EEA 25. Does the enemy's capability to employ obstacles affect the mobility of the maneuver/movement elements?

EEA 26. Does the division engineer battalion provide effective obstacle crossing support for the mobility of maneuver battalions during tactical operations?

EEA 27. Not used.

FIREPOWER

EEA 28. Do the doctrine and organization (for firepower) of the maneuver battalion provide adequate techniques, procedures, and personnel to support the battalion's tactical employment?

EEA 29. Are the weapons and weapons systems of the maneuver battalion adequate in terms of range, lethality, and mobility?

EEA 30. Does the organic firepower of the maneuver battalions provide adequate terminal effects?

EEA 31. Does the organization of the maneuver battalion provide for continuous fire support throughout the battalion's area of operations?

EEA 32. Is the organic or attached target acquisition capability of the maneuver battalion adequate to detect and locate targets within the battalion area of operations for engagement by organic fire support and/or supporting aerial and ground based fire support?

EEA 33. Does the organization of the maneuver battalion have an adequate resupply capability to sustain the required firepower for the time period necessary to accomplish the battalion's mission?

EEA 34. Do the doctrine and organization of the aerial and ground based fire support units provide adequate techniques, procedures, and personnel to support the maneuver battalion's tactical employment?

EEA 35. Are the weapons systems of the aerial and ground based fire support units adequate in terms of range, lethality, and mobility to support the maneuver battalions?

EEA 36. Does the firepower of the aerial and ground based fire support units provide adequate terminal effects to support the maneuver battalions?

EEA 37. Does the organization of the aerial and ground based fire support units provide for continuous fire support throughout the supported organization's area of operation?
EEA 38. Is the capability to detect, identify, and locate targets throughout the division or brigade area of operations adequate in terms of the maneuver battalion's requirements for timeliness and response?

EEA 39. In terms of firepower requirements, does the organization of the supporting fire support units provide an adequate, responsive resupply capability?

EEA 40. Do the doctrine and organization for use of non-organic aerial and ground based fire support elements provide the techniques, procedures, personnel, and equipment required to support the division or brigade operations?

EEA 41. Not used.

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

EEA 42. Is the current doctrine pertaining to the type of operations being conducted usable and valid?

EEA 43. Does the existing organizational framework of the maneuver battalion require modification to improve its total capabilities for the execution of the various type operations?

EEA 44. Does the staff organization of the maneuver battalion provide for the most effective staff operation in the type operations being conducted?

EEA 45. As organized, are the operational capability and organization of the command facilities/operations centers of the maneuver battalions equal?

EEA 46. Does the use of standard battlefield control measures inhibit the operations of any maneuver battalions?

EEA 47. Is the brigade capable of controlling a varying number and mix of battalions?

EEA 48. Do the division and separate brigade organizational base and staff organization provide the capability to execute all missions for which the division and separate brigade are responsible?

EEA 49. Are the numbers and types of assigned maneuver battalions appropriate to each type mission and organization?

EEA 50. Do the communications resources of the maneuver battalions, when supported by their parent organizations, fulfill the requirements for command, control, and support of battalion operations?
EEA 51. Do the environmental conditions of the area significantly degrade communication capability?

EEA 52. Can lighter, less bulky equipment, including non-standard and reconfigured items, be substituted to increase efficiency and capabilities of communication means?

EEA 53. Not used.

SERVICE SUPPORT

EEA 54. Are supplies available in the correct amount at each echelon under consideration?

EEA 55. Is the supply system responsive (are the right supplies delivered to the right place in the right quantities at the right time) at each echelon?

EEA 56. Is the maintenance system responsive to the requirement? (Does it accomplish the maintenance workload at the proper level of maintenance in the prescribed time?)

EEA 57. Are the medical resources for treatment of casualties available to meet requirements for lightly wounded in action (LWA) and severely wounded in action (SWA) at the prescribed medical levels?

EEA 58. Are the medical evacuation resources responsive to the requirements of each echelon?

EEA 59. Are the division/separate brigade organic engineer units responsive to the service support requirements of the maneuver elements which they support?

EEA 60. Can service support units meet their rear area security (base security) requirements without degrading their primary service support missions?

EEA 61. Is unit effectiveness reduced by a lack of personal/administrative services?
INCLOSURE 4

GLOSSARY

The terms appearing in this inclosure are those which have been used extensively in the preparation of this report. As a general rule no terms appear here which are already defined in the Army Dictionary, AR 320-5. The definitions of some terms have been obtained from USMACV directives. The remainder are deemed necessary to clarify terminology used in this evaluation report.

ADVERSE WEATHER - Weather in which Army aircraft cannot operate effectively because of ceilings averaging under 200 feet absolute and/or visibilities of less than 1/2 mile generally throughout the area of operations, or other conditions hazardous to flight such as thunderstorms, severe turbulence, excessive dust, haze, smoke, precipitation, or icing.

AIR ASSAULT - An attack of an objective by a completely airlifted combat force utilizing Army aircraft for maneuver and aerial fire support.

AIR ASSAULT OPERATION - A tactical airmobile operation characterized by great speed and surprise conducted against enemy forces by air assault units utilizing Army aviation for movement and aerial fire support.

AIRMOBILE - Capable of being transported by Army aircraft. Includes the capability of being air landed by Army aircraft.

AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO) - An area outside the TAOR in which US/FWMA forces will operate tactically for prescribed periods of time. These areas and the responsibilities and authorities of US/FW forces within them will be coordinated with RVNAF officials in the course of operational planning.

BASE CAMP - The semi-permanent administrative and logistical installation within a TAOR from which US or other units conduct operations.

CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (CTZ) - One of the four major military and political subdivisions in VN. The Corps Commander is the permanent GVN representative in his CTZ, but normally concerns himself only with tactical operations.

CRITICAL MATERIEL - Those non-standard items of equipment obtained to fill equipment voids, substitute for, or augment existing standard equipment. Such items are obtained directly from industry,
or other service sources or modification of existing materiel.

DISTRICT - The organizational level of the GVN directly subordinate to the province and comparable to the American county. The district chief, usually military, is usually also the sub-sector chief.

EAGLE FLIGHT - An airmobile, quick reaction force usually of company size or smaller capable of searching out and destroying or capturing enemy forces or camps with minimum advance notice. Normally it has the capability to deploy in one lift.

EQUIPMENT DEADLINED FOR PARTS (EDP) - That equipment made non-available for lack of repair parts.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS (EEA) - A question specifically designed to obtain data that will provide an answer in a particular problem area or information required to conduct an evaluation.

FORWARD (SERVICE) SUPPORT ELEMENT (FSE) - Those service support elements of a division or separate brigade which are located at the brigade forward position to furnish direct support to the brigade combat elements.

HAMLET - The smallest community organization in VN and the lowest organizational level in the GVN.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOC) - All the routes, land, water and air, which connect an operating military force with a base of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.

MANEUVER BATTALION - One of the infantry battalions studied by the evaluation team that are organic to the 1st Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

MARGINAL WEATHER - Weather conditions where, for fixed-wing aircraft, the ceiling is below 1000 feet and the visibility is less than three miles; or, for rotary wing aircraft, the ceiling is less than 700 feet and the visibility is less than one mile.

PRIMARY JUNGLE - Tropical rain forest characterized by giant trees the tops of which form a dense canopy over 100 feet from the ground, and under which there is a second layer of undergrowth forming a second canopy up to 40 feet in height (hence double canopy). This type jungle is difficult to traverse but not impossible.

PROVINCE - The organizational level of the GVN subordinate to the Corps Tactical Zone, but that handles most administration of local gov-
ernment upon instructions direct from Saigon. It is comparable to the state in American government. There are 43 provinces in VN. The province chief is usually a military officer and also sector chief.

SECONDARY JUNGLE - Areas where primary jungle growth has been cleared for cultivation, then allowed to be reclaimed by the jungle growth. Characterized by a dense sea of underbrush and creepers. It is lower than primary jungle, and much more difficult to traverse.

SECTOR - The military organizational area equivalent to the province. The sector chief is a military officer charged with the security of the sector. USMACV advisors are assigned to sectors.

SORTIE - One sortie is one aircraft making one take-off and one landing for purposes of loading or off-loading personnel, ordnance, or fuel, except that specifically armed helicopters escorting troop carrying helicopters in air assault operations will log a sortie in the landing zone regardless of whether or not they land. (MACV Dir)

SUB-SECTOR - The military organization area directly subordinate to the sector and comparable to the GVN district. USMACV advisors are assigned to sub-sectors.

TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY (TAOR) - That area within which a US/FWMA unit has the following continuing responsibilities to be coordinated as necessary with local GVN authorities both military and civil:

1. Defense of key installations.
2. Conduct of operations including such reaction operations as are necessary to secure the area against organized military forces.
3. Support of GVN Rural Construction (Pacification) activities as required.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) - A physical groupment of those elements of the general and special staff concerned with the current tactical operations and the tactical support thereof.

TACTICAL RESPONSIVENESS - The time required for a unit to react to the assignment of a tactical mission or a change in a situation. It comprises the total time from the initial receipt of orders from higher authority (or knowledge of a situation change) to initiation of combat which occurs as a result of executing the particular assigned mission.

4-3
VIET CONG (VC) - Organized insurgents directed by the Lao Dong Party dedicated to the overthrow of the established GVN.

VILLAGE - A small township normally consisting of four to six hamlets. The most important organization in the GVN for local government, it retains many important legal and tax collection functions. It is directly responsible to the district.
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INCLOSURE 6

COMPOSITION OF ARCOV EVALUATION TEAM

1. ARCOV EVALUATION TEAM (See Figure 6-1)
   Brig. Gen. G. L. Mahry, Jr. Team Chief
   Col. R. A. Winfield, Jr.
   1st Lt. W. A. Gunlicks
   Sp4 A. L. Russell

2. USARV LIAISON TEAM
   Col. L. A. Williams
   Lt. Col. C. C. Wilson
   Capt. R. A. Warfield
   MSgt E. W. Dickman
   PFC R. Wagner

3. CDC LIAISON TEAM
   Col. R. A. Winfield, Jr.
   Lt. Col. R. S. Nash
   Lt. Col. B. E. Edney
   Maj. G. M. Scheets
   Maj. H. B. Blanchard, Jr.
   Maj. E. F. Harvey, Jr.
   Maj. G. P. Hanley

4. OPERATIONS BRANCH
   Col. F. C. Mahin
   Lt. Col. E. W. Stewart
   Lt. Col. L. W. Wemmer
   Capt. C. P. Hutton
   Mr. S. H. Winston
   Mr. W. E. Curtis
   Sp4 R. A. Petrin
   Sp4 J. G. McPhee
   Sp4 R. D. Price

5. DOCTRINE
   Lt. Col. E. L. Adoue
   Maj. J. T. Schroeder
   Maj. R. F. Spinks

6. ORGANIZATION
   Lt. Col. G. Lokken
   Maj. G. L. Farrar

7. TOE
   Lt. Col. H. A. VanHout

6-1
8. DEVELOPMENTAL EQUIPMENT IN AIRMOBILE DIVISION
Lt. Col. J. L. Teague
Maj. A. B. McClintock

9. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL READINESS
Lt. Col. L. O. Pruett
Lt. Col. C. C. Wilson
Maj. J. J. Zirkle

10. INTELLIGENCE
Lt. Col. A. E. Wolf
Mr. W. I. Pohlman
Sp4 E. J. Day

11. MOBILITY
Lt. Col. E. Newport
Mr. W. V. Brown
Sp5 W. H. Hill

12. FIREPOWER
Lt. Col. A. D. Harris
Mr. W. A. Carswell
PFC R. L. Synave

13. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Lt. Col. V. A. Henson
Mr. E. B. Vandiver
Sp4 M. D. Chase

14. SERVICE SUPPORT
Lt. Col. P. E. Smith
Maj. R. W. Truex
Mr. G. P. Lewett
PFC D. N. Brown

15. 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION DATA COLLECTION TEAM
Lt. Col. J. D. Coleman, Jr.
Lt. Col. J. K. Clark
Lt. Col. W. C. Lindahl
Lt. Col. E. L. Adoue
Lt. Col. S. R. Blunck
Lt. Col. J. Mayer
Lt. Col. W. E. Parker
Maj. K. Thorstensen
Maj. M. R. Wilson
Maj. G. L. Farrar
Maj. J. J. Zirkle
HiS

Maj. J. W. Cain
Maj. E. A. Shea
Maj. R. A. Baker
Maj. H. L. Reid
Maj. G. E. Bringhurst
Maj. J. W. Church
Maj. M. D. Cox
Capt. W. J. Fry
Sp4 T. E. Bowman
Sp4 R. A. Fee
Sp4 R. D. Russell
PFC D. L. Little

16. 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) DATA COLLECTION TEAM
Lt. Col. D. L. Skinner
Lt. Col. R. D. Reed
Lt. Col. E. E. Crow
Maj. A. L. Redding
Maj. A. F. Collins
Capt. D. C. Samuel
Sp5 R. D. Rivas
Sp4 E. C. Bill

17. 1ST BRIGADE, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION DATA COLLECTION TEAM
Lt. Col. D. S. Carroll
Lt. Col. W. J. Todd
Maj. H. E. Schneider
Maj. H. C. Smith
Maj. R. F. Spinks
Maj. L. R. Frankes
Sp4 T. S. Duda
PFC P. L. Zarbaugh

18. 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) DATA COLLECTION TEAM
Lt. Col. L. O. Pruett
Lt. Col. H. A. VanHout
Lt. Col. E. C. Wilson
Lt. Col. W. G. Riggs
Lt. Col. R. L. Herbert
Lt. Col. M. R. Quantz
Lt. Col. E. T. Owens
Maj. W. Cleveland
Maj. R. H. Wong
Maj. F. L. Clapp
Maj. N. P. Delmas
Maj. T. E. Anderson
Maj. B. G. Haney
Maj. E. T. Guidroz
Maj. J. T. Schroeder
Maj. N. W. Wells

6-3
Maj. J. R. Johnson
Capt. S. D. Hoyem
Capt. D. T. Titus
Sp4 L. C. James
Sp4 D. A. Hartmann
PFC J. E. O'Leary
PFC R. E. Storer
Figure 6-1 (U) COMPOSITION OF ARCOV EVALUATION TEAM
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