

around the inside of the perimeter to facilitate movement. A vine, rope, or wire may be strung waist high along each path as a guide.

f. Base Alert.--The critical periods for defending the base are dawn and dusk. During these periods, the entire patrol remains in an alert status. The base alert serves the following purposes:

(1) Enables each man to see the disposition of his neighbors and the nature of the ground to his front and flanks.

(2) Allows the men to adjust their eyes to the changing light so they will acquire a mental picture of front and flanks.

(3) Provides a definite cut-off period for the change of routine. Beginning with evening alert, all movement and noise cease and lights are extinguished. After the morning alert, the daily routine begins.

(4) Enables the area squad leaders to check details while all men are positioned. This will include a check on maintenance of weapons, equipment, ammunition, etc.

g. Alarm.--The patrol must have a suitable alarm system to signal the approach of either friendly or enemy troops. This alarm system should not sound foreign to the operational area and must be one that can not be easily detected by the enemy. The system must be designed so as to allow sufficient reaction time by the patrol.

h. Administration of a Base

(1) Cooking Fires and Smoking.--The smell of cooking and smoke can carry up to 200 meters in the woods or jungle. These fires are not allowed when the base position is close to the enemy, or when guerrilla patrols are active. If cooking is permitted during daylight hours, smokeless fuel only is used.

(2) Location of Heads.--Heads are located in protected areas.

(3) Disposal of Garbage.--Garbage and trash must be disposed of as it occurs. Before evacuating a base, the patrol leader ensures that all trash and food are buried and camouflaged.

(4) Water Purification.--The patrol leader must ensure that water is sterilized.

(5) Cooking.--When each man carries his own rations, cooking will be done on an individual basis. If 5-in-1 or 10-in-1 type rations are carried, other group cooking arrangements are made.

i. Leaving a Base.--Before leaving the base all signs of occupation are removed. Any shelters are destroyed. The area is left to appear as though it had not been occupied.

3. PATROLLING

a. General.--The only way successful operations against guerrillas can be accomplished is by conducting aggressive small unit patrols. To make contact with guerrillas is difficult, and infantry troops will be occupied primarily with patrol activity. Routine patrolling seldom produces positive results. Because of the terrain, vegetation, and enemy tactics,

d. Planning and Preparation by the Patrol Leader.--The patrol leader listens carefully to the patrol order and after making sure he

modifications to normal techniques may be necessary. Patrols need to be all-purpose, prepared to fight, ambush, pursue, and reconnoiter.

b. Patrol Authority.--The authority to conduct patrols is decentralized as much as practicable. Although overall patrolling policy and certain special patrols may be determined by higher headquarters, the extensive patrol activity and rapid response usually required makes it desirable to assign patrol authority to lower echelons. Battalion, company, or platoon level may be assigned patrol authority. Flexibility is the prime consideration. Specific authority will be determined by such things as terrain, guerrilla activity, coordination problems, and troop availability. The actual control of patrols and the decentralization of authority are improved by the assignment of operational areas of responsibility to a battalion which, in turn, may subdivide its area into company areas. The assignment of operational areas will require considerable coordination to avoid patrol clashes, to permit the pursuit of guerrillas from one area to another, etc. Coordination may be achieved laterally between commands or by their parent command(s). Although patrol authority may be decentralized, patrol activity will be reported to higher headquarters. To prescribe and facilitate control and coordination, SOPs may be devised.

◆ c. Planning and Preparation by the Command.--The echelon which has the authority for conducting patrols has numerous responsibilities in connection with their planning and preparation. Depending on the echelon, responsibilities may include all or most of the following:

(1) Training.--Prepares training programs and exercises relative to patrolling with emphasis on the locale and situation wherein operations are to be conducted.

(2) Selection of Patrol Leaders.--Selection is based upon experience and leadership abilities. Insofar as possible, rotation of patrol leaders is accomplished to avoid excessive use of a selected few.

(3) Formulation and Assignment of Patrol Missions.--Only the commander of the echelon which has the authority for conducting patrols can approve the assignment of patrol missions.

(4) Issuance of the Patrol Order.--Issues the patrol order to the patrol leader. This order provides the instructions, information, and guidance needed by the patrol leader to plan, prepare, and accomplish the mission.

(5) Coordination.--Ensures coordination among the staff, patrol leader, and other units.

(6) Assignment of Control Measures.--Assigns control measures such as time of departure, time of return, checkpoints, general route, and communications.

(7) Arrangements for Support.--Includes such arrangements as may be necessary to provide fire support, logistic support, transportation, and the assignment of personnel with special qualifications needed to accomplish the mission.

(8) Supervision.--Commanders and staff officers actively supervise all phases of patrol planning and preparation, giving patrols the benefit of their own training and experience.

(9) Debriefing.--Debriefs patrol upon return.

(c) Weapons, ammunition, and equipment the patrol will carry.

(d) Who will accompany patrol leader on reconnaissance and

◆ d. Planning and Preparation by the Patrol Leader.--The patrol leader listens carefully to the patrol order, and after making sure he understands all instructions, information, and guidance, uses the patrol planning steps to assist his planning and preparation to ensure accomplishment of the patrol mission. The patrol planning steps are:

(1) Plan Use of Time.--The patrol leader mentally outlines everything that must be done before departing on his mission and allots time for each action. The technique of "backward planning" helps ensure that time is allowed for all necessary actions. The sequence may vary according to such factors as availability of personnel for coordination, times at which a reconnaissance can be made, and extent of coordination by the command echelon.

(2) Study the Situation.--Enemy and friendly troop dispositions, strengths, and capabilities will influence the patrol's route, size, organization, weapons, and equipment.

(3) Make a Map Study.--A thorough map study will assist in the reconnaissance and may influence patrol size, organization, equipment, and route.

(4) Coordinate.--The patrol must coordinate movement in friendly areas, fire support, and transportation. The commander may perform some of the coordination, but the patrol leader should double check to ensure complete understanding.

(5) Select Map, Weapons and Equipment.--Selection of men and weapons will normally be limited to the patrol leader's own unit, and the size is usually prescribed by the command.

(6) Issue a Warning Order.--As soon as possible, the patrol leader issues a warning order to all members of the patrol. See subparagraph e.

(7) Make a Reconnaissance.--While the patrol prepares, the patrol leader makes a visual (aerial, if possible) reconnaissance.

(8) Complete detailed plans.

(9) Issue the Patrol Leader's Order.--See subparagraph f. In a clear, concise, forceful manner, the patrol leader orally issues the detailed plan to the patrol. By the use of visual aids and questions, he seeks to determine if all members of the patrol understand their jobs.

(10) Inspect and Rehearse.--The patrol leader holds an inspection before and after rehearsals to determine the physical and mental state of preparation of the patrol. He holds rehearsals (day and night, if the patrol operates at night) to ensure operational proficiency of the patrol. In rehearsals the patrol members must become thoroughly familiar with the action they are to take during the patrol.

◆ e. Format for Patrol Warning Order.--The patrol warning order consists of the following minimum items of information:

(1) A brief statement of the enemy and friendly situation.

(2) Mission of the patrol.

(3) General instructions:

(a) General and special organization.

(b) Uniform and equipment common to all, to include identification and camouflage measures.

- (c) Weapons, ammunition, and equipment the patrol will carry.
 - (d) Who will accompany patrol leader on reconnaissance and who will supervise patrol members' preparation during patrol leader's absence.
 - (e) Instructions for obtaining rations, water, weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
 - (f) The chain of command.
 - (g) A time schedule for the patrol's guidance. As a minimum, include meal times and the time, place, and uniform for receiving the patrol leader's order.
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▶ f. Format for Patrol Leader's Order

(1) Situation

- (a) Enemy forces.--Weather, terrain, identification, location, activity, and strength.
- (b) Friendly forces.--Mission of next higher unit, location, and planned actions of units on right and left, fire support available for patrol, mission, and route of other patrols.
- (c) Attachments and detachments.

(2) Mission.--What the patrol is going to accomplish.

(3) Execution.--Subparagraph for each subordinate unit.

- (a) Concept of operation.
- (b) Specific duties of elements, teams, and individuals.
- (c) Coordinating instructions

1. Time of departure and return.
2. Formation and order of movement.
3. Route and alternate route of return.
4. Departure and reentry of friendly area(s).
5. Rallying points and actions at rallying points.
6. Actions on enemy contact.
7. Actions at danger areas.
8. Actions at objective.
9. Rehearsals and inspections.
10. Debriefing.

(4) Administration and Logistics

- (a) Rations.
- (b) Arms and ammunition.
- (c) Uniform and equipment (state which members will carry and use them).
- (d) Method of handling wounded and prisoners.

(5) Command and Communications-Electronics

(a) Communications

1. Signals to be used within the patrol.
2. Communications with higher headquarters - radio call signs, primary and alternate frequencies, times to report, and special code to be used.
3. Challenge and password.

(b) Command

1. Chain of command.
2. Location of patrol leader and assistant patrol leader in formation.

g. Administrative Help.--A simple plan, or SOP, must be understood by all patrol members and cover the following items:

- (1) Cleaning of weapons and equipment.
- (2) Turning in of special equipment drawn for the patrol. This may include certain types of Class V items.
- (3) Personal washing and hygiene, to include availability of small items of medical supplies.
- (4) Food and rest.
- (5) Use of exchange facilities, if available.
- (6) Discussion of mistakes among members of the patrol, if not covered at the debriefing.

h. Debriefing

(1) Return to Base.--It is essential that there be a SOP for the reception of patrols upon returning to base. This can have considerable morale value in a campaign in which most patrols will be routine, and contact the exception.

(2) Debriefing.--The use of a debriefing form greatly simplifies the job of the patrol leader in making his report. As the patrols return from the operational area, they are immediately debriefed. The entire patrol may be brought into the building or tent being used. A terrain model or large scale map is used to trace the patrol route and to correlate various bits and pieces of information. A relaxed, calm, informal, unhurried atmosphere must prevail. The debriefing officer fills in the debriefing form, as the debriefing progresses.

(3) Sample Patrol Debriefing Report

Designation of patrol

Date

TO:

MAPS:

A. Size and Composition of Patrol.

B. Task (mission).

C. Time of Departure.

D. Time of Return.

E. Routes Out and Back (show sketch or annotated overlay).

F. Terrain (information on roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas. Location of fords, bridges, and ferries across water barriers. Location of

all small settlements and farms in or near suspected guerrilla areas. Location and trace of streams that can provide a water supply. If an outside agency is supplying the guerrillas; location of areas suitable for drop or landing zones; boat or submarine rendezvous; and roads and trails leading into enemy-held or neutral countries supporting the guerrillas).

G. Enemy (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment).

H. Any Map Corrections.

I. Miscellaneous Information.

J. Results of Encounters with the Enemy (prisoners and disposition, identification, enemy casualties, captured documents and equipment).

K. Condition of Patrol (include disposition of any dead or wounded).

L. Conclusions and Recommendations (including to what extent the task was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics).

Signature, grade/rank and organization/unit of patrol leader

M. Additional Remarks by Interrogator.

Signature, grade/rank and organization/unit/date of debriefing

4. ATTACKING GUERRILLA HOUSES AND CAMPS

a. Attacking Houses.--In planning an attack--

(1) Secrecy is essential. Relatives, sympathizers or intimidated natives can warn the enemy of the patrol's approach.

(2) The location of the house and the nature of the terrain surrounding it are determined by ground or aerial reconnaissance, sketch, photo, or guide.

(3) The patrol normally approaches and occupies its position during darkness.

(4) The patrol is no larger than required to carry out the mission. A large patrol is hard to control, difficult to conceal, and may make too much noise.

(5) The approach is made quietly and cautiously. Barking dogs and other animals often warn the inhabitants.

(6) All available cover is used.

(7) All avenues of escape are covered either physically or by fire.

(8) If the mission is to capture the occupants, and armed resistance is not expected, surround the house and approach it from all sides.

(9) If the mission is to attack the house, and armed resistance is expected, the patrol is located so that every side of the building is covered by fire.

b. Attacking Camps.--Many of the instructions for attacking houses are applicable to attacking camps.

(1) A guide who knows the exact location of the camp is used.

(2) The guide makes a sketch of the camp and its approaches. This can be traced on the ground.

(3) The trail is left as soon as it is convenient, and the camp is approached from an unexpected direction. When in the vicinity of the camp, approach slowly and cautiously.

(4) Normally, the patrol is split into two or more groups. One group attacks the camp while others cover the main avenues of guerrilla withdrawal.

(5) After sighting the camp, the leader makes a careful reconnaissance.

(6) When the patrol is in position and prepared to open fire, the leader orders the enemy to surrender. In the event they refuse, the leader opens fire. All men direct their fire into the guerrilla camp.

c. Destroying Captured Bivouacs.--The value of a camp as a known enemy site is considered before destroying it. Guerrillas occupy camp sites they have previously found satisfactory, particularly if shelters have been constructed.

5. AMBUSHES

a. General.--An ambush is an effective means for attacking patrols, columns, and moving vehicles. They are normally executed in terrain when troops or vehicles are restricted in movement, such as trails, roads, bridges, stream crossings, and similar areas. The terrain should afford concealment to the ambushing unit. Maximum fires are placed on the target. As a rule, an effective ambush lasts only a few minutes. There are two types of ambushes, the deliberate and the immediate.

b. Deliberate Ambush.--A deliberate ambush is one which allows sufficient time for planning, preparation, briefing, and, if necessary, a rehearsal.

(1) Principles.--There are two fundamental principles for positioning troops: all possible approaches should be covered, and the ambush must have depth.

(a) Approaches.--Information may frequently give the destination of the guerrillas but will rarely give the exact route they will take. No matter how good the information, guerrillas have a flair for arriving from an unexpected direction. This factor causes a high failure rate in ambushes. It is essential that all possible approaches be covered.

(b) Depth.--At the first burst of fire, guerrillas scatter rapidly and the chances of getting a second burst from the same position are small. Therefore, withdrawal routes must be covered to provide an opportunity for subsequent fire at the fleeing guerrillas.

(2) Organization of Unit and Occupation of Position.--An ambush consists of a series of small units. The rifle squad facilitates the organization of the ambush group. One or two men are positioned where they can listen and observe, while the others rest in the ambush position. In positioning the men of the squad, the squad leader must--

(a) Consider concealment as his first priority. Movement in the area is kept to a minimum. Each man enters his position from the rear. The squad leader ensures that all traces of movement into the position are removed or concealed.

(b) Ensure that the man detailed to begin firing has a good view of the killing ground. He begins firing when the guerrillas are positioned so that a maximum number can be killed.

(3) Planning

(a) Intelligence.--Information can be obtained from maps, recent patrol reports, police, special intelligence agents, photographs, and ground and aerial reconnaissances. Numerous pieces of information such as sightings of smoke, camps, patrols, food plots, trails, and foot tracks are evaluated prior to selecting the area for the ambush. The commander obtains all the information available on guerrilla tactics and the manner in which the guerrilla will react when ambushed. Details of the enemy might include--

1. Time of movement, strength, organization of the guerrilla patrol, and type of supplies carried.
2. Details of size, routes, habits as to time or location, frequency, and arms.
3. Size of the guerrilla working parties, ration parties and similar detachments.
4. The guerrillas' technique of patrolling.
5. Interval that the guerrilla patrol maintains between men.

(b) Clearance.--The time of departure, route used, location of ambush, time of return, signs and countersigns, and friendly patrols in the area are coordinated and cleared with those forces that need to know.

(c) Time Factor.--The time for departure and establishing the ambush is based upon intelligence about the guerrilla patrol to be ambushed, the necessity for being undetected, and the route which the patrol will use.

(d) Security.--Planning should ensure that every aspect of security is maintained throughout the planning and conduct of the operation. It provides a secure place for briefings and conduct of rehearsals. Secrecy is maintained in the coordination of other operations that are to take place in

the vicinity of the ambush. Daylight aerial reconnaissances to the front, flanks, and over guerrilla trails are planned. The password, signs and countersigns, and codes for the operation are included. A secure route over which the ambush party can move to the ambush site is selected. The plan will normally provide for the patrol to move to the ambush site during darkness. A cover plan is also considered.

(e) Ground.--Terrain which affords the ambush group cover, concealment, and command of the site is selected for the ambush. All possible approaches are considered.

(4) Preparations

(a) The time available for preparation is often limited. Certain items are kept in a state of constant readiness:

1. Weapons are zeroed and tested.
2. Ammunition, magazines, and chargers are kept clean, and the magazines are frequently emptied and refilled.

(b) Preparation on receipt of intelligence includes--

1. Thorough briefing.
2. Rehearsal, when time allows.
3. Final checking of weapons.

(5) Briefing.--All members of the ambush party are fully briefed. Briefing is divided into two parts:

(a) Preliminary briefing at the base camp. This briefing may include a five paragraph order. The ambush commander briefs his command as thoroughly as possible to reduce the time spent on final orders, and as early as possible to allow maximum time for preparation and rehearsal.

(b) Final briefing in the ambush area by the ambush commander. This may be limited but must include:

1. General area of each group including direction of fire.
2. Order to begin firing.
3. Order on completion of ambush.
4. Variations from the rehearsal in regard to individual tasks.

(6) Rehearsal.--Rehearsals will increase chances for success. Rehearsals are not carried out at the ambush site. All possible and likely guerrilla action is simulated, and the ambush groups practice under a variety of circumstances. Final rehearsals for night ambushes are conducted at night. When planned for, night illumination aids are employed.

(7) Positioning

(a) The ambush commander first chooses the killing ground and the general area and directions of fire for each group. He then designates the assembly point and gives the administrative plan.

(b) The ambush party moves to a dispersal point from which groups can move by selected routes to their positions. The ambush commander may be able to position only one group in detail, leaving the remainder to be positioned by group leaders. On reaching the ambush area, the commander will--

1. Make his reconnaissance to choose a killing ground and consider the extent of his position, bearing in mind that guerrillas usually move with large intervals between one another. A killing ground of 60 to 100 meters is desirable. The ambush position should offer concealment.

2. Ensure that the man designated to begin firing has a good view of the killing ground.

(8) Lying in Ambush.--The position of an ambush party is carefully concealed. (Such minor items as the smell of hair tonic and peculiar food odors may alert a guerrilla force.) Each individual should be able to see his sector of responsibility and be prepared to fire from any position once firing begins. Once a group is in position, there must be no sound or movement. This is a real test of training and battle discipline. Men are trained to get into a comfortable position and remain still for long periods. During the wait, each man has his weapon ready for immediate action.

(9) Begin Firing.--The firing begins when all guerrillas possible are in the killing ground. There must be no premature action. All men must clearly understand the orders and methods for opening fire.

(a) Fire can be opened providing the guerrillas are moving toward someone in a better position to kill. A limited ambush can be commenced by the commander.

(b) Should any guerrilla spot the ambush, begin firing.

(c) Once firing begins, targets become difficult to engage; to cope with moving targets, men may have to stand up.

(d) A signal is arranged to stop firing so immediate followup action and search can start as soon as the guerrillas disengage.

(e) When the firing ceases, men previously detailed search the immediate area under cover of ambush weapons and by covering each other. These men will--

1. Check guerrillas in the killing area.

2. Search surrounding area for dead and wounded.

3. Collect arms, ammunition, and equipment.

c. Assembly Point.--An easily identifiable assembly point is selected at which troops collect at the end of an action. Assembly begins following execution of a prearranged signal.

d. Long Term Ambushes.--When ambushes are set for periods of more than 12 hours, administrative arrangements for relief of groups for eating and sleeping are necessary. In long term ambushes, an administrative area is set up. It should be located away from the ambush position. Trails may be cleared, and water should be available.

(1) Consideration is given to reliefs, particularly in the case of the area ambush. Normally the relief will come from the administrative area along the communication lines. Although the whole party in the ambush is relieved, only one firing position is changed at a time. The reliefs take place when no guerrilla movement is expected.

(2) One method is to divide the ambush group into three parties, one in the ambush position, one in reserve, and one at rest. On relief, the party at rest takes over the ambush position; the men in the ambush position go to the reserve; and reserve goes to the rest area. If the party has less than eight men and the duration of the ambush is long, the whole party should be withdrawn to rest during set periods. Such a party would be responsible for its own security while resting. When an ambush party is over eight men but not large enough to carry out the three group method, sufficient men for all around observation man the ambush. The others move away from the ambush position, post sentries, and rest. The party at rest does not smoke and eats pre-cooked rations.

e. Night Ambushes

(1) General.--The techniques applied in the day ambush also apply to the night ambush. In darkness, concealment is easy, but shooting less accurate. More importance falls on good positioning of weapons so killing ground is covered by fire.

(2) Factors.--The following factors apply to night ambushes:

(a) The shotgun may be the primary weapon. (These will have to be requested early.)

(b) Ambush should contain a high proportion of automatic weapons. The M14 with selector is a good weapon for this purpose.

(c) In darkness, all weapons, particularly machine guns firing down trails, may have their left and right limits of fire fixed to eliminate danger to the ambush party.

(d) The ambush party never moves about. Any movement is regarded as guerrilla movement.

(e) Clear orders, explicit fire control instructions, and clear assembly points and signals are essential.

(f) Men and groups are positioned closer together than in day. Control at night is all-important.

(g) It is difficult to take up an ambush position at night; where practical, the position is occupied during last light.

(3) Illumination.--The success of a night ambush may depend on artificial illumination. Only in open country with a bright moon and no chance of clouds is it possible to rely on an unilluminated ambush. Infrared devices such as Sniper Scopes may be used to great advantage. As a general rule, all night ambushes are provided with artificial illumination. Illumination at ground level is placed to prevent the ambush party from receiving glare. There are a variety of night illumination aids available: hand illumination grenades, trip flares, rifle grenades, hand fired illuminants, parachute flares fired by mortars, artillery, naval gun fire, and parachutes dropped from aircraft. One possible method of employing illumination is to commence firing before illumination. Illumination is then fired behind the guerrillas. The personnel who go forward to check guerrillas in the killing area and to collect arms and equipment should have illumination. This illumination is placed directly on the killing zone. Upon completion of the activities in the killing zone, there is normally no further requirement for illumination.

f. Obstacles.--The objective of the ambush is to kill all of the guerrilla force. A useful aid is an ambush obstacle which may consist of a series of anti-personnel mines, Claymore Weapons, sharpened stakes, deep ditches, barbed wire, or any device that will either delay or inflict casualties upon the guerrillas. Possible places for obstacles are--

- (1) On likely guerrilla lines of retreat from an ambush.
- (2) In dead spaces difficult to cover by the weapons of the ambush group.
- (3) In the likely halting place of the main body of guerrillas.

g. Immediate Ambush.--Little time is available for reconnaissance and occupation, and success depends on the techniques used.

(1) The immediate ambush is employed when the point or scout sees or hears a guerrilla group approaching.

(a) The scout decides that an immediate ambush is possible and gives the signal.

(b) On seeing the signal, the leading element immediately takes cover and remains still, even if it does not have a good firing position. The other men or units have time to choose good positions on the same side of the trail or road. The machineguns are carefully positioned.

(c) When the patrol leader estimates that the enemy is caught in the ambush, he opens fire himself. If the ambush is discovered before the patrol leader opens fire, fire will be opened by any member of the ambush party.

(2) There must be a prearranged signal for cease firing. An illumination rifle grenade or similar signal may be adequate.

h. Signals For the Ambush.--The following signals are planned, rehearsed, and understood by all members of the ambush party:

- (1) Enemy approaching.
- (2) Commence firing.
- (3) Cease firing.
- (4) Check the killing zone.
- (5) Withdrawal from the killing zone.
- (6) Withdrawal from the ambush position.
- (7) Abandon the position.

i. Checklist.--The following are items that may cause failures in ambushes against guerrillas:

- (1) Disclosure by cocking weapons and moving safety catches or change levers.
- (2) Disclosure by foot prints.
- (3) Lack of fire control.
- (4) Leaders badly positioned.
- (5) Lack of all around security.

(6) Misfires and stoppages through failing to clean, inspect, and test weapons and magazines.

(7) Lack of a clearly defined procedure for opening fire.

(8) Firing prematurely.

6. COUNTERAMBUSH ACTION

a. General

(1) Planning.--In planning for defense against ambush, initially consider the available forces. The small unit leader responsible for moving a unit independently through areas where ambush is likely plans for the following:

- (a) The formation to be used.
- (b) March security.
- (c) Communication and control.
- (d) Special equipment.
- (e) Action if ambushed.
- (f) The reorganization.

(2) Formation.--A dismounted unit employs a formation that provides for all around security while en route. March interval is based on the type of terrain, limits of visibility, size of the patrol, and to a certain extent on the means of control available. The interval between individuals and units at night is closer than the interval used during daylight. The interval is also great enough to allow each succeeding element to deploy when contact with the enemy is made. However, the distances are not so great as to prevent each element from rapidly assisting the element in front of it. The patrol leader is located well forward in the formation but not so far as to restrict his moving throughout the formation as the situation demands. Units are placed in the formation so they may distribute their firepower evenly throughout the formation. If troops are to be motorized, tactical unit integrity is maintained.

(3) March Security.--Regardless of whether the unit is on foot or motorized, security to the front, rear, and flanks is necessary. A security element is placed well forward of the main body with adequate radio or pyrotechnical communications. The security element is strong enough to sustain itself until followup units can be deployed to assist in reducing the ambush. However, if the enemy is not detected, it may allow the security element to pass unmolested in order to attack the main body. If this occurs, the security element attacks the ambush position from the flanks or rear in conjunction with the main action. Flank security elements are placed out on terrain features adjacent to the route of march. They move forward either by alternate or successive bounds, if the terrain permits. This is often difficult because of ruggedness of the terrain and the lack of transportation or communications. The next best thing is moving adjacent to the column along routes paralleling the direction of march. Rear security is handled similarly to frontal security, and plans are made for the rear guard to assist in reducing the ambush either by envelopment or by furnishing supporting fire. Aircraft above the column flying reconnaissance

and surveillance missions increase security. When ambushed, fighter and attack aircraft can provide support. Communication between these elements is a must.

(4) Communication and Control.--Consistent with security, all available means of communication are used to assist in maintaining control of the small unit. March objectives and phase lines may be used to assist the commander in controlling his unit. Communication with security elements is mandatory. Detailed prior planning, briefing, and rehearsals for all units will assist in control. Alternate plans are made to prevent confusion and chaos. If ambushed, higher headquarters is notified as soon as possible to alert other units in the vicinity.

(5) Special Equipment.--It is often necessary to provide the unit with additional items of equipment and weapons, such as engineer tools, mine detectors, and demolition equipment. Ample communication equipment is always necessary, including panel sets or smoke grenades for identifying the ambush to aircraft.

(6) Action if Ambushed.--If the unit is ambushed, the most important counteraction is for all available personnel to return fire as rapidly as possible. Troops riding in trucks remain alert at all times and are trained to disembark immediately and to return fire. When trucks are required to halt, drivers halt their trucks on the road. They do not pull off onto the shoulders because they may be mined. Trucks used as lead vehicles are reinforced with sandbags to reduce the effect of mines.

(7) Method of Attack.--If the strength of the unit is adequate, envelopment is usually the most desirable method of attack. A holding element and an attacking element are designated in all plans. Each element is briefed thoroughly on its actions and alternate plans necessary to meet different situations. For example, a plan calling for the advance guard to be the holding force would not succeed if the enemy allowed this force to pass unmolested. If the strength of the ambushed unit prevents their attacking by envelopment, the plan should be to break out of the immediate area rapidly to minimize casualties. If a unit is surprised by the enemy, it tries to overcome him by returning all available fire immediately. This also allows the ambushed unit to deploy and maneuver.

(8) Alert Force.--An alert force, prepared to move by foot or helicopter, is on constant alert for employment by higher headquarters in the event a patrol is ambushed or for employment for other purposes. The alert force studies the plans of all patrols. By studying the routes, checkpoints, and designated helicopter landing sites and through means of communications, it can rapidly reinforce an ambushed unit. If ambushed, the patrol leader may request reinforcements. He designates his position by reference to checkpoints, designated helicopter landing sites, terrain features, smoke, panels, etc. If possible, he sends a guide to the place designated to guide the reinforcements into position. A system for rapid employment of alert forces, ensuring defeat for the guerrilla ambushes, makes the ambush less likely to be employed by the guerrilla.

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(9) Reorganization.--The reorganization after an ambush involves the use of assembly points and plans for security. Care is taken to minimize the possibility of the enemy pressing the attack during this period. All personnel (including wounded), equipment, and supplies are assembled. If reorganization cannot be accomplished because of guerrilla action, it is accomplished after reinforcements arrive.

b. Dismounted Units

(1) General.--Immediate action (IA) drills are taught and thoroughly practiced. The underlying principles of each drill must be simplicity, aggressiveness, and speed.

(2) Immediate Action Drills.--The IA drills used, when a unit is caught in ambush are of two kinds:

(a) Where only the foremost elements of a patrol are caught in the ambush, an immediate encircling attack is carried out by the remainder of the patrol.

(b) Where the entire patrol is ambushed in open ground, an immediate assault is launched.

(3) Encircling Attack.--The encircling attack is the correct reaction to a guerrilla ambush and is based on the normal principles of fire and maneuver taught in small unit tactics.

(a) Formations are designed so that only part of a patrol should be caught in the ambush. If these formations are practiced and the distances correctly observed, the whole patrol should not be pinned down by the opening burst of fire.

(b) As the unit advances, the patrol leader always has the terrain situation in mind. He takes control of the battle by signalling or shouting "Envelop Right (or Left)." This should be all that is necessary to initiate action. The troops will have practiced the drill and will know their positions in the attack.

(c) The leading element lays down a base of fire to cover the maneuvering element. If the leading element has smoke grenades, these are used to screen the elements caught in the killing zone.

(4) Immediate Assault.--If the guerrilla ambush extends on a wide frontage and occupies a considerable portion along the trail or road, then a different tactic is called for. A small patrol, even with correct spacing, can be caught within the ambush. Sufficient room for maneuver is often limited, requiring an immediate assault mounted directly at the guerrilla. It is seldom possible or desirable to try and take up firing positions and exchange fire with the guerrillas as long as the patrol is in the killing zone. The patrol moves as quickly as possible to a position outside the killing zone and then assaults the guerrilla position.

c. Mounted Units

(1) General.--The guerrilla will ambush on ground that he has carefully chosen and organized from which he can kill by firing at point

blank range. The principle behind the IA drill is that it is incorrect to stop vehicles in the area which the guerrilla has chosen as a killing zone-unless forced to do so. The proper action is to drive on when fired upon, to stop only when through the ambush area or before running into it, and to counter-attack immediately from flank and rear.

(2) Immediate Action Technique.--When vehicles are fired upon--

- (a) Drivers drive out of the danger zone.
- (b) Vehicle guards return fire immediately.
- (c) When vehicles are clear of the danger zone, they stop to allow unloading and offensive action.
- (d) Subsequent vehicles approaching the danger zone will halt short of the area and their occupants take offensive action.
- (e) When vehicles are forced to halt in the danger zone, troops quickly unload under the covering fire of the guards whose use smoke if possible, and will make for cover from which to join the attack against the guerrilla force.

(3) Counterattack

(a) Guerrillas are always sensitive to threats to their rear or flanks. Offensive action to produce such threats can be carried out by those troops who are clear of the danger zone. If there are no such troops, then a frontal attack under cover of smoke is made.

(b) In action when no troops have entered the danger zone, the convoy commander will launch an immediate flanking attack on the guerrilla position, using supporting fire from such weapons as machineguns and mortars.

(c) In action when some troops are ahead of the danger zone and others are halted short of it, confusion may arise as to which group should initiate the attack. The group which has not yet entered the ambush should make this attack.

(d) The best way in which an armored vehicle can assist in counterambush action is by moving into the danger zone to engage the guerrillas at very short range. In this way it can give good covering fire to our flanking attack and afford protection to any of our own troops who are caught in the guerrilla killing ground.

(e) It is possible that the convoy commander may be killed or wounded by the guerrilla's initial burst of fire. It is essential that vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organizing a counter-attack. This is clearly stated in unit convoy orders and stressed at the briefing.

(f) The techniques outlined above are practiced repeatedly in varying situations until the natural reaction to a guerrilla ambush is the application of an IA drill.

(4) Vehicle Unloading Drill

(a) General.--In an ambush, the guerrilla first tries to stop one or more vehicles in his killing ground by the use of mines or obstacles and/or by firing at the tires and driver. He then tries to kill the troops in

the vehicle. It is essential that the troops unload instantly when a vehicle is brought to a halt in a danger zone.

(b) Vehicle Loading.--To ensure ease of unloading, all packs and cargo are piled in the center of the vehicle and/or excessive quantity of cargo is not loaded.

(c) Drill.--When the vehicle is forced to stop--

1. The vehicle commander shouts "Unload Right (or Left)" to indicate the direction in which troops will assemble.

2. Vehicle guards throw smoke grenades and open fire immediately on the guerrilla positions.

3. Troops unload over both sides and the rear of the vehicle and run in the direction indicated.

4. As soon as the troops are clear of the vehicle, guards follow to join in the attack.

5. Once the troops are clear of the vehicles, vigorous counteraction is taken. Wounded troops are cared for following counteraction.

(d) Training.--This drill must be practiced frequently by vehicle loads; e.g., infantry squads and platoons. Where miscellaneous vehicle loads are made up before a movement, two or three practices are held before the convoy moves out.

7. SEARCH PROCEDURES

a. General.--Misuse of police or military authority can adversely affect the ultimate outcome of operations against guerrillas. Seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other material during searches must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded to be of future legal value. Seizure of guerrilla supplies alone is not as damaging to a guerrilla movement as the apprehension of the suppliers and agents along with the supplies or material. Proper use of police powers will gain respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or inconsiderate police methods may temporarily suppress the guerrilla movement but at the same time it may increase the civilian population's sympathy and/or support to the guerrillas.

b. Authority.--Authority for search operations must be carefully reviewed. Marines must be aware that they will perform searches and seizures in places and areas within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful in the exercise of their police authority) for purposes of apprehending a suspect or securing evidence that tends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually there will be special laws regulating the search and seizure powers of the military forces. These laws must be given wide dissemination.

c. Searching a Suspect

(1) General.--The fact that anyone can be a guerrilla or a guerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all training. It is during the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatest caution is required to prevent surprise and dangerous acts. During a search, one Marine must always

cover one making the search. However, the searcher must be tactful to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect who may be antiguerrilla.

(2) The Frisk Search.--This method is a quick search of an individual for dangerous weapons, evidence, or contraband. It is preferably conducted in the presence of an assistant and a witness. In conducting the frisk, the searcher has the suspect stand with his back to him. The searcher's assistant takes a position from which he can cover the suspect with his weapon. The suspect is required to raise his arms. The searcher then slides his hands over the individual's entire body crushing the clothing to locate any concealed objects.

(3) The Wall Search.--Based on the principle of rendering the suspect harmless by placing him in a strained, awkward position, the wall search affords the searcher a degree of safety. It is particularly useful when two Marines must search several suspects. Any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, or a tree, may be utilized. The wall search is conducted as follows:

(a) Position of Suspect.--The suspect is required to face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with his upraised hands placed far apart and fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart, turned out, and as parallel to and as far away from the wall as possible. His head is kept down.

(b) Position of Searcher's Assistant.--The searcher's assistant stands on the opposite side of the suspect from the searcher and to the rear. He covers the suspect with his weapon. When the searcher moves from his original position to the opposite side of the suspect, the assistant also changes positions. The searcher walks around his assistant during this change to avoid coming between his assistant and the suspect.

(c) Position of Searcher.--The searcher approaches the suspect from the side. The searcher's weapon must not be in such a position that the suspect can grab it. He places his right foot in front of the suspect's right foot and makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. From this position, if the suspect offers resistance, the suspect's right foot can be pushed back from under him. When searching from the left side of the suspect, the searcher places his left foot in front of the suspect's left foot and again maintains ankle-to-ankle contact.

(d) Searching Technique.--In taking his initial position, the searcher should be alert to prevent the suspect from suddenly attempting to disarm or injure him. The searcher first searches the suspect's head-gear. The searcher then checks the suspect's hands, arms, right side of the body, and right leg, in sequence. He crushes the suspect's clothing between his fingers; he does not merely pat it. He pays close attention to armpits, back, waist, legs, and tops of boots or shoes. Any item found that is not considered a weapon or evidence is replaced in the suspect's pocket. If the suspect resists or attempts escape and has to be thrown prior to completing the search, the search is started over from the beginning.

(4) Search of More Than One Suspect.--When two or more suspects are to be searched, they must assume a position against the same wall but

far enough apart so that they can not reach one another. The searcher's assistant takes his position a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon ready. The search is begun with the suspect on the right of the line. Search each suspect. On completing the search of one suspect, he is moved to the left of the line and resumes the position against the wall. Thus, in approaching and searching the next suspect, the searcher is not between his assistant and a suspect.

(5) Strip Search.--This type search is usually considered necessary when the individual is suspected of being a guerrilla leader or important messenger. The search is preferably conducted in an enclosed space, such as a room or tent. Depending on the nature of the suspect, the searching technique can be varied. One method is to use two unarmed searchers while a third Marine, who is armed, stands guard outside. His clothing, including his shoes, is removed and searched carefully. A search is then made of his person, including his mouth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, crotch, and other areas of possible concealment.

(6) Searching Women.--Marines must be reminded that the resistance movement will make maximum use of women for all types of tasks where search may be a threat.

d. Searching of Vehicles

(1) General.--It will be necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to catch wanted persons and to prevent smuggling of contraband items. This requires the use of roadblocks. Since roadblocks cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it is important that the civil population understand that they are entirely a preventive and not a punitive measure.

(a) Types.--Broadly speaking, there are two types of roadblocks, deliberate and hasty.

1. Deliberate.--This type of roadblock is positioned in a town or in the open country, often on a main road. It will act as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement. This type of roadblock may not achieve spectacular results.

2. Hasty.--This type of roadblock is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country, and the actual location is often related to some item of intelligence. The hasty roadblock is designed to achieve a quick success.

(b) Location.--Concealment of a roadblock is desirable, but often impossible. The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or reverse a vehicle without being noticed. Culverts, bridges, or deep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that drivers do not see the roadblock in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweigh the advantages in such positions. A scarcity of good roads will increase the effect of a well placed roadblock.

(c) Troop Dispositions.--A roadblock must have adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise. An element of the roadblock should be positioned and concealed an appropriate distance (one hundred to several hundred meters) from the approach side of the roadblock to prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn around and flee upon sighting the block. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. If the roadblock is manned for any length of time, part of the troops are allowed to rest. The rest area is located near the search area so that the troops can be turned out quickly.

(d) Special Equipment Required.--For the roadblock to achieve maximum results, special equipment is required. Portable signs in the native language and English, should be available. Signs denoting the vehicle search area, vehicle parking area, male and female search area, and dismount point, speed movement. Adequate lighting is needed for the search area if the roadblock is to function efficiently at night. Communication is required between the various troop units. Barbed wire obstacles across the road and around the search area should be provided. Troops must have adequate fire power to withstand an attack or to repulse a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the roadblock.

(2) Method.--The roadblock is best established by placing two parallel lines of concertina barbed wire (each with a gap) across the road. The distance between these two parallel obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that will have to be held in the search area. The enclosure formed can then be used as the search area. If possible, there should be a place in the search area where large vehicles can be examined without delaying the flow of other traffic which can be dealt with quickly. Accommodations are required for searching women suspects and holding persons for further interrogation. If possible, the personnel manning a military roadblock should include a member of the civil police, an interpreter and a trained woman searcher. An officer or NCO must always be on duty or close to the search area. When searching a vehicle, all occupants are made to get out and stand clear of the vehicle. The owner or driver should be made to watch the search of his vehicle. The searcher is always covered by another Marine. When searching, politeness and consideration are shown at all times. In searching vehicles, depending on the type and cargo, a careful search of likely hiding places may require a probe. The occupants of the vehicle can be searched simultaneously if sufficient searchers are available.

e. Searching a Village or Built-Up Area

(1) General.--The basic philosophy of a search of a village or built-up area is to conduct it with a measure of controlled inconvenience to the population. They should be inconvenienced to the point where they will discourage guerrillas and their sympathizers from remaining in their locale, but not to such an extent that they will be driven to collaborate with them as a result of the search. The large-scale search of a village or built-up area is normally a combined police and military operation. It is preplanned in detail and rehearsed. Secrecy is maintained in order to achieve surprise. Physical reconnaissance of the area is avoided and the information needed about the ground obtained from aerial photographs. Both vertical

and oblique photos are studied carefully. In the case of large cities, the local police may have a detailed map showing relative size and location of buildings. For success, the search plan is simple and is executed swiftly. Methods and techniques can be varied.

(2) Organization of Troops.--As villages and built-up areas vary, a force is task organized for each search. An organization consisting of troops, police, etc., is designed to accomplish the following:

- (a) To surround the area to prevent escape.
- (b) To establish roadblocks.
- (c) To prevent an attack or interference by forces outside the area.
- (d) To search houses and individuals as necessary and to identify a suspect.
- (e) To escort wanted persons to the place designated.

(3) Command and Control.--Normally, a search involving a battalion or more is best controlled by the military commander with the police in support. For a smaller search, it is often best for the police to be in control with the military in support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual search is best performed by native police, when feasible.

(4) Method

(a) Approach.--An area is approached and surrounded before the inhabitants realize what is happening. Sometimes it is best to drive into the area; on other occasions it is best to disembark at a distance. The decision depends on the available approaches, exits, and the local situation.

(b) Surrounding the Area.--During darkness, troops should approach by as many different routes and as silently as possible. When close to their positions, they should double-time. After daylight, the area can be covered by a chain of observation posts with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, it is impossible to completely surround an area for any length of time due to the large number of troops required. If necessary, troops dig in, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wire to help maintain their line.

(c) Reserves.--If there is a chance that hostile elements from the outside could interfere, reserves are employed to prevent them from joining the inhabitants of an area under search. An air observer can assist by detecting and giving early warning of any large scale movement outside the isolated area.

(d) Search Parties.--The officer in command of the operation makes known that the area is to be searched, a house curfew is in force, and all inhabitants are to remain indoors or gather at a central point for searching.

1. Each search party should consist of at least one native policeman, protective escort, and a woman searcher.

2. When searching a building that has people in it, first action required is to get everyone into one room. The police may give the necessary orders and do the actual searching. The object of this search is to screen for suspected persons.

3. Buildings are best searched from bottom to top. Mine detectors are used to search for arms and ammunition. Every effort is made to avoid unnecessary damage.

4. After a house is searched, it is marked. Persons awaiting search are not allowed to move into a searched building.

5. In the case of a vacant house or in cases of resistance, it may be necessary to force entry. After searching a house containing property but whose occupants are away, it can be nailed up and a sentry placed outside to prevent looting. Before troops depart, arrangements are made in the community to protect empty houses until the occupants return.

6. When it is decided to search inhabitants in one central area, the head of the house remains so that he can be present when the house itself is searched. If this is not done, the head of the house is in a position to deny knowledge of anything incriminating that is found.

7. A problem in searching is the accusation of theft and looting which can be made against troops. In small searches it may be possible to obtain a signed certificate from the head of the household that nothing has been stolen, but in a large search this may be impractical. In order to avoid accusations of theft, it may be necessary to search in the presence of witnesses.

(e) Escorts.--Wanted persons are evacuated as soon as possible. Troops normally undertake this task, therefore escort parties and transportation must be planned in advance.

APPENDIX B
CIVIL POPULACE CONTROL MEASURES

1. Establishment of Restricted Areas

Military and critical civil installations (police facilities, communications centers, utilities activities, supply agencies, etc.) may be designated as restricted areas to prevent guerrilla interference and limit civilian access. These installations should be fenced off; gate guards are established and warning signs conspicuously posted. Whenever possible, vegetation or obstructions are cleared at least 100 meters on both sides of the fence. Fenced areas are patrolled. Persons attempting to cross the fence or flee the cleared area are apprehended or shot. Persons entering or leaving the area are subject to search. Percentage of persons searched in detail depends on the amount of traffic, degree of security required, and degree of support the civil population in the area is suspected of rendering the guerrilla.

2. Curfews

a. Curfews are one of the simplest and most effective means of isolating the civilian from guerrilla contact and preventing civil interference with military operations.

b. Exceptions to curfew restrictions may be granted to--

- (1) The clergy.
- (2) Doctors and midwives.
- (3) The civil police.
- (4) Public officials and employees specified by civil affairs officers.
- (5) Firefighting personnel.
- (6) Emergency repair crews of water, gas and power concerns.
- (7) Private employees, providing essential services.
- (8) Individual meritorious requests when approved by civil affairs officers.

c. In all cases except in subparagraph (8), above, the power to grant exemptions may be delegated to the local police. All exemptions should be numbered serially, and the reason for the exemption, conditions of exemption, and the name of the issuing officer clearly stated. Any individual granted exemption should be deprived of it in the event of misuse.

d. Commanders should see that curfew regulations are rigidly enforced, preferably by civil police. This can be determined by checks on all persons on streets after curfew hours and by spot-checks of residences to determine that residents are at home.

- e. The following is an example of a curfew notice:

NOTICE

CURFEW

Until further notice no person within _____ will be permitted to move on the streets or outside his own house between the hours of _____ and _____ without a permit from _____.

Any person found in the streets without a permit between those hours will be severely punished.

All persons are warned that military guards/civil police are instructed to shoot any person seen outside his house after hours who is attempting to hide or escape.

Exceptions to this order include _____

Signature

Name

_____, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

3. Relocation of Villages and Settlements

a. The military commander may evacuate or relocate civilians from guerrilla areas. This will assist in isolating the guerrilla by depriving him of local support as well as freeing innocent civilians from terrorism through better protection. Areas cleared of civilians provide better areas for tactical operations. Resettlement towns and villages may be fenced off; occupants of individual houses near the resettlement village may be required to move into the enclosure. Military, civil police, or civil defense units provide surveillance against guerrilla intrusion. Measures similar to those taken for restricted areas (par. 1) may be employed.

b. The Law of Land Warfare prohibits deportation of civilians from their country. However, total or partial evacuation of a given area may be undertaken for the security of the population or imperative military reasons. To the greatest practicable extent, persons evacuated must be accorded proper accommodations, satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety, and nutrition. Members of the same families should not be separated.

c. In situations where the Law of Land Warfare does not apply, treaty agreements regarding the rights of civilians must be respected.

d. Relocation/Evacuation planning should include consideration of the following:

- (1) Transportation.--Civilian transportation is used whenever possible.
- (2) Distance.--The distance of the move should be as short as possible, consistent with the requirement for adequate security of the new location.
- (3) Control.--Movement should be made by rigidly controlled convoy.
- (4) Screening.--Security screening and documentation should be accomplished as soon as possible.
- (5) Identification.--Evacuees may be provided with and required to wear a tag identifying him by name, location from which evacuated, and destination.
- (6) Briefing.--Adequate briefing to explain the purpose of the move is accomplished by leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means prior to beginning the movement.
- (7) Personal Effects.--Each person is allowed to take a predetermined allowance of personal effects.
- (8) Rations.--If available, food for the estimated period of the movement is provided at the time of departure to each person evacuated, or it may be issued at designated points en route.
- (9) Housing.--Housing in the relocation area should be such that it will not endanger the health of evacuees, nor unnecessarily increase the suffering caused by evacuation.
- (10) Medical Care.--Available civilian medical personnel are used when required, supplemented by military medical personnel. Particular attention is given to elderly persons, pregnant women, the blind, crippled, and very young children. Appropriate measures must be taken to prevent the spread of infectious diseases and to prevent epidemics.
- (11) Religious Needs.--The religious needs of evacuees are satisfied at the relocation area.

4. Control of Weapons

a. Prior to issuance of any order or decree disarming the civil population, it is necessary to analyze all features of the undertaking. Plans should include--

- (1) Measures necessary to strengthen existing civil laws in existence.
- (2) Forces necessary to enforce the order or decree.
- (3) Form and method of promulgation of the order or decree.
- (4) Designation and preparation of storage areas for arms, ammunition and explosives.
- (5) Disposition of munitions collected.
- (6) Method of accountability for such munitions, including the preparation of necessary receipts, tags, and permits to be used.
- (7) Designation of types and classes of munitions to be turned in.
- (8) Exceptions to the order or decree. These persons will be issued a special permit.

(9) Agencies (civil and/or military) who will collect, guard and transport the material.

(10) Instructions governing the manufacture and importing of munitions.

(11) Time limit for compliance and penalties assigned thereafter.

b. The problem of retaining knives, machetes and certain agricultural tools can be a source of difficulty and misunderstanding. The working machete or knife is practically the only implement found on farms or forests in many areas of the world; it is used for clearing land as well as harvesting crops. Civilians cannot be deprived of general utility tools. The disarming order (or supplementary instructions) should describe these weapons sufficiently to properly guide subordinates executing the order.

5. Food and Restricted Article Denial.--In cooperation with civil agencies, close supervision of the harvesting, distribution, and sale of food and other articles required by guerrillas can effectively reduce civilian support. The development of a food and restricted article denial plan will include the following considerations:

a. Foodstuffs must be defined and include all types of prepared or unprepared food, grain, oil, sugar, and canned goods which may conceivably be used for human or animal consumption.

b. Restricted articles are defined and usually include paper, ink, medical supplies, flashlights, clothing, and cloth.

c. Restrictions involving the sale, movement, or possession of foodstuffs and restricted articles are carefully drawn up and thoroughly publicized.

d. The procedures regarding search of houses, stores, individuals and vehicles are clearly defined.

6. Search of Individuals, Vehicles and Houses.--Searches are preferably conducted by civil police or self-defense forces. Military searches may be required when these forces are unavailable, unwilling, or inefficient.

7. Rewards, Bribes, and Inducements.--In addition to possible rewards for information leading to the killing or capture of guerrillas, bribes and inducements may be given to civilians who inform military or civil authorities of illegal actions taken by other civilians; i.e. curfew violations, possession of weapons, restricted articles, or illegal food. Rewards may take the form of local currency, additional food and clothing, or supplies in critical demand. Persons who inform should not receive additional confidence or privileges that may violate security. Inducements should be scaled to provide greater value in proportion to the value of the information received.

8. Formation of Self-Defense Units.--In addition to providing a degree of security from guerrilla attack, self-defense units, made up of the civil

population, can be used to assist in the enforcement of civil populace control measures. The military capability of these organizations will vary; however, they provide the military commander with an additional means of economy of force. Care must be exercised in arming self-defense units for they may be a relatively easy prey for local guerrillas. In some cases, weapons may be secured under military custody when not actually in use by the individual or unit.

9. Establishment of Clandestine Intelligence Nets.--Clandestine nets can be used as a means to report civil violations of control measures as well as information about the guerrilla force. This covert method should supplement the overt acts of inspection and enforcement by military and civil authorities.

10. Riot Control

a. Plans should include provisions for coping with civil disturbances. Whenever possible, local civil police or civil defense units should be employed to quell riots, strikes or disturbances. Military action is used as a last resort. See FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances and Disasters, for details regarding the techniques to be employed.

b. Chemical riot control munitions are very effective in dispersing riots and violent demonstrations. They are quite safe as far as permanent injury is concerned. There is much less restriction in their use than in the use of other chemical weapons. Enemy propaganda reaction must be expected, but there will be a propaganda reaction regardless of the means used to thwart the objectives of the rioters. All friendly forces including indigenous civil police will require gas masks. Expedient protection available to the rioters, such as transparent plastic film over the eyes and wet cloths covering the nose are effective.

11. Restrictions on Communications and Transportation

a. Communications.--In cooperation with civil police, telephones and telegraphs may be limited from general civilian use to avoid passing messages important to the guerrilla force. Radio transmitters may be included among the restricted articles. Censorship of mail may be imposed. Search parties should be alert for written messages. Printed matter such as books and newspapers may be coded to carry messages.

b. Transportation

(1) Gate checkpoints should be established to control traffic entering restricted areas and may be required in specified villages and settlements. The following principles should be followed:

(a) The officer or NCO in charge should be responsible for movement through the gate and should not take part in actual search.

(b) Hurdles or barricades are required to canalize movement.

(c) Strict crowd control must be exercised so that searchers are not crowded by persons waiting to move through the gate.

(d) Adequate lighting must be provided.

(e) When only a percentage of persons are being searched, no prior indication of selection should be given and search patterns should be avoided.

(f) A careful watch should be made for suspicious actions; e.g., attempts to evade search, uneasiness, etc.

(g) Younger men and women will usually be the primary carriers of illegal goods.

(2) Roadblocks and checkpoints may be established on a temporary, surprise basis or may be semipermanent in nature. Armored vehicles are especially valuable to provide mobile checkpoints. Local security against guerrilla attack must be provided. Roadblocks and checkpoints may produce relatively few tangible results; however, their value in restricting and hampering guerrilla resupply and in impressing the neutral population with a "show of force" cannot be underestimated.

12. Prevention of Illegal Political Meetings.--The political parties which support the resistance movement are outlawed; however, parties may take on new names or profess other interests in order to meet for coordination of efforts. All meetings and assemblies must be carefully observed, preferably by civil police. The military commander should be kept informed of all scheduled assemblies and meetings in order that he can be better prepared to control them if necessary. Religious services in church premises may be exempt from all restrictions. Permission may be granted to hold public entertainment, sports meetings, and other similar events having no connection with political activities, such permission should be granted only after consultation with counterintelligence personnel and investigation of the persons requesting such permission and the organization they represent to make certain that it is not a cover for prohibited activities.

13. Registration of All Civilians

a. Civil affairs units are charged with the responsibility of the screening of civilian officials, employees of the military, and/or quasi-military organizations of allied forces, by means of processing questionnaires. These units coordinate their activities with counterintelligence agencies. Responsibilities include the establishment of an office of record, and establishment of an archives center of documents pertaining to the people in the area of operations.

b. The purpose of this activity is to seek out and control all elements which are hostile to the allied operations. It also assists in counterintelligence with its responsibility for the investigation of, and the taking of proper action against, subversive individuals actively opposing the legal authority or engaged in activities prejudicial to the political objectives of the operation.

c. In the early phases of operations, the activities of this type are limited to the screening of only such important public officials as is essential to the maintenance of order and the security of persons and property.

d. The discharge of this responsibility may be achieved by the establishment of an agency with two subordinate elements as follows:

(1) The Records and Statistics Unit performs the following duties:

(a) Receives questionnaires from all sources, assigns serial numbers to them, and prepares the accompanying forms.

(b) Indexes, records, and files questionnaires and related documentary information.

(c) Prepares statistical information and reports for higher authority.

(d) Checks payrolls and personnel records to ensure that no local employee has escaped registration and screening.

(2) The Operations Unit performs the following duties:

(a) Evaluates the questionnaires and extracts pertinent information from them.

(b) Searches and evaluates civil service records, police records, and records impounded by counterintelligence.

(c) Receives and evaluates oral and written denunciations of civilians in government or civil affairs service.

(d) Conducts special investigations as required.

APPENDIX C

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

1. General.--In areas where guerrillas are known or suspected, the security of all forms of transportation is a serious problem. Good security is not simply a matter of the number of personnel involved. It is training, movement procedures, and a general awareness of the seriousness of the problem. This appendix describes certain procedures that may be used to improve the security of road, rail, and inland water movements. For counterambush techniques, see appendix A.

2. Military Classification of Roads.--The highway system may be identified according to the various categories of alert. One system, using a color code, is as follows:

a. Green Roads.--Those which lie within the city limits of major towns and such other roads designated by the responsible headquarters. Subject to restrictions, which local commanders may impose, military personnel are permitted to travel on these roads in any type of vehicle.

b. Yellow Roads.--Those where there is a very limited risk of guerrilla ambush. The following conditions apply:

(1) All personnel transported in military or civilian police vehicles will be armed.

(2) Each military vehicle will carry at least one other armed man besides the driver.

(3) Military personnel may travel alone in civilian cars but must be armed when traveling.

c. Red Roads.--Those roads which are considered to be in the combat area and subject to ambush or interference. The conditions governing movement are--

(1) All personnel will be armed and each military vehicle will have at least one other armed man besides the driver.

(2) Travel at night will be restricted to that of operational necessity.

(3) Movement of single military vehicles is not permitted and, if possible, armored vehicles should be included in convoys. Red roads may be further divided into subcategories and special precautions for certain sections of road may be stated.

3. Special Movement Measures

a. Green Roads.--There are no special measures concerning the movement of military convoys.

b. Yellow Roads

(1) An armored vehicle as escort is not considered essential.

(2) Convoys of up to ten vehicles will move at normal interval and in blocks of not more than five or six vehicles.

(3) Convoys of more than ten vehicles should be approved by the commander of the operational area concerned. All convoys of more than ten vehicles will also move in blocks of not more than five or six vehicles.

c. Red Roads

(1) Troop convoys of tactical units will provide their own protection and use will be made of armored vehicles, if available.

(2) Groups of administrative vehicles, such as a supply convoy, will be escorted by armored vehicles whenever possible. The scale of escort for such convoys should be about one armored vehicle to every five vehicles.

(3) Interval between vehicles will normally be 150 meters depending on the type of terrain; on red roads it is important that vehicles move sufficiently close to each other to render mutual assistance in case of emergency, but not so close that an ambush is likely to catch several vehicles.

(4) Convoys should always be escorted by troops.

(5) Whenever possible, helicopter or other observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance and to assist in controlling the convoy.

4. Convoy SOPs.--SOPs should be established to cover--

- a. Approval authority for convoy movements.
- b. The appointment and duties of convoy and vehicle commanders.
- c. The organization of the convoy.
- d. The weapons and ammunition to be carried.
- e. The preparation of the vehicles. (Detailed instructions regarding tarpaulins, tail gates and windshields.)
- f. Immediate action drills.
- g. Security measures.

5. Security.--Maximum precautions are taken to prevent the guerrillas gaining advance information of vehicle movement. It should be remembered that--

- a. The telephone system is seldom secure.
- b. Radio messages in the clear can be picked up easily.
- c. The loyalty of civilian employees cannot be guaranteed.

d. Information concerning the timing, route, and composition of a convoy should be furnished on a need-to-know basis. Drivers and escorts should be alerted to their jobs as late as feasible.

e. Plans should be made for alternate routes and deception measures.

6. Convoy Commander.--The convoy commander, detailed for every convoy, will position himself where he can best control the convoy. He issues the necessary orders to initiate the march and ensures that instructions contained in standing operating procedures and in march orders are followed.

7. Briefing.--All personnel traveling in the convoy will be thoroughly briefed to include--

a. Details of timing, route, speed, order of march, maintenance of contact, and action to be taken if contact is broken.

b. The distribution of men to vehicles.

c. The distribution of weapons.

d. The appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and vehicle guards.

e. The action to be taken in the event of guerrilla attack.

8. Preparation and Loading of Personnel in Vehicles.--Men traveling in a vehicle must have all-around visibility. They should be able to fire their weapons without hindrance and be able to disembark quickly. The following points should be noted:

a. Vehicles should have tarpaulins, bows, and wooden side boards removed. The tail gate should either be removed or placed in the horizontal position. The front glass windshield should be left up. "Chicken wire" should be placed over the door windows of larger trucks and sides of personnel vehicles to prevent the throwing of grenades into the cabs of trucks. Equipment on vehicles that will slow up disembarkation of troops, and that is not essential to the vehicle's safe operation, is removed.

b. Vehicles in convoys must not be overloaded with personnel. If the vehicles are fully loaded, men will be unable to use their weapons effectively.

9. Vehicle Commanders.--A commander is designated for each vehicle. His duties will be to ensure alertness and to assist in maintaining convoy formation by controlling the driver. The primary mission of the vehicle commander is to command the troops in his vehicle should the convoy be ambushed. He is located in the back of the vehicle with the troops.

10. Vehicle Guards.--In troop carrying vehicles, four men should be posted as guards. These men are posted two at the front and two at the

rear, and each is assigned an area of observation covering the 90° from the center of the road to the side in each direction. These guards should be armed with automatic weapons and smoke and fragmentation grenades. (A phosphorus smoke grenade can be particularly useful as an anti-ambush weapon.) When ambushed, guards cover the troops disembarking. They can also assist in the traffic control of the convoy by informing the vehicle commander if the vehicle following halts or drops back.

11. Use of Armored Vehicles.--When a convoy of few vehicles is escorted on red roads, the armored vehicle should be centrally placed in the convoy. An armored vehicle at the front or rear of a convoy may be prevented from moving into the ambush area by halted vehicles. The armored vehicle can be a mobile CP for the convoy commander. When large convoys move on main roads, vehicles should be divided into blocks of about five or six and, when sufficient armor is available, one should be placed with each block. For vehicle convoys, the inclusion of an armored vehicle has two important effects on ambush action:

- a. Provide covering fire for the counterattack.
- b. Provide protection to anyone caught in the ambush by driving into the danger area and engaging the enemy at point blank range.

12. Precautionary Tactics.--Troops may disembark to clear any likely ambush areas before the convoy moves through. Such tactics are unlikely to surprise guerrillas in position; they will move as soon as they see the troops. This examination of likely ambush positions will make the guerrillas less confident of their ability to execute an ambush without danger to themselves.

13. Convoy Communications.--Unit SOPs may designate the means and use of communications for convoys. The march order specifies the communication security that may be required. Communications with other forces is desirable. Methods of intracolumn communication include--

- a. Visual Signals.--Visual signals are most commonly used for column control. These may be hand-and-arm, flashlight, or flag signals. Visual signaling is easily understood, rapid in transmission, and covers all the basic column maneuvers such as starting, stopping, changing speed, and changing direction. Helicopters or other aircraft covering the column can employ smoke grenades or other such means for emergency signals. Each color is coded for a specific message such as ambush ahead, bridge out, guerrillas sighted, or road impassible. A similar system is employed for signaling from the column to aircraft.

- b. Radio Communication.--When communication security permits, radio is the principal means of communication during a march. Its use is generally specified in orders, unit SOPs, and communications operation instructions.

- c. Audio Signals.--Whistles, horns, or bugles are used to attract attention, to warn personnel of further transmission of commands, and to

spread alarms. Voice commands and verbal messages are used when the situation permits.

d. Other Methods.--A road message may be written on a board and posted along the route or displayed by an individual who stands at a vantage point where it can be plainly seen by all drivers. A message may be posted at the head of the column and picked up after the last vehicle of the column passes. Written messages, orders, and overlays are usually delivered during scheduled halts. Messages may be delivered by helicopter by selecting and designating helicopter landing sites along the route.

14. Guarding Officials

a. When moving by road, the protection of indigenous authorities or other high ranking officials may require the assignment of a troop escort. In such cases the following should be considered:

- (1) The strength of the escort required will depend on the circumstances; a platoon will be adequate in most instances.
- (2) There should be an armored vehicle available in which the official may travel if deemed necessary.
- (3) Throughout the move, the vehicle carrying the official must be closely supported by a second vehicle carrying at least one automatic weapon and "bodyguard" troops. If possible, this vehicle should be armored.
- (4) The vehicle carrying the official should not bear any special distinguishing marks.
- (5) In the event of an attack, it is the duty of the "bodyguard" troops to protect the official and to get his vehicle out of the danger area as quickly as possible.

b. Before starting the move, the escort commander should brief the official on the action he wishes him to take in the event of attack. Regardless of the seniority of the official, the escort commander is in complete command of the move.

15. Protection of Railroads and Trains

a. Operation of Railroads.--Railroads in the area may be operated in one of three ways: entirely by the civil population; by the military and civilians combined; or by the military alone. No matter how the railroads are operated, liaison and protective measures must be established.

b. Train Guards

(1) Train guards may be military police or other troops assigned to the duty. Economy of personnel will result if a unit is attached to a particular railroad organization for the specific purpose of providing security for railroad operations.

(2) The guard force on a cargo train should be concentrated in one or two positions and when possible, should have radio communication with units in the area that can provide support in the event of ambush.

c. Security Measures.--Security measures which may be taken for rail movements are listed below:

- (1) Trains should run on irregular schedules.
- (2) Security elements should precede and follow individual trains.
- (3) Flatcars loaded with sand can be pushed in front of each train to guard against derailment by mines or cuts in the track.
- (4) Automatic weapons may be mounted on cars.
- (5) A right-of-way may be cleared on each side and the cleared area declared a restricted zone where shoot-on-sight conditions may apply. If clearance of the entire right-of-way is impractical, vegetation surrounding critical locations such as defiles, tunnels, and bridges, is cleared.
- (6) Air reconnaissance may be conducted over the right-of-way.

d. Security of Tunnels, Bridges, and Stations.--Critical installations such as tunnels, bridges, and stations are guarded.

e. Troops Embarked on Trains.--Troops embarked in regular passenger cars should disembark through all exits and windows. Because disembarking rapidly from a passenger car is difficult, the technique employed is planned and rehearsed. If practical, troops are transported by flatcars so guerrilla ambushes can be quickly engaged by fire from the cars and disembarkation can be done quickly.

16. Protection of Waterways.--Critical points along rivers and waterways should be guarded. Points offering favorable ambush sites are cleared of vegetation near the banks. Other security measures include--

- a. Irregular schedules for movement.
- b. Mounting automatic weapons on all craft.
- c. Providing security on each craft moving independently and on each group of craft moving in convoys.
- d. Providing adequate communication means for each craft.
- e. Establishing waterway patrols in fast, heavily armed craft.
- f. Patrolling the waterway by air.

◆ GLOSSARY

civic action. See military civic action.

clandestine operation. Activities to accomplish intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

cold war. A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives.

counterespionage. A category of counterintelligence, the objective which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage.

counterguerrilla warfare. Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas.

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

counterintelligence. That aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.

countersabotage. Action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating, and manipulating, neutralizing, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

countersubversion. That part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversive activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

covert operations. Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

economic action. The planned use of economic measures designed to influence the policies or actions of another state; e.g., to impair the war-making potential of a hostile power, or to generate economic stability within a friendly power.

economic warfare. Aggressive use of economic means to achieve national objectives.

evasion and escape. See unconventional warfare.

guerrilla. A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. See also unconventional warfare.

guerrilla warfare (GW). Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. See also unconventional warfare.

insurgency. A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

irregular forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces.

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

paramilitary operations. An operation undertaken by a paramilitary force.

political warfare. Aggressive use of political means to achieve national objectives.

propaganda. Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

black. Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

grey. Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source.

white. Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.

psychological activities. Those activities conducted in peacetime, or in areas outside active military theaters of war, which are planned and conducted to influence the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of foreign groups in ways favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

psychological operations. This term includes psychological warfare, and, in addition, encompasses those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

psychological warfare. The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

psychological warfare consolidation. Psychological warfare directed toward populations in friendly rear areas or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with the objective of facilitating military operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil populace.

psychological warfare objective. A military, political, economic, or other objective, the attainment of which is to be achieved or facilitated by the employment of psychological warfare.

psychological warfare task. A particular project whose accomplishment will contribute to the achievement of the psychological warfare objective.

psychological warfare theme. A subject or topic used as a means of accomplishing a psychological warfare task.

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime. See also unconventional warfare.

subversive political action. A planned series of activities designed to accomplish political objectives by influencing, dominating, or displacing individuals or groups who are so placed to affect the decisions and actions of another government.

unconventional warfare. Includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

evasion and escape (E&E). The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control

guerrilla warfare (GW). Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime.

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