we will have the specific details of the deployment schedule to South Vietnam that is being requested for the additional approximately 45,000 forces that are being added. We then will have to determine our own activation schedules, our own training schedules, and our own restoration schedules in terms of the elements of the Strategic Reserve that will contribute some parts of that force.

Now, I testified earlier that we have a tentative authorization for the activation of an additional division to compensate for the 101st Airborne Division and [deleted] that are tentatively a part of the package for deployment [deleted].

(The information referred to is as follows:)

After the activation of the 6th Infantry Division, presently planned for 1968, and after the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division(—) and the [deleted] to South Vietnam by early 1968, our Strategic Reserve Forces in the United States will consist of the 82d Airborne Division, the 6th Infantry Division, and [deleted] the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The 82d Airborne Division is ready now. The 1st and 2d Armored and the 5th Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions could now deploy under mobilization conditions within [deleted] weeks. This would mean: abandoning current personnel policies concerning time at home after a year away from family, extension of terms of service, and offsetting any personnel shortages with personnel from the ready reserve manpower pool. Under circumstances that did not permit mobilization, the ground rules adopted for the particular case would determine the time required.

STRAF divisions will reach the following readiness times at home stations by the dates given:

Senator THURMOND. I do not feel too secure with these divisions in less than tiptop shape, and I do not imagine that you do either. I assume that, as soon as possible, you will exert every effort to see that they are restored to first priority readiness.

STARTING COMBAT LEADERS COURSE

General JOHNSON. They are taking all possible measures that are within our power, Senator Thurmond, right now not only to restore but to maintain those forces that we have, and we think that we have made significant progress, both from the point of view of equipping the forces and from the point of view of coming up with alternate methods of providing the replacement requirements in terms of the rotation requirement for South Vietnam. For example, on the 5th of September, we are initiating a combat leaders' course at Fort Benning that will turn out about 10,000 combat leaders a year.

Senator THURMOND. I recall your having mentioned that.

General JOHNSON. These will be fire team leaders and squad leaders.

Senator THURMOND. If we had an emergency arise in South America, the Middle East, or somewhere else, how would we meet it?

General JOHNSON. Well, if a force no larger than a division were required, we would meet it with the [deleted].

With regard to the Middle East, the question here would be the extent of commitment or involvement, depending upon where it might be needed. [Deleted.]

SKILL-LEVEL NEEDS IMPROVING

Senator THURMOND. Many of us become very concerned when these divisions have units or personnel withdrawn from them and
they become so weakened that they are not ready to use their full strength if needed. You will use your influence to bring them up to full strength as soon as you can.

General Johnson. Our strengths are good now in all of these units. It is a case of improving the skill levels with them.

Senator Thurmond. The personnel skills should receive priority, too.

General Johnson. Yes, sir.

READINESS OF NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS

Senator Thurmond. How many National Guard divisions are fully combat ready to take the field?

General Johnson. In one sense—that is, in the sense that any division has all of its equipment issued to it—none. In the sense that we established a Selected Reserve Force 2 years ago or nearly 2 years ago now, which took elements of a number of divisions and have subordinated them to individual divisions for purposes of creating division forces, we have three divisions, three National Guard divisions and six separate brigades that this—by the end of this summer, and that is just about right now—have had training so that with an [deleted] additional training period, during which time we can get equipment to them by withdrawing from other elements or by issuing from depots would be ready to go at the end of that training period. Now this is less the administrative time required to process them for overseas movement.

Senator Thurmond. If an emergency came tomorrow, what do you have in the National Guard ready to meet it, or what would you have to do to get ready?

General Johnson. [deleted] Then at the end of that training period, depending on where they were going, we would have to prepare them for overseas movement, which means preparing the vehicles and equipment for shipment, this sort of thing.

Senator Thurmond. So you do not have any National Guard divisions ready to go, so to speak?

General Johnson. We have never intended to have any National Guard divisions that are ready to go tomorrow. The concept has always been that with the part-time training which they get, we can bring them up only to a certain level of readiness in peacetime, and that following mobilization, some additional period of training would be required before they could be deployed into combat.

Senator Thurmond. And that would take about [deleted].

General Johnson. Roughly [deleted].

EQUIPMENT STATUS FOR RESERVES

Senator Thurmond. And they would have to acquire their equipment after they came upon active duty for training.

General Johnson. No; they have some complement of their equipment. They would have to be filled up with equipment after they reported to their mobilization station. At the present time we provide training equipment to our Guard units that is only a part of their full authorization. We have never intended to provide their
full equipment at their home stations because, in the first place, it takes too enormous an effort to keep it maintained. In the second place they do not need it for their week-to-week training.

Senator Thurmond. Do you have it ready for tomorrow if it should be needed?

General Johnson. We have equipment that we can redistribute from other units and from some of the equipment sites that we use to support the weekend training sessions and use to support the summer training sessions. For example, at Camp Drum, N.Y., where I was on Saturday with the 42d Division, they have a pool of equipment that the Guard units coming through there on summer training use repetitively. A unit that went up to Camp Drum for a mobilization station would have that in addition to the equipment that it has in its hands, and in addition we have other sites around the country from which equipment could be shipped to fill them up.

Now we could fill substantially all of the requirements for the three divisions, although there will be some substitute items and some of the equipment will not be the most modern.

Senator Thurmond. And how long would it take to get the equipment to them if they were called to active duty?

General Johnson. We estimate that we can accomplish this equipment redistribution over a [deleted].

Senator Thurmond. Then, where would you be short if you took that equipment from other units?

DID NOT BUY EQUIPMENT FOR THREE NEW BRIGADES

General Johnson. We would be short in what we call the reinforcing Reserve divisions. In other words, those State forces for which we have not bought equipment for the last 20 years, and we would be short if all of the Reserve forces that are authorized were brought to active duty. We would be short a division set of equipment that we have used for one of the divisions that was added to the active Army at the time of Vietnam. You will recall that in 1965 the Army was authorized to activate one additional division and three separate brigades. We bought equipment for one of those divisions. We did not buy equipment for the three separate brigades.

Senator Thurmond. Why?

General Johnson. This was the authorization that was given us.

Senator Thurmond. Given to you by whom?

General Johnson. The Army's next higher authority is the Department of Defense.

Senator Thurmond. I think Congress has authorized and appropriated just about everything, with few exceptions, that the Defense Department has requested, so far as I know. As far as the Congress is concerned, we stand ready to provide what is needed for the security of this country. We would hope that the military people, the Chiefs of Staff particularly, will recommend what is needed whether they can get the Defense Department to go along or not.

General Johnson. I believe that we have recommended what is needed.
Senator Thurmond. Now for the record, what about the Army Reserve?

General Johnson. In what way?

Senator Thurmond. If an emergency arose, what do you have available in the Army Reserve to meet it?

General Johnson. We have at the present time in the Army Reserve four brigades. I do not have the number of battalions that are involved in those brigades. We have a total paid drill strength in the Army Reserve of 260,000, of which we have onboard about 263,000. They are committed to units.

Senator Thurmond. All of those are in units?

General Johnson. All of those are in units, and they are committed to units that are of a combat support and combat service support type.

Senator Thurmond. Would you furnish for the record how many of these units are up to strength in personnel and if they are not in top combat readiness, how long it will take them to achieve that status?

General Johnson. The units—I will furnish that for the record. I would just like to make this statement. The units of the U.S. Army Reserve, because many of them are combat support and combat service support type, generally require between [deleted] of additional training prior to the time that they are ready to deploy, and this basically because the training time required for the smaller units is not as long as the training time required for the larger units.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

The current U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) unit structure consists of 3575 company and detachment sized units. Of these 233 are in the Selected Reserve Force (SRF) with authorized strengths of 100% of TOE. The balance of the 3575 USAR units are in the Immediate Reserve with an average authorized strength of 83% of TOE. As of 31 July, 1967, the assigned strength of the USAR was 263,014, or 101% of the FY-67 budget strength of 260,000.

With respect to equipment, USAR units of the SRF are equipped at a level of [deleted]. The balance of the units of the US Army Reserve have onboard [deleted]. During the 2-week annual field training periods, additional equipment is provided USAR units from equipment pools located at annual field training sites.

SRF units will require about [deleted] additional training after mobilization to achieve a full combat readiness. Non-SRF units will require approximately [deleted] to achieve the same state of training.

Senator Thurmond. Without going into detail, in general, what is the situation with regard to their equipment?

General Johnson. Their situation with regard to equipment is substantially the same as that pertaining to the National Guard. That is we provide them a level of equipment for training. We provide them with equipment pools at their training sites, and then from all of the rest of the stock for the Army we provide the full T.O. & E. equipment after they are mobilized.

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted] is the 82nd Air Division and the 101st less one brigade?

General Johnson. 101st less one brigade.

DETERIORATION IN ENEMY'S MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

Senator Miller. General, I am sorry to detain you, but I have been waiting my turn for quite some time and I do have a few more
questions. Would it be accurate to say that the air campaign against the north has caused a deterioration in the enemy's total military environment?

General Johnson. That is what I said in my statement. I think that it is accurate to say that.

Senator Miller. The reason I ask is because your statement read "causes," and I am interested in knowing whether it has "caused." The testimony you have given us would, I believe, support that statement, but would it be accurate to say that this deterioration to the enemy's total military environment, which has been caused, has reduced his ability to support the war in the south?

General Johnson. I believe it would be accurate to say that, because of the diversion of manpower that I have identified, because of the disruption to his transportation system, which interferes with his ability to move supplies to the south, and because of the reduction in some storage facilities which has destroyed supplies that otherwise might have been moved to and used in the south.

Senator Miller. And then would it be accurate to say that as this reduction has been achieved, enemy forces in the south have suffered and friendly forces have benefited?

General Johnson. Yes, I would say that is accurate.

Senator Miller. On page 2 of your statement you state that the North Vietnamese support of aggression in South Vietnam has been made more difficult. Would it be accurate to say that the air campaign in the north has not only made it more difficult for North Vietnam to support aggression in South Vietnam, but that it has held down the level of forces which can be supported in South Vietnam?

General Johnson. I am unable to say that, because I don't know, and I don't know anyone that could say that. We don't know how many they want to send down.

BOMBING PROBABLY ESTABLISHED CEILING ON FORCE LEVELS

Senator Miller. I know it is difficult to read the minds of the enemy leaders, but, on the basis of your intelligence reports and your estimates of enemy intentions, would it be accurate to say that it has held down the level of support which the enemy probably would have wished? We read and read it and bumper bumper bumper.

General Johnson. I would say this. That it has probably established a ceiling on the level of force that he can insert into the south.

Senator Miller. And that that ceiling probably is less than he would like to have?

General Johnson. Here we are attributing to the enemy—or we are attributing to ourselves the knowledge that we simply don't have.

Senator Miller. Don't we have some intelligence estimates of what his probable intentions are?

General Johnson. His intention is to overthrow the Government of South Vietnam, as we see it. His intention appears to be to test the patience of the American people to the extent that they will withdraw support of South Vietnam.

To do this becomes a test of perseverance, and so whether he thinks that he needs more than he has in the south is a question. It is my own judgment that he would like to provide more to the south, which I
determine from the manner in which some of the forces that he has in the south now have not been supported. In other words, he has failed to support adequately some of the forces that he has in the south, and it would appear to me that he would desire to support them more fully than he appears to have been able to support them.

Senator MILLER. I believe earlier in your testimony you pointed out that [deleted].

General JOHNSON. I did so testify.

Senator MILLER. That would imply, would it not, that he had done something which he would have preferred not to have done?

General JOHNSON. It would appear that would not be a preferred course of action for him.

HIGH LEVEL OF ATTACKS.

Senator MILLER. That is why I suggested the probable level of forces which he would have preferred to have had and which would, I think, tie in with some of your testimony.

On page 3 you mention, "The high level of attacks since the advent of good weather in April." By "high level of attacks," do you mean an increased number of sorties or do you mean the application of the available sorties to an expanded targeting system?

General JOHNSON. By "high level of attack," I mean the application of the available sorties to the more profitable targets in the northern part of the country that are denied during periods of bad weather.

Senator MILLER. Well, were they denied because of bad weather or, prior to that period of bad weather, were they denied because they were on the restricted list?

General JOHNSON. Some targets were denied. Some were not. Some simply could not be struck because the weather was bad.

Senator MILLER. Yes, but prior to the bad weather—going back a year ago—there were a number of those targets on the restricted list, were there not?

General JOHNSON. That is correct, but they were on the restricted list because of the policy of gradually increasing the pressure, and had not yet come into the category of an increased pressure.

Senator MILLER. I understand, but if they had been on the approved list, and if this high level of attacks had been permitted at an earlier date, then the increase in the level of damage inflicted would have been earlier, would it not?

General JOHNSON. I think that would follow naturally.

Senator MILLER. I believe you testified that, as a military man, you would recommend [deleted].

General JOHNSON. [Deleted.]

Senator MILLER. Assume there was a target—a storage area for example—where it was estimated the civilian losses would be [deleted]. I presume then, that that target would not be recommended.

General JOHNSON. [Deleted.]

Senator MILLER. [Deleted.]

General JOHNSON. That would be a part of the basis for my consideration of recommending approval or disapproval of a target.

Senator MILLER. [Deleted.]

General JOHNSON. [Deleted.]
Suppose that we should drop leaflets or send radio messages—which would be received by the civilian population—indicating that any target of military value is subject to being struck.

The United States would urge the civilians to evacuate the areas to protect themselves. We would not specify the targets, nor indicate when this might happen. We would merely serve notice that a storage area or any other area having a target of military significance is subject to being struck and that therefore, they had better leave. If that were done, would you then recommend not only target A but target B?

General JOHNSON. Yes, I would recommend both targets in that event. I think that there would be an alteration actually on the estimate of civilian casualties under that circumstance.

Senator MILLER. You would feel that we, at least as far as the general public, and possibly some of the foreign press are concerned, would have met any moral requirements to minimize civilian casualties, would you not?

General JOHNSON. I believe so.

ROOTING OUT INFRASTRUCTURE

Senator MILLER. Now, you referred to the rooting out of the infrastructure. What is your definition of the infrastructure?

General JOHNSON. The infrastructure is the Vietcong governing element within the hamlets and the villages and the districts and the provinces of South Vietnam, and it consists of a Vietcong controlled counterpart government for a great portion of South Vietnam.

In some cases this infrastructure actually exercises control. In other cases where the Government presence and the Government force is strong enough, it is a dormant structure and may be relatively weak. It may not be entirely filled out but waiting for a point in time when the Government strength has weakened to a point where by terror tactics and persuasion they can administer or exercise a degree of control over the populace of South Vietnam.

Senator MILLER. Then, it would not include troops or political cadres which had been sent from North Vietnam to South Vietnam?

General JOHNSON. It would include political cadres. It would not include armed force.

Senator MILLER. If North Vietnamese support is stopped or greatly diminished, so that the people of South Vietnam believe that the war against North Vietnam will be won, would not the time for rooting out the infrastructure be reduced?

General JOHNSON. Yes, and I think we would have a whole lot of assistance or rooting out the infrastructure, because we have some belief that a part of this infrastructure is known, but that individuals are fearful of disclosing the fact that members of their community are also members of the VC or North Vietnamese infrastructure, because disclosure usually results in a penalty of losing a life or of maiming of some sort. Penalties are pretty severe for exposing VC where the VC exercise any power of reprisal at all.
Senator MILLER. Over the last year and a half has there been an increase in the tempo of reporting or informing against the infrastructure?

General JOHNSON. There has been an increase in tempo in some areas, but not in all areas.

Senator Miller. But countrywide there has been?

General JOHNSON. Countywide, and this is only an estimate on my own part, there has been some improvement in reporting the presence of infrastructure.

Senator MILLER. That fact would tend to refute the allegation of stalemate, would it not?

General JOHNSON. Oh, I don’t believe there is stalemate at all.

Senator MILLER. I know you don’t, but, if we were to point to indications to rebut those who claim there is a stalemate, would this countrywide increase in reporting and informing against the infrastructure not be one piece of evidence?

General JOHNSON. Yes.

**ENEMY DESERTIONS MOUNTING**

Senator MILLER. Has there been an increase in desertions from the infrastructure over the last year and a half?

General JOHNSON. Yes, there has. The rate of return to Government control has nearly doubled the rate of last year, and last year had doubled the rate of the preceding year, so we have almost four times the rate for the end of July this year that we had in 1965.

Senator MILLER. What does that amount to in thousands?

General JOHNSON. In 1965 there were roughly 11,000. In 1966 there were approximately 20,000 and through the 30th of July the 31st of July this year there were approximately 20,000. In other words, in the first 7 months of this year, the number of returnees had slightly exceeded the number of returnees in all of calendar year 1966.

Senator MILLER. That would be additional evidence to be used in rebutting the allegation of stalemate, would it not?

General JOHNSON. That is a substantiation, it seems to me, of improvement in South Vietnam.

Senator MILLER. What about desertions from the Army of South Vietnam? I saw something recently indicating that they were still quite high, but that they were down a third from a year ago.

General JOHNSON. Desertsions vary by components within the force in South Vietnam. I can provide specific information.

Senator MILLER. Could you do that for the record to save time?

General JOHNSON. I can do that for the record if you wish. I can say this: that the desertions are down substantially. Moreover, the record of weapon exchange has improved significantly for the Government.

Early last year the RVNAF loss rate was something on the order of two weapons lost for every weapon that was recovered from the enemy. This year the loss is about one for every two recovered from the enemy, or a change of about 50 percent.

(The information requested has been deleted for security reasons.)

Senator MILLER. And those would be other evidentiary items to rebut the allegation of stalemate, would they not?
CRACKDOWN TO INCREASE ARVN FORCES

General Johnson. Yes, they are.

Senator Miller. Finally, in this morning's paper I noticed where Premier Ky was quoted as promising a crackdown on South Vietnamese draft dodgers in these words:

'It is ridiculous, unfair, unacceptable that while other young men from other countries, Americans, Thailanese, Australians, Koreans, New Zealanders come here to die for us, the theaters and night clubs of South Vietnam are packed full of young men able to serve the military.

Is it your opinion that such a crackdown is needed to increase the forces which South Vietnam will provide in this war? You mentioned lowering the age.

General Johnson. Actually South Vietnamese laws were changed about a year ago and imposed much more severe penalties on a draft dodger and on a deserter. The penalties up until a year ago had not been awfully severe.

In the course of the last year there has been an imposition of the penalties that the new law provided, and this I think has helped improve the situation. There still needs to be an improved enforcement of the new law, but I believe that they are taking steps in that direction, and they are getting progressively better with each passing month. This is not something that is going to occur or that might be expected to have occurred overnight, and I think that the progress toward improved enforcement has been encouraging.

Senator Miller. General, you have been very patient. We are sorry to detain you as long as we have. Thank you very much for your fair and honest answers. The committee will stand in adjournment until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m. the same day.)

AFTEBNOON SESSION.

Senator Stennis. Members of the subcommittee, General Greene, as always we are delighted to have you here as a witness. We regret exceedingly that other matters have intervened as to nearly all of our membership; but there is nothing more important than this subject, and nothing more important about the subject than your testimony. So it is of the utmost gravity to us, and you can rest assured that what we do not hear we will consider nevertheless, because we will get it. General, you have a statement, I know, and I think it would be well, as well as helpful, if you could just read the statement, please.

General Greene. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. General, all witnesses are sworn. Do you solemnly swear that your testimony will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General Greene. I do, sir.

Senator Stennis. Is someone else going to testify too?

General Greene. No, sir. I am the only witness.

Senator Stennis. All right. General: Will you proceed, please?
General Greene, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor and a distinct personal pleasure to meet with you again. I know you have questions and I hope to answer them.

Since I have recently returned from a most rewarding trip to South Vietnam, perhaps I can set the stage for some of your questions. I found—as usual—a refreshing desire on the part of all hands to contribute to the war and, even more encouraging, a complete reversal of the pessimistic outlook—the doubts and fears—which plague us so here in Washington.

The Marines are more deeply committed than ever in all facets of the war. [Deleted.] Very nearly one-third of all the marines on our rolls being committed to the Vietnamese war. This proportion of commitment is higher than that of any other service.

Insofar as the DMZ area is concerned, Nguyen Van Mai of the NLF press office in Phnom Penh said:

The National Liberation Front will entice the Americans close to the North Vietnamese border and will bleed them without mercy. In southern South Vietnam the pacification campaign will be destroyed.

In essence, our enemy is counting on his patience, our lack of it, plus an attrition of our forces, as his formula to win. Further, he wants to divert our forces from the critical regions where the people and resources are.

He has succeeded to a degree in drawing forces away from the critical, populated lowland areas, but he has paid heavily. He has lost over 30,000 troops in I CTZ just in the first 6 months of 1967. That is the price he was willing to pay in an effort to slow down our pacification program. But despite his efforts, it is still grinding slowly ahead; The rate of progress is slow and as long as we must counter the threat of [deleted] DMZ area, progress will continue to be slow.

WE NEED MORE FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

It is for these reasons that we need more forces in South Vietnam, and I applaud the President's recent decision to provide additional forces.

With respect to the air war, I recognize that while the Marines are not a major participant in the activity over North Vietnam, we have been involved from the very beginning and are getting deeper into it all the time. In addition to our continuing effort [deleted] in southern North Vietnam, our [deleted] are being used in the far north [deleted]. That we have been able to make these needed contributions to the air campaign in the north in addition to conducting operations in I Corps is testimony, I believe, to the soundness of Marine Corps concepts that its forces must be balanced in air/ground structure and equipment to meet readily any combattant task that U.S. commitments around the world may require.

ADVOCATE OF STRONGER AIR CAMPAIGN

As you well know, I have long been an advocate of stronger air campaign against North Vietnam, and I remain convinced that such
must be a necessary part of our strategy. Since Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler have covered that strategy and the relationship of the air campaign to it, I won’t go over it again. I would emphasize, however, that we must make it as difficult and costly as we can for Hanoi to support the war.

Of prime importance in accomplishing this task is reducing to the minimum their importation of war supporting material. We must do all we can to reduce infiltration of men and supplies, regardless of its source. We should do everything possible—indeed we have the responsibility—to provide our forces with the support they require.

Of course we have our problems. You gentlemen are aware of them as you should be. My duty is to answer your questions about them. But there are bright sides as well, and they also merit your consideration.

The war is progressing. The continuing attempts of North Vietnam to invade the south in force, designed to reverse the successes we have made in our vital pacification task, have not succeeded; and every invasion has met with dismal failure—and overwhelming enemy losses. But they have slowed down the planned progress we had for pacification. To that extent, we must concede a measure of enemy success.

Short of that, however, all they have left is to hold onto their hope that, because of the slowness of our progress, and our casualties, and our domestic dissent, we will become discouraged. I, for one, gentlemen, am not discouraged. It will take time, and money, and determination; not just by the military, but by all Americans. The amount of time the actual fighting will last is a function of the effectiveness of the air campaign, the number of combat forces we have on the ground for both the pacification and major engagement tasks, the supporting naval effort, and the soundness of our strategy.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Senator STENNIS. General, as I said, it is always helpful to us for you to come here as a witness and adviser, and we appreciate your presence here today.

Now due to this conflict that I have, I must leave temporarily. I will use just a few minutes now. This is highly classified, of course. But please go over the situation as to your manpower picture there, and what your actual needs are in connection with your mission, how many more marines you need. Let’s get that brought up to date, please.

General GREENE. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I would like to say that the Marine Corps at the present time is unable to deploy any more organized units to South Vietnam without a mobilization of our Reserve. Of course we have units in the Continental United States that can be moved, and moved very quickly.

For example, the 2d Marine Division and the 2d Aircraft Wing on the east coast in North Carolina can be moved very quickly if necessary [deleted].

SITUATION IN I CORPS

Now what about our situation in I Corps itself? At the present time we have two reinforced divisions. We have one reinforced w.n.g. We have some 77,000 marines in South Vietnam.
In addition to that, we have some nine battalions, Task Force Oregon, made up of Army troops located at Chu Lai in the southern part of our tactical zone, and then we have the Korean brigade of marines, three more reinforced battalions, and of course we have the two Vietnamese Army divisions which are also located in our area.

At the present time I feel that we certainly have the situation in hand in I Corps, as indicated in my statement. However, one of the problems that has been caused by the pressure put against the DMZ has been the requirement for us to divert troop units which formerly engaged in a major way in the pacification program to the DMZ effort, in other words, the search and destroy effort, the facing of the enemy below the DMZ. This situation of course was eased when General Westmoreland moved Army troops into the southern part of our corps zone and our pacification program as I indicated is now getting underway again slowly, but nevertheless getting underway.

In the event of a real all-out emergency of our area, General Westmoreland has assured me he was prepared, as he has done before, to move Army troop units from other assignments in South Vietnam, from the other corps areas, into I Corps to support our current effort and any increased requirement that might be put upon it.

Now, what do we need in the way of troops in I Corps?

I have made a careful analysis of the situation in I Corps, and my feeling, with the idea of doing as best I could, to determine how many troops would be required to get the military part of the operation in I Corps over in a reasonable period of time. This analysis was made not only by uniformed officers, some of the best planners I have in the Marine Corps, but was also made by several civilian operations analysts who work with us at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

So I feel that a very sound, very scientific, analysis has been made of this problem, and the results are essentially that I feel we need [deleted]

I feel if we were to have this number of troops, and if the situation, as we find it today, were to continue without any changes that, at the end of [deleted] with these additional troops on the ground, we would be able to start turning the military part of the program, and I wish to emphasize that, the military part; because the pacification, the civic action, the nation-building program is going to take much longer, but we could finish the military part of the program and start turning that over to the South Vietnamese forces, and possibly redeploying our own troops.

Senator STENNIS. Well, thank you very much for a very complete answer.

Now, time has run out on me—I think I will get back—but I certainly want you to outline clearly and in detail your thoughts about the air campaign, what you think ought to be done; and what your recommendations have been.

You say here, and I quote you:

Of prime importance in accomplishing this task is reducing to the minimum their importation of war supporting material.

Of course, what furnishes the real basis for the war is the materiel that is imported, is it not, either from Red China or Soviet Russia? Well, I just mention that, and anyone can go into it who wishes to.
If you will excuse me now for some reasonable time, Senator Cannon, would you preside, please, and Mrs. Smith, may I call upon you?

Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD REQUIRE MORE FORCES IN SOUTH

General Greene, you have answered some of my questions, and may I ask you some of the questions that I have asked of previous witnesses? We have received almost unanimous testimony thus far to the effect that there is a direct relationship between the intensity of the air campaign against North Vietnam and the forces we are required to deploy to the South. What is your view of the testimony which concludes that any reduction or cessation of the air campaign against North Vietnam would require the deployment of larger allied forces in the South?

General Greene. There is not a particle of doubt in my mind, Senator, but what that is a fact.

DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASUALTIES IN SOUTH AND INTENSITY OF AIR CAMPAIGN

Senator Smith. Do you believe that there is any direct relationship between the casualties we suffer in South Vietnam and the intensity of the air campaign that we conduct against North Vietnam?

General Greene. I certainly do believe that there is a direct relationship between those two factors.

DOES NOT AGREE WITH CONCEPT OF GRADUALISM

Senator Smith. You state on page 4 that you have long been an advocate of a stronger air campaign against North Vietnam. This has been our understanding of your thinking. Am I correct in assuming that you do not personally agree with the concept of gradualism which we have adopted as national policy with respect to the air campaign against North Vietnam?

General Greene. Insofar as my private views and advice on this are concerned, I certainly do not agree. However, this is my own personal view, Senator.

OBSTACLE SYSTEM

Senator Smith. This is what I wanted.

Because your Marines, deployed as they are along the demilitarized zone, are immediately involved in it, your personal views with respect to the origin, status, and probable effectiveness of the [deleted] obstacle system would be of particular interest to the subcommittee, and I wonder if you would care to state them.

General Greene. The [deleted] project, of course, is in its initial, formative stages. We have a very limited area that has been cleared in the open country a few miles below the DMZ in our corps zone. This clearance has resulted, of course, in some casualties—some killed and wounded.
In that particular area, I believe that there will be some advantage to come from this clearance, and due primarily to the way the terrain lies in this particular part of our zone. I am speaking of cleared fields of fire and better observation.

[Deleted.]

OPOSED TO OBSTACLE SYSTEM

General Greene. From the very beginning I have been opposed to this project. [Deleted.]

Senator Smith. There has been some conflict in the testimony, General, over whether or not the enemy strength in the south of perhaps, 297,000 men, is not roughly the maximum which can be supported provided there is no relaxation in the bombing of the north.

On the other hand, we have been told that irrespective of how our airpower is employed against the north it cannot prevent the infiltration of whatever amount of men and munitions the enemy may require to conduct the operations it chooses in South Vietnam.

Surely, General, there must be some point beyond which the enemy could not further build up his forces and still support them in South Vietnam provided airpower was used efficiently.

Do you have any comments to make on this point?

General Greene. Yes, I do.

In the figures that I just gave you regarding our estimate for additional troops in I Corps, I mentioned that if we were to have [deleted] that we felt that if the situation were to remain as it is now, that we would be able to finish the military part of the campaign in [deleted] time.

I think that if this type of analysis were to be made of the other parts of the country, that conclusions similar to this possibly would result.

For example, we made a similar study to reinforce the statement which I have just made to you of the problem in the delta area. We did this, of course, and this type of analysis is primarily the sort of study that General Westmoreland would make, and no doubt is making and has made, but in view of the possibility that the Marine Corps might have to deploy units and men to the delta area, we made a similar study of IV Corps which comprises most of the delta, and here again, taking all of these factors which you have mentioned and I have talked about into consideration, our conclusion was that it would require [deleted] to reach the point in the delta campaign where at the end of [deleted] we would be able to turn the military part of the program over to the South Vietnamese and, possibly, start redeployment of American forces.

LOGISTIC SHORTAGES

Senator Smith. General, it was quite disturbing to me to receive a report from a member of our staff who visited the Third Marine Division at such places as Camp Carroll, Khe Sanh, and Hill 881, to name a few, that the Marines were living far more austerely than even the magnificent pride of the Marines would admit. They were short of mobile field laundry units, field showers, refrigerating units, icemaking machines, and even bunker materials for the artillery duels across the Demilitarized Zone which are now taking place.
I am sure you have received similar information regarding these imperative needs of your men during your recent visit, and I would like to ask when you think these needs will be satisfied.

General Greene. Well, some of these deficiencies, Senator, which do exist are caused primarily by the concentrated campaign that we are waging up there, and the attacks and daily contacts that we are having with the enemy. I went as far west as Khe Sanh and visited company-size units and patrols in that area, and my professional opinion was that they had plenty of good food, that their clothing was most adequate, their equipment and ammunition was good; there was plenty of water. Some of these others I would call luxury items, such as mobile laundries and possibly ice, although in some places they are getting some of those services, were something that our people could well wait on.

I did not find any disgruntlement or unhappiness among our people over the necessity for their everyday life in carrying on the campaign there.

Now, as far as materials for bunkers are concerned, this sometimes is a problem due to either the speed with which we have to build them, or the distribution of fortification materials which sometimes is difficult, but from my visit with the 3d Division and movements in the area below the DMZ, I would say they were very adequately supplied.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I have one other question. Do I have time?

Senator Cannon (presiding). Yes, Senator.

Need More Troops in 1 Corps.

Senator Smith. General, what are your present manpower deficiencies in the Marine Corps Tactical Zone, and to what extent will they be alleviated by the additional forces which have been authorized for deployment under program 5?

General Greene. Well, Senator, actually right now our so-called foxhole strength, which is a popular term for the number of Marines that are actually in a company when it is in combat, is about [deleted] men. Now, we rate 210 men in a company. We are down about [deleted] percent with the average company.

I have already taken steps to secure authority for additional men in the pipeline and also in the so-called reserve in-country to build the infantry units, I hope, up to their full T/O strength.

As far as the additional troops that we may get, from the 45,000 men, which I understand will be deployed to South Vietnam, the partition or allocation of these personnel of course, will be up to General Westmoreland, and I am sure, based on talking with him, that he intends to apply these where they are needed most, and we certainly have a requirement for some of them up there in 1 Corps.

Basically I come back to my estimate of [deleted] is our real requirement.

Senator Smith. Thank you very much, General. It is always nice to have you here before us.
Mr. Chairman, we are marking up the appropriations bill for independent offices, and I must leave for that purpose so if I may be excused, I will return later. Thank you.

General Greene. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Cannon. Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Greene, I am sorry to be late. It is always such a pleasure to talk with you about your great service, and the defense problems in general.

I read your statement over the weekend. Did you read the testimony of General Walt before the Armed Services Committee?

General Greene. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator Symington. Was there anything in that testimony with which you did not agree.

General Greene. No, there was not.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, if the counsel has questions he would like to ask General Greene, if in order, I would yield, and take up from there when my turn comes around again.

Senator Cannon. I think we will go through and give Senator Miller and myself an opportunity.

Senator Miller.

Senator Miller. I understand that, in response to Senator Smith's questions, you believe that you need [deleted] in I Corps. Am I to understand that you have no hopes of having that need filled from the new 45,000-man estimated augmentation of our forces?

**Allocation of Troops Up to Westmoreland**

General Greene. Senator, the allocation of the troops in that 45,000 will be up to General Westmoreland. General Westmoreland is familiar with my estimate of the situation in I Corps, and by stating what our analysis has shown, I do not mean that we cannot get along and progress in I Corps.

What I simply tried to do was to take what I termed a reasonable time, [deleted] and try to compute, using a given situation, how many troops I would need.

Now, if we do not get those troops or only get part of them, and the situation continues as it is today, I would say that the time would then be extended.

Senator Miller. Do I understand that 45,000 would not include air elements?

General Greene. I believe the bulk of the 45,000 troops, Senator, will be ground units.

Senator Miller. So that would mean assigning [deleted] which is already in South Vietnam to I Corps activity; is that correct?

General Greene. It would mean the assignment of Army and/or Air Force helicopters and fixed wing to increase the tempo of air operations in I Corps.
DISCUSSION OF STRONG AND STRONGER AIR EFFORT

Senator Miller. General, on page 4 of your statement which was released to the press I notice that at the beginning of the second paragraph it reads:

As you well know, I have been an advocate of a strong air campaign against North Vietnam.

In my copy the word “strong” was deleted and the word “stronger” was substituted.

Mr. Kendall. That was put back in, Senator.

Senator Miller. That was put back in.

Mr. Kendall. That was put in in the Pentagon.

Senator Miller. I was wondering who had put in the word “strong” originally.

Mr. Kendall. I cannot answer that, Senator.

General Greene. Well, in preparing the statements, Senator, we discussed the statements with the counsel, and also with the Defense Department representatives in the Pentagon, and as far as that particular word is concerned I believe that word was placed in there during the review in the Pentagon.

Mr. Kendall. I might say, Senator, it came over originally like you have it. There was no argument or discussion about that matter.

Senator Miller. I understood that. But in General Greene’s classified statement it reads——

General Greene. I believe, Senator, and a member——

Senator Miller. It reads, as you well know, “I have long been an advocate of a stronger air campaign.”

Then the portion released to the press reads that way now with “stronger” written in, and the way it was apparently originally intended for the press was “strong”. I am wondering where, in the Pentagon, that happened.

General Greene. Well, actually I think it was a typographical error. Actually between the two, as far as I am concerned, I could accept either way. As I said in my statement, in my classified statement to you, I think I made it quite clear that I had consistently advocated a strong and increasing air campaign in the north.

Senator Miller. To me, General, the difference between “strong” and “stronger” is highly significant in the context of these hearings. Is it not your opinion that we have been having a strong air campaign?

General Greene. I believe we have been having a strong air campaign. But I believe it could be much stronger by the application of our airpower against targets that we have not, until recently, attacked, and some that we have not yet attacked.

Senator Miller. By “stronger” then, you mean more effective by the application of the airpower we now have to more meaningful targets; is that correct?

General Greene. That is one of the things I mean.

The second thing I mean is if we require additional airpower in order to strike these targets adequately, I advocate the addition of whatever extra aircraft or effort may be needed.
Senator Miller. Then you are not necessarily advocating more bombing but you are advocating more effective bombing; is that correct?

General Greene. I am advocating more effective bombing, and I am also advocating more bombing if that is necessary in order to produce the maximum effectiveness.

Senator Miller. Well, at this stage of the air campaign, is it your opinion that we need more bombing in addition to more effective bombing with our present level of airpower?

General Greene. Well, Senator, maybe the best way for me to get at that would be to try to reduce the situation as I see it now to specifics and then point out what I mean.

Senator Miller. I wish you would, sir.

SOME OF MOST CRITICAL TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM

General Greene. Now, what I have to say, of course, is my own opinion, and I would like to emphasize that.

As of the 17th of August 1967, my analysis showed that there were some 427 targets on the operating target list maintained by the Joint Staff. Of these some 359 targets have been recommended by the JCS for strike.

Three hundred and two of these have been authorized. This is some 85 percent authorized by higher authority. This left some 57 that had not been authorized.

Among these 57 targets in my opinion are some of the most critical targets in North Vietnam. For example, we have the three ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha; and just as an example, Senator, during the month of May, we had some 147,000 tons of material come through that port.

This is the type of target—

Senator Miller. Through Haiphong?

General Greene. Through Haiphong, that is correct. And this is the type of target that, for a very long time, I felt that we should attack, that we should cut this artery of supply.

Now, I realize very well that there are political implications involved in this. Nevertheless, I also believe that if the air arm is to be effective in the way it was designed to be, it has to hit the artery and not wait until the stream of supplies has been dispersed through all of the smaller conduits throughout the country.

POL is a good example of what I mean, and I feel that airpower could most profitably be applied against the port.

Now, we also have four airfields. As you know, they are Phue Yen, Cat Bi, Gia Lam, and Bao Mai. These airfields I likewise have felt for a long while should be struck by our airpower.

Now, I will agree that there have been only a relatively small number of MiGs operating from these fields; perhaps, but these MiGs have not only destroyed some of our own aircraft but they have [deleted] and, so here again, there is a second type of target that I feel that our airpower should be programmed against.

Senator Miller. You mentioned petroleum. We are told that although petroleum concentration points were authorized for strike and destroyed, that this has had no particular impact on the enemy's
petroleum resources; that they have, I believe, 120 days' reserves in the country with no apparent slowdown of their motor transport in the North and, therefore, the implication is that these strikes on the petroleum storage points, the major ones, were without any particular effect on the enemy's capacity. What would be your answer to that?

**POL COMES INTO HAIPHONG**

General Grauamp. Here again I am going to give my own ideas on this. The principal entry point for POL in North Vietnam is the port of Haiphong. Tankers from the Soviet Union, principally from the Soviet Union, and from Communist China are free to enter the port and to off load fuel either by barge or originally by pipeline into these storage points ashore.

Here again you have a principal artery, which, for many, many months, I have felt should be struck, and I felt that this petroleum supply should be cut off.

Now, eventually authority was given to strike the POL supplies at certain points in country, but during the months which intervened, for example, we saw the enemy making a great effort to disperse their POL storage throughout the country. In fact, tanks were being fabricated at the iron and steel plant about 40 miles northwest of Hanoi.

Aerial photographs showed these tanks being buried in dispersed locations around the country. We watched these tanks going into place, but at that time it was not deemed desirable to strike the POL dispersal and storage points.

We never have, of course, as I understand the reason to be, for political reasons, been permitted to shut off the POL input at Haiphong, which is really the key point in this whole supply system.

We now, of course, are able to attack POL where we find it. Yet there are considerable supplies that are within the restricted and prohibited areas; that, we cannot strike without special authority, and I have seen one aerial photograph that I recall where POL was stowed in a dump just inside one of these restricted areas which we, at that time, were not able to hit.

We have principal storage points at the large airfields, and for many months, we have not been, or have not been, or were not permitted to attack these principal storage points.

What I am saying, in essence, is that we have been unable to cut off the entering artery of POL at Haiphong, and until that is done, the air campaign, dispersed as it must be around the country, against small storage points, is not going to be as successful as it should be.

**ENEMY HAD TIME TO DISPERSE**

Senator Miller. I assume that another implication from what you have said is that, because of the delay in authorizing the taking out of the principal storage points for petroleum, the enemy was able to foresee what we might do and dispersed his storage of petroleum much more effectively.
General Greene: That is exactly what he did, Senator.

Of course, the real test in the success of a POL destruction campaign from the air is how many trucks can they field, I mean, this is your test; and, of course, large numbers of their trucks have been destroyed, and yet these trucks have been replaced from Communist sources, so you have got that factor to consider.

But I believe that the key problem in this POL campaign is shutting off the POL at the principal entry point in Haiphong.

Senator Miller. Another argument that has been used, General, is that if the port is closed, Soviet tankers would go up and down the coast and arrangements would be made to offload those tankers along the coast and while closing the port might hamper the enemy somewhat, nevertheless, they would still get the necessary petroleum supplies in.

General Greene. Well, I have no doubt but what there will be some petroleum supplies brought into the country no matter what effort we launch against a POL supply. But I do think it can be most importantly and considerably reduced by attacking the delivery points no matter where they may be.

Senator Miller. Now, one final question: I notice in the classified portion of your statement on page 5 you say:

I would emphasize that we must make it as difficult and costly as we can for Hanoi to support the war.

The statement, as released to the press, said:

I would emphasize that in my view we must make it as difficult and costly as we can for Hanoi to support the war.

It appears to me that the words “in my view” were added. Can I ask where that was added?

General Greene. A member of my staff advises me, Senator, that that was simply a variation between the two statements and “in my opinion” is a proper addition because it does state my view, and I think it should be—it certainly was not added with any pressure from DOD, and I do not believe that counsel had anything to do with that either.

Mr. Kendall. No, sir.

I might say, Senator, as the chairman indicated in his letter, that I called Saturday about several matters which were deleted from the original statement, and, without exception, the ones that I insisted on were put back in the statement. This was sort of a joint proposition between myself, the Marine Corps, and I assumed OSD, although I did not contact OSD.

General Greene. Yes.

Senator Miller. I am reassured on that point. But this is a little different twist. This is not a matter of deletion, but it was a matter of addition.

Mr. Kendall. I did not address myself at all, Senator—

Senator Stennis. Read me that statement. I was looking at another part. I would like to follow you.

Senator Miller. Mr. Chairman, the words “in my view” have been added to the released portion of the statement. They are not included in the original portion of the statement.

Senator Stennis. Yes.
Senators, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Miller. And I was wondering why the intention of saying in this particular portion of the whole statement "in my view" when, as I understand it, the whole statement represents General Greene's personal views. There was no change made by your office on this point, as I understand it?

General Greene. No, sir. This was made by ourselves.

Senator Miller. That covers it. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RECOMMENDS BLOCKING HAIPHONG

Senator Cannon. General, you have made it quite clear that you favor blockading or blocking the port of Haiphong. How would you propose to do it? Have you gone so far as to propose specific recommendations as to what should be done?

General Greene. In arriving at positions within the Joint Chiefs' area, I have recommended from time to time that Haiphong be blocked.

Now, there are a number of ways that this can be done. [Deleted.]

Of these, I believe the simplest, the easiest to do, the most effective would be mining.

[Deleted.]

Senator Cannon. In your statement you say:

We must do all we can to reduce infiltration of men and supplies regardless of the source.

Do you feel that the blockading in some fashion of Haiphong would reduce infiltration; that it would have the direct effect of reducing infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam?

General Greene. I certainly do in a major way. Of course, what I tie in, Senator, with Haiphong are the other two principal ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha. But I am talking about the principal ports, and I also feel that our Navy, both air and surface, has the potential of stopping any other attempts to inject supplies across other portions of the coast. I feel that could be done.

Now, in connection with this, Senator, I also feel that the land routes are going to have to be taken out, too, and I am speaking specifically now of the rail route and road route to the northeast out of Hanoi to the Chinese border.

Recently we have attacked that in force, and that is about 90 miles in length, and it has been estimated that an average of 1,000 tons per day have been coming over that line with a potential of over 5,000 tons per day.

Now, for many months we have been hampered in attacking that LOC because we have had a restricted area of some [deleted] around the city of Hanoi. We have had a [deleted] restricted zone, the outer portion of the so-called doughnut, then we have had a [deleted] prohibited circle around the center point of the city of Hanoi. This was [deleted]; total...

All right. Now below the Chinese border we have had a sanctuary area of [deleted] that we were not permitted to penetrate. This meant that out of a total of 90 miles we had two segments of [deleted] and [deleted] forbidden for our attack operations, leaving a total unrestricted distance available for strike of some [deleted].
Now, in addition to this shortened distance, and it did not take the enemy very long to see we were not going to operate outside of this area, so they moved their antiaircraft in toward the area in which we are operating, the strip in which we are operating.

In addition to that, we had the problem of approaches. We could only approach from certain directions, and so this made it extremely difficult to get in against this particular rail line and to stop the flow of supplies.

Furthermore, we had a bridge just outside the city of Hanoi across which all the railroads have to go to get into Hanoi.

**Red River Bridge**

Senator Cannon, Is that the so-called Red River Bridge?

General Greene: The Red River Bridge. Now, the spans have been dropped in that now making it, in my opinion, extremely difficult for them to move what supplies do come in from Haiphong or from the north into the city.

So if we block the ports we are also going to have to take out the LOC’s that lead to the Chinese border, and there are two principal ones, one to the northeast, and one to the northwest out of Hanoi.

**Value of Newly Authorized Targets**

Senator Cannon: In your opinion, will the newly approved targets that have been added from August 8 until the present time add to the cost of infiltration into the South by North Vietnamese?

General Greene: I strongly believe that they will, Senator. I know that many of these targets, if you look at them as individuals, may not seem to be of prime importance. The prime important ones, of course, are the airfields, for example, and the ports, the four airfields and the three ports.

But all of these targets when they are woven together into a fabric result in a very decided impact, in my opinion, on the infiltration of supplies and equipment.

Senator Cannon: My question was specifically directed toward the 16, the 11, and the two targets that were released from August 8 up to the present time. Do you believe that adding those targets to the list will add to the cost of infiltration into the South?

General Greene: Yes, I do.

Senator Cannon: And you have already testified that you felt that some of the most critical targets were on this 57 list that is yet not approved. Do you believe if those targets were also approved that this would substantially add to the cost of infiltration into the South?

General Greene: Yes, I do.

But I wish to emphasize once more, Senator, that the key in this are the three principal ports and the two LOC's out of Hanoi.

**Stepped-up Air Campaign Results in Less Casualties**

Senator Cannon: Do you believe that a stepped-up campaign in the north would result in less casualties to our personnel in South Vietnam?

General Greene: Yes, I do.
Senator Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. (presiding). Thank you, Senator.

Suppose we let—

Senator Miller. Would the Senator yield at that point, please?

Senator Stennis. All right. As soon as we can I want to give Mr. Kendall a chance. Have you asked any questions yet?

Mr. Kendall. No, sir.

Senator Stennis. That is all right. We want him to ask some basic questions here for the subcommittee to make sure we get certain information in the record.

You wanted to ask a question now?

Senator Miller. I just wanted to clarify the last question about a stepped-up campaign in the north. I believe, General Greene, your answer would be in the frame of reference which you and I earlier discussed; namely, the same level of air activity hitting the more meaningful targets, and then, if that were not sufficient, an increased level of air activity.

General Greene. Yes, sir.

Senator Miller. That is all.

Senator Stennis. All right, Mr. Kendall, you may proceed with your questions.

Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just so the record might be clear, General Greene—of course, we know this—but as a member of the Joint Chiefs you have been very closely connected with and have had a substantial role in the development and direction of the air campaign since it originated in February 1965, is that correct?

General Greene. As an associate of the Joint Chiefs, that is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. Kendall. We have had outlined to us what has been referred to as gradually increased pressure in the air campaign; I would like to ask you, sir, if that is in accord with what was and has been recommended by the Joint Chiefs and, if not, in what respect it differs.

I would like for you to start back with the 94 target list that the Joint Chiefs recommended in March and April of 1966.

JCS AGAINST GRADUALISM CONCEPT

General Greene. Well, I would say, as a general statement, that to start with that, in my opinion, the Chiefs have not espoused this concept of gradualism in the air attack. I certainly know that I have not. I have consistently advocated a strong air campaign against North Vietnam as part of our overall effort in South Vietnam, and the JCS recommendations have followed a similar pattern from late 1964 to the present.

As far as the details on the specific recommendations and higher authority action, I do not have that available here with me. I do believe there have been other witnesses before the subcommittee who have been in a better position to respond to that detailed information.

However, as far as the effectiveness of the air campaign against North Vietnam I consider, as I have previously testified, that it has been most useful in supporting our overall objectives and I do feel
that it could have made a greater contribution if a stronger campaign as envisioned by the destruction of the 94 target list in 1965 had been carried out.

Mr. Kendall. Well, I believe it is correct, is it not, that through 1966, in contrast to the Joint Chiefs' recommendations with respect to specific targets, the bulk of the air campaign was devoted to hitting lines of communication well south of Hanoi and Haiphong?

General Greene. Yes, that is correct, yes.

**ONLY 1,000 SORTIES AGAINST JCS FIXED TARGETS**

Mr. Kendall. For example, the information I have is that out of 106,000 combat sorties that were flown over North Vietnam in 1966 only 1,000 were against JCS fixed targets. Does that correspond generally with your information?

General Greene. That corresponds as I recollect. Of course, as I pointed out, the key targets have not even yet been hit and the targets that I think are perhaps the determinates in efficiency of the air campaign.

Senator Stennis. Pardon me; let him name those right there in the record in addition to the facts you have already emphasized.

General Greene. Well, the ones I have been thinking of, Mr. Chairman, are the ports and the four airfields, those are the specific ones, plus the two LOC's out of Hanoi, one to the northeast and one to the northwest, rail and road lines.

**ONLY 22 JCS TARGETS HIT IN 1966**

Mr. Kendall. My information also is, General, that in 1966 a total of 22 JCS targets were hit and only four of those were considered as really significant, at least by Admiral Sharp. Are you in position to comment on that, sir?

General Greene. To the best of my recollection that is approximately correct.

Mr. Kendall. Admiral Sharp advised us that, although 80 percent of the significant military targets in North Vietnam identified for strike had been authorized for attack and struck, the remaining unauthorized targets are the most critical targets in NVN, and for the most part are located in the prohibited or restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong.

I believe that is generally in accord with what you have already testified to.

**IMPORTANCE OF HAIPHONG**

General Greene. Yes, sir. That is correct, and just as a specific example, Counsel, I would like to just once more describe the importance of this port of Haiphong.

From January to July of this year inclusive we have estimated that some 830,000 metric tons have entered North Vietnam through Haiphong.

Now as to some of the major imports, the POL has amounted to some 25 percent, of foodstuffs 25 percent, fertilizers 25 percent, and then machinery, vehicles, timber, cotton, medicines have made up the 25 percent more.
Most of military equipment, in our opinion, comes over the rail lines from Soviet Russia through Red China. I have not been able to determine what the exact percentage is or the types and categories of equipment, although I have seen that equipment after it has reached South Vietnam; and also, of course, seen photographs of equipment such as the SAM's in North Vietnam.

This shows you how vital this port of Haiphong, one of these fixed targets which has been recommended by the Joint Chiefs for strike actually is, and I would like to say it is important, Counsel; not only because of the use of many of these items in the campaign in the south, but also the impact that the receipt of these supplies has upon the people in North Vietnam. That, to me, is a most important factor. They are having to import, for example, a great deal more of their food now than they did last year. [Deleted.]

I would like to just give you a little more data, too, on what is coming through the borders into North Vietnam. I would like to give you one or two examples. In the first half of 1967 we estimated that 62 tons of combat material came in by rail. This is weapons and ammunition, for example—62,000 tons came in by rail. I would like to correct that figure, if I may, sir, 62,000.

We had trucks, construction equipment, generators, 12,000 tons by ship, 4,000 tons by rail. This is in the first 6 months.

Petroleum we estimate 142,000 tons came in by ship. Metal products, textiles, coal, machinery, equipment, timber, some 265,000 tons came in by ship, 111,000 tons by rail. Fertilizer 112,000 tons by ship, and food 238,000 tons came in by ship.

I cite these factors to you to just show how important these items are not only to the war in the south but also to the morale and support of the Vietnamese people in the north.

Mr. KENDALL. General, there has been testimony to the effect that there is nothing we can do about closing Haiphong or interdicting the other routes and transportation, rail, water, and highway which can really substantially reduce the amount imported.

Do you believe, as a military man—and I, of course, am not talking of bombing civilian populations or area bombing such as we had in World War II—but do you believe it is within the capabilities of our aviation, short of that, in conjunction with mining and things of that nature and the use of seapower, to take action which will substantially reduce the flow of supplies, both by sea and by land, into North Vietnam itself?

General GREENE. Well, I have seen various computations on the number of metric tons required to support the effort in South Vietnam. These have ranged from as low as 15 tons per day to much higher.

I do not believe that the air campaign will ever successfully completely shut off the flow of supplies and ammunition and materials into South Vietnam.

Mr. KENDALL. Of course, I was talking about stopping the importation of it into North Vietnam.

General GREENE. Yes, I know; I was going to come to that.

Mr. KENDALL. All right, General.

General GREENE. I do feel if we could shut off the importation through these major ports and over these two major LOC's that a tremendous impact would be felt on the availability of equipment and supplies to support the campaign in the south.
The other thing, and I want to say this again to you, the impact on the people themselves in North Vietnam is also a factor that must be measured in this, too.

**HAIPHONG—THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT THING**

**Mr. KENDALL.** You would say that closing Haiphong from the military viewpoint is the most single important thing that we should do in North Vietnam, would this be correct?

**General GREENE.** That is my feeling, provided the closing of the port is tied in with the closing of the principal LOC's from the Chinese border.

**Mr. KENDALL.** General, do you have any idea to what can be attributed the fact that the Joint Chiefs were able to obtain approval after August 1 of the important targets that they did get when many of them had long been previously recommended and disapproved?

**General GREENE.** I know of no reason other than just the natural progress of the gradualistic system we have been using. I mean, I know of no other reason. We have had more targets gradually added to the list.

**INEFFICIENT USE OF AIRPOWER IN 1966**

**Mr. KENDALL.** Admiral Sharp advised General Wheeler, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that, and I quote:

In the final analysis it must be concluded that in 1966 the air campaign did not apply adequate and steady pressure against the enemy. Imposed restrictions have resulted in an inefficient use of our airpower.

Do you agree with that assessment, sir?

**General GREENE.** Yes, I do.

**Mr. KENDALL.** For what reason?

**General GREENE.** Well, for the very reason that I have outlined before, that the vital important targets we were unable to hit and of course I would add this, that perhaps there are other political reasons better known to people other than myself that might lead to the conclusion that these targets should not be hit. But certainly the air campaign in the north has been crippled by the restrictions that have been placed upon it and for a long time I have been alarmed and concerned over the possibility that the air arm, the capability of airpower, was being—

**Senator CANNON.** Demigrated.

**General GREENE.** Was being demigrated, that is exactly the word I want, thank you. I felt very strongly about this.

**Mr. KENDALL.** Did the Joint Chiefs take any specific action as a result of Admiral Sharp's message? Did that generate anything specific or just a continuation of the recommendations?

**General GREENE.** No, the Chiefs from time to time have reiterated their recommendations regarding fixed targets and the desirability of hitting them. Haiphong is a good example.

**Mr. KENDALL.** Would it be correct for me to say that it is your opinion that had we conducted a more vigorous and sustained campaign with a sharp attack against the six-target system and had started that, say, a year ago, we would be in a better position militarily today or at least would have inflicted more damage on North Vietnam and lessened its ability to support the war in the south?
General Green. I do not want to be a Monday morning quarterback on this particular subject, and I do not think I am because from the very first, going back into the fall of 1964, I have advocated the rapid and heavy application of airpower to targets in North Vietnam as well as in South Vietnam, wherever they might be found. I mean we are fighting a war, and we know from study of military history that the gradual application of force usually results in a long-term campaign or possibly an unsatisfactory conclusion. Once we decide to use the military power, in my opinion, it should be applied in great strength to key targets.

Mr. Kendall. I understand, you, to say in response to Senator Cannon's question that you considered the 57 targets which had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs but not authorized for strike to be very significant and very important; is that correct?

Target's become important when meshed together.

General Green. I said that although some of those targets might in themselves, when viewed individually, be considered relatively unimportant targets, but when they are all meshed together, as part of a bombing effort, they are important and the result is important.

JCS felt proposal to limit bombing south of 20th very unwise.

Mr. Kendall. I wonder, General, if you would tell us what you know about the proposal or maybe suggestion, or at least discussion, about limiting our bombing to south of the 20th parallel. How did it originate; did you support it; what is its present status; and what is its relationship to the [deleted] project, if any?

General Green. Well, I think that this question of whether or not to limit the bombing to the southern part of North Vietnam below the 20th parallel came from a study or a consideration that originated in the Defense Department. This matter was considered by the Joint Chiefs, and we felt that it was a very unwise proposition. It would preclude our bombing, for example, the key points that I enumerated already, the key areas of Hanoi and Hanoi and the LOC's coming down from the Chinese border. So we did not think that this was a wise proposal at all.

Sanctuary areas.

Mr. Kendall. I wish you would, if you will, discuss the sanctuaries which we have referred to as North Vietnamese and by the I mean the buffer zone and the prohibited and restricted areas around Hanoi, and Hanoi, and the effect which these sanctuaries have had on the air war. Include in your answer, if you will, the use to which the North Vietnamese have made of these sanctuaries, if any.

General Green. Well, the sanctuary areas along the Chinese border were placed there in order to avoid, as far as possible, any accidental crossing of the border by our aircraft.

The sanctuary in the western half was some [deleted] in depth, and [deleted] further to the east. This meant that without specific authority our aircraft were not permitted to go into these areas.
Mr. Kendall. And you did not get any authority in this area until August 8, as I recall, is that not right?

General Greene. Well, we did not get the authority until recently, when we received permission to go in against specific targets. I am thinking of the northeast LOC.

Now, it did not take the North Vietnamese and Chinese apparently very long to determine that we were not going to enter these zones, because aerial photographs, for example, would show trucks and cars parked in this area, waiting to be moved south into Hanoi.

[Deleted.]

So I question actually the necessity for the maintenance of this type of buffer zone. It certainly was an assist to the enemy.

Now, the buffer zones around Hanoi and Haiphong were placed there, of course, primarily to, as I understand it, to reduce to an absolute minimum civilian casualties. We have been in a war for two and a half years, and my feeling is the war is made possible in South Vietnam not only by the leaders in the north but also supported by the people in North Vietnam, and if we have prime military targets in Hanoi or Haiphong, I feel that these targets—and this is my personal view—should be struck. Military targets should be struck no matter where they are if they are of prime importance to our campaign in the south.

Mr. Kendall. What recommendations have the Joint Chiefs made about [deleted] the prohibited and restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong?

General Greene. Well, we have made recommendations regarding striking certain targets within those areas, and, of course, recently we have been permitted to hit them. For example, the Red River Bridge is a good example of the kind of target, and I might say that gradually and apparently targets in these areas are being released for air attack.

Mr. Kendall. Did the Chiefs not make a recommendation that the restricted zone [deleted].

General Greene. Yes, they did.

Mr. Kendall. With no results taken.

General Greene. Not at this time.

Mr. Kendall. General, since I think this is important and have discussed it with other people, I understand that you are rather enthusiastic about it, so I wonder if you would take a few minutes and tell us [deleted]?

General Greene. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

JCS Considerations

Mr. Kendall. We have had some previous testimony which indicated that in some cases at least the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs as to targets were influenced and restrained, perhaps, by the feeling that there was little likelihood that they would get the targets approved. Would you comment on this, sir?

General Greene. I do not recall any sensing in that particular area, counsel. And I believe that the targets, some of these fixed targets, have been repeatedly recommended, and I think the views of the Chiefs are very well known on—in regard to striking these targets.
Mr. Kendall. There also has been some indication that consideration of foreign and domestic reactions both in the press and otherwise have influenced the direction, nature, and extent of the air war against North Vietnam as well as the targets which are approved. I would like to ask you from your viewpoint whether or not lucrative targets, which from a military standpoint should be struck, have been eliminated from the target list either by the Joint Chiefs or by higher authority because of the possibility of adverse reaction either from foreign or domestic sources?

General Greene. Well, basically being a marine, my personal belief is that we should hit any military target no matter where it is in North Vietnam if it is of prime importance to this war and to the campaign—the success of the campaign in the south.

However, I realize that we have got other considerations, too, political considerations, in which people more adept than I have a better judgment in this particular area, and that this certainly will temper what, from a purely military point of view, might be desirable. [Deleted.]

The thing is we certainly at some time are going to reach a point at which we are going to have to decide whether the importance of these targets is such that they must be attacked if we are going to find a successful conclusion to the war.

DELAY GAVE ENEMY TIME TO BUILD AAA DEFENSES

Mr. Kendall. General, in a previous answer you gave some indication of some instances in which the delay in striking targets, primarily Haiphong, I believe, gave the North Vietnamese the opportunity to take other measures such as dispersal. Is it not also true that the delay gave the enemy time to build up their air defenses over important targets and thus the attacks upon these targets, when approved at some later time, became more costly to us?

General Greene. There is no question in my mind, counsel, but what this is a fact.

Senator Stennis. As a matter of fact, if I may intervene, the delay made it far more costly in planes and men, did it not?

General Greene. You mean the number of SAM emplacements, for example.

Senator Stennis. Yes.

General Greene. And the vast numbers of conventional-type antiaircraft weapons that have been introduced into this country in the last two and a half years.

Senator Stennis. And that has cost us very dearly and it continues to.

General Greene. That is one of the aspects of a gradualistic approach.

Senator Stennis. Yes. That is all. I just wanted to emphasize that.

Mr. Kendall. Did you have anything further, General, on that point?

General Greene. I would say, for example, in the last 18 months antiaircraft guns have been increased by more than 250 percent. The
surface-to-air, so-called SA-2 sites, have more than doubled, and radar early warning capability has tripled, with fire control radars increasing at an even faster rate.

The heaviest concentration of the North Vietnamese air defense equipment is in the Hanoi-Haiphong areas and along the primary northeastern LOC's, that I talked to you gentlemen about.

Senator STENNIS. All right. You have three more questions and you may proceed.

BASIS FOR ALLOCATING SORTIES

Mr. KENDALL. I would like to ask you, General, and I do not believe this has been covered in the record. It may not be too significant but what is the basis for the allocation of the sorties over North Vietnam between the services and what is the rationale behind the division of the territory and the allocation of the sorties?

General GREENE. Well, as you know, the sorties into Route Package [deleted] directly north of the DMZ are the responsibility of General Westmoreland, and most of the sorties into that area are flown by the Air Force, although the Marine Corps is also supplying sorties as they become available or excess on a day-by-day basis in the south.

The other route package areas throughout the country are the responsibility of Admiral Sharp, and here the bulk of this effort is carried by the Air Force and by the Navy with some Marine aircraft, particularly F-4B's and the A-6's assisting in this area.

Now, the allocation of sorties among the services is based on planning factors approved by the JCS in early 1966. These factors provided for [deleted] combat sorties per month for Army maneuver battalions and [deleted] per month for Marine Corps maneuver battalions. Of course now I am talking about the sorties allocated to our effort in the south.

This variation resulted from differences in battalion composition, in the amount of organic artillery support and the use of armed helicopter support. [Deleted.]

Mr. KENDALL. Give that priority again. General GREENE. [Deleted.] Mr. KENDALL. General, I would like for you to discuss your judgment as to under what circumstances you think Red China would be provoked to intervene openly in North Vietnam with land forces, and particularly, what is the probability that the increase in the bombing effort will bring them in provided we do not attack their territory or their ships or something of that nature.

General GREENE. [Deleted.]

IMPELING FLOW OF SEABORNE SUPPLIES

Mr. KENDALL. This is my final question, Mr. Chairman.

The thought has been advanced that even though we close the port facilities, it would not impede the flow of seaborne supplies or reduce it substantially because they would lighten it and offload petroleum either in drums or directly into barges, and, therefore, we could not stop it and if we tried to stop that activity we would run the risk of damaging Soviet, Chicom shipping or third-country shipping.
What is your judgment on that question?

General Greene. Well, we certainly have been successful in South Vietnam in shutting off the coastal areas to the gun-and-supply runners that have been trying to come in and formerly did come in. I am convinced, in large numbers. I think the amount of supplies that are coming across the coast in South Vietnam is very small at the present time. I would even estimate it to be as small as 5 percent of everything that comes into the country.

Now, if that can be made successful in South Vietnam, it would seem to me that the same sort of operation could be made successful against the coasts of North Vietnam. I know they have a great many waterways up there that are in from the coast but naval gunfire, air attacks, certainly could play an important part.

Of course another thing, some percentage of this shipping is free world shipping, principally ships flying the British flag and it seems to me that these ships certainly could be stopped from making this type of voyage.

Mr. Kendall. Thank you very much.

General Greene. Although they are under a charter.

Mr. Kendall. Thank you very much, General.

Senator Stennis. All right; thank you.

Senator Symington?

TREMENDOUS IMPACT OF AIR CAMPAIGN

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Greene. A recent editorial stated:

Enormous tonnages of bombs dropped on nearly 300 targets in North Vietnam, in more than two years of aerial attacks have failed to cut down the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam and have apparently stiffened the will of the North Vietnamese to continue the fight.

Do you agree with that?

General Greene. I think the air campaign in the north, even restricted as it has been, has had a tremendous impact on the North Vietnamese people. For example, the diversion of up to 1,000,000 of them into tasks directly concerned with the results of the air attacks, and I feel that the units moving south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and also through the DMZ have been seriously hampered by these air attacks.

We would not be as far along in our campaign today in South Vietnam if we had not had the air support that has taken place during the past two and a half years.

Senator Symington. This editorial continues:

Only a few days ago the Associated Press reported that about 50 raids by B-52 bombers and several hundred raids by jet fighter bombers on a North Vietnamese fixed base in South Vietnam under "the most ideal conditions offered to the jets in the Vietnam war" failed to destroy the camouflaged camps or cut the supporting roads for more than a few hours at a time. This failure, said the dispatch from A Shau Valley, "has raised serious questions in the minds of some senior military men over the inability of air power to seriously hamper the flow of men and materials into the south."

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What are your thoughts about those statements?

EDITOR SHOULD TALK TO THE MARINES

General Greene. I do not agree with that at all. I think that editor should go out to South Vietnam and go out to I Corps and talk with a few of the marines that are benefiting from these B-52 raids and see what their feeling is. They are actually there on the ground. I have looked at these areas into which these massive raids have gone, have talked with many of our men and I do not agree with that at all. I think that editor should go out to South Vietnam and I have looked at these areas into which these massive raids have gone, have talked with many of our men and not only marines but in the other Services, and I feel that they have been of immeasurable assistance to the operations in South Vietnam.

As far as the A Shau Valley is concerned, we have a problem there, Senator. As you know that is in the western part of the I Corps zone. It is being used certainly as an LOC, a passageway into the areas in the south, and possibly also as a base area for launching guerrilla and possibly later on main force attacks into the eastern portion of I Corps.

As the present time we are trying to handle that problem by air attacks, B-52's and also other attack and bombing aircraft from incountry.

We are also reaching into the valley now with 175-millimeter guns that the Army has stationed in the I Corps area. This is a serious problem, but it would be much more serious, in my opinion, if we had not had these attacks made into this specific area.

Senator Symington. This editorial continues:

This seems a clearcut case of utter failure. But as for the overall picture, the Air Force wants to expand the war to new targets. I do not know anybody in the Navy or Air Force but who agrees we should hit the meaningful targets instead of the meaningless targets. Once in [deleted] 1965, [deleted] we made 358 strikes [deleted] I asked one of the pilots, when he came back "What did you hit". He replied, "So far as I know, nothing but a lot of leaves."

If there are any people more for hitting the meaningful military targets in North Vietnam than Marine generals it is the Army generals; and if there is anybody who wants to see these targets hit hard in North Vietnam, it is the Marine generals.

This editorial apparently wants to cut the Air Force out of the picture, so as to destroy airpower, not just the Air Force, but Naval Air also. So I am grateful to get your thinking, because if there is anybody in a position to talk about this war in Vietnam, you, at least as much as anyone else have that right.

This editorial continues:

When 302 out of 389 targets recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already been approved for attack, what more could the Air Force need to prove that it is effective?

You know, there was no such figure as 57 at the beginning of this month. Then for whatever reason a lot of new targets were released, which targets for years had been held up for reasons we do not know. Admiral Sharp testified he had no idea why they had been held up, nor did other members of the Joint Chiefs who testified before this committee. When we asked Admiral Sharp why, when his request to
attack Phuc Yen airfield, for example, was disapproved, he said he was given no reason; and General McConnell also said he was given no reason for that particular refusal. Were you given any reason?

PHUC YEN AIRFIELD

General Greene. I was not given any reason, Senator, but I listened to some discussion on the subject among the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff on the supposition that authority had not been granted possibly because of the fear that a large number of civilian casualties might result.

This has been a prime consideration in this target problem in the north.

Senator Symington. I talked to one pilot who said:

Four of my last five missions have been flown over Phuc Yen airfield so as to attack targets that meant a great deal, close to Hanoi. I have watched Communist jets wheel into line to take off to destroy me, but I was not allowed to touch them on that field.

Was that not also given some consideration?

General Greene. I am sure it was. I was not in, of course, on the decisionmaking process. I was on the receiving end of it. But I do know that there have been some discussions which encompassed the idea that the possible losses in going in against Phuc Yen might outweigh the benefits that would accrue, and that the small number of aircraft on Phuc Yen really were not worth attacking.

I did not agree with that. I certainly do not now [deleted].

Senator Symington. That is right; and the Migs also drove our pilots down into the flak.

General Greene. Right.

Senator Symington. This editorial concludes:

If bombing of the north has failed, as it has, and if further bombing on a less selective basis would involve too great a risk of spreading the war, as Mr. McNamara testified, why continue the bombing at all? It is well understood that an end of the bombing is a necessary first step toward negotiations.

We have had six bombing cessations, and nothing happened.

Continuing with said editorial it concludes:

So if bombing will not bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table, why not try nonbombing? Nothing else makes sense. Nothing could be lost.

General Walt testified before the full committee that one of the chief reasons, if not the chief reason, he lost so many Marine dead around Hill 881 and others was because of what was brought down during the Tet holiday. General Beech said that if we stopped the bombing again, it would guarantee the additional loss of 10,000 American lives. Without getting into any detail as to figures, would you be for stopping the bombing again?

WORST MISTAKE WE COULD MAKE—STOP THE BOMBING

General Greene. I certainly think it would be the worst mistake we possibly could make, Senator, and not only would it result, as it did in February when we had the Tet standdown of 96 hours and we had 20,000 tons of materials moved into the DMZ area, not only that but I
am thinking about the impact on the attitudes of the American fighting men, the Marines, below the DMZ if they knew that the bombing in the North had been stopped.

Senator STENNIS. Would you yield to me on that. You say you are thinking about it. We do not know what you are thinking. Tell us more in detail, if you will, just what the impact would be on the Marines as they are stationed there now. I want you to spell this out.

General GREENE. Well, I think the Marines would certainly feel they have been let down, that the action was entirely wrong, and they would feel that much of the ammunition being used against them, Mr. Chairman, was coming down without any trouble at all to artillery pieces, and to the men, the enemy down there, and that was being used against them, and to me this is—this impact on the attitudes of our fighting men, if the bombing were to be stopped, is the most serious part of the problem.

Senator CANNON. Mr. Chairman, would you yield at that point for a question?

Senator STENNIS. Senator Symington has the floor. He has about used his time.

TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND TONS DELIVERED DURING TET STANDDOWN

Senator CANNON. General, you used the figure 20,000 tons. Is that the estimate of the tonnage that came down during the Tet holidays?

General GREENE. It was actually—during the Tet standoff some 23,000, I said 20,000, but the best information we have is 23,000 tons of supplies were delivered to the southern part of the military region 4, just below the 18th parallel.

Senator CANNON. Then, based on the 15-ton-a-day requirement, they got enough down there during the truce to last 1,500 days; that is a pretty good supply they got in there.

General GREENE. Well, Senator, I would not accept that figure of 15 tons.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I do not either. I might add.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just a minute. Let us not dispute a computer here. We all know that computers are considered by some to be far superior in their capacity to analyze than any Americans who have the misfortune to wear the military uniform of their country.

Thank you for your testimony, General. As one who had a son who served in World War II under General Bradley, and another son who served in the Marines under General Vandegrift, I still have what appears like a photographic memory of what it meant to them, when they were being given the uniform he would not refuse it. I have great respect for the opinion of the American people. As a great Supreme Court Justice once said to me, “Partial truth is an evasion of truth,” and as far as this member of this committee is concerned, I am washed up with the Pentagon letting out only half-truths.

It is my earnest hope that every American will read this record. That is all.
Senator STENNIS. Gentlemen, I have a few questions, and then I will call on whichever Senator is next. I think it is Senator Thurmond. You haven’t had a chance?

Senator Thurmond. No.

EFFECT OF BOMBING CESSION

Senator STENNIS. I haven’t either except for one or two questions. General Greene, you were very vivid in your illustration of what it would mean to the Marines and their morale if there is a cessation or suspension of the bombing. You mentioned that they would know that these supplies and additional men were coming down unimpeded.

Enlarge on the physical aspects of that, if you will. For example, we already know from experience how much they can bring in there in just a few days during bombing lulls. However, if we suspend for a substantial number of days, can’t they get a high percentage of the destruction we have caused repaired and get things back in motion? Enlarge on that a little.

General Greene. Well, if the bombing were to stop entirely in North Vietnam, they would be able to repair and restore their lines of communication, their roads, their railroads, their bridges. They would be able to expedite movement of supplies and men throughout the country, and furthermore, some half million people that it has been estimated have been diverted from the repair and restoration of bomb damage would now be able to turn their efforts toward other war-making or support activities in North Vietnam.

Senator STENNIS. They would be back in business in from 15 to 30 to 40 days almost completely, wouldn’t they, on many of their installations?

General Greene. I would say, sir, in a comparatively short time, yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Men of great purposes and knowledge are debating about turning this matter over to the U.N., as soon as elections are held in Vietnam. Without totally discounting that, I imagine if we make such a move it might involve a suspension of the bombing.

I would like for you to give some kind of an idea about what, if anything, the enemy could do as a reciprocal action or a quid pro quo if we suspend the bombing. What should we call on them to do in such a case?

General Greene. [Deleted.]

Senator STENNIS. [Deleted.]

General Greene. That is right, yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Kendall asked you your estimate of the probabilities, and this is purely a speculative thought with reference to Red China coming in, and you gave your opinion and your reasons.

Now what about the Soviet Union? Let me put it this way. What do you think are the chances and what would be the reasons for or against the Soviet Union for risking war or coming into war with the United States because of anything that might happen in connection with Vietnam?

General Greene. Mr. Chairman, I can only hazard a guess.

Senator STENNIS. That is all anyone can do.

General Greene. [Deleted.]
Senator STENNIS. [Deleted.]

General GREENE. [Deleted.]

Senator STENNIS. [Deleted.]

General GREENE. [Deleted.]

Senator STENNIS. Senator Thurmond, I call on you now, sir.

Senator THURMOND. General Greene, I want to express my appreciation for the splendid work the Marines have done in Vietnam, and to you, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, for the outstanding service that they have rendered our country in this war.

General GREENE. Thank you, Senator.

FIVE BOMBING PAUSES WITH NO FRUITFUL EFFECT

Senator THURMOND. I also want to compliment you on your testimony today. You made a statement on page 4 in these words:

I have long been an advocate of a stronger air campaign against North Vietnam, and I remain convinced that such must be a necessary part of our strategy.

I was very much pleased to see that statement, and I think you are just as right as you can be. There are many people in the country who, I think, have been misled by false propaganda to the effect that, if we stop bombing, the Vietnamese will come to the negotiating table. I have been of the opinion that the more pressure we put on the North Vietnamese will bring them to the negotiating table quicker than stopping the bombing. I presume from what you say today that we are more or less in accord on thinking that?

General GREENE. I feel strongly as you do about this matter, Senator. We have already tested the stoppage of bombing several times, without any effort on the other side, the Communist side, to meet us halfway.

Senator THURMOND. How many times have we suspended bombing— I recall at least three.

General GREENE. I believe it is five times, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Five times?

General GREENE. I believe it is five times, as I recollect it.

Senator THURMOND. And on each of those occasions neither the Vietcong nor the North Vietnamese showed any inclination that they wished to negotiate even though we did stop, did they?

General GREENE. That is correct, sir. The last Tet stoppage of 5 days, of course, is a prime example. They used every effort they could muster to move supplies into the southern part of their country next to the DMZ.

Senator THURMOND. Instead of participating in the religious ceremonies of that time of year, they used it to build up their strength to continue the war.

General GREENE. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

FAVORS LIFTING RESTRICTIONS

Senator THURMOND. I believe all of the Chiefs of Staff and also Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief in the Pacific, have made statements that they favored lifting the restrictions on bombing. I believe that is the general effect of your testimony here today.

General GREENE. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Thurmond. I believe all of the Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Sharp have testified that they favor closing the port of Haiphong and closing it preferably through mining. I believe that is the general effect of your testimony here today.

General Greene. It is.

Senator Thurmond. I believe all of the Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Sharp, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, have said that [deleted]. I believe that is the general effect of your testimony here today.

General Greene. It is, although in the case of closing the ports, I feel that some care should be used in the method of closure.

Senator Thurmond. I believe your thinking was that possibly mining would be the most feasible way to do it.

General Greene. [Deleted.]

EIGHTY-FIVE PERCENT ENTERS THROUGH HAIPHONG

Senator Thurmond. Secretary McNamara testified last week that enemy goods infiltrating into South Vietnam enter North Vietnam chiefly through the port of Haiphong. He estimated that as much as 85 percent of the enemy goods come through that port. I have read figures anywhere from 60 percent to about 85 percent. Have you given your opinion as to the approximate amount that would come through?

General Greene. Yes, sir, I have in detail.

Senator Thurmond. And what percent is it?

General Greene. Well, I would say 85 percent is approximately correct. I gave a detailed breakdown, Senator.

Senator Thurmond. You need not repeat it. If that is the case, it would seem that it would be very helpful to our cause if that port could be closed.

General Greene. I feel very strongly about it, Senator, that it should be closed.

Senator Thurmond. It has been said by some who seem fearful that Red China or the Soviets might come in, that if we did close it, it would bring those countries into the war. [Deleted.] Now I believe Mr. Kendall asked you as to what you thought would bring Red China in, and if I understood your answer correctly [deleted]. Did I understand that correctly?

General Greene. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. Red China must surely know that with our nuclear weapons, we could destroy their potential for developing atomic weapons and thereby destroy their ability to become a world power so far as atomic weapons are concerned. The general belief of the military people with whom I have talked is that Red China will not come into the war simply because we bombed North Vietnam or if we should close the ports to keep out enemy goods but would only come in if we were to make an invasion of North Vietnam. Do you have anything else to say in that connection?

General Greene. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

General Greene. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

General Greene. [Deleted.]
TROOP MORALE HIGH

Senator Thurmond. I have been hopeful that our Government and the Defense Department will not be influenced by some of the newspapers and news media in our country, with the propaganda they have been putting out, and some of the news items which come from over there. I have found the morale among our troops very high.

I visited General Walt when I was there, and the morale among the Marines was exceedingly high. It seems that most of the fear that I have encountered has been on the part of people back here who really don't know the situation first hand, and seem to be receiving this propaganda from various individuals who are possessed of appeasing mind or stalemate mind or no-win mind, or those who seem to have great fear that it will bring China or Russia into it.

General Greene. There certainly is no diminution in the morale out there in South Vietnam. I try to go out there every 5 or 6 months. I made six trips, and I think this one has been the most illuminating and profitable of any of them, and the attitudes and the morale, not just among the Marines but among all of the services—for example, I went down into the Delta, and visited two Army battalions down there and the Navy and the tremendous enthusiasm and belief in what they are doing, is just something to see.

As far as the Marine Corps is concerned, Senator, we have had over 9,000 men voluntarily extend their tours in South Vietnam, and why do they do it? These are 18, 19-, 20-year-old boys. You ask them why, and they say because they feel that they are doing something worthwhile, not only for their country but for the people that they are among.

Senator Thurmond. They feel they are being challenged and they are willing to meet the challenge. I think that is most commendable on their part. I found the same was true with the other services. I have talked with Air Force pilots who go out on these dangerous missions, and risk their lives. In some cases, there have been some targets they felt were not as vital possibly as warranted their going, but I found their morale exceedingly high. There have been many other targets that they felt they should be bombing, however, that they felt were of greater importance.

WHAT GREENE WOULD DO TO END WAR

General Greene, let me ask you this question: You have covered most of the matters I had in mind. If you were given the power—the freedom to act—and told to win this war, what would you do that we are not doing now?

General Greene. Well, I would increase our air campaign in the North to the maximum. Of course what I am saying again is my
opinion, Senator, but I would attack military targets no matter where they were found in the North, if they were of vital import to the war, to our winning the war.

Secondly [deleted].

Thirdly, I would try to get the word to the American people as to what our national security stake in Southeast Asia really is. This is the thing that alarms me in going around our country, is that they understand that we are there in South Vietnam to help South Vietnam as a poor struggling country to whom we have made certain pledges, but very few of them understand the great stake that we have in South Vietnam. I have a note here. I would just like to read this into the record. Senator, my friend, Ambassador Johnson, who is now Ambassador in Japan, said once, and I want to quote:

The question is not whether Vietnam itself or indeed Southeast Asia as a whole is of such political, strategic, or economic importance as to justify asking our men and women to risk their lives there. Rather the question is the worldwide effect of permitting the Communists to breach by force any of the lines that were drawn in the various postwar settlements.

The principle of self-determination is paramount. And shall we merely watch as countries are subjected to infiltration, invasion, and terrorism? As the leader of the community of free men, we have committed our word to the defense of freedom.

I feel very strongly about this, and I certainly agree with Ambassador Johnson.

Senator Thurmond. I have made the statement many times that really our only reason for being there is our own national interest, as much as we would like to see people of other countries remain free.

To my way of thinking, we are there because our own national interest is affected, and if we should withdraw, the whole of Southeast Asia would be lost to the Communists. The Communists would then continue to encroach upon us and getting closer and closer to the United States. Do you agree with that?

General Greene. I agree with it wholeheartedly, and I think the most serious problem we face is to get this word to our people.

Senator Thurmond. I have stated, though that if we are just going to fight there for 5 or 10 years, and end up with a stalemate, then we might as well get out now. I don't feel that we are justified in having thousands and thousands and thousands more men killed just to end up with a stalemate.

I think we ought to win that war. We can win it, and it is to the advantage of the United States and the free world that we do win it. I think if this war is left to the men who fight wars, the uniformed people, I am sure they would win it. I just hope the policy of our Government will be revised to that effect. Thank you very much.

General Greene. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Thurmond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. I believe that brings us to Senator Cannon.

Senator Cannon. I have no more questions.

Senator Stennis. Senator Miller, that brings us back to you.

WE ARE AT WAR

Senator Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, we hear arguments to the effect that our bombing of North Vietnam has
resulted in anger of the people of North Vietnam against the United States, and that this actually is helping, rather than hindering, the popular support for the government of Hanoi. Do you have any comment on that argument?

General Greene. I don't agree with that statement, and I don't think it is of prime import. We are at war with North Vietnam right now, today, and we shouldn't be so much interested in their anger as we are in bringing the war home to every one of them up there.

Senator Miller. In other words, they were angry at us when we got into the war?

General Greene. I would say their anger in my opinion is the least important factor that I could think of in the war. The most important one is to make them realize that they are in a war, and that is why I advocate an increased bombing campaign in the North, to bring it home. That is why I feel if we were to cut off the supplies coming in through Haiphong and over the LOC's, that we would make this warfront among the people themselves in North Vietnam.

Now we know what happened in Red China when the people became dissatisfied with their rulers, and I think the same thing would happen in North Vietnam if the North Vietnamese people became dissatisfied with Ho Chi Minh and the ruling hierarchy in that country. I listened to a lot of talk about the war is being waged primarily as Ho Chi Minh and the leaders in North Vietnam want it waged.

Well, when we see what has happened in China, I refuse to believe that if the pressure is brought home on the individual North Vietnamese, that he isn't going to let his leaders know, and this to me is the key factor in bringing them to the table to negotiate.

Senator Miller. Have you seen any intelligence reports indicating that while there is some war weariness among the people of North Vietnam, that generally the morale is determined and in support of the Government?

General Greene. There has been a great deal of upset in the life of the people in North Vietnam. I think the better way to describe their attitude, my feeling has been from reading the reports, is that they are enduring at this point. In other words, these discomforts and misfortunes attendant to the bombing, and the effort which is being required of them, the problem of food supplies, and the many other difficulties, they have are something to be borne with the typical oriental stoicism that these people are famous for. But I do believe they can be brought to a point, just as the Chinese people have, where they will make their position known.

TONNAGES IMPORTED DAILY

Senator Miller. We have received testimony that the capacity of the railroad and waterway system in the north is 8,400 tons per day, after all of the damage we have inflicted, it already—8,400 tons per day, and at present it would require 16,800 tons.

Suppose we could knock out half of it. That would be about 4,200 tons per day capacity still remaining. The argument is advanced that 4,200 tons per day would then be capable of being moved on the railroad and waterway network. 4,200 tons daily is only 70 percent of the volume of present imports, and in turn, is far, far less than the requirement to maintain forces at their present levels in the south.
Therefore, the argument is advanced that we will not reduce the flow of military equipment to the south by knocking out the ports.

General Greene. Well, I do not agree with that position, Senator. I believe that any reduction in the 8,400 daily flow of supplies will have its impact on the south, either directly or indirectly.

Senator Miller. Pardon me, General, I didn't make myself clear. I am not talking about the capacity of the ports. I am talking about the capacity of the rails, the roads, and the waterways.

The capacity is 8,400 tons per day. That even if we could knock out half of all that network, that would mean a capacity left of over 4,200 tons per day, and that that is 70 percent of the present volume of imports, and that 4,200 tons per day capacity, which could be shifted too if the ports were knocked out, is far, far in excess of what they need to maintain their present levels in the south.

Therefore, the argument is made, knock out the ports, and they are still going to get the imports in one way or another. You could knock out half of their railroad and waterway network, and they are going to end up with 4,200 tons daily capacity. That is far in excess of what they need in the south, and it is practically 70 percent of what they are now taking in through the ports.

**IMPACT ON PEOPLE OF NVN NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED**

General Greene. Well, first let me say, as I did before, that if the ports are attacked, then the LOC's, the landlines must be attacked too, both along the coast and up to the border between North Vietnam and Red China. This has to be a coordinated effort.

Secondly, I feel that any reduction as a result of these attacks will have an impact on the campaign in South Vietnam, and what's more important, in many ways, is the impact it is going to have on the people of North Vietnam who can't get these things that are being brought in. [Deleted.] So I think the key here is not the so-called 15 tons a day or a thousand times that, if that is what is actually being moved into South Vietnam. The key thing is the reduction of any of this material, and secondly, the impact it is going to have on the people themselves.

I don't think that this has been really addressed properly in the consideration of the desirability to take this action.

Senator Miller. I have heard two schools of thought expressed. One is that more effective bombing in the north could actually reduce the flow of war material to the south, and, therefore, reduce the capability to maintain forces at their present levels, certainly in as efficient condition as they are now.

Then the other thought that the will of the people in the north to support the war effort can be cracked by more effective bombing. Then there is a third school, and that is let's do both.

Senator Stennis. Excuse me, what is that?

Senator Miller. And there is a third school of thought in that we don't know whether it is going to crack the will in the north or whether it is going to reduce the flow of supplies and thereby, reduce the enemy force levels in the south, but let's try to achieve both.

If I understand the present bombing campaign in the north, we are trying to do both; is that correct?
General Greene. Yes, we are, and I am fully in accord with doing both. I am simply saying that I believe the impact on the morale and the attitudes of the people in the north, perhaps that hasn't been considered adequately in measuring whether or not the bombing campaign should be intensified.

Senator Miller. It has been considered in a reverse sort of way, General, by some people saying you can't bomb the north into submission or bomb the people into coming to the negotiating table. I don't know of any member of our committee who has said that you can. But every indication is that this is a part of the overall mosaic in trying to shorten the war. If they are suffering defeats in the south and there is more war-weariness in the north, because of more effective bombing, that the whole combined package should shorten the war.

General Greene. I agree.

Senator Miller. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator Miller. Senator Cannon, that brings us to you.

Senator Cannon. I have nothing further.

Senator Stennis. Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kendall. I have one further matter.

Senator Stennis. Senator Thurmond, had you finished?

Senator Thurmond. Yes, sir, thank you very much.

Senator Stennis. All right, Mr. Kendall.

VALIDITY OF 15 TONS PER DAY

Mr. Kendall. General, this relates to your statement that during the 72-hour Tet Truce, 23,000 tons of supplies went from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Now we have had previous testimony that the daily tonnage may be as low as 15 tons. I want to relate your 23,000 tons to the testimony by General McConnell, who said, without giving any tonnage figure, that they pushed through a volume of supplies that would require 58 days to move during periods of our air activity.

Thirty-eight into 23,000 is 605 tons per day. Does not this cast a little cold water on the 15-tons-per-day theory?

General Greene. Well, it could. Of course, much of this material might be going into stockpiles, too, you know, for major operations, which could conceivably come at later or irregular periods. I don't know what the exact tonnage is that is required to support the effort in South Vietnam, but certainly, 500 or 1,500 tons a day seems like a ridiculously small amount. Of course, this is supposed to cover materials other than food.

Senator Stennis. General, excuse me just a moment, please. I hate to interrupt, but I am compelled to go on another matter. I am going to ask Senator Symington to preside. We want to especially thank you for this very valuable testimony. It has strengthened the record in every way, and your opinion is worth a lot to begin with.

Your experience greatly adds to it as does the responsibility you have been carrying. They combine to make your testimony doubly valuable. We have been helped. We have been greatly concerned about this matter, and I think this record is going to show very strongly what the bombing has done, where we would be without it, and also the need for expansion of these more meaningful targets.
So as always, this committee is grateful to you. We appreciate very much your appearance today. Whenever you do appear, your testimony is always valuable.

General Greene. Thank you, sir.

Senator Stevens. Thank you very much. Now if you will excuse me.

Mr. Kendall. I have no further questions, General, if you have completed your answer.

General Greene. I would simply like to say in closing to the chairman and the members of the committee that the testimony which I have given has been my personal opinion. I have made these views known to the civilian secretariat as well as the Joint Chiefs, and that I have tried to carry out the decisions that have been made, whether they have been in accord with my recommendations or not.

IMPACT OF POTENTIAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Senator Miller. Could I ask one more question? General, some of the targets which have been off limits have apparently had, as a factor in placing them off limits, the estimated civilian casualties that would result if they were struck. Do you believe that the estimate of the civilian casualties that might be entailed by striking any of these targets should be a factor in determining whether or not they should be authorized?

General Greene. I feel that that has played an important part in the decisions made on whether or not certain fixed targets would be attacked.

Senator Miller. Do you think it should be a factor?

General Greene. In my opinion the prime factor is whether or not the target is of prime importance to the military campaign, the success of the war. [Deleted.]

Senator Miller. You recognize that there has been criticism in certain quarters of the civilian casualties resulting from our bombing attacks. Would you think that it might be prudent before authorizing these targets to be struck if we should engage in some kind of information activity—by radio or leaflet drops—to warn the civilians in the north that any target of military significance is subject to being struck, and that civilians should stay away from those targets. We would not tell them the specific targets, nor tell them when they may be struck but just let them be warned. Do you think that would satisfy a possible moral requirement on our part?

General Greene. I certainly think it would, Senator.

Senator Miller. I have no further questions.

Thank you, General.

Senator Symington. General, I would join the chairman and my colleagues in thanking you for your testimony. What worries many of us is that the people of this country are becoming restless about the price of the war as against any success, whatever that word implies, the price in lives as well as treasure.

This committee is now doing its best to get all the truth out to the people that could not help a possible enemy. Your testimony is constructive and helpful to that end. There has been no real difference in the position of any of the military before this committee; I believe that is correct, is it not, Counsel?

Mr. Kendall. Yes, sir; no essential difference.
Senator Symington. No essential difference. It is a sad business indeed when such a wide difference of opinion has developed between the civilian leadership and the military as to how to conduct a war. I only hope, if we do ever get into another war, which God forbid, there will be more true teamwork on how to handle the hostilities. No one believes more in civilian control than do I but when it comes to tactical execution of military decisions, I would hope that in the future more respect is given to the opinions of the military people.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are supposed to be the best of all the tens of thousands of young men in our country who went to the military academies. If they are going to be constantly brushed off as saber-rattling warmongers, men not capable of having constructive opinions on the subject they have spent their lives to learn, the future of this country in the world as it is today is dismal indeed.

I do thank you for your testimony. I hope, as mentioned before, that the facts presented to this subcommittee will be given to the people. The people, in our form of government, are the ones with the ultimate decision. Based on this record let them decide.

General Greene. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Senator Symington. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned until Tuesday, August 29, 1967, at 10 a.m.)
AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Smith, Thurmond and Miller) met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 224, Old Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Thurmond, and Miller.

Also present: James T. Kendall, chief counsel; and Lt. Col. Everette L. Harper, professional staff member.

Senator STENNIS. General, in this hearing all witnesses are sworn. If you will stand, please, and take the oath.

Do you solemnly swear that your testimony in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General MEYERS. I do.

CHAIRMAN’S OPENING STATEMENT

Senator STENNIS. All right. Have a seat.

I have a brief statement, gentlemen, that I shall read.

As we continue with our inquiry into the conduct and effectiveness of the air war against North Vietnam, we have as our witness Maj. Gen. Gilbert L. Meyers, U.S. Air Force (retired). General Meyers is rightfully recognized as one of the foremost experts on the use and application of tactical airpower. A brief recital of his experience and qualifications in this area makes his expertise in this field very clear.

Immediately before retiring, General Meyers served in Vietnam as deputy commander of the 7th Air Force from April 1965 to August 1966. Following that assignment, having 30 years of service, he retired from the Air Force.

Immediately prior to his Vietnam assignment, General Meyers commanded the Tactical Air Warfare Center at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., where he participated in the development of new doctrines on tactical air warfare. In doing this, he worked closely with the Army's 1st Infantry Division. The great majority of General Meyers’ career in the Air Force has been spent with tactical air forces. In World War II he served as a combat group commander and later was responsible for commanding and executing air strikes in support of the 1st Army as director of operations of the 1st Tactical Air Command. In the Korean war he was Director of Operations for the 5th Air Force for the first 2 years of that conflict.
He served in the Pentagon from 1953 to 1957 as Deputy Director of Requirements and, during his career, has commanded several fighter wings and fighter air divisions.

We are delighted to have General Meyers with us today and know that his close and intimate experience with the air war against North Vietnam, and his fine knowledge and experience in the tactical air war field, will enable him to bring to us information which will be of great value in this hearing.

For the record, you were asked to be here today because of your previous command directly in line with the subject matter of our inquiry. We have not opened the doors—nor do we expect to open the doors—to a great number of witnesses. For the time being we are confining the witnesses to those with official responsibility or immediately preceding official responsibility.

You are highly recommended by Senator Symington, who has a fine knowledge of the practical side of air warfare himself. He is a longtime student of military affairs and a valuable member of this subcommittee. I am going to call on Senator Symington for some questions in a few minutes.

I emphasize again that we are delighted to have you here and appreciate your being willing to come. Do you have a prepared statement?

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. GILBERT L. MEYERS, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED), FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE IN VIETNAM

General Meyers, I do not, sir, but I would like to make some opening remarks.

Senator Stennis. Whether or not they are prepared in writing, you certainly may make some opening remarks, and I hope you do.

General Meyers: First I would like to say that I am very pleased to have an opportunity to talk with you gentlemen. You are obviously dealing with a subject which has been very close to my heart. Having spent about 16 months in Vietnam, naturally I am extremely interested in what is going on over there to this day.

I think that in any review or look at the Vietnam war, first you must look at the strategy or the policy which is being pursued there, and my understanding, of course, is that we have three stated objectives. These objectives I think have been given to the committee many times, and in the interests of saving time, I will not repeat them.

I do not think that any military man that I have ever talked to has any quarrel with the objectives as presented. They are very straightforward, and easily understood, and I think capable of achievement.

I think where the great difference of opinion occurs is how these objectives are being carried out; specifically, how firepower is being used in North Vietnam to implement these objectives.

Associated with the objectives, there is another policy that does not come out as loud and clear as the three stated objectives. If you look at the way firepower has been employed in Vietnam, it is very obvious that this policy exists. This policy is the application of the air effort on...
a graduated controlled response basis. Initially, as we went into this war conflict, our targets were just across the DMZ. We were trying to create pressure on the enemy, and hopefully by doing so he would come to a decision that he could not win the war, and would agree to some sort of negotiated settlement.

**GRADUATED PRESSURE GIVES ENEMY TIME**

This policy of graduated pressure has a lot to do with how the air is being employed and the effectiveness of the air campaign in Vietnam. It gives the enemy time to take corrective action on many of the targets that we have struck and nullify the results of our attacks.

For example, consider the interdiction program against bridge targets on his lines of communications. It became obvious to him of course that this was a target complex that we were going to destroy. But because we did it piecemeal over a long period of time, he was able to put the material that he needed to repair the bridges in place, so that when the bridge was destroyed, he would cut down the time that the bridge was out of use.

In addition to that, he put cables across the rivers and the inlets so that he would have a means of crossing. Ferryboats were put into position so that they could be utilized immediately. By giving him this opportunity to organize his resources, he could cut down the effect of the destruction of a given target.

**HIT POWER FACILITIES ON PIECEMEAL BASIS**

Another specific along the same line. Our attack against the power facilities in North Vietnam. Again this was done on a piecemeal basis. It has been said that there are about 2,000 portable generators that have been brought into Vietnam to replace the loss of these permanent facilities.

Obviously, these generators did not exist initially, but because of the long period of time we spent destroying them, these replacement items were provided, so the impact of the destruction of these facilities was lost.

This graduated application of airpower I think has a major impact on the effectiveness of the airstrikes in the north. That is the point that I would like to get across to the committee, and I do not think it has been emphasized, at least in the press reports that I have read.

The targeting, of course, in North Vietnam is also very pertinent to the effectiveness of our air efforts up there. The target systems that we have gone after in the past have been limited in scope because of this graduated pressure policy that we were pursuing, and many of the good, more lucrative targets in the north were not attacked.

**HAIPHONG NO. 1 TO MILITARY MAN**

I understand that additional targets have now been released. Of course to the military man, the No. 1 target in North Vietnam is the port of Haiphong. This port represents to North Vietnam what the industrial capacity of Germany and Japan represented to them during the World War II time period.
North Vietnam is basically an agrarian country. They do not have the industrial capacity to produce the wherewithal to fight a war. As a result of this, they must import these necessities. A great deal of necessity come through the port at Haiphong. It has been estimated to be somewhere between 75 and 85 percent of the total North Vietnam imports enter through this port. The remaining percent enters through the northeast railroad and road nets from China.

DOESN'T MAKE SENSE

It just does not make sense to me that we would put thousands of sorties into North Vietnam on armed reconnaissance when the material we are trying to destroy is located in a very vulnerable position as it is off-loaded from the ships in the port at Haiphong: Why do we leave the equipment unmolested in these ports; and then attempt to relocate and destroy it as it moves down hundreds of miles of jungle trails? This is a very difficult thing obviously for our pilots to accomplish. Obviously a port is a very vulnerable facility, because the material has to be distributed after it is unloaded and stored. It is a very lucrative military target, and that is the point in time to bring your airpower to prevail against the material, not after it has been scattered all over the country of North Vietnam.

Gentlemen, with these few remarks, I would like to accept what questions you might have with respect to them.

(Off the record.)

Senator STEWART. All right, Mr. Kendall.

Mr. KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General we are very glad to have you with us, sir.

I believe that during your tour as deputy commander of the 7th Air Force, you first served under Gen. Joseph Moore, and then you had about a 30-day overlap with General Momyer, the present commander of the 7th Air Force; is that correct?

General MEYERS. That is correct.

AIR CAMPAIGN BEGUN IN APRIL 1965

Mr. KENDALL. When you arrived in Vietnam in April of 1965 our air campaign against North Vietnam had only recently begun and was then in the formative stage and was gradually building up; is that right?

General MEYERS. That is correct.

Mr. KENDALL. In March or April of 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a list of some 94 targets and had recommended that they be struck as opposed to the gradual and controlled application of air power which you have discussed. They felt that there should be a sharp and sustained blow against North Vietnam. Are you familiar with that?

General MEYERS. Not specifically with what the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended at that point in time.

When I arrived on the Vietnam scene in April of 1965, we were receiving our targets from CINCPAC one or two a week, on a weekly scheduled basis.

Mr. KENDALL. These were fixed targets?

General MEYERS. These were fixed targets.
In addition to that, of course we were permitted to conduct armed reconnaissance. At that time the 97 target list existed. This was a list of targets that had been developed prior to the start of the conflict in Vietnam. They were the targets that the intelligence people had developed based on data that existed at the time.

Naturally, as the war progressed, we flew reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam. Additional targets were developed and they were passed back for approval.

**GIVEN ONE TO TWO FIXED TARGETS A WEEK**

Mr. Kendall. Let's go back to the target proposition to which you referred. When you first arrived you were given one target a week?

General Meyers. One, occasionally two.

Mr. Kendall. This was one for the Air Force?

General Meyers. Right.

Mr. Kendall. And one for the Navy, I assume; is that correct?

General Meyers. That is correct, the Navy of course had their own separate—Admiral Sharp's headquarters in Hawaii broke the targets out and gave roughly half of them to the Navy and half of them to the Air Force.

Mr. Kendall. Where were the targets located generally and of what significance were they?

General Meyers. These targets at that stage were located in the Panhandle just north of the DMZ of North Vietnam. Again I am sure they were related to the policy of putting as much pressure or as little pressure on the enemy as was thought necessary. Hopefully, they would decide that they were fighting a losing battle and would agree to some peaceful settlement.

These targets gradually went north over the period of time that I was there, and finally, of course, we were receiving targets in the Hanoi area. During calendar year 1966 the majority of our effort went into the southern part of North Vietnam.

**LITTLE FLEXIBILITY**

Mr. Kendall. And the great majority of this effect, as a matter of fact, was in armed recce strikes, was it not?

General Meyers. Most of our effort was armed recce. Only one to two targets a week, as I indicated, were of the fixed target types. We did not like the one to two targets a week operation because it gave us little flexibility in planning our air operations on a day-to-day basis. As a result, requested that the targets be increased in number and the time expanded.

Our justification was based on the fact that we were forced under the one to two target program of going back to the same targets day after day. Obviously the enemy could very quickly observe the pattern we were using, and were deploying their defenses accordingly.

**“ARMED RECCE” DEFINED**

Senator Symington. General, would you define armed recce for the record?

General Meyers. On armed reconnaissance missions pilots are told to fly over a given area or along a given road, and to destroy any
moving targets that are found in the area. Moving targets such as transportation, locomotives, rail cars, military targets, and personnel are typical examples. Personnel in the designated areas that were wearing uniforms could be attacked. Shipping along the rivers and canals were included in the armed reconnaissance type of target. Moving targets primarily associated with their logistic system were the objects of our armed reconnaissance missions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

NEED FOR SPECIFIC AUTHORITY

Mr. KENDALL. To clarify that just a little, the highways, the railroads and the bridges themselves were not included in armed reconnaissance unless you were striking moving vehicles? You had to get specific authority to hit the highways, railroads, and bridges?

General MEYERS. That is correct, the bridges associated with these communications networks were not attacked as the major bridges were on the JCS target list.

Mr. KENDALL. So those were in the fixed-target area?

General MEYERS. That is right, they were in the fixed-target category. Only the so-called moving targets, mobile targets, boats, and vehicles were fair game for the armed reconnaissance attacks.

Mr. KENDALL. Now as further clarification, General, since the previous testimony indicates that only a small number—I think it was 22—JCS-designated targets were hit during the entire year of 1966, I assume that the fixed targets that you are referring to or that the majority of them were not on the JCS list but were generated locally in the field.

General MEYERS. That is right. They were all approved—

NEED FOR WASHINGTON APPROVAL

Mr. KENDALL. You had to come back to Washington?

General MEYERS. That is right, they were all approved at the Washington level. These targets were general barracks, military complexes, and ammo storage facilities, most of which had been built by the French many years ago. Based on the available photography that we had, they were no longer being used. In other words, they were not active, but we were destroying them anyway.

Mr. KENDALL. Would it be a valid conclusion that, generally speaking, these targets were less significant than JCS-designated targets from the military standpoint?

General MEYERS. In my judgment, they were much less significant.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you repeat that question?

Mr. KENDALL. Referring to the bulk of the fixed targets that the Air Force was permitted to hit during this period, Mr. Chairman, we had previously developed that most of them were not on the JCS target list, and I asked him would it follow from this or be a proper conclusion that they were less significant from a military standpoint than the JCS-designated targets which were not being hit; and your answer, General, was?

General MEYERS. There is no doubt in my mind that they were much less significant than other targets that were available in North Vietnam.