance. When redeployed to the subordinate detachments, these personnel were found to perform in their new role in an outstanding manner.

(C) Co. D also experimented with the use of the AN/FRC-93 for teletype traffic, but it was found that though traffic could be passed via the AN/FRC-93, the set was not made to be keyed for a sustained period, and consequently the radio blew several 4 ampere fuses during operation. Due to fragile construction of the fuses, it was agreed to use the AN/FRC-93 radio only under emergency conditions.

(C) The closing of two 'A' detachments during the quarter and two others the previous quarter, caused some problems for the Comptrollers office. First, a large number of CIDRs were not effectively evaluated by AMN physicians prior to camp conversion, and an influx of disabilities resulted, all occurring in a short period of time. Secondly, disability payments jumped significantly owing to the increase of the base pay of the CIDRs, and this increase ruined budget plans because of the large number of discharges at closing camps. A third problem area was that a number civilian workers who had been in USAF employ for eight years were released without any sort of compensation. Separation pay should be provided these personnel to enable them to subsist while seeking new employment.

(C) Local purchase expenditures were significantly reduced during the quarter because logistical support in the area of office expendables increased substantially.

(C) A final problem area was the enormous workload placed on the time nurses.

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at the CHC hospital, with the tremendous rise in the number of patients caused by increased battlefield activity. The nurses presently employed worked up to 16 hours per day, 7 days per week, even with the assistance of nurse trainees from the subordinate detachments. It was agreed that the employment of additional nurses was essential to the efficient functioning of the hospital. A new TD was due to come into effect in June 1970, but under existing conditions, this was seen as too long a period to wait.

(C) Herein follows a diagram of Company D's organization and command relationships for the quarter February-April 1970.
(C) For the period of May, June, and July 1970, once more we have extensive documentation available; the major events of the quarter were the Cambodian operation, and, after 30 May, the Sea Float Operation, conducted in coordination with U.S. Navy forces. The source for the quarter is our primary document, but numerous after action reports exist, as well as POMAR and Engineer surveys.

(C) Company D's mission remained essentially the same as before. Organizational structure included two 'B' detachments, ten 'A' detachments, of which one, A-116, was supported, but not advised by Co. D. The Commanding Officer of Co. D throughout the period was Lt Col. Frank E. BASHORE; the Deputy Commander was Lt Col. Leonard D. CHAFIN, and in May, Maj. William BLASHFIELD held the Executive Officer's position, with Maj. Robert L. JOCURIK taking over during the month; Maj. JOCURIK remained the Executive Officer throughout the rest of the quarter.

(C) The S-2 Intelligence Officer for all three months was Capt. Joseph F. STOCK Jr.; in July, Capt. E.J. GAFFNEY assumed the position when Capt. STOCK became the S-3 Officer.

(C) The S-2 continued its review of agent dossiers and 912 fund expenditures to assure that the productivity of agents was continuing. The termination procedures were described in the last quarter's review. During the closing of Detachment B-40 and A-103, during May 1970, all intelligence informants were terminated, as the operational interests of the other Co. D units did not require the use of these informants. During A-103's conversion, no agents were transferred to MACV's control, as all informants had been terminated for unproductivity in February.

(C Op.3) Effective 10 July 1970, polygraph support by the OI branch of the S-2 was terminated owing to the loss of the polygraph examiner. The question of how to dispose of 'secret' material arose when B-40 closed, as also did the question of the disposition of classified material originated by Detachment B-40. Instructions given were that B-40 had the authority to downgrade secret material originated by itself. Classified Records such as control registers, document receipts and document destruction certificates were to be forwarded to the 5th Group, S-1 Records Holding Section.

(C) The Operations Officer for May was Capt. Lee C. DUNLAP, along with Maj. William A. BLASHFIELD; for June and part of July, Maj. BLASHFIELD held the position alone, and during the rest of July, Capt. Joseph F. STOCK Jr. became the Operations Officer.

(C) For the quarter ending 31 July 1970, Company D conducted 1,267 company size operations, 2,964 small unit and 260 GCP operations. Results were 2 USASF killed, 15 USASF wounded, 2 VNSF wounded, 22 CIDG killed, 45 wounded and 1 missing in action, along with 13 weapons lost. The enemy suffered 115 VC/NVA killed, 20 captured, 37 suspects detained, 18 Hoi Chams and 215 weapons captured. Authorization for the Cambodian incursion was given on 25 April 1970, and the actual operations began on 1 May.

(C) A late entry for B-413 for 30 April 1970 reported that, at MT 990 23E, A-113 and A-114 elements, acting on an intelligence report, located a cache and a grenade manufacturing plant. Explosives and equipment were destroyed, and 20 VC/NVA helmets, along with assorted equipment were captured; the facility was destroyed.
(C) In Cambodia, at WT 300 570, on 9 May at 1110 hours, an A-432 company conducted a heliborne assault against a known VC stronghold. A three hour fire-fight ensued, after which the enemy broke contact and withdrew North; the enemy had AK-47s, 60mm mortars and wore blue uniforms. Casualties were 1 CIDG wounded, 3 VC/NVA killed, 5 prisoners (2 wounded) captured, 3 x AK-47s and Ghep grenades also captured. At 1830 hours on the 9th, Thuong Thoi's troops made another contact at WT 297 017, with two enemy platoons, and after a 30 minute fire-fight, the enemy again withdrew North. Air elements supported the friendly troops, and there were no friendly losses. The enemy, however, lost 2 POWs, 20 VC killed, 5 prisoners (2 wounded) captured, 3 x AK-47s, and assorted arms and ammunition were captured.

(C) On the 10th of May, at 0010 hours, B-41, Moc Hoa, received 14 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, from 3,000 meters Northwest; enemy fire was rather accurate, as several rounds impacted in the compound, wounding 4 USASF, and 1 other U.S., including Lt Col. Lindig. B-41's commander. At 1400 hours the same day, at WT 353 025 a prisoner led A-432 CIDG troops to a VC cache containing 49 SKS rifles.

(C) Between 17 and 24 May 1970, the An Phu Operation in Cambodia occurred; it is also known as Operation Guu Long II, and the after action report survives for it. The task organization was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USASF</th>
<th>VNSF</th>
<th>CIDG</th>
<th>INTERPRETERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-402 (Moc Hoa)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-403 1st Co.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Co.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Co.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-432</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-412</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-119</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-115</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-431</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) On the 17th of May, the A-402 element was inserted in reaction to Black-hawk intelligence, and gunships accompanying the insertion set off 22 secondary explosions and also set two sampans afire. By 1630 hours, however, the A-402 force was surrounded at WT 019 307, 155mm howitzers, "Spa", "Shadow" Black Ponies and Seawolves came to assist the friendly forces. At 2010 hours, the surrounding force took an incoming mortar round, and at 2115, troops from A-403 were inserted to reinforce the A-402 element. Meanwhile, at 1110 hours, A-432 and A-442 troops were inserted and started a search and clear mission, seizing four detainees in the process. On the 18th, A-402's forces, having escaped their predicament, discovered a cache at WT 026 308, containing 1 x 82mm mortar, 5 x 60mm mortars, 1 x 40mm mortar, 3 x .50 calibre M2s, 9 x RGs, 1 x British Bren, 2 x SMGs, 1 x Thompson, 2 U.S. Carbines, 1 x U.S. .50 Caliber M2, 3 x 7.62mm Antiaircraft Mics, 1 x .30 calibre MG, 2 x German 7.62mm MGs, 2 x .30 calibre water cooled MGs, 3 x AK-47s, 2 x SKS rifles, 2 Mausers and 10 kilos of documents. Meanwhile, at 1730 hours, A-403's 2nd Company was inserted to check on a cache and captured a detainee and a machine gun kit. Also on the 18th, at 1900 hours, the 2nd Composite Battalion was inserted at WT 009 117, and a brief firefight ensued with an unknown enemy force. Results were 1 enemy soldier killed, 1 captured, an SKS, medical kit, 2 grenades, 2 x FM 10 radios and 2 typewriters also captured. On the 19th of May, A-402's elements and three A-403 companies reacted to a Great Ho-
not report about a bunker complex: FAC, Spat, Seawolves, and artillery gave support to the friendly troops. No contact was made, but seven secondary explosions were noted after a friendly airstrike.

(c) On 20 May, A-402 and A-403 elements conducted a search and clear mission and found numerous bunkers, all unoccupied; 1 x AK-47 was also captured. At 0930 hours, A-403rd 1st Company on a Blackhawk mission, came under small arms and mortar fire. The Second Composite Battalion reinforced the troops in contact at 1100 hours, and 1 USASF, 1st Lt. Randall R. PIKE, was medevaced owing to wounds. Meanwhile, an A-31 element, inserted at WT 108 070, in reaction to a Green Hornet report, lent support to the contact made by the MSF on 19 May. A company from A-401 was also inserted, and a joint sweep was organized and conducted; no contact was made. At 1530 hours, as the sweeps continued, contact was made with 10 VC at WT 172 072. In the firefight which ensued, two VC were KIA and an AK-47 was captured. 1st Lt. KHANH then ordered the units to withdraw and react to another Green Hornet report. Three 'Slack' ships arrived to ferry the troops, and 30 CIDG were moved on the first trip; they were inserted at WT 130079, about 10 meters from a treeline, where 5 machine gun positions had been reported. Results were 1 x 1919 AG machine gun and five boxes of ammunition captured, along with 2 VC killed, but a larger enemy force initiated fire upon the friendly troops, from concealed positions. Lt. KHANH, realizing that the enemy held superior positions, ordered a withdrawal; 6 CSF were killed, 6 were wounded as was Sp/S David MILLER, a USASF. A second element was inserted at 1650 hours, but suddenly, difficulties in communications with the gunships were experienced. Meanwhile, the enemy was taking the friendly positions with heavy fire, still firing from the treeline. Additional gunships arrived and silenced the hostile fire, and a medevac was executed for the wounded. At 1900 hours, ARVN marines arrived in four sorties; the helicopters received renewed enemy fire as they came in, and 2 marines were killed and six wounded. A joint perimeter for BDM was established once the marines had landed. During the night, two fighter strikes were placed on the enemy, and three Black Pony, two Cobra, and three Spooky sorties were made; two secondary explosions were observed. On the morning of 21 May, the CSF elements advanced against the enemy positions, while the marines entered the treeline and uncovered bunkers, establishing contact with a VC platoon. In the firefight which followed, 32 VC were slain, and resistance was reduced to sporadic sniper fire. Finally, at 1900 hours, A-431's troops were extracted.

(c) Meanwhile, back at the original A-402-403 operational area of 20 May, the A-402 MSF searched the field and found 10 VC KBA, 1 x B-40 rocket launcher, 1 x AK-47s and encountered two booby traps, which wounded two CSF. 37 x 76mm recoilless rounds, 100 x 60mm rounds and 200 grenades were also recovered by the troops.

(c) On 22 May, A-402's troops were lifted to WT 106 050, for further transport to Moc Hau the following day. A-403's 1st Company (IRF) and the 2nd and 3rd Companies were airlifted to WT 130 258 to conduct a search and clear operation, Southwest of the Bassac River. A bunker complex was found, and four fresh graves were in the area; one was opened and contained a VC/NVA who had died of wounds. The Second Composite Battalion continued search and clear operations on the South side of the river and encountered small arms and B-40 rocket fire, which wounded 5 CSF. On the 21st of May, at WT 105 850, the 1st platoon, 3rd MSF Battalion was inserted in reaction to a Green Hornet report, but it made negative contact and found nothing. In the final action of Operation Gun Long II, at 1300 on the 21st, a platoon of the third MSF battalion was inserted.
and made contact, at KT 170-088, with 1 VC; results were 2 MSF wounded, 1 VC killed, 3 captured; 2 SKS rifles, 1 x AK-47, 300 rounds of AK ammunition and 2 machineguns. The light contacts and the extensive fortifications indicated that the main enemy force had retreated prior to the start of allied operations.

(c) The Cambodian Operation, from 22 April to 30 June is covered in a summary of contacts drawn up on 17 August 1970. There were several major subdivisions into which the Cambodian sequence was divided. One of these, Gun Long II, has already been treated. This portion of the history will examine the events preceding Gun Long II and the whole of Gun Long III, and finally, the withdrawal from Cambodia.

(c) For the action preceding Gun Long II, covering 22 April to 17 May 1970, the action was all by MSF troops.

(c) On 22 April, at 1000 hours, at KT 220-065, two companies from A-402 made contact with two squads of NVA, located in bunkers along a treeline. The enemy received reinforcements from two additional companies, and after an hour and a half long firefight, the friendly troops withdrew. Results were 5 MSF killed and 2 x M-16 rifles missing; enemy losses were 4 NVA killed, 1 x M-1 rifle, 8 rucksacks and two kilos of documents captured. There were three further small actions on 30 April, including the destruction of a grenade factory, which was earlier described. From 9-13 May, near KT 285-045, Luong Phoi conducted a two company operation, C-05-540, in which 38 VC/NVA were killed; 3 prisoners were also taken, and 7 Ho Chi Minhs rallied to the GVN; a total of 63 weapons also was captured.

(c) Operation Gun Long III was conducted 27 May through 21 June, and all the contacts were in Cambodia.

(c) On the 27th, at KP 085-070, a company of CSF from A-414 captured three of the enemy who were hiding in a tunnel complex which the MSF had uncovered and were in the process of clearing out. Two companies from A-415 made contact with an estimated enemy company; the contact occurred at KP 152-095, and the enemy used 82mm mortars, B-40 rockets and small arms against the CSF. The action then spread to KP 262-110, and a company each from A-413, A-414 and A-419 were inserted as reinforcements, while Seawolves and Tac air supported the friendly troops. Results were 4 CIDG killed, 1 USAF wounded as well as 21 CIDG. Enemy losses were 5 VC/NVA KIA, 3 KIA and 1 x AK-47 captured. On the 27th of May, at KT 191-025, air assets flying a VR mission sighted and destroyed 50 submerged sampans. On the same day at 1600 hours, a company of CSF from A-415 discovered a Chicom radio and 15 kilos of documents, all belonging to a rear service element from Gun II. An estimated squad of VC/NVA made contact with a company of A-415 troops and a three hour firefight ensued, in which 2 CIDG were wounded. Air assets supported the friendly troops and killed six of the enemy, 35 x AK-47, 20 x SKS, 25 x 107mm rockets, 12 x 1 kilo anti-personnel mines, 200 AK magazines, 2 x 60mm mortars, complete, 80-100 grenades, and 1,500 pounds of ordnance and electrical devices were captured, as well as 10 kilos of documents and 30 sampans. On 31 May, a company from A-415 discovered another cache, and captured 3 x 60mm mortars, 3 x M-1, 3 x M-16, 9 x AK-47, 1 x M-79 grenade launcher, 3 machinegun barrels, 2 tons of ammunition supplies, a forge, a sheen and a drill press, 5 x 60mm grenade launchers, 400 pounds of ordnance repair tools and three anti-aircraft machine gun barrels.
On 2 June, two minor cache discoveries were made by A-113 and A-114 troops; one held contained weapons' barrels, and the other 210 pounds of propaganda documents. On the 3rd, A-113's element discovered yet another cache with eight small arms, and at 1930 hours, the NHKT on a Vi mission spotted 2 VCs in spider holes, took them under fire and killed both. On the 5th, at XT 139 085, an unknown size enemy element fired mortars and automatic small arms at a group of A-431 CSF. Friendly air assets came to the aid of the CSF and killed 2 VCs, while friendly ground fire killed two others; enemy fire wounded 2 CSFs. An A-414 and A-116 element on the 6th of June, discovered 20 dead enemy, about a week old and evidently slain in the contact of 25 May at XT 148 028. On 7 June, two contacts occurred, one, an ambush, at XT 120 080, in which 3 VC/NVA were trapped; three were killed and two GKG rifles were captured. In the other contact, A-431 CSF contacted a squad of VC, but after a brief firefight, no results were forthcoming. On 8 June, another brief firefight occurred between A-113 elements and 5 of the enemy. Results of that encounter were 1 CIDG wounded and 1 VC captured along with a K-54 pistol and a pound of documents. A-114's troops uncovered a small cache on the 13th, at WT 980 023, containing 3 x K-2 carbines, 52 grenades, 3 x 60mm mortar rounds and a B-40 rocket. Gai Gai's troops were also subjected to an indirect fire and B-40 attack and a ground probe. After 15 minutes of fighting, the enemy broke contact and withdrew, neither side suffered any known casualties. A larger action occurred on 15 June at WT 970 100, at which a Cavalry packet received enemy ground fire, and an A-115 element on the ground made contact with the enemy. Another platoon from A-113 was inserted, and was greeted by B-40 and automatic weapons fire. Friendly elements placed several air strikes against the enemy. More troops arrived as reinforcements, until a total of 360 were in action. The enemy continued to fire throughout the night, but withdrew just before dawn, a first light sweep was conducted, and the following results were obtained: 1 USASF was killed, Sgt Robert L. HENDERSON of A-113, another USASF was wounded, an interpreter was killed, as also was a VNSF, 2 VNSF and 6 GKG were wounded as was another interpreter. Enemy losses were 3 VC killed, 4 KSA, 2 x AK-47s, 2 grenades, 5 x B-40 rockets and 5 x 60mm mortar rounds captured. On the 16th, as two companies conducted a sweep, they received small arms fire from about 12 VCs, and a 15 minute firefight ensued. The enemy then broke contact and withdrew; neither side suffered any known casualties.

A battalion consisting of two companies from Gai Gai, one from Tay Nhon and three Cambodian Army Squads, attached for a ten-day period, were inserted on 20 June, at 1600 hours, and received fire almost immediately; the resulting contact lasted until 2010 hours, at which point the VC broke contact. On the 21st at 0730 hours, the friendly elements swept the area and rounded up a number of civilians who stated that a platoon (+) sized element was the enemy unit involved, and that the enemy had withdrawn in small groups, carrying several wounded with them. Other casualties were 3 CIDG wounded and a Cambodian civilian female wounded; 1 VC was found slain, and an M-72 LAW and 5 rounds for the 75 mm recoilless rifle were captured and destroyed. In the final action of the Qua Long III operation, on 23 June, 1330 hours, Gai Gai troops swept the area of WT 773 150 and uncovered several caches in bunkers. Material captured included 300 grenades, 1 x B-40 rocket, 1 unknown type booby trap and one and one half tons of rice.

Two other contacts were made in June, one on 21 June, at 0910 hours, vicinity WT 777 275 when operation C-414 from A-112 was sweeping the area and sighted two men walking. The friendly troops challenged the two to halt, but one ran, and was slain; the other was surrounded and proved to be a VC.
The other action occurred on the 27th of June at 1105 hours, near MT 611 159, when 20 of the enemy initiated contact with an element of Cai Cai troops, a two hour firefight ensued, after which the enemy withdrew. Neither side suffered any known casualties. Thirteen other contacts occurred in Cambodia, but all were very minor in nature, and so are not described here. The total results of the Cambodian operations were: 1 USAF killed, 5 wounded, 15 Vietnamese troops killed, 96 wounded; the enemy lost 94 killed in action, 88 killed by air, 13 captured and 7 Koi Chamba. From the results it is quite clear that major enemy units had fled prior to allied movement into Cambodia, and only rearguard troops remained to harass allied forces. The enemy had left in haste, however, as is indicated by the number of cached items left behind and recovered by allied operations.

(C) The last USAF to leave Cambodia crossed the border at W 87 290, at 0830 hours, 30 June, after an unsuccessful night ambush; they were Capt. Walter V. KALLAUS and Sp/4 Jack JUNN. Both arrived at an FSB in Vietnam at 0945, and were extracted by air at 1530 hours the same day.

(C) Actions within Vietnam during the period of the Cambodian Operation included the following:

(C) On 19 May, at 2355 hours, at VS 567 638, the Gia Tham FOB received 57 rounds of .30-06 machine rifle fire during a 50 minute attack from a range of 7000 meters Northwest. Results were 1 VNSF, 1 CSF, and 7 civilians wounded, while losses were unknown. The action was reported by camp Vinh Gia, A-119.

(C) On the 25th, at 0015 hours, at VS 456 458, the camp at To Chau received 1 x 120mm mortar round and automatic small arms fire from the Northeast. The firefight lasted 30 minutes and friendly casualties were: 1 ODC killed, 1 wounded and 1 FA radio damaged; the enemy lost 1 VC, NVA killed and 1 AK-47 captured.

(C) On the 15th of June, during Operation C-52-A from A-111, a VC cache was located in the Cambodian village of SARMAR at KT 052 062, and a report on the villagers was also submitted. It is a grim report of conditions resulting from the chaos in Cambodia's border areas, where VC and NVA elements have preyed on the population to keep their organization supplied and viable. The cache was found empty, but VIPs reported that it had contained 200 automatic small arms until the previous night, when the fleeing VC had removed everything.

(C) The villagers reported that the enemy had entered the village nightly, seeking food and shelter. Their influence was strong in the area, as the people feared the VC greatly, owing to the latter's liberal use of reprisals and terror, plus protests of loyalty to the former chief of the Cambodian state, Prince Sihanouk, and claims that free world forces were unable to curb them. At least 15 villagers suffered from untreated shrapnel wounds, and all the villagers, after a medical examination, were found to be suffering from severe malnutrition and its attendant diseases; their diet consisted of rice and salt; all the village animals had been killed or stolen by the VC originally, or what few survived, by the allied forces who drove the VC out. There was absolutely no medical aid available to the villagers. The report is a good example of the havoc wreaked upon the people in the middle of the war, trapped between VC, NVA forces, and subject to depredations by both. Such is the legacy of the conflict.

(C) In the Gia's Nest area of Cambodia occurred a Blackhawk operation from 15 June to 17 June, for which an after action report exists. The objective was a bunker and trench complex with numerous weapons positions. Command and Control
Headquarters was at B-43, and the reporting officer was Capt. Robert L. CLANTWELL, the S-3 Officer of B-43.

The task organization was as follows:
1) One Air Cavalry Troop.
2) One company of CSS from A-41, A-41B, and A-41C.
3) Two companies CSS from A-415.

The whole comprised a composite battalion, whose commander was Lieu. Ve Song KHANG.

Support was provided by:
1) USAF bomber #411.
2) US Navy Black Ponies.
3) Shadow 77 and 78.
4) Mini Packet.
5) Cavalry Packet.
6) US Navy Beachjumpers.

(c) Pre-operation intelligence indicated that the 267 A Battalion was in the objective area; Cambodian civilians who were in the area and had been questioned revealed that 250 VC were in the area and a tunnel complex also existed.

(c) On the 15th of June, at 0850 hours, the Cavalry Packet, while conducting a RA of the area from XT 09C 075 to XT 020 075, sighted at 0915 hours, six Vietnamese and a monk; three of the civilians carried M-16 rifles, while two had M-2 carbines. The O&C ship landed and checked the personnel, who proved to be from A-4143 on a CRP. At 0930 hours, a LOL sighted two VC in bunkers and placed mini gun fire on them, killing both. At 0950 hours, an element of A-4143 consisting of 30 personnel, was inserted at XT 972 1013 and moved along the ground to XT 977 102, where they came under heavy small arms fire and 840 fire, and S/Sgt HENDERSON and a OBIW were wounded. At 1145, a medevac was attempted, but heavy ground fire drove off the helicopter. At 1200 hours, a LOL tried to extract the wounded, but fire hit it, and it crashed in the area; the pilots were successfully extracted. Between 1230 and 1300 hours, 60 troops from A-4143 were inserted and tried to link up with the originally inserted element. 60mm mortars, 810 and small arms fire blocked the maneuver; at 1235, US Navy Black Ponies arrived and placed fire on the enemy. A-41 now inserted another 50 troops, and at 1400, the elements moved South of the enemy line and attempted to roll up the Black, but heavy 840 and small arms fire, 60mm and 810 and small arms fire, the Allied forces, wounded 1 USAF from Tuyen Nhon. At 1130 hours, a mini packet with slick ship inserted another A-4145 company at XT 978 1009; these troops moved to within 300 meters of the contact and set up blocking positions. At 1500 hours, a company from A-4143 was inserted at XT 975 050, and it moved East to the contact area and also set up blocking positions. Then US Navy Black Ponies and other gunships struck at the enemy while the elements to the South formed another assualt; at 1730 hours the US FOC placed three air strikes on the enemy, but the firefight was bogged down by fierce enemy fire again at 1900 hours, and the allied force halted for the night, attempting to hold the enemy. Illumination rounds and flares were provided, and plans were made to re-open the assault at first light. The Navy Beachjumpers conducted broadcast. to urge the enemy to rally to the GVN throughout the night.

(c) On the 5th of June, the assault was renewed, and several companies attacked, even though the enemy continued pouring out small arms fire. On ships
and the mini packet placed in area air strikes. At 0900 hours, Dr. HAMMERS et
who had died of his wounds the previous day, and 5 aiding CIDW were extracted.
By 1130, the sweep was finished and 4 VC were KIA, along with 5 x 60mm rockets
and 5 x 50cm mortar rounds captured. At 1230 hours, A-114 element, took fire
from the East of the contact area; gunships responded and silenced the hostile
fire; 1 CIDW was wounded and a VC was killed.

(6) Between 1300 and 1800 hours, one company each from A-113, A-114 and A-
115 were extracted while A-111 and the remaining A-115 elements continued the
search. That evening the remaining troops were extracted. Final total results
of the operation were: 9 VC/kIA, 6 KBA, 1 x AG-47, 5 x 60mm rockets, 5 x
60cm mortar rounds, 2 grenades and 2 anti-tank mines captured. The friendly
troops lost 1 USASF killed, 5 CIDW and an interpreter killed; 1 VNSF was taken
prisoner; and the wounded included 1 US, 2 VNSF, 11 CIDW and 1 interpreter.

(7) The major event of the quarter was Operation Sea Float which
started on 30 May and lasted until 6 September 1970. The operation was basic-
ally conducted by the US Navy in An Xuyen Province, where there were contin-
uing problems with the VC. MAC was asked for assistance with ground forces,
to assist in search and clear operations, and the USASF were given the assign-
ment.

(G) On D decided to supply the troops on a rotational basis, with A-112
providing the first contingent on 30 May. Rotation was scheduled for every
two weeks; To Chan (A-112) took over the assignment in July, and on 12 August,
Bayon, Nha Trang A-115, took over the task. On the 6th of September, Vietnamese
Marines arrived and relieved the USASF elements. For the duration of the USASF
involvement, the command element was housed and billeted on the South bank of
the Cua Lon river, at site 989. Operations averaged 1-3 days throughout Nam
Can and Dan Boi districts of An Xuyen province. Operational reports exist for
all phases of the operation, and will be summarized below.

(c) On the 16th of June, at site 136 757, a CSF platoon from A-112 contacted
5 VC and a three-minute firefights ensued; there were negative results. Friend-
ly killed on everyone. That same day at 1930 hours, at the same location, three sampas
with 8 VC carrying weapons were contacted by a CSF element; a brief fire-
fight ensued; and 4 VC killed were confirmed, while 1 others were probably killed.
Captured was a manually, a radio operator’s manual, a circuit diagram, a chicco
machine, diverse documents and enlistment papers. At 1530 hours, the CSF picked
up from a male and two female suspects and returned them to the base for inter-
rogation. On 19 June, the CSF captured a sampan with a motor and water pump.

(d) At 1730 hours, on 20 June, the operations halted and the CSF returned
to the base for stand-down. On the 22nd, the CSF were out again, but negative
contact was made; the same results were obtained on 23 June. On the 25th, 3 VC
were contacted at 0630 hours; the VC escaped, but captured were 1 mortar
5 cages of rice, 200 pounds of shrimp and 5 sampas; 3 hochees and a buyer
were destroyed; on the 28th of June, the company of CSF was rotated.

(e) From 28 June to 13 July 1970, the second phase of Operation Sea Float
occurred; the reporting officers from A-112, 2 VN Navy Tanno boats, 1 VN Navy
Minitor boat and an Alpha boat made up the task force. Support came from one
section of Swift Boats, a section of Seawolves, 1 x } inch gun, a flight of
Black Flies and a section of the EOD, and UDT teams.

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(c) Pre-operation intelligence reported that the VC were all local people operating in squad size units, conducting mainly ambushes and sapper attacks, using rockets, small arms and claymores. The terrain consisted chiefly of mango trees and thick shrubs in swampy ground, interlaced with deep streams and impenetrable on foot; concealment was good, but cover poor. The best avenues of approach were by boat along the waterways.

(d) On 28 June, at 1000 hours, the CSF company, with 2 VNSF and 3 USASF advisors departed A-432 by Chinook CH-47 in two sorties, and arrived at Gia Ma at 1110 hours. Camp was set up on the South bank of the Gia Lon River. At 1200 hours, Lt LENTS and 2nd Lt THAM received a briefing from US Navy 1st Lt INGRAM, Operations Officer of Seafloat. A four day operation was revealed, with a Navy boat and 3 inch gun for support. Resupply was to be by boat.

(e) On 29 June, 34 CSF and their four advisors departed Gia Ma on a Tangle Boat, with an Alpha and Monitor Boat along as security elements. An insertion was made at WQ 217 760, but movement was extremely slow, and flank security left much to be desired. The objective was the canal junction at WQ 220 765, and it was reached at 1200 hours. Dense vegetation and impenetrable terrain forced the CSF to move West of their intended route. At 1130, a fresh campsite was sighted, and tracks were observed leading away from it for about 100 meters. A thunderstorm forced the platoon to a halt, and Lt LENTS and Sp4 GREEN had to climb a tree, in order to make contact with the Navy boat on the Gia Lon River. The unit requested extraction, but the boats did not arrive until 1730 hours, because no US Navy personnel were on board, and the Vietnamese sailors were not aware of where the insertion had occurred. Further, the boat was stranded by low tide, and the group did not return to Gia Ma until 2300 hours. The 30th of June was spent on de-briefings and resupply for the troops. On the 1st of July, it was decided to change to one day sweep operations. An incident occurred when the Navy personnel refused to give empty ammunition boxes to the CIDG, because they suspected that the CSF would sell them to the VC. The 2nd of July was spent on plans for an operation on the 3rd, and Maj BASHFIELD and Capt CHIU, arrived for a visit to Seafloat. On the morning of the 3rd, a platoon of CSF and advisors finally moved out on operation, but at 1000 hours, they encountered an ambush at WQ 102 670, with the enemy using 2-40 rockets and claymores; 1 CIDG was wounded, as well as 2 VN Navy personnel, and one boat engine was damaged. Enemy losses were 2 VC killed, 1 wounded and 4 x 2-40 tubes captured. At 1100 hours, when the boats returned to base, it was learned that one of the Vietnamese Navy boats had had its radio frequency compromised; the VC commander was picked up on the radio. Again on 4 July, the operation was ambushed, this time at WQ 685 561, from the West bank of the creek. Almost instantly, two 'lunch' bombs hit the Alpha boat, and it sank instantly with all hands. The Monitor boat also received four 2-40 rounds, which damaged the boat, but failed to sink it. Claymores, .51 calibre M2s and AK-47s were also fired at the friendly force. VN Navy personnel, 3 CSF and Sgt WOODWARD, a USASF, were wounded. When the crew served weapons on the boat were tested, they were found inoperative. Lt LENTS called in a medevac, and at 1000 hours, a sweep was inserted to locate the ambush; it was found that 4-6 VC had initiated the attack. The sweep obtained negative results, and dives to the sunken boat were unable to rescue any of its crew. Results were 5 VN Navy personnel killed, 1 wounded, 2 CSF wounded, as also was 1 USASF. Prior to the operation, extra caution had been taken to avoid another compromise, but it was to no avail. Finally, upon return to Seafloat quarters, the US Navy personnel refused Lt LENTS' request for oil to clean the CSF's
June 16th, and only after extensive debate and haggling on the follow-
ing day, the oil and two cases of M-36 rounds issued. Meanwhile, four of the
3SF had been apprehended trading rations to local woodcutters, and the Navy
personnel flatly insisted that the culprits be returned to their base; the
four 3SF were returned to A-432.

(c) On 6 July, the operational briefing was put off until the boats were
underway, to avoid the possibility of another compromise and ambush, and plans
were made to sweep the sides of the canal while the boats gave support along
the canal. After proceeding along the canal approximately 1 kilometer, an obst-
cacle was encountered, and the US Navy EOD team was called in to dispose.
At 1500 hours, the 3SF were inserted and immediately located numerous clay-
more, and two were accidentally set off, injuring two 3SF, who were medevaced
by US Navy boat. The next day was spent on upkeep and maintenance of the boats
and equipment. On the 8th, the boats had to be deadlined; another incident
occurred when the US Navy medic accused one wounded CIDG, who had grown sicker
in the course of the night, of malingering. The CIDG continued to worsen,
and, finally, he had to be medevaced.

(c) On the 9th of July, another operation was conducted leaving Sea
float at 0900 hours, with 30 3SF and 4 advisors. The element was inserted
at 1000 hours on both banks of the canal, at WQ 129 680, and a sweep was 1-
itially made; progress was very slow, owing to difficult terrain, and claymores
were again encountered, two being detonated. The EOD was once summoned, and
upon arrival it exploded nine additional claymores. Finally the troops were
extracted, but no contacts had been made. On 10 July, at 0900 hours, Maj.
Robert L. JOCZIK, Executive Officer of Co. B, and Lt Col. MISALICZ, Commander
of B-43, arrived to visit the operational site; they departed for Samo Tho at
1100 hours.

(c) On 11 July, the A-432 group started stand-down for rotation, but the
troop pick-up was delayed until 0700 hours on 13 July. At 1030 hours, Maj.
JOCZIK and Maj. HIRSH arrived and conducted a VR of the base area at 7a Mau.
The visiting party requested a boat to enable them to visit the camp in person,
but when it failed to show by 1245 hours, the two officers returned to Co. B.

(d) A summary of A-432's operations at Sea Float revealed that the 3SF
were short of ammunition for the M-36, oil, mosquito repellent and the pro-
per M-60 and M-36 spare parts. The crew served weapons on the VN Navy boats
were improperly maintained, hence inoperable. Problems between the US Navy
personnel and CIDG occurred mainly because of Navy unfamiliarity of the CIDG
concept of operations, and also by the CIDG's unfamiliarity with the Sea
Float operational area. The other main problem was encountered with poor
coordination of transportation.

(e) The next contingent to participate in Operation Sea Float (refer-
red to in later reports as Solid Anchor) was from To Chan, A-442, and its
dates of participation were 11 to 26 July. The USAF reporting officer was
Lt Col. T. KOS, A-442's senior advisor. Other USAF members on the opera-
tive were S/Sgt Jimmy MENEO, S/Sgt Joseph O. MATAYA of B-43, S/Sgt William FAKEH,
radio operator from Co. D and Sp/1 Fredric W. LINNATT, Medical technician from
Co. D.
(c) Task organization differed from the last phase of Sea Float only in the inclusion of 4 US Navy Swift Boats and 1 US Navy Patrol Gun Boat; support elements remained unchanged.

(c) The weather for this phase of the operation featured heavy rain, alternating with two to three days of clear weather. Mission and concept of operation remained as in the last phase.

(c) On 13 July, a company of CSF with five advisors departed to Chau in two sorties of CH-47 Chinook aircraft. Maj. JOCZIK and Maj. HUSS were still at Sea Float, having conducted their VR of the area. Lt LENTS of A-432 briefed Lt MOSS, the new reporting officer, and the visiting command party departed for Co. D at 1245 hours. At 1030 hours, Lt INGRAM, of the Navy contingent, gave his own briefing to Lt MOSS, W.P. DIEP, and Sg. ROMERO of the USASF party. The operation was scheduled to commence on 16 July, with a heliborne assault of the VC positions by 30 CSF. At 1030 hours, on the 14th, Lt Col. MERRICK and Maj. MOODY arrived with a resupply mission, and met with the US Navy commanders, Mr. KELLEHER, who then joined the USASF party for a VR.

On the 15th of July, Lt INGRAM reported that Sea Float was unable to get the Cavachi Packet for 16 July, and hence a change would have to be made in the planned operation; the new concept of operation would employ three Tango boats, one Monitor and two PGMs for transport and fire support. On the 16th, the operation started out at 0600 hours, but at 0630 hours, it was suddenly cancelled, and rescheduled for 17 July. On the next day, 30 CIDG, commanding at 0730 hours, swept South of the base area for 1½ kilometers, but made negative contact. On the 18th of July, a new operation for 20-21 July was planned with four PGMs for transport and fire support. On the 19th, the CSF were briefed, (an improvement over the procedures of the last phase), and on the 20th, at 0630 hours, the operation departed the Sea Float base. An insertion was made at 0930 hours, at WQ 261 713, with 30 CSF and 4 advisors going ashore, while the Navy PGMs set up waterborne guard posts. A search and clear operation was then conducted along the Rach Doi Vam, and a camp for RON was set up at WQ 256 728; meanwhile, Lt Col. BASHORE, the Commander of Co. D visited the operation, and Sg. LIDMATT replaced Sg. ROMERO, as medical advisor. The search and clear revealed 10 hooches and 7 bunkers, all of which were destroyed, but no contact with the enemy was made. On 21 July, at 0730, the operation moved out once again, and at 1030 hours, a group of VC in a sampan opened fire on the friendly troops; artillery support was called in; results were 2 VC killed and a sampan captured. At 1215, the operation was terminated, and the elements returned to base. There were no operations on the 22nd, as the US Navy boats required maintenance. On the 23rd, 30 CSF and two advisors aboard a Tango and a Monitor Boat set out along with four US Navy advisors for the Navy personnel. At 0930 hours, an insertion occurred and a sweep was initiated, during the course of which 3 VC were spotted; fire couldn't be placed upon them, however, and no contact occurred. At 1100 hours, 20 civilian detainees were seized, and at 1115, the friendly party returned to camp.

(c) On the 24th of July, Cpt WISE, Lt UNDESKOFLER, Sg. AVERY and an Engineer representative arrived at Sea Float to survey possible sites for new construction, and at 1115, the party of visitors met with Mr. KELLEHER, the US Navy commander. The group returned to Can Tho at noon.

(c) A sweep on 25 July, at WQ 002 673-WQ 021 683, yielded negative results. On the 26th, another visiting party, consisting of Maj. JOCZIK, Cpt...
(C) The second phase of Operation Sea Float proceeded considerably more smoothly than the earlier phase. Supply was conducted efficiently by Sea Float personnel, and communications and medical care were also efficient. The chief difficulty encountered was the dead-lining of several VN Navy boats, owing to mechanical failure.

(C) The final phase of USAF participation in Operation Sea Float/Solid Anchor occurred between 12 August and 6 September 1970, when A-415's troops were assigned to the operation. Only one major action is recorded for this last phase, and it occurred on 23 August; while the A-415 troops were on a search and clear mission, they encountered a reinforced VC platoon, armed with small arms and claymores. A 30 minute firefight ensued, and finally the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results were 1 USAF killed, Sp/5 Raymond S. BRAWNELL, and another wounded, Sgt Ernest H. KIRK; 2 CIDG were also wounded, and 3 VC were reported killed.

(C) The total results for Operation Sea Float/Solid Anchor were 20 VC killed, 1 mortar, of unknown size, 4 x B-40 tubes, 6 x B-40 rockets, 25 claymore mines, 1 grenade, 3 individual weapons, 5 sampans; assorted papers and documents, 750 pounds of rice and 400 pounds of shrimp captured; 3 hooches, a bunker and 6 sampans were also destroyed.

(C) The remaining contacts in the other operational areas of Co. D are continued below.

(C) Two brief contacts are reported from 7-10 July 1970 for detachments B-41 and A-415. They occurred as follows:

(C) From 7-10 July, B-41 conducted an operation at WS 837 928, the reporting officer was 1st Lt James FULLELY, and the advisors were Sgt Jack BUSE and Sp/4 Jack DUNN. There was only one company involved and artillery support was planned, but not used. Intelligence revealed that a company size enemy unit was using the area as a rest/base area for infiltration operations; the mission was to search and clear the area, and to set up ambushes for the hostile forces.

(C) In the only contact recorded, a VC squad was sighted moving at WS 837 928, and a maneuver was executed to close with the enemy. Fire was opened by the friendly elements, and the VC never had a chance to return fire. Results were 3 VC killed and 1 x M-2 carbine and 5 pounds of documents captured.

(C) On the 9th of July, detachment A-415 conducted a sweep between KS 150 655 and KS 190 812, along the Va Go Tay. The reporting officer was 1st Lt Michael PAGE, Cpt THANH and Lt SMELLEY, US Navy. Tank organization consisted of a CIDG company and two advisors, along with a larger boat. 81mm and 105mm howitzers fired support from A-415, and 12 FABs were available for support. Intelligence reported the sighting of 4 VC. At 0800
On 9 July, the friendly troops were inserted at 150,000 yards, and a two kilometer stretch of riverbank was searched. Numerous tracks were sighted and followed, but no contact was established. The VNSF conducted communications in an efficient manner, and two members of the POLWAR team disseminated 40,000 Propaganda leaflets.

(c) On 19 July, A-119 reported that at VS 610, 615, air assets had received fire at 1150 hours. 30 GSF were inserted to sweep the area but contact was not made. Results were negative friendly losses, but 12 VC/NVA were killed by air, and 3 x AK-47s and assorted documents were captured.

(c) On 31 July, at 0200 hours, at VS 928, 611, a GSF platoon at Le Hoa Outpost, of A-421, received 20 rounds of 62mm fire, 8-l0 rockets and small arms fire, from an estimated platoon of the enemy. After 60 minutes of attack, the VC/NVA withdrew South. Artillery from Chi Lang and Ba Xoai gave support, and gunships placed airstrikes on suspected enemy positions; results were 5 GSF wounded, 3 civilians killed and 5 wounded; enemy casualties were unknown.

(c) For offensive operational procedures, a document on airboat utilisation exists, dated 7 July 1970.

Some of the uses of airboats that were recommended included reconnaissance and surveillance operations, screening the flanks of attacking elements, and also in conjunction with blocking forces. The airboats were also found practicable for screening the flanks of PBRs or sampans, for water convoys and for hauling freight. The boats were best suited for shallow draft waterways where conventional naval escort cannot operate. They also proved most useful for operations during the rainy season, being able to skim over the flood waters, over rice paddies and marshy areas.

The airboat gives a good surprise element, owing to its speed and maneuverability; loads, however, must be as light as possible during raids, to reduce drag and consequent vulnerability. In ambush maneuvers, the airboat is ideal for the pursuit of a fleeing enemy, and the boats can operate in even the shallowest of waters, so that escaping in a sampan does the enemy no good. The airboats are also ideal for transporting small ambush elements, as their area of operation is limited only by the extent of waterways. In MR 15, the Delta, with its intricate network of canals and streams, the airboat has proved to be a most valuable operational element. The airboats are also useful for interdicting waterborne enemy forces; they can outmaneuver just about any craft available to the VC, and thus are instrumental in halting or cutting infiltration. Finally, with their speed and maneuverability, the boats are good as decoys against an enemy force. An airboat can present itself as a target and lure the enemy into an ambush, or else draw him off a beleaguered force. The enclosed diagram depicts an airboat section TOE. Recommended uniforms for the boat operators and crew are: Steel helmet for grenadiers and gunners, flak jackets and life preservers for all crew members; the driver should wear a combat vehicle crewman's helmet.

The personnel available to man an airboat platoon are as follows:

- 12 GSF
- 6 VNSF
- 10 NATIONAL POLICE

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ANNEX "A" (Airboat Section TO&E) to OPLAN 2-70, C-43 VN:

1. Airboat Section TO&E.

1. SGT/PILOT/USASF.
1. CPL/MG, or interpreter.
1. M-79 GRENADEIR/
   NATIONAL POLICE.

1. CPL/NG
1. PFC/M-79
1. CPL/Pilot

1. .30 Cal. MG
1. SGT/PILOT/VNSF
1. M-79
1. PFC/M-79
1. CPL/NG
1. .30 Cal. MG
1. M-79
1. AN/FRG-77

1. CPL/NG
1. PFC/M-79
1. CPL/MECH/PILOT

1. .30 Cal. MG
1. SGT/PILOT/VNSF
1. M-79
1. PFC/M-79
1. CPL/NG
1. .30 Cal. MG
1. M-79
1. AN/FRG-77

1. CPL/MECH
1. PFC/M-79
1. CPL/MECH/PILOT

1. .30 Cal. MG
1. SGT/PILOT/VNSF
1. M-79
1. PFC/M-79
1. CPL/NG
1. .30 Cal. MG
1. M-79
1. AN/FRG-77

NOTE: If lead airboat has .50 Cal. MG mounted, there is no M-79.
Each section consists of: 2 USASF
1. INTERPRETER
1a VNSF
13 NSF or 2 NATIONAL POLICE

2 NATIONAL POLICE
(C) Plane and Organization: Phasedown procedures went smoothly during the quarter, with two facilities converting, namely, A-401, Don Phu, and A-431A/H-20 at Camp Roger L. Brown. Can Tho, Don Phuc was transferred to Kien Giang Province, and its ESF were converted to RF/FF. The conversion date was 3 July 1970. The facilities at A-401 and B-10 were transferred to the 6th AIC on 3 July 1970, and were being used by the Ranger Signal and Support Company of MR 1. Four other Co D detachments went into the conversion cycle A-431, Thanh Tri; A-432, Tuyen Khoai; A-431, Ca Ba, An Ha, and A-432, To Chua. They were scheduled to convert to main force ARVN Rangers at the conclusion of the 90 day cycle. The chief problem encountered was the lack of motivation and indoctrination material and team at the converting camps. The lack was reflected in the increased AWOL rate at the camps scheduled for conversion at the end of August. Another factor operative in the AWOL situation was the unwillingness of some ethnic minorities, especially the Canadians, to work directly for the GVN. Some of the other CIGD were confused about what conversion meant for them. Another problem was that the ARVN Rangers Advisors had not yet arrived at the converting camps, as of the end of the quarter.

(C) Training: One MSF company attended the MSF refresher course at Dong Ba Thin in July 1970; a CSF GCP went through the Dong Ba Thin Center, also in July. 25 CIDG attended the Leadership School, 6 attended the Combat Interpreter course, 8 completed the basic medical course and 6 CSF/MSF attended the TAE Know Do Course in July 1970.

(C) At Co D, 9 CSF completed the Generator Operator and Maintenance Course during June, and the airboat company conducted refresher training, refitting and maintenance for the upcoming rainy season; an orientation and training program was also instituted for the newly assigned WNSF.

(C) The Army Aviation Support picture was unchanged from the last quarter. The C-7 aircraft support by the 183rd Tactical Airlift Wing at Bien Hoa on Mission IRIS '456, was the only bright spot in the whole aviation area.

(C) In the field of Logistics, the S-4, during the quarter, supported the following number of personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA SF</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>3,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>1,514</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) Phasedown has resulted in the backloading of large amounts of materials. Stocks at the FSP were reduced, and all unserviceable equipment was backloaded. Construction materials were shipped to the subordinate detachments for the purpose of improving berms, fortifications and shelters. 200 sampans were purchased and shipped to the detachments for rainy season operations.

(C) In the field of Maintenance, on the 4th of May, the six week Generator Repairman Course was started, and 12 CIDG troops were trained in third and fourth echelon maintenance. When the course ends, a total of 56 generator operators and maintenance personnel will have been trained.

(C) Air Movements Section shipped the following tonnages of supplies:

- Airland: 2,809 tons
- Airdrop: 116 tons

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(c) Psychological Operations were emphasized on Nui Cam, Nui Bost and Nui Coto, with 300,000 leaflets dropped in that region, warning the citizens of air-light operations, and offering medical aid to the enemy wounded. Also stressed were the Chien Hoi, VIP and weapons reward theme leaflets. Other leaflets were dropped to explain the presence of U.S. personnel, and their gradual withdrawal as the GVN grows stronger. The 307th Aviation Battalion conducted nightly leaflet drops in the environs of Can Tho. This procedure lightened the load of the "B" teams, which were experiencing difficulty in obtaining air assets.

(c) In the Seven Mountains Area, intelligence reported that after air-light operations, the enemy had to shoot some of the more seriously wounded, because medicine and facilities were in short supply. Payops exploited this situation by having leaflets and tapes made stressing medical care for members of the enemy forces who rallied. The Navy Beachjumpers were instrumental in the implementation of this program. Another program was evolved in the Phoenix/Phung Hoang policy; coordination was established with Phung Hoang personnel in both BOCs, and 10th Payops Battalion and Co. D exploited black lists furnished by the Phung Hoang program by printing leaflets and making tapes using material from the lists. These were then disseminated on Civic Action and Medcap operations, both to alert the people about VCI in their area and to familiarize them with the Phung Hoang program. The Beachjumper personnel were also most helpful in making this project a success. In HR 1, a similar program helped to neutralize many VCIs, and it was hoped that the same effect could be produced in HR 4.

(c) In the area of Social Welfare, the S-5 devoted time and resources to support the MR 1 Buddhist Chapel of Peace school for the orphans of ARVN troops, and also the Binh Lai Catholic Elementary School for needy youngsters. Both S-5 programs at the BOCs conducted their own programs in 194 villages and schools, using materials and supplies provided through the Company D and Group S-5 organizations.

(1) There exists a document relating a POWMAR story concerning the assistance that Chaplain (Cpt) Leonard J. SABALLES, Roman Catholic Chaplain of Co. D, gave to the S-5 program during the quarter. In the course of his ministry to Co. D's subordinate detachments, Father SABALLES learned that many of the A-12TH (Thanh Tri) CIDG and their families were Catholics, and had not had the opportunity to receive the Sacraments and attend Mass for over a year. Through the coordination made by the WNSP and USAF camp commander, the saying of Mass was scheduled in the Thanh Tri village church, with the assistance of an interpreter. After the service, these families, wishing to have children baptized, received that opportunity. The efforts of Father SABALLES were much appreciated by the CIDG and members, and they stand out as a good example of the USAF's interest and
dedication to the welfare of the people they are advising.

(D) Co. D implemented a special motivation and indoctrination program in accordance with Group S-5 regulations and directives, starting on 27 July 1970, and aimed at assisting camp conversion. POWAR teams were given materials and instructed to begin explaining the Ranger program to the CIDG. Further, a Ranger M&I team and a special team from CORDS was scheduled to visit all the detachments. Posters and films were also borrowed from the 16th Psyops Field Artillery and the VIS Program to supplement the existing motivation and indoctrination program. In some cases, the VNSF were found to be opposed to the M&I program, owing to professional jealousy and the fear of the VNSF that after conversion, some of the ex-CIDG, who were once commanded by the VNSF, would become commanders in their own right, perhaps over some of the VNSF, and this would represent a severe 'loss of face'. Further, a certain amount of interbranch rivalry exists between the VNSF and the Rangers, and the VNSF were loath to support a program that would bolster the Rangers, at the expense of VNSF influence.

(G) The Medcap program, in conjunction with the Medical Section, increased in scope at the end of the quarter, owing to the assignment of new S-5 personnel to each of the BCOR's. The Beachjumper teams and Navy units in BCOR III also assisted the program by giving time, personnel and transportation to assist the USASF efforts.

(G) Village self-help efforts were also encouraged at the 'A' detachments, especially due to the decrease of materials available through Co. D channels as phasedown continued.

(C) At Thanh Tri, (A-111), a mess hall was under construction for the CIDG, and interest was also aroused in animal and farm projects, to supplement the troop rations. Chicken pens and garden plots were built; garden plots were placed atop stilts, in order to keep them out from under the floodwaters of the rainy season.

(G) An Engineer update exists from Co. D, Cai Cai, dated 26 July 1970, and it covers several engineer projects at different 'A' sites.

(G) At Cai Cai, A-131, construction of new generator sheds and a hardened POL storage facility was underway. Further work was initiated on new hollow block concrete bunkers, to be spaced evenly along the berm, five bunkers to a side. Eight were completed by the end of the quarter, and seven others were underway. Once this project was completed, plans were to extend the front of the older sandbag bunkers up into the berm, to give better fields of fire, and also to add concrete caps, to provide improved security.

(G) At Binh Thanh Thon, A-132, engineer progress was slow. The hollow block concrete bunkers remained to be capped. 31st DIVISION was exerting considerable effort, but the CIDG detailed to assist the 31st were lackadaisical in their share of the effort. 101 shaped pickets were reported in short supply at the camp also.

(G) Tuyen Khoi, A-135, completed expanding its funds for sandbags and the Co. D Engineer approved an additional 910 Fund expenditure. The VNSF requested an extension to their TOC, but the Engineer told them either to...
utilize ammunition cases, or else, to delay their project until higher priority items were completed. Two graders and their operators from the Airfield Detachment were employed in improving the airstrip. There were also plans to upgrade the access road running parallel to the airfield, in the past, vehicular traffic had used the airstrip itself, creating a hazardous situation, and also to place a crown and improve drainage runoff from the airstrip. There were also plans to extend the runway by 2,000 feet, and to clear a selected site on the other side of the USAF camp. It was expected that construction would delay reopening of the airfield for 10 days beyond the end of the quarter.

(C) At Thang Thoi, A-432, problems with the seawall continued to mount, but a summary of the whole seawall episode will be given in the next quarter's summary, when the final collapse of the structure is considered.

(C) Personnel strength at Co. D was as follows for the quarter ending 31 July 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) Critical shortages existed only in the enlisted MOS positions for 11F, where 29 personnel were lacking, 11C where 11 were short, and 05B where 8 were lacking. All other positions were relatively close to TQSS levels.

(C) Combat losses were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) There was also one non-hostile death for the quarter, and one injury due to non-hostile activity.

(C) Gains for the quarter were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICERS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENLISTED</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) Losses due to rotation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICERS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENLISTED</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) Under law, order and discipline, only one Article Fifteen was issued during the quarter. Morale remained excellent with the continuing emphasis placed upon personnel services. Rest and recuperation leaves were utilized as follows: In May, 29 out of 31 allotted to the company were taken; in June 25 of 28 were used, and in July the full quota of 23 was utilized. Promotions were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICERS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENLISTED</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to the update described earlier, the Engineer Company, whose officer was Capt William A. WISE until the end of July, and Capt J. BENT after that date, reported fifteen projects completed by the quarter. All other projects were scheduled for completion during August and September. New projects undertaken during the quarter were the construction of four elevated general purpose tents at the Sea Float/Seal Base quarters, and three dependent housing units at Thanh Tam, A-432.

Rehabilitation of dilapidated structures was undertaken at all camps in anticipation of conversion. This project included replacing or repairing sandbag bunkers and fighting positions, and installing new defensive tactical wire.

Other Engineer units, not organic to Co. D, were engaged in depassivating three detachments—Thuong Thoi, A-432; Chi Lang, A-15; and hardening and extension of the medical facility, and the airfield project earlier described at Tuyen Nhon, A-15. At Co. D, the POL and ammunition storage yards were under construction; a large load of construction materials arrived at Co. D during the quarter, and progress on projects requiring "U" shaped pickets and 1" by 6" lumber moved ahead.

The Medical Section reported only one change in USASF medical care; this involved administration; Capt LA overstated, and Capt Harold HECKMAN moved into the Company Surgeon's position. Capt HECKMAN also became the Chief Medical Officer at the CIND Hospital. 1st Lt William BOST arrived to replace 1st Lt Paul CAPALDO as Chief of Company Medical Operations and Supply officer. Sfc JOHNSON was the NOCIC of the Anderson Dispensary.

Plans were made for the closedown of the CIND hospital, which was to occur in the following quarter. To ensure the records of USASF personnel were reviewed and updated. The medical files were closed and next to the pay line each month, it was insured that all personnel needing immunizations received them. The rodent control program went forward with live traps and poisoned food pots out to snare the rodents, and a spraying team periodically conducted foggings of all buildings and facilities to keep the insect problem under control.

Medical supplies were reduced as closedown continued. Critical supplies were backed up, inspected and referred to the Group Signal Supply Section. Non-critical items were turned over to the churches, other needy US facilities in the vicinity of the closing camps.

The Signal Section required only one special configuration for the quarter, and that of the simplest equipment, and one radio operator at Sea Float quarters. The equipment was the basic issue given to all air detachments for emergency CW/SSB Voice Communications. The radio employed was the AN/FPS-7A, with a 4-wave antenna. Communications were 100% reliable throughout the quarter, and other detachments' communications were also trouble free during the quarter.

The Signal Section NOCIS for the quarter was Sfc Johnny CHENG, who remained in charge until the closeout of Co. D.
(C) In the area of training, all 'B' detachments and the 'C' detachment reestablished their RTT capability. Radio operators were given instructions on the use of the equipment, and a daily use of the system was also required. Cross training of OSG radio operators in the role of OSC operators also continued.

(C) The Comptrollers Office, whose OIC was Capt. Robert J. Lohspeigh in May and June, and 1st Lt. Steven A. Offenhauser for the rest of the quarter, experienced several problems due to conversion. The VNSF, when B-40 closed, in their efforts to keep security guards at the B-40 camp, assigned selected CIDG to other 'A' detachments' rosters, but physically kept the CIDG at B-40.

(C) Problems still occurred with the issuance of marriage licenses and birth certificates. The VNSF at C-4, Strength and Accounting, should have coordinated with the Rangers and the RF/PF to insure that the new recruits had the correct paperwork. Subordinate detachments were instructed to insure that the VNSF collected the correct paperwork from each recruit prior to coming to Co. D.

(C) Herein follows an organizational diagram of Co. D, and its subordinate detachments, as of 31 July 1970.
(C) The final CALL for Co. D covers the period 1 August to 31 October 1970. Phasedown was the primary concern of Co. D during this quarter, with emphasis placed upon successfully converting the detachments to the Reserve program. The organizational structure shifted continually throughout the quarter due to closing camps. At the close of October, B-43, Chu Lai was the only B detachment still open, A-413 had passed directly under Co. D control, and A-421, A-432, and A-449 rounded out the list of remaining camps. In September, A-432, Thua Thien finally was compelled to close when the seawall finally collapsed. The entire engineer file on this incident and its history is available and will be surveyed. By the end of the quarter, all camps were in the conversion cycle, and Co. D itself received a close-out date of 31 December 1970, although this was later amended to 15 December 1970. The remaining camps of Co. D, other than the Can Tho facility, were converted by 30 November 1970, and so ended the USAF involvement in Khe Sanh.

(C) The commanding officer of Co. D was Lt Col Frank H. BUSHER, until 2 November, when Maj. Robert L. JOZIK assumed command. The Deputy Commander position was discontinued as the phaseout progressed and the Cao Lanh TOP closed, on 31 October 1970. Maj. JOZIK was the Executive Officer until Lt Col. BASHORE's departure, at which point, Capt Franklin J. McGlynn, formerly the Funds Officer, assumed the position.

(C Op. 3) During the quarter, the S-2 Officer was Capt Joseph F. STOCK. The termination of agent's procedure remained unchanged from the last period, and, during September and October, all intelligence informants were terminated. Polygraph examinations, which had been terminated earlier in the year due to a loss of operators, resumed once more on 9 September, and the remaining detachments were notified of the change. S-2 Intelligence killed all operations on 8 December 1970, when Capt J.F. STOCK departed Co. D. All backloading of documents was completed as of 6 December 1970.

(C) The Operations Section was under the command of Capt George SHEREF, and 1st Lt BERTRAM served as the Conversion Officer until his rotation date. Msg. MANBERG was the WOIC until late November, when he also rotated, and SG. VAN DER HOEST and SFC Fred KINCHEF operated the S-3 section until its close.

(C) Co. D conducted 709 company size, 1,703 small unit and LCM CAS operations during the quarter. Total results were 3 USAF killed, 2 VNSF killed, and 8 CIDG wounded, 1 USAF killed as missing in action, and a total of 17 weapons were lost. The enemy lost 49 73 killed, 2 captured, and 97 Hoi Chi Minh ralliers. There was a rise in the number of ralliers because of a change in recording procedure. In the past, only ralliers who physically appeared at a USAF camp were tabulated, few of the enemy, however, rallied in this manner, because they feared the CIDG greatly, and also because raller leaflets usually depicted routes leading to district and province Chieu Hoi centers. The figures for this last quarter were taken from the Chau Doc and Kien Hoc Province chieu hoi figures, as B-41 and B-43 were located in these provinces, and at least some of the ralliers there were due to USAF effort. Below follows a listing of the significant actions conducted by Co. D elements.

(C) On 7 August, about 25 kilometers North of Cao Lanh in Kien Hoc province, one section of airboats encountered a squad of VC, and a 20 minute
firefight ensued, after which the VC broke contact. Results were: 2 USASF MIA, and an interpreter also wounded; an airboat was hit and sunk, causing the loss of 1 x PC2-77, 2 x M-16 rifles with 30 magazines and 1 x .30 caliber MG. The enemy's losses were unknown.

(c) On the 23rd of August occurred a contact which was part of the Sea Float/Solid Anchor Operation and is described under that operation; see p. 151.

(c) On 4 September, at 1815 hours, B-43 reported that a company of 2nd SE SF and two USASF advisors, along with elements of the 2nd Armored Cavalry, contacted 3 VC/NVA, and a five minute firefight ensued. The enemy broke contact and withdrew, leaving behind one KIA and three 90 kilogram bags of rice. The friendly elements suffered negative losses.

(c) On the 6th of September, at 1330 hours, 60 troops from A-102, Moc Hoa Mike Force, along with two USASF advisors were inserted at VS 018 470, and they made contact with a single VC during a sweep of the area; the enemy soldier was slain after a two minute firefight, and his AK-47 and some documents were captured.

(c) On the 8th, at 1155 hours, troops from A-402, Moc Hoa Mike Force, were inserted to check a swampy area at VS 088 907, and they uncovered a small cache. Captured were five rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 60 kilograms of documents and assorted medical supplies.

(c) At WT 1314, a squad sized element initiated fire upon an airboat section which was sweeping the area; the VC were firing from concealment on the river bank; the date of the incident was 22 September, time, 1935 hours, and the contact was reported by B-41. After a 35 minute firefight, the VC ceased firing and withdrew; results were 1 VNSF KIA and 1 USASF; the VC lost 5 KIA and 5 x AK-47s, an unknown type machine gun, and 5 prisoners captured.

(c) On the 30th of September, at 1730 hours, as a section of A-102 airboats was returning to their base at Cao Lanh, a group of the enemy took the last boat in the formation under fire, near VS 77 55; using automatic small arms and light machine guns, a 20 minute firefight ensued, after which, the VC broke contact and withdrew; there were 1 VC killed, and 7 probable kills; there were negative friendly losses.

(c) At 0820 hours on 6 October, a section of airboats from A-102, with 2nd National Police personnel aboard were contacted by two squads of VC, at VS 920 820, using mines and automatic small arms. The airboats made three gun runs, and a Cavalry Packet gave support to the friendly element. Results of the action were 1 USASF wounded, Sp/5 Steven Johnson, 1 USASF also wounded; the enemy lost 1 VC killed and a bunker destroyed.

(c) In another airboat contact on 6 October, at 1010 hours, near a section of the boats from A-401, operating out of Tram Chin contacted an unknown size enemy force at VS 630 725; air cavalry assets made several gun runs to support the airboats. The enemy broke contact and withdrew, and a friendly sweep of the area revealed a cache; friendly casualties.
were an interpreter and 1 HSF wounded and two aircrews damaged by booby traps; the enemy suffered 2 VC KIA and a prisoner seized. The cache was 45 W8x600 7.62, and it contained 5 x 105mm rounds, 4 x 20 kilogram mines, 40 fragmentation devices, 220 grenades, 100 time fuzes, 1 x 2.75mm rocket, 50 pounds of gunpowder, 3 canteens, 15 ponchos and a sleeping platform. A US Navy ROO team was on station and assisted in blowing up the cache.

(C) On the 18th of October, at 1400 hours, SSg Randall KNISELY was killed by drowning, when the CH-47 Chinook he was accompanying received enemy fire and overshot the runway, while attempting to land at Chi Lang, and overturned in an adjacent flooded rice paddy.

(C) On the 27th, 14 CSF troops from A-119, on a patrol near the camp were attacked at 0615 hours by two platoons of VC. Two additional CSF platoons were sent in as reinforcements for the friendly element in contact. That same day, at 1200 hours, a reinforced company of CSF contacted a company of VC at VS 543 069. After an eight hour firefight, the VC broke contact at 1515 hours. Results were 1 CSF killed, 1 wounded, while the enemy lost 16 VC KIA, 1 x light machine gun, 2 x B-40 rockets, 9 x AK-56s, 1 x AK-47 with 30 magazines, 3 belts and 2 shovels captured. The friendly elements went overnight and conducted a first light sweep, but no additional material or personnel were found.

(C) On the 30th, at 1400 hours, a platoon of HSF operating on Nui Giai, together with elements of the 67th Ranger Battalion, on a reconnaissance mission, became engaged in a three hour firefight with an unknown sized enemy force. Friendly troops received support from the artillery at Chi Lang. Results were 3 HSF wounded, while enemy losses remained unknown.

(C) Enemy activity remained at low levels throughout the quarter. Much of the activity was in VC Military Region 3 (Seven Mountains); Kien Hoa, Kien Tuong and Vinh Binh Provinces, comprising the enemy's Military Region 2, were all exceptionally quiet. A ho chi minh revealed that the enemy had almost completed the second phase of a three part plan outlined in OCSO solution #20, aimed at defeating pacification and initiating a country-wide uprising. Other sources noted that the enemy efforts were a costly failure. In Kien Hoa Province, the enemy failure was so severe that the VC/NVA shifted emphasis onto Dinh Tuong Province, in an effort to pool their depleted resources. Personnel losses caused the disbanding of the 502nd VC Local Force Battalion into small, district level groups. Enemy elements were planning a return to parts of MR 4 as part of a recovery effort from the results of the Cambodian operation. Deployment was noted near Ha Tien in Kien Giang Province with the intention, apparently, of movement to the U Minh Forest Base Area. The 27 October contact, about 25 kilometers West of Vinh Gia was probably a result of part of that infiltration effort. In the Seven Mountains, ARVN operations on Nui Cam and Nui Giai drove the enemy out onto Nui Co To; involved was the 18A NVA Regiment. Finally there were reports of resupply movements from the Tram Forest to Nui Ta Bec.

(C) All operations at Co. D terminated as of 30 November 1970; December was spent on phasedown procedures. By 6 December 1970, the S-3 office had backlogged or destroyed all of its files and the shop closed down for all practical purposes on that date.
(C) In the area of training, two medical courses were held at Can Tho and Long Xuyen from 17 August to 17 November, and 31 August to 31 November respectively, graduating a total of 21 CID. A preventive maintenance course was held in Nha Trang for 7 VNSF in two classes, shifts, between 3 August and 30 November 1970. At Can Tho, a six week logistics course for 22 CID was given starting 6 October and a parallel driver's course was given for 12 CID. On 28 October, a drivers test was administered to all indigenous personnel at Can Tho whose duties required driving military vehicles. At A-104, the Cao Lanh Airbase Group conducted a seven day course on operation of airboats and their tactical employment for selected Republic of Korea Armed Forces Personnel; two officers and five NCOs attended the course. An airboat maintenance course for Republic of Korea Marines, of one week's duration, was also held during November. Detachment A-104 USAF airboat personnel acted as instructors for the course.

(C) In the area of aviation, problems still existed with insufficient rotary and fixed wing aircraft assets. Improvements did occur, but only due to decreasing Co. D requirements, owing to phasedown. Air support for Co. D, including advisor aircraft, terminated on 15 November 1970. Air contact with the Group in Nha Trang was retained, with other aircraft flying one mission every other day between Nha Trang and Can Tho.

In the area of Logistics, Opt James D. HOLLAND was the S-4 Officer throughout the quarter, and right down to closeout on 16 December 1970. Perhaps the greatest workload resulting from phasedown fell upon the S-4 section. During November, the backloading and preparation for redeployment of all airboats was accomplished, and the S-4 also had to handle the backloading of equipment as each detachment returned or closed. At the end of September, Cal Cal, A-43J, and Tuyen Nhon, A-415, closed out. At the end of October A-104 at Moc Hoa closed out, and A-432, Thuong Thoi, had to move to Chi Lang, after its seawall collapsed in September 1970. At the close of November, A-413, Binh Thanh Tho, the last EOR III 'A' detachment, and B-41 at Ho-Hoa both closed out, as did Ba Xao, A-414, and Thuong Thoi, A-432; Chi Lang, B-41J, closed out on 1 December, while the camp itself, at Chi Lang, was transferred to Co. A at Bien Hoa.

(C) Three convoys were held by the S-4 between Co. D and B-41J for the purposes of transferring equipment and supplies. The dates of the convoys were 25 November, 2 December, and 6 December, 1970.

(C) Further responsibilities of the S-4 were the backloading of PHXs on vehicle convoy boxes on 2 December, collection of all excess personal and office equipment, accomplished by 1 December, collection of all service vehicles, except for a few essential ones left behind for the emergency use of the company, between 5 and 15 December, assisting with medical and emergency supplies backloading and transfer to the Ranger program, clearing of the maintenance yard and motor pool, accomplished on 9 December, the transfer of CID equipment to Co. A, Bien Hoa, and finally, the signing over of equipment and the compound itself to the AWF Rangers and their advisors, scheduled for 4 December 1970. It is to the credit of the S-4 officers and the staff that this complicated and lengthy task has been accomplished efficiently and with a minimum of inconvenience to the remaining CID personnel.

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In other elements of the S-4 operation, support for the final units of the Solid Anchor Operation terminated on 6 September, when USASF ceased operations with the US Navy.

The maintenance facility ceased its training of new personnel because of phasedown, and the yard itself closed down on 9 December 1970.PD-4's Technical Representatives were reassigned over a period of a week to their agency in Nha Trang. During the final quarter of its operation, maintenance reduced deadlines to zero in several areas, and decreased the percentages in all other areas. Air conditioners were the item with the greatest savings—70%, and this is a good indicator of the efficiency of the maintenance personnel and their operation.

Local Class III service was provided by the 228th Service and Support Company, whose efforts on behalf of Co. D were outstanding. Local Class I support (ammunition) was provided by the 54th Ammunition Base Depot, An Nhun, which operated in all areas save .50 calibre ammunition, which had to be procured from the LSC.

The Engineer Section, with Cpt Richard VAN ALLEN right through November, and Cpt John A. VALERSKY, from November to closeout, was yet another section which saw a great amount of work during the last quarter and closeout.

During the quarter, six projects were completed: E-437's demilitarized wire, A-413's barracks, A-414's dependent housing and bunkers, A-421's bunker capping and tear house, and A-431's helipad. Three other projects were completed by camp conversion by the defensive bunkers at A-404, Line bunkers at A-413, and an ammunition bunker at A-421. Post Engineer at Cam Tho laid down plans and assisted in backhauling of supply equipment and utility items to Nha Trang. The Engineer personnel also were continually of great assistance to rotating personnel, whose whole engagement they created for shipment.

Several documents exist for the Engineer Section, and these give an excellent account of the activities conducted during the quarter. The Tamong Thoi seawall file stands out as the largest, most extensive work.

Dated 3 August 1970, was an update of A-415's, Tuyen Nhon, project, chiefly the airfield extension. The work was performed by the 213th Engineer Detachment, but progress was slow, owing to weather and soil stabilization problems. Co. D's Engineer Section worked on the helipad. Bunkers on the perimeter wall were also under construction. Concrete blocks were being poured at the camp, at a rate of 200 per day, and a burnout latrine was under construction, and had been 90% completed as of 1 August 1970.

A Ba Xoi report, dated 3 August 1970, revealed that bunkers were being capped, the dispensary was being hardened, and an ammunition bunker and 105mm howitzer pad were under construction. Certain materials were reported in short supply, chiefly cement, rebar, and engineer stakes. 3rd Lite (D-9-41), offered to supply the cement as soon as transport aircraft became available. Footers for the ammunition bunkers were laid out August 10-12, by Lt ROHRY.

As of 7 August, four wooden tent frames at Sea Float had been taken down.

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plated. Ssg MARLOW was in charge of the project, and only 2" by 4" boards were lacking. The US Navy provided six 55-gallon drums for use as support pillars. The 2" by 4" boards were placed on line to Sea Float at 1000 hours 7 August, and the project was scheduled for completion on 16 August.

(c) An 11 August 1970 update from Gai Cai, revealed that the berm was under construction, and eleven bunkers were planned, using hollow concrete blocks. 105mm howitzer positions, 81mm mortar pits and a few bunkers remained to be capped; of the other work, one wall of the berm was complete, and the others were underway; materials used were PSP, cut barrels and engineer stakes.

(c) On 12 August, Maj SCHELFAK, Staff Engineer of Group, Lt COL, Commander of the 31st Engineer Detachment, and Capt G F. ALLEN, Co. D Staff Engineer, conducted a staff visit to A-l15, A-l13, A-l14, A-l32, and B-l13; the following notes were made about the camps visited:

A) A-l15, Tuyen Nhon-The cement block making machine was not fully operable because of cement caked on its inner surfaces; it was also recommended that the motor be cleaned.

B) A-l13, Binh Thanh Thon- Construction on the wall and fighting bunkers was continuing. A motor was being awaited from A-l15 to assist with the projects at camp, and additional materials were placed on line, along with a carpenter.

C) A-l14, Thanh Tri- Sfc BOOKER was in charge of the dependent housing project, and work was progressing very well at that location, with all needed materials already placed on line at Co. D. Rope nets, for air shipment were the chief item in shortage.

D) A-l31, Gai Cai- The fighting bunkers and berm construction were underway here, and the detachment was requested to backload its ordnance, which was no longer being utilized at the camp.

E) B-l1, Moc Hoa- This camp was found to have completed all of its planned construction, and the general state of the compound was excellent.

F) A-l32, Thuong Thoi- The seawall at this camp was the Engineer Section's largest outstanding problem. After extensive erosion by the Hekong River, the wall had started to completely collapse on 13 September 1970. In addition to the comments of the visiting party, there exists a large and comprehensive document from the Engineer files, which gives a complete history of the seawall problem, from the first signs of trouble in 1969, to its final abandonment.

(c) The first document in the file is dated 26 June 1969, and it concerns a request to hire 100 civilian labourers for the purpose of constructing a sandbag supplement on the South Berm of the camp, bordering the Hekong River. The request was approved on 11 July 1969, and $2,200 were allotted for the construction of an erosion revetment.

(c) On 1 October 1969, Co. D gave approval for the installation of a special purpose US Navy Van to reinforce the unstable shoreline undermining Thuong Thoi's berm. On the 9th of November, the 35th Engineer Battalion
used a bulldozer placed at the edge of the berm's base in order to unload a front loader off a barge on the Mekong. During the unloading procedure, a portion of the berm had to be cut away in order to unload and accommodate the bulldozer itself. The following day, a major failure occurred in the part of the berm facing the proposed site for the placement of the US Navy Van. On the 12th of November, a meeting was held between Co. D representatives and the 35th Engineers Battalion, in order to discuss the installation of the van. It was concluded that the berm collapse of 10 November was probably caused by the unloading of the bulldozer, the winch operation to raise the front loader, and by the cutting away of a section of the berm to accommodate the bulldozer. It was further concluded that this initial failure would hasten the deterioration of the rest of the berm and the shoreline as well. Finally, it was realized that the expedients being employed by the USASF were, at best, only slowing the erosion process, but not solving it. A brief glance at the configuration of the river will reveal the probable source of the original problem. Delta geologic formations are inherently unstable, since they consist primarily of river-borne silt. Their flat nature and uniform soft texture causes rivers flowing through them to meander widely, depending upon which way the river current is cutting at any given time. The speed of the current, volume of water and shoreline vegetation are other factors which may have an effect on the rate of erosion.

Camp Thuong Thai lay at the location of a bend in the Mekong, vaguely an 'S' shaped curve, with an island at the center of the river. Thus the current of the river, deflected by the first portion of the 'S' bend, crosses over, and further directed by the island, which in fact it formed by erosion and deposition, it undercut further into the bank in its path. A diagram will illustrate the situation.

NOTE: The arrows denote the path of the river current, the dark, shaded portion of the sketch represents those parts of the river bank most vulnerable to erosion. The hatched part represents the island in mid-stream.

Thuong Thai was located in a position corresponding to one of the shaded areas on the diagram, and so the erosion problem was aggravated by the camp's very location.

(C) At the meeting, the representatives suggested the installation of a sheet pile revetment as the only long term solution. On 18 November,
personnel from the Staff Engineer reached the same conclusion as the meeting of the 12th had arrived at, namely, that the removal of earth to accommodate the bulldozer was instrumental in the collapse of part of the berm on 30 November. On the 19th of November, the Commander of the 55th Engineer Battalion visited the site, inspected the damage, and assumed responsibility for the collapse, but the Commander of the 20th Engineer Brigade overruled him and stated that the bulldozer and the removal of the earth weren't the sole causes of the failure. The 35th Engineers then agreed to draw up plans for a revetment, but Maj. SCOTT, the 5th Group Staff Engineer, insisted that 5th Group should not be involved financially in the matter of the revetment.

(c) On the 10th of December, Co. D requested engineer support from the Commanding General of MAC to repair the seawall. The request was accepted, and 34th Engineers were assigned the task. (Note: The staff visit of the 13th of November agreed that the river was one of the culprits in the failure, but also stated that the bulldozer and earth removal were aggravating factors.) A letter from Lt Col. PETERS, Commander of Co. D, clarifies some of the controversy of who was culpable for the failure of 10 November. The letter noted that on 1 October, when approval to install the US Navy Van was given, it was stipulated that, since the shoreline was naturally unstable, it would require reinforcing prior to installing the van. Due to the 'gravity of the situation,' it was concluded that the berm and revetment would have to be repaired and installed before the next rainy season and inundation.

(c) On 11 December 1969, Maj KING, S-3 of the 34th Engineers called Capt WISE, Co. D Engineer, and informed him that the 34th Engineers would repair the whole berm. He proposed that temporary repairs (pushing back the berm and placing sandbags) be effected immediately, and permanent repairs follow later. Capt WISE agreed to this timetable.

(c) The next correspondence on the matter is dated 11 March 1970. Col. STEELING, Commander of the 34th Engineers, stated that a contract for soils analysis had been made, and that the final remedy would depend on the outcome of the tests. Plans were still in effect to initiate the permanent repairs around 1 June. The slippage of the berm, meanwhile, continued, causing a loss of 75-100 meters of earth. With the increasing angle of repose of the bank, as the river level fell, the slippage became more aggravated. The firing of heavy weapons added to the problem through vibrations. It was concluded that an early rise in the river in the Spring would very likely inundate the camp.

(c) On 23 March, a study of the river was made, to determine when the rise in the water level could be expected to start, and when it would reach its climax.

(c) The heavy rain season starts in May, but the river's rise is delayed until September and October when the flood waters have accumulated. The Mekong also receives water from the mountain watersheds in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia, where the monsoon rains are even heavier than in Vietnam. The result is an accumulated flood, which descends on Vietnam's delta, raising water levels four or more meters.
(C) Current patterns in the Mekong and the Bassac Rivers are very sketchily known, but it is recognized that seasonal changes in the water level, volume, and tides affect the current. It is also known that in waterways connecting the Mekong and the Bassac, the flow is always towards the Bassac. The pattern of flooding is a slow rise in June, accelerated in July, and peaking out in September-October. Thus, if the problem of the berm was early resolved, by mid July, the further rise of the river wouldn't necessarily affect the camp.

(C) On 16 May 1970, a civilian engineering team started a five day study and soil analysis to determine what stresses the river bank could sustain. (Results of the study are not entered in the file.) On the 26th, a pile driver rig from the 523rd Port Construction Company arrived and drove a test pile at the site of the proposed revetment. After the initial tests, the barge was relocated to await further work, but on 31 May, both anchors used to maneuver the barge were lost in mid-river, and until their recovery was completed, work shifted to welding together a backload of piling sections. The anchors were recovered by sea divers on 2 June, and the setting of the piles was initiated. On 6 June an interim survey concluded that the framing piles would be completely emplaced by 9 June. Phase II, construction of the seawall frame was targeted for 9 September, and soil fill operations would occur simultaneously with the work of phase II. Drag lines would be used to dredge up soil from the river, and barge fill will also be delivered. The availability of equipment, serviceability and rate of river rise were the factors which could be expected to affect the work progress. As of 8 June, neither the dragline nor the clamshell was on station, but a 40 ton pile driver was expected on site, as soon as a project at Vinh Long was completed. The arrival of the second pile driver was expected to hasten the work. (A letter of 28 June reveals that the original rig at Thuong Thoi was 80 years old.) Maj. KING, 34th Engineers S-3 Officer, stated that owing to higher priority items, the 40 ton pile driver had to be diverted to Yung Tau and would not be available for another two weeks. He further stated that once the 40 ton pile driver became available, the older rig would be removed.

(C) On the 4th of July, another letter on the berm project was sent, stating that priorities for the project would have to be raised, if the camp were to be saved. The job was 65% complete as of 4 July; it was felt that work could be speeded up if the 40 ton rig and the present one were allotted to the project, and the clamshell and dragline were brought to Thuong Thoi at once. Lt Col BASHORE requested that the priorities of the project be raised, owing to the rise of the river. On 8 July, an RTT message was sent to Group, to the effect that Thuong Thoi would be indefensible in three weeks because of the deterioration the flood waters were causing. Once higher priority was requested for the project, The MAC engineer agreed that the situation was critical, and he promised to exert influence to achieve completion of the project by 31 July 1970. This came as a result of a visit Lt UNDERKOFLER, Cpt ANDERSON, the assistant IMAC Engineer, and Cpt McCLOY, the S-3 Officer of 34th Engineers made to the camp on the 10th of July. The inspection of the berm revealed that had collapsed to within 12 feet of several buildings, and numerous cracks extended from the berm into the compound. Half of the corner bunker on the west perimeter was already hanging over the water, owing to erosion. Six feet of soil had disappeared in the course of a week, and, in another week,
The water level rose two feet. The barbed wire was calculated to be another two weeks, after which water would flood the camp, and, according to Capt. Earl Mackin, the camp would be 90% ineffective. The ancient pile driver was experiencing breakdowns every two or three days, and it was dangerously weak, requiring up to 300 blows to sink a pile one inch. Lt. Underkoffer relayed news of the critical state of affairs to his commander at IMAG. The Commanding General at IMAG sent a message to the 34th Engineers, ordering equipment and personnel to Thuong Thoi as soon as possible. Lt. Underkoffer recommended that single-tier sheet piling be driven at points where the current was doing its severest erosion, and he also repeated the earlier requests to use the two pile drivers together. Further, Co. D was urged to move a front loader and two dump trucks from Ba Xoai to Thuong Thoi, to help construct a supplemental berm; sandbags and water pumps were also suggested.

(c) In a memorandum dated 11 July, all of Lt. Underkoffer's recommendations were implemented by the Engineers, and Ba Xoai agreed to send the trucks and front loader on 12 July. 18,000 sandbags were also scheduled to arrive on the 14th, and 910 funds were authorized to hire civilian labor. A problem arose, in that Col. Sterling refused to accept responsibility for putting backfill behind the seawall, even though Co. understood, under the earlier agreement, that 34th Engineers would complete the whole project. Backfill could not be brought in prior to the berm's completion, because the river simply eroded the soil. Further, existing parts of the berm which were to be used as fill, once the seawall was complete, had in the meantime washed away, so that now, the clamshell and external soil source became essential. 2nd Group did not have the equipment for so large a task, and it was recommended that 34th Engineers be tasked with the backfill job as well.

(c) On 12 July, proposed sites as sources of soil fill were surveyed, and an ideal site was located upriver at WS 312 958. There were no civilians living upriver, no cultivation going on, and the river was not threatening the area. Further the soil at the selected site was light and sandy, ideal as fill. A barge would be used to transport the fill to Thuong Thoi, using a winch ashore, or else a tug. Backfill operations were delayed until two tiers of piling were emplaced, as a single tier could not sustain the weight of the fill. Two square kilometers of the fill sites would be excavated, and coordination was initiated with District and Province officials for permission to undertake excavation.

(c) On 19 July 1970, Lt. Col. Bashore and Lt. Underkoffer visited the site and found all work had halted, as the pile driver was again inoperative; further, the winch cable for the barge had snapped, and the 2-7 bulldozers had to serve as makeshift anchors. The second rig was on site, but it needed an ocean-going tug to shift its barge into position. Already, nine days waiting had elapsed for the tug, even though a request to the Transportation Movement Authority had been submitted. An additional 12,000 sandbags were requested, and the X3 team was assigned to construct a new road from the North corner of the compound to areas adjacent to the airfield, to erect supplemental berm of sandbags and fill at a distance from the seawall. Communications with the going tug's dispatchers revealed that the tug had arrived three days earlier and moved the wrong barge. Another tug was scheduled to arrive on 20 July.

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(c) Capt Steven J. DEVER, assistant Staff Engineer visited Thoong Thoi on 23 July 1970: he was accompanied by Maj SCHLAPAK and Capt Wise of the 31st Engineer Detachment at Group; the visiting party inspected the camp to view progress on the seawall. No work had been accomplished since the previous visit. On 16 July, Capt MacMILLIN, the Senior advisor at A-132, reported that the coming tug had removed the pile driver #1890 and had taken it to Vung Tau. Back in Can Tho, the S-3 officer of the 31th Engineers, Maj JOHNSTON, stated that the had orders not to depart Thoong Thoi until the 40 ton pile driver was in place. A message was forwarded to Capt MacMILLIN to the effect that he should order the tug to return. On the 23rd, Capt MacMILLIN revealed that the tug had departed on 22 July, 1500 hours, and had not yet returned, but the 10 ton rig was still not in place. Maj JOHNSTON was paid a visit, and he promised to submit a new request on 26 August. On 24 August, and stated that the tug ought to arrive at Thoong Thoi the next day. The tug did arrive on the morning of the 26th and after the skipper briefly appraised the situation, he stated, "No can do, river too fast, barge too heavy," and promptly, he departed. Thus fifteen days were wasted with the rig in mid-river and no work done on the seawall for eighteen days. Once again the 31th Engineers were approached and asked, this time for two ocean-going tugs; the Engineers agreed, and another TCGMD was submitted, to Saigon, J-4.

(ii) Several documents are evidently missing from the Thoong Thoi file, as the next date entered is 8 September, and the dilemma of the movement of the barge remains unanswered. A parallel document, however, a short summary of events, reveals that on 31 July 1970, a request was filed with the Province Chief for an excavation permit for soil fill. On the 5th of August, Co. U's Engineer requested certain information about the river, including difference of the river elevation between high and low tides, the maximum velocity of the open river current, and the velocity of the current between the seawall and the barge, and also the difference between the lowest point on the supplemental berm and the maximum height of the river at high tide; the information was requested on a daily basis.

(c) On 14 August, the backfill operation was reported as 93% complete, and the seawall was 10.5% complete, with the work temporarily halted owing to needed repairs on equipment.

(c) From the next entry, we learn that on 8 September, two breaks occurred in the West berm, and a portion of the South berm collapsed, and forced out about 20 feet of sheet piling revetment. A bulldozer was employed to anchor the displaced piling. The river, meanwhile, undermined and forced out 50 feet of single-tier sheet piling on 13 September, and about 70 feet of the 12 foot berm was washed away; the berm from the seawall to the East was threatening collapse, and water was seeping in under its base. Sandbags were put up, and a sea barge was moved in to plug the hole in the berm; the barge, as it was demonstrated, had the additional benefit of slowing the river current at the point where it lay, and so protected a small part of the wall.

(c) On the 14th of September, a diver descended to check the state of the revetment, at its base; his examination revealed that a cave-like hole had been eroded at the base of the berm, 5 feet wide by five feet deep, and growing larger by the hour. When the revetment was originally driven in, there was a seven foot space between its top and the silt at its base on the landward side, and an eight foot space on the riverward side. The diver took the revetment and found that the space was now 20 feet. What was occurring was still too clear; the current, unable to cut into the revetment, was cutting down into the
the river bed, until it had undermined the base of the revetment and caused cutting the bank. The revetment, its riverward support and sandbag, had simply collapsed outward, due to the pressure of the soil fill behind it. The river had cut away 12 feet of its bed undercuts the revetment and the seawall was defeated. That the results were not foreseen is surprising; for a cutting current will, if thwarted from the sides, cut down into its own bed, if that bed is soft material, until it undercuts the obstacles; or its cutting force is relieved by the deepening of the channel. Clearly, in this case, with a silt river bottom, the current was able to undercut the revetment prior to having its cutting strength dissipated by a deepened channel.

(c) Starting 11 September, the Engineers attempted to delay the final collapse with sandbags, but the detachment personnel started to evacuate to higher ground.

(c) On 15 September, the 34th Engineers resolved to preserve the base by driving in additional piles to save the original revetment from crumbling down into the river under the weight of the fill. They also continued to sandbag the base, in an effort to keep leaks at a minimum. Lt Col GONZALEZ, the DMAC Engineer, concluded that the river could not be contained with the equipment at hand, and that the most expedient course was to move the camp to a new, higher location and the sheet pile revetment be pulled out to salvage it. Maj JOHNSTON concurred with this opinion.

(c) The wall and base continued to collapse, and on 16 September 1970, water surged into the camp as the river crested. The Engineers concluded that without a firmer and more extensive salvage program, the camp was beyond saving. At 1700 hours on the 16th, DMAC gave orders to evacuate the camp because total inundation was imminent. One to two Platoons were to remain on the site, to secure it until EF/FF troops could arrive and cover the area. Camp A-432 was relocated to Chi Lang, and its AN/TPS 25 radar system was moved to Tuyen Nhon.

(c) It became evident in the final stages of the Thoong Thiien base collapse, that the location of the camp could have been better chosen. The camp lay in a zone of natural erosion for the Mekong, and its permanent safety could only have been insured by a massive solidifying of the riverbank and its underlying sediments. This apparently had not been realized in the original geologic survey of the camp's location; or else, the camp's existence was not envisioned on a long-term basis. Even after the trouble was underway with the seawall, the 34th Engineers seemed not to realize that there was a losing struggle against the river, with the equipment and material allotted to the task. Only in the course of the final days, in September, was it realized that the case was a hopeless one. The river, no doubt, had been undercutting the bank during previous years, but it only became serious for the camp's existence with the floods of 1972 and 1976. It is unfortunate that earlier records on the erosion of the river at the site do not exist, for they would have revealed the trend quite early; however, as was noted earlier, current charts for the Mekong were sketchy at best. Nonetheless, familiarity with riverine delta geology should have alerted the camp designers to the possible dangers of the site. In the light of this, the collapse caused by the bulldozer and the sandbagging operation were but secondary factors which hastened a natural geologic process.
In the PULWAR Section, Capt John D. MCIFFEE held the position of Public Officer until the section's closeout. According to the directive of Group S-5 at the Nha Trang PULWAR conference held 7-8 August, 1970, B-43 services would be gradually turned over to VCSP counterparts between 5-30 September. Co. D and its detachments complied with this directive, taking on a more of a monitoring role as time passed. About 21 September, the 5th detachment at Co Tho was emptied, and its contents were shipped to the detachment or else backloaded. B-41 S-5 converted its operations to a support U. Navy Beachjumper-VCSP Sector-H&N PULWAR operation, the conversion went smoothly, and the new group functioned efficiently. At B-43, the S-5 remained to monitor activities until 30 November, but S-5 participation was wound up about 8 October when the S-5 NOCIG at B-43, Sp/5 Alexander DEREKCH returned to Co Tho; Lt DEESELEI remained at B-43 to monitor the conversion section. Co. D S-5 halted all operations as of 1 October, and only the remaining detachments continued to submit reports on activity. By 1 November the S-5 had ceased all operations and its personnel assumed the writing of the Co. D history.

During the last quarter of operation, leaflet dissemination was at about 7.5 million, about equally divided between the two BOCs. This increase was brought about because of Beachjumper assistance, new, full time S-5 personnel at the '31' teams and a briefer increased availability of aircraft. The S-5 was the most frequently utilized asset. At the very end of the quarter, about 25 October, in BOCR III, the AATN Sector S-5 started providing VB helicopters for PSYOPS missions.

BOCR III (B-43) conducted a joint PSYOPS operation with the US Sector and the US Navy 511th PBUs at Phuoc Xuyen. Support for the operation came from the 10th PSYOPS Battalion in Can Tho, which provided two preplanned tactical dissemination missions on 4 and 5 September, along the Grand Canal in Kien Ngoo Province. The mission of the operation was to assist the US Navy at Phuoc Xuyen initiate a PSYOPS program, and the operations consisted of three leaflets held in villages along the waterways. Broadcasts and leaflet dissemination accompanied the leaflets. The B-41 S-5 NOCIG, Sp/5 Franklin B. MERRITT of Sector S-5 and B-43's S-5 interpreter represented BOCR III, and the US NAVY provided a medic. Mr. MARTIN, the 511th PBU's Executive Officer, was instrumental in coordinating the operation and he accompanied one of the leaflets also. The USASF provided commodities used during the operation as well as some of the more common medicines, while the Navy provided tetanus shots and the medic supplied some of the rarer medicines and also gave his services to the operation. The operation was quite successful, and one of the effects was the unmasking of two civilian employees at the Naval base who were passing information to the VC; about a week after the operation, seven boi of the victims from the area of the operation, and one proved to be a close associate of the Tan Lap Village VC chief; the latter was thus compromised, and shortly afterward, the National Police picked him up.

Regular operations in both BOCs included close cooperation with the Navy's 532nd PBUs, whose commander, Mr. KELLEHER, showed great enthusiasm for the S-5 program; he also provided great assistance in providing two operations for the operations and also in obtaining the services of the Navy medics in one of the leaflets which were run. Intelligence gathering was made a prime mission, medics, and the results were very favorable. Medics after dark and had great success with the farmers, who in daylight hours were out in the fields and were in a position to observe the VC, could be reached, and they pre-
vided much valuable information.

(C) The Phung Hoang program for eliminating VCI was also stressed. USASF personnel worked closely with the Province Phung Hoang personnel, assisting them by distributing literature to the villagers and also by monitoring the response to the program among the people.

(C) At Co. D, bi-monthly hospital visits to the wounded CIDG at the 3rd Surgical Hospital CIDG wards continued. A special event was the September 15 Autumn Festival for Children, when special gifts were distributed to all the dependent children and the other children as well. The VNSF commander at C-l Col. TAT, started a commendable program—the holding of an award ceremony for the wounded CIDG who were to receive medals, right in the hospital. This practice served as a tremendous boost to morale for the troops who had been wounded, and also illustrated concern on the part of the VNSF command for those who had performed valorously.

(C) The Motivation and Indoctrination program was a particular area of emphasis as Co. D's detachments closed out or converted. Group S-5 sent special material to assist the conversion teams in clarifying to the CIDG what exactly was involved in the Ranger Program; changes in pay, benefits, and rank structure were carefully explained. The 10th Psyops Mattalion assisted by printing special posters in Vietnamese and Cambodian to explain the changes for the CIDG and to provide them with a ready reference. Some problems arose, especially in BOR 1, when province and district officials, and also the VNSF showed apathy toward the program. One abuse that was noted was the selling of documents which were required by the conversion process by the VNSF and some officials. Services which the S-5 personnel found normally cost 5-15$ VN were being 'sold' to the CIDG for 500-2,000$ VN. Group S-5 launched an investigation into the matter, but as of the date of the writing of this history, results were not known.

(C) In the area of Civic Action/Social Welfare, B-43 sponsored a rice distribution program for many of the refugees in their TAOR, and both BORs distributed health items, clothing, medicines and school supplies to the villagers and their children. Assistance was also given to the hospitals and orphanages in Can Tho and Moc Hoa. After the Thuong Thoi seawall collapsed, B-43's S-5 assisted in the evacuation of the CIDG and their families and upon the evacuees arrival in Chi Lang, shelter, food and clothing were provided for them. Finally, during this quarter, the 'A' detachments completed construction projects for CIDG and dependent housing and also lent assistance in repairing roadways and buildings in villages.

(C) Two documents casting light on conversion proceedings and problems exist; one is an ORLL dated 20 October 1970, from B-41, the other, a letter of instruction for the transfer of USASF real property.

(C) At Moc Hoa, B-41, it was noted that during the rainy season the best mode of operation was to employ airboats in coordination with air cavalry units and gunships. An LCH searches for targets, and airboats and the air cavalry react to the findings. It was noted in the course of operations, that the enemy
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frequently returned to the scene of the battle to recover personnel and weapons which were lost; this was viewed as a practice exploitable tactically and by Psyops.

(C) Detachment A-402, the BCGR III MSF, requested two riggers for the duration of their conversion cycle. The relative briefness of the backloading period and the large workload placed a great burden on the small number of regular detachment personnel, and these personnel, moreover, often were not trained in shipping procedures.

(C) Detachment A-413 reported that it found the Starlight Scope excellent for determining kills after an operation. Without the scope a sweep was required to determine the number of killed.

(C) B-43 found that awards lose their incentive and morale value because of the excessively long period required to process them. Recognition for outstanding performance loses its meaning when the granting of the award is overly delayed.

(C) Air assets were found to be in very short availability throughout the quarter. Bird-dog aircraft were withdrawn, and the NHKT was often diverted to Sector/MACV or other units. The Seven Mountains Region, which allied forces had almost entirely recovered, after long and bitter struggles, often involving cave to cave fighting, cannot be held without air support, and so long as those mountains are vulnerable to enemy occupation, pacification of the Western Delta is impossible, as the mountains are a key link in the infiltration chain extending from Cambodia to the U Minh Forest. Reconnaissance, utilizing electronic and mechanical ambushes and detection devices was excellent, but without air assets, timely exploitation of the detections was impossible.

(C) Finally, as the conversion proceeded, the theft of government property reached severe proportions; A-402 suffered especially badly, to such an extent, that several firefight nearly erupted between guards and MSF troops who were attempting to steal POL supplies. Due to the severity and dangers of the situation, B-43 was considering employing mechanical anti-theft devices, or even booby traps to foil the would-be thieves.

(C) According to the property transfer letter, dated 2 September 1970, the Cao Lanh TCP facility, which was held by the USASF on a tenant basis from MACV team 84, would be converted to the Rangers when all operations terminated there, on 31 October 1970. The airboat facility, also at Cao Lanh, with 90 airboats, was scheduled for inactivation on 30 November 1970, but the backloading of the boats was to start on 15 October, and all combat operations would be halted 31 October. The airboats were to be transported to Binh Thuy for shipment by 6 November; the actual completion of the move was accomplished by 8 November, and as of 15 November, the Cao Lanh camp was ready to convert. A Ranger battalion was scheduled to move into the facility.
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(C) Detachment A-402 was inactivated on 30 September 1970; one of it's MSF companies was reassigned to Camp Thanh Tri, already a Ranger unit, to bring it up to assigned strength. The other two MSF companies were planned for integration into other border camps, and the MSF compound was turned over to the Rangers.

(C) Chi Lang, B-43, was scheduled for deactivation on 30 November 1970, with all support facilities due to terminate on 15 November. USASF personnel strength dropped to a 12 man advisory limit. Chi Lang's compound, which possesses excellent command post facilities, was scheduled for conversion to a Ranger Mobile Battalion.

(C) Moc Hoa, B-41, terminated it's command and control functions on 1 October 1970, and, on the 31st of October, all remaining USASF personnel departed the camp, and the Rangers took control. The B-18 VNSF, who were B-41's counterparts, planned to remain in the camp until 30 November.

(C) The C-4 Can Tho compound was scheduled to become the Ranger Headquarters and Command Post; this camp's location, near a major airfield, renders it an ideal facility for logistics, transportation and helicopter support. December 31 was scheduled as C-4's conversion date, but a subsequent order from Group Headquarters advanced the closeout date to 15 December.

(C) Personnel section, S-1, was commanded by Cpt Dwight SUMMI, Cpt John A. McAFEE and Cpt John A. BURGH between August 1970 and closeout. Personnel strengths for Co. D were as follows for the periods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) There were no critical shortages at Co. D as the phaseout eliminated many positions. Losses owing to hostile action were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) In the area of maintenance of law and order, five Article 15's were issued, but no court martials were given during the final four months of Co. D's existence. Morale remained excellent during the period due to careful attention paid to personnel services. Rest and Recuper-ation leave utilization was 100% from August 1970 to closeout. The sole problem remained the receipt of rotation orders, which continued to arrive late, causing hardship for departing personnel.
(c) S-1 Personnel, had one of the more difficult tasks with the close-operation, and the smoothness and timeliness of the conversion is much to the credit of the Adjutant and his staff; Sgt BARNES, who held the position of Administrative NONIC since 1968, and his assistant, Sgt SMITH, along with the two Vietnamese assistants helped the day to day matters of the S-1 to go smoothly.

(c) Late in November, the S-1 staff drew up a suspense date schedule for the whole company; as this schedule deals with the final aspects of conversion, we will examine it here. On the 5th of December, the S-1 office coordinated with Binh Thuy Finance for the withdrawal of Co. D's finance records. Also on the 5th, the Headquarters Commandant held a closeout party at the Alamo NCO Lounge for all members of Co. D and the Filipino Technician Staff, and on the 8th, the club closed for business. As of 8 December, the Mess Hall was closed to all non-USASF personnel. The removal of all of Co. D's air conditioners was coordinated between the Headquarters Commandant and the Engineers, and the job was accomplished on 7 December. By 8 December, all staff files were due in at the S-1 office for review and shipment to the S-1 Records Holding Section at Nha Trang. This task, however, was nearly complete by 6 December, thanks to outstanding cooperation from all the Staff sections. On the 10th, all personnel action, except that of an emergency nature, came to a close. Nha Trang was also contacted and given a list of personnel who would require air transportation from Can Tho to Nha Trang. The 10th was also the last day of operations for the S-1 messhall for the remainder of Co. D's stay at Can Tho; personnel took their meals at the 307th Aviation Battalion messhall. Co. D staffs were also closed to all transient personnel, and Chi Lang and Co. A were notified accordingly. On the 12th of December, Funds and S-1 terminated all civilian employees, except for Miss Nguyen Thi HIEU, who kept through the 15th for any emergency secretarial work. Also on the 12th, all units acquiring Co.D property were required to sign for it by the close of business; the unit mailroom also filed locator cards with the APC for all Co. D personnel. A terminal audit was scheduled for 13 December by the Headquarters Commandant, and on the 14th, Col HEALY, the Group Commander was scheduled to arrive for closeout and award ceremonies the following day. It was learned on the 14th that Col HEALY's arrival had been delayed until the 16th, and the final ceremonies were held that afternoon at 1400 hours. The company compound was then turned over to the Rangers, and the VNSF provided transportation for the entire company to Binh Thuy airfield where a USAF C-130 aircraft picked up the personnel and their baggage at 1800 hours. At about 1915 hours, the company arrived at Nha Trang, where an advance party form the S-1 and Engineers had arranged for billeting and transportation.

(c) An administrative section functioned at Nha Trang until 28 December 1970 to take care of all final business for the company. On that date, Maj JOCZIK departed Co. D, and all personnel proceeded to new duty assignments.

(c) During September 1970, it was learned that 5th Group required a history of Co. D, which was to be submitted before closeout. Capt DOBSON, of the 21st MHD, the Group Historian, arrived at Co. D in early...
also the SSB RTT system, which added depth to the whole communications system. All communications equipment was safely backloaded from the converting camps and also from Camp Thuong Thoi, which had to be evacuated due to flooding.

(C) During September, all O5B and O5C operators received a class on safeguarding defense information, using AR 380-5 as a textbook. The class trained all communications personnel in the techniques of down-grading, identifying, classifying and desposing of sensitive documents.

(C) One new concept which proved to be a valuable asset was the new high frequency F.M. Gain Antenna, AS 2236/GRO.; in usage, it proved to be highly directional and it also increased transmission range, so that even communications to B-43 Chi Lang were clear. At B-43, however, the old RG 292 Antenna, which was incapable of broadcasting between Chi Lang and Can Tho, was still in use.

(C) The Comptroller's Office was under the command of Cpt Franklin J. McGlynn, until he assumed the Executive Officer's position, at which point 1st Lt. Frank Fundenberg took control. During the quarter, five 'A' detachments were converted; this raised several problems, one of which was an excessively large number of CID: coming directly to the Funds office instead of to the VNSF S-1 to solve their problems. To halt this practice, the CID: were required to come to Funds with a slip of paper referring them from the VNSF S-1. Both sections benefitted, as the VNSF S-1 became better acquainted with its functions, and USASF Funds lost an unnecessary part of its workload.

(C) Civilian workers re-employment encountered considerable difficulties, as many U.S. agencies and units in Can Tho were simultaneously cutting back on operations and personnel. Efforts were made to re-locate the best personnel in other USASF units.

(C) Funds continued to operate at the conversion exchange rate of 116$ VN - $1 U.S., in spite of the change for U.S. Military personnel to a rate of 275$ VN - $1 U.S. Expenditures for the quarter were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>42,580,940 $ VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>34,635,832 $ VN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>28,000,000 $ VN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) Conversion functions for Funds and Signal Sections were as follows:

(C) On 3 December, all civilian employees were notified of their termination of service date, which was scheduled for 12 December for most personnel and 14 December for a selected few essential personnel. All old Funds reports were surveyed and destroyed on 5 December, and files for backloading to Group were submitted to the S-1.

(C) On 6 December, the Signal Maintenance facility ceased all operations, and on 8 December, the VHF circuits to Nha Trang were closed.
October to supervise the start of the project; Sp/5 Franklin J. YUACO and Sp/5 Kenneth LECKIE were selected for the task, and the S-5 office became the operation's facility; the History personnel also secured the most valuable assistance of the former S-5 secretary, Miss Nguyen Thi Hien. The requirements were a bibliography of Co. D's documents and a narrative of the Company history in MR 4. The lack of historical surveys of previous years made the job longer than would be expected. Cpt KALLAUR and Sfc DURHAM were also sent by the Group Historian to interview all personnel who had served two or more tours in Vietnam, and who might cast valuable light on the history of the earlier years, the records of which were destroyed or backloaded. During November and December, this team visited Co. D and all its subordinate detachments, and the interviews were taped. Several valuable interviews were obtained, and this history used the comments of several persons to assist in illuminating the history of the years 1962-1967.

(C) Cpt Harold HOOKMAN and Cpt Timothy COLLARD were the Co. D Staff Surgeons during the final quarter and closeout. Medical Supply was controlled by Capt BOST, and the dispensary NCOIC was Sfc JOHNSON, with Sgt DEES and Sp/4 LIMAMATA as assistants. Anderson Clinic closed all operations on 1 December, and the Airfield Dispensary at Can Tho was utilized for sick call until the company's departure. On 2 December, all medical and dental records were drawn from the medical facility. On the 6th, the transfer or backloading of all medical and dispensary supplies was completed, and on the 8th, the Medical Supply facility closed.

(C) The CIDG medical facility, at the 3rd Surgical Hospital at Binh Thuy, ceased operations on 20 November 1970. The remaining patients were transferred to the Phong Dien Province Hospital. All the assets at the hospital were turned back over to the 3rd Surgical Hospital. A final inventory of medical and equipment was also carried out prior to backloading. In the course of the final quarter, only an average of 20 inpatients were in the facility, and hence, one ward was returned to the 3rd Surgical Hospital early, reducing bed capacity from 60 to 80.

(C) In Veterinary medicine, a "Cleanup Week" was sponsored by Co. D, and the WNSF Medical Staff responded enthusiastically to the idea. Consequently, animal illnesses were reduced to a minimum during the quarter.

(C) In the area of Preventive Medicine, influenza inoculations were administered to all Co. D personnel by 1 November. The "pay line inoculation procedure" was utilized to apprehend those personnel who had evaded the vigilance of Ssg John RODDEN, who was in charge of the preventive medicine program. All inoculation records were screened, in order to bring vaccinations up to date by closeout.

(C) The Signal Section had no officer in charge, but Sfc John CLARK did an admirable job of supervising the section. There were no significant problems encountered during the quarter. The FM secure voice communications line operated smoothly and efficiently, as did
appendices on Co D awards, and casualty lists.

Co. D ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
AS OF 30 OCTOBER 1970
On 10 December, the RTT circuit to Group was terminated and all manual telephones (TA 312) were removed from all offices.

(C) On 12 December, all Vietnamese civilian personnel received their final pay, and on the 14th, Signal Section terminated and removed the secure telephone; finally, on 15 December, all telephone circuits were cut and the final fund report and cash return were made to Group.

(C) There follows here a diagram of Co. D structure at the end of October and three appendices, giving the text of a Medal of Honor awarded to a member of Co. D, a list of personnel killed in action, and a list of camps.
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

W.C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General.
(U) Detachment B-k3, Chi Lang received a Valourous Unit Citation in the course of 1969, for action in the Seven Mountains.

(U) One member of Co. D has been cited for the Medal of Honor during the tenure of Co. D in MR 4. The award citation follows below:

(U) By direction of the President, under the Joint Resolution of Congress, approved 12 July 1862 (amended by act of 3 March 1863, act of 9 July 1918, and act of 25 July 1963), the Medal of Honour for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty is awarded posthumously by the Department of the Army in the name of Congress to

(U) Sergeant Gordon D. YNTEMA, 370-46-7838 (RM 16761492) United States Army who distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity on 16-18 January 1968 while assigned to Detachment A-431, Company D, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, in the Republic of Vietnam. As part of a larger force of civilian irregulars from camp Gai Gai, he accompanied two platoons to a blocking position East of the village of Thong Binh, where they became heavily engaged in a small arms firefight with the Viet Cong. Assuming control of the force when the Vietnamese Commander was seriously wounded, he advanced his troops to within fifty meters of the enemy bunkers. After a fierce thirty minute firefight, the enemy forced Sergeant YNTEMA to withdraw his men to a trench in order to afford them protection and still perform their assigned blocking mission. Under cover of machine gun fire, approximately one company of Viet Cong maneuvered into a position which pinned down the friendly platoons from three sides. A dwindling ammunition supply, coupled with a Viet Cong mortar barrage which inflicted heavy losses on the exposed friendly troops, caused many of the irregulars to withdraw. Seriously wounded and ordered to withdraw himself, Sergeant YNTEMA refused to leave his fallen comrades. Under withering small arms and machine gun fire, he carried the wounded Vietnamese commander and a mortally wounded American Special Forces advisor to a small gully fifty meters away, in order to shield them from the enemy fire. Sergeant YNTEMA then continued to repulse the attacking Viet Cong attempting to overrun his position, until, out of ammunition and surrounded, he was offered the opportunity to surrender. Refusing, Sergeant YNTEMA stood his ground, using his rifle as a club to fight the approximately fifteen Viet Cong attempting his capture. His resistance was so fierce, that the Viet Cong were forced to shoot in order to overcome him. Sergeant YNTEMA's personal bravery in the face of insurmountable odds and supreme self sacrifice were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect the utmost credit upon himself, the 5th Special Forces and the United States Army.
LIST OF MEN KILLED IN ACTION WHILE SERVING IN COMPANY D. PLACE GIVEN IS NOT NECESSARILY WHERE THEY WERE KILLED.

PFC WILLIAM C. TOTH
27 Oct. 64, TO CHAU

1LT ROYAL G. ISAACS
23 April 65, TO CHAU

SSG LUIS R. JIMINEZ
10 July 65, CAN THO

SSG CLIFFORD D. MELTON
27 Sept. 65, DUONG DONG

MAJ JOHN O. ARNN
26 Dec. 65, CHAU DOC

SFC CARL H. TORELLO
26 Dec. 65, CHAU DOC

SSG GEORGE A. HOAGLAND III
29 Jan. 66, DELTA IV CTZ

SFC JESS L. HANCOCK
29 Jan. 66, DELTA IV CTZ

SFC MARLIN O. COOK
29 Jan. 66, DELTA IV CTZ

SSG DONALD L. DUTSON
29 Jan. 66, DELTA IV CTZ

1LT JONATHAN P. WORKS
3 March 66, VINH QIA

CPT RONALD T. SHELTON
10 March 66, TUYEN NHON

CPT JOSEPH W. PARENT
3 April 66, PHU QUOC IS.

CPT LEO M. DONKER
3 April 66, KINH QUAN II

SSG GERALD B. KASPEZYK
23 April 66, BA CHUC

SGT DERYL K. STANFORD
13 May 66, VINH QIA

SSG WILLIAM A. WILL
5 July 66, BINH HUNG

1LT CURTIS E. BINION
8 July 66, BINH HUNG

SFC DONALD L. LEHEM
26 July 66, PHU QUOC IS.

1LT EUGENE MAJURE
18 Aug. 66, BA CHUC

SP/4 JULES T. GITANNER
26 Aug. 66, PHU QUOC

SSG GENE MENNEFEE
12 Oct 66, KINH QUAN II

SFC DAVID W. BOYD
14 Nov. 66, MOG HOA

SP/4 JOHN MAYO
14 Nov. 66, MOG HOA

SSG CLYDE D. RUSH JR.
29 Dec. 66, TUYEN NHON

CPT THOMAS D. GULP
11 Feb 67, THUONG THOI

SFC ROBERT ANSFACH
11 Feb 67, THUONG THOI

SFC SAMMY BRUCE
19 April 67, KINH QUAN II

2LT STANLEY M. BAKER
20 May 67, KINH QUAN II

CPT CELSO A. PEREZ
4 Jun. 67, PHU QUOC IS.
LIST OF MEN KIA, continued:

SSG RONALD E. FIKE
28 Jun 67, MY AN

SP/4 MICHAEL G. BROWN
28 Jun. 67, MY AN

LT EDWARD L. SHUBERT
28 Jun. 67, MY AN

SFC LOVIE D. BRISCOE JR.
11 July 67, NUI GIAI

SFC LUIS M. LOPEZ MARQUEZ
Nov. 67, MY PHUOC TAY

CPT GEORGE P. O'TOOLE
13 Dec 67, MY PHUOC TAY

SFC JOHN W. FITZGERALD
13 Dec. 67, MY PHUOC TAY

SSG CLIFFORD R. CARTER
13 Dec. 67, MY PHUOC TAY

CPT JOHN F. YOUNG
16 Jan 68, MY PHUOC TAY

SFC EARL R. BIRD
16 Jan 68, MY PHUOC TAY

SP/4 HERBERT R. ANDERSON
16 Jan 68, MY PHUOC TAY

SFC FRANK C. PARRISH
16 Jan 68, MY PHUOC TAY

SGT THEODORE KALEIKINI JR.
18 Jan 68, CAI CAI

SGT GORDON D. YNTEMA
18 Jan. 68, CAI CAI

SP/4 DAVE R. SCOTT
24 Jan 68, TO CHAU

SGT CLIFTON M. DAVIS
19 April 68, DON PHUC

SGT WILLIAM G. BAER
20 May 68, THANH TRI

SSG JERRY D. WRIGHT
22 May 68, MY DIEN

SFC CLARENCE HORNBUCKLE
6 Jun. 68, THANH TRI

SP/4 RICHARD S. DAVIS
6 Jun. 68, THANH TRI

SFC MANUEL T. LOPEZ
27 Jun. 68, MOC HOA

LT JON W. LAYTON III
27 Jun. 68, CAO Lanh

SP/4 MICHAEL KWAZANESKI
2 July 68, MOC HOA

SGT JOSEPH E. SMITH
9 Sept. 68, MOC HOA

LT STEPHEN D. SPARKS
11 Sept 68, MY AN

SP/5 ROGER L. BROWN
1 Jan. 69, CAI THO

SGT ROBERT M. STEC
3 Jan. 69, MOC HOA

SFC RALPH CANNON
11 Feb. 68, CAO Lanh

SFC ROBERT D. ANDRADE
July 69, MOC HOA

SP/5 ALAN C. BURTNESS
20 Feb. 69, CAI THO

CPT CHARLES F. HUGHES
4 July 69, DON PHUC

CPT LOUIS J. GENESIO
21 July 69, MOC HOA
LIST OF MEN KIA, continued:

LTC MARTIN L. BECK
24 July 69, MOI HOA

SSG FERRY N. BROWNING
29 July 69, TUYEN NHON

MICHAEL T. BURNS
6 Sept. 69, AP THAI BIENT

SFC RONALD J. HAGEN
17 Sept. 69, CHI LANG

SFC FRANCIS M. LOGAN
4 Nov. 69, NUI COTO

SGT THOMAS C. TUCKER
8 Nov. 69, A-401, NUI COTO

LT RUSSELL E. UPWRIGHT
11 Nov. 69, A-411, MY PHUOC TAY

SGT ERROL D. FARRAR
23 Dec. 69, NUI BA DEN

CPT DAVID M. COPPERNOLL
6 Jan 70, KIEN PHONG

2LT WAYNE M. COLE
6 Jan. 70, KIEN PHONG

CPT JUSTIN R. SPISTO
4 Mar 70, CHI LANG

SGT WALTER B. FOOTE
5 Mar 70, BINH THANH THON

MSG WILLIE D. STEPHENS
5 Mar 70, BINH THANH THON

LT DONALD TANNENBAUM
9 April 70, B-413, BA XAOI

SGT RALPH M. JENERSON
9 April 70, A-412, BA XAOI

SFC ROBERT L. HENDERSON
15 Jun 70, A-413, CAMBODIA

SP/5 RAYMOND S. BRAMWELL
23 Aug. 70, NUI CAM

SGT STEVEN C. JOHNSON
7 Oct. 70, KIEN TUONG PROV.

SSG RANDALL C. KNISELY
18 Oct. 70, CHAU DOC PROV.

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