3. (C) SUMMARY

a. The Air Force has provided excellent support with air dropped flares. The Air Force flare ships are normally available, weather permitting, and provide accurate and responsive support. They can provide illumination over a much larger area and for longer periods of time that the artillery support.

b. Illumination round capability is provided by the 105mm howitzer, 4.2 inch and the 81mm mortars. The 105mm howitzer round has proven very effective; however, coverage is limited by the present available supply rate and range capability. The infantry normally operates within artillery range, but, since all artillery does not have an illumination capability, the infantry may not have artillery illumination support.

c. This evaluation did not indicate that the artillery units had used the 155mm howitzer illuminating round for battlefield illumination, however, the Ammunition Section, J4 MACV indicated that 14,200 rounds of this illuminating round are in-country and the established available supply rate is .64 rounds per tube per day.

d. Ground searchlights which are available to the artillery battalions provide support for both the artillery and infantry in the vicinity of the base camp. The limited mobility of ground searchlights generally precludes taking them on operations.

e. There has only been limited use of airborne searchlights in Vietnam. They have a great mobility advantage over the ground searchlights, but they cannot illuminate a large area and lack accuracy because of its aircraft platform. Airborne searchlights were reported used on only five operations; therefore, data on this means are very limited, aside from ACTIV's evaluation.

4. (U) CONCLUSIONS

a. The Air Force can satisfy most battlefield illumination needs except under adverse weather conditions.

b. The 105mm howitzer battalions are capable of providing adequate illumination support within their range and the limits of the available supply rate.

c. Ground searchlights are normally used only in the vicinity of the base camp because of their limited mobility.

d. The division aviation general support companies are capable of but have not been required to fly any illumination missions.
Appendix 10 to Annex A (Intelligence)

EEA 10: Are personnel and equipment sufficient to conduct reconnaissance for the combat units?

1. (C) GENERAL

a. BACKGROUND. The purpose of this appendix is to determine the adequacy of the organic capability of the division, brigade, and battalion to collect intelligence information to support combat operations through reconnaissance. Each maneuver battalion has an organic reconnaissance platoon. The divisional brigades do not normally have an additional TOE reconnaissance capability. Each separate brigade has one cavalry troop to provide additional reconnaissance support. Each division has a cavalry squadron and an aviation group or battalion which provides a ground and aerial reconnaissance capability.

b. SCOPE.

(1) In order to provide answers to the EEA and its related questions, the eight brigade commanders and their S2's, the 22 battalion commanders and their S2's and the 10 cavalry troop commanders were interviewed.

(2) Additional information pertinent to reconnaissance, aerial surveillance, and target acquisition is contained in Appendices 5 and 7 of this annex.

2. (C) DISCUSSION

a. BATTALION RECONNAISSANCE

(1) Means Available. A discussion on the composition of each battalion reconnaissance platoon is contained in Appendix 2 of Annex D.

(2) Employment.

(a) Employment if the reconnaissance platoon in the maneuver battalions varied greatly from unit to unit. The 22 maneuver battalion commanders were questioned on the missions assigned the reconnaissance platoon. Responses from 14 are contained in Figure A10-1. An analysis of these mission assignments indicates that the predominant roles of the reconnaissance platoon are those of a reserve/reaction force, command post and base camp security element, and rifle platoon. Only 24 percent of the missions assigned were in the nature of reconnaissance. The individual battalions used the reconnaissance platoon for non-reconnaissance type missions on from 55 to 100 percent of the missions assigned. These were missions normally performed by...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions Assigned</th>
<th>Battalion responses in percent of total missions</th>
<th>Average Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve/Reaction Force</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance Base CP Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle Platoon for Maneuver</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total for non-reconnaissance Missions</td>
<td>55 70 75 75 100 65 90 70 85 80 80 75 70 75 75 75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Range Patrols</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route Reconnaissance and Route Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route Reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy Escort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Clearing/Convoy Escort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush/Reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screening Missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambushes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Patrol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total for reconnaissance missions</td>
<td>45 30 25 25 0 35 10 30 15 20 20 25 30 25 25 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE A10-1 (C). Missions assigned to the battalion reconnaissance platoon by percent.
rifle platoons. The following summarization of Figure A10-1 shows the average percent of mission assignments to reconnaissance platoons for various categories of missions.

MISSION ASSIGNMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

1. Reserve/reaction force, or as rifle platoon
   42 percent

2. Forward or base camp security type missions
   34 percent

3. Combat patrol, long range reconnaissance, or screening type missions
   12 percent

4. Route reconnaissance and convoy security type missions
   9 percent

5. Other type missions
   3 percent

(b) In both US battalions of the 173d Airborne Brigade, the personnel from the reconnaissance platoon, anti-tank platoon and ground surveillance section have been combined into a provisional rifle company. This provisional company receives mission assignments comparable to those of the rifle companies of the battalion, but most often is retained as a battalion reserve/reaction force.

(3) Mobility. The 22 battalion commanders considered the mobility of the reconnaissance platoon to be adequate to perform the mission assigned during the 37 battalion operations conducted. However, it must be realized that ground vehicles are seldom used to move the reconnaissance elements on a mission. In practically all cases they moved into or near their target area by helicopter and proceed on foot.

(4) Surveillance Devices

(a) Radar surveillance devices are not used by reconnaissance elements because of their weight, bulk and lack of durability. These devices are normally used only for base camp security. A further discussion of them is contained in Appendix 6 of this annex.

(b) Reconnaissance elements have a need for night vision devices. This requirement is discussed in Appendix 7 of this annex.

(5) Confirmation of Aerial Surveillance. Ground reconnaissance is required to confirm or enlarge on reports rendered from aerial surveillance due to the constraints on aerial observation caused by terrain, vegetation, weather, and concealment techniques used by the VC.
(6) Airmobile Reconnaissance Requirement.

(a) The total number of operations performed by the maneuver battalions during the evaluation in comparison with the number of airmobile operations is shown on the following chart.

**NUMBER OF AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS COMPARED TO TOTAL OPERATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Number of Battalion Operations</th>
<th>Number of Airmobile Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Division</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Airborne Brigade</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade, 101st Abn Div</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The preponderance of the battalion combat operations conducted during the evaluation period were airmobile operations. These require an increased reconnaissance effort. In particular, photographs of landing zones and alternate landing zones are needed.

b. DIVISIONAL BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE.

(1) At the brigade level in the 1st Infantry Division, a Long Range Reconnaissance Team has been organized under MTOE 7-42E, 4 February 66. This team consists of a team leader, an assistant team leader and three team members, for a total of five personnel. These teams are specifically organized to conduct long range reconnaissance. According to the 1st Infantry Division, the brigades require long range reconnaissance teams to locate the enemy and his installations.

(2) Two brigade commanders in the 1st Infantry Division stated that the ground reconnaissance information did not satisfy their requirements for planning and accomplishing combat missions. They stated that a brigade reconnaissance element was required to provide intelligence information of immediate importance to operations.

(3) Sufficient data are not available to evaluate the effectiveness of the brigade Recon team or to evaluate the need for a brigade reconnaissance element.

(4) The brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division do not have...
DIVISION AND SEPARATE BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE

(1) Means Available

(a) The primary reconnaissance element of the 1st Infantry Division is the armored cavalry squadron which consists of a headquarters troop, an air cavalry troop, and three armored cavalry troops.

(b) The primary reconnaissance element of the 1st Cavalry Division is the air cavalry squadron which consists of a headquarters troop, a cavalry troop (ground) and three air cavalry troops.

(c) The 173d Airborne Brigade and the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, each have one armored cavalry troop as their primary reconnaissance element. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, has also formed a long range reconnaissance platoon consisting of two officers and 31 enlisted men. The five operating teams (patrols) consist of one patrol leader, one forward observer, one radio/telephone operator, and three riflemen. Each member of the platoon is a graduate of the Ranger school or a similar course of instruction. Each member is trained as a forward observer, a radio operator, a forward air controller, and is also capable of adjusting naval gunfire.

(2) The 10 cavalry troop commanders in the evaluated units were questioned on the adequacy of their organizations to accomplish assigned missions. Nine units responded as follows:

(a) Seven commanders stated that no communications problems existed. Of the other two, one needed an additional FM radio and one required more range than the AN/PRC-25 provided. It can be concluded that no major problems exist in cavalry troop communications.

(b) The cavalry troops have a need for night vision devices of the light intensification type. This is discussed in Appendix 7 of this annex.

(c) Troop commanders were satisfied with their organic mix of aerial and ground vehicles, except for the OH-13. The new LOH will replace the OH-13.

(d) Seven troops conducted reconnaissance missions for all five of the following types of operations:

1. Search and destroy
2. Clearing and securing
2. Counterambush

4. Convoy escort

5. Base camp perimeter defense

During these operations problems encountered stemmed from difficult terrain limiting off-road mobility and the low weight carrying capability of brigades which limited road movement of tanks. With the exception of these limitations no major problems in either equipment or operations were expressed.

3. (C) SUMMARY

a. The battalion reconnaissance platoons are being assigned reconnaissance type missions only approximately 24 percent of the time. The remaining 76 percent of mission assignments are as a security and reserve/reaction force which are normal rifle platoon missions. The rifle companies are frequently performing reconnaissance type missions such as combat patrols and screening. Both battalions of the 173d Airborne Brigade have combined the personnel of the reconnaissance platoon, anti-tank platoon and ground surveillance section into a provisional rifle company.

b. The mobility of the reconnaissance platoon was adequate for the missions they performed; however, these elements normally were moved by helicopter and then became foot mobile.

c. Reconnaissance elements did not use radar surveillance devices because of their weight, bulk, and lack of durability. Night vision devices were used very effectively and are required by all reconnaissance elements.

d. Reports from aerial surveillance and reconnaissance frequently had to be confirmed by ground reconnaissance because of terrain, vegetation, weather, and VC concealment techniques. This was accomplished by the cavalry troop, reconnaissance platoon, or elements of the rifle companies.

e. The large percentage of operations which are airmobile increases a requirement for reconnaissance, particularly in the vicinity of the landing zone. Airmobile operations comprised 36 of the 42 operations evaluated.

f. Reconnaissance elements at all levels, battalion, brigade, and division, have adequate communications.

g. Brigade reconnaissance teams were organized by the three brigades of the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Sufficient data were not available to evaluate the
effectiveness of these teams.

h. The organic mix of aerial and ground vehicles in the cavalry troops is adequate to effectively perform their reconnaissance mission.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS

a. The battalion reconnaissance platoons are being assigned reconnaissance missions only 24 percent of the time.

b. The mobility of the reconnaissance platoon which normally travels by helicopter or on foot is adequate.

c. Reconnaissance elements do not use ground radar surveillance devices during combat operations.

d. All reconnaissance elements have a requirement for night vision devices similar to the Starlight scope.

e. Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance reports frequently have to be confirmed by ground reconnaissance.

f. Reconnaissance elements at all levels have adequate communications.

g. The organic mix of aerial and ground vehicles in the cavalry troop is adequate.
Appendix 11 to Annex A (Intelligence)

EEA 11: Is the Military Intelligence Detachment (MID), as organized, capable of providing the specialized intelligence support required?

1. (C) GENERAL
   a. BACKGROUND
      (1) The objectives of the Military Intelligence Organization (MIO) in Vietnam remain the location and identification of the enemy, ascertaining his capabilities and probable courses of action, and neutralization of his intelligence effort and organization. In this type of conflict, being inherently a civil war, the accomplishment of these objectives is much more difficult and, at the same time, more essential to the successful accomplishment of combat operations. The MID's attached to the division and separate brigade are an integral part of the MIO.

      (2) The MID is designed to provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to the command to which it is attached, using special intelligence skills. They provide the command intelligence officer assistance in the order of battle (OB), imagery interpretation, interrogation of prisoners of war, document translation, and counterintelligence. Personnel to perform these functions are fixed by TOE.

      (3) TOE's 30-500 and 30-600 provide for cellular teams which may, by local tailoring, be used to augment the MID's attached to tactical units.

      (4) Action is underway by COMUSMACV to assign the four MID's in Vietnam to the 325th Military Intelligence Group which will assume responsibility for backup intelligence support.

   b. SCOPE.
      (1) To ascertain if the MID was capable of accomplishing its mission to the satisfaction of the supported command, 22 battalion commanders, and their S2's, six divisional brigade commanders, two division G2's, two separate brigade S2's, and the four MID Commanders were asked to comment on:

         (a) The adequacy of intelligence provided battalions and brigades.

         (b) The quantity and quality of MID support.

         (c) The adequacy of MID organization to provide required support.
(d) The adequacy of MID equipment.

(e) Whether the MID should be attached or organic to divisions/brigades.

(2) Battalion S2's provided additional data covering MID support requirements, and the detachment's ability to fulfill these requirements, on questionnaires prepared on fifty-five combat operations.

2. (c) DISCUSSION

a. ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT.

(1) The MID's included in this evaluation were organized in accordance with the TOE's and at the strengths indicated below.

(a) Division.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONAL MID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOE 30-178</td>
<td>1st MID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 WO EM</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command/Administration</td>
<td>2 8 2</td>
<td>10 2 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
<td>3 3 10</td>
<td>6 1 10 4 3 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagery Interpretation</td>
<td>4 2 9</td>
<td>3 2 7 4 2 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogation of Prisoners of War</td>
<td>6 15 5 10 7 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of Battle</td>
<td>1 3 1</td>
<td>4 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16 5 45 17 3 41 21 5 38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) Separate Brigade.

ORGANIZATION OF SEPARATE BRIGADE MID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>TOE 30-L/E</th>
<th>181st MI Det</th>
<th>1/101st Am Div</th>
<th>172d MI Det</th>
<th>173d Am Bde</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command/Administration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagery Interpretation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogation of Prisoners of War</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of Battle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The salient deficiency in the composition of the MID's, as reflected in the views of all respondents, is the inability of the detachment to provide adequately trained interrogators and interpreters who are fluent in the Vietnamese language.

(a) The inability of interrogation personnel to produce satisfactory results from interviews with prisoners of war and civilians deprives the commander of one of his best sources of intelligence (See Figure A1-1, Division G2 and Separate Brigade S2 Source Ratings, Appendix 1, Annex A).

(b) Battalion S2's unanimously indicated a critical need for qualified linguists with the battalion during combat operations. They, and the four MID Commanders, recommend the assignment of four interrogators to the maneuver battalion: one with each rifle company and one at battalion headquarters. Linguists would be able to obtain valuable tactical information on an immediate basis from captured personnel and documents. Quite frequently, these sources are not rapidly exploited at levels above the rifle company because of difficulty in evacuating PW's and documents. Hence, information of immediate tactical value is often lost.

(c) ARVN soldiers are attached under current practices for screening and interrogation of captured personnel. However, experience has shown them to be unsatisfactory because:

1. They cannot converse in English.
2. They are not trained in interrogation techniques.
2. They are prone to avoid asking specific, pertinent questions because of existing political conditions.

4. They are not knowledgeable on current US Army organization and tactical concepts and therefore are unable to obtain the desired information without tedious and prolonged instruction and supervision.

5. They are of doubtful reliability and cannot be made aware of impending operations.

(d) At present, there are only ten personnel who possess a marginal fluency in the Vietnamese language in the four MID's. Two are in the 1st Infantry Division, seven in the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and one in the 1st Cavalry Division. Current TOE authorizations provide for 104 counterintelligence and interrogator MOS trained personnel with language fluency.

(3) Although they were not supported by data from the division G2's and separate brigade S2's, 75 percent of whom approved of the strength and composition of the MID, all of the detachment commanders wanted an increase in counterintelligence and order of battle personnel. Indirectly, this requirement was reinforced by half of the maneuver battalion commanders who indicated outright dissatisfaction with the intelligence support rendered their battalions in these fields. The number and categories of personnel required varied by detachment, indicating that the extent of augmentation is dependent upon the demands placed upon the specific MID by its operational requirements.

(4) It is readily apparent that the MID's are incapable of providing required support, especially in those areas requiring linguistic ability. However, this fact does not indicate an organizational deficiency. As an integral part of the theater MIO the detachment looks to the MIO to provide it the special support it requires to accomplish its mission. This is in accordance with existing doctrinal concepts.

b. MID EFFECTIVENESS. The two division G2's and the S2's of the two separate brigades, all of whom exercise operational control over the attached MID's, stated the MID structure was completely satisfactory. One division G2 indicated a need for additional OB specialists, however this increase can be met and is provided for from within the theater MIO personnel resources. Further, the addressees indicated that with the exception of a lack of fluent linguists for the IPW function, the attached MID's were satisfying all special intelligence requirements within their assigned mission.

c. EQUIPMENT OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT

(1) Comments with respect to the adequacy of the equipment authorized the MID were generally in the category of requirements.
to satisfy local conditions.

(2) The two MID’s attached to airborne brigade have been authorized lighter equipment to provide an airborne capability which is compatible with the mission of the supported unit. However, this equipment has proven generally inadequate for conducting sustained ground combat operations. The MID’s attached to airborne brigades conducting combat operations in Vietnam should be provided some of the heavier, non-airborne equipment authorized by TOE 30-14E. Action for equipment changes must be initiated by the specific MID through the unit to which attached, so the parent unit’s contingency mission(s) are not jeopardized.

(3) Replacement of authorized FM radios with radios of the series authorized the brigade to which the MID is attached is required so that the MID can enter prescribed nets.

(4) None of the data indicated an organizational equipment deficiency which affected the MID’s capability to provide the required support. It appears, therefore, that all equipment requirements can be met through application of existing supply regulations to satisfy specific conditions.

d. ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT. Division G2’s and separate brigade S2’s were asked if they thought MID’s should be attached or organic to the units they supported.

(1) Three believed that the MID could better receive technical support from the intelligence resources at higher levels if it remained in its present status of attachment and therefore would be better able to support the command.

(2) The one dissenter (G2, of a division), based his argument in favor of changing to an organic status on the premise that the detachment could be given better administrative and logistical support. Better control over personnel would also be possible.

(3) The present concepts of centralized control of qualified military intelligence personnel and specialized equipment provides the maximum support possible at each echelon of command from the limited resources available, have proven to be sound.

3. (C) SUMMARY

a. As currently organized, the MID’s are capable of providing the specialized intelligence support required by the tactical units to which they are attached, if provided adequately trained personnel. Under existing concepts, they can extend this support to the lowest level of command, as specified by theater policy.
b. The lack of personnel fluent in Vietnamese has decreased the capability of the MID's to provide the required support in the IPW and other language associated functions. This situation does not call for a change in organization or authorized TOE strength. It does indicate that personnel in these MOS's should be language qualified as prescribed in the prerequisites for the MOS's. The Vietnamese qualified US linguists should remain organic to the MID and provided to subordinate elements of the supported units for specific operations. They should not be made organic to the battalions or companies as indicated by the maneuver battalion 32's.

c. Because the theater MID in Vietnam is as yet incomplete, excessive requirements have been placed upon the MID's attached to tactical units in the counterintelligence and order of battle fields. When completely organized and fully operational, the theater MID will be able to better provide support in these fields in accordance with existing doctrine.

d. The equipment authorized each of the MID's by its respective TOE is adequate, except where modifications have been made in the equipment authorizations for the MID's supporting the two airborne brigades. Equipment changes were made to provide them an airborne capability. Since the brigades have not conducted airborne operations in Vietnam to date, the MID's require their original TOE equipment in order to support sustained combat operations.

e. The present doctrine of attaching the MID to a tactical unit instead of making it organic is sound and preferred by three out of four tactical unit G2's/S2's.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The MID's are sound in organization. When furnished adequately trained personnel and augmentation as required, they can provide the required specialized intelligence support to the supported tactical units to a level of command established by the Theater Commander.

b. The personnel assigned to the MID's in the functional areas of counterintelligence and IPW must be fluent in Vietnamese.

c. The TOE equipment authorized the MID's is adequate and, where additional requirements exist, current supply regulations provide ample flexibility in obtaining augmentation.

d. The concept of attaching the MID to a tactical unit is sound and should not be changed.
Appendix 12 to Annex A (Intelligence)

EEA 12: Have the attached United States Army Security Agency (USASA) units effectively provided USASA type support (signal intelligence and signal security)?

1. (C) GENERAL

a. BACKGROUND

(1) Signal intelligence support of US tactical units in the RVN is provided by the attachment of USASA detachments at division and separate brigade level. These detachments are designed to provide communications intelligence (COMINT) and communications security (COMSEC) support and to satisfy the special intelligence requirements in these areas for the supported unit.

(2) The USASA detachments are under the operational control of the G2/S2, but the detachment commander remains responsive to special requests for information/intelligence (SRI's) received directly from the parent USASA unit. During combat operations, teams from the detachment attached to the division or separate brigade are sub-attached to subordinate elements for the duration of the operation.

(3) The division is supported by a TOE 32-57F unit which may consist of as many as 10 officers and 100 enlisted personnel. The separate brigade USASA detachment may consist of two officers and 40 enlisted men.

b. SCOPE.

(1) This appendix investigates the effectiveness of USASA support in terms of type and timeliness and accuracy of information provided to the maneuver battalion commander and staff. The concept of employment of USASA teams in attached or organic status and COMSEC was also studied.

(2) The data base was established by interviewing commanders and intelligence staff representatives of two divisions, two separate brigades, six divisional brigades and 22 maneuver battalions. A total of 48 combat operations are included in the data base. A detailed discussion on the closely related subject of communications security is contained in Appendix 4 to Annex A.
2. (C) DISCUSSION

a. USASA-SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.

(1) USASA support was used by the maneuver battalions in 34 of 48 documented operations. It was judged to have provided useful intelligence in 25 of these operations. The division and separate brigade G2/S2's all rated USASA intelligence as one of the most useful of 17 sources of intelligence information (See Appendix 1 to this annex for a complete discussion of the evaluation of the intelligence sources).

(2) Responses from nine out of 10 division organic brigades, and separate brigade G2/S2's indicated that the information provided by the supporting USASA unit encompasses the following categories:

- Indications of enemy communication centers - 8 units
- Indications of enemy troop concentrations - 5 units
- Indications of enemy weapons positions - 2 units
- Information on routes of infiltration into RVN - 1 unit
- Indications of enemy battalion and regimental size units - 1 unit
- Airborne radio direction finding - 1 unit
- Indication of approximate location of enemy radio transmitter - 1 unit
- Indications of enemy logistics base location - 1 unit

(Using units received information in more than one category; therefore the "units" shown total more than nine.)

(3) Two division, two separate brigade, and six divisional brigade G2's/S2's questioned on USASA signal intelligence support all indicated they were supported by USASA elements and that the support was adequate.
(4) Accuracy of USASA information was rated as adequate 90 percent of the time. The information obtained from the supporting USASA element was confirmed through the use of aerial or ground surveillance/reconnaissance 66 percent of the time.

(5) Timeliness of USASA information was rated as adequate 76 percent of the time. The G2/S2's also indicated that information received from the USASA supporting unit was sufficiently timely in 55 percent of the time to alert the maneuver battalions of imminent danger in the area of operations.

b. USASA SUPPORT STATUS

(1) The USA SA elements currently providing COMINT and COMSEC support to the two US divisions and two separate brigades conducting combat operations in the RVN are attached to the supported unit. The desirability of having the USASA unit made organic to the division/brigade was investigated and produced an even division of opinion.

(2) One division G2 stated, "The personnel in the USASA unit are highly technical and the division does not desire to have training responsibility". The other division G2 said, "The Military Intelligence and USASA detachments' attached status is a nuisance, wasteful, causes misunderstanding, and places both units in a step-child position".

(3) The responses from the two separate brigades also disclosed a 50-50 split. One separate brigade S2 indicated that no change in the status of the USASA unit is desired, while the other wanted the USASA unit to be organic. The latter justified his position by stating, "The USASA unit commander is rated by the executive officer of the major USASA unit in RVN whose headquarters is geographically distant from us, and he had observed the unit commander's activity for only a very limited time". There is insufficient evidence to warrant a change in the status of the USASA unit.

(4) The current concept is that USASA units are attached to and under the operational control of the US divisions and separate brigades conducting combat operations. USASA support to brigades organic to the division is provided on an attached basis for specific operations.

c. USASA SIGNAL SECURITY SUPPORT. Respondent G2's/S2's indicated that the supporting USASA adequately satisfied requirements in the area of signal security. All of the US tactical units questioned on communications security indicated that no problems had been encountered in this area. A detailed discussion on communications security is contained in Appendix 4 to Annex A (Intelligence).
3. (C) SUMMARY.

a. Two US divisions, two separate brigades, and six divisional
brigades received signal intelligence support from USASA detachments.
The support was determined to be adequate by all intelligence officers
of these units.

b. On the question of whether or not USASA support should be
organic to divisions and brigades, there was an even division of opinion.
One G2 and one brigade S2 wanted it organic, another G2 and brigade S2
did not.

c. All of the brigade and division intelligence officers
were satisfied with USASA signal security support.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

a. USASA support to the US tactical units conducting combat
operations in the RVN is adequate.

b. The 50-50 split of the intelligence officers on the organic
or attached status of supporting USASA units indicates that no change in
its status should be made.