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2 Characteristics

a. Type and weight of main charge. TNT weighting approximately 35 pounds.
b. Type of fuze. Soviet pressure fuze MV-5. N/A when command detonated.
c. Body. TNT blocks placed inside wooden box.
d. Booster. N/A

e. Detonator. Standard electric or non-electric blasting cap.

3 Functioning. This mine has been designed to fire with either an electric or non-electric firing system inserted into a 1/2 inch square cut hole through the lid.

4 Employment. When command-detonated the mine is buried in the roadway, and an aiming stake approximately 4 inches high is placed on the shoulder between the mine and the command firing position. This mine has also been employed so that a rice paddy dike runs in line from the firing position to the mine.

5 Disarming techniques. The disarming of this mine should be accomplished according to the regulations prescribed for standard electric and non-electric firing systems.

(10) Antitank Mine TM-41 (CHICOM)

(a) Description. The antitank mine TM-41 (CHICOM) is a CHICOM copy of the standard Soviet antitank mine TM-41. The mine is made of blued steel metal. The overall dimensions of this mine will vary slightly depending upon the manufacturer, and the type of explosive (powder or cast). 1

(b) Characteristics

1. Type and weight of main charge. Cast or powder explosives.
2. Type of fuze. MV-5 pressure fuze.
4. Booster. A 2.6 ounce pteroic acid charge.

1. Reference 3

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5 Detonator. MD-2

6 Total weight. Approximately 5.5 kilograms (12 pounds)

7 Weight of explosive. Approximately 2.6 kilograms (6 pounds)

8 Height. Varies from 25.4 centimeters to 7.7 centimeters, (5.2 inches to 3.0 inches).

9 Diameter. Varies from 25.4 centimeters to 26.7 centimeters, (10 inches to 10.5 inches).

(c) Functioning. Mine requires an operating pressure of approximately 350 to 400 pounds of pressure on the lid of the mine case to crush the corrugated sides of the mine lid. The crushing action activates the pressure type MV-5 fuze beneath the pressure cap, thus detonating the booster and main charge.

(11) VC Terrorist Devices

(a) VC Explosive Cigarette

1 Description. This device resembles an ordinary cigarette (Figure A-52).

2 Characteristics

a Type and weight of main charge. The cigarette is filled with shredded tobacco, fine tobacco impregnated with black powder, propellant, explosive charge, and a mixture of red phosphorous, and potassium chlorate. Explosive weight is approximately ten grams.

b Measurements. Three inches long and 7/16 inches in diameter.

c Color. White

2 Functioning. Item could be lit as an ordinary cigarette. After a short delay the explosive train would be initiated by fire causing detonation.

(b) Incendiary Sabotage Device

1 Description and Employment. This item is to be used as an incendiary device. It is placed within a standard cigarette. The cigarette containing the device may then be placed in such an area that the heat and flash produced will start a fire. The filler in the device is
loosely packed and granular in form to allow the flow of air through the item to permit ignition of the cigarette. There is one air hole located in the front closing plug and two in the rear closing plugs to allow for flow of air during ignition (Figure A-5J).

2 Characteristics

a Type of main charge. Incendiary composition, consisting of red phosphorous, and potassium chlorate.

b Color. Unpainted, silver in color

c Configuration. Cylindrical

d Dimensions. 1 9/16 inches long and 5/16 inches in diameter.

e Fuze

(1) Powder/train/time

(2) Configuration. Hollow tube filled with black powder composition.

(3) Location. Fuze protrudes from one end.

(4) Construction material. Plastic

(5) Dimensions. 1 1/2 inches long and 1/2 inches in diameter.

(6) Functioning. Fuze is ignited by burning of the cigarette. Burning time is approximately four seconds before filler ignites.

(12) Waterlines and Associated Equipment

(a) Spherical, Floating Moored Mine (Figure A-54).

1 Description. Metal, welded construction (case originally made for use as a mooring buoy).

2 Dimensions. Diameter 22 inches

3 Weight. 125 pounds (explosive)

A-1-54
(c) Figure A-53 Incendiary Sabotage Device
Figure A-54 Spherical Floating Moored Mine
Adapted From Spherical Mooring Buoy
(b) Frustrum, Floating, Moored Mine (Figure A-55).

1. Description. Metal, welded
2. Dimensions. Diameter - Top 13 inches, Middle - 17 inches, Bottom - 6 inches, Height - 16 1/2 inches
3. Weight. About 35 pounds (explosive)
4. Explosive. TNT shaped charge

(c) Frustrum, Floating, Moored Mine (case originally made as a mooring buoy) (Figure A-56).

1. Description. Metal, welded, frustrum of cone with floatation bell chamber.
2. Dimensions. Diameter - Middle - 18 inches, Bottom - 8 inches, Height - 17 inches.
4. Explosive. TNT, bulk charge, cast TNT booster.

(d) Twin Can, Floating, Time Delay Fired Mine (Figure A-57).

1. Description. Two rectangular 5-gallon cans containing explosives are secured in line between two slender, rigid wooden poles. For buoyancy, each can is equipped with an inflated rubber air bladder, and two pieces of palm log about 20 inches long. Two short sticks are inserted between the main poles; one stick is utilized for attachment of a double timing device used for detonation, and the other is used to support a battery power pack.
2. Weight. 137 pounds (explosive)
3. Explosives. CHICOM TNT
4. Fuze. 24 x 4.5 volt dry cell batteries divided into two sets of 12, and wired in series to a timing device.
5. Timing Device. Two mechanical alarm clocks with metal contacts are wired in parallel to make contact with the hour hands. The mine was attached to the anchor chain of the SS OUR LADY OF PEACE, and was recovered on 26 May 1966. It failed to explode because of a malfunction in the timing device.

(e) Twin Metal Box Floating Mine (Figure A-58).

1. Description. Two sheet metal rectangular boxes containing

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Diameters

Top - 13 inches
Middle - 17 inches
Bottom - 6 inches
Height - 16.5 inches

Explosive - 35 lb. TNT shaped charge

(c) Figure A-55 Frustum Floating Moored Mine

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DIAMETERS
TOP - 8 INCHES
MIDDLE - 18 INCHES
HEIGHT - 17 INCHES
EXPLOSIVE - 65 LB. BULK TNT WITH CAST TNT BOOSTER

(c) Figure A-56 Prusium Floating Moored Mine Adapted From Mooring Buoy

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LENGTH - 60 INCHES (APPROX)
WIDTH - 15 INCHES (APPROX)
HEIGHT - 15 INCHES (APPROX)
EXPLOSIVE - 137 LB TNT (CHICO)
FUZE - 108 VOLT DRY CELL BATTERY, IN SERIES WITH TIMING DEVICE, IN PARALLEL WITH DETONATORS
TIMING DEVICE - 2 MECHANICAL ALARM CLOCKS, HOUR HANDS WIRED IN PARALLEL

(C) Figure A-57 Twin Can Floating Time Delay Mine

A-1-60

CONFIDENTIAL
AIR BLADDER

PUTTY SEAL

SHEET METAL BOX

HAND GRIPS

DIMENSIONS: 21 INCHES X 14.5 INCHES X 11.5 INCHES

EXPLOSIVE: 80 LB US C-4 PLASTIQUE
40 LB (CHICOM) TNT

DETONATOR: ELECTRIC, CONTAINED WITHIN BOX

(c) FIGURE A-58 TWO BOX FLOATING MINE (COMMAND DETONATED)
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Explosives sealed at the tops with a putty-like substance or linked together by a single lead of detonating wire from each box, and connected to a third wire leading to the electric power source. Inflated rubber air bladders are attached to each box for buoyancy.

2 Dimensions: 21 inches x 14 1/2 inches x 11 1/2 inches
2 Weight. 160 pounds (explosives)
1 Explosive. 60 pounds US C-4 plastique and 40 pounds CHICOM TNT in one box.

This mine was attached to staging lines on the USS JAMES COUNTY (LST-821), and was recovered on 29 December 1967. The mine detonation resulted in low order explosions in both boxes. The failure was apparently due to faulty detonating caps.

(f) Variation of Soviet 1933 Chemical Horn Contact Mine (Figure a-59)

1 General. This watermine is in the shape of an elongated sphere, and weighs 98.4 pounds with the case loaded. The anchor employed weighed 1450 pounds. This mine is usually moored, and launched by surface craft.

2 Characteristics
   a. Type and Weight of Main Charge. TN. weighing 506 pounds.
   b. Loosely. Tetryl (weight unknown)
   c. Case. Steel
   d. Diameter. 34.5 inches
   e. Detonator. Electric
   f. Fitting. Five chemical horns, mercury switch plug, large hydrostatic arming switch, detonator, and booster, cover plug, lifting eyes, anchor securing lugs, mooring eye, and filling hole plug.

2 Functioning. Hydrostatic pressure accomplishes the following:
   a. Closes two breaks in the firing circuit.
   b. Removes shunt from chemical horn circuit.
   c. Vertical orientation of the mine case permits a mercury switch to close the firing circuit.

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Confidential
DIMENSIONS: 21 INCHES X 14.5 INCHES X 11.5 INCHES

EXPLOSIVE: 80 LB US C-4 PLASTIQUE
40 LB (CHICH) TNT

DETONATOR: ELECTRIC, CONTAINED WITHIN BOX

(C) FIGURE A-58 TWIN BOX FLOATING MINE (COMMAND DETONATED)
explosives sealed at the tops with a putty-like substance or linked together by a single lead of detonating wire from each box, and connected to a third wire leading to the electric power source. Inflated rubber air bladders are attached to each box for buoyancy.

2 Dimensions. 21 inches x 14 1/2 inches x 11 1/2 inches

3 Weight. 160 pounds (explosives)

4 Explosive. 80 pounds US C-4 plastique and 40 pounds CH20 TNT in one box.

This mine was attached to staging lines on the USS LONG ISLAND (LST-821), and was recovered on 25 December 1967. The mine detonation resulted in low order explosions in both boxes. The failure was apparently due to faulty detonating caps.

(f) Variation of Soviet M33 Chemical Horn Contact Mine (Figure a-57)

1 General. This watermine is in the shape of an elongated sphere, and weighs 984 pounds with the case loaded. The anchor employed weighed 1450 pounds. This mine is usually moored, and launched by surface craft.

2 Characteristics

a Type and Weight of Main Charge. TNT weighing 506 pounds.

b Looser. Tetryl (weight unknown)

c Case. Steel

d Diameter. 34.5 inches

e Detonator. Electric

f Fitting. Five chemical horns, mercury switch plug, large hydrostatic arming switch, detonator, and booster, cover plug, lifting eyes, anchor securing lugs, mooring eye, and filling hole plug.

2 Functioning. Hydrostatic pressure accomplishes the following:

a Closes two breaks in the firing circuit.

b Removes shunt from chemical horn circuit.

c Vertical orientation of the mine case permits a mercury switch to close the firing circuit.
(C) Figure A-59 Soviet NKVD Chemical Horn Contact Mine (Section View)
(g) Equipment required for emplacement of watermine

1 Vehicle for transportation. According to the size of the mine, distance, and terrain over which it must be transported for use, junks, sampans, motor vehicles, and even animals are utilized to assist the sappers in moving their weapon.

2 Anchor, cable and pulleys.
3 Electric wire (waterproof).
4 Bouys and bouy cables.
5 Electric power source.
6 Times device.
7 Tape, pliers, crimpers.
8 Shovels, picks, machetes.
9 Weights or other material for securing a concealing command detonation wire on the bottom.
10 Ohmmeter or suitable testing device for testing firing circuits.
APPENDIX 2

EXAMPLES OF ENGINEER UNIT TRAINING PROGRAMS

(Verbatim extracts from captured enemy documents.)

A. Subjects and Periods for an Engineer Company

General Training Subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item#</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Use of weapons</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Launching and laying of grenades</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Regulations for warning patrols, and guards</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Regulations for interior affairs (responsibility)</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Reconnaissance drill-security or positions</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Individual and cell attack by maneuvering troops</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Squad attack by maneuvering troops under artillery fire</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Chemistry, first aid, and dressings</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13 days</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Skill Training

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>21 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Explosive charges</td>
<td>25 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Tactics and construction</td>
<td>26 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Revision and control</td>
<td>5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>77 days</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detail of Each Training Subject

I. Mines

1. Anti-infantry mines, illuminating mines, claymore mines. | 3 days
2. Various types of bombs and their removal. | 1 day
3. Anti-infantry mines (claymore mines, mosquito mines) | 1 day
4. Anti-infantry mines, laying of automatic mines, trapping mines, and torpedoes. | 1 day
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Anti-mechanical mines</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Anti-helicopter</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Mine detectors (responsibility of the detachment)</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Engineer cell and squad laying mines, platoon setting up obstacles.</td>
<td>4 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Engineer squad opening routes through mine fields</td>
<td>4 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Engineer squad laying mines and attacking enemy infantry in formation.</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**II. Explosive charges**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Varicous types of explosive charges</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Explosive charges in cake or powder form</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Assembly of igniter, and detonator of an ordinary explosive charge.</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Electric detonation instruments</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Electric line and its camouflage, computing, selection</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Destruction of wood and wooden structures</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Destruction of iron and iron works</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Destruction of concrete constructions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Cell and squad opening routes through obstacles where electric detonator lines are laid</td>
<td>6 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Cell and squad opening routes by explosive charge, and use of explosive charges to attack fortifications, and resistance positions.</td>
<td>4 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**III. Tactics and construction:** 26 days (specific training will be disseminated later).
IV. Revision and control under drill form 5 days.

Additional Cadre Training

-Computing electric line, and selecting electric current.
-Computing explosive forces to destroy wooden, iron, and reinforced concrete structures (gathering specific experiences).
-Computing floating capability of materials, and instruments to insure transportation across the river.
-Use of field glasses, compass, and map.

B. Subjects and Periods for a Province Engineer Unit

Contents of the Specialized Subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>-Use of out (VC) mines: Bazooka, artillery shell, booby trap grenades</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DH-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Min Hoa Hanh (TV: mine which is placed in a hole in the ground)</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Grenade launching hole</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Enerq mines: M18, M130, M83, M16E3 M48, M2A1</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive charges</td>
<td>-Characteristics of explosives</td>
<td>5 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Packing of explosive charges</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Assembly of detonating devices</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Maintenance</td>
<td>3 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Transportation of explosive charges; method of continuously attacking</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with explosive charge to destroy obstacles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-The selection by the squad leader of objectives to be destroyed by</td>
<td>16 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>explosive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>CONTENTS</td>
<td>DURATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of Fortifications</td>
<td>- Digging of individual fortification, pronr, and standing position, communication trench, combat, and camouflage</td>
<td>16 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Digging of fortifications for AR, MG, and RR</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Setting up of obstacles against tanks</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Field observation tower</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge and river crossing</td>
<td>- Method of destroying wooden, steel, and concrete bridges</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Making of bridge with tools on hand for infantry and heavy weapons to cross small rivers and deep streams</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Packing of weapons at the river crossing area</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>- Sabotage of macadam, dirt, and asphalt roads, and railroad (railway and train turn table)</td>
<td>11 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Repair of destroyed section of road</td>
<td>5 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>- Fundamentals of electricity, the measure of the power of the line</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Assembly of batteries in parallel and in series</td>
<td>8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>CONTENTS</td>
<td>DURATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance of enemy structure</td>
<td>-Reconnaissance of bridge and road drawing sketches, and making reports. &lt;br&gt;-Reconnaissance of mine fields, drawing sketches, and making reports.</td>
<td>8 hours 16 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer tactics</td>
<td>-Engineer in attack on posts and counter-sweep operation &lt;br&gt;-Engineer in attack on communication axis</td>
<td>11 hours 5 hours 16 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C. Subjects and Periods for an Engineer Detachment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Subjects</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Time (Days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General training</td>
<td>Weapons firing, 1st and 2nd phase</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grenades-launching and laying</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defense, guard, patrol, and warning regulations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal affairs and military responsibilities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security of positions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile combat for individual, and cell</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Squad mobility under enemy artillery fire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemistry—Preventive measures, first aid, dressing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In accordance with guidance of the unit political section</td>
<td>30 (main training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (Secondary training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>Use, structure, laying, and removal of enemy mines</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General purpose bombs, time bombs, and removal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-infantry mines</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-2-6

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAINING SUBJECTS</th>
<th>THEMES</th>
<th>TIME (Days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traps coordinated with torpedoes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antitank mines</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-helicopter mines</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mine detectors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer cell, and squad laying mines, platoon deployment of obstacles</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Squad opening routes through obstacles</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer, and squad laying mines in formation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detonating powder used for explosive charges</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wrapping of detonating powder</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assembly of igniter, and detonator</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electric detonator instruments</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lines of electric detonators</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destruction of Concrete constructions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destruction of wood, and wooden structures</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destruction of iron, and iron works</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer cell secretly opening routes, and destroying electric fenses</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING SUBJECT</td>
<td>THEMES</td>
<td>TIME (Days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECTS</td>
<td>Engineer cell, and squad opening routes by continuous explosive charges</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction tactic revision</td>
<td>Themes will be disseminated later</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control under the form of drill, and discussion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>125</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks: Construction tactics consist of the construction of bridges, roads, and fortifications.

- Request the detachment study subjects and times, and suggest necessary corrections so that the higher echelon can make appropriate changes.

- Besides the main time, request you make an appropriate use of 15 days of secondary time for military purposes.

- Use as much time as possible for the training, make a careful record of the training for future organization.
APPENDIX 3

INFILTRATION ROUTES AND PROCEDURES

Information contained herein concerns specific enemy infiltration routes into the Republic of Vietnam, infiltration procedures, and other related data. This information is divided into four inclosures as follows:


b. Inclosure 2: Laotian infiltration route (sample).

c. Inclosure 3: Infiltration routes (water) into IV CTZ from Cambodia.

d. Inclosure 4: Route of NVN Naval Gunrunner (example).
DEPARTURE POINTS IN NORTH VIETNAM FOR INFILTRATION

(The following is a listing of the known points of departure in North Vietnam for infiltration into the Republic of Vietnam. There are a total of 69 of these departure points, with 17 of the 31 provinces being represented.

1. Quang Binh province.
   a. XE 020 740  Tuyen Hoa training center
   b. XE 030 630  Quang Binh province
   c. XE 040 730  Tuyen Hoa district
   d. XE 050 755  Do Vang railway station
   e. XE 050 760  Training area, Tuyen Hoa district
   f. XE 052 758  Tuyen Hoa district
   g. XE 055 740  Quang Binh province
   h. XE 055 760  Tuyen Hoa forest
   i. XE 055 765  Quang Binh province
   j. XE 060 770  Dong Lo, Tuyen Hoa district
   k. XE 070 730  Tuyen Hoa forest
   l. XE 100 660  Thuan Hoa village
   m. XE 120 735  Dong Lang, Tuyen Hoa district
   n. XE 141 695  Dong Tam forest, Tuyen Hoa district
   o. XE 173 771  Tuyen Hoa district
   p. XE 193 723  Camp, Tuyen Hoa district
   q. XE 252 692  Minh Cam, Tuyen Hoa district
   r. XE 260 700  Co Lien


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| a. XE 486 766 | Quang Binh province |
| t. XE 539 783 | Sin Camp, Quang Lien village |
| u. XE 670 340 | Phong Loo district |
| v. XE 737 200 | Quoc Trach village, Le Thuy district |
| 2. Thanh Hoa province. |
| a. WH 482 025 | Thanh Hoa province |
| b. WH 640 008 | Thanh Hoa training school |
| c. WH 746 274 | Pho Cat training area |
| d. WH 755 294 | Son De hamlet |
| e. WH 768 278 | Thach Thanh district |
| f. WH 836 638 | Chua hamlet, Quyet Thang village |
| g. WH 836 250 | Thanh Hoa province |
| h. WH 846 213 | Qui Huong, Ha Trung |
| i. WH 865 280 | Ha Long forest |
| j. WH 890 220 | Bim |
| k. WH 903 075 | Thuang Tin railway station |
| 3. Ha Dong province |
| a. WJ 512 106 | Luong Son village |
| b. WJ 590 050 | Cu Yen training camp |
| c. WJ 603 100 | Xuan Mai training camp |
| d. WJ 604 096 | Xuan Mai training area |
| e. WJ 610 110 | Xuan Mai training area |
| f. WJ 616 115 | Xuan Mai training area |
| g. WJ 616 210 | Xuan Mai training center |
| h. WJ 757 920 | Le Za area, My Duc district |
1. WJ 899 097  
2. Van Giap hamlet
3. Hoa Binh province.
   a. WH 015 965  
   b. WH 750 685  
   c. WH 800 250  
   d. WJ 350 040  
   e. WJ 460 127  
4. Hoa Binh training center
5. Agriculture site
6. Nung Ly training area
7. Hoa Binh school
8. Xom Danh hamlet

5. Vinh Linh province.
   a. XD 620 920  
   b. YD 137 878  
   c. YD 163 877  
   d. YD 215 860  

6. Dong Hoi village
7. Ho Xa village
8. Ho Xa training area
9. Vinh Nam village

6. Thai Nguyen province.
   a. WJ 985 755  
   b. XJ 015 715  
   c. XJ 080 730  
   d. XJ 330 161  

7. Training school, Viet Bac
8. Military and political school, Viet Bac
9. Training center

7. Ngo Xa, Nghi Loc district
8. Nghia Dan training base

8. Hai Duong province.
   a. XJ 330 161  
   b. XJ 475 200  

9. Cao Xa railway station
10. Hai Duong railway station

9. Training area, Vinh Yen
10. Nam Dinh province.
a. WJ 280 625  Phu Tho

11. Ha Noi province.
a. WJ 425 260  Training area

a. WJ 320 625  Railway station

13. Ha Tinh province.
a. WF 450 465  Huong Hai village

a. WJ 340 680  Phu Nam village, Phu Minh district

15. Son Tay province.
a. WJ 477 334  Son Tay training center

16. Da Nang province.
a. WH 970 665  Ngai hamlet

17. Ha Bac province.
a. XJ 090 490  Tieu Lat hamlet
INCLOSURE 2. APPENDIX 3
LAOTIAN INfiltrATION ROUTE (SAMPLE)

The following information is taken from the interrogation report of SGT
Dan-Huy-DUY, Squad Leader, 8th Squad, 5th Battalion, 24th NVA
Regiment. It is included here to show a typical Laotian infiltration route
used to move troops, supplies, to include arms, ammunition, and explosives.

1. In February 1966, while infiltrating into the Republic of Vietnam, the
24th Regiment was instructed to stop for recuperation and to provide security
service for the infiltration corridor at Ban Tasseing (YB 37 35) in Laos for
a two-month period before continuing toward Ban Tasseing (YB 64 21).

2. From Ban Phia Ha to Ban Pak Ha (YB 590 184) the 24th Regiment moved only
on jungle trails, and then from Ban Pak Ha to Ban Tasseing the regiment
traveled at night. After that section the regiment proceeded on the strategic
road, approximately 3.5 meters wide and camouflaged with tree branches laid
on the road.

3. Source assumed that the strategic road ran from Ban Tasseing, Ban Pak
Ha, and Ban Phia Ha to Aitopou province. (It was further learned that this
infiltration route lead into QL 14 (Route 14) in Kontum province.)

1. Reference 25.

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The following, is a breakdown of the main routes of supply and infiltration from Cambodia into IV CTZ, Republic of Vietnam:

1. Supplies travel from Cambodia to the Ile a L'Eou (US 70 50) to Phu Quoc Island (US 867 504, US 829 455, US 750 664) and from Cambodia (US 255 584) to Phu Quoc (US 00 40, US 055 516). From these points supplies move to Kien Giang province (US 645 257, VR 865 620) and then on to An Xuyen province.

2. From Cambodia to the Tra Tien forest, the Viet Cong use five major routes:
   a. From VS 465 520 in Cambodia along the Kinh Van Hang canal to VS 478 520, across the Song Gia Van Thanh river to VS 49 52, and into the Tra Tien forest (VS 61 53).  
   b. From VS 50 56 in Cambodia along a path to VS 506 546, across the Song Gia Van Thanh river, along the Kinh Muong Khai canal and into the Tra Tien forest.
   c. From VS 51 58 in Cambodia across the Song Gia Van Thanh river to VS 533 585, to VS 533 580, and into the Tra Tien forest.
   d. From VS 66 66 in Cambodia to VS 662 634, across the Kinh Vinh Te canal to VS 710 616, and into the Tra Tien forest.
   e. From VS 713 640 in Cambodia along the Kinh Giang Xap canal to VS 714 619, along the Kinh Vinh Te canal, and into the Tra Tien forest. The area from the Tra Tien forest to the Cambodian border is inundated from June through January to the extent that the Viet Cong are not limited to the above routes during this period. Cross country movement in shallow draft boats is common.

3. Supplies are moved from the Tra Tien forest via the Kien Giang commo-liaison route to the U Minh forest base areas by the following routes:
   a. From the commo-liaison station of Ha Tien district, located at the Tra Tien pagoda (VS 605 534) to station 2, located at the Kinh Tam Nhan canal (VS 840 420).
   b. From station 2 to the end of the Kinh Tu canal (VS 843 313) and from this point across Route 8 into the Co Coi area (VS 82 26), along the Kinh Luynh Quynh canal, then to station 3, located at Nui Hon Dat (VS 890 147) (Three Sisters Mountain base area).

c. From station 3 by boat on the Rach Xao Nhan creek to VR 865 770, and along the Kinh Long canal to station 5 at VR 945 825.

d. From station 5 across the Rach Can Gao stream to station 6 at Cay Bac (WR 142 684) (U Minh Thuong base area).

4. Supplies travel from the U Minh Thong base area (VR 82 40 - VR 87 80 - WR 19 40 - WR 17 80) south to the U Minh Ha base area (VR 80 10 - VR 80 30 - WR 10 10 - WR 10 30) and southwest to the Dan Doi base area (WR 25 70 - WR 25 00 - WR 34 70 - WR 40 00). Arms and ammunition also move north and east from the U Minh Thuong base area through a zone generally defined by the following coordinates: WR 01 59 - WR 01 77 - WR 20 77 - WR 22 87.

5. From the U Minh base areas the Viet Cong make extensive use of the waterways northeast to the Song Hau Giang river. The principal waterways through this area are as follows:

a. The Song Cai Be river at WR 12 97 east to the Kinh Chung Bau canal (WR 243 093) and north through various canal systems to the Song Hau Giang river.

b. The Song Cai Lon river at WR 35 71 east to the Kinh Xang Ko canal (WR 54 73) and north to the Song Hau Giang river.

c. The Song Cai Tu river at WR 36 74 north to the Kinh O Kon canal (WR 43 83) and northeast to the Song Hau Giang river.

6. Supplies from the Dung Ven base area (WT 13 07 - WT 13 10 - WT 18 10) move south along the Song Hau Giang river to WS 12 89, south through various canals to the Kinh Tri Ton canal at WS 19 68, down the Kinh Tri Ton canal to the Seven Mountains base area (VS 89 55 - WS 02 45 - WS 95 62). Disposition from the Seven Mountains base area is believed to be to the area in An Xuyen province, and east to Kien Phong province; however, this is as of yet unconfirmed.

7. Ordnance from factories in the Giang Bao base area (WT 35 03) moves south on the Kinh Than Nong canal at WS 25 90, and southwest to the Song Hau Giang itself.

8. From ordnance facilities along the Kinh Cai Co canal (WT 73 14) supplies move south through the Plaine des Joncs to the Song Cai Cai river at WT 55 10, south to the Kinh Cong Hoa canal, and west to An Giang and Chau Doc provinces.
The following information concerns the route of a North Vietnamese naval gunrunner.1

On 20 June 1966 the US Coast Guard cutter Point League intercepted the North Vietnamese naval gunrunner Number 2135, and forced it aground at Ba Dong (XR 735 675), Long Toan district, Vinh Long province. A study of the ship's log revealed that the ship set out from Hai Phong, and headed towards a point south of Hai Nan island, then to a point 80 kilometers north of Tay Sa island. Afterwards it veered easterly, and after reaching a point about 250 kilometers from the Phillippine Islands, it changed its course towards the southwest, went past the eastern side of Nam Sa island at a point fifty kilometers from the island, and then changed its course again to reach a point west of Con Dao island as listed in the log:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 June</td>
<td>21-03</td>
<td>North 112-43 East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 June</td>
<td>18-34</td>
<td>113-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17-13</td>
<td>115-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 16 June   | 16-46| 115-51 |
|           | 17-02| 115-27 |
|           | 17-09| 115-34 |

| 16 June   | 16-24| 115-42 |
|           | 17-03| 115-27 |
|           | 16-10| 115-31 |

| 17 June   | 15-37| 115-37 |
|           | 13-59| 114-00 |

| 17 June   | 13-52| 113-59 |
|           | 13-29| 113-45 |
|           | 12-53| 113-20 |

1. References 27 and 28.
The following information was provided by the interrogation report of Tran-van-PHUONG, PFC, Gunery Section, 125th Transportation Group North Vietnam Naval Headquarters, assigned as the number two gunner of the 12.7mm HMG aboard Ship #2135 of the 125th Transportation Group.

In late February 1966 source (Phuong) was sent to Naval Headquarters in Hai Phong city (he had been previously assigned to the NVA 170th Training Regiment). Source was assigned to Ship #2135 of the 125th Transportation Group, North Vietnam Naval Headquarters. Source reported to the ship and was designated the number two gunner of the 12.7mm HMG. The ship left Hai Phong harbor the same evening that source reported. The ship proceeded to Ha Long Bay, and there source received training in the firing of the 12.7mm HMG and general practices of the ship. The ship returned to Hai Phong harbor about once a month to receive provisions and fuel supplies, but then always returned to Ha Long Bay. This procedure lasted for about three months. The evening of 13 June 1966 the ship went to Hai Phong harbor to pick up cargo. The ship docked at a wharf (exact location unknown) and began taking on cargo. The ship's crew did not help with the loading of the cargo, since there was a crew of about ten on the dock and a crane to do the loading. The loading was carried on throughout the night, and there were no lights on this particular section of the dock. The cargo was brought to the dock by an undetermined number of trucks in relay fashion. There were no other boats in the area during the time that the ship was being loaded. The following morning the ship left and proceeded to Hai Nan island. The ship arrived at the island on the 14th and anchored offshore. While there the crew stayed

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1. Reference 29.
aboard ship, and no one boarded the ship. On the morning of the 15th the ship departed. Source stated that another ship (source thought it to be Chinese) was ahead of their ship until about 1700 hours on the 15th, when it changed course and left them. The trip into Republic of Vietnam waters was uneventful. On 20 June 1966, at approximately 0330 hours, the ship was attacked by US and Republic of Vietnam Navy ships. Source stated that he and PFC Binh were firing their guns from the fan tail when the ship ran aground.
APPENDIX A
IN-COUNTRY SUPPLY PROCEDURES AND ROUTES

Information contained herein concerns VC/NVA unit supply procedures, one of the best detailed supply routes, and other related data. This information is divided into two inclosures as follows:

a. Inclosure 1: Sao Vang Division Supply procedures.

b. Inclosure 2: Inland waterway supply route, supply trip information, and sampan operating procedures.
The following concerns the Viet Cong logistical system designed to support
a large size field unit, such as the Sao Vang ("Yellow Star") Division with
a strength of 13,000 men. The division is active in Guang Ngai and Binh
Dinh provinces in southern I and northern II CTZs. The system is new,
since its principle was introduced and tried out successfully during the
war against the French (1949-1954). Recently captured documents disclosed
many details about the Viet Cong supply system for the Sao Vang Division
that could be applied to other large size Viet Cong Units.

1. Organization

a. Staff. The Rear Service Staff has the responsibility of providing
troops with the necessary items for combat, i.e., food, clothing, and ammu-
nition. Other functions assigned to the Rear Service Staff are medical
and financial support. Accordingly, the Rear Service Staff is organized into
four functional sections: Quartermaster Section for procurement, storage,
and distribution of food and clothing; Ordnance Section for procurement and/
or requisition, storage, maintenance, and distribution of weapons and munici-
pions; Medical Section for medical support and evacuation; and Finance
Section for financial support.

b. Specialized units. Since motor transportation is neither available
nor desirable at the present time, the Division Rear Service Staff has to
rely heavily on foot transportation. This is comprised of the Sao Vang
Transportation Battalion, the Quyet Tam ("Determined to Win") Regimental
Transportation Company, and laborers levied from within the Division’s
TAOR. The strength of the laborers may vary depending on the local manpower
resources; however, the Division Rear Staff has planned for 1200
laborers. The laborers thus play a primary role in the logistical activi-
ties of the Division. The Transportation Battalion is normally employed
in its entirety to transport weapons, ammunition, and explosives from secret
derops. The Regimental Transportation Company can be used either in piec-
meal to reinforce organic battalions or as a whole to support the Regiment,
according to current tactical requirements and/or the availability of labor-
ers.

c. Depots

(1) Depots, consisting mostly of rice depots, and ammunition dumps,
belong to the Military Region, Sub-Rear Service, Division, or the district.
The distribution from Region and district depots is, however, controlled by
Region under an available supply rate system. Prescribed quantities of
supplies are drawn from a given depot by a specific unit which presents to
the depot an issuance order in exchange for goods. In case of an emergency,
rice can be borrowed from the local people or depot, then deducted later by the Region. Division depots are former Region depots transferred to the Division Rear Service Staff by the Region Rear Service Staff with or without servicing personnel.

(2) Details about the Region Sub-Rear Service (Phan So) are sketchy. It seems to be an ad hoc organization from the Region Rear Service Staff detached to support a tactical command such as the Front Command whenever the latter is activated. Once the Front Command is transformed into a Division, a Rear Service Staff is established and takes over much of the logistical functions of the Region Sub-Rear Service which, in the case of the Sao Van Division, nevertheless remains active for three months after the transfer.

(3) No fixed TOE is applicable to a Viet Cong unit. Despite the rigid control from the Party, local commanders are allowed a great deal of flexibility and are empowered to organize their unit to fulfill their mission.

2. Supply system

a. Basic concept

(1) The Viet Cong supply system is dictated by the operational environment of the people's war. Almost all procurement (food, clothing, even ammunition, and explosives) must come from the Government of Vietnam controlled zone. The system should be efficient enough to supply the troops' requirements adequately and flexible enough to answer immediate tactical contingencies.

(2) To satisfy these two requirements, the Viet Cong have developed what could be classified as an area supply system. Numerous small depots are established over a wide area to support any major Viet Cong unit operating in the area. This system is based upon the premise that one large depot would restrict the operating area to an area around the base and that the destruction of this one large depot would cripple the unit. The exception to this rule is found in the large Viet Cong base areas where huge rice stocks are stored. These areas are located in a relatively safe Viet Cong controlled area and are used to support troops in training or refitting phases. In the case of the Sao Vang Division, depots are not scattered all over its area of activity, but rather they are located in one central area where the Division units are likely to conduct most of their operations. This storage area is located in rugged terrain, denying easy access to the RVNAF and US forces, yet it is close to populated areas due to transportation considerations. This location would also answer the Viet Cong tactical plan. Populated areas usually constitute the main Viet Cong objective politically, economically, and even militarily since FVN troops usually are concentrated in those areas.

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(3) In the case of the Sao Vang Division, the storage area is located in the southern portion of Quang Ngai province and allows the unit to operate flexibly in both Linh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces and then to fall back to its rest area with adequate logistical support.

b. Procurement and storage. The people constitute the main source of food supply, procurement, and transportation capability. This is obtained through agricultural taxes, contribution drives, and labor draft. At the head of the flow of supply is the Village Forward Supply Council, which is made up of key personnel of the Village People's Revolutionary Party and administrative apparatus. The main mission of the Village Forward Supply Council is procurement. Above the Village Forward Supply Council whose primary function is the supervision of the Village Forward Council and storage and distribution of supplies. The Province Forward Supply Council seems to perform as a planning and regulating agency between districts and their depots. If furnishes logistical data to the Region's Sub-Rear Service or to the Division's Rear Service Staff for the latter's planning, and it receives and carries out logistical plans to support a military campaign. In reference to storage, the normal method seems to be to move one-third of the prescribed stock up to depots while the remaining two-thirds is dispersed among the civilians for custody. Each village and hamlet could thus be considered as a Viet Cong depot.

c. Distribution

(1) Within the unit, the Viet Cong use the supply point system with depots sometimes acting as supply points, if they are located close to combat units. Regiments are responsible for setting up supply points and the division for designating depots and/or villages as supply points.

(2) Regiments are given an initial issue corresponding to a 30-day supply to be replenished when half of the supply has been consumed. In addition to this initial issue, the Region Sub-Rear Service or Division's Rear Service Staff should maintain a stock equivalent to one month of supply for all forces operating in their area of jurisdiction. When a regiment moves out, the remaining supplies will be returned to the Division's Rear Service or to the related Region's Sub-Rear Service. Since soldiers are ordered to have seven days of supplies in their individual packs as reserves for emergencies, the regiment would draw supplies from depots or villages located along its axis of movement. This method considerably lightens the regimental train, and it reduces requirements on the laborers.

(3) When supplies are drawn from a depot, regimental laborers will be used. Battalion laborers are used to transport supplies from supply points or depots acting as supply points to the respective units. However, in some instances, when a village is to provide supplies, it will also furnish the labor.
(3) In the case of the Sao Vang Division, the storage area is located in the southern portion of Quang Ngai province and allows the unit to operate flexibly in both Linh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces and then to fall back to its rest area with adequate logistical support.

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(3) When supplies are drawn from a depot, regimental laborers will be used. Battalion laborers are used to transport supplies from supply points or depots acting as supply points to the respective units. However, in some instances, when a village is to provide supplies, it will also furnish the labor.
d. Food stuff and clothing. Each regiment is assigned an area from which food stuff is purchased. The Regiment Rear Service Staff must send out purchasing teams to this area to contact the local Viet Cong authorities and arrange for the purchase of the prescribed quantities. Cloth material is bought by the Division purchasing teams and then transported to the Division depot which directs it to the clothing manufacturing section. This section has many sewing machines dispersed in one or two villages, and again the local people, mostly women, do the sewing. Current output is two and one-half uniforms per day per machine, enough for a regiment in two months. The Viet Cong aim is to increase the output up to four uniforms per machine per day. Money allocated for 1966 amounted to $1,459,000 for clothing expenditure for the Division. This money also was intended for the purchase of plastic sheets to be used as tents, raincoats, hammocks, etc.

e. Labor. Laborers levied from the labor draft system are organized into Platoons and companies, according to their residing places, then directed by Village and District Forward Supply Councils to the combat units or to the Rear Service Staff according to their classification. Front line or Class A laborers are used by the combat units in transporting ammunition, explosives, and food supplies, thus constituting the regimental, and battalion trains. They are also used to evacuate battle casualties from the front to the Battalion Aid Station, Regimental Surgery Station, and Division war booty collecting points. Besides the transportation of ammunition, explosives, and food supplies, medical evacuation, war booty evacuation, etc., laborers are also used for construction of depots, digging defensive positions, and other miscellaneous tasks. The combat units are not alone in the need for labor. Practically all Viet Cong agencies from the region down to district level have a high requirement for laborers.
The following information is taken from the interrogation report of Nguyen-hoang-Ny, Assistant Squad Leader, 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, V.41 Transportation Company, T.53C Laar Service Section, Military Region 3. It is included here to show a well-detailed, typical supply route in IV CTZ. Also included of interest is information taken from the same source concerning supply trips and sampan operating procedures.

1. Supply routes. The following is a description of the V.41 Transportation Company supply route. The trip commenced at the intersection of the Kinh Xoc Duoc canal and the Rach Nuoc Trong stream (WR 456 685), west on the Rach Nuoc Trong to the intersection of the Rach Nuoc Trong, the Rach Cai Lon stream, and the Song Cai Tu river (WR 376 698), north on the Song Cai Tu to the intersection of the Song Cai Tu and the Song Cai Lon river (WR 372 707), south on the Song Cai Lon to the intersection of the Song Cai Lon and the Kinh Xang Qut canal (WR 365 692), southwest on the Kinh Xang Qut to the intersection of the Kinh Xang Qut and the Rach Nga Ea Cai Tau stream (WR 399 654), southwest on the Rach Nga Ea Cai Tau to the intersection of the Rach Nga Ea Cai Tau and the Rach Duong San stream (WR 318 612), west on the Rach Duong San to the intersection of the Rach Duong San and the Kinh Kiem Lam canal (WR 287 667), west on the Rach Kiem Lam to where it turns south (WR 242 608) and south to the intersection of the Kinh Kiem Lam and the Kinh Ca Cho canal (WR 240 570), southwest on the Kinh Ca Cho to the intersection of the Kinh Ca Cho and a canal (WR 165 658), south on the canal to the intersection of the canal and the Kinh So Ea canal (WR 163 430), northwest on the Kinh So Ea to the intersection of the Kinh So Ea and the Kinh So Hot canal (WR 151 470), southwest on the Kinh So Hot to a rest stop (WR 110 430), southwest to the intersection of the Kinh So Hot and the Song Trem Trem river (WR 073 394), southeast on the Song Trem Trem to the intersection of the Song Trem Trem and the Kinh So Nam canal (WR 077 383), southwest on the Kinh So Nam to the intersection of the Kinh So Nam and a canal (WR 029 254), northwest on the canal to the intersection of the canal and the Rach Giong Ong stream (WR 028 357), southwest on the Rach Giong Ong to the intersection of the Rach Giong Ong and the Rach Cai Tau stream (WR 012 345), southeast on the Rach Cai Tau to the intersection of the Rach Cai Tau and the Rach Giong Ong and a canal (WR 043 235), southeast on the canal to the intersection of the canal and the Rach Fo stream (WR 051 223), southeast along the canal to the intersection of the canal and the Rach Giong stream (WR 067 198), southwest on the canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (WR 063 102), southeast on the new canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (WR 067 182), east and south on the new canal to the intersection of the canal and the Nhon Rach Nham stream (WR 076 175), southwest on the Nhon Rach Nham to the intersection of the Nhon Rach Nham and a canal (WR 050 154), west along the

1. Reference 31  A-4-6
canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (VR 034 153), south
on the new canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (WR C35
157), southwest on the new canal to the intersection of the canal and the Kinh Hoa Dong Thach canal (WR C23), southeast on the Kinh Hoa Dong Thach to the intersection with the Kinh Hoa Trach and a canal (VR C07 134), northwest on the canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (VR 998 138), southwest on the new canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (VR 933 075), southwest on the new canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (VR 914 065), southwest on the new canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (VR 896 054), southeast on the new canal to the intersection of the canal the Song Ong Doc river (VR 906 007), southwest on the Song Ong Doc to the intersection of the Song Ong Doc and the Kinh Ba Kheo canal (VR 887 002), south on the Kinh Ba Kheo to the intersection of the Kinh Ba Kheo, the Song Dong Ong river, and the Dam Dong Ong lake (VQ 897 951), east and southeast on the Dam Dong Ong to a rest stop (VQ 925 952), southeast to the intersection of the Dam Dong Ong and the Ngon Dong Cong stream (VQ 955 937), south on the Ngon Dong Cong to the intersection of the Ngon Dong Cong and a canal (VQ 956 904), east and southeast on the canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (VQ 972 893), south on the new canal to the intersection of the canal and the Lung Cai Dua stream (VQ 971 882), south on the Lung Cai Dua to the intersection of the Lung Cai Dua and the Rach Dong Ong stream (VQ 968 866), east and south on the Rach Dong Ong to the intersection of the Rach Dong Ong and a canal (VQ 983 811), south on the canal to the intersection of the canal and another canal (VQ 985 804), southeast and south on the new canal to the intersection of the canal and the Song Bay Hap river (VQ 995 773), southwest on the Song Bay Hap to the intersection of the Song Bay Hap and the Rach Ong Do stream (VQ 987 765).

2. Supply trips. In late August, source (Hy) was 1 of 20 men who
started out at night in 10 sampans from WR 012 345 (at the intersection of
the Rach Giong Ong stream and the Song Cai Tau river). Source stated that
ammunition was being transported, but he could not recall the amount and the
types. The sampans followed the route described above. After an unknown
number of nights of travel the sampans arrived at VR 346 664 (on the Kinh
Xang Ong canal). At this point they contacted a liaison man, unloaded their
cargo, and remained in the village until the next night. Then they loaded
their sampans with 1000 kilograms of 7.62mm ammunition for the Soviet
SKS Carbine (CHIOM Type 56), and the AK-47 CHIOM Assault Rifle Type 56, and the German Heavy Molotegun. This ammunition was unloaded from 10 sampans by 20 men of the D.2 Bear Services Section into the sampans of the V.41 Transportation Company. That same night they departed for their original starting point of WR 012 345. During these two times over this route the location of WR 302 612 (on the Rach Dong San stream) and WR 110 430 (on the Kinh So Hot canal) were used as rest stops, which later became general
practice on any trips along this route. After arriving at WR 012 345, they
continued south with the ammunition to rest stops at WR 035 152 (intersection
of two unnamed canals) and VQ 928 (on the shore of the Dam Dong Ong lake), which later became established rest stops along the route. The sampans arrived at VQ 987 765 where they turned the ammunition over to a liaison station.
a. In early March 1967, source was on a supply mission that transported 10 SKS carbines, 10 AK 47 assault rifles, and approximately 2000 kilograms of ammunition for the 2 rifles. There were also approximately 500 kilograms of the Viet Cong DH-10 directional antipersonnel mines. This trip started from WR 012 345 and followed the supply route to WR 456 685, where this equipment was turned over to 20 men and 10 sampans from the D.2 Rear Service Section.

b. In the middle of June 1967, source and 20 other men in 10 sampans departed from WR 001 345 (on the Song Cai Tau river), went down the Song Cai Tau to WR 012 345, and north along the supply route to WR 346 664. This time they transported approximately 1000 kilograms of Fexcad (sic) mines, approximately 500 kilograms of DH-10 antipersonnel mines, 250 kilograms of locally manufactured grenades, and approximately 750 kilograms of ammunition for the K.44 carbine (CHI-GOM Type 53). This ordnance was turned over to the D.2 Rear Services Section, and the V.41 sampans departed the next night.

3. Sampan operating procedures. The sampans would begin their trips after 1700 hours, and they would continue, except for rest stops, until sunrise the next day. At the start of the trip, an interval of ten meters would be maintained between the boats. As visibility decreased with darkness, the interval was shortened until it became approximately one meter. When an area of doubt was approached, one man would stay with each sampan while the rest investigated. When it was determined that it was safe to proceed, they would wait for one half hour and then proceed. During the trip there was no talking, no smoking, and the sampan interval prescribed by the leader was adhered to. All cooking and eating was done in the daylight when they were not on the move. Any food that they prepared at these times was taken with them. There were no prescribed signals for any emergency stops. The complete trip from the southern end of the supply route to the northern end would take them seven nights to travel, with the daylight devoted to resting. When they stopped during the trip, the sampans were pulled in under overhanging foliage to prevent aerial or ground surveillance.
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APPENDIX 5

ENEMY STORAGE FACILITIES

Information contained herein concerns enemy storage facilities, locations, and other related data. This information is divided into three inclosures as follows:

a. Inclosure 1: Enemy base areas.
b. Inclosure 2: Description of storage facilities.
c. Inclosure 3: List of ordnance storage facilities.
ENEMY BASE AREAS

The following is a listing of the current enemy base areas. It is included since it can be safely presumed that the VC/NVA use these areas for the fabrication, and storage of explosives.

1. Base Area 100 (Do Xa). Location: I CTZ, Quang Ngai province: AS 940 873 - AS 950 871 - AS 950 860 - AS 964 815 - AS 960 875 - AS 958 848 - AS 982 878 - AS 998 848 - AS 999 853 - B3 000 850. The base area consists of predominantly low, flat, sloped hills with an average elevation of 450 meters. Generally the slopes vary from 10 to 50 percent with an average slope of 20 percent. The vegetation is predominantly discontinuous-canopied forest with dense undergrowth, which affords good to excellent cover and concealment from both air and ground fire and observation. There are scattered small areas of moderately dense brushwoods and continuous-canopied light undergrowth forests. The hills are dissected by the Nuoc Tabi in the east and three intermittent streams in the northwest. The drainage is fair to good for the base area, and moderate to small quantities of fresh water are available throughout the year. This area is well suited for surface installations, and the surrounding area affords good observation and defense. This area is considered to be the major base area for the Headquarters of Military Region 5.

2. Base Area 114 (Rao Trang). Location: I CTZ, Thua Thien province: YD 430 170 - YD 460 140 - YD 500 180 - YD 470 210. The base area is located 20 kilometers due west of Hue in hilly to mountainous terrain. Generally the area contains rounded valleys and lies on the leading edge of the mountains located only five kilometers from the coastal plain. The area has good sources of water. The Song Bo river is navigable and can support logistical and operational movement. Vegetation is predominantly evergreen forest with brush and grass increasing at lower elevations. The base area functions as a command center, probably for the northern sub-region headquarters. It is positioned along a natural infiltration route reaching from the mountains to the coast.

3. Base Area 116 (Nui Mat Rang). Location: I CTZ, Quang Nam province: BT 000 419 - AT 970 398 - AT 940 406 - AT 930 440 - BT 000 470 - BT 030 450. The base area is positioned in a finger of mountains extending into the coastal plain southwest of Hoi An, approximately 20 kilometers from the coast. The area lies abreast of the coastal rail line 7 kilometers southwest of Route 1 and 15 kilometers west of the district capital of Thang Binh. This point is surrounded by heavily populated lowlands. Vegetation in the mountainous areas is predominantly evergreen forests and scrub. In the central portions of the designated area, there

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is considerable scarring due to steep slopes and deep narrow gullies. The lowlands surrounding the base are rice producing areas; smaller hill complexes are covered with brushwood. Fifteen fixed installations and two battalions have been reported within the area.

4. Base Area 117 (Nui Go). Location: I CTZ, Quang Tin province: BT 200 030 - BT 255 030 - BT 255 090 - BT 200 100 - BT 170 050. The base area lies in an enclosed valley dotted with small clusters of villages. The Song Bong Mieu meanders west through the valley and exists by the only major opening in the wall of encircling mountains. Except for rice paddies and areas within the villages, the valley is predominately evergreen forest with isolated areas of brushwood scattered randomly throughout. The base area lies 15 kilometers southwest of the city of Tan Ky and Route 1. Twenty installations and two battalions have been reported within the area.

5. Base Area 118 (Nui Suoi La). Location: I CTZ, Quang Nhai province: BS 360 850 - BS 400 808 - BS 450 850 - BS 400 880. The base area is located 4 kilometers southeast of Tra Bong, the district headquarters and site of USSF camp, and 20 kilometers west of Route 1. The base consists of a series of rounded hills and small interior valleys which extend eastward into the coastal plain. The north edge of the base abuts the Tra Bong river valley. To the east the hills increase in size and relief. Vegetation is predominantly dense evergreen forest interspersed with areas of open forest and brush, particularly on the outer edges of the base. The two valley systems, the Tra Bong and the Song Giang, are rice growing areas and are populated with scattered villages. Thirty-five installations and two regiments have been reported in the area, and the base is considered to be more of a support base than a headquarters area.

6. Base Area 119 (Do Xa). Location: I CTZ, Quang Ngai province: BS 030 750 - BS 050 840 - BS 180 710 - BS 235 770 - BS 180 815. The base area is located 45 kilometers from Quang Ngai city within the Annamite Mountains. The area is extremely rugged and is incised by narrow valleys which contain the headwaters of rivers that cut through the mountains towards the coast. The mountains within the base area rise to heights approaching 1700 meters. Two hundred meters below the peak of the mountains lies the Nuoc Ong Valley, the major valley within the base area. Vegetation is predominantly dense evergreen forest with some small areas of brushwood and clear forest. Eleven logistical installations have been reported within the area, and it is considered as an alternate headquarters for Military Region 5.

7. Base Area 120 (Nui Can). Location: I CTZ, Quang Ngai province: BS 360 800 - BS 330 770 - BS 420 780 - BS 370 767. The base area is located 38 kilometers from the coast on a ridge extending from the central mountains. It is an extremely rugged area overlooking the Dong Tra Khuc river 24 kilometers west of Quang Ngai city. Vegetation is consistent with the general region - evergreen forest and scattered areas of brushwood. Sources of water are limited. Fifteen installations, two regiments, and one battalion have been reported in the area. This base area is used in conjunction with Base Area 118.

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8. Base Area 121 (Nui Ky Lam). Location: I CTZ, Quang Ngai province: BS 425 672 - BS 450 690 - BS 455 735 - BS 472 736 - BS 485 672 - BS 467 652. The base area is located 17 kilometers west of Quang Ngai city and 5 kilometers northeast of the Son Ha district headquarters. It is located on hilly and mountainous terrain. The mountains are dissected by narrow valleys, forming island-like groups which border the coastal plain. Small rounded hills are uniformly distributed within the base area. The western edge of the designated area lies along the Song Tra Dhuc river; the northern boundary overlooks the Song Tra Khuc valley which extends in from the coast. While vegetation is predominantly evergreen forest and scrub, rice is grown in the narrow valleys created by tributaries of the Song Tra Khuc that enter the base from the north. Fourteen installations have been reported within the area.

9. Base Area 122 (Suoi Da). Location: I CTZ, Quang Ngai province: BS 570 530 - BS 546 489 - BS 560 465 - BS 590 500. The base area is located on the eastern fringe of the controlling mountains and isolated by the Song Ve Valley to the east and the Song Phuoc Giang Valley to the west. It is 15 kilometers from Route 1 and 2 kilometers southeast of the district headquarters at Minh Long which is also the site of a USSF camp. The base area consists of a ridge system and valleys which extend inward from the west and east. The mountains are covered with evergreen forest and scrub while the valleys are wet, rice growing areas. Seven installations, one regiment, and one battalion have been reported in the area.

10. Base Area 123 (Nui Coi). Location: I CTZ, Quang Ngai province: BS 614 490 - BS 655 420 - BS 685 455 - BS 675 497 - BS 640 500. The base area is located 15 kilometers from the coast and 27 kilometers south of Quang Ngai city on a series of rugged hills severed from the central mountains to the Song Ve river valley in the west and the Song Phuoc Giang river valley to the south. The base area has small interior valleys and several flat topped mountains that are suitable for bivouac and staging. Evergreen forest is the predominant type of vegetation. Thirty installations and two battalions have been reported in the area.

11. Base Area 124 (Nui Vu). Location: I CTZ, Quang Ngai province: BS 720 390 - BS 690 350 - BS 720 320 - BS 755 370. The base area is located in the transitional hills that border the coastal plains nine kilometers from the coast and five kilometers west of Route 1. The mountains enclose a segment of a narrow valley which bisects the area along a southwest-northeast axis. The mountains are covered with evergreen forests, and the valleys which penetrate the edges of the area are suitable for wet-rice cultivation. Ten kilometers west of the area is the USSF camp at Ba To. Eleven installations and two specific bases have been reported in the area.

dissected mountains with an average elevation of 1000 meters. The slopes vary from 30 to 100 percent with an average slope of 50 percent. In the eastern portion there are predominantly flat-topped hills with an average elevation of 700 meters and an average slope of 30 percent. The vegetation is predominantly discontinuous-canopied forest with dense undergrowth which provides excellent cover and concealment from both air and ground fire and observation. There are some large areas of moderately dense brushwood in the southwest and two large areas of continuous-canopied light - undergrowth forest in the north. The area is dissected by the Nam Nhia, Nuoc Lah, and Dak D' river valleys in the east and a narrow river valley in the south. These rivers and the numerous intermittent streams provide large to moderate quantities of fresh surface water during the high water season and moderate to small quantities the remainder of the year. The drainage is good to excellent in this area. Runoff is drained with high hydraulic gradients. This area is considered to be a major support base for Military Region 5. The terrain affords both a large area suited to above ground logistics installations, troop bivouacs, and a mountainous area with excellent soil conditions for permanent underground installations.

13. Base Area 225 (upper An Lao valley, Thuan An). Location: II CTZ, Binh Dinh province: upper An Lao valley above the grid lines BS 650 150 - BS 750 100- BS 750 230 - BS 830 150. The base area is comprised of a valley in northern Binh Dinh province. The valley is characterized by an extensive drainage system (Song An Lao river) and adjoining delta-like terrain. The terrain rises sharply in both the eastern and western thirds of the area. A dozen or more small population centers are found within the area. The area has an ample source of water and is suitable for installations. Its suitability for defense and deployment has not been determined.

14. Base Area 226 (Binh Son). Location: II CTZ, Binh Dinh province: BR 655 708 - BR 790 785 - BR 650 860 - BR 754 862. This base area, approximately 15 kilometers southwest of Bong Son, consists of 4 hill masses. The hills reach a maximum elevation of about 500 meters and are separated by 6 or 7 small streams (Song Lao). Route 3A terminates near the center of the base area about two kilometers from Binh Son. The area is generally forested. An adequate water supply exists in the area. It is suitable for installation, but its suitability for defense and deployment is unknown. At present this base area is being denied the enemy by the US 1st Cavalry Division. It may be expected that the enemy forces will return to this area soon after friendly forces are withdrawn.

15. Base Area 228 (Dam Tra O). Location: II CTZ, Binh Dinh province: BR 955 760 - CR 000 710 - CR 000 790 - CR 030 760. This base area consists almost entirely of a generally forested hill mass with a maximum elevation of about 500 meters. It is bounded on the east by marshes which extend to the South China Sea, on the north by the inland body of water Dam Tra O, on the south by a slightly higher hill mass, and on the west and northwest by delta-like terrain. Its potential as a water source and for defense and
17. Base Area 320 (Nui Pa Mountain). Location: II CTZ, Binh Dinh province: BR 930 550 - BR 990 510 - CR 060 570 - BR 990 590. Located in central Binh Dinh province near the coast, this base area consists almost completely of a hill mass with streams and valleys running off to the north, northeast, and southwest. A continuous hill mass extends generally in a southeasterly direction for a distance of 12 to 14 kilometers. Extensive delta country is found to the southwest, west, northwest, and north; one to four kilometers of marsh extends to the east; and there is an inland waterway about one kilometer to the northeast. The terrain is generally forested, provided with water sources, and suitable for installations. Its suitability for defense and deployment is undetermined. Extensive installations and unit sightings have been reported.

18. Base Area 231 (Canh Hung). Location: II CTZ, Binh Dinh province: BR 720 000 - BR 750 140 - BR 810 140 - BR 830 240. Located in the lower portion of Binh Dinh province, this base area is a forested series of hills and stream valleys which run virtually the whole length of the area. The principal stream valley spreads out in the north and northeast to a width of one and one-half to two kilometers. Route 6B roughly parallels the eastern boundary of the area at a distance of from six to eight kilometers. This area is a source of water and is suitable for installations. Its suitability for defense and deployment is undetermined. Seven logistical installations and one battalion have been reported within the area.

19. Base Area 233 (Plei Poe). Location: II CTZ, Gia Lai province: AQ 900 890 - AQ 940 860 - AQ 860 910 - AQ 930 850. Located in southeastern Pleiku - northern Gia Lai provinces, this base area is a forested area of generally rolling terrain permeated with small streams. The elevation is somewhat higher in the northern half of the area. Route 14, running from north to south, nearly bisects the area. Water is available, and the area is suitable for installations. Its suitability for defense and deployment is undetermined. Four logistical installations and numerous units have been reported within the area.

20. Base Area 234 (Nui Suoi Lun). Location: II CTZ, Phu Yen province: CQ 040 930 - CQ 060 990 - CQ 080 890 - CQ 100 960 - CQ 090 900. Located in northeastern Phu Yen province, the base area has fairly well forested, rugged terrain, especially along the highway running through the southern portion of the area. There is considerable marshy terrain in its southeastern quadrant close to the sea. Route 1 parallels almost the entire eastern boundary of the area, and the village of Lon Hai lies about two kilometers to the south. It is a source of water and is suitable for installations. Its suitability for defense and deployment is undetermined.

21. Base Area 235. Location: II CTZ, Phu Yen province: BQ 995 800 - CQ 030 870 - CQ 030 810. CQ 060 810. Located in eastern Phu Yen province, the