VCI CASE STUDY TT-1

Subject: Viet Cong (VC) District People's Revolutionary Committee (PRC)
Phu Vang District, Thua Thien Province

1. The following information has been extracted from a CAS source document. This information, collected during August 1968, provides an insight into a typical infrastructure operation at the District level.

2. The Viet Cong (VC) Phu Vang District People's Revolutionary Committee (PRC) has nine subordinate sections and is responsible for the district's Local Force Unit and village PRC's. (See Tab A). Its chief functions are to execute all orders of the Current Affairs Section of the Special Zonal Party Committee and of the Special Zonal PRC, to command all subordinate organizations in the district, and to report the results of its operations and the general situation to the Current Affairs Section of the Special Zonal Party Committee.

3. The VC Phu Vang District PRC's primary duties are: to set up armed groups to consolidate other organizations at hamlet and village level; to set up armed groups to guard the PRC area and to defend "liberated" areas; to motivate the people into increasing production, developing husbandry, economizing in order to be able to pay taxes and participating in transportation; and to force the people to persuade their dependents or relatives who work for the GVN or who are in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to return to the VC and thus avoid more bloodshed, shorten the war, and "save" the country. The district PRC's secondary duties include motivating and agitating the people to struggle politically against the GVN in a legal manner, thus creating problems for the GVN. Armed groups are to build up the infrastructure, enlarge "secure" areas, fight against all enemy operations, and defend the "liberated" areas.

4. The Economy Section commands all hamlet and village economy sections, collects taxes from the people in the form of money and rice, caches all rice collected from the hamlets and villages, distributes rice among various district organizations, and transports items to the Economy Section of the Special Zonal Party Committee.

5. The Security Section executes all orders from the Special Zonal Party Committee's Security Section, reports all activities and local security situations in Phu Vang District, and commands village security sections. The section investigates and classifies the people of the district, makes recommendations for arrest, assassination or reformation, issues pass cards, and controls the movement of people in the district. It is expected to know all other forces in nearby areas.
6. The Health Section commands all village health sections, distributes medical supplies, and treats all skin diseases and minor infections of both the people and the VC.

7. The Farmer's Association commands all farmer's associations in the villages, prepares plans for land distribution, and motivates the farmers into increasing production and raising domestic animals. It also confiscates the lands of people who have moved to GVN areas or work for the GVN, and redistributes these lands to the remaining people.

8. The Women's Section participates in propaganda activities, urges the people to pay troop-support taxes, and takes care of wounded soldiers.

9. The Local Force Unit commands all armed groups, guards and defends VC areas, maintains security in "liberated" areas, digs trenches, and sets up mine fields. It also motivates the people into participating in medical evacuation and the transportation of weapons and ammunition.

10. The Phu Yang District PRC leaders, such as chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, section chiefs, and armed unit commanders, receive a monthly salary of VN$830 (US$6.95 at the official exchange rate of VN$118 to US$1.00). Members of village and hamlet organizations receive no salary. The PRC has no fixed schedule of daily work hours and PRC members work as many hours as the situation requires. An administrative rule prevents anyone from taking leave.

TAB A - Line and Block diagram
ANNEX D (RESULTS OF INTERROGATION OF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE 111ST NVA REGIMENT) TO III MACPHERSON II-69.

1. On 25 February 1969, at the height of the NVA/VC post-Têt offensive, L/3/7 captured an enemy PW in the vicinity of HILL 22 (AT 957667). Upon interrogation it was determined that the prisoner was Senior Captain Nguyen Thanh LONG, the executive officer of the 111st NVA Regiment. In a series of interrogations conducted both by U.S. and NVA interrogators, Captain LONG has provided a wealth of information concerning enemy order of battle, tactics, logistic support and most important of all, an excellent insight into the viewpoint of the more senior NVA officers who are charged with the mission of carrying out the war on the regimental level in QUANG NHAN (P).

   a. Post-Têt Offensive. It was apparent from the information elicited from Captain LONG that the offensive thrust which the 31st and 111st NVA regiments conducted during the period of 23-26 February 1969 had been long planned and carefully coordinated. The unit which was charged with carrying out this mission was the Western Command, Front Four which had the aforementioned 31st and 111st Regiments as its principal subordinate elements. The commanding officer of the 31st Regiment was the overall commander and was double-hatted as CO of Western Command. A month prior to the actual commencement of the offensive a meeting was held by Front Four at which the principal staff members of these two regiments were present.

   b. Plan of Attack. The plan of attack which was eventually decided upon was indeed ambitious. The 31st and 111st Regiments which were then located in the mountainous areas to the west of DANANG were to move in an easterly direction to forward assembly areas within striking distance of HILL 327. The 31st, a bob-tailed two battalion regiment, was to move its maneuver elements up to HOA LOC (AT 905735). At the same time, the 25th Sapper Company was to cross the TUY LOAN River and maximizing the use of covert movement and small infiltration groups was to scale HILL 327 and reassemble in the vicinity of (AT 946745). This position was in proximity to a position which Captain LONG identified as an outpost of the First Marine Division CP.

   Once this sapper company was thus emplaced, the 31st Regiment was to move out of the HOA LOC area and, attacking in a northeasterly direction, was to cross the river, pass through the road junction known as HOA LOC Three Corners (AT 912743), continue the attack through DAI LA Pass and then descend upon the First Marine Division CP.

   While the 31st was carrying out this mission, the 111st Regiment, operating in close coordination with the 31st, was to be divided into two attacking elements. The first element was to be commanded by Senior Captain LONG. This force included the 3rd Battalion, 111st Regiment reinforced by a company from 2/111, a section of 12.7 AA guns, a section
of 82mm mortars, a radio/wire section and an additional sapper company. Their mission was to seize the TUY LOAN Bridge. Once the bridge had been seized Captain LONG intended to attack the artillery position which he identified as being located at (AT 938747). H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines is located in this general vicinity (AT 921737). In addition LONG also intended to attack a unit which he identified as a Marine engineer unit immediately to the north of the TUY LOAN River which we believe to have been "C" Company, 7th Engineers (AT 949709).

The mission of the second element of the 111st Regiment was not as clear in Captain LONG’s mind. This force was commanded by Major HAO, the regimental political officer and included the 1st Battalion, 111st NVA Regiment and the balance of 2/111 not already assigned to the first element. As Captain LONG explained it, the mission of the second element was to exploit the bridgehead over the TUY LOAN which the first element was to seize. This was to be in one of two ways. Major HAO was to either move northwest, join the 31st Regiment in the vicinity of DAI LA Pass, cross the mountains at that location and then, in coordination with the 31st, descend upon DANANG itself; alternatively, the second element’s attack plan, if HILL 327 appeared to have been secured or at least neutralized, called for an attack N/W immediately upon crossing the TUY LOAN Bridge and directed at DANANG with I Corps Headquarters as its principal objective.

Which of these two alternatives Major HAO would have opted for is unknown as the 111st never got the opportunity to carry out this attack. Throughout the period 23-26 February elements of the First Marine Division fought a series of pitched battles with both the 31st and 111st but the battles all took place south of the TUY LOAN River. These units experienced little battlefield success in their overt movement against our forces. The enemy’s units that relied on covert means of crossing the TUY LOAN and infiltrating the HILL 327 area, however, experienced a substantial measure of success as the attacks on the 26th Marines CP, the outpost positions on HILL 327, and in the vicinity of the First Marine Division CP clearly attest.

c. Order of Battle. Senior Captain LONG provided a substantial amount of information concerning enemy order of battle in QUANG NAM Province. He verified the fact the forces subordinate to Front Four consisted of the 31st, 36th and 111st Regiments plus the 2nd NVA Division. It was of particular interest to us that he made no mention of the 38th NVA Regiment although he specifically mentioned several of the subordinate battalions of this unit. From this interrogation, added to the information we have been gathering for some time, it is probable that the 38th NVA Regiment is a task organized headquarters which is formed in response to the requirements of a specific mission. Special intelligence would support this view as would the statement of the executive officer of the reconnaissance company of Front Four who, upon
being captured in August, stated that the 38th was formed out of Front Four assets for one-time missions.

Captain LONG also noted that the 366B Rocket Regiment no longer exists as a separate regimental entity. Instead, there are three independent rocket battalions which have been assigned to the three subordinate elements of Front Four, the northern, central and southern wings. He made no mention of the second rocket regiment which we have carried but not seen in many months, the 65B. We feel it is probable that this unit and its assets have been amalgamated into the above cited independent rocket battalions. However, there is no hard evidence to confirm or deny this hypothesis. The northern wing of Front Four which has geographic responsibility for the area lying between HILL 327 and the HAI VAN Pass, is composed of the HAI VAN Engineer Battalion and the V-12 Rocket Battalion. No mention is made by LONG of the T-87 Sapper Battalion as a third element in this area.

We have no record of a V-12 Rocket Battalion. However, we are aware that the enemy has demonstrated a rocket firing capability from north of the NAM O. We estimate that this rocket capability represents a part of the assets of the 366B Rocket Regiment, and consider the V-12 Rocket Battalion to be an AKA for one of the three battalions of the 366B.

The second element of Front Four is the central wing and has the geographic responsibility for that area lying to the west of a line drawn from HILL 327 S/W to the SONG YEN. The forces assigned to this wing are the 31st and 111st Regiments plus a battalion of the 366B Rocket Artillery Regiment. This wing is commanded by the CO of the 31st Regiment who is double-hatted as CO of the central wing. To further confuse the issue, this central wing is sometimes referred to as the Western Command.

The third element of Front Four is the southern wing which has responsibility for that area lying east of the SONG YEN to the South China Sea. The forces assigned to this wing, according to Captain LONG, are the 36th Regiment and the 4.91 Battalion (AKA 3d Sapper Battalion).

Captain LONG also noted that the 2d NVA Division was not assigned to any of these wings but was considered the reserve force for the entire Military Region 5. However, due to the fact that the 36th Regiment was "lacking in real strength" MR-5 had reinforced the southern wing with the 21st NVA Regiment.

No mention was made of the 1st VC or the 3d NVA Regiments by Captain LONG. Considering the locations where we have held these units during the past few months it is quite understandable that he would have little knowledge of the operation of these units.
d. Infiltration. Captain LONG provided a wealth of detailed information concerning his unit's infiltration into South Vietnam. Information elicited from this PW makes it clear that the enemy's personnel infiltration system has achieved a relatively high degree of sophistication.

Prior to the unit's departure from NVN, training for infiltration was integrated into the unit's regular regimental training schedule. When the 141st NVA Regiment was ready for southward movement, Captain LONG reports that his unit was moved by truck the entire distance from NVN to Base Area 611. Only upon reaching the A SHAU did the 141st shift to shank's mare. Captain LONG also reported that there was no need to resupply his unit during the infiltration movement as sufficient quantities of food were carried with them on the trucks. No mention is made of shuttling of trucks as has been reported in the past. In the case of the 141st it appears that the same truck serials took them all the way. It is evident from this description that the interdiction of the Laotian road system at this time (February 1968) could not have been a serious problem or mention of the fact that by-passing of heavily interdicted areas would have been made.

Whether or not the method of infiltrating the 141st was the exception or the rule we could not determine from our interrogation sessions. It is possible that the movement of the 141st was unique as the 141st was scheduled to be a reinforcing unit in the battle for HUE during TET '68. Fortunately for the health of this unit, it arrived too late to participate in the battle and after having traversed #547 in an easterly direction within 15 miles of HUE they turned around and walked back to the A SHAU Valley, then south on #548 and east on #614 to A YIN and then to the eastern lowlands of QUANG NAM.

e. Communications. Captain LONG discussed the communications system used in his regiment. From the information he provided, it is quite clear that their communications system is well organized and established on a formal basis similar to any conventional military force. The principal means of tactical communications employed on the battlefield is the K-63 radio. This radio has a seven to eight kilometer range. There are four of them in each battalion and the four radios are used to support the battalion tactical net with one radio at battalion level and the other three with the rifle companies. In addition to the K-63, the 141st has a second radio described as a 15 watt radio capable of contacting either HANOI or FRONT 4. Each battalion has two cryptographers assigned. They carry the frequencies and call signs for all units with them. Normally, the names of mountains, rivers and cities are used as call signs for units. The fact that the enemy uses radio intercept was touched upon by Captain LONG. He noted that each unit has two personnel who speak English to monitor our radio traffic. However, Captain LONG felt that their successes as a result of using intercepts were minimal.
This was largely ascribed by him to the fact that the English language trained personnel had been taught English in NVN and not very well at that. For this reason, they were unable to read much of what we were saying.

Captain LONG affirmed the fact that the NVA is aware of our ability to read their traffic. He emphasized that only the highest priority information was passed by radio, and the majority of the traffic continues to be handled by messenger.

f. Tactics. Captain LONG discussed the tactics taught and employed by the 11st NVA Regiment. They were without exception the tactics employed by all conventionally organized forces with the same doctrine as we teach concerning interval, how to cross an open area or secure the banks of a river, how to establish an ambush, how to extricate oneself from an ambush, etc. LONG also noted that General WESTMORELAND's manual concerning the tactics to be used by U.S. troops in SVN had been translated into Vietnamese and was used in their training.

There were areas of special interest noted by him which were of special interest to us. One of these areas was selection of routes of withdrawal and methods of reforming units after an attack. Captain LONG noted that his personnel had learned quickly from harsh experience that prearranged routes of withdrawal, particularly those that maximized speed rather than security, turned into death trains because invariably the Americans delivered devastating fires on every conceivable route of withdrawal. In response to this problem the tactic which the 11st employed when forced to withdraw was to scatter their troops throughout the villages in the immediate area of the attack and have the troops mingle with the villagers. Later, when the Americans had left, guides would be sent to the villages to lead these small units back to the CP.

g. Captain LONG's General Attitude and Viewpoint on the War. This PW is a veteran of 20 years of service with the Viet Minh and North Vietnamese Armies. He attended OCS in China in 1951 and was a platoon commander at DIEN BIEN PHU. With the exception of a two year stint at the SON TAY Artillery Academy, LONG had continuously served with the 11st Regiment since 1953. Since infiltrating into South Vietnam in February of 1966 he had not participated in a great deal of heavy fighting but had been involved in the battle fought at THUONG DUC in September and October of 1968.

Captain LONG noted that 50% of the senior officers had been with the 11st Regiment since DIEN BIEN PHU. Concerning the strength of the 11st, he gave varying figures. However, the one which appears to be the most reliable was that the 11st's infiltration strength was 2,100 men, their strength prior to the present battle was 1,800 with an effective strength of 1,100. The three infantry battalions of the regiment were assessed at a strength of 250, 233 and 240 respectively, each battalion having three rifle companies and a weapons company. LONG affirmed that
his unit had received losses from air, artillery, ground combat and malaria, however, he did not appear to be worried about his losses. He understood that a new draft of personnel was to arrive in late February to make their losses good. Whether this was wishful thinking employed by Captain LONG's superiors or actual fact, we have no way of knowing. However, considering the infiltration figures we have had reported by other sources, there is no reason to believe that the reinforcements would not arrive as scheduled.

It was interesting to note Captain LONG's basic attitudes towards how the war was going. Regardless of past losses there appeared to be not the slightest doubt in his mind that the NVN would eventually win. He expressed what appeared to be sincere regret that as a PW he would now be denied the opportunity to participate in the "big battle" which will eventually be fought and won by the NVA. Captain LONG did not consider the general condition and combat efficiency of the 11lst to be any problem whatsoever. When asked whether he had considered the possibility of the 11lst withdrawing further to the west he dismissed the idea as absurd because "there was no possible reason for such a move."

Captain LONG's outlook here is not unreasonable considering what is known about the 11lst. This unit has not been engaged since THUONG DUC in early October. Other than the privations of living in the mountainous area west of THUONG DUC and the problem of malaria, there would be no particular reason for this unit to feel other than fully combat ready. No food or ammunition shortage appeared to have been experienced by the 11lst according to Captain LONG's report.

Captain LONG was very politically aware and well-informed on the subject of the international scene. He not only commented on the Russo-Czechoslovak problem but also such relatively recent developments as the present Berlin confrontation.
PERINTREP 12-69

Period covered: 160000H March - 222400H March 1969

Ref: (a) Maps: JOG (V) Vietnam 1:250,000 Sheet NE 49-12, NW 49-13, ND 49-14, ND 49-5

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. There was a marked increase in enemy activity in I Corps Tactical Zone throughout the week of 16-22 March, with the exception of the first week of the NVA/VC post-TET offensive (22-28 February) it was the highest level of enemy activity experienced during the past few months.

Ground attacks of company size or larger rose to nine as compared to one the previous week. The number of assaults by fire increased to 33 during the week which ended 22 March, compared with 24 the previous week. Incoming was more than double last week's total and similarly, enemy casualties rose to 1,540 from the previous week's 966.

Viet Cong terrorism increased significantly during the past week while other counterintelligence-related activity remained at a low level. The majority of terrorist incidents consisted of attacks on populated areas. A moderate increase in VC water sapper activity was also noted. Propaganda themes remained essentially unchanged with most propaganda efforts being devoted to urging the people to increase production and make contributions of food and labor to the VC. While captured documents and agent reports continue to state that the VC will increase their military proselytizing activity and attempt to foment demonstrations in favor of an immediate peace, little of this type activity has been reported.

a. QUANG TRI (P). While the week of 16-22 March produced a noticeable increase in the tempo of the enemy's efforts in the three southern provinces which comprise the Military Region 5 area of I Corps Tactical Zone, the general enemy situation in QUANG TRI (P) experienced relatively little change from the preceding period. Within the province itself, the 3-5 FRONT area was the center of attention for the second consecutive week while activity in the southern portion of the province subsided as the 9th Marines terminated their highly successful DEMILY CANYON operation.

DMZ sightings/incidents decreased sharply during the period, dropping from 230 to 140, with a corresponding decrease in the average number of daily sightings/incidents from 33 to 20. Of the 230 sightings/incidents this week, 61 were north of the BEN HAI river.

Unlike the past two reporting periods during which the enemy violated the DMZ on several occasions by shelling allied installations and tactical units in the northeastern portion of the province, this week there
was only one confirmed firing incident emanating from within the demilitarized zone. However, this particular incident occurred in the extreme western reaches of the DMZ where the enemy directed 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire against 1/3/4 Marines, 10 kilometers north northwest of the ROCKPILE (XD 944654) on 22 March.

Further interrogation of a PW captured in the northeastern extremities of QUANG TRI (P) (YD 259805) on 15 March (paragraph 1a, III MAF PIR 11-69 refers) and initially identified as a member of the 2nd Battalion, 25th Regiment, reveals that his regiment is also known as the 92nd Artillery Regiment. The prisoner stated that he has heard that the regimental headquarters is located 50 kilometers west of the VINH LINH Special Zone. He further indicated that the 2nd Battalion began operations south of the BEN HAI River on 10 March with the mission of shelling allied installations. His unit, armed with eighteen 60mm mortars, was to return to an undisclosed base area in the northern portion of the DMZ upon completion of its mission. An 82nd Artillery Regiment is currently carried in order of battle listings as subordinate to the 351st Artillery Division in NVN.

Enemy sappers, most likely elements of the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment, remained active along the CUA VIE River this past week. River patrol craft continued to encounter small groups of enemy along the banks of the river as well as some harassing small arms fire. One mining incident occurred on 20 March when an LCM-8 proceeding down the river from DONG HA experienced a small underwater detonation approximately two kilometers northeast of the DONG HA Bridge (YD 252623). The explosion failed to produce any damage or casualties. Investigation for evidence of command detonation was unable to be effected due to friendly artillery impacting in the area. However, this particular locale has produced no less than four recent minings or attempted minings, the latest of which occurred on 23 February when a patrol boat detonated a large watermine.

The northeastern quadrant of QUANG TRI (P) was again the stage setting for significant ground action this week as the enemy conducted two additional attacks against friendly tactical units following last week's 13 March platoon size sapper attack against an ARVN outpost southeast of GIO LINH.

The most significant of these two incidents was a company size sapper attack conducted against a CAP unit compound in a hamlet of DONG XUAN Village, two kilometers north of DONG HA (YD 231632) during the early morning hours of 16 March. The enemy followed a CAP night patrol to the hamlet and initiated the attack by breaching the perimeter and overrunning the compound. Several bunkers and buildings including the village chief's home were blown up with satchel charges, grenades and bangalore torpedoes. This short-lived but intense foray resulted in heavy friendly casualties including the village chief and two hamlet
chiefs, all three of whom were killed in the attack. The enemy unit, which withdrew to the northwest, was not identified.

Of lesser intensity was a combination mortar and two-pronged sapper attack launched against a PF platoon in night defensive positions (XD 313690), two kilometers west of the CUA VIET Port Facility on 20 March. During the encounter, conducted by an estimated platoon size enemy force, the enemy effected a brief penetration of the PF perimeter. However, the attack produced only light casualties on both sides.

Friendly forces operating in the central region of the B-5 FRONT met with little serious opposition this past week as enemy efforts in this area were limited mainly to light and scattered attacks by fire. Most of these attacks were directed at vehicular traffic operating on Route 9 between DONG HA and VANDEGRIFT Combat Base. In the CON THIEN-CAM LO-ROCKYVE complex, ground action was scattered and desultory, with a two platoon size enemy force being the largest unit contacted.

Northwest of KHE SANH, however, enemy activity increased as elements of the 4th Marines met with moderate to heavy resistance upon attempting to reopen FSB ARDONG (XD 676573) during the latter part of the week. During the fighting to secure this fire support base in close proximity to the LAOTIAN border which has been closed for several months, no less than 10 helicopters sustained hits from enemy ground fire with one aircraft being downed. Although the fire support base was subsequently secured, friendly forces continued to receive frequent but light mortar attacks throughout the remainder of the week. Although there was no positive identification of the enemy unit in contact, elements of the 246th NVA Regiment were most probably involved.

To the south of the KHE SANH-LANG VEI complex in the area of Route 926 (616), only light contact was encountered this week by friendly forces participating in Operation NAIRNE CRAG, which include elements of the 3rd Marines, ARVN Forces, and elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division. Of interest concerning this area were continued reports of enemy vehicular traffic along this road. As but one example, elements of G/2/3 Marines observed two C6C trucks travelling northeast along the route on 18 March, approximately 19.5 kilometers south of KHE SANH (XD 381229). One vehicle was subsequently engaged and destroyed. The trucks were reported to have been carrying rockets and small arms ammunition.

Of particular interest were two PW's captured in a bunker along Route 926 (616) (XD 897229) by H/2/3 Marines on 21 March. Both prisoners stated that they were members of a 19th Construction Company which has the mission of building bunkers and road repair. One of the PW's further revealed that his company is subordinate to a 4th Battalion, 330th Regiment, a unit not held in III MAF OOB Listings. However, NVA order of battle carries a 330th Division, believed to be a training and garrison unit. Interrogation of these two PW's is continuing.
Elsewhere in QUANG TRI Province, remaining elements of the 9th Marines in the DEWEY CANYON AO continued to meet with light enemy resistance as they prepared to close out this major operation. This resistance took the form of light amounts of incoming artillery and mortar fire as well as some RPG and small arms fire. Operation DEWEY CANYON was officially terminated at 181800H March. The final enemy casualty figure for this highly successful two month operation which commenced on 21 January was assessed at 1,355 KIA's.

b. THUA THIEN (P). Enemy activity remained generally at a reduced level in THUA THIEN (P) during the week of 16-22 March although an increase in attacks by fire was noted during the latter part of the week.

Ground action within the province was sporadic throughout the week with the majority of contacts occurring along Route 547 in the vicinity of FSB VEGHEL (YD 550035). Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) participating in Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER encountered light enemy resistance in this area from probable elements of the 9th NVA Regiment as they continued their efforts to eliminate the enemy's use of the A SHAU Valley for logistic and personnel throughput.

Friendly installations astride Route 1 from HUE to PHU LOC continued to be favorite targets for enemy mortar and rocket attacks during the reporting period. Light casualties and material damage were sustained at Camp EAGLE on 16 March when 10 rounds of 122mm rocket fire impacted at the headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division (AM). Further to the south during the latter part of the week, both PHU BAI and PHU LOC District Headquarters received incoming rocket/mortar fire on 22 March. Light material damage resulted from thirteen 122mm rockets fired at the former installation, while 70 rounds of incoming 60/82mm mortar fire received at the latter installation during daylight hours resulted in one individual (J.S.) wounded.

Of particular significance in THUA THIEN (P) this past week has been the capture of no less than five prisoners of war from the 5th NVA Regiment, all of whom were taken in a cordon operation five kilometers south of PHU BAI (YD 9010) by AM/NI Forces and elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM). Two of these PW's were identified as members of the 5th NVA Regiment's reconnaissance company while a third PW revealed he was a member of the K-32 Artillery Battalion, also subordinate to the 5th Regiment. Information gleaned from the two members of the reconnaissance company indicate that they were conducting a recon of allied installations in the PHU BAI area in preparation for an attack to be conducted by elements of the 5th Regiment during the period 1-10 April. Included among a list provided by these two PW's of several targets for this alleged forthcoming attack are the PHU BAI Airfield and FSB ANZIO (YD 92071). All three of the aforementioned PW's indicated that elements of the K-32 Artillery Battalion would shell HUE City and other installations in the HUE-PHU BAI area with 122mm rockets during the specified period of 1-10 April.
c. QUANG NAM (P). Although there was a slight increase in enemy activity in northern I Corps this past week, this fact was overshadowed by a marked increase in the enemy's efforts in QUANG NAM as well as QUANG TIN and QUANG NGOI Provinces throughout the latter part of the reporting period.

The early part of the week in QUANG NAM (P), however, produced only light ground action, with the majority of contacts during this three day period being concentrated in the AN HQA and HOI AN areas.

Elements of 3/26 Marines had several sporadic encounters in the former area of operations and the AN HQA Combat Base was subjected to additional rocket and mortar attacks. Noteworthy was a 16 round barrage of 122mm rockets and 82mm mortar rounds directed at the DUC Duc District Headquarters (AT 886-176) on 17 March which killed 10 civilians and wounded 26 others in the adjacent THANH MY Refugee Camp.

In the latter area, elements of the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade killed several enemy in night ambushes and search and clear missions while a CAP unit confirmed the presence of the 2nd Battalion, 36th NVA Regiment when they captured a PW during a meeting engagement with an NVA platoon 10 kilometers west northwest of HOI AN (BT 05-609) on 17 March.

The most significant ground contact during the early part of the week occurred on 18 March when Combined Action Platoon 2-4-2 engaged a large enemy force 2.5 kilometers west of HOI AN (BT 120-70). An aerial observer reported sighting 43 enemy bodies in the action that continued throughout the afternoon and into the night. A sweep of the area the following morning revealed 16 houses destroyed but no enemy bodies. However, civilians in the area reported there were over 100 enemy KIA's and WIA's and revealed that the local populace had been forced to carry wounded enemy troops west during the night. The local DIOCC reported that agents had confirmed 19 enemy KIA and 13 enemy WIA.

Five kilometers north northwest of DIEN BAN on 16 March, two significant terrorist incidents occurred in THANH QUIT Hamlet (BT O16-23). In the first of these incidents two terrorists riding a motorcycle threw a grenade at a civilian truck which missed the vehicle and detonated in a market place. The second incident occurred 200 meters to the south of the first (BT O1621) when a terrorist threw a grenade at a bus taking civilians to a polling place. These two indiscriminate acts of terror resulted in two civilians killed and 41 civilians, one ARVN and one PF soldier wounded.

Enemy initiated activity increased significantly in QUANG NAM (P) during the middle of the week when forces subordinate to MILITARY REGION 5 conducted a series of attacks by fire interspersed with ground attacks throughout the eastern portion of the province. In the early morning hours of Wednesday, 19 March, light rocket and/or mortar attacks were launched against DANANG City, Force Logistics Command, HIEU DUC, DIEN