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OPENING STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN

Senator STENNIS. The subcommittee will come to order.

I have a brief opening statement this morning.

Today we continue with our important hearings into the conduct and effectiveness of the air war against North Vietnam, with Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, who is with us this morning, and Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, who will appear at 2 o'clock this afternoon, as our witnesses.

These outstanding military leaders, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been closely connected with and have played a major part in the development, direction, and extent of the bombing campaign. In this capacity they can discuss the significant military targets which have been struck in the past, as well as those which have not been hit because recommendations for their inclusion on the target list have not been approved by higher authority. They can also give us their evaluation of the overall impact, effect, and worth of the bombing campaign and their judgment as to whether or not it has been as effective as it would have been had the close restrictions and limitations which have controlled since its inception had not been in effect.

Previous military witnesses have stated very clearly and strongly that they have not been able to gain approval to strike militarily important targets which they had recommended and that a number of worthwhile and critical targets have not yet been authorized for strike. On the other hand, Secretary McNamara, in his appearance before the subcommittee last Friday went to considerable pains to deprecate
the importance and significance of the unapproved targets which remain on the target list. Therefore, there is a clear and direct conflict in the testimony between Secretary McNamara and the military experts on this point. A fundamental question, of course, is why our military leaders would recommend these targets for strike if in fact they have no appreciable military significance.

In addition, the witnesses today, in their capacity as the chiefs of the ground services, can address themselves to the impact of the air war on the ground fighting in South Vietnam and to the crucial and critical question of what the impact would be if the bombing campaign against the north is either suspended or substantially curtailed. They are, of course, particularly well qualified in the field. In addition, their services have a very basic and fundamental interest in this area since our previous testimony establishes without any question whatsoever that any significant reduction in the air war against North Vietnam would be translated into additional enemy men and supplies in South Vietnam and thus increased American casualties.

These and many other important questions will be explored during our hearings today. We will be particularly interested in getting the opinions of General Johnson and General Greene as to what, in their professional opinion, can and should be done to help bring this tragic war to an early and satisfactory conclusion.

All members will remember that we will have a rather crowded situation on the Senate calendar tomorrow if plans work out to bring up the appropriations bill. I hope that we can move along now with justice to the subject matter, and that our questions will be as many as anyone wishes to ask, of course, but as brief as possible.

General, you always go right to the point, so I don't have to caution you about long answers. We are delighted to have you here. We await your testimony with a great deal of interest.

I want to say this. I don't know of any member of this subcommittee that has ever talked or thought of the bombing campaign as a substitute or an alternative for the wonderful fighting that the Army and Marine Corps are doing in South Vietnam. I don't know how that has gotten into the picture. I know no one here had suggested that or anything like it.

What we are thinking about is to help the ground forces in South Vietnam by trying to choke off men and supplies before they get down there. We don't want to usurp the field of military judgment, but we want you to cover that field and cover it fully. I don't think there is any doubt people are realizing now, General, that we are at war, and they want to know more about it. I am not trying to explain why we are there. We are already there. The question is what we ought to do.

All witnesses in this hearing, General, have been sworn. Will you take the oath, please. Do you solemnly swear your testimony in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

General Johnson, I do.

Senator Sparkes, All right, without further ado, I think it would be well if you read your statement. You can emphasize such parts of it as you wish.
General Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to appear before you this morning and would like to offer a brief, general statement concerning our air-operations against North Vietnam.

First, the effectiveness of all operations must be measured against U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. These objectives are—

To assist the South Vietnamese in eliminating the armed enemy within South Vietnam and to support the South Vietnamese in the extension of their Government’s control over its own territory.

To apply gradually increasing pressures against North Vietnam so as to cause North Vietnam to cease supporting and directing the insurgency in South Vietnam.

The war in Southeast Asia is a single conflict integrated militarily, geographically, politically, psychologically, and socially. Individual elements of the war effort must be considered within the context of the total operation. All combat operations contribute to the eventual achievement of our objectives in Southeast Asia. Within the military share of the total effort, the results of the air campaign against North Vietnam have an effect on military operations in South Vietnam.

The air campaign against the North causes a deterioration in the enemy’s total military environment which reduces his ability to support the war in the South. As this reduction is achieved, enemy forces in the South suffer, and friendly forces are benefited.

The substantial investment in U.S. ground, air, and naval forces in Southeast Asia has saved South Vietnam from certain defeat and is producing progressively more favorable results. Most importantly in my estimation, the enemy has not been able to win a major military victory in South Vietnam. Indications of some of the other cumulative effects of military operations are now emerging:

- Enemy units are encountering increasing difficulty in conducting operations;
- Attacks against North Vietnam have removed its status as a sanctuary from which insurgency is exported;
- North Vietnamese demands upon Communist nations for war support equipment and materials have increased.

Specifically, I want to highlight two observations regarding air operations against North Vietnam:

First, the air campaign is making it more difficult for the North Vietnamese to support enemy forces in the south. They have had to divert an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 personnel to full and part-time war-related tasks to counteract the effects of the air campaign. These individuals represent a work force and, perhaps more significantly, management and technical skills that might otherwise be more directly engaged in support of activities in the south. The high level of attacks since the advent of good weather in April, particularly against the lines of communication in the northeast quadrant, has resulted in a major increase in the level of damage inflicted. Although trucks, rail cars, and equipment are replaceable and bridges and rail lines repairable,
valuable North Vietnamese resources must be diverted to accomplish this repair and replacement. Thus, these resources are unavailable for commitment to South Vietnam.

Second, the air campaign is exacting a cost from North Vietnam for her aggression. In this regard we have also achieved some success. All or substantial segments of the militarily important elements of North Vietnam's limited industrial base have been destroyed; for example, her explosives, pig iron, and cement production facilities as well as her thermal power plants have suffered major damage.

In summary, I believe that air attacks in the north have contributed significantly to the success we have achieved thus far in South Vietnam. Although the air campaign in the north cannot by itself achieve our objectives in the south, it is an essential complement of the total military effort in Southeast Asia.

WOULD HAVE SEEN MORE AND LARGER WEAPONS

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement.

Senator Stennis. General, in your own fine way—and this subcommittee is fairly familiar with the trend of the fighting on the ground—please describe where you think you would have been if it had not been for this bombing—if it had not been mounted and continued? Where would you be in your problems in the war in the south?

General Johnson. Of course, Mr. Chairman, I think my answer can only be speculation.

Senator Stennis. I know that.

General Johnson. But it would seem to me that we would have seen substantially higher quantities of larger weapons used, and we would have seen them used earlier.

You will recall that one of the first damaging attacks on U.S. installations—or installations used predominantly by U.S. forces—was at Pleiku in February of 1965, and this was a mortar attack. Now since that time, larger weapons have made their appearance. These weapons have been deployed progressively from North to South Vietnam—and I am speaking specifically of the 122-millimeter rocket and the 140-millimeter rocket.

Additional recoilless rifles have shown up. These are rather heavy, and their ammunition is heavy to transport.

With regard to men, in 1965 and throughout most of 1966, judging by prisoners that were captured, it has been concluded that most of the individuals in the North Vietnamese force introduced into South Vietnam, were 18 years or older. This year among the individuals captured there appears to be a substantially higher proportion of individuals in the 15-18 and 17-year categories this indicates that the manpower that they have had to divert to supporting their own distribution system within North Vietnam has caused them significant problems with regard to the quality and the age of the individuals that they can send into South Vietnam.

It is extremely difficult to determine exactly how many people are diverted in North Vietnam. Our estimates have run from as low as 300,000 to as high as 600,000, part of whom perhaps are part time but certainly it is a substantial effort that they require.
In 1965 the major North Vietnamese effort was through the pan-handle of Laos and into the central highlands of South Vietnam. In late 1965, starting with the engagement in which the 1st Cavalry Division participated in October and November, there have been a series of actions running on into the middle of 1966. [Deleted.]

Now, of course, at this same period of time, the second half of 1966 and early 1967, they made a major effort in the area of the demilitarized zone [deleted]. Nonetheless, had they had the capability, I think it is reasonable to speculate that they would have tried to support both operations, and I think that the bombing in the north interfered with and interrupted their capability to support both operations.

BOMBING CAUSES ENEMY DIRECT LOSS OF MANPOWER AND MATERIEL

Senator Stennis. Well, where would a suspension of the bombing for any appreciable time at all, or a cessation of it, leave you? I am asking you as Chief of Staff of the Army.

General Johnson. Of course, I must also speak, Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because as a member of that corporate body, I share the responsibility for our actions in the north.

Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, I ask for your own opinion. You can't speak for the Joint Chiefs, but you are the Chief of Staff of the Army.

General Johnson. But in my professional judgment, the bombing in the north does these things for the total war effort.

There is a direct loss of enemy manpower resulting from it, because they are suffering casualties as a consequence of bombing in the far north and on the infiltration routes leading to the south. There is a direct loss of materiel.

Senator Stennis. Pardon me, you mean a loss of enemy military manpower.

General Johnson. Loss of military manpower.

Senator Stennis. All right. Excuse the interruption. What about materiel?

General Johnson. I should even define that and say there is a direct loss of soldiers who would be committed to the war in South Vietnam. There is a direct loss of materiel in terms of transportation and in terms of ammunition that would support the war in the south.

There are time delays imposed on the movement of forces to the south, and these time delays have a cumulative effect in my judgment. The longer those individuals are on the trails moving south, the more they are subject to sickness and disease. And in recent months there has been some indication that there has been greater difficulty in controlling those individuals moving south, with some increase in their desertion rate during the period of this move.

The bombing also tends to limit the size of force that they can concentrate at any one time. This is really related to the time delays imposed.

But I think that the major factor, from the point of view of the ground forces, is the impact that it would have on the morale of the men in the south if the bombing were to be discontinued. Their frame of mind would be that the whole brunt of the fighting would have to be carried by them, and that there was no effort being made to deny...
forces in the south their reinforcements or the ammunition with which they were supported. I think this would be a major impact.

Senator Stennis. Well, that is a good statement. Of course, if the President decides to suspend this bombing after the election, we will all be bound by that decision. He is the one who will ultimately make a decision. But I hear, and I have heard for a good while, that there would probably be a suspension after the elections. I read yesterday that there perhaps would be a special effort with reference to the U.N. intervening and so forth made after the election.

General Johnson. I must say, Mr. Chairman, that I have seen speculation in the press, but there has been no indication that has come to my personal attention of any desire to suspend the bombing following the elections.

JOHNSON DOESN'T WANT BOMBING STOPPED

Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, that is the President's prerogative and I am not going to put you in the role of criticizing him, but I did want to know your opinion about it. If we are going to continue the fighting in the south, as I judge it, you don't want that bombing stopped, is that right?

General Johnson. That is correct. I should go on to say that I think there has been a tendency in the press and in all of the discussions to try to put elements of this war into little compartments and to treat them in isolation from the whole. War is still largely an art and not a science, and it is the interaction of all of the elements that will ultimately lead us to the achievement of our objectives in the south.

MORE MEN INTO SOUTH VIETNAM MILITARY

Senator Stennis. May I ask one further question and then I am going to call on Mrs. Smith to continue the questioning. I heard someone say that there were 65,000 additional South Vietnamese soldiers that were going to go into the war when we sent in the extra 45,000. What do you have on that? Except for replacements, do the South Vietnamese have 65,000 additional men that they could put in?

General Johnson. By lowering their draft age they could increase the number of individuals that they could put in their armed forces, and the consideration at the present time is to reduce their draft age to age [deleted]. I am not sure of the number 65,000, and I would like to confirm it for the record.

However, there is to be an increase in the Vietnamese forces, [deleted].

Senator Stennis. [Deleted.]

General Johnson. [Deleted.]

Senator Stennis. Those figures are classified, I suppose.

General Johnson. These figures are classified "secret" at the present time; yes, sir.

U.S. TO SEND 45,000 MORE MEN

Senator Stennis. We are sending over 45,000 more men. Is that largely from the Army's Strategic Reserve?
General Johnson. The 45,000 is all services. From the Army our figure will be approximately [deleted]. The exact figure is under consideration right now in Hawaii.

Sen. STENNIS. I shouldn't have said 45,000 from the Army but of those you do send will be from your top men, will they not? Will they not come from the Strategic Reserve?

Gen. JOHNSON. The Army units will be from the present force structure of the Strategic Reserve. The men themselves will be a mixture of individuals who are presently in training and of individuals who are presently assigned to other elements of the force. They won't all necessarily come from the Strategic Army Force because we have a continual rotation between our forces overseas and the forces in the United States. [Deleted.]

Sen. STENNIS. They won't all come from your Strategic Army Reserve.

Gen. JOHNSON. [Deleted] part of them will.

Sen. STENNIS. [Deleted] part of them.

Gen. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Sen. STENNIS. I was just thinking about what we are sending and what we are getting in return over there, Mrs. Smith.

JOHNSON FAVORED HEAVY BOMBING RATHER THAN GRADUALISM 2 YEARS AGO

Sen. SMITH. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I believe the chairman has covered most of what I had in mind, General, but I will ask the questions and if you feel that you have answered, or if you feel you can expand further, it will be helpful.

You stated, on page 1 of your statement, that one of the objectives of the [deleted] air campaign is to apply gradually increasing pressures against North Vietnam. I realize that this has been national policy with regard to the [deleted] operations, but I would like to ask whether this gradualistic approach, is one which you personally advocate, or whether you are, in a sense, required by virtue of your position to support it as a decision of a higher civilian authority?

Gen. JOHNSON. The decision to apply gradually increasing pressures, in contrast to as large an effort as possible against substantially the same target systems was one that was made approximately 2 years ago. My view at that time was that the most effective way to employ airpower in the north was as heavy a blow as possible over as short a period of time as possible. This view was not accepted. Therefore, we supported the gradual approach that has been used since that time.

Sen. SMITH. Thank you very much, General. Do you believe that more free world forces would be required in South Vietnam if, for any reason, the bombing of North Vietnam should cease? As I recall it, General Westmoreland has repeatedly stated that the air campaign against the north is vital to his combat operations in South Vietnam.

Gen. JOHNSON. This question, Senator Smith, I believe can be answered in two ways, and I don't believe that there is an absolute judgment that could be made with regard to it. On the one hand, if there is to be reasonable progress toward the objectives [deleted], I believe that there would be more ground forces required to achieve those objectives.
On the other hand, if the question were raised as to whether or not the war would be lost in South Vietnam, that is, would our forces be placed in jeopardy along with the South Vietnamese and other free world forces and be defeated if we didn’t have more force in South Vietnam, I don’t believe that we could be defeated if no more forces were provided. It would result in a loss of initiative in some parts of the country, and a very serious loss in momentum—if not an entire loss of momentum—throughout all of the country. It could result in the stalemate that has been postulated by some individuals. I should say that in my judgment there is no stalemate there at the present time.

The increase in forces, I might add, will increase the momentum of progress that is evident throughout much of the country at the present time, in my judgment, because I think that success feeds on success, and that we should reinforce it.

Senator Smith. Have any studies been made which seek to determine the number of free world combat forces which would conceivably be required in South Vietnam if the bombing of North Vietnam were to cease?

General Johnson. Not to my knowledge. It is conceivable that there have been some staff papers written that would not have the status of a study, but to my recollection I have not seen even one of those.

BELIEVES THERE IS DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASUALTIES AND BOMBING

Senator Smith. General, is there any direct relationship, in your opinion, between a restrictive air campaign against North Vietnam and the probability of increased allied casualties in South Vietnam? I think you touched upon that in a response to the chairman.

General Johnson. This is a most difficult question to answer definitively. I believe that there is a relationship between casualties in South Vietnam and the bombing in North Vietnam, and I think that the best example of the relationship is the stand-down during the Tet period in February when we made the estimate that somewhere between 20,000 and 25,000 tons of supplies were moved during that cessation or suspension of the bombing.

Some substantial part of those supplies consisted of ammunition. When that ammunition is fired, it causes casualties, and if the ammunition had not been moved, it is only reasonable to assume that the casualties would not have resulted.

Now how many casualties or how many more casualties we might take if the bombing were suspended or if the bombing were to cease altogether, I just don’t know, and it would be most difficult to try to make any kind of a definitive judgment in that area. I do believe that the casualties would increase.

Senator Miller. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Senator Smith. Yes.
Doubt Should Be Resolved in Favor of Combat Forces

Senator Miller. Even though it is a difficult question, and even though no one probably knows what the answer is, wouldn't it be your opinion that any doubt ought to be resolved in favor of our combat forces in the south. In other words, if there is any doubt about the matter, even though we don't know, if we are going to make a decision, shouldn't the decision be resolved in favor of the combat forces in the south?

General Johnson. In my judgment there can be no question about resolving the doubt in favor of the combat forces. I think I made that point with regard to the frame of mind and the general psychological attitude of the American fighting man on the ground in South Vietnam which could develop if he were made to feel that he was carrying the full burden of this war, which he would be made to feel if the bombing were to be stopped in the north.

Senator Miller. Thank you.

Senator Smith. General, would not the [deleted] campaign against North Vietnam have been far more effective and its effects felt much sooner if it had not been hindered and burdened with restrictions and prohibitions against the lucrative military targets which are only now being authorized for strike?

Disputes But Does Not Discount Political Implications

General Johnson. As I indicated earlier, Senator Smith, I believe that, from a military point of view, a sharp blow against the important targets within the six target systems that have been identified in North Vietnam would have been more effective than the more gradual approach. I cannot discount—although I guess I can dispute—the judgment that the political implications of such a course of action at the time outweighed the military desirability of conducting a more intensive campaign earlier.

Now by this I don't mean bombing more targets than have been described here before this committee. I mean bombing substantially the same basic target list earlier and over a shorter period of time.

Senator Smith. Are you aware of any of the reasons why in recent weeks targets which have been recommended for strike for as long as 2 years or more are only now being authorized for strike?

General Johnson. I am not aware of any specific reason. I was out of the country at the time targets were authorized for strike about the 5th or 9th of August, as you will recall, at the time that Admiral Sharp came back to testify.

However, the lengthening target list is consistent with the gradual approach that has been taken. I think the major point of contention is the timeframe within which these strikes should be made.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I think my time is up, I have one more question. Shall I ask it now or wait?

Senator Stennis. Ask it now, that will be better.
ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Smith. Thank you very much.

The shuffling of combat forces within South Vietnam from one tactical area of responsibility to another on the basis of emergency deployments—I have in mind, for example, the emergency redeployment to the Marine Corps' tactical zone of the so-called Oregon Task Force of Army units—is proof enough that General Westmoreland really needed the additional forces he had asked for, but did not get last October. At that time, he acquiesced in a troop strength of 469,000, when he had asked for [deleted]. Recently, he asked again for [deleted] and apparently is going to get 521,000 men.

We are told that the limitation on the expenditure of piasters is not controlling this time in providing General Westmoreland the forces he needs because the economy of South Vietnam could probably absorb [deleted] additional troops without unacceptable inflation. Are we to infer then, that the reason why General Westmoreland is not being given the forces he has recommended is because the United States cannot furnish [deleted] troops without mobilization? I think it would be helpful, General Johnson, if you would discuss this situation in some detail for the benefit of the committee, or perhaps expand on it for the record later.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Mrs. Smith, thank you very much.

General Johnson. A year ago there was a very real concern with regard to the impact of inflation in South Vietnam. Moreover, a year ago, there was not a very comprehensive understanding of just how many pressures, in an economic sense, were being brought on the South Vietnamese in terms of the great variety of forces contributing to those pressures. By this I mean the construction agencies, the military forces themselves, the extent to which purchases were being made on the black market, the extent to which individuals were being hired for personal services, such as providing laundry in base camp areas and keeping streets clean and this sort of thing. All of these tended to upset the basic wage structure within South Vietnam and to induce competition within the labor force of South Vietnam, not only for the services of those laborers normally associated with this type of work, but it was also attracting people from the farms as well, and thus reducing the acreage of rice that could be planted and farmed during the year.

Since that time there has been a very intensive study made and an intensive effort made to control expenditures. As far as the military forces are concerned, General Westmoreland has enjoyed a unique success in reducing individual expenditures very, very substantially. He had established a goal last year, if my memory serves me, of [deleted] per man per month. Expenditures have been somewhat below that, although they were at least [deleted] percent higher than [deleted] at the time that he established it as his goal. For this year he has established a personal expenditure goal of [deleted] a man per month, [deleted].

So, therefore, in the course of the last year the concern over the strength of forces as related to the Vietnamese economy has been allayed appreciably, although there is still a concern about economic pressures and inflation setting in out there.
COULD PROVIDE WESTMORELAND'S REQUEST IN LONGER TIME FRAME

Now with regard to the size of the force that the United States can provide out there, the significant point I think is the time frame within which additional forces can be provided. We have a training establishment in the United States that can support a substantially higher output than we presently are supporting. Thus we could provide, in a longer time frame, the forces, the original level of forces that General Westmoreland requested. Without a partial mobilization, a partial callup of Reserve Forces, we do not have the capability of providing additional forces within the constraints that we have established for ourselves.

It should be recognized that a part of the difficulty that is associated with the deployment of additional forces is that we have established certain rules for ourselves—and have abided by them, with some exceptions. The basic rule is a 1-year tour in Vietnam. If there were an indeterminate period of service in Vietnam, for example, it would alter substantially what we could provide out there. If we were not separating more than 25,000 men every month, as we are now, and were holding them in service, we could have substantially more forces out there. If we were not rotating people between commands, we could have more forces out there; but we are following substantially the same peacetime pattern elsewhere in the world that we followed prior to the commitment of major forces to Vietnam.

The question as to the level of force provided to General Westmoreland is related not only to the purely military situation within South Vietnam, but also relates to the broader problems of both the domestic political situation and the international political situation as to just how our actions are going to be viewed. I think that from the very beginning, and this is a personal opinion that I am expressing, there has been an unstated hope that with the gradual increase in pressure, a country like North Vietnam could be dissuaded from pursuing its aggression in South Vietnam, and at the same time, we would not arouse the passions worldwide that could conceivably result in an outbreak of a larger war or expand the war to areas outside the boundaries of North and South Vietnam.

We have limited the ground war to the geographic boundaries of South Vietnam. We have limited the air war to North and South Vietnam. [Deleted.]

Senator STENNIS. Thank you for your good question, Senator.

General Johnson. I don't know if that answers the question enough,

Senator Smith. Yes.

General JOHNSON. Or whether you would want further expansion for the record.

Senator Smith. What I was trying to elicit was whether the shortage of money or the shortage of men was causing reluctance to send more men over and I think you have answered it.

General JOHNSON. I think the substantive part of the question is one we have not generally understood. We have established certain policies which I think contribute materially to the morale of the fighting man in Vietnam and which I would hope would not be altered.
Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator Smith. Senator Jackson, you just got in. Senator Symington has passed for the time being. Senator Jackson, shall I call on you now?

CONTINUED SOVIET AID WILL LENGTHEN WAR SUBSTANTIALLY

Senator JACKSON. I will ask my usual question. General, if the Russians continue to send in supplies, material, equipment as they have in the past, and we are not able to interdict a substantial amount of it so that it continues to flow to the south, wouldn’t you say that this war can go on interminably?

General JOHNSON. I don’t believe that anyone can make such an absolute judgment as that. I think that it will certainly materially increase the period required to bring the conflict to a successful conclusion.

Senator JACKSON. It seems to me, General Johnson, that this is the heart of the problem; that is, to find some way to prevent what is being shipped into the north from being transshipped and giving meaningful assistance to the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese in the south. I must confess that unless we solve this problem, and it is the heart, it is the real issue as I see it, I don’t see any end to this conflict. I am not saying that we can dismiss the tremendous task that we have before us in South Vietnam.

We must have the ground forces—both ARVN, our own and our other allies—to do that job, but I don’t see how that job in the south can ever come to a conclusion unless we find a way and a means of stopping in an effective way what the Russians are doing. The Chinese are involved, sure, but, as I understand the picture, the latest information is that something like $600 to $700 million worth of material annually is being supplied by the Russians and about $200 million by the Chinese Communists.

I would just like to get your judgment on this, because unless we concentrate on what I think is the basic issue, we just go round and get lost in details.

General JOHNSON. I think I would differ with you only in degree. I would not limit it to the Russians. I think that it is in the entire Communist bloc.

SOME MEANS MUST BE FOUND TO STOP SUPPLY FLOW

Senator JACKSON. Yes, when I say Russians I include the bloc countries. You can’t include China in the bloc because they are in another bloc.

General JOHNSON. Some means must be found to stop the flow of supplies into North Vietnam, because as best we have been able to determine, the supplies reaching South Vietnam are transshipped through North Vietnam in almost every instance. [Deleted.] But I think that one illustration of the concern that the Vietnamese hold is when I talked to General Doan earlier this month, his statement was if you have the dish and you are trying to get the water out of that dish you must stop the faucet, don’t put more water into the dish, but he didn’t have any good suggestions, at least one that is acceptable at the moment, for stopping the flow of that water. [Deleted.]
Senator Jackson. If this assistance was not coming into North Vietnam from Russia and its satellites and from Red China one could readily see some predictable end of the conflict, wouldn't you say?

General Johnson. Yes. There is still the problem, however, of rooting out the infrastructure within South Vietnam.

Senator Jackson. I don't dispute that.

General Johnson. There would be an end, I think there would probably be varying views as to when that end would occur.

Senator Jackson. The task would be substantially different than the one you now face.

General Johnson. Substantially different and substantially easier.

Senator Jackson. If this outside support were to come to an end.

General Johnson. Yes.

Senator Jackson. Don't you feel this is the heart of the problem, in addition to the tasks that one faces in trying to deal with the problem of counterinsurgency and guerrilla war? I am not dismissing that lightly. I look upon that as one involving many years of effort—maybe 10, I don't know. At least it is one, however, that we could lay the groundwork for the ARVN forces to carry the main load.

General Johnson. I would phrase it this way. I don't believe that it is the heart of the problem, but I think that it is a very substantial part of the problem. The reason that I don't believe that it is the heart is that without any Russian assistance, there is still going to be a dissident element in South Vietnam that will continue to fight on without any Communist bloc assistance.

However, without Communist bloc assistance, the problem of coping with the dissidents within South Vietnam then becomes manageable in a very near time frame, because as the people get some confidence in their own government, which I believe they are acquiring now, they will begin to report the terrorists in their midst, and they will be more quickly surfaced and more quickly eliminated.

Senator Jackson. On the other hand, however, they can go on indefinitely supplying assistance and support to the Vietcong and sending in their own forces. This would be an interminable thing, if the Russians make the decision that they are going on indefinitely, that we don't have the will to sustain the course, so to speak. Isn't this true?

General Johnson. Well, as I indicated earlier, we believe that the North Vietnamese are encountering increased difficulty. Last year the ages of the North Vietnamese who were captured in the south were 18 or older. This year many of the North Vietnamese prisoners that have been captured are falling in the 15-16 and 17-year-old category. Now, there are many younger than that among those that are picked up in South Vietnam. They have been 15 and 16 years old.

INfiltration and the Numbers Business

Senator Jackson. But the total number coming into South Vietnam has increased over a year ago; hasn't it? I realize there are some revised figures out lately but at least this is what we have been given.

General Johnson. If I can avoid getting into the numbers business on infiltration, I would certainly prefer not to. I don't think that any useful purpose is served by a discussion of it.
Senator Jackson. But this is a real tough one on those of us who have been pushing hard for more bombing up there and they say "Look, Senator; there are more coming down now than a year ago according to the figures released by the Defense Department."

I think we need some answer to that contention, and I wish it could be supplied. I think this is an important point, Mr. Chairman. The public record as it now stands is to the effect that there are more enemy forces coming into South Vietnam this year than last year, despite the increased bombing. Therefore the argument is made that the bombing is ineffective. You don't need to answer it now, but I do think we should have something on this. General. It is more DOD's responsibility than yours; but I am sure you can appreciate the difficulty that one is up against when the public record stands as it does at the present time.

General Johnson. I can't answer the question right now. I could provide something for the record if you wish. I can say this. In Vietnam, at the end of July, I questioned the J-2 with regard to a study that was to have been completed on the 28th of July but was not because they were not satisfied with the validity of a good number of the figures they were getting from the districts and the provinces. They were going back out to check the figures that are kept by the Vietnamese. That study is not yet complete, and there is a very thorough going review underway right now of this whole problem of the enemy in South Vietnam.

(The information requested is as follows:)

We estimate that during 1966, at least 55,000 and possibly 85,000 North Vietnamese' troops were infiltrated into South Vietnam. The majority of these used the long-established infiltration trails through Laos that skirt the western edge of the DMZ. Beginning in mid-1966, however, sizable numbers of NVA troops began to move directly across the DMZ into the northernmost province of South Vietnam.

During the last half of 1966, there appears to have been a slackening in the pace of infiltration [deleted]. A further complicating factor in determining infiltration totals concerns replacements provided when NVA/V.C. units are outside of South Vietnam. This is particularly troublesome with units operating in border areas, where, as Communist forces move back and forth across the border, considerable numbers of replacements can be added without being reflected in the infiltration statistics.

Any conclusions of infiltration for 1967 must be highly tentative because of the time lag in identification of infiltration groups. [Deleted] Infiltration into the DMZ area has continued. [Deleted]

Senator Jackson. General, how many of our forces are tied up along the DMZ to cope with the forces that the North Vietnamese have deployed in that area?

General Johnson. The forces vary [deleted] in the immediate DMZ area.

Senator Jackson. How about adjacent to it? I mean below that area from Da Nang north, I suppose?

General Johnson. Well, from Da Nang north, including the Da Nang area itself, there are now substantially [deleted].

Senator Jackson. So when you put ARVN in there, it is a substantial number.

General Johnson. Yes, it is a substantial number.

Senator Jackson. What I am getting at is that if this assistance from the Communist bloc countries, the Soviet Union and Red China, was not forthcoming the picture would be a lot different, wouldn't it?
General Johnson. Well, if there were no assistance from them, there would be no munitions, because North Vietnam has no munitions industry.

Senator Jackson. That is what I am saying.

General Johnson. Everything would be coming out of cottages, and there would be a very limited amount of firepower available to them.

Senator Stennis. All right, gentlemen, that is a good line of questioning. Your time is up. Thank you very much.

Senator Miller.

GRADUAL BOMBING APPROACH TENDED TO PROLONG WAR

Senator Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, would you say that the approach of gradually increasing the pressures against North Vietnam has tended to prolong rather than to shorten the war?

General Johnson. I would have to say in my judgment, yes, it has, although I must qualify that by saying—referring back to Senator Jackson's question—that until there is some cessation of support by the Communist bloc to North Vietnam, the duration of hostilities is somewhat indeterminate.

Senator Miller. When you stated earlier that you had recommended a sharp increase, what motivated you to recommend a sharp increase rather than a gradual increase? Wouldn't it have been with the view to shorten the war?

SHARP BLOW EARLIER AND SHORTENED WAR FEWER U.S. CASUALTIES

General Johnson. Well, the term was not "sharp increase", but "sharp blow," and the reason was to bring the maximum effectiveness of airpower to bear. We believe this would require a lesser effort and result in fewer casualties to sustain the closure of routes and to impede the movement of supplies. In the fast analysis, it would reduce the time required for this effort.

Senator Miller. To shorten the war.

General Johnson. General, do you know of anyone on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or do you know of any military leaders who have suggested that bombing of the north can prevent the flow of military supplies into or through North Vietnam?

General Johnson. No, I do not, and the bombing campaign to my knowledge has never been described in that way by any responsible military official.

Senator Miller. Isn't it rather a case where they have suggested that the flow can be impeded and reduced rather than prevented?

General Johnson. Yes, it impedes, it disrupts, and destroys a part of the supplies and a part of the manpower moving south.

Senator Miller. And reduces the flow?

General Johnson. Reduces the flow.

Senator Miller. Would it be fair to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are more interested in hitting more lucrative targets, with the same intensity of bombing that we now have in the north rather than recommending more bombing or an expansion of the bombing?
General Johnson. I hesitate to use the word "lucrative" targets, although I know it has been used extensively by earlier witnesses before this subcommittee, because "lucrative" is such a relative term, and a target which might be described as "lucrative" to us with regard to North Vietnam might look somewhat ridiculous if it were compared to similar resources within the United States and described as being "lucrative."

Senator Miller. By that I mean more lucrative targets. In other words, there are some people who say: "Well, the Joint Chiefs of Staff want more bombing. They want to expand the bombing." It is my understanding that what they have really been interested in doing is maintaining the same level of bombing, not having more bombing, but that they want to hit more meaningful targets instead of hitting less meaningful targets. Would that be a correct statement of the views?

JCS Favor "Deepening" Targets

General Johnson. Not exactly. I would say that at least my interpretation of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to bombing attacks against the target systems in North Vietnam is that we favor deepening the targets within the system, that—take the transportation system as an example, it consists of railroads, it consists of bridges on those railroads, it consists of ports, it consists of waterways, it consists of docks in ports, it consists of POL offloading points in ports—our desire has been not to be limited to striking only a part of the system, but to strike the entire system. So you get into the old axiom that for want of a nail a shoe was lost, and perhaps the destruction of the nail might lead to the loss of the shoe, which in turn might lead to the loss of the horse.

Senator Miller. But that doesn't automatically lead you to more bombing as far as numbers of sorties is concerned in order to do that, does it?

General Johnson. It doesn't necessarily lead to more bombing. Certainly not more than the number of sorties that we are employing now. Nor does it lead to indiscriminate bombing, nor does it lead to population bombing.

Senator Miller. Might it not lead to even fewer sorties? In other words, couldn't we fly fewer sorties than we are flying now, and still, because they were directed at the deepening of the impact on the systems, achieve the objectives to which you refer?

General Johnson. This is a possibility, but I can't say that it would be inevitable. I do think that a certain level of effort must be maintained in order that the air defenses can be suppressed on a continuing basis, which then results in lesser casualties as the bombing campaign is continued. The damage to the transportation system is going to reduce the flow of air defense materials, for example, which will contribute to a reduction in the casualties.

I think that the focus that has been made on individual targets at the expense of a concentration on target systems has not been a useful focus.
Senator MILLER. How many U.S. Army forces are there in South Vietnam at the present time?

General JOHNSON. As of midnight on the 18th of August on the latest strength report we had assigned or on temporary duty in South Vietnam [deleted] but I should point out that of that number, there are [deleted] that were in a transient status. They were either going in or coming out. There were [deleted] that were patients, and there were [deleted] that were there on temporary duty from outside the Pacific Command. The total operational Army forces were [deleted].

Senator MILLER. How many of the [deleted] are in what you would classify as the support area, as distinguished from the combat area, approximately?

General JOHNSON. Well, we categorize our forces as combat, combat support, and combat service support.

Senator MILLER. Could you break it down?

General JOHNSON. The percentage of forces in the combat and combat support area is I think about [deleted] percent, but I would like to correct that if I can. Just a minute, I have it right here. The combat and—the figure that we carry in the combat and combat support area at the departmental level is [deleted] percent and in the support area, [deleted] percent.

Senator MILLER. Of the [deleted] percent, how much would be what you call combat support?

General JOHNSON. Combat support would be roughly [deleted] percent of that.

Senator MILLER. [Deleted.]

General JOHNSON. [Deleted.]

Senator MILLER. That includes artillery?

General JOHNSON. That includes artillery, and it includes signal. It also includes an armored cavalry regiment, and I think that the people in that armored cavalry regiment would tend to dispute their categorization as "combat support." This is a rather arbitrary distinction that is drawn. As a matter of fact, I think that it would be hard to persuade the men in an ordnance ammunition battalion, who is "combat service support," but is standing guard on an ammunition point at night, that he is not subject to many of the same hazards that the riflemen face. So the distinctions get to be pretty artificial.

Senator MILLER. I can appreciate that, but on a rough basis then [deleted] would be what you would call your combat infantry type troops; is that right, taking roughly [deleted] percent of [deleted] that is about [deleted] and about [deleted] of those are combat support and a [deleted] are combat, so that is why I said on a rough basis about [deleted] would be combat infantrymen.

General JOHNSON. It would be roughly that basis.

**BOMBING DISCUSSION WITH SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND KOREAN LEADERS**

Senator MILLER. Thank you. Have you had occasion to discuss with the top leaders of the Korean forces and the top leaders of the South Vietnamese forces this subject of the bombing of targets in the north?
General JOHNSON. I have not discussed it with them recently. I did have an occasion to do so during an informal discussion in Seoul near the end of September or early in October last year; and also in April of 1966, [deleted].

With regard to the South Vietnamese, I have never really raised this question with the South Vietnamese military leadership; I think because I have had the feeling that there have been no differing views or difference of opinion as to the necessity for taking all military measures possible to support the war in South Vietnam.

Senator MILLER. I noticed in this morning's paper a report stating "Premier Ky yesterday indicated that a new military government may ask for stepped up bombing of the north instead of a pause." And the statements I have seen seem to indicate that if anything they have been equally or more insistent on the bombing campaign in the north.

General JOHNSON. Well, I think that certainly this outlook can be attributed to Premier Ky ever since the bombing was started in the north. He is on the record, I think, a number of times with similar statements.

Senator MILLER. If there was cessation of the bombing in the North, do you think this might endanger the support we are receiving from the Koreans?

General JOHNSON. I would hesitate to make that judgment [deleted].

Senator STENNIS. Excuse me, gentlemen. This is our first time around and I want to get to Senator Cannon. Senator Cannon.

TARGETS RECOMMENDED 2 YEARS AGO ONLY NOW BEING APPROVED.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would like to go back to a question that Senator Smith asked and ask it in a little different form. I don't know that I understood your answer. Senator Smith asked you why targets were just now being released that had been on the list for 2 years. You answered that in the context that this was part of the stepped up pressure that has been applied consistently over a period of time.

That raises the question in my mind as to why these particular targets? In other words, many targets had been added to the list as a part of the stepped up pressure, let's say, but not all of the targets were targets that had been on the recommended list of the Joint Chiefs for a couple of years. Would you address yourself to that point?

General JOHNSON. Well, I think that there are two points to be made. The first is that the extension of the target system; that is, striking targets that have not been struck before, is consistent with and compatible with the policy of gradually increasing pressure that was adopted 2 years ago. Now with respect to which targets are struck, which I interpret your question to be——

Senator CANNON. That is correct.

General JOHNSON. The intelligence that we have keeps changing all the time—as we take pictures, as we get information from the north—as to which are important targets. [Deleted] the timing of the strike to the best of our ability is made consistent with the intelligence that is available when the strike is directed; and even then as wide a latitude as possible is given to the operating commander out there so that he can take advantage of his latest intelligence.
Senator Cannon. I can understand that, and I think that helps bring into sharper focus Senator Smith's initial question, and that is you have some targets now on the list that are just now being released. At the same time, there are some targets not yet released that have been on the list for a period of 2 years.

General Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. While you have these changing targets you have added targets to the list that have been released as part of the stepped up process. This, I think, gets to the very important question of why these particular targets which had been on the recommended list for a 2-year period were not added to the list before this time in the process of stepping up.

Now if you want to just say that was a political decision, if that is the answer, why that is up to you, General, but I would like to know what your views are.

JCS UNANIMOUS IN RECOMMENDING "SHARP" BLOW 2 YEARS AGO

General Johnson. I come back to my initial response to Senator Smith's question, which was that there were two views at the onset of the air campaign. One, that a sharp blow be struck, and that the significant targets within the six target systems be hit in as short a time as possible, and that then an effort be maintained to keep them out of action following the initial strikes made against them. The decision was made to make a graduated attack against those targets, against substantially the same targets. Now, there have been targets added to the list since that time, and there have been targets removed from the list since that time, depending upon the intelligence available, and as time has gone on, what I call deepening the strike against these systems has taken place.

The targets that have been added in recent weeks are compatible I think with that policy of graduated response or gradually increasing pressures that was adopted 2 years ago.

Senator Cannon. When you say that there were two views, one for the sharp attack and one for the graduated attack, do you mean there were two views within the Joint Chiefs?

General Johnson. No. There was a unanimous meeting of minds within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Cannon. The Joint Chiefs were unanimous; were they not?

General Johnson. For a sharp blow.

Senator Cannon. For a sharp attack and sharp blow, and then keeping the pressure up.

General Johnson. That is correct.

Senator Cannon. As I understand it, are 57 in number, is that correct?

General Johnson. I believe that is correct. I think that is what Mr. McNamara testified on Thursday.

Senator Cannon. I believe that is correct. Now I would like to ask you this: Do you believe these are the same? Now I would like to ask you this: Do you believe these are the same significant military targets on that list of 57 at the present time?
General Johnson. I come back to the point here as to the relative nature of all of these targets. Certainly, one can’t say that North Vietnam is an industrial society. They have a very minor industrial capacity. On the other hand, what they have is important to them, and what is important to them then should be important to us as a target for attack or a target to destroy.

Now on the 57 targets, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 10th of August, which was the day I returned from South Vietnam, had a special meeting in the morning and we considered these 57 targets, and we thought that they should be struck, all of them, not from the point of view of the importance of each single target by itself, but from the point of view of the importance of the package of targets to the total effort.

As I indicated earlier this morning, we have tended to compartmentalize the various elements of this war without paying adequate attention to all of the interrelationships between all of the elements of the war.

Senator Cannon. There are unapproved targets on the list now that have been on the JCS recommended list for 2 years, are there not?

General Johnson. That is correct.

Senator Cannon. Do you think, in your opinion, that the striking of all or part of these 57 targets would have any significant effect on the termination of the conflict over there?

General Johnson. Would you define what you mean by “significant effect”?

Senator Cannon. You use your own interpretation and answer the question.

NEED FOR UNRELENTING PRESSURE

General Johnson. I believe that the striking of these targets would add to the burden that we have imposed on North Vietnam, but I don’t believe that anyone can determine the point at which they will break. It is something like the repetitive strokes of a jackhammer; if you will. At some point the concrete begins to break up, and I think that it is this continuing and unrelenting pressure that will eventually bring us to a conclusion. Unless we maintain that pressure, I think that we simply are leading to an extension of the time over which a lesser pressure must be applied.

Senator Cannon. And we know that at the present level of pressure they have not broken. That pressure has not been sufficient at this time to cause them to break.

General Johnson. That is correct, but we also know that as the pressure has gradually increased, they have had to divert more and more of their man power resources to their own internal problems, and they have had to resort to lower levels, lower age groups in order to support their forces in the south, so that I think that the pressure is telling, and I think that the answer is to increase the pressure more.

Senator Cannon. And do you think that increasing the pressure more would add to their cost of infiltration of supplies, equipment and men to South Vietnam?

General Johnson. I think there is little doubt but what it would add to their cost, and add to their difficulties.
Senator Cannon. In your judgment would blockading the Port of Haiphong, substantially reduce the supplies to North Vietnam, and thereby have a significant effect on their ability to furnish the support in South Vietnam?

General Johnson. I did not catch the first part of the question. I wonder if you would repeat it.

Senator Cannon. I asked if blockading the port of Haiphong would substantially reduce the infiltration of supplies into North Vietnam and correspondingly their ability to furnish support in South Vietnam?

General Johnson. Not necessarily. It should reduce the supplies into North Vietnam, although the North Vietnamese could use alternate means; that is, they could be off-loaded in China, they could be brought down by small craft, they could be off-loaded off-shore into small craft, and brought in over the beaches, as we have done in times past. But this will require an enormous increase in the manpower required to do it, which we don't think they have.

It will also result in some loss, because the weather is not always favorable for this type of operation, and it must introduce a time delay when those supplies are going to be available for their forces. So, on balance, adding all these things up, I believe that there would be some loss, although it is possible that they might conceivably be able to maintain substantially the same volume.

I would like to correct the record on one thing. You inquired about these 57 targets, and in responding I indicated that we addressed 57 targets on the 10th of August. We actually recommended 70 on the 10th of August, and since that time 13 more have been approved for strike. I just want to get the record correct.

**NUMBER OF TARGETS**

Senator Cannon. On the 8th of August, 16 were released. We started our hearings the 9th of August. On the 10th of August you had a reassessment of the targeting. After that 11 were released, then two more released, to bring it down to a total of 57.

General Johnson. Fifty-seven now, that is correct.

Senator Cannon. So when we met on the 10th of August there were actually 70 targets.

General Johnson. Under consideration. I just want the record to be clear on that.

Senator Miller. Would the Senator yield on that point? On the 8th of August there were how many?

General Johnson. Excuse me, Senator Miller?

Senator Miller. How many were there on the 8th of August?

General Johnson. I can't answer the question of my own knowledge.

Senator Cannon. I think I can answer it for you. Prior to the release of the 8th of August, there were 86 targets; 16 were released on the 8th of August. We started our hearings on the 9th. On the 10th the Joint Chiefs met, considered the list again, and thereafter 11 targets were next released, and then two more were released that, and the list now, as I understand it, is at 57 at this time.

General Johnson. Exactly.
Senator Miller. So that, as of the date before these hearings commenced, there were 86 targets, is that what the Senator says?

Senator Cannon. That is my understanding.

Mr. Kendall. It I may intervene, I think there were actually more than that but in the meantime there was some reassessment that resulted in this operating target list. Is that accurate?

General Johnson. That is a term that has been used, although I am not sure that this is one that Admiral Sharp has accepted.

Senator Stennis. All right, Senator, your time is up but, if you have another question or two that you want to ask, you may. You have been waiting a long time here. Do you have another question or two?

**Bombing Has Helped: “Hold Down” Casualties**

Senator Cannon. Yes, sir, just one more question. In your judgment, General, has the stepped-up pressure campaign of bombing in the North helped reduce our casualties in the South?

General Johnson. Are you speaking of the stepped-up campaign since roughly the 1st of August or the 7th or 8th of August?

Senator Cannon. I wouldn’t necessarily break it off right at that point, but has the continual stepping up of the air campaign, in your judgment, helped reduce our casualties in the South?

General Johnson. I would say “reduced” means that we have come down from a higher level and I don’t think this is demonstrable. I believe that the bombing in the North and the continual increased pressure there has helped hold down the casualties in the South compared to those that we might otherwise have expected.

Senator Cannon. I will accept that definition. That is what I wanted. Thank you very much.

Senator Stennis. Senator Symington.

**Air Campaign Essential Complement**

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr., Chairman.

General Johnson, it is a pleasure to see you again, sir. I read your statement over the weekend. The last line worried me.

“Although the air campaign in the North cannot by itself achieve our objectives in the South, it is an essential complement of the total military effort in Southeast Asia.”

Is there anybody that you know who feels that the air campaign in the North, by itself, can achieve our objectives in the South?

General Johnson. No, but there has been a great deal of comment made that because men and material are still coming South, that the air campaign has not been effective, and my point is that it was never designed to stop the flow. It was designed to interfere with, and interrupt the flow and to cause some reduction in the flow, and I think that it has achieved that objective.

Senator Symington. That is a good answer. As soon as anyone talks about using air power against more meaningful military targets in the North, some people say the Navy and the Air Force think they can do it all by themselves. That is not a fair deduction. Would you agree?
General JOHNSON. I would agree that it has no application within this context.

Senator SYMINGTON. This graduated attack business; as a military man with a lot of experience, where do you think Israel would be today if they had decided they would have a graduated attack policy against the Arab nations?

General JOHNSON. They would not have the victory under their belt that they have. I think we can go back into our own history. Actually, we had a man named Nathan Bedford Forrest who said it succinctly, "Get there first with the most." Senator JACKSON. "Firstest with the mostest."

Senator SYMINGTON. I remember what Lee said after Jackson was killed: Someone asked "Who's your best general?" General Lee replied "A man I have never met, Nathan Bedford Forrest."

What do you think of General Beach, out there in Hawaii, a friend of mine. Do you think he is good?

General JOHNSON. I think that is an unfair question to ask me, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why?

General JOHNSON. I recommended his promotion for four stars when he took over in Korea and I recommended his change of assignment from Korea to Hawaii, and of course I think he is good.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then you think it is a fair question?

General JOHNSON. Perhaps so.

Senator SYMINGTON. I mention him as an admirer of his, and did not know you were the one who recommended his fourth star. That is additional reason for my respect for you.

General JOHNSON. I didn't give it to him, sir. I recommended him.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand.

General JOHNSON. The Senate must confirm general officer promotions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. Well, we are always glad to come in, whenever asked.

General Beach, in a press conference in Hawaii recently, said with respect to possible further stopping the bombing over North Vietnam, "We are just condemning another 10,000 American servicemen to death if we did it. Would you agree with that?"

I higher casualties if uninterrupted flow of supplies to South

General JOHNSON. I cannot agree or disagree. I do not know over what period of time he was talking, over what period of time these casualties would occur, but I do believe that if we permit the uninterrupted flow of supplies to the South, inevitably we must have higher casualties in the South.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you read General Walt's testimony before the full Senate Armed Services Committee?

General JOHNSON. I have not.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mention Nathan Bedford Forrest. That always raises an interest on the part of the chairman because there is a fight on between Tennessee and Mississippi. Both claim him. You are a student of military history, and I would like to ask you this question.
"GRADUATED" MILITARY PRESSURE RARELY USED

Senator Symington. Do you know of any other war that succeeded with a policy of "graduated increase" of military pressure.

Start as far back as you want, say, Carthage, or any war where it was said we will start cutting you inch by inch, unless you behave in accordance with our wishes.

General Johnson. I think that the only one that one might equate to the situation in South Vietnam would be our own Indian wars. Even then, however, the actions taken within given areas had no restraint, but the tempo with which the West was settled was on a progressive basis. It kept moving out gradually to somewhat the same extent the Russians pushed out through Siberia from about 1740 or thereabouts, pushing their lines out and settling behind their forces as they moved. But that is probably not a direct analogy.

So I would have to answer your question no. When force has been applied, generally it has been applied faster and in greater quantity.

Senator Symington. As I understand it, the two wars that come to your mind would be the Russians pushing out their boundaries and the United States pushing out its boundaries.

General Johnson. And they were not really wars.

Senator Symington. They were colonization efforts; were they not, the taking of territory?

General Johnson. Yes, although our colonization effort has acquired the term the Indian campaigns.

Senator Symington. Yes, but there is no desire on our part to establish any colony out in Southeast Asia, is there?

General Johnson. None.

Senator Symington. What worries some of us has to do with the philosophy that is developing with respect to air power, the effort, continuing effort, to denigrate air power, as both immoral and ineffective. One reason perhaps is that the only two nuclear weapons ever used in anger, were dropped from an airplane. The chances of that ever happening again would be most remote as against a silo, or a tube on a submarine.

One reason I have changed my position with respect to the Vietnam war, no dove but no longer a hawk, is that we have lost many fliers over North Vietnam. But their casualties have been nothing as compared to the number we have lost in South Vietnam. Our fliers are regularly assigned to do their job. Some of them protested bitterly to me that the targets they were being allowed to hit were meaningless. The ground generals, and I have talked to the best of my knowledge to just about all of them, who have been leading the fighting in South Vietnam, have all emphasized that they would have had less casualties if the Air Force and Navy had been allowed to take out the arms and ammunition at the source, where it is coming into North Vietnam.

That is what has been chilling me out on this whole operation, in the north which in effect guarantees more casualties in the south.

Who started this? Where did the concept of gradual increased power, everybody with little pins to show what was going to be hit on Thursday, then what was going to be hit Friday. Where did this concept of "gradualism" originate?
General Johnson: I do not know that it could be pinned down to any single person or even groups of people—any definite agency within the Government is what I mean by groups of people. [Deleted] the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered a variety of methods by which power might be applied, and one was by gradually increasing pressure.

**JCS RECOMMENDED AGAINST "GRADUALISM"**

Senator Symington: Did you recommend that as the best plan?
General Johnson: We did not. We recommended against it.
Senator Symington: That is most interesting.
General Johnson: We felt that it permitted the enemy to accommodate, and that it is not the most effective use of power and would not be the most effective use of the power that we had available at that time [deleted].

Senator Symington: The pilots themselves, and I am quoting from direct talks with them, protested bitterly that the targets they were being allowed to hit were meaningless. They pointed out that what they could hit slowly increased, the way it worked was that the enemy automatically geared up with better defenses.

As one pilot said about the few miles he was allowed to hit one on railroad line, "going into it now is like going into a sheet of flame." Other pilots said it was worse, antiercraft than anything they had found in Germany. We gave the enemy a chance to build his defenses.

Now the story is in some quarters that we do not want to risk the lives of the pilots, but it seems to me that policy is a little late in being arrived at.

**CINCPAC RECOMMENDS TO JCS**

What is the relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with CINCPAC?

General Johnson: By DOD directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in the chain of command to CINCPAC. CINCPAC reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Symington: When Admiral Sharp recommends targets to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are those targets considered, discussed and accepted or rejected by the Joint Chiefs before forwarded to higher authority?

General Johnson: Admiral Sharp actually recommends packages of targets periodically to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When he comes in with a package they generally are discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They will come in a message. The Chairman will have an analysis made of them by the Joint Staff, the members of the Joint Staff who work on these things come into a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, describe the targets, describe the impact of striking the targets on the total air effort and the Joint Chiefs of Staff then formulate a recommendation.

Sometimes Admiral Sharp comes in with a single target or two targets. Last week, for example, when I was Acting Chairman, he came in with a single target.

Knowing the outlook of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to this target, I did not consult with them. I started moving, trying to get an approval of what he had asked.
SHARP IN CHARGE OF "OPERATING" ROOM

Senator Symington. Admiral Sharp is in effect, the surgeon in the operating room, the head surgeon with respect to the operations against North Vietnam. He controls the airstrikes of both the Air Force and the Navy on North Vietnam, except for a few miles north of the DMZ; is that correct?

General Johnson. No, sir. I would say he is in charge of the operating room, but the surgeons themselves are the 7th Fleet and the 7th Air Force, and they actually do the——.

Senator Symington. I accept your correction, but Sharp is in charge of the overall operation, is he not?

General Johnson. He has the responsibility for the air campaign, yes, sir.

Senator Symington. Now it has been my experience in business, as well as in the executive branch of the Government, that if you have a good man, you do not first give him the job and then tell him how you want him to do it down to the last detail. You trust him enough to let him handle the details of the job he has been assigned, or else you get another man and then trust that other man.

Why do you think so many of the targets that CINCPAC has recommended in North Vietnam have been rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or higher authority? To me this is the thrust of much of the problem under discussion today. If he is not the right man to recommend these targets, with people like General Ryan and General Beach out there, why do you not relieve him and get a man you do trust. If he is the right man, however, why do you constantly forbid him to do what he says he needs to do in order to bring about the success you have asked him to achieve?

General Johnson. There is no simple answer to that rather complex question, Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. I do not think it complex. It might be hard to answer, but I think it is a fair one to ask.

In business, you hire a man and pay him on the basis of results. You do not tell him all the minute details as to how he is to conduct his job. I just do not see why it is that we here on this committee, for the first time find out that a great many targets recommended by the man who supervises the details of the operation were rejected by his own military conferences, or somebody else; and he is not even given the reasons for the rejection of a target like the Phuc Yen Airfield.

General Johnson. I think that there are basically three reasons.

No. 1 and the basic reason— I should change "basic" to "underlying" reason—is that since the inception of the air campaign and since the decision was made for a graduated increase in pressure, there has been a continuing contention as to what is graduated, what tempo should be maintained. In light of the fact that in the very beginning the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for a sharp blow, this obviously would be the proposal of the field commanders as well, and the recommendations coming in to the JCS would therefore be for as fast a tempo as is possible.
Now the second reason then is that as the recommendations come in, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, being closer to the place where the final decision is going to be made, believe we have a little bit better appreciation of the tempo that will be accepted by the decision authority.

Now when Admiral Sharp comes in and asks for 10 targets, the Joint Chiefs of Staff might then make a judgment that this tempo is too fast. Perhaps five would be considered acceptable and the JCS recommendation would be made on that basis.

And then the third thing is, there are some kinds of targets that Admiral Sharp has proposed with which we simply do not agree. You are undertaking a rather enormous project.

For example, [deleted] I do not think that is a profitable undertaking, especially in terms of the effort that would be required to make it effective over a long period of time.

Senator Symington. I am clear now. The reason quite a few of the CINCPAC targets have been rejected by the Joint Chiefs is because you knew that they did not conform to the broad overall policy of graduated response; is that correct?

General Johnson. Yes, I would say that is correct.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

General Johnson. Let me alter the term "graduated response," which I did not use. Let me change that to "gradually increasing pressures." The recommendation did not conform to the gradually increasing pressures.

Senator Symington. In December 1965 many pilots asked me to see if we could not get permission to take out the Phuc Yen Airfield. The same thing was true in December 1966. Admiral Sharp testified before this committee that he consistently recommended taking it out.

When we asked him why it was not taken out, he said he had not been informed as to why his request had been disapproved.

Do you think it good management, when a man as high as this admiral is told "No" on a request which he considers essential to protect lives and treasures, in that order; but he is not even told why his request was rejected? Why should this able and dedicated admiral, who has working for him a four-star Army general and a four-star Air Force general, not be told why the recommendations of him and his staff are considered wrong?

General Johnson. I would agree that it would be desirable to always inform commanders of the reasons why requests are denied.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. I am going to take a little time at this point.

Let me observe, members of the subcommittee, that I am compelled to ask the general and the members to excuse me at a minute or two before 12. I have other matters that I must attend to.

Senator Symington is going to preside and I hope that counsel will get a chance to ask the questions that he has prepared for the subcommittee.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to proceed now.
Senator STENNIS. Let me complete my comment. I say that because they represent questions for all of us.

General, with all deference to you, I think your testimony has been good, but with great respect and deference to you, the term "gradually increasing pressure" that you used in response to Senator Symington's question seems in itself to recognize the need for more bombing. We talk about increased pressure, and I totally disagree with the idea of it being so gradual.

I think that points up the fact that even the terms that are used to express that present policy show that there has got to be a stepping up of the bombing and the military and political pressure on North Vietnam.

I just cannot get away from the idea that that is necessary, and the sooner the better. That is the only way to terminate successfully this terrific fighting we have in South Vietnam.

I do not believe you have been asked much about specific targets this morning, to get your views on that. You have mentioned the [deleted] just a minute ago. Now what about this Haiphong Harbor? What is your military judgment about it? What do you think should be done there?

Certainly that is a fair question to you who are high up in the military profession and in responsible.

What do you think ought to be done there?

That will be my sole question at this time.

General JOHNSON. I believe that we should close the harbor at Haiphong [deleted].

I believe that by doing this we throw another very significant burden on the North Vietnamese in moving supplies into and distributing them within South Vietnam.

Senator STENNIS. Well, that is a very revealing answer. I am glad to get your opinion on this point. If it is agreeable to the subcommittee now, I would like to call on Mr. Kendall to ask some questions he has in mind for the subcommittee.

RECOMMENDATIONS IN 1965

Mr. KENDALL. General, we are delighted to have you with us again, sir. I would like to go back to this question of gradually increasing pressure, which, as I understand it, neither you nor the other Joint Chiefs supported. You preferred instead a sharp blow, as you have referred to it, against the six-target system.

As a part of this, I believe in the spring of 1965, in March or April, the Joint Chiefs recommended that a list of 64 targets be hit; is that correct, sir?

General JOHNSON. I would want to confirm numbers for the record, simply because my memory does not serve me with what numbers were agreed at any particular point in time, and there has been a great deal of discussion and to a degree dissension with regard to numbers at a particular point in time.

(Additional information is as follows:)

A review of JCS recommendations concerning attack of targets in NVN indicates that attack of the 64 JCS' targets was first recommended by the JCS
This recommendation remained valid in February and March of 1965. However, in response to specific requests from the Secretary of Defense, the JCS on 11 February 1965 provided an eight week program of air strikes against 34 fixed targets and 16 armed reconnaissance routes. On 25 March 1965 the JCS recommended air strikes against 30 bridges for strike in a three week time frame in April 1965.

Mr. Kendall. Well, whether 94 is correct——
General Johnson. But that is substantially correct.

Mr. Kendall. You did not at that time get approval for any of those, did you, sir?
General Johnson. In the spring of 1965?
Mr. Kendall. 1965, yes, sir.
General Johnson. I believe that at that time the bombing was restricted to an area immediately north of the demilitarized zone.

TWENTY-TWO JCS TARGETS HIT IN 1966

Mr. Kendall. And even during 1966, generally speaking, the bombing campaign was limited to LOC's substantially south of Hanoi and Haiphong, and the valuable targets in the northeast quadrant were not struck; is that correct, sir?
General Johnson. A substantial effort was made south of Hanoi and Haiphong, but there was also a fairly substantial effort northwest of Hanoi on the rail line leading to the northwest, but not to the northeast.

Mr. Kendall. And in 1966 the information that we have is that only 22 JCS targets were struck. Would that number be consistent with what you recall about it?
General Johnson. I am sure that your information is substantially correct. However, 22 targets, if they relate to your original 94, I would say is a fairly substantial number.

Mr. Kendall. I, of course, cannot relate it. I realize these things evolve and change, but the fact is that the greater part of the combat sortie effort in 1966 was in the armed reconnaissance role:
General Johnson. That is correct.

INEFFICIENT USE OF AIRPOWER IN 1966

Mr. Kendall. Of course, I am not depreciating the importance of that at all, but in any event on [deleted] Admiral Sharp advised General Wheeler that:

In the final analysis it must be concluded that in 1966 the [deleted] campaign did not apply adequate and steady pressure against the enemy. Imposed restrictions have resulted in an inefficient use of our air power.

Do you agree with that, sir?
General Johnson. Yes. I think that the major point of contention has been the rate at which pressures have been increased, and I think that the military commanders have chafed continually under a relatively low rate of increase of the pressure.

Mr. Kendall. What action did the Joint Chiefs take as a result of Admiral Sharp's message, if any?
General Johnson. I cannot tell you. I do not know from [deleted]. I do not know, however, from some one else's testimony, have you not?
This recommendation remained valid in February and March of 1965. However, in response to specific requests from the Secretary of Defense, the JCS on 11 February 1965 provided an eight week program of air strikes against 34 fixed targets and 16 armed reconnaissance routes. On 25 March 1965 the JCS recommended air strikes against 30 bridges for strike in a three week time frame in April 1965.

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General Johnson. I cannot tell you. I do not know from [deleted]. I can look it up and provide it for the record. I am sure you already have it, however, from someone else's testimony, have you not?
Mr. Kendall. I had more in mind his message of [deleted] rather than any specific action related to that particular message really.

General Johnson. I would have to provide it for the record. I do not know.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

The concept of operations contained in CINCPAC's message of [deleted] was carefully evaluated by the JCS, both conceptually and in terms of specific targets recommended for attack.

The specific targets nominated by CINCPAC for strike were analyzed by members of the Joint Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency for purposes of further evaluation and assessment. Recommendations for attack of many of these targets were included in subsequent [deleted] proposals. In addition, [later] JCS formal proposals recommended attacking the NVN ports as well as certain other militarily significant target systems in NVN.

In summary, this CINCPAC message was specifically considered in the preparation of subsequent JCS target recommendations as well as broader proposals which were forwarded to higher authorities.

Increased Casualties. II Bombing Suspended

Mr. Kendall. This question partially covers some ground that has already been covered. I want to ask it in this particular language and see what your answer would be. If there was a suspension of the air strikes, and if the North Vietnamese took full advantage of the permissive environment, that the absence of the air strikes would afford to them to move men and material, and do whatever else is necessary, then certainly increased casualties in the South would result, would they not?

General Johnson. We believe they would, both as a consequence of their ability to provide additional manpower that presently is used to repair and replace the damage that the bombing is doing in the North, and that is presently used in compensating for the disruptions to their own internal distribution system. In addition, based on the experience over the TET period and the increase thereafter in the number of artillery, mortar, and rocket rounds that were received, we would expect more and heavier armament to be used. If there were no interruptions to the movement of that material to the south, this would result in increased casualties.

Now, the degree to which casualties might be increased I do not think anyone can say.

Mr. Kendall. But as a military man, and recognizing that these people are resourceful, you would assume that they would take advantage of whatever opportunities we gave them?

General Johnson. We have already had that experience with the TET standoff last February.

Mr. Kendall. Now, is any estimate available of the percent of war materiel and equipment supplied by the U.S.S.R. and the CHICOM's which is destroyed after it reaches North Vietnam but before it is infiltrated into South Vietnam?

General Johnson. None that I have seen. We are continually searching for that kind of information. [Deleted.]
Mr. Kendall. What is the estimate that you receive as to the actual amount of material and supplies which move from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in support of the VC's and the North Vietnamese forces and the war effort in general?

General Johnson. The estimates will vary between as little as 15 tons and as high as 85 tons. I do not have confidence in any of the estimates.

First, I believe that there are more supplies coming in in small increments from the sea than we have been able to identify. Here I am talking about half a dozen mortar rounds under a load of charcoal in a sampan. These sampans are just virtually impossible to handle because of the enormous number of small craft that are in the waters off South Vietnam and in the rivers in the Southern Delta area.

In addition, I do not believe that we quite appreciate the extent to which manpower moves things in Asia nor the loads that manpower can handle on a continuing basis.

We would not think, for example, of hauling a lot of supplies on a regular basis by bicycle. Yet we have good evidence that, and you will recall that in about Christmas of 1964, I believe, East Germany donated 5,000 bicycles to North Vietnam—they will carry anywhere from 400 to 600 pounds by bicycle. On this basis, it does not take many bicycles to move a fairly substantial quantity of supplies.

Senator Symington. Would counsel yield?

General Johnson. The total number of supplies moved into South Vietnam is awfully difficult to determine.

Senator Symington. Secretary McNamara testified there were 4,700 out of 5,800 tons coming through the Harbor of Haiphong; but he said that if the harbor was knocked out, it would not be effective militarily, because the enemy would use the railroads and the roads.

But, if we took out the harbor, I asked, and the railroad, would that not be important? The Secretary said, well they could still use the roads. The effect of this testimony was frustrating. In effect the Secretary said there was no way to stop the infiltration of these weapons because you could not stop the roads, because they have so many roads; also that they are good at putting things in sampans, and taking things down by bicycle; and they are very courageous and hard working, so there just was not any way to stop them.

Well, with that disheartening premise, why do we not agree to negotiate on any basis and get out? If it is true there is no way to stop these supplies coming down from the north, then we have no chance for any permanent success, so why don't we get out?

COMBINATION OF PRESSURES

General Johnson. I think I have to come back to the statement that I made earlier, that attempting to put each of these activities into little compartments and to treat them in isolation simply is not going to give the proper perspective of what goes on. I think that we have to bring pressure to bear on every single aspect and every single element of this war and that the combination of these pressures eventually is going to bring us to a point of success.
Senator THURMOND. Will counsel yield for just a minute?
Mr. KENDALL. Certainly, Senator.

EXTENSIVE USE OF BICYCLES

Senator THURMOND. Did you mean that one bicycle with one rider—

General JOHNSON. He does not ride it, Senator, he pushes it, but one bicycle with one man.
Senator THURMOND. One bicycle pushed by one rider?
General JOHNSON. Yes.
Senator THURMOND. One pusher would push 400 to 600 pounds?
General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator THURMOND. Is that the ordinary bicycle or is that a specially built bicycle?
General JOHNSON. No, sir; it is an ordinary bicycle, as I understand it.
Senator THURMOND. The reason I say that is that I ride a bicycle myself quite frequently and the amount you mentioned 400 to 600 pounds, is amazing. I wonder what kind of tires they use?
General JOHNSON. I do not know. As I understand it, they do not use the balloon tire we have, they use the thin tire that comes on the European bicycle.
Senator THURMOND. And it will carry that much weight, 400 to 600 pounds?
General JOHNSON. That is what our report is.

(Additional information follows:)

A recent infiltration study completed in May of this year [deletions] states the following concerning carriers used in infiltration: 'The carriers used to transport supplies into South Vietnam range from human porters to modern trucks. Most carriers are modified in some way since a pack or load carrying rig is generally attached to make transport easier. Pack bicycles are modified by the removal of the driver's seat and the installation of bamboo rods in one handle bar and in the former position of the seat. These modified pack bicycles are capable of carrying 525 pounds of supplies. The tires are non-pneumatic.'

Senator THURMOND. That is very interesting. I did not dream they could carry that much weight.
Thank you very much.

Mr. KENDALL. In connection with the Port of Haiphong, General, in the month of June the seaborne imports were estimated at 59,000 metric tons of foodstuff, 63,600 metric tons of miscellaneous and general merchandise, plus POL which has averaged 46,000 metric tons during the first 6 months of 1967.

Would not those figures alone indicate that it was of major importance that we make a major effort to stop this influx of material.

HAIPHONG SHOULD BE CLOSED

General JOHNSON. Counsel, I do not think you have to develop this point with me. I testified earlier that I think Haiphong should be closed.

Mr. KENDALL. I wanted to get the figures in the record, General.

Now, with reference to the target system, do you not also have a problem in your restrike authority? In other words, getting initial
approval is not always the only problem, because of the necessity to
restrike a target which has previously been hit, and often or on many
occasions you are not given restrike authority? Is this not also a
problem in the entire equation?

General Johnson. It is a problem, but I do not believe of the pro-
portions that you have indicated, because the restrike authority
generally is limited to the restricted area around Hanoi and Haiphong.

Mr. Kendall. But that is where many of your important targets
are, sir.

General Johnson. That is where some of the important targets are,
but the restrike authority is not of the same proportions as the initial
strike authority which applies to all of the targets.

Mr. Kendall. Well, for example, Admiral Sharp said:

The remaining unauthorized targets are the most critical targets in North
Vietnam and for the most part are located in prohibited or restricted areas around
Hanoi and Haiphong.

So those are the targets which, when approved—he was talking
about those which have not been approved—but those are the types
of targets that you do not get restrike authority on, or automatic
restrike authority.

General Johnson. Not in every case.

TARGETS SHOULD NOT BE ANALYZED IN ISOLATION

Mr. Kendall. Bearing in mind what Admiral Sharp said, when
General Wheeler testified, he said that the 70 targets on the JCS list—
which has now been reduced to 57—were worthwhile, and he said in
addition there is "no question about it."

Another witness who appeared before me said that it was his opinion
that "Many if not most of these targets are relatively insignificant
targets."

What is your judgment about them, sir?

General Johnson. I come back to the point that I have made
several times earlier, that if you consider each of these targets in
isolation, and its impact alone on the total North Vietnamese war
effort, it is possible to categorize them as not of major importance.

But when one puts them all together and considers the interrela-
ship between all of the targets, that it is necessary to bring pressure
to bear on all of them, and that is, in my judgment, why these are
important targets. They are a part of a whole mosaic, and it is im-
portant that we strike the whole mosaic and not just some parts of it.

Mr. Kendall. Would I be safe in assuming that the Joint Chiefs
would not, at least knowingly, recommend targets which either
individually or as a package did not have some military significance?

General Johnson. I think that is a fair statement.

Mr. Kendall. Did you in response to Senator Stennis' question
indicate what you believed was the best method to close or neutralize
Haiphong?

General Johnson. Only partially. [Deleted]

Mr. Kendall. [Deleted.]
Mr. Kendall. [Deleted.]

General Johnson. [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall. What is your idea about the best way to take out Haiphong or neutralize it and close it. I do not necessarily mean bombing the docks. Mining?

General Johnson. [Deleted.]

Obstacle system did not originate with military

Mr. Kendall. General, I would like to ask you about the [deleted] project, how it originated, its relationship, if any, to the possible cessation of the air war against the north, and your professional judgment as to its value from a military standpoint, particularly from the standpoint of being a possible substitute for the air war. Did I ask too many questions at once?

General Johnson. No.

My introduction to the [deleted] project, and I must qualify this, this is the best of my recollection, was a description of it by the Chairman in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its source was not specified. I am not exactly sure of its source now, although I believe it came out of a meeting of a group of scientists somewhere last summer. I am not sure whether the meeting was on the east coast or on the west coast. I have been led to believe at one time that it was an east coast meeting.

Mr. Kendall. But it did not originate with the military then, as far as you know?

General Johnson. The [deleted] concept did not originate with the military to the best of my knowledge, at least it did not originate within the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the best of my knowledge. Now it may have originated with the military, who may have been associated with the study group or individual members of the group.

Now, what will its impact be on the bombing? Theoretically it is not supposed to interfere with, or alter any on-going actions in North or South Vietnam. It is my own belief that at its conception this project was designed to be an alternate for the bombing, although I know of no one who has ever made such a statement. I am just suspicious of it myself.

Mr. Kendall. A suspicion which I share, sir.

Minimum effectiveness considering cost

General Johnson. Next, just how effective will this be? I think it is going to have minimum effectiveness for the cost that has been associated with it. These costs range anywhere from [deleted] dollars up to—I should alter that to say cost estimates vary from [deleted] depending upon what you associate with the costs.

[Deleted.]

My own description of it is that it is like closing the window and leaving the door open.
Mr. Kendall. What are the intelligence assessments of the likely U.S.S.R. and the Chicom reactions, (a) to an increase in the air war against North Vietnam from the standpoint of what would be their breaking point that you think might provoke them to open intervention with forces of their own?

General Johnson. I do not understand the question.

You say what is the intelligence assessment with regard to what is the breaking point in the air war against North Vietnam which would induce the Chinese or the Russians to come in?

Mr. Kendall. Yes, sir.

General Johnson. What do you mean, breaking point?

Mr. Kendall. I mean is there an intelligence estimate that some type of bombing that we might do at some point might provoke or would probably provoke Red China or the U.S.S.R. to intervene openly in the war?

General Johnson. I cannot answer the question. I know of no intelligence estimate. I just cannot answer the question.

I can provide an answer for the record, but I would have to do some research in order to do it.

Mr. Kendall. No, that will be all right, sir. I though you were privy to estimates of that type.

General Johnson. Well, the estimates, there are a great variety of estimates that are made. [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall. [Deleted.]

General Johnson. I think we have to distinguish between intelligence estimates and a whole variety of judgments coming from many sources.

Now with regard to formal intelligence estimates, and this is the basis on which I made my earlier answer, [deleted.]

Now with regard to opinions, there is a wide variety of opinion and judgment as to whether or not at some point the Chinese would be forced to react or the Soviets would be forced to react. [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall. What you have said is generally your opinion, I assume?

General Johnson. [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall. Thank you, sir.

General Johnson. [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall. One or two further questions, and this relates to what you have been asked about the additional forces that you require, some [deleted] from the strategic reserve. I know you and I have discussed this on several occasions over the past few years. I understand your position, but I have always expressed the apprehension that it is dangerous to deplete your strategic reserve without taking some steps to replenish it, which we have not really done yet.

I am wondering if you have a little more apprehension about the situation than you did the last time we discussed this, because obviously you are getting depleted more and more as far as your forces back here in CONUS are concerned.

General Johnson. At the present time in the Strategic Reserve we have the 82d Airborne Division, which is in first-class shape.
We have the 101st Airborne Division minus a brigade, which is at the present time substantially in the same shape as the 82d Airborne Division.

Now, this is for an emergency deployment. It ignores the deployment criteria that we have set up that a man does not go back to Vietnam inside a 25-month turnaround period, and the Strategic Reserve that I am talking about represents the emergency actions that our country might have to take in the event of some incident occurring beyond that presently occurring in Southeast Asia, where we would go to an all-out war and a mobilization accompanying it.

Mr. Kendall. But the 101st is scheduled to go to Vietnam so you are going to lose them.

General Johnson. You are talking about the Strategic Reserve now?

Mr. Kendall. I am talking about the prospects for the future.

General Johnson. If you are talking about looking ahead, that is something else.

Mr. Kendall. With the new drawdown?

POSTURE ERODED WITH DEPLOYMENT OF 101ST AIRBORNE

General Johnson. Let me complete.
[Deleted.]

Now, looking ahead, we have a tentative, and I emphasize the word "tentative," authorization for the activation of an additional division. To do this there will be some absorption of a part of the support structure in terms of total manpower spaces. But with what we have in reserve, we believe that we have a building process underway that will result in a recovery in [deleted]. The posture of the strategic reserve will be eroded [deleted] with the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division, if it is deployed.

That decision still has not been made, because there is a capabilities conference going on in Hawaii right now, and the results of that conference must come back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who must act upon it, and then make their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense as to the specific units and as to the timing of the departure of those units.

Mr. Kendall. Of course, if you do not take the 101st or 82d, you cannot get there from here, can you? You cannot get that [deleted].

General Johnson. You can if you take a long enough period of time. [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall. In connection with this entire matter, Mr. Chairman, and this relates to Senator Smith's question in talking about the [deleted] manpower requirement that the Joint Chiefs favor, this is a response from General Wheeler to a previous question:

On April 29, 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted the recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on force requirements in Southeast Asia for fiscal year 1968. [Deleted.]

That was based on the [deleted] ceiling which you could not get without those actions. And therefore you are back to the 525,000; is that correct, sir?
General Johnson. Not entirely correct. We could not meet it in the time frame that he requested.

Mr. Kendall. [Deleted.]

General Johnson. That is correct.

Replacement Situation

Mr. Kendall. Now one further question. I think I will ask you to answer this for the record in view of the fact that the time is drawing short.

Admiral Sharp indicated that the replacement problem is going to be a big problem in future months, particularly with this added build-up, and suggested that we address the question to you.

General Johnson. I can answer the question generally and then I can give you a specific answer for the record, if you wish.

Mr. Kendall. All right.

General Johnson. The replacement problem is not of major proportions for us, because generally we have taken actions ahead of time to provide the replacements, with the exception of certain categories of personnel who require a very long leadtime. Now there is not much that you can do about producing infantry majors, for example, because what we are suffering from here is an ROTC shortage way back in the early sixties, and you cannot offset a shortage that occurred at that time.

With regard to pilots, we have a 10-month leadtime on the production of pilots, so we are turning them around pretty fast. But we have an expansion program now that will get us out of the woods in [deleted].

With regard to the junior enlisted leadership, we are initiating what we call a Combat Leaders' Training Course on the 8th of September at Fort Benning, and we are preparing an additional leaders' course for other skills where we have indications that our retention factors are not going to be enough to maintain the strength that we need. But we do not believe that we are going to be in any significant trouble with regard to our replacements, except relatively narrow categories of personnel, and then for a period of time. But we are taking offsetting actions.

Mr. Kendall. Between now and [deleted].

General Johnson. No, between now and [deleted]. We have got other measures that we can take and that we have under consideration.

With regard to pilots the same thing is true.

(Additional information follows:)

The Army tour policy is one year in short tour areas, and we try to maintain a minimum of 25 months in the base (CONUS or long tour areas) between short tours. Personnel are returned to short tour under a policy of longest back, first to return.

Without extraordinary measures we estimate that approximately 33,000 personnel who have less than 25 months in the base would be returned involuntarily to short tour in FY 68 to meet our higher skill requirements. However, we are taking a number of measures to reduce this number substantially. These measures are: a program of advanced skill training for selected new personnel, use of less critical skills and lower grades as substitutes for our shortage skills where feasible, and development of incentives to encourage personnel in Vietnam to extend their tours.
Mr. Kendall. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, General. As usual I enjoyed talking with you.

Senator Symington. General, we would like to finish with you this morning. I will ask a few questions. The United States has a gross national product of some $750 billion, a population of some 200 million. For some years we have been fighting a country with practically no gross national product with some 17 million people. Our failure to succeed is hurting our image, all over the world.

I reported back to the chairman of my committees earlier this year that hostilities were going to bust out any minute in the Middle East, because the Soviets would never give that kind of air force, plus submarine support, et cetera, to Nasser, unless they expected him to move. Until somebody, Gen. Moshe Dayan, or somebody, decided that graduated response was not the answer. I reported, "Look out, she is going to bust any time." That was last January.

With the United States putting in for defense over $70 billion a year, with all our experience in World War II, and with all our experience in Korea, why are we not getting anywhere out there? Why is it that we are putting out this gigantic effort, but getting so little, so terribly little results. It is what everybody wants to talk about when I go back to Missouri. The people are now beginning to realize we have shackled our seapower and shackled our airpower; and if you look at our defense structure as a team proposition, when you shackles air, and you shackles sea, you also shackles ground; else there is no true concept of the carrying out of a team.

What is it you think we can do, as a respected member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to get this whole situation on the rails. The people are not going to put up much longer with all this empirical stumbling around. Over the last weekend a former member, and a highly respected member, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said to me, "To hell with it. Let's get out of there with all these restraining rules." That is the first time a military man of his former position ever talked that way to me. Please comment on or off the record.

General Johnson. I am prepared to put it on the record.

Senator Symington. Fine.

Believes We Have Momentum Now

General Johnson. In the first place I think that we have to keep things in perspective, and I think that as a measuring point we have got to go back to the low point, which I established March 1965. You can take the 1st of July 1965 if you wish. At that time about 37 percent of the population was under Government control as best it could be determined then. Today—this is 2 years later—a little bit more than 63 percent of the people are under Government control. The increase in the last year has only been about 10 percent, but we made significant gains in the last half of calendar year 1965.

I think that now we have a momentum going for us out there on the ground that is not discernible here, and I think that the sad part of it is it is not being reported here. I think that we get very bad perspective in the reporting out of South Vietnam. When individuals go out there for 3 months, respected reporters and experienced reporters, and do stories in depth, they bring a perspective that the regular press corps out there or the regular TV people just do not provide.
I think there is another factor, and that is that the TV camera itself brings such a vivid picture that it inevitably creates an impression that this is the way it is everywhere in South Vietnam, and we forget that it does not even cover as much ground relatively speaking as a microscope.

Senator Symington: I agree, but how about that $70 billion annual cost to the American taxpayer?

General Johnson: In the first place $70 billion are not going into South Vietnam, and I do not think that a comparison of gross national product is a fair comparison to make. I think that we have to go back to the objective that we established when we began, and this was "no wider war." I do not know of anyone who has quarreled with that objective.

I think that we have to associate with it not only the things that we say we are going to do, which is substantially restore law and order within the geographic boundaries of South Vietnam, and permit the South Vietnamese to choose their own destiny without, as the President has said, staring down the barrel of an aggressor's gun.

Senator Symington: We have no wider war, and North Vietnam is part of South Vietnam.

THE "DON'TS" REALLY INFLUENCE THE SITUATION

General Johnson: Then we have to take a look at what we do not want to do. Many of our public officials have said we are not going to invade North Vietnam. We have said we do not want to overthrow the Government of North Vietnam. We said we are going to abide by the Geneva accords of 1954. We do not want to let us go into Laos. We have said we do not want a war with Cambodia. We have said we do not want to bring China into the war. We have said we do not want to bring Russia into the war.

So it is all the "don'ts" that are really doing the influencing in this situation. It is not the "do's." And I think that with regard to the "do's," we are making progress, and actually, with regard to the "don'ts" we have met the objectives there.

Senator Symington: I was going to ask whether you thought we were making progress with these "don'ts," but...

General Johnson: We have maintained the "don'ts," pretty well.

Senator Symington: Thank you. I am glad to see that.

Senator Thurmond: How old are you, Mr. Chairman?

General Johnson: I am glad to see some of these statements you are making. I was very interested in your statement on page 1, and I think it is important. I think the people and the Nation ought to understand this better. This is not just a war between North and South Vietnam. This is a war by the Communists, against the free world, and is another battle by the Communists to take over the world. North Vietnam was chosen as the place to fight it, just as Korea was chosen as a place to fight that war I think that might answer in part my good friend's question that he just asked you—my distinguished colleague, Senator Symington—that, with all of our resources and our population, why do we not win more quickly? That question is being asked by my people everywhere.
I try to explain to them that this is not just North Vietnam we are fighting. We are fighting the Soviet Union—not their manpower but their resources. We are fighting their war equipment, their surface-to-air missiles, their antiaircraft artillery; their Mig planes, their trucks and helicopters and so forth, and we are fighting Red China's resources which the Communist Chinese are able to provide.

I believe the record shows that the Soviets are furnishing about 80 to 85 percent of the war goods that enter North Vietnam, and Red China is furnishing practically the rest, with very little produced by North Vietnam.

AID COMES FROM WHOLE COMMUNIST BLOC

General Johnson. I think you would have to broaden that, sir, to include the whole Communist bloc, because there are things coming from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, aid of one kind or another.

Senator Thurmond. I was impressed with your statement that the war in Southeast Asia "is a single conflict, integrated militarily, geographically, politically, psychologically, and socially."

It is all one conflict and cannot be compartmentalized between North and South Vietnam.

General Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. It is an integrated conflict. You cannot separate it by saying that just a few soldiers are fighting in South Vietnam?

General Johnson. Yes, sir. I would go a step further and say that this is, as you indicated, a part of the pattern of Communist expansion, and that here the forces of the free world are confronted with a different pattern of aggression from that which we encountered in Korea. The commitment of major conventional forces in Korea was found by them to be unbearably expensive and one that did not achieve their objectives. After that they searched for some other method of achieving their ends. And in 1961 Mr. Kruschev put a name on those methods when he called them "wars of national liberation."

And so we are countering a new Communist tactic, which is endorsed by both the U.S.S.R., as "wars of national liberation," and by Communist China as "people's wars," and which are described by each of them as being the wave of the future. And it is important for us, if that part of the free world which is free now is to remain free, that we prove in Southeast Asia that we can defend against this kind of aggression.

Senator Thurmond. Do you consider that this war over there is just a civil war between the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese as some people try to portray it, or do you feel that this is another battle by the Communists in their overall goal to take over the world, even though the tactics have changed from what they were in Korea?

OVERT AGGRESSION—not a CIVIL WAR

General Johnson. This is not a civil war. It is an overt aggression directed from Hanoi and supported by the entire Communist bloc, East and West.
Senator Thurmond. It is another battle in the overall effort of the Communists to conquer the world, is it not? This is not just a war by North Vietnam is it, as you see it?

General Johnson. No. This is supported by the entire Communist bloc.

Senator Thurmond. The entire Communist bloc and therefore, a battle by the Communist world, is it not? It is a war supported by the Communist world, even though they may not be placing their soldiers or personnel there. It is a war that is supported by the Communist world—the Soviet Union, Red China and the satellites.

General Johnson. They are providing the material and they are providing the advisers. The U.S.S.R. is believed to have advisers in there, certainly in assisting the air defense forces.

Senator Thurmond. That is the message that ought to be made clear to the American people. It is not understood why a big nation like ours, with all of our resources and manpower, cannot go in and whip a little country like North Vietnam with only 17 million people. But that is not the battle. It is more than that. We are fighting more than just North Vietnam. We are fighting for more than just South Vietnam's right to remain free. We are fighting for our own and the free world's survival. It is a war of the Communists against the free world, and we are bearing the brunt of it.

VIECONAMISES CARRY HEAVIEST LOAD

General Johnson. We are bearing the brunt of it after the Vietnamese. I think proportionately the Vietnamese are carrying a heavier load than are we. Although there have been many criticisms to the effect that they are not, I believe that they are.

Senator Thurmond. I would not detract from what they are doing. I want to make that plain. Korea now has made a significant contribution in sending troops.

General Johnson. Korea is bearing a significant part and so is Australia.

Senator Thurmond. Australia and New Zealand are helping too, but if it were not for the United States, South Vietnam could not have withstood the assaults.

General Johnson. We have about the same relationship as we had to the Korean forces in Korea during the Korean war.

Senator Thurmond. And South Korea could not have held out without our help.

General Johnson. South Korea could not have defended itself alone.

Senator Thurmond. And South Vietnam could not without our help.

General Johnson. They could not do it alone.

Senator Thurmond. I think you have made a good statement on that point. Now, some people say that we should not bomb over there. I was interested in a statement that was made—you probably have seen it—by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of the Army forces in the Pacific. He said, "If we stop the bombing we are just condemning another 10,000 American servicemen to death."

I do not know how General Eisenhower arrived at that figure, but he was trying to express, as I construed it, the fact that the bombing is impor-
tant to saving American and South Vietnamese lives in South Vietnam, and that it is important that we keep it up. It is all one integrated effort, as you have expressed it. Is that the way you construe General Beach’s remark?

General Johnson. That is how I construe it. I responded to that question raised by Senator Symington a moment ago, and said I could not endorse the figures exactly. I think that General Beach was using them in an illustrative sense rather than as hard figures.

Senator Thurmond. I imagine so.

General Johnson. He is just showing the interrelationship between the air campaign in the north and the ground battle in the south.

Senator Thurmond. The integrated effort.

General Johnson. That is correct.

Senator Thurmond. It could be more than 10,000 or it could be less.

General Johnson. That is right.

**MUST CONTINUE BOMBING OR LOSE THOUSANDS OF MEN**

Senator Thurmond. But it is a statement that indicates that it is important for us to continue this bombing. Otherwise, we will lose thousands more American men; that is correct, is it not?

General Johnson. That is correct.

Senator Thurmond. You also say that:

Within the military share of the total effort, the results of the air campaign against North Vietnam have an effect on military operations in South Vietnam.

Certainly it has an effect. It has had a very vital effect. You state further that:

The air campaign is making it more difficult for the North Vietnamese to support enemy forces in the south. They have had to divert an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 personnel to full and part time war-related tasks to counteract the effects of the campaign.

That is a strong endorsement for continuing the air war. The enemy has had to divert 500,000 to 800,000 people because of this air campaign, and the American people ought to know that.

General Johnson. This is unclassified, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Thurmond. This is unclassified. Is there any reason why this cannot be stressed? I agree with what you said a few moments ago about the reporting of news from over there. I think it is horrible. It seems that the networks want to bring out anything they can find against us, such as a few civilians killed in North Vietnam. They seem to take the other side to show perhaps that we should not be there, or for some other obscure reason. I do not know what the reasons are, but it makes me very suspicious of what they are reporting for news.

I do not think they are reporting the truth and I do not think they are reporting accurately:

**ONLY REPORT PART OF TRUTH**

General Johnson. I think they are reporting the truth, Senator Thurmond, but I think that they are reporting only a part of the truth.

Senator Thurmond. Not all of the truth.

General Johnson. A very narrow part of it.
AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Thurmond. The reporting may be true, but they are not giving the whole story, and a half lie is worse than a whole lie. If something is completely false people can usually see through it, but when they just see a portion that they know is correct and then do not get all the facts, they are given a distorted view. Do you agree to that?

General Johnson. No; I agree that a half truth is worse than the whole truth, but not that a half lie is worse than a whole lie, because I think they are telling the truth within very narrow limits, and that a partial truth in this instance distorts significantly the picture that is presented and distorts it in an unfavorable way, certainly a way that is not—

Senator Thurmond. Does that not deceive those who do not have the remaining facts?

General Johnson. I think that it tends to deceive and tends to mislead.

Senator Thurmond. How could it do otherwise?

General Johnson. I do not think there is any answer.

MANPOWER DIVERTED IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Thurmond. You made the statement about diverting 500,000 to 600,000 personnel. On what is that based?

General Johnson. We have estimated that the manpower required to repair roads, to repair bridges, to substitute for the transportation that they normally use in their distribution system in order to keep their own people supplied within North Vietnam, would add up to somewhere in the neighborhood of about 300,000 people that are full time and somewhere between another 200,000 to 300,000 that are there on half-time duties to meet all of these tasks—something on the order of 300,000.

Senator Thurmond. What did you say, General?

General Johnson. Something on the order of about 300,000 that are there on full-time duties.

Senator Thurmond. In other words, the air war in North Vietnam is causing 300,000 full-time people to be diverted from other duties they would normally be performing to promote the war effort in order to make repairs and to overcome damage done by the air war, is that right?

General Johnson. Let me correct that. There are 97,000 full-time people that are diverted to coping with the air campaign, and the rest of these people are part time; 97,000 are estimated to be surely full time and there may be others in addition. The balance, somewhere between 370,000 and another 500,000 that are part time are involved in war-related tasks.

Senator Thurmond. Are any of these 97,000 Red Chinese civilians?

General Johnson. Not that we know specifically. Those people generally are carried separately. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. Now these 500,000 to 600,000 are all in North Vietnam, as I understand it.

General Johnson. All in North Vietnam.

Senator Thurmond. This does not include the Vietcong in South Vietnam?

General Johnson. It does not.
AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Thurmond. If 97,000 full-time people, and from 403,000 to 503,000 part-time people have been diverted, it shows how valuable our air campaign is in North Vietnam.

ALL JCS HAVE ENDORSED AIR CAMPAIGN

General Johnson. Yes, sir. I have endorsed fully the air campaign against the north.

Senator Thurmond. I believe all the Chiefs of Staff have endorsed the bombing in North Vietnam, have they not?

General Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. In fact, as I recollect, they have all endorsed doing even more bombing than is being done including, General Wheeler, General McConnell, Admiral Moorer and Admiral Sharp to name some.

General Johnson. I think we have all endorsed the expansion of the number of targets struck within the six target systems.

Senator Thurmond. They have all endorsed an expanded target system?

General Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator Miller. Would the Senator yield at that point?

Senator Thurmond. I will be pleased to yield to the distinguished Senator from Iowa.

Senator Miller. Expansion of the target system without necessarily implying an increase in the number of sorties being flown; is that not correct? I want this phrase "more bombing" clarified for the record, General, because we encounter a number of people who say, "Well, there are many so-called hawks, who want to have more bombing up north."

I have attended all these hearings and I do not recall that anyone has advocated an increase in the number of sorties or an increase in the quantity of bombs being dropped on the north, which is my concept of what "more bombing" means. Most have advocated an expansion of the targeting program within the number of sorties and quantity of bombs presently being directed against North Vietnam.

NEED MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF AIR POWER

General Johnson. I think that it is generally agreed that the number of aircraft available and the number of sorties that those aircraft can produce day after day and month after month, if employed against an expanded number of targets within the six target systems, would be a more effective employment of the air power that is available. This does not mean a heavier employment of air power. It means a more effective employment of the existing air power.

Senator Thurmond. General Johnson, I believe all of the Chiefs, too, have favored closing the port of Haiphong. I believe that they have all preferred mining as the method for closing it; is that correct?

General Johnson. That is correct.

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.] Do you agree with the same opinion expressed by the other Chiefs on that question, and Admiral Sharp? I asked Admiral Sharp the same question.
General Johnson. I have not reviewed Admiral Moorer's testimony in depth nor General McConnell's testimony in depth, so I must limit my response to my own answer.

Senator Thurmond. Yes. Do you feel that the closing of the ports, [deleted]?

General Johnson. [Deleted.]

Senator Miller. Would the Senator yield at that point?

Senator Thurmond. I will be pleased to yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Senator Miller. Would it not be fair to say, General, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not recommend any action in connection with the air campaign over North Vietnam which they felt would probably bring in Red China and the Soviet Union to a greater extent than they are now in the war?

General Johnson. I would phrase it this way. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as I understand the viewpoints of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are made within the context of the limited objectives that have been established for this war, and the attendant limitations on broadening the war that have been established, [deleted].

Now I can say that categorically for myself; I say that this is my belief with respect to the views of my colleagues.

FALSE CHARGE

Senator Miller. There are some critics who say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other military leaders would irresponsibly recommend action which would widen the war and bring the Soviet Union and Red China in with their planes and their troops. If I interpret your answer correctly, that would be false.

General Johnson. I would say that is a false charge.

Senator Miller. Thank you.

Senator Thurmond. Of course, any time you are fighting a war there is always some risk, there is some chance, [deleted].

General Johnson. That is correct. I would say again the point that I made earlier, that I believe that a major point of contention is the rate at which the pressures are increased. That is, whether there should be a fairly rapid rate of increase of pressure or whether there should be a very slow and prolonged rate of increase of pressure. This is the principal point of contention with respect to the air war in the north.

Senator Thurmond. General, I want to ask you a question without involving you in the political aspects. Being a military man in your position, it is your duty to carry out the policy of the Government. You do not make the policy. And frankly, I frequently do not agree with the policy. I believe my thinking is more in accord with the men in uniform with whom I have talked. At any rate, under the U.S. objectives as you gave them on page 10, No. 2 says "to apply gradually increasing pressures against North Vietnam so as to cause North Vietnam to cease supporting and directing the insurgency in South Vietnam."
I wondered why you included the word "gradually." Is that the way to fight a war militarily or was it determined that, from the political standpoint, it was felt advisable to be stated in that manner? Who prepared these objectives?

**GRADUAL PRESSURE**

General Johnson: This phrasing is my own, and I am not prepared to identify the source of the word "gradually." These statements of objectives, which I had tried to put, rather simply and as clearly as possible, are my own wording. I can try to identify the source of the word "gradually," if you wish, and provide it for the record.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

The announced objectives do not denote the application of a gradual increase of pressure, but rather the application of selective pressures against North Vietnam so as to cause North Vietnam to cease supporting and directing the insurgency in the south. I assimilated the objectives by the use of the words "gradually increasing," the application of military power in North Vietnam as it actually evolved.

Senator Thurmond: I wish you would do that. I just think that from a military standpoint, I mean, that doesn't—

General Johnson. I had testified earlier, Senator Thurmond, that there were two viewpoints expressed in the [deleted]. One was the sharp blow, in other words, the application of military power as quickly as possible, and the other the graduated application of military power over a period of time. I think the latter reflects the underlying hope that at some point the evidence of U.S. determination and the evidence of U.S. power available, coupled with the support provided by allies and coupled with the major efforts of the South Vietnamese themselves, would cause the North Vietnamese to see that they had no prospect at all of winning in the south, and at the same time were going to bring upon themselves a substantial punishment in the north.

**COMBAT READINESS OF U.S. DIVISIONS**

Senator Thurmond: Now, turning to another subject, if we should encounter trouble elsewhere in the world, what forces do we have in reserve here in this country, other than the Federal Reserve and the National Guard Forces, to meet an emergency and what is their degree of combat readiness?

General Johnson. We have five division equivalents. We have the 82d and the 101st Airborne Divisions, less one brigade in Vietnam, and we have a brigade in Hawaii, the 11th Brigade, which fills that division out in terms of a division equivalent. We have the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions at Fort Hood, and we have the 5th Mechanized Division at Fort Carson, a total of five.

They are in varying states of readiness. The 82d Division is in first-class shape. The 101st, as it stands now, is in first class shape. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. When will all five of these divisions be fully combat ready?

General Johnson. I will have to provide that for the record for this reason. At the present time there is a capabilities conference going on in Hawaii. When that conference is complete at the end of the week,