

may effect the actual destruction, but the majority of it will usually be accomplished by the attacking element, while the stationary element holds the guerrilla force in place. This technique is most effective when the blocking or stationary force is located on, or immediately in the rear of a natural terrain obstacle.

5. Variations of the operations described above include such techniques as having forces encircle an area and await the enemy attempt to escape as he is subjected to intense saturation type indirect fire and/or attack by tactical aircraft. Flushing fires are discussed in paragraph 802.

▶ 405. OPERATIONS FROM MOBILE SEA BASES

a. Landing force units operating against guerrilla units from a mobile sea base are an effective means of combating insurgency. As previously discussed in subparagraph 403c, the doctrine for operations against guerrilla units normally requires that combat bases be established to serve as a focal point for operations. The mobile sea base concept is entirely compatible with this doctrine.

b. Counterinsurgency forces based at sea possess the mobility and flexibility required for operations against guerrilla units. Furthermore, the problems associated with a buildup of forces ashore for support and security are greatly reduced.

c. The inherent mobility of the amphibious task force as a whole, combined with that of helicopterborne units, will normally ensure a mobile sea base superiority in this capability.

d. Operations against guerrilla units which are conducted from mobile sea bases may employ either landing craft and/or amphibian vehicles, helicopters, or a combination of these movement means as follows:

(1) Helicopters are particularly suited to operations against guerrilla units and to operations from mobile sea bases. Helicopters can lift landing force elements directly from the mobile sea base into surprise attacks against guerrilla units or to positions to block avenues of escape during encirclement operations. Helicopterborne forces operating from mobile sea bases are free from dependence on beaches, airfields, or overland lines of communications.

(2) Landing craft and/or amphibian vehicles will be the primary movement means in situations where unfavorable geographic or meteorological conditions restrict the employment of helicopters. Generally, areas possessing a system of waterways near the coast will be favorable for landing craft and amphibian vehicle employment.

(3) The use of both helicopters and waterborne craft and vehicles will provide the ideal tactical movement means in some situations. Operations of this type may include landing by one means and withdrawal by another. Other examples include the convergence of forces against insurgent elements, or the conduct of encirclement operations where there is a significant advantage in the commitment of forces from several directions.

e. Landing force operations from a mobile sea base may be conducted as independent operations, as a part of an amphibious operation,

or in conjunction with counterinsurgency operations already in progress. The concept of employment in each of these general categories is discussed in the following subparagraphs:

(1) When operations from a mobile sea base are conducted as independent operations comprising the total military effort of the counterinsurgency, their speed and flexibility contribute to their effectiveness. During periods of political uncertainty, for example, the establishment of a military force ashore may be an untimely, undesirable, or irrevocable move. In contrast, in operations from a mobile sea base, the landing force may be committed at a precise time and place, with ready withdrawal as an inherent operational characteristic.

(2) Forces operating from a mobile sea base may be employed as part of large-scale counterinsurgency amphibious operations as follows:

(a) To initiate operations preparatory to the full employment of larger forces at a particular time and place.

(b) To determine the whereabouts of insurgent forces and to develop the situation ashore in order that the remaining forces may be committed at the most advantageous time and place.

(c) To exploit those situations where other landing force elements have contacted or contained insurgent forces.

(d) To conduct denial and/or interdiction operations aimed at isolating the insurgents from their source of supply.

(3) Forces operating from a mobile sea base may be employed in conjunction with counterinsurgency operations already in progress. In these situations the landing force may be employed either as a reaction force in coordination with forces ashore, or as a force to operate in areas otherwise inaccessible.

f. The Navy elements of a mobile sea base force; e.g., landing craft with operating personnel, may be employed in support of land forces, either U.S. or indigenous. Navy support capabilities include troop mobility on inland waterways, resupply, surveillance, denial of waterways to insurgents, and training of indigenous personnel in the naval aspects of warfare in inland waterways areas.

g. The doctrine for operations against guerrilla units expressed in other sections of this manual is valid for such operations conducted from a mobile sea base. Although mobile sea base forces are effective in harassing and denial operations, they are particularly suited to the conduct of reaction and elimination operations.

h. Employment considerations which require emphasis include the following:

(1) Regardless of the size of the force or the mission, an element of appropriate size is retained, normally aboard ship, as a reaction force to rapidly engage reported insurgent forces or reinforce other friendly forces.

(2) To minimize delay in reaction and elimination operations, the following preparatory measures

are initiated early in the operation and developed throughout:

(a) Potential landing beaches and helicopter landing zones are selected, reconnoitered, classified as to suitability, and are assigned an identifying code.

(b) Potential targets for insurgent action are located, reconnoitered, and assigned a code identification. Reaction plans for such situations are prepared in detail, and whenever possible are rehearsed.

(3) Forces conducting harassing operations such as ambush and raid patrols are committed and withdrawn according to precise schedules and usually remain ashore for several days.

(4) Two general types of employment apply to mobile sea base helicopterborne forces in reaction or elimination operations.

(a) The simultaneous landing of units adjacent to insurgent forces in landing zones favoring immediate encirclement. This employment exploits surprise and avoids troop exhaustion but is dependent upon the availability of suitable landing zones.

(b) The second means of employment involves landing, assembly, and reorganization prior to the attack or pursuit of guerrilla units. Coordinated action is facilitated by establishing control of small units before engaging the insurgent forces, thereby minimizing danger to helicopters and troops in the landing phase.

(5) A high state of operational readiness is essential. The requirement for quick response to situations ashore frequently will be a dominant factor.

(6) The capability to withdraw and return to the parent ship is an inherent characteristic of operations from a mobile sea base. A major consideration is the determination of the time of withdrawal. In certain harassing operations such as patrolling, the hour of withdrawal can be replanned. In reaction or elimination operations, or at any other time contact with insurgent forces is made, withdrawal is not conducted until the insurgent force is destroyed or contact is completely broken. Based upon these contingencies, planning for operations from a mobile sea base must ensure flexibility and freedom of action for forces ashore.

(7) Fire support will include field artillery, either previously established ashore or accompanying the combat units; naval gunfire to the limit of its ranges; and air support. The air support capability should be emphasized as it may be the only fire support means available in operations at great distances inland.

i. The depth of operations ashore may be extended significantly by the temporary establishment of austere helicopter bases at points near the extreme radius of action from parent ships. These temporary bases are essentially refueling stations and when helicopters are the only means of stockpiling fuel, their availability for other operations is greatly reduced. Therefore, a decision to conduct operations beyond the helicopters' radius of action from their parent ship must be carefully weighed, and should employ minimum forces necessary to accomplish the mission. When helicopter bases are established, they should be simple, well-guarded, and should exist for a limited duration.

If for no other reason, these operations should be conducted periodically for the purpose of convincing the insurgents that they have no safe haven beyond the radius of action of the helicopters from their parent ship.

▶ 406. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

a. In a counter guerrilla warfare situation the mission of psychological operations is to support combat operations and to assist military and civilian agencies in the control and administration of the area of operations.

b. Although most psychological operations are planned and directed by the highest echelon concerned with conducting counter guerrilla operations, all personnel participating in the operation should have an understanding of the purpose, capabilities, and certain of the procedures of psychological operations. Commanders at lower echelons must be prepared to--

(1) Constantly seek guerrilla psychological vulnerabilities to be exploited.

(2) Request psychological operations to provide direct support of combat operations.

(3) Request psychological operations to facilitate civilian control and promote cooperation among the civil populace.

(4) Assist in the conduct of psychological operations and in the evaluations of its results.

(5) Plan and conduct limited psychological operations such as loudspeaker appeals directed at guerrillas during combat operations.

c. FM 33-5, Psychological Operations, provides basic information with regard to the capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare, its organization, procedures, methods, and techniques. It further describes the procurement and use of intelligence for psychological warfare, the nature of propaganda and the means of communications utilized in its dissemination, and the operational employment of psychological warfare in support of military operations.

d. Psychological indications are those evidences or manifestation of attitudes, whether positive or negative, which may point to the existence of guerrilla or civilian psychological strengths and vulnerabilities capable of being exploited by propaganda. Personnel participating in combat operations against the guerrillas and those in contact with the civil populace must be alert to psychological indications. Essential elements of information (EEI) may be announced to assist in the determination of indications. Indications may be vague clues, definite signs, or information pointing to the existence of psychological strengths and vulnerabilities. Examples might be hunger (or lack of hunger) in recently captured guerrillas; obvious resentment against (or respect for) their leaders among prisoners; worry (or lack of worry) among civilians or captured guerrillas about conditions in the area.

e. Propaganda is planned and employed in operations against guerrillas to achieve the following:

(1) Demoralize, divide, and disorganize the guerrilla force.

(2) Induce defection of guerrilla force members.

(3) Reduce or eliminate civilian support of the guerrilla force.

(4) Dissuade civilians from participating in covert activities on the side of the guerrilla force.

(5) Win the support of non-committed civilians.

(6) Preserve and strengthen friendly civilian support.

(7) Win approval for the presence of the military force.

f. For purposes of planning and conducting the propaganda program, the population in the area is divided into the following target audiences:

(1) Guerrilla units.

(2) Underground elements.

(3) Civilians sympathetic to the guerrilla; those who provide information, supplies, refuge and other assistance to the guerrillas and the underground.

(4) Uncommitted civilians.

(5) Civilians sympathetic to the forces operating against the guerrillas.

g. Propaganda themes are based on recognizable aspects of friendly civil programs and on the following potentially divisive characteristics of target audiences:

(1) Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the guerrilla force and civil populace.

(2) Rivalries between guerrilla leaders.

(3) Danger of betrayal.

(4) Harsh living conditions of guerrilla force.

(5) Scarcity of arms and supplies.

(6) Selfish motivation of opportunists and apparent supporters of the guerrilla forces.

h. The use of persuasion, as opposed to direct order, is implicit in most psychological warfare techniques. The aim of psychological warfare techniques should be to employ reason, logic, and emotional appeals to persuade the target audiences to adopt a course of action rather than to order it to take such a course of action. When the guerrilla force or its civilian supporters are demoralized, the authoritative approach may be effective.

i. The granting of amnesty and rewards may induce the guerrilla and his civilian supporters to defect from the guerrilla movement.

j. The conduct and attitudes of the individual participant in operations against guerrillas will have a decided psychological influence on the civil populace, and indirectly the guerrilla force.

k. Psychological warfare media are the means or channels of communications to the guerrilla force and civil populace. Media of particular interest to the force conducting operations against guerrillas include the following:


(1) Leaflets.-- Leaflets and other printed materials are disseminated by artillery, aircraft, patrols, and agents. Depending on the character of the target audience and the purpose of the leaflet, it

may be either primarily textual or primarily pictorial. A leaflet is a permanent record of the message to which the reader may refer until it has become impressed upon his mind. Weather and enemy countermeasures may reduce the effectiveness of leaflets. Surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes have proved valuable in past operations against guerrillas.

(2) Loudspeakers. -- Loudspeaker sets mounted on vehicles or aircraft as well as lightweight public address equipment that can be hand carried are employed in close support missions. Loudspeaker appeals may be made from aircraft over areas known or suspected to contain guerrillas. During elimination operations, particularly when an encirclement is achieved, loudspeaker surrender appeals are made to the guerrillas. If effective, such appeals will reduce the number of casualties that would result from stubborn resistance. Loudspeaker

appeals should be brief, and made in simple, easily understood language. Important phrases should be repeated throughout the appeal for emphasis and clarification. Surrender appeals should always include specific instructions on how to surrender. Loudspeaker messages are particularly effective when used in conjunction with specific combat actions. For example, a message to an encircled force may be an ultimatum prefaced by an artillery barrage and concluding with a threat of redoubled barrage if the ultimatum is not obeyed. Such threats must be kept, and on schedule.

(3) Radio Broadcasts. -- Radio broadcasts beamed toward areas within the effective range of the transmitter form an effective medium to reach both guerrilla and civilian targets. The audience is limited however, to those who have access to receiving sets of appropriate wave length and who will listen if they can.



SECTION 5: SECURITY

501. GENERAL

In areas threatened by a guerrilla force, security measures must be taken to safeguard troops, installations, key civilian communities, and lines of communication. The scope of guerrilla activity threatens all elements of the forces operating against them. The guerrilla characteristics, capabilities, and weaknesses must be constantly studied to determine the pattern for security and the emphasis to be placed on its various aspects. Vigilance and sound security measures will not only minimize interference with operations, but will tend to discourage guerrilla operations.

502. SECURITY MEASURES

Security measures are either active or passive in nature; the best security is provided by a combination of both. Actions and measures which enhance security against guerrilla threat include the following:

a. Offensive Operations.-- Constant pressure is maintained

against the guerrilla force. Harassing operations to include patrols, raids, ambushes, air attack, and use of supporting fires deny the guerrilla the opportunity to conduct operations.

b. Adequate Warning.-- Adequate warning is essential to timely reaction. The forces, agencies, and devices employed in normal land combat are used to provide warning. Depending on the situation, these include such things as: advance, flank, and rear guards; outposts; patrols; and ground surveillance radar. Continuous ground and aerial reconnaissance is conducted to detect threats to security. Maximum use is made of civilian informants and other indigenous personnel.

◆ c. Timely Reaction.-- All elements and personnel of a counter-guerrilla force, including the means of mobility, must be prepared to react instantly to a security threat. Reaction forces, discussed in paragraphs 403 and 404, are particularly suitable when adequate warning is provided. Immediate action drills are discussed in appendix A. In all

situations, all personnel keep their weapons available for instant use.

d. Effective Communications--Effective communications are essential to adequate warning, control of security activities, and timely reaction. Multiple and emergency means are established to ensure reliable communications in the event of failure of the primary system as a result of malfunction, destruction of facilities, or guerrilla interference.

e. Use of Obstacles and Aids--Appropriate use is made of physical obstacles and aids such as wire, mines, illumination, searchlight and restricted areas.

f. Deception--Deceptive operations, including communications, are conducted when appropriate. Deceptive measures such as cover, concealment, and camouflage are employed.

g. Care in the Establishment of Installations--Special attention is given to the selection of combat bases, patrol bases, and all other installations. Paragraph 403 discusses the establishment of combat bases and appendix A covers the organization of patrol bases. To economize on manpower, it is important to select sites for installations that readily lend themselves to defense. Since guerrillas are not as heavily armed as conventional ground forces, it is desirable to group installations together so that they may be guarded as a unit. The routine means of securing an installation are altered frequently to prevent the guerrilla force from obtaining detailed accurate information about the composition and habits of the defense.

h. Security of Lines of Communications--For a discussion of

techniques used in transportation security, see appendix C.

i. Designations of Clearance of an Area--To facilitate security, a system is established for the designation of the degree of control existing in any specific area. Such a system, based on traffic light colors, is described in paragraph 403.

j. Police-Type Operations and Civilian Control--Police-type operations and civilian control measures are essential to security. Curfew, movement restrictions, roadblocks, search and seizure and related measures are common. Techniques of civilian control are covered in appendix B; certain police-type operations are covered in appendix A. As a defense against espionage and sabotage within installations, rigid security measures are enforced on native labor, to include screening, identification, and supervision.

k. Supply Discipline--Supply discipline must be strictly enforced, and it must be emphasized to troops that supplies lost, traded, or thrown away may be recovered by the guerrillas and used against them. Arms and equipment must be salvaged from battle areas and from civilians who have collected them.

l. Troop Indoctrination--Psychological indoctrination of troops must minimize the anxieties which may stem from the nature of guerrilla operations; on the other hand, contempt for the guerrilla must be guarded against. Troops in areas considered secure may acquire a sense of false security and relax their vigilance. In units that have not experienced a guerrilla surprise attack, methodical supervision to maintain security discipline will be necessary. Since guerrilla force

operations may be spasmodic, long quiet periods will require particular attention to security vigilance.

m. Static Security Posts.--A static security post is any organized security system for the protection of fixed critical military or civil installations, or critical points along lines of communications, such as terminals, tunnels, and bridges. The size of the post will vary with the size and importance of the installation or point being secured. It may vary from a two-man bridge guard to a reinforced company securing a key communication center or civilian community. The following factors are considered in establishing static security posts:

(1) To preserve the tactical integrity of military units of the counter guerrilla force, maximum use of indigenous forces is made, consistent with their capability and reliability. Militia, self-defense forces, and police may be employed for this task. Every effort is made to avoid the piece-meal commitment of combat forces to static security duty.

(2) The outpost is organized for the security of both the installation and the security force. The security measures described above are particularly applicable.

(3) Static security posts in remote areas will necessarily be larger than those closer to supporting forces. Remote posts are maintained with a supply level to meet the contingency of isolation from their combat base.

503. REAR AREA SECURITY

a. Rear area security in a conventional operation includes the planning for and employment of anti-

guerrilla measures when a guerrilla threat exists. Because the rear area is threatened by other enemy action in addition to guerrilla action, rear area security embraces a variety of defensive measures; it cannot be directed only at the guerrilla menace. Both prior to and during a conventional operation, the enemy's capabilities to interfere with the operation are carefully assessed and the security of the rear area is established to accommodate the various possibilities. Accordingly, rear area security measures often represent a compromise based on enemy capabilities. For example, dispersion required under nuclear threat encourages and favors guerrilla action; when both threats exist, units are dispersed and particular attention is paid to the guerrilla threat. On the other hand, when a nuclear threat does not exist, dispersion is minimized to provide security measures against guerrilla threat.

b. When a guerrilla threat exists in a conventional operation, security of the rear area includes the use of the security measures covered in paragraph 502, as appropriate. Additional factors in rear area security which must be considered include the following:

(1) The accomplishment of the primary mission must not lose precedence, and whenever possible, enemy actions are overcome with minimum interruption to it.

◆ (2) A commander is usually assigned responsibility for the overall security of the rear area. As rear area defense commander, he is responsible for the integration of local security plans into the overall area plan. His plans provide for unity of effort and ensure the most efficient use of available defensive means.

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(3) Specific combat units may be assigned the mission of assisting in security of the rear area. The type and size of the force depend on the characteristics and size of the area, enemy capabilities, and availability of forces. When the guerrilla threat is significant and the rear area units and installations cannot successfully cope with it, reserve elements of the combat units are assigned the mission of conducting antiguerrilla operations. This

assignment must be considered as a secondary and temporary mission. When a major guerrilla threat is anticipated, combat units other than reserve elements may be assigned to the operation to conduct antiguerrilla operations as a primary mission. Combat units assigned an anti-guerrilla mission conduct operations similar to the counter-guerrilla combat operations covered in paragraph 404.



SECTION 6: COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

601. GENERAL

a. In general, the communications capability within the Fleet Marine Forces is adaptable to counter guerrilla operations. The similarity of communications requirements between amphibious operations and counter guerrilla operations includes such things as the need for communications for command of the force as a whole, for special forms of control, and for coordination between diversified forces in the conduct of common or related operations.

b. The terrain in which the guerrilla usually operates and the methods of counter guerrilla operations impose definite limitations on the normal employment of the infantry communication system. Mountains, jungles, and other areas with heavy vegetation greatly reduce the rated distance capability of FM radios which are normally used for tactical radio nets. The lack of roads, trails, or good trafficability severely restrict the employment of vehicular

radio sets. The problem is complicated further by the wide separation of units and extensive long-range patrol operations.

602. REQUIREMENTS

a. The communication system must provide the commander with the capability of control and maneuver, rapid reporting of guerrilla movements, security and warning, and for handling normal administrative and logistic requirements. A communication system is required between military and civil agencies. Ground-to-air communication is established for all air-supported ground operations. Operations characterized by continuous small unit actions require a communication system that is reliable, rapid, secure, and flexible. A clandestine communication system is often required between intelligence agents and headquarters of higher echelons. The use of civilian police, self-defense units and friendly guerrillas in civilian population control or small scale operations requires a

communication system for coordination and control by the counter-guerrilla force.

b. The added burden placed on the communication system requires that the problem be met by ingenuity and improvisation as well as augmentation by personnel and equipment.

603. COMMUNICATION MEANS

a. Radio.--Radio is the primary means of communication. Great reliance is placed on portable radio equipment, capable of necessary transmission distances to control units operating in widespread areas. All units, particularly the infantry battalion and its subordinate units, require portable radios to facilitate mobility. Infantry platoons may be employed in situations that require a net of their own to coordinate patrols, raids and ambushes. Transmissions must be kept to a minimum so that high priority traffic such as reporting guerrilla contact and issuance of orders to reaction forces can be rapidly transmitted. Pre-determined codes will greatly assist in shortening transmission times. Emission control will enhance security and surprise. The counter-guerrilla force radio equipment will include the following:

(1) High Frequency (HF).--High frequency radio sets are used extensively; in some instances they may be required by rifle squads. HF sets are commonly used to pass intelligence information and control patrols during denial and harassing operations, and to control and coordinate units participating in reaction and elimination operations. In situations where increased ranges are required, HF radios may be employed rather than very high frequency (VHF) equipment. When op-

erating in areas with heavy vegetation, the effectiveness of vertical antennas is greatly reduced, and the use of half-wave and three-quarter wave horizontal antennas is required. To give satisfactory results, antennas must be set up in cleared areas and/or elevated above the surrounding vegetation. The noise level of HF receivers can be reduced by using CW emission instead of voice transmissions and by using headsets rather than speakers. The use of single sideband (SSB) radios will greatly increase capabilities in the HF range.

(2) Very High Frequency (VHF).--FM radio sets are used to the extent that line of sight transmission conditions exist. These sets are used for short-range ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications. In this connection, aircraft may be used effectively for temporary relay of radio traffic to support a specific short-term action.

(3) Ultra High Frequency (UHF).--UHF radio sets are used for ground-to-air and air-to-air communications. Additional UHF sets may be required to accommodate the increase in air support activity.

b. Wire.--Wire communication is used to the maximum extent possible. Normally, the vulnerability of wire communication to guerrilla force action dictates that wire be used only in secure areas and within combat bases and installations. However, if the area of operations is covered largely by heavy jungle growth, helicopters may be used to lay wire which will rest on top of, or high up in the growth. This technique will make it difficult for the guerrillas to locate or destroy the line.

c. Radio Relay.--Radio relay use is consistent with line of sight

conditions and mobility of the equipment. Radio relay sites are protected against guerrilla force raids and sabotage and should be located, when possible, in secure areas or installations.

d. Messenger.--Messengers are the most secure and reliable means of communication and the best means of transmitting maps, overlays, and long messages. Helicopterborne messengers are most often employed. Messengers who travel by vehicles must be provided security guards or travel with armed convoys. Reliable indigenous persons may be used; they are less conspicuous and usually have a thorough knowledge of the area, including trails. Aircraft can be used to drop and pick up messages.

e. Visual.--The use of arm and hand signals, semaphore, lights, smoke, pyrotechnics, mirrors, and panels find considerable application in counter guerrilla operations, particularly at the small unit level. Panels for ground-to-air signaling and marking, and pyrotechnics for prearranged signals are the most frequently required visual means other than arm and hand signals. In patrolling, ambushing, and other small unit operations where surprise and security are essential, additional arm and hand signals may be devised.

f. Sound.--The use of sound devices such as sirens, whistles, bugles, and weapon-firing may be used to signal the commencement of an attack or ambush, or for warning purposes. The use of less audible techniques such as rifle-tapping or twig-snapping may be used for warning at night, in patrol bases, or during patrolling. Airborne loudspeakers may be particularly effective in controlling the movement of large

units or transmitting messages to isolated units or patrols.

604. SECURITY

a. It must never be assumed that guerrilla forces do not have the capability of performing communication intelligence operations or countermeasures. Normal security precautions must be observed since a guerrilla force must be credited with the capability of tapping wire lines, monitoring radio transmissions, and receiving information from a sponsoring power or a conventional enemy force that can conduct communications intelligence operations.

b. All communication facilities are considered important targets by guerrilla forces and must be protected from sabotage or guerrilla attack.

605. COMMUNICATION COUNTERMEASURES


a. While the guerrilla force usually will not possess sophisticated communication equipment or training comparable to the counter guerrilla force, it will normally depend to some extent on radio communication for contact with a sponsoring power, its underground element, and for control and coordination of its subordinate elements. There are different objectives to consider in countering a guerrilla force's communications. These are:

- (1) Intercept and decode his transmissions.
- (2) Intercept his couriers.
- (3) Jam his radio traffic.
- (4) Deceive and mislead him by false transmissions.

(5) Find and destroy or capture his communication equipment.

b. The countermeasure mission assigned will depend on the desired result or product. If communications intelligence is desired, then subparagraphs (1) and (2), above, are the objectives. If the guerrilla force depends on his communication equipment for information and control in a fast moving tactical situation, and it is desired

to deny him that information and control, then subparagraphs (3) and (4), above, are the objectives. However, it should be kept in mind that communication deception is an exacting technique that requires as much knowledge of the enemy as he has of himself. Probably the final objective will be subparagraph (5), above, and would take place concurrent with the destruction or capture of the guerrilla force itself.



SECTION 7: AIR SUPPORT

701. GENERAL

Marine aircraft and air support tactics and techniques are readily adaptable to operations against guerrillas. Attack aircraft, helicopters, fixed-wing transports, and observation aircraft can contribute to the defeat of a guerrilla force. The employment of aircraft for reconnaissance is greater than normal. Helicopters are particularly important; they provide the means for rapid response to the tactical situation. The use of attack aircraft to support pursuits, raids, reaction operations and elimination operations utilizes both the mobility and the firepower of these aircraft to the maximum and will have a deteriorating effect on the morale of the guerrilla force. Extensive patrolling by small units will place them at distances beyond normal support and for long periods of time. These units will utilize air support for resupply, reconnaissance, evacuation, firepower, and contact with parent unit.

702. HELICOPTER SUPPORT

a. In recent years, the advent of the helicopter is the most significant innovation in the conduct of operations against guerrillas. When applied to these operations, its influence on the principles of war is remarkable. Most favorably affected is the principle of movement, which in turn influences the application of such fundamental principles as offensive, mass, surprise, and economy of force. The use of helicopters greatly reduces the ratio of opposing forces. In this connection, two principles are enhanced; economy of force - which requires the most advantageous distribution of the forces available, and its corollary, mass-- which requires the concentration of combat power at the decisive place at the decisive time. Finally, the helicopter helps provide for the application of the principle of the offensive, which is the basis of tactical doctrine for defeating guerrillas.

b. Although the employment of helicopters may be limited by

such factors as availability, terrain, and weather conditions, the possible advantages offered by helicopters should challenge the imagination of commanders at all echelons. Helicopters may be used--

◆ (1) To conduct aerial reconnaissance and maintain observation over known or suspected guerrilla areas in order to develop more accurate intelligence. The hover capability will facilitate detailed investigation of a specific area, but will increase the vulnerability of the helicopter to ground fire. (See par. 703.)

(2) To keep detected guerrillas, suspected guerrillas, or civilians under constant surveillance during daylight.

(3) To familiarize commanders and key personnel with the terrain and other characteristics of the area. (See par. 703.)

(4) As a means for natives, defectors, and patrol leaders to identify guerrilla camps, routes, etc., that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to describe by map inspection.

(5) To transport reaction forces, weapons, and equipment quickly to an area where the guerrillas can be engaged. This procedure will also assure the commitment of fresh troops. In addition, the transported force can be supplied with heavier weapons and more ammunition than guerrillas can carry.

(6) To keep guerrilla movements under surveillance during a fire fight, move troops from one area of the fire fight to another, and air lift troops not in direct contact to points along routes of escape.

(7) To introduce and extricate patrols and roadblocks in isolated areas.

(8) In an assault support capacity, by using the assault support helicopter (ASH) concept; and suppressive fires by hand-held weapons from transport helicopters.

(9) To resupply, deliver maintenance personnel, or withdraw damaged equipment for rear area repair.

(10) To provide reconnaissance/surveillance escort for armored columns or vehicular convoys. In this connection, they may be used to deliver troops ahead of the column for such tasks as obstacle removal, traffic control, and security in villages along the route. (See par. 703.)

(11) For psychological operations, such as leaflet dissemination and loudspeaker broadcasts. In addition, the frequent appearance of helicopters at many places and over a wide area has certain psychological value, suggesting intensity in the operations against the guerrillas.

(12) To evacuate casualties. This is of prime importance in the case of isolated units and patrols.

(13) To facilitate line-of-sight radio communications by acting as relay, to conduct wire laying missions when feasible, and to perform courier service.

(14) To assist in winning the support of the civilian population by rapidly transporting troops to besieged communities and conducting various mercy missions such as flood evacuation and the delivery of needed food, supplies, and medicine.

(15) To transport civil affairs personnel and indigenous authorities to isolated villages and areas, permitting better control and a wider coverage of influence.

(16) To apply defoliation material on guerrilla crops, camps and assembly areas.

(17) As a means for command control.

(18) As a means of establishing, maintaining, and checking isolated static security posts.

(19) To adjust fires, artillery, mortars and naval gunfire, and to direct and control various air support missions.

(20) In target acquisition and damage assessment.

(21) To conduct photographic missions employing hand-held cameras. (See par. 703.)

► For more details on helicopter employment, refer to FMFM 3-3, Helicopterborne Operations.

c. Employment Considerations

(1) As indicated above, the capabilities of the helicopter are many and varied; however, the availability of helicopters for conducting multiple missions may be limited. In planning helicopter support, potential missions must be carefully weighed to determine priorities. Other transportation means available must be considered. In planning for a particular operation, the nature and extent of helicopter participation should be estimated as early as possible.

(2) The location and development of helicopter bases, and the establishment of adequate maintenance facilities, is a prime consideration in planning.

(3) The requirements for efficient utilization and immediate response must be weighed. The requirement for immediate response is best satisfied by helicopters remaining in a standby alert at tactical unit combat bases; however, in certain situations, a more centralized control of helicopters may provide more efficient utilization.

(4) The helicopter unit and the units to be lifted must give special consideration to the problems of loading and unloading. Pilots must be capable of rapidly computing loads to reflect the changes in atmospheric conditions, wind, and distances to be flown.

(5) The commander of a unit to be lifted and the helicopter unit commander jointly select landing zones. The troop commander is primarily concerned with selecting zones that can support his tactical plan. The helicopter unit commander is concerned with the tactical aspects such as the ability of helicopters to get in and out of the landing zone, the number that can operate in the zone at one time, and whether or not landing sites require improvement.

(6) Operations against guerrillas may be conducted over a wide area and the opportunities to engage the guerrillas may be extremely limited. Accordingly, time and other conditions permitting, potential helicopter landing zones throughout the operational area should be selected and reconnoitered. These potential zones should be classified as to suitability

and given an identification (by a combination of letters and numbers) so that helicopters may be employed with a minimum of delay.

(7) There may be a requirement for the development of helicopter sites in rugged and/or densely overgrown terrain. In this case, teams composed of infantry and engineer personnel equipped with suitable tools and demolitions to clear sites and trained to debark from hovering helicopters are employed. Preparing an area for delivery of an emergency resupply with an externally-carried load requires little more than clearing an area roughly twice the size of the helicopter.

(8) Additional communication equipment and personnel may be needed to assure adequate ground-to-helicopter contact and overall helicopter coordination and control.

(9) Helicopter security presents several problems. Due to the effectiveness of the helicopter, raids on helicopter bases and grounded helicopters, and guerrilla efforts to induce helicopters into ambushes or to mine potential landing zones, can be expected and must be carefully guarded against. Special attention must be paid to security of the landing zones. Pathfinders are used to determine landing zone conditions, the presence or absence of enemy, and to furnish guidance. Another method is the advance landing of a heliteam to scout and secure the landing area and report on existing conditions. The guerrillas' normal lack of anti-air weapons and air support reduces the inflight danger to helicopters. Nevertheless, the security of helicopter approach and retirement lanes against fire is essential; protection means such as the use of

attack aircraft escort must be provided when circumstances warrant.

703. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION

a. Various types of aircraft are used to provide photographic reconnaissance and observation and adjustment of fire in support of the operation. As appropriate, many of the helicopter capabilities listed in subparagraph 702b should be considered in the employment of the Marine Observation Squadron.

b. Aerial photographs provide recorded information that can be assessed objectively and reproduced in quantity. Photographic reconnaissance is conducted to provide map substitutes or supplements and to obtain information on such things as targets, target damage assessment, illegal cultivations, clearings, roads, and trails. Photographic reconnaissance is valuable in confirming intelligence from other sources. Most photographic reconnaissance missions are conducted by high performance aircraft of the Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron. However, the Marine Observation Squadron has a limited capability; aerial observers, using hand-held cameras, are capable of providing pinpoint photography of specific areas or targets.

c. Visual reconnaissance plays an important part in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations. Direct communication between the reconnaissance aircraft and tactical unit headquarters is essential. In conducting visual reconnaissance missions, the following methods are employed:

(1) An area search is a general, continuous search covering

the entire area for intelligence information and the detection of changes. Accordingly, the same observer should be assigned to reconnoiter a specific area. Although guerrillas will seldom be seen, except when surprised or on the run, there will be signs of his existence even in areas possessing good concealment.

(2) A specific search is one conducted to obtain specified information concerning a limited area. It may be used to follow up information gained from agent or informer reports, ground reconnaissance, or photographic or other visual reconnaissance. Possible drop zone and helicopter landing sites are also reconnoitered to determine their suitability.

(3) A route reconnaissance is essentially a specific search. It is conducted for the purpose of determining route conditions, to report on convoy movements, and to provide security escort for convoys. Particular emphasis is placed on locating ambush sites. Helicopters may be assigned for short trips involving convoy escort. OE aircraft are better for longer trips. High performance aircraft may be used for armed reconnaissance of the route.

(4) Contact reconnaissances are conducted to locate and reestablish contact with patrols who have lost communications with tactical headquarters. Long-range patrols may include the preplanned use of contact reconnaissance for prescribed times and locations. These missions may also be used to maintain contact between widely separated units.

(5) Troop commanders and key personnel are flown on aerial

topographic reconnaissances of the area of operations. To ensure maximum benefit, a thorough briefing should be conducted before the flight. Prominent landmarks should be marked on the map that the passenger takes with him. Normally, these flights are limited to 1 hour; the passenger's powers of observation diminish rapidly after that period. Although limited, the 1-hour duration does not apply to trained aerial observers.

704. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

a. General

(1) Close air support may be difficult to provide and of limited value because of the guerrilla capability for dispersion, effective camouflage, moving and fighting at night, and his tactics of clinging to his enemy or of mingling with the populace. Satisfactory results can be achieved, however, when air support can react promptly under the guidance of a forward air controller (FAC) or tactical air controller (airborne) (TAC(A)) to attack observed guerrillas.

(2) Because of extensive patrol action, the traditional bomb line may not be practical and unit commanders may find it necessary to establish troop safety lines for specific operations. Positive identification of targets is difficult in jungle and overgrown country. Extensive briefing for pilots, SOP for air-ground operations, communications, and control require emphasis. As targets are fleeting, instantaneous response is required for decisive action. A minimum reaction time is possible only when adequate communications nets and procedures have been established for request and control of attack aircraft.

(3) In guerrilla warfare, on-call missions will take on added importance. Every effort must be made to shorten time required for planning and executing the close air support mission. Immediate engagement of targets as they appear will allow little time for briefing. Ordnance loads will be predetermined on the basis of experience. Although preplanned close air support provides the most effective utilization of aircraft, ground alert or airborne alert will be the most practicable basis of employment for quick response.

b. Capabilities.--Close air support provides supporting fires that other supporting arms cannot, due to range, defilade, or the limitations of terrain. Aircraft may be the only fire support available to ground units conducting long-range combat operations. The ability of the pilot to observe the target area permits him to see and fire on targets not visible to ground forces. His reconnaissance may often provide valuable information concerning guerrilla movements and location. Close air support can be used to conduct flushing fires on the guerrilla.

c. Control.--In jungle areas or other difficult terrain, forward air controllers may be unable to see the target or the attacking aircraft. Marking friendly positions by use of panels may not be effective in densely overgrown areas; colored balloons on long cords or smoke may be used. A tactical air coordinator (airborne) may be necessary to control the mission. Marine Observation Squadron aircraft can be used effectively as a TAC(A). The radio equipment, endurance, and low speed of the aircraft, and the capa-

bilities provided by trained aerial observers, are particularly valuable as a TAC(A) in operations against guerrillas.

d. Effects.--Choice of weapons presents a close air support problem. Heavy growth affords a degree of protection from blast and fragments. Rocket attack and strafing in jungle areas are relatively ineffective; weapons with high blast effect are more suitable. In open country, strafing is the most accurate and effective weapon to use against personnel. When friendly positions are easily identifiable, strafing runs can be pressed very close to their lines. When authorized, fragmentary bombs with VT fuses, napalm, or chemical and biological agents are effective on concentrations of guerrillas. The advantages of nonlethal biological/chemical weapons are many. Since the guerrilla is not prepared to defend against these agents, large areas can be denied him, and casualties are relatively easy to inflict. The most effective method of dispensing smoke, chemicals, and biological agents is by aerial delivery.

e. Search and Attack.--Air support in operations against guerrillas is difficult to define due to the absence of a bomb line. Missions that are controlled may be called close air support, others are called search and attack or armored reconnaissance missions. Armed reconnaissance is normally run as a specific search mission. All available means of collecting target information are exploited. Harassing attacks in suspected areas of guerrilla activity by armed reconnaissance can be most effective, but care must be taken not to subject civilians to attack.

705. FIXED-WING TRANSPORT SUPPORT

a. Fixed-wing transport aircraft have the capability of operating from relatively short, unimproved fields. This, coupled with their air delivery capability, provides a significant extension to the logistic and operational resources of forces engaged in operations against guerrillas. Utilization of fixed-wing aircraft, however, imposes logistic support requirements that must be considered. Weather and terrain are also limiting factors in fixed-wing air operations. Fixed-wing transport operations may be classified as administrative or tactical air movements.

b. Administrative air movements consist of the movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment. Tactical considerations in loading, movement, and unloading are of minor importance. Aircraft are loaded to most efficiently utilize cargo spaces. Such movements may be divided into--

(1) Scheduled flights, conducted on a predetermined recurring basis.


(2) Unscheduled flights, conducted on an as-required basis.

c. Tactical air movements consist of movement of forces, personnel, and cargo in which loading, movement, and unloading are determined by tactical considerations. Such movements, to accomplish a specific tactical mission, are made into or near enemy controlled territory. Counter guerrilla forces are prepared to conduct--

(1) Air landed operations wherein the tactical units are disembarked after the aircraft has landed.

(2) Air delivery operations wherein supplies and equipment are unloaded from the aircraft in flight.

d. Fixed-wing transport support is utilized for many of the same purposes as are helicopters. Such support is especially useful when missions are beyond the lift and/or range capabilities of the helicopter. (See par. 903.)



SECTION 8: COMBAT SUPPORT

801. GENERAL

Employment of combat support may be limited in guerrilla warfare. Rugged terrain that provides the guerrilla an area for operating forbids unlimited movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles and restricts the employment of supporting weapons. The employment of artillery, naval gunfire, and mechanized units in quantity may not be possible, although every effort is made to provide maximum combat support consistent with realistic requirements. Areas that possess navigable coastal and inland waters will be suited for the employment of naval ships and craft. Support provided by reconnaissance and engineer units can be most effective in rugged terrain. In planning the amount and type of combat support required, a detailed study of the terrain is conducted. Care is taken in planning the combat support to assure that it can be effectively employed. The unnecessary burden that will be imposed on logistics and the additional problem of security associated with noneffective units is to be avoided. Generally, combat support that is helicopter

transportable can provide effective support in guerrilla operations.

802. FIELD ARTILLERY

a. General.--Field artillery properly employed against guerrilla forces is a major asset to the commander. Proper employment of artillery is attained by modifying the conventional principles, techniques, and tactics. The vague enemy situation and difficult terrain require the artillery commander to exploit every means to provide adequate and continuous fire support. Although the principle of massed artillery fires is applicable against guerrilla forces, most firing will be accurate surprise fires on temporary and fleeting guerrilla targets.

(1) Counterguerrilla Operations.--The planning, composition, and employment of artillery units is based on the landing force plan of operation. The artillery plan is based on a careful study of the terrain, road nets, and the enemy situation. Support may be required for numerous patrols, ambushes, roadblocks, and similar guerrilla-type operations.

(2) Conventional Operations.--The planning, organization, and employment of artillery in conventional operations differs from counter guerrilla in that two concurrent operations may be conducted, one against guerrilla forces and the other against conventional forces. Diversion of artillery from the primary mission is a guerrilla tactic and diversion must be avoided. When required, a specific force, including artillery, is assigned to conduct operations against guerrilla forces which significantly threaten conventional operations. This force operates in the same manner as it would for counter guerrilla operations.

b. Organization for Combat.--Artillery must provide adequate fire support, including massing of fires; and the weapons employed should be those that can best support the operation. There is no standard organization for operations conducted against guerrillas. The artillery units are organized to be employed in specific terrain, to combat a certain size guerrilla force, and to support the tactics and techniques to be employed during a particular operation.

(1) Light Artillery Support.--As light artillery can be moved by helicopter, fixed-winged aircraft, landing craft, and on the ground, it can be delivered to areas that are inaccessible to other artillery.

(2) Medium Artillery Support.--Medium artillery, self-propelled and towed, provide increased accuracy and range over light artillery. However, medium artillery requires better roads and stronger bridges.

(3) Heavy Artillery Support.--Although restricted to good roads and strong bridges, its long

range can provide support to deep patrols and widely separated units.

(4) Amphibian Howitzer.--The amphibian howitzer (LVTH) can be employed in areas possessing poor roads, little or no bridging, and in areas too wet or otherwise unsuitable for conventional artillery. Its 360-degree turret traverse also affords rapid support in any direction.

(5) Searchlight Support.--Searchlights can be employed to prevent infiltration, limit night movement of guerrillas, locate friendly patrols, and for patrol orientation. They can also be employed to assist in night close air support.

(6) Target Acquisition Agencies.--If guerrillas employ mortars or artillery, sound, flash, and radar ranging can be utilized. Artillery aerial observers should be of sufficient numbers to provide constant surveillance. Because of the numerous patrols, an increase in the number of forward observers may be required.

(7) Survey Capability.--In addition to normal survey requirements, need exists for a greater number of surveyed control points (SCP) throughout areas to facilitate target location, transfer firing data and computation of corrections to be applied to firing data. Extensive survey operations can also aid in orientation of patrols. To accomplish such extensive survey, augmentation of additional survey teams will normally be required. In engagements of short duration where SCPs have not been established, fire will generally be directed from an observed firing chart. In these instances, artillery units can rapidly establish common direction by simultaneous astronomical observation. Helicopters can provide a

valuable asset to rapid survey of the area of operations to establish a common grid.

(8) Changes, Modifications and Additions.-- The changes, modifications, and additions that are incorporated in the artillery structure are carefully considered. Special training may be necessary if animals, new type equipment, or special procedures are employed.

c. Artillery Staff Planning.-- Staff estimates are prepared for the commander to assist him in making decisions. The decision to provide artillery support in operations against guerrillas will require imagination on the part of the staff in preparing its plan.

(1) Intelligence.-- The target acquisition agencies are exploited to locate targets. Rapid processing of target intelligence is vital in order to deliver fires as expeditiously as possible.

(2) Operations.-- Fire planning and fire direction techniques follow the conventional methods. Fire direction should remain centralized insofar as possible; however, decentralization may often be necessary due to widely dispersed operations and special task assignments. The operation may require decentralization of mutual defensive fires, countermortar fires, harassing and interdiction fires, flushing and barrier fires, and fires to support attacks. Coordination and control of fires require detailed planning. Training of personnel should include training in guerrilla warfare and in techniques required for operating any special equipment.

(3) Logistics.-- If related to the total guerrillas killed, ammunition expenditures by artillery may

appear excessive. The requirement for displacement of artillery may result in greater than normal POL consumption. Position area security may require abnormal amounts of barbed wire, concertina, tripflares, and anti-personnel mines. Other specialized equipment is considered in planning. The movement of supplies, protection of dumps, and distribution of widely dispersed units must be provided for.

d. Fire Support.-- In addition to the normal fire support plans, certain fires peculiar to operations against guerrilla forces must be planned. These plans are innovations or variations of fire plans utilized in conventional artillery support. Among these are:

(1) Countermortar Fires.-- The normal countermortar techniques are utilized in target accumulation, target selection, and target attack. However, in operations against guerrillas, the target will be even more fleeting and temporary than in normal countermortar operations. Accordingly, rapid dissemination of countermortar target information is essential in order that a quick response can be made by supporting arms. Plans are prepared on active locations.

(2) Counter guerrilla Fires.-- The accumulation and collection of counter guerrilla targets are provided by the normal target acquisition agencies and the infantry sources. Fires are planned on guerrilla installations, camp areas, communications routes, and known positions. Many of these targets may be unoccupied during firing of a counter guerrilla program; nevertheless, effective neutralization of installations may be obtained. A counter guerrilla program of fires can be prepared preliminary to

supporting an infantry attack on guerrilla areas. Individual fires may be prepared to force the guerrilla into a particular area.

◆ (3) Defensive Fire Plans.--

Defensive fire plans are devised to protect rear area installations, to prevent infiltration in strength, and as mutual fires in defense of other installations. Defensive fire plans require careful coordination and control when planned concentrations are near friendly military installations and occupied civilian areas.

◆ (4) Harassing Fires.--

Harassing fires are designed to disturb the rest of the guerrilla, to curtail his movement, and by threat of loss, to lower his morale.

◆ (5) Interdiction Fires.--

Interdiction fires are fires placed on an area or point to prevent the enemy from using the area or point.

◆ (6) Reconnaissance by Fire.--

Reconnaissance by fire is a method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause him to disclose his presence by movement or return fire. It is accomplished by firing on suspected target areas to produce a reaction from the guerrilla force. Because the fire may expose guerrilla installations by destroying natural cover and camouflage, aerial photographs are taken before and after the program is fired. Maximum aerial observation is used during the firing to detect and report guerrilla activity.

◆ (7) Flushing Fires.--

These fires are prepared to support infantry operations by "flushing" the guerrilla into an ambush. They are employed in rough and difficult terrain and in vegetation near defined

paths, roads, and streams that are used as routes of communication.

◆ (8) Barrier Fires.--

Barrier fires are planned to support infantry operations by denying guerrillas ingress or egress in the area of operations, preventing escape and denying the guerrilla reinforcements.

◆ (9) Deception Fires.--

These fires are placed away from friendly troops and are designed to deceive the guerrillas and to cover friendly troop movements. Deception fires can be used to distract and mislead the guerrilla force while friendly troops approach from other directions.

◆ (10) Illumination Fires.--

The illumination fire plan is made to assist friendly troops, by exposing guerrilla activity, and deterring infiltration. It can be utilized for orientating lost patrols.

◆ (11) Survey by Fire.--

Location of guerrilla activity can be provided from replot data. Survey by fire using center of impact (CI) and high burst (HB) techniques with HE, WP, and illumination shells will give accurate location of targets, patrols, etc. Patrols that possess the necessary communications can determine their position or those of the enemy from adjusted coordinates provided by the artillery FDC.

◆ (12) Chemical Fires.--

Chemical fires may be utilized effectively against guerrilla forces to screen friendly troop movements, to confuse the enemy, and for casualty effect. White phosphorus (WP) is best suited to marking guerrilla activity for air or infantry attack. WP can also be used as a casualty agent, to burn vegetation, and destroy supplies. Other toxic

and nontoxic chemical shells are ideally suited to counter guerrilla tactical operations against a foe ill-prepared for it.

▶ (13) Biological Fires.-- Missiles and rockets of field artillery can deliver biological fires against personnel, animals, and crops which contribute to the guerrilla effort. These fires are ideally suited to counter guerrilla operations since nonlethal doses can be utilized to retard the activity of the guerrilla in areas that are inhabited by friendly or neutral civilians. These people can be treated or even inoculated against the biological agents used. Food can be issued to replace crops and animals of friendly civilians lost through this action.

e. Employment Considerations.-- The employment of artillery requires movement to complement the infantry scheme of maneuver. Selecting position areas in rough terrain to extend the range and support capability for infantry units operating in widely dispersed areas will require extensive reconnoitering. To prevent wasteful expenditure of ammunition, forward observers and artillery air observers should be provided with a target criteria. This criteria should state what comprises a counter guerrilla target and the normal means and amount of artillery fire to be used. The coordination of fires on rear areas, farms, and built-up areas is based on guidance received from the artillery commander.

(1) RSOP.-- Reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position will follow the normal principles. Security and all-around fire capability are emphasized. A search for easily accessible position areas is made to prevent the requirement

for building extensive roads, clearing areas, and cutting access ways. This also applies in selecting position areas for helicopterborne and airpack artillery. Security measures on the march and while occupying the position are considered. A compact position area is desirable, providing there is little or no threat of enemy counterfires.

(2) Security.-- Security measures against guerrilla infiltration and attack are carefully considered by the artillery commander. In addition to planning the normal local security, employment of direct fire utilizing time-fused shells, ricochet burst with delay-fused shells, and beehive rounds to defend against guerrilla attack are considered. Direct fire sectors can be assigned to each gun section as is done in antimechanized defense. Illumination of approaches into the position are planned. Illumination fires can be included in mutual defensive artillery fires. When not committed elsewhere, the mortar battery of the direct support battalion can provide defensive fires for the battalion installations. Joint installations and command post for artillery and infantry can provide greater protection and simplify the local defense problem. Passive defense techniques are considered. The use of wire, trip-flares, and antipersonnel mines may be extensive. Emphasis is placed on the training, equipping, and employment of the security section. When organic personnel and weapons are inadequate in providing for security, the commander may obtain additional security means from the supported commander.

(3) Movement.-- When providing support for operations conducted over a large area, artillery is frequently moved. Adequate roads

and bridges are necessary for movement on land. Roads and access ways can be improved somewhat by organic means. In some instances, engineer support will be required to construct bridges and roads. Self-propelled artillery is particularly hampered by its size and weight when moving in rugged and undeveloped terrain. When land movement is not possible, helicopterborne or airpack artillery delivered by aerial drop are substituted.

(4) Coordination.--Fire support is carefully planned. Guide lines provided by the commander and the use of the "traffic light" system of areas contained in subparagraph 403b, will facilitate coordination. A criteria is stated by the commander to specify the number of guerrillas and the size and type installations that constitute a legitimate artillery target. The amount of ammunition that may be expended against counter guerrilla targets may be stated, if required. The commanders can control fire discipline and preclude unnecessary expenditures of ammunition.

(5) Observation.--In order to provide the most effective support, it is important that a completely integrated observation plan be instituted to cover each area of operation. The following observation means should be fully integrated.

(a) Observation Posts.--Artillery and infantry observation posts should be established in conjunction with each other and fully coordinated by the intelligence officers.

(b) Aerial Observers.--The intelligence and operations officers coordinate infantry and artillery aerial observers surveillance of the area of operations. In

addition to performing observation and photographic missions these observers relay requests of ground observers with patrols.

(c) Electronic Surveillance.--The ground surveillance and countermortar radars of infantry and artillery should be integrated in the observation plan. Limitations imposed by terrain and vegetation may be overcome by local or isolated area employment. Adequate protection for equipment and operators must be provided.

f. Execution of Artillery Operations.--Weapons such as tanks, anti-tanks, and amphibian howitzers may be included in certain fire support operations. If employed, heavy and medium artillery will normally execute fire missions on distant targets while light artillery may be able to accompany the task forces in many operations.

(1) Artillery Support Considerations.--In providing artillery support all problem areas need to be carefully analyzed. Range and trajectory capabilities, the cross-country mobility of self-propelled artillery, the use of helicopterborne artillery, air delivery and resupply, and the capability of artillery communications are examined. Ammunition requirements must be considered.

(2) Techniques of Support.--Forward observers with patrols, reconnaissance elements and large or small task organizations will increase the number of guerrilla sightings and targets of opportunity. Forward observers operating in dense vegetation or rugged terrain should be capable of adjusting fire by sound. To provide for troop safety, fire for effect on initial data is placed at a greater distance

from troops than in normal operations. Within transfer limits, adjustments on check points or terrain features will assure accurate surprise fire on guerrilla activity and provide for troop safety. Trained aerial observers will be of particular value in adjusting fires, coordinating movements, reporting guerrilla activities, locating friendly elements, and acting as radio relay station for ground elements. Calibrated artillery pieces, the use of survey, registration, and metro corrections will ensure greater accuracy and troop safety.

(3) Native Guides.--Native guides and interpreters may be necessary in batteries and battalions to assist in movement from one position area to another. Their knowledge of the terrain and language can often preclude delay by assisting in the reconnaissance for position areas and routes. They can be invaluable to the observers and commanders for orientation and target information.

(4) Offensive Action.--As offensive operations progress, forces are directed toward isolation, encirclement, and destruction of guerrilla units. The value of artillery increases during this period. Planning of artillery fires, target acquisition, and attack of guerrilla targets may approach conventional warfare. The use of flushing fires to force the guerrilla in a desired direction and barrier fires to seal off the possibility of withdrawal and to deny reinforcements, is applicable. The destruction of guerrilla installations, the constant harassing and interdiction of facilities and routes of communications, will hamper and destroy the morale of guerrilla forces. Artillery is positioned to support the scheme of maneuver against a fixed guerrilla

force, to exploit the maximum number of weapons, and to provide massed fires.

(5) Pursuit.--Artillery is invaluable in the pursuit of escaping guerrilla elements. The demoralizing effect of artillery fires on a defeated guerrilla force should not be overlooked. Helicopterborne artillery is ideally suited to accompany the infantry pursuit of guerrilla remnants.

803. NAVAL GUNFIRE

The demoralizing effect of naval gunfire on guerrillas may justify the use of gunfire support against targets smaller than would normally be considered appropriate or when there is little probability of inflicting material damage. Naval gunfire spotters should be provided for platoon or larger size units operating within range. When assigning spotters to units of less than company size, alternate communications must be provided in instances where normal communication equipment would adversely affect the unit's mobility. Spotting teams must be trained in operational techniques, preferably with the same units with which they will be employed. Maximum use should be made of air spotters.

804. MECHANIZED UNITS

a. Tanks and ONTOS.--The long-range firepower of the tank can be exploited in many areas where its mobility is restricted. Tanks may be employed for mobile roadblocks, mobile CPs, convoy escorts, and for a "show of force" to indicate strength to the civilian population. Convoy protection against ambush can be provided by ONTOS in addition to furnishing fire support in other combat situations.

b. Amphibian Vehicles.--The ability of amphibian vehicles to provide infantry transport, direct and indirect fire support, a command post or fire direction center, and flexible communications with other ground units or air elements will greatly enhance operations. In areas where waterways offer the most readily available avenue of mobility, the LVT is especially valuable. Amphibian vehicle/infantry teams employed in connection with helicopterborne force may have the requisite mobility and firepower to outmaneuver and destroy an elusive enemy.

805. NBC WEAPONS

a. Nuclear Weapons.--Nuclear employment requires a well-defined target. In counter guerrilla operations, seldom will there be a target of sufficient size to justify the use of a nuclear weapon.

b. Chemical and Biological Weapons.--Under certain conditions chemical and biological (CB) weapons may increase the combat power of counter guerrilla forces. Employment of such weapons will require proper authorization, a decision which will have been taken in concert with the friendly government and forces. Our own and friendly forces operating in proximity to CB targets must have protection suitable for the agent selected for attack. It is unlikely that guerrilla forces can obtain CB defensive equipment. Where guerrillas are relatively weak, they will typically be well-concealed and located in remote areas. Lethal C or B agent attacks over large areas by support aircraft during carefully selected weather conditions offer the optimum means for destruction of these forces. Persistent lethal or persistent vesicle chemical agents may deny routes or

areas to guerrillas in isolated regions. When guerrillas are strong, they may be found close to or mingled among a noncombatant population. In this situation nonlethal incapacitating chemical or biological agents are ideal. The period of incapacitation must be long enough so that counter guerrilla forces may move in, disarm and imprison belligerents, and seek out hidden arms. A means of identifying hostile persons is required in this sorting process. See appendix B, paragraph 10, for riot control by chemical agents.

806. RECONNAISSANCE UNITS

a. Reconnaissance units, with their mobility and operational capabilities, provide the commander with valuable means in conducting operations against guerrilla forces. Their most important role is to gather information.

b. The reconnaissance battalion, Marine division, has the mission of conducting reconnaissance in support of the division and/or its subordinate elements. Reconnaissance personnel can be used as helicopterborne forces for deep reconnaissances, for attacking small isolated forces, and for reconnoitering helicopter landing sites and drop zones. In counter guerrilla operations, consideration may be given to employing the battalion or subordinate units as a mobile reserve. In antiguerrilla operations, units may be employed to conduct limited tactical operations against located guerrilla bands, patrol rear areas, reconnoiter isolated areas between tactical units, and provide convoy escort.

▶ c. See FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance, for detailed discussion of missions, organization,

and concept of employment of reconnaissance units.

807. ENGINEERS

a. Included among the engineer tasks which face the tactical unit commander are:

(1) Neutralization of guerrilla mines, booby traps, and obstacles in tactical operations.

(2) Clearing vegetation along potential ambush sites.

(3) Destruction of facilities and/or areas of value only to the guerrilla force.

(4) The construction and/or maintenance of roads to operational areas to ensure rapid employment against guerrilla forces.

(5) Operation of ferries at river crossing sites in areas where guerrillas can readily destroy bridging.

(6) Possible construction of secure settlements for the civil population.

b. Field expedients should receive emphasis. All units should be proficient in simple engineer work such as erection of barbed wire fences, obstacle clearance, and field expedient bridging. To make maximum use of the civilian population, engineer personnel may be used to train and supervise laborers.

c. Mining and mine removal cannot be overemphasized. Training in employment of our own mines, and mines and booby traps employed by the guerrilla, should be

stressed. A favorite tactic of the guerrilla is to employ mines on trails, roads, and in built-up areas. Once he becomes familiar with our selection of helicopter landing sites, these too may be mined. All units should train in mining and mine removal to deny the guerrilla freedom of movement and to assist in defense of all installations.

808. NAVAL SHIPS AND CRAFT

a. Naval ships can be employed to disrupt guerrilla supply channels maintained by local coastal or river craft, provide sea transport for rapid concentration of ground forces, attack guerrilla formations in areas close to the sea, and prevent seaward infiltration or escape of guerrilla forces.

b. If terrain and inland waterways are suitable, small craft can aid the mobility of tactical units. Combat support may be provided through LCVPs, LCMs, and LCUs by mounting mortars, tanks, and artillery for fire support directly from the landing craft, or when infantry is available to provide protection, weapons may be landed to provide support. These and other craft can provide service support such as evacuating casualties, supplying and resupplying, operating ferries and by providing craft with jury-rigged helicopter platforms where this would be the only means for landing.

c. Precautionary steps must be taken against guerrilla countermeasures involving ambushes employing recoilless rifles, "frogmen" with demolitions, or underwater mines.



SECTION 9: LOGISTICS

901. GENERAL

Operations against guerrillas present special logistic problems that require detailed planning. The logistic support system must be flexible enough to provide self-sufficiency for the tactical unit, preplanned resupply, and prepositioned supplies and service installations. Security must be established to protect supplies against raids and ambush even in "safe" areas. Although some type of transportation can usually be provided, units must be prepared to man-carry supplies or utilize pack animals. Individual preventive maintenance on all equipment must be stressed. Medical requirements include mobile units with surgical capability; greater self-sufficiency of medical personnel attached to tactical units, and thorough first aid proficiency on the part of all personnel.

902. SUPPLY

a. Planning.--Forces operating against guerrillas should carry a minimum of supplies in order to

maintain their mobility. Small units should be prepared to live off the land when necessary. The commander must determine the amount and type of supplies needed for the entire operation. After estimating the expected resupply transportation support and the supplies which will be available locally, he must decide both the supplies to be carried with the unit and stock levels to be maintained at the resupply base(s).

b. Types.--Generally, the major supply requirements are for Class I and V. The amount of Class III supplies required will depend on the amount of automotive transportation included in the tactical organization, plus the amount needed to maintain communications facilities. Necessary Class II items should be available at pre-positioned locations on an "as-required" basis. There may be a requirement to provide essential items of Class I and medical supplies to civilians.

c. Procurement.--Replenishment schedules must be planned utilizing prearranged delivery of

supplies to tactical units by air, land or water transportation. While emergency combat rations can suffice for a few days, provisions should be made to deliver standard rations periodically. Smokeless heat tablets should be provided. Class III may be procured locally, but care should be taken to determine its reliability; delivery will generally be possible by 5-gallon containers only. Local procurement should not deprive the civil populace of scarce materials. On the other hand, only the necessary amounts of Class I, medical supplies, and clothing should normally be supplied to civilians. No Class III or V should be turned over to civilians unless specific authority has been granted.

d. Pre-positioned Supplies.--Temporary supply points should be established at static defense or security installations to replenish troops and supplies.

903. TRANSPORTATION

a. General.--The success of operations depends, to a large measure, on transportation support that can be maintained. This applies to tactical displacements, supply and service support, and the evacuation of casualties. Resources of the guerrilla tend to limit him to foot mobility. Forces operating against guerrillas will also frequently rely on foot mobility; wheeled vehicles will often provide such forces a decided advantage. See appendix C for discussion of transportation security.

b. Helicopters.--Helicopter-borne forces arrive fresh and are quickly deployed. Helicopter support during combat is particularly desirable since resupply, reinforcement, and evacuation by other means are often infeasible. The use of helicopters for supply and evacuation

offers a high degree of logistic support flexibility from the highest echelon down to the squad patrol. (See par. 702.)

c. Fixed-Wing Transport.--Fixed-wing aircraft delivery is perhaps the most satisfactory means of resupply for tactical units beyond helicopter range. (See par. 705.) If electronic guidance systems are available, all-weather parachute or free-drops can be used. The chief disadvantages of this method are that the locations and sizes of the drops may give information to the opposing guerrillas as to the location and size of the receiving unit and that some supplies may drift into areas where they will be recovered by the enemy. There is also a damage risk.

d. Landing Craft.--Landing craft can be used to move troops, supplies, and surface vehicles on inland waterways. Armament can be mounted on the landing craft for combat support. Tanks and supply laden vehicles can either be off-loaded or used while waterborne. (See par. 808 and app. C.)

e. Rail.--Existing rail facilities may offer good transportation over part of the supply route but will seldom extend to the forward areas. Since rail shipments are easily sabotaged or ambushed, security considerations may often rule out use of rails even though otherwise feasible. See appendix C for discussion of security measures for rail movement.

f. Land Vehicles.--Rugged terrain usually limits the types of vehicles which can be used in the forward areas. However, LVTs, track-laying prime movers, and mechanical mules may provide cross-country mobility.

g. Other Means.--When no other transportation is available, troops move on foot and supplies are man-packed. Native carriers and/or pack animals can be employed. When pack animals are used, their owners or other native handlers should be hired, if possible.

904. SERVICE

▶ a. General.--It will not be feasible to attach heavy maintenance support units to tactical organizations; therefore, they should be located at the bases or static defense installation closest to the combat areas. For the organization of maintenance support areas see FMFM 4-1, Logistics and Personnel Support. Preventive maintenance should be given a high priority. Contact repair teams may be flown to the tactical locations for unit replacement repairs or unserviceable equipment may be helicopter lifted to the support area. Movement of the tactical unit should not be delayed by lengthy maintenance operations. Inoperative vehicles which cannot be repaired or evacuated should be destroyed or cannibalized.

b. Planning.--Service support planning must consider the complete operation, the organization of the force, and its equipment. Spare parts and replacements must be spotted at locations where they can be easily transported to the tactical areas. When extended operations are planned, it may be advisable to attach repair teams to the tactical units. Only essential combat replacement items should be stocked. Time must be allocated before and after each mission for repairs and replacements.

▶ c. Execution.--Emphasis is placed on replacement of component parts by mobile maintenance teams

helicopter-lifted. Temporary repairs and local civilian repair facilities should be used as much as possible. Requests for service support will be passed over normal command or administrative radio channels to the logistic support area commander.

d. Security.--Maintenance personnel must be trained and equipped to protect themselves and their installations from guerrilla attacks and sabotage. In addition, the commanders of the tactical units concerned must provide for their safety when they are working in their tactical areas.

905. MEDICAL TREATMENT, EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. General.--Medical support must be as flexible as the tactical operation. Flexible, mobile medical support units, with a surgical capability, support tactical operations against guerrillas from the nearest base or static installation. Small unit casualties are evacuated to medical units by the most expeditious means available, usually helicopter. Further evacuation will be in accordance with normal doctrine.

b. Initial Care.--Initial emergency medical treatment is by organic hospital corpsmen. The use of small tactical units in widely dispersed areas requires that each man be trained in basic first aid measures so that he may save his own life or that of another because the unit may be required to hold casualties for extended periods of time before evacuation. First aid training must emphasize practical application of emergency treatment.

▶ c. Evacuation.--Organic medical personnel should be placed with the companies and platoons, especially when units are operating

at considerable distance from the parent unit. Only necessary medical supplies and equipment are carried by medical personnel. Evacuation is accomplished by the most practical means available. Unit commanders must make every effort to evacuate casualties as they occur so as not to reduce tactical mobility. (Helicopters should be considered the primary evacuation means for isolated units or long-range patrols, even when helicopter landing sites do not exist in the vicinity. A long-range, platoon-size patrol with casualties can clear a helicopter landing site in much less time than it would take to evacuate the casualties overland. Engineer personnel with tools and demolitions could debark from hovering helicopters to assist in clearing a site. It is a matter of hours versus days.) Company and platoon medical personnel are required to establish casualty collecting points pending evacuation. Evacuation plans must be carefully coordinated at the lowest levels. Radio nets and procedures for requesting evacuation helicopters are identical to those used in amphibious warfare. Procedures for locating and marking evacuation stations for both day and night evacuation operations must be established

prior to commencement of operations.

d. Treatment of Civilians.-- Use of military medical personnel to assist in treatment of civilians is a powerful psychological weapon to gain support of the local population. Medical personnel should assist, particularly when civilian casualties are the result of guerrilla actions, but without depleting stocks required by troops.

906. SANITATION AND PERSONAL HYGIENE

The importance of hygiene and sanitation must be emphasized. Every effort is made to prevent sick casualties through good sanitation and hygiene practices. Individuals and small units may often be isolated from sanitary food and water supplies. Most local diseases can be controlled and prevented. Depending on the area of operations, head nets, insect repellents, and water purification tablets should be issued. All troops must receive intensive indoctrination in preventive measures prior to being committed to combat if they are to continue as a potent fighting force. Care of the feet is of prime importance.



SECTION 10: CIVIL POPULATION CONSIDERATIONS

1001. GENERAL

Successful operations against guerrillas will depend to a large extent upon the attitude of the civil populace. One of the guerrilla's greatest assets lies in his identification with a popular cause and his ability to conceal himself within the populace. His success depends on civil populace support. Based on the attitude of the civilian populace, the military/civilian relationship will range from severe populace control--where the populace is sympathetic to the guerrilla cause--to limited control and a generous program of civic action, where the populace is sympathetic with the counterguerrilla efforts. Civil affairs and civic action are the major factors in developing favorable public opinion. They are an effective instrument for fostering active civilian opposition to the guerrilla force and active participation in, and support of operations against guerrillas. (See app. B.)

1002. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

a. Objectives--Civil administration conducted by military

forces should accomplish the following:

- (1) Support military operations.
- (2) Fulfill obligations arising from treaties, agreements, or customary law.
- (3) Implement United States policies.
- (4) Provide for smooth and prompt transition back to civil control.

b. Responsibility The commander's responsibilities may vary from complete social and economic control to limited security control in specified combat areas. He may be authorized civil controls in combat zones similar to those exercised in occupied areas, but any such authority will be specified in treaties or other agreements with the local governing bodies.

- (1) In territory dominated by a guerrilla force, the commander

may be assigned responsibility for absolute control subject only to the limits set by International Law and regulations contained in policy directives. See NAVMC 2500, Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government, and FMs of the 41 series.

(2) In areas where the government friendly to the United States has sufficient control, the commander's responsibilities will usually be limited to advice, assistance, and negotiations.

(3) Total responsibility for control over liberated areas is rapidly transferred to the local government. Premature transfer, however, may threaten the stability of the reestablished power. Close liaison and ample support is provided for the reestablished government and its organized forces until it is entirely self-sufficient. Such support may be administered through advisory and liaison groups.

c. Approach.--Commanders must realize that operations against guerrillas will seldom solve the problems of the area in which they occur. The guerrilla force is only a symptom of the overall problem which caused the resistance movement to arise in the first place. Throughout military operations, a positive program of civil assistance must be conducted to eliminate the original cause of the resistance movement. While administration will normally be conducted by the civilian agencies of the National Government in situations short of war, the military force will normally possess many of the technical, managerial, and administrative skills needed and may be called on to provide assistance for portions of the program such as:

(1) Stabilization of social and political institutions.

(2) Development of a balanced economy.

(3) Establishment of acceptable living standards.

(4) Provision of individual and group equality.

(5) Establishment of an acceptable educational program.

1003. POPULACE CONTROL

a. General.--Rigid and strict control and stern administrative measures are imposed on a populace that is collaborating with guerrilla forces. Public attitudes must be judged carefully. Control and restrictions are relaxed on a populace in direct proportion to its efforts to cooperate. The sincere will of the civilians to oppose the guerrilla force should be supported. The basic objective is to physically and ideologically isolate the guerrilla force from the populace.

b. Measures.--Administrative measures and punishment are exercised with care. If the people become so frustrated as the result of control and punishment that they feel their lot might just as well be thrown in with the guerrillas, the purpose of the control measures is defeated. However, rigid enforcement and stern punishment are necessary. Half-heartedness or laxness will breed contempt and defiance. Violators are apprehended and justly punished. The guerrilla force may initiate acts of violence in communities that are cooperating. Unjust or misplaced punishment is vigorously exploited by the guerrillas. Every means is used to publicize the nature of offenses for which

punishment is imposed. The populace must be made to realize that the action is taken to enforce law and order.

c. Methods.--Administrative measures to suppress an unfriendly populace and minimize its ability to collaborate with guerrilla forces may include:

- (1) Employment of road-blocks.
- (2) Search and seizure operations.
- (3) Constant surveillance by block control.
- (4) Apprehension of guerrilla sympathizers.
- (5) Prevention of political meetings and rallies.
- (6) Registration and documentation of all civilians.
- (7) Inspection of individual identification documents, permits, and passes.
- (8) Restrictions on public and private transportation and communication means.
- (9) Controlling all movement.
- (10) Curfew.
- (11) Censorship.
- (12) Control of the production, storage, and distribution of foodstuffs and protection of food-producing areas.
- (13) Controlled possession of arms, ammunition, demolitions, drugs, medicine, and money.

(14) Complete evacuation of areas, if necessary.

1004. CIVIC ACTION

a. General.--Civic action is performed by military forces utilizing military manpower and material resources in cooperation with civil authorities to socially and economically better the civilian community. Opposition to the guerrilla force and local support for counterguerrilla efforts are a by-product of civic action. It should not be regarded as a gift, but as a method through which the civilians may effectively support the government.

b. Public Assistance.--Local civic action may include--

- (1) Construction or rehabilitation of transportation and communication means, schools, hospitals, churches, and utility systems.
- (2) Assistance in agricultural production.
- (3) Provision of emergency food, and supplies, and clothing.

c. Local Employment.--Civic action programs are often designed to employ the maximum number of civilians until a suitable economy is established. The energies of unemployed and perhaps discontented civilians, should be directed into constructive channels supporting the purpose of the friendly campaign.

1005. CIVIL FORCES AND LOCAL INDIVIDUALS

a. General.--To lessen the requirement for military personnel, maximum use is made of local individuals and civil forces sympathetic

to the friendly cause. The use and control of such forces depends on national and local policy agreements and suitable security screening. Civil forces require assistance and support by the military force. Assistance is required in an advisory capacity for organization, training, and the planning of operations. Support is required in supplying arms, ammunition, food, transportation, and communications equipment.

b. Use.--Careful evaluation is made of the civil force's potential use so as to realize their full effectiveness. Their utilization must be based on sound intelligence and planning. The premature organization and exploitation of such forces may invite treachery. Commanders must first establish an efficient counterintelligence organization to screen persons available for use. Guerrillas may be expected to infiltrate agents into any locally organized unit. Even when there is some doubt about their loyalty, individuals may still be used on certain nonsensitive duties to release more troops for military operations. It may also be possible to use them in other areas where they do not have a close relationship with the local populace. Within some areas, sympathetic nationals may be too few to assist in combating the guerrilla force. Within a guerrilla force it is not uncommon to find subordinate elements opposing each other over political or organizational differences. Properly maneuvered, the factions may even be induced to fight each other. A guerrilla movement split by internal strife is far easier to deal with than a completely unified force. The employment of civil

forces and individuals may include the following:

◆ (1) Self-Defense.-- Local individuals of both sexes who have had any kind of military experience or training should be organized into self-defense units. Self-defense units are organized according to villages, counties, and provinces. The units must be capable of repelling terrorists attacks and preventing loss of supplies and equipment. If possible self-defense forces should be sufficiently strong to enable them to hold an attacking guerrilla force until the arrival of mobile military reaction forces.

(2) Police.-- Local and regional police are employed primarily to assist in establishing and maintaining order in urban areas. They are most effective in areas which are densely populated. Other national or military-like units are effective in maintaining order in rural and remote areas.

◆ (3) Allied Force.-- Whenever possible, friendly units native to an area are employed against guerrillas. Their familiarity with the country, people, language, and customs makes them invaluable. The military commander controls friendly units capable of combat operations through a liaison party and logistic support. These units are usually organized, trained, and possess equipment prior to their utilization and are employed in small scale combat operations. Allied forces using weapons, uniforms, ammunition, and other equipment that differs from ours imposes a

complex logistic burden that must be resolved. Those civil forces and local individuals without experience or training may be employed as--

(a) Intelligence agents and informers.

(b) Propaganda agents.

(c) Government and key civil leaders.

(d) Security forces.

(e) Labor and service forces.

(f) Trackers and guides.

(g) Interpreters and translators.



SECTION 11: TROOP INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING

1101. GENERAL

◆ a. A separate and distinct program of training is neither necessary nor desirable to prepare military forces for operations against guerrilla forces. However, there is a necessity that training for operations against guerrilla forces be effectively integrated into all phases of the prescribed training program for all units. Troops must be trained to realize that the prime difference between conventional warfare and operations against a guerrilla force is the nature of the opposing force. A military force, well-trained in counterguerrilla operations, will be capable of minimizing the strengths and exploiting the weakness of a guerrilla force.

◆ b. The success of operations against guerrillas is affected by the attitude of the civilian population in the area. It is important that the local populace be favorably impressed by the standard of conduct of all units. Troops are oriented in their relations with the civil populace, the ideological and social cus-

toms of the country, and in respecting public and private property. Needless destruction of public and private property, and abusive use of police and military power against civilians cannot be tolerated. Claim officers should be available throughout the area of operations for immediate settlement of claims when property is damaged or destroyed. A friendly, courteous, and considerate manner toward the population as a whole by all units in a country will have a direct bearing on military operations. If this positive attitude is achieved, civil agencies and the civilian population will assist in the detection and control of guerrillas.

1102. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

a. Troops should be indoctrinated in the political, social, economic, religious, and racial conditions, customs and conflicts in the country. Furthermore, it must be understood that the basic causes of the situation may stem from a variety of political, social, economic

or religious problems. The application of purely military measures alone may not be sufficient to achieve the purpose of the operation; however, the efficiency of military operations can be greatly increased when troops understand the total problem.

b. The guerrilla resistance encountered may not be confined entirely to those bearing arms, but may also come from elements of the population providing moral and material support to the guerrilla. Such resistance may come from a majority of the population, or it may be confined to a strong minority with vested political, economic, or religious interests that thrive on chaos or political unrest in the country. On the other hand, a situation may arise where the bulk of the population is economically stable. Under these circumstances, a condition of political unrest would adversely affect the popular interest, and the bulk of the population may be expected to support the intervening force, providing it is apparent that the objective of the intervention is the speedy reestablishment of political stability.

c. Normally, the bulk of the population of the country is not in sympathy with those dissident forces which operate to their social and economic disadvantage. However, through ignorance, fear of reprisal, local political conditions, or other factors, the people in an area may be compelled to support such forces. Similarly, ignorance on the part of personnel of the landing force with respect to social customs, religious customs, superstitions, racial and ethnic loyalties, background of an area, and the basis of the local economy may serve to turn popular opinion against the landing force. An understanding of these various social, religious, and economic fac-

tors by all elements of the landing force is essential to accomplishment of the military mission and indeed, the entire military/diplomatic effort.

d. The following considerations, with respect to the character of a local population, must receive continuing attention by the landing force and its various elements.

(1) Social customs, such as class or racial distinctions, dress, etc., must be recognized and accorded due consideration.

(2) Local political alignments and affiliations must be understood and recognized; any appearance of political favoritism by personnel of the landing force must be avoided.

(3) Religious customs must be recognized and respected.

(4) An understanding of the basis of the local economy, and the economic status of the various segments of the local population is vital to an intelligent appreciation of the attitudes of the population toward the operation.

1103. MORALE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

a. Troops must be indoctrinated to appreciate the effectiveness of guerrilla forces and never to underrate them. To regard guerrillas as inferior, opponents may lead to carelessness and may result in serious losses. Conversely, guerrilla capabilities must not be overrated. Analysis of historical events will reveal that a well-trained, well-equipped, well-organized, well-led, aggressive military force is more than a match for any guerrilla force.

b. Troops employed in operations against guerrillas are subjected to morale and psychological pressures different from those found in normal operations. Commanders at all echelons must conduct an indoctrination and training program which will offset these pressures, which result in a large degree from the following:

(1) The difficulty in realizing or observing tangible results in arduous and often unexciting operations. Operating against an elusive, destructive force that seldom offers a clear target, that shows little interest in seizing and holding terrain, that disintegrates before opposition, and then reforms and strikes again, is quite different from operating against the more tangible forces encountered in normal combat.

(2) Severe living and operating conditions in difficult terrain.

(3) The long periods of inactivity which may occur when troops are assigned to static security duty.

(4) A reluctance to take repressive measures against women, children, and old men who may be active and willing supporters of the guerrilla force or who must be resettled or concentrated for security reasons.

(5) Anxieties resulting from reported or observed guerrilla force atrocities and conversely, the impulse to take vindictive retaliatory measures because of such atrocities.

1104. MAJOR TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS

a. All troops subject to participation in counter guerrilla operations must be aware of the characteristics of the individual guerrilla and methods of guerrilla operations.

In addition, all troops must be trained in both active and passive measures which they can employ for their own safety and for effective countering of the guerrilla force. Since there are no front lines or rear areas as such in counter guerrilla operations, combat support and combat service support troops must be alert to the possibility of guerrilla attack on their installations, at times combat service support troops may find themselves, on short notice, taking an active part in tactical operations. Similarly, all troops should be familiar with the control measures imposed upon the populace which may require extensive troop effort throughout an operation.

b. Since an enemy guerrilla force will always strive to attack with maximum surprise, often at unusual times and places, troops must be trained and disciplined to be constantly on the alert. Extensive use of immediate reaction drills during training is required. Furthermore, once contact has been made with a guerrilla force, there is seldom time for the issuance of detailed orders for the conduct of the operation. Success will often result from the immediate coordinated reaction the unit makes in the absence of orders or a detailed reconnaissance.

c. The semi-independent nature of operations against guerrilla forces requires that, insofar as possible, troops be cross trained in the use of communication equipment and all individual and crew-served weapons.

d. The employment of helicopters in unit training should be emphasized. The possible advantages of the helicopter, listed in paragraph 702, should be exploited in training exercise.

e. Marksmanship training should emphasize accurate and quick

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firing. The fleeting nature of most guerrilla contacts and the need for total destruction of all members of a guerrilla force requires that all troops be capable of firing quickly and accurately.

f. Individual and unit training must develop an aggressive and offensive state of mind in each individual, for it is by offensive action only that a guerrilla force will be destroyed.

1105. INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT TRAINING

In addition to the above considerations, normal individual and small unit training should emphasize--

- (1) Physical conditioning.
- (2) Tactics and techniques for combat in urban areas, mountains, deserts, swamps, and jungles.
- (3) Long-range combat patrolling.
- (4) Techniques of raids, ambushes, and ruses, and techniques to counter these operations.
- (5) Night operations.
- (6) Aerial resupply techniques.
- (7) Riot control.
- (8) Police-type patrolling and operations of roadblocks.
- (9) Techniques of search and seizure operations.
- (10) Survival techniques.
- (11) Target identification.

(12) Use of animal transport.

(13) Convoy escort and security.

(14) Use and detection of mines, demolitions, and booby traps.

(15) Counterintelligence and interrogation.

(16) Fieldcraft and improvisation.

(17) Tracking and land navigation.

(18) Advanced first aid and preventive medicine measures.

(19) Silent movement.

(20) Observation.

(21) Boat handling.

(22) River crossing expedients.

(23) Map and compass training.

(24) Carrying casualties without the aid of modern medical equipment.

(25) Navigation without the aid of land marks.

1106. ORIENTATION

a. Prior to entry into an area of operations, troops receive an orientation on the nature of the terrain and weather, unusual health hazards, characteristics of the populace, their relations with the civil populace and the ideological, social, and political situation in the country.

b. Troop orientation should stress that the local populace must be favorably impressed by their standards of conduct and by the efficiency with which they pursue their duties.

1107. TROOP INDOCTRINATION

a. Troops should be thoroughly indoctrinated concerning the situation in areas where their commitment is possible.



SECTION 12: GUERRILLAS IN SUPPORT OF THE LANDING FORCE

1201. GENERAL

a. The development and support of friendly guerrilla forces, as well as the doctrine and plans for their employment, are primarily the responsibility of the U. S. Army.

b. Marine landing forces may conduct operations with support or assistance from guerrilla forces located within or near the objective area. Because of the complex nature and value of guerrilla support, an understanding of their organization, capabilities, and limitations is essential. See FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations.

1202. COORDINATION AND CONTROL

a. In an amphibious operation, the establishing authority will specify in the initiating directive the amphibious task force commander's responsibilities and authority in connection with the guerrilla forces. Operational control of guerrilla forces is initially assigned to

the amphibious task force commander and is subsequently passed on to the landing force commander. Coordination and control of guerrilla forces will rarely be delegated below landing force level.

b. A liaison detachment with detailed knowledge of the guerrilla force will be assigned to the headquarters that is charged with the operational control of the guerrillas. This detachment provides the communications link with the guerrilla forces and makes recommendations concerning their employment.

1203. CAPABILITIES

a. Guerrilla forces may be employed to conduct the following prelanding operations:

(1) Conduct cover and deception operations to deceive the enemy as to the time and/or place of the landing.

(2) Interdict enemy lines of communication to delay or deny the enemy approach to the beachhead

or withdrawal from the beach-head.

(3) Gather information for intelligence purposes.

(4) Provide evasion and escape assistance to downed aviators, reconnaissance units, etc.

(5) Assist in the conduct of psychological operations.

(6) Capture designated indigenous personnel.

(7) Seize key installations to prevent destruction by the enemy.

(8) Conduct operations to isolate selected portions of the objective area.

(9) Seize and hold portions of the landing area to facilitate the landing.

(10) Seize and/or clear and mark landing zones or seize and hold adjacent key terrain.

b. Once the landing has taken place the above tasks may be intensified and the guerrillas may be assigned additional missions to:

(1) Conduct reconnaissance operations for the landing force.

(2) Operate as a regular tactical unit, after being trained and equipped.

(3) Provide for rear area security.

(4) Assist Civil Affairs personnel.

1204. LIMITATIONS

a. The landing force should not formulate plans that are dependent on specific guerrilla successes. Significant guerrilla support limitations are:

(1) Infiltration of guerrilla forces by enemy agents could cause the compromise of landing force plans. Only information essential to guerrilla operations should be provided and counterintelligence must be applied.

(2) Existence of guerrillas in the area of operations may restrict fire support including offensive air support.

(3) Communications between guerrillas and the amphibious task force or landing force may be unreliable.

(4) Lack of training, weapons, or supplies may prevent guerrillas from conducting operations of a significant nature.

(5) Normal dispersion of guerrilla forces reduces their reaction time to orders from higher headquarters.

b. Certain of the limitations described above may be overcome by the introduction of contact teams into the area prior to landing to establish better communications with the amphibious task force or landing force and to exercise more positive control over the guerrilla.

APPENDIX A

SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL

a. Scope.--Operations against guerrillas are characterized by aggressive small unit actions. They are conducted by numerous squads, platoons, and companies operating continually throughout the guerrilla area. This appendix contains the tactics and techniques employed by these units. All small unit leaders and their men should thoroughly understand the contents of this appendix. It includes establishing a patrol base, patrolling, attacking a guerrilla camp, ambushes, counterambush action, and search procedures.

b. Historical Examples.--To show the importance of small unit operations, two historical examples are given: an operation conducted in August 1954 in the Philippines and an operation in 1954-55 in Malaya.

(1) The Alert Platoon.--Counter guerrilla operations were conducted by the Philippine Army during the period 1946-60. Beginning in September 1950, through personal leadership and increased intelligence efforts, concentrated offensives were launched. Once dispersed, the guerrillas were gradually hunted down by small units.

Typical of the small unit response was the action of the alert platoon of the 17th BCT (Battalion Combat Team) in the vicinity of Manila, 16-17 August 1954. About midnight an intelligence agent reported the presence of ten guerrillas bivouacked in a hut, preparing for an attack. Immediately the alert platoon was dispatched in a vehicle to a point about a mile short of the hut. With two civilian guides, the platoon proceeded on foot to the objective. The terrain and a full moon favored their movement. Trails to the hut were easily followed.

About 200 yards from the objective, the platoon leader divided his platoon into two groups and gave instructions. At 0430, 17 August, the first group advanced toward the objective while members of the second group positioned themselves along the guerrilla's avenue of withdrawal on the right flank of the objective. So that members of the assault group could deliver a large volume of fire, they formed into skirmishers about 60 yards from the objective. The guerrilla sentry opened fire, but was immediately knocked down. A fire fight with the guerrillas in the hut continued for about 20 minutes and then they broke contact. Attempting to withdraw, they were shot by members of the second group from their ambush positions. This was only one of hundreds of such actions that took place during this period.

(2) Operation "Nassau."--During the period 1948-1960, the British conducted many difficult operations in Malaya. By 1951, the British forces established well-defined objectives and then began their counter guerrilla operation.

Victory in this counter guerrilla operation is primarily attributed to good intelligence work, effective communications, rapid deployment of troops, and food control measures. Rapid deployment was achieved by deploying small units in battalion controlled operations.

Operation "NASSAU," typical of the battalion-sized operations in Malaya, began in December 1954, and ended in September 1955. The South Swamp of Kuala Langat covers an area of over 100 square miles. It is a dense jungle with trees up to 150 feet tall where visibility is limited to about 30 yards. After several assassinations, a British battalion was assigned to the area. Food control was achieved through a system of rationing, convoys, gate checks, and searches. One company began operations in the swamp about 21 December 1954. On 9 January 1955, full-scale tactical operations began; artillery, mortars, and aircraft began harassing fires in South Swamp. Originally, the plan was to bomb and shell the swamp day and night so that the terrorists would be driven out into ambushes; but the terrorists were well-prepared to stay indefinitely. Food parties came out occasionally, but the civil population was too afraid to report them.

Plans were modified; harassing fires were reduced to nighttime only. Ambushes continued and patrolling inside the swamp was intensified. Operations of this nature continued for 3 months without results. Finally on 21 March, an ambush party, after 45 hours of waiting, succeeded in killing 2 of 8 terrorists. The first two red pins, signifying kills, appeared on the operations map and local morale rose a little.

Another month passed before it was learned that terrorists were making a contact inside the swamp. One platoon established an ambush; one terrorist appeared and was killed. May passed without a contact. In June, a chance meeting by a patrol accounted for one killed and one captured. A few days later, after 4 fruitless days of patrolling, one platoon en route to camp accounted for two more terrorists. The No. 3 terrorist in the area surrendered and reported that food control was so effective that one terrorist had been murdered in a quarrel over food.

On 7 July, two additional companies were assigned to the area; patrolling and harassing fires were intensified. Three terrorists surrendered and one of them led a platoon patrol to the terrorist leader's camp. The patrol attacked the camp, killing four including the leader. Other patrols accounted for four more; by the end of July, 23 terrorists remained in the swamp with no food or communications with the outside world. Restrictions on the civil population were lifted.

This was the nature of operations: 60,000 artillery shells, 30,000 rounds of mortar ammunition, and 2,000 aircraft bombs for 35 terrorists killed or captured. Each terrorist represented 1,500 man-days of patrolling or waiting in ambushes. "NASSAU" was considered a success for the end of the emergency was one step nearer.

2. ESTABLISHING A PATROL BASE

a. General.--To cover the entire area of guerrilla operations, it is usually necessary to establish temporary patrol bases some distance from the parent bases. Temporary patrol bases are established by company or smaller units and occupied for a few days or less.

◆ b. Deception.--A patrol base is secretly occupied. Secrecy is maintained by practicing deception techniques that are carefully planned. Deception plans should include the following considerations:

- (1) If possible, the march to the base is conducted at night.
- (2) The route selected avoids centers of population.
- (3) If necessary, local inhabitants met by the patrol in remote areas are detained.
- (4) Inhabitants of areas that cannot be avoided are deceived by marching in a direction which indicates that the patrol is going to some other area.
- (5) At night, in the desert, or in dense vegetation, navigation and control require special consideration.
- (6) Scouts operate forward of the main body of the patrol.
- (7) Bases are located beyond areas that are patrolled daily.
- (8) If security permits, smokeless fuel is burned.
- (9) The base is not established on an existing trail and normally not more than one trail should be made into the base and it is camouflaged and guarded.
- (10) After a reconnaissance the base is occupied as quickly and quietly as possible. Security is established beyond sight and hearing of the base.
- (11) The route to the base is selected by use of photos, maps, ground and aerial reconnaissance.
- (12) If practical, the patrol leader makes an aerial reconnaissance.
- (13) Terrain features that are easily identified are selected as check-points and rest breaks.
- (14) Daily aerial and ground reconnaissance is continued. If necessary, other cover operations can be conducted.

c. Locating the Base

- (1) The base must be located so that the patrol can carry out its assigned mission.
- (2) It must be secret and secure. A patrol operating from a base unknown to the enemy increases the possibility of guerrilla contact. A secure base permits the troops to rest.
- (3) The base must have facilities or terrain suited for the erection of adequate radio antennas.
- (4) If it is anticipated that an air drop or a helicopter resupply will be required, the base should have a convenient drop zone or landing point. These are generally better if located on high ground. For security reasons, the drop zone or landing point should not be located too close to the base.
- ◆ (5) The base should allow men to sleep in comfort. Dry ground that drains quickly affords the best location.

◆ d. Layout of a Base.--All units should have a SOP for quickly establishing a base. After a SOP has been used during training, laying out a base becomes simple routine. The patrol leader indicates the center of the base and the base direction. The members of the patrol then take up positions in their assigned areas and are checked and corrected as necessary.

e. Sequence of Establishment.--A suggested sequence for establishing a base in jungle or heavy woods is as follows:

(1) Leaving the Road or Trail.--The jungle and heavy woods provide the best security from surprise and the best conditions for defense. Generally the best method to use in leaving the trail or road is--

- (a) Select the point to leave the trail or road.
- (b) Maintain security while the column moves off the trail.
- (c) Have men at the end of the column camouflage the area where the exit was made from the trail.
- (d) Continue movement until a suitable bivouac site is reached.

(2) Occupation of the Bivouac Site

(a) This occupation is based on a platoon of three squads, but the force may be larger or smaller. Using the clock method of designation, the patrol leader sends for his squad leaders and then selects the center of the base.

(b) Upon arrival of the squad leaders, the patrol leader stands in the center of the base, indicates 12 o'clock, and then designates the area to be occupied by each squad.

(c) Each squad moves into its assigned area under the control of its squad leader.

(d) Each squad establishes security posts to the front of its assigned position. The security is normally maintained by one fire team and the remaining two prepare their positions for defense.

(3) Digging-in.--The extent of digging is dependent upon the length of time the position is to be occupied. Shelters are not erected until adequate individual protection is assured. The clearing of fields of fire will be accomplished concurrently. All field works are camouflaged as they are constructed.

(4) Sentries.--Upon completion of their defensive positions, each squad security patrol is replaced by at least one sentry, the exact number depending upon visibility and likelihood of contact. During darkness, the sentries are posted forward of the squad position but closer than posted during daylight. Squads may have to post additional sentries on the trail and on key terrain features.

(5) Water.--A reconnaissance is made for a suitable water point. A spot is selected for drinking and for bathing. Normally, baths at the patrol base are not taken when the patrol is there for 24 hours or less. Individuals should fill canteens for other members of their squad. Security is provided.

(6) Garbage.--Each squad will dig a garbage pit to reduce the fly and rat menace. It will be covered periodically.

(7) Perimeter Path and Marking Trails.--Narrow paths are cleared from platoon headquarters to the center of each squad position and then