FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO lst ForReCo ltr 3/SLO/jla 5750.1 of 4 Jan 1966 Ser: 026-65

From: Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

1. Forwarded. Contents noted.

K. J. FERRICH
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division, FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, FMF

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1
(b) C3, III MAF verbal order of 2 December 1965
(c) DSO 429-65 of 27 December 1965
(d) C3, III MAF verbal order of 7 December 1965
(e) C3, III MAF verbal order of 24 December 1965
(f) C3, 3rdMarDiv verbal order of 27 December 1965
(g) C3, III MAF OpO 306-65 (S)
(h) C3, 3rdReconBn FagO of 290600Z December 1965

Encl: (1) Command and Staff Billets
(2) Operation Order and After Action Report 1-65, BA TO, RVN
(3) Operation Order and After Action Report 2-65, BA TO, RVN
(4) Operation Order and After Action Report 3-65, BA TO, RVN
(5) Operation Order and After Action Report 4-65, BA TO, RVN
(6) Operation Order and After Action Report 5-65, BA TO, RVN
(7) Operation Order and After Action Report 1-65, TRA BONG, RVN
(8) Operation Order and After Action Report 2-65, TRA BONG, RVN
(9) Operation Order and After Action Report 3-65, TRA BONG, RVN
(10) Co "D", 3rdReconBn FagO 476A-65 and Patrol Report
(11) Co "D", 3rdReconBn FagO 477-65 (No Patrol Report)
(13) 1st Force Recon Co OpO 12-65

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted for the month of December 1965.

a. Organizational Data.

(1) Designation/Location. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-), DA NANG, Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

(2) Period Covered. 0100H - 312400H December 1965.

(3) Command and Staff Billets. See enclosure (1).
b. Significant Events.

(1) Personnel.

(a) The former Commanding Officer and Communications Officer of this company were transferred on 27 and 29 December 1965, respectively. No replacements were provided.

(b) On 21 December 1965, this company's personnel readiness category changed from "C-1" to "C-3" due to the following:

1/ Three (3) USMC enlisted KIA's occurring on 16 December 1965.

2/ One (1) USMC enlisted and one (1) USN enlisted WIA on 16 December 1965 and evacuated on 17 and 20 December 1965, respectively.

3/ The inter-theatre rotation of one (1) officer and eight (8) enlisted to Okinawa on 21 December 1965. Anticipated replacements of like personnel from platoons presently in Okinawa, attached to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, FMF, have not been provided to date.

4/ One (1) non-battle casualty hospitalized on 1 October 1965.

(c) For the reasons set forth in paragraph (4), below, this Company's ability to support subsequent missions is severely handicapped unless additional communications personnel are provided.

1/ In view of the foregoing, four (4) additional communicators (MOS 2533) have been requested.

(2) Special Operations. As directed by reference (b), a minimum of two swimmers were provided to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing, for drone aircraft recovery as indicated.

(a) CHU LAI, RVN: 5 December to 20 December 1965.

(b) DA NANG, RVN: 7 December to 20 December 1965.
(3) Command and Control.

(a) As directed by reference (c), the former Company Executive Officer, assumed command of this company on 28 December 1965.

(b) In compliance with reference (d), the 3rd Platoon shifted to OPCON, CG, III MAF, on 7 December 1965.

(c) In compliance with reference (e), operational control of the 2nd and 3rd Platoons, shifted to CG, 3rd Marine Division, FMF, on 24 December 1965.

(d) In compliance with reference (f), this company shifted to OPCON, CO, 3rd Recon BN, 3rd Marine Division, FMF, on 27 December 1965.

(4) Communications and Electronics. The physical remoteness of one platoon's objective area to another requires an unexpected number of relay sites to ensure continuous communications. As result, "all" communicators, technicians included, find themselves manning these sites. This operational necessity severely hampers this company's ability to perform even the minimum preventive maintenance and repairs of its communications equipment. In order to support operational commitments and provide for the repair and maintenance of its equipment, additional communications personnel are imperative.

(5) Close Combat.

(a) In compliance with reference (d), this company dispatched one platoon to Special Forces Camp A-107, TRA BONG, RVN, on 7 December 1965, for operations as directed by reference (g).

(b) As directed by reference (e), the 2nd Platoon returned from BA TO, RVN, on 24 December 1965.

(c) The Platoon Operation Orders and After Action Reports for patrols conducted from the Special Forces Camps at both TRA BONG and BA TO, RVN, are appended as enclosures (7) through (9), and enclosures (2) through (6), respectively.

(d) As evidenced by enclosure (5), the 2nd Platoon, while operating in conjunction with a Central Irregular Defense Company (CIDG), and from Special Forces Camp A-106, BA TO, RVN, on 16 December 1965, were attacked by an overwhelming number of Viet Cong using 60mm mortars and machine guns. As result of the action, the platoon suffered three (3) USMC enlisted KIA's, three (3) USMC enlisted WIA's, and one (1) USN enlisted WIA.
(e) On the 5th, 13th, and 24th of December 1965, respectively, one platoon was attached to Company "D", 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, FMF, for platoon size reconnaissance operations of a three (3) to seven (7) day duration in Reconnaissance Zones (DA NANG) 4, 4, and 5, respectively. See enclosures (10) through (12), for operation orders and patrol reports.

(f) As directed by reference (h) and enclosure (13), one platoon was inserted into Reconnaissance Zone (DA NANG) 5, on 30 December 1965, for a seven (7) day reconnaissance operation.

(6) Logistics.

(a) Operational Platoons began reconnaissance missions with Special Forces "A" Camps. The logistic co-ordination was established between both units, for providing "tiger-stripe" utilities, carbines, and establishing of resupply procedures for Platoons. The experience gained in this type support will greatly enhance the success of future operations.

(b) Division Supply approved the acquisition of Long Range Patrol Rations for this unit and Recon En. This was a result of information submitted by this section concerning a project test of the item.

(c) A minefield was laid as part of a barrier defense plan. Engineer assistance was provided by a representative of 3rd Engineer Battalion, operating with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. Seismic Intrusion Detectors were received and put into operation as an added part of the Camp Defense Plan.

(d) For the first time since August, detergent was made available to units in the DA NANG area. Another high-usage item that is in critical demand is insect repellent.

W. C. Shaver

W. C. SHAYER
## Command and Staff Billets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Billet</th>
<th>T/O Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>SERNO/MOS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>SHAVER, William C.</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>080180/0302</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>OWENS, Sammy L.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>085114/0302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>OWENS, Sammy L.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence Officer</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>KOCH, Gus A.</td>
<td>SSgt</td>
<td>1306606/0239</td>
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<td>Supply Officer</td>
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<td>BEST, Sheldon J.</td>
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<td>Communications Officer</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>GOEWEY, Virgil L.</td>
<td>GySgt</td>
<td>1113771/2539</td>
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<tr>
<td>Platoon Commander, 2nd Platoon</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>LENKER, John C.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>087585/0302</td>
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<tr>
<td>Platoon Commander, 3rd Platoon</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>SUTTLE, Walter G.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>086594/0302</td>
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<td>Platoon Commander, 4th Platoon</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>PARKER, Richard F., Jr.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>085283/0302</td>
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Enclosure (1)
OPERATION ORDER 1

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy. Local VC throughout the area and possible regiment of the 325 PAVN division in the VUC LIEM area.
   b. Friendly. One company CIDG with the reaction force, two companies CIDG at Camp BA TO.
   c. Attachments. Three men per team from CIDG combat recon platoon.

2. MISSION. Determine location, identity, strength, movement and armament of VC/PACV units. Locate assembly areas, training bases, logistic bases and infiltration routes. In addition, Team 23 make a damage estimate of the bombing of the VUC LIEM area.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. At 041500, Team 21 will move from camp to outpost South. At 050500, move from there to objective area (BS 6431, 6532).
   b. At 041500, Team 23 will move from camp to outpost East. At 050500, move from there to objective area (BS 6336, 6436).
   c. Coordinate with CIDG on possible routes and alternate routes and submit overlays.
   d. Coordinating instructions.
      1. Thrust line - 6434.
      2. MedEvac - Give location. When helicopter is on sight, display red panel and throw yellow smoke.
      3. E & E Plan - Move to BA TO and approach during daylight hours.
      4. Reaction Force - If you are in trouble, give your location and situation and how you think the reaction force should be employed. If you locate a target for the reaction force, give its location and disposition.
      5. Airstrike. - If you call for an airstrike, be prepared to put out panel and direct the aircraft from the ground.
      6. If communications is lost, move to high ground and try to re-establish communications. If communications results in a complete failure, return to camp.

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ENCLOSURE (2)
7. If team is compromised, either by a firefight or being sighted, move to another area and attempt to continue mission.

8. When mission has been accomplished, return to camp.

4. LOGISTICS.
   a. Uniform and equipment - Normal, except for tiger stripe utilities.
   b. Weapons and ammunition - Minimum 120 rounds per carbine, 24 rounds per M-79, 25 rounds per shotgun.
   c. Two fragmentation grenades per man.
   d. Rations for five days.
   e. Special equipment:
      (1) One yellow smoke per team.
      (2) One red panel per team.
      (3) One spotting scope per team.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.
   a. Team leader will exercise command of his team in the field.
   b. Platoon command post will be at Camp BA TO.
   c. Each team will carry a PRC-25 with two batteries and an HT-1 as a backup radio.
   d. Communications will be according to the COI.
   e. Initially, communications will be either directly to the camp or relayed through the relay on outpost South. Once the reaction force moves into position, they will become the relay.

J. C. LENKER
1stLt Plt Cmdr.
AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OPERATION ORDER

2. MAP SHEETS 6755 II, 6755 III, Series L701

3. PATROL COMPOSITION.
   a. Team 21 - 4 USMC, 3 CIDG
   b. Team 23 - 4 USMC, 3 CIDG

4. TIME OF DEPARTURE - 041500 for both teams.

5. TIME OF RETURN
   a. Team 21 - 071200
   b. Team 23 - 071300

6. SIGNIFICANT SIGHTINGS.
   a. Team 21
      1. 4 VC, moving east, 645312, black pajamas, 051445, small arms and rucksacks.
      2. 3 VC, moving east, 624312, black pajamas, 051445, small arms.
      3. 2 VC, possible observation post, 629322, black pajamas, 051445, no weapons sighted.
      4. 40 VC, moving west in streambed, 655319, black pajamas, 061145, small arms and large rucksacks.
      5. Suspected observation post, 626300, 061525, no one was sighted, but saw smoke from fire.
      6. Groups of 2 - 4 VC sighted at different times moving back and forth in streambed, appeared to be carrying gear into the jungle growth along the streambed, 653320, black pajamas, 061150 - 06160 small arms and large rucksacks. The VC would walk into the jungle with the packs and then walk back to 65319 without packs.
      7. 3 VC, heading east, 643316, black pajamas, 061500, small arms.
      8. Fighting positions and burned shelters, 610299, 621301, possible VC outpost.
9. Suitable HLZ along ridge line from 603299 extending east to 625295.

b. Team 23

1. 2 VC, walking north, 639355, camouflage utilities, 051520, one carbine, one BAR.

2. One thousand pounds of rice, 633354, 051520, rice was too green to burn.

3. 3 VC, moving southeast, 624360, two in black pajamas, one in camouflage utilities, 060740, M1 rifles.

4. Fighting positions at 632357, large foxhole with grassy patch in the center - presumed to be used for shooting at aircraft.

5. Suitable HLZ's at 622356, 632357, and along ridgeline from 624355, extending south to 622344.

7. OBSERVATIONS

a. Team 21 - It is believed that the 40 VC were moving equipment into the jungle at 653320. They were seen moving into the jungle with large packs and then moving back up the stream in small groups without packs.

The CIDG personnel moved very good. Much of the time the terrain was very open and had it not been for the ground fog, the VC observation posts could have seen the patrol.

b. Team 23 - The ridgeline extending from 619369 southeast to 632357 has VC observation posts which makes entry to the VUC LIEM area very difficult from the west. The three VC sighted at 624 360 were taken under fire by one of the CIDG with the patrol before they were in range. Had it not been for this incident, they may have not been seen the patrol. As a result, the patrol was compromised and had to leave the area. The patrol was able to see into the VUC LIEM area prior to the firefight, however, all that was seen was one building and some burned off areas. Most of the hills that the patrol moved through were covered with punji stakes. The VC are believed to employ radio jamming techniques because several times Vietnamese would cut in on transmissions.

8. CONCLUSIONS

a. Team 21 - CIDG personnel were an asset to the team because they know the area. Although they can't read a map, they were able to take the team where it was to go. Language was not a big factor. Most of the communications was done by sign language.
b. Team 23 - The CIDG personnel with this team had poor fire discipline. Had it not been for this the patrol could have stayed in the area longer.

J. C. LENKER
1st Lt. Plt Comdr.
Operation Order 2

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy. Local VC throughout the area and possible elements of the 325th PAVN division.
   b. Friendly. Three companies CIDG to remain at BA TO. Reaction force will be on call to move out from the camp.
   c. Attachments. Three men from CIDG combat recon platoon.

2. MISSION. Determine location, identity, strength, movement and armament of VC/PAVN units. Locate assembly areas, training bases, logistic bases and infiltration routes.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. At 081600, Team 22 will move out from camp to outpost South. At 090600, move from there to the objective area. (BS 5727, 5728, 5827, 5828, 5928).
   b. Coordinate with CIDG on routes and alternate routes to and from the Objective area.
   c. Coordinating instructions.
      1. Thrust line - 5928
      2. MedEvac - Give location. When helicopter is on sight, display red panel and throw yellow smoke.
      3. E & E Plan - move to BA TO and approach during hours of daylight.
      4. Reaction force - If you are in trouble, give your location and situation and how you think the reaction force could be used. If you locate a target for the reaction force, give its location and disposition.
      5. Airstrike - If you call for an airstrike, be prepared to display panel and direct aircraft from the ground.
      6. If communications is lost, move to high ground and try to re-establish communications. If communications is a complete failure, return to base.
      7. If team is compromised, either by a firefight or by being sighted, move to another area and attempt to continue mission.

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ENCLOSURE (3)
4. LOGISTICS.
   a. Uniform and equipment - normal except for tiger stripe utilities.
   b. Weapons and ammunition - Minimum 120 rounds per carbine and M3A1, 24 rounds per M-79, 25 rounds per shotgun.
   c. Two fragmentation grenades per man.
   d. Rations for four days.
   e. Special equipment.
      (1) One yellow smoke per team.
      (2) One red panel per team.
      (3) One spotting scope per team.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.
   a. Team leader will exercise command of his team in the field.
   b. Platoon command post will be at Camp BA T0.
   c. Each team will carry a PRC-25 with two batteries and an HT-1 as a back up radio.
   d. Communications will be according to COI.

J. C. LENKER
1st Lt Plt Cmdr.
AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OPERATION ORDER 2

2. MAP SHEETS 6755 II, III, Series L701.

3. PATROL COMPOSITION: Team 22 - 4 USMC, 3 CIDG


6. SIGNIFICANT SIGHTINGS:
   a. Possible HLZ site at 577287, large enough for two H-34 Aircraft.
   b. Two (2) fighting positions 577287, possible VC observation post.
   c. Two (2) suspected VC, moving north, 579282, one wearing black pajamas,
      other wearing black bottoms and green utility jacket, 091130, no
      weapons sighted, one man carrying brown object.

7. OBSERVATIONS:
   a. It is believed that the two VC were moving to possible OP site to the
      north.

8. CONCLUSIONS:
   a. The patrol moved well and was ahead of schedule to the objective,
      CIDG personnel were an asset to the team because they know the area.
   b. The team had problems with communications due to the large masses in
      the area.

J. C. LENKER
1stLt Plt Cdr.

---1---
ROUTE OF TEAM # 22
2nd Platoon, 1st
Force Recon Co. Dec 65 w/Encl 9.

BATO, MY TRANG
6755 II, III
VIETNAM 1:50,000
SERIES H701
EDITION 2-AMS
OPERATION ORDER 3

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy. Local VC throughout the area and possible elements of 325th PAVN division.
   b. Friendly. 3 companies CIDG at Camp AN THAI. Reaction force of one company on call.
   c. Attachments. One CIDG from the combat recon platoon.

2. MISSION. Determine location, identity, strength, movement, and armament of VC/PAVN units. Locate assembly areas, training bases, logistic bases and infiltration routes.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. At 101500 move from Camp AN THAI to RF/FF Outpost at BS 580346. At 110600 move from Outpost to vicinity of TAN AN (1), (2), (BS 6039, 6040).
   b. Coordinate with CIDG on routes to and from the area.
   c. Coordinating instructions.
      (1) Thrust line 6036.
      (2) MedEvac Give location, when helicopter is in sight, display red panel and throw yellow smoke.
      (3) E&E Plan - move to BA TO an approach during daylight hours.
      (4) Reaction force - If you are in trouble, give your location and situation and how you think reaction force could best be employed.
      (5) Airstrike - If you call for an airstrike, be prepared to display red panel and direct aircraft from the ground.
      (6) If communication is lost move to a location where it can be re-established. If communications is a complete failure, return to base.
      (7) If team is compromised, either by a firefight or by being sighted, move to another area and attempt to continue mission.

ENCLOSURE (4)
4. LOGISTICS.
   a. Uniform - Normal except for tiger stripe utilities.
   b. Weapons and ammunition - Minimum 120 rounds per Carbine and M3A1, 24 rounds per M-79, and 25 rounds per shotgun.
   c. 2 fragmentation grenades per man.
   d. Ration for 4 days.
   e. Special equipment.
      (1) 1 yellow smoke per team.
      (2) 1 red panel per team.
      (3) 1 spotting scope per team.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.
   a. Team leaders will exercise command of his team in the field.
   b. Platoon command post will be at Camp AN THAI.
   c. The team will carry a PRC-25 with two batteries and an HT-1 as a backup radio.
   d. Communications will be according to COI.

   J. C. LENKER
   1stLt Plt Cmdr.
AFTER ACTION REPORT.

1. OPERATION ORDER 3
2. MAP SHEETS 6755 II, III, Series L701.
3. PATROL COMPOSITION - 3 USMC, 3 CIDG.
4. TIME OF DEPARTURE - 101500 Dec 1965
5. TIME OF RETURN - 111630 Dec 1965.
6. SIGNIFICANT SIGHTINGS:
   a. 4 VC, heading northwest, 591365, green utilities, 111045, carrying small arms and one rucksack.
   b. 4 VC, standing on top of hill, 609366, uniform undetermined, 111220, M-1, BAR, and other small arms.
   c. One suspected VC, standing on top of hill, 605375, uniform undetermined, 111245, no equipment sighted.
   d. Two VC, standing on top of hill, 598358, uniform undetermined, 111400, one automatic weapon on bipod.
   e. 7 suspected VC, standing on hill, 619369, uniform undetermined, 111400, equipment undetermined.
7. OBSERVATIONS:

   While observing VC at 609366 the patrol's position, which was at 591369, was compromised. A fire mission with a 4.2 mortar was run on this sighting. The rounds landed in the area the VC were in but the patrol could not confirm any VC KIA's. The patrol then moved to 585368 and sighted the VC at 598358. A fire mission was run on them and again the rounds landed where they were sighted, but the patrol could not confirm any KIA's. The patrol leader decided that because the patrol had been compromised they would return to base.

   While observing village in 5837, 5838, the patrol observed many people moving around the area. There appeared to be several young men among them. They were all dressed in black pajamas and coolie hats. No weapons were sighted. While observing the village, an incident took place worthy of note. A man wearing a light colored poncho was sighted at
587374. He had four men around him and by their actions it appeared that the one man was making an inspection of the rice fields in the area. While he was in the area, everyone stopped their work and looked at him.

The patrol found two booby trapped 60 mm Mortar rounds at 591366. These were the only obstacles the patrol encountered.

The terrain in the area is very open in some places, but there is enough cover to enable undetected movement. The tops of the hills are covered with short grass and small bushes.

8. CONCLUSIONS. The three CIDG that accompanied the team were a real asset to the patrol. It would be to the advantage of the team to work with the same men on subsequent patrols. They moved very good and are outstanding scouts.

J. C. LENKER
1st Lt Pt Cdr.
OPERATION ORDER 4

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy. Local VC have been sighted in the area. Suspected combat
      outpost line extending from hill 50A at BS 619369 to BS 640329.
      Possible Regimental Headquarters and staging area of 325th PAVN
      division in VUC LIEM area.
   b. Friendly. One company CIDG at patrol base, 2 companies CIDG at
      Camp AN THAI.
   c. Attachment. Three men per team from CIDG at patrol base, 2 companies
      CIDG at Camp AN THAI.

2. MISSION. Determine location, identity, strength, movement and armament of
   VC/PAVN units. Locate assembly areas, training bases, and infiltration
   routes.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. At 140600 one CIDG company with three Force Recon Teams will depart
      Camp AN THAI and move to the objective area vicinity BS 640329 and
      set up patrol base.
      (1) Team 21 - Subsequent to arrival at patrol base, team will move
          to vicinity 657347. On order, return to patrol base.
      (2) Team 22 - Subsequent to arrival at patrol base, team will move
          to vicinity 652322. On order, return to patrol base.
      (3) Team 23 - Subsequent to arrival at patrol base, team will move
          to vicinity 645357. On order, return to patrol base.
   b. When all teams have returned to patrol base, CIDG company with
      attachments will return to camp AN THAI; sweeping the valley in
      BS 5834 and 5934 from East to West on the way.
   c. Coordinating instructions.
      (1) Coordinates will be given by subtracting 2 from the second,
          third, fifth, sixth numbers in a six digit coordinate.
      (2) MedEvac - Give location, when helicopter is on sight, display red
          panel and throw yellow smoke.
      (3) E & E Plan - Move to BA TO and approach during daylight hours.
      (4) Reaction force - If you are in trouble, give you location and
          situation and how you think reaction force could best be
          employed.

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DECLASSIFIED
(5) Airstrike - If you call for an airstrike, be prepared to display red panel and direct aircraft from the ground.

(6) If communications is lost through both primary and alternate means, return to patrol base.

(7) If team is compromised, either by a firefight or by being sighted, move to another area and attempt to continue mission.

3. LOGISTICS.

a. Uniform and Equipment - Normal, except for tiger stripe utilities.

b. Weapons and ammunition - Minimum 120 rounds per Carbine and M3A1 24 rounds per M-79, 25 rounds per shotgun.

c. Two fragmentation grenades per man.

d. Rations for five days.

e. Special equipment
   (1) Special equipment: One yellow smoke per team.
   (2) One red panel per team.
   (3) One pair binoculars or spotting scope per team.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Team leader will exercise command of his team while on patrol.

b. Platoon command post will be at Camp AN THAI.

c. Each team will carry an PRC-10 with two batteries.

d. Communications will be according to COI.

J.C. LENKER
1st Lt Plt Cdr.
AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. OPERATION ORDER 4

2. MAP SHEETS 6755 II, III Series L701.

3. PATROL COMPOSITION:
   a. Team 21, 4 USMC, 3 CIDG
   b. Team 22, 3 USMC, 3 CIDG
   c. Team 23, 4 USMC, 3 CIDG
   d. Reaction force and patrol base defense consisted of: 53 CIDG, 1 USMC, 1 UNS, 1 USSF, 2 LLUB, 2 Nungs, 1 Interpreter.

4. TIME OF DEPARTURE - 140530 for reaction force and teams.

5. TIME OF RETURN - Those personnel that returned, returned at different times on 16 Dec 1965.

6. SIGNIFICANT SIGHTINGS.
   A. Team 21
      (1) 4 VC, observation post, 645344, gray, black and khaki uniforms, 151000, weapons undetermined.
      (2) 2 VC, heading north, 625357, black pajamas, 151050, small arms.
      (3) 1 VC, sitting in foxhole, 622346, black pajamas, 151050, small arms.
      (4) 5 VC, sitting under tree, 635357, 151115, uniforms and equipment undetermined.
      (5) 5 VC, observation post, 654336, 2 gray, 3 black uniforms, 161130, small arms.
      (6) 5 VC, observation post, 656343, 3 gray, 2 black uniforms, 161220, 1 BAR, 4 small arms.
      (7) 3 VC, observation post, 647347, gray black and khaki uniforms, 161220, small arms.
      (8) Fifteen VC, heading north, 660341, khaki and gray uniforms, 161400, small arms and heavy packs.
b. Team 22

(1) 6 huts at 639310, not occupied, sweet potato patches and chickens in the area, 151220.

(2) 3 VC suspects, moving west, 642312, black pajamas, 151220, no weapons sighted.

(3) 2 VC, sitting in place, 639340, 151303, uniforms and equipment undetermined.

(4) Well concealed village consisting of 12 large huts and several small ones at 641313. The large huts were 10 - 20 feet square. The village is estimated to be capable of housing 200 men. Each of the big huts had bundles of freshly cut punji stakes inside huts. Some of the huts had food inside them. There were listening posts to the north, east and west of the village with communication wire leading to them. There was some livestock in the area and also some tunnels. Two propaganda leaflets were found, one in Chinese and the other in Vietnamese. Both were subsequently lost. The Vietnamese leaflet was translated and said, "Eager to Learn Communist Party Letter."

(5) Suspected cache sighted at 632212. Seven feet wide, 10 feet long, and 3 feet high. It was made of bamboo and wooden planks and thatched all around.

(6) Two large buildings at 693315. One appeared to have two levels. They were well concealed. Smoke was coming from a chimney in one.

c. Team 23

(1) Four suspected VC, standing on top of hill, 617337, black, gray, and khaki uniforms, 151045, no weapons or equipment sighted.

(2) Thirty VC, moving south 634355, 151100, uniforms and equipment undetermined.

(3) Three VC, moving south, 634344, gray uniforms, 151145, small arms.

(4) Four VC, sitting down, 625357, 151200, weapons and equipment undetermined.

7. Narrative of the attack on the patrol base on the night of 16 Dec 1965.
By 161730, all reconnaissance teams had returned to the patrol base located at 640329. The entire patrol base was preparing to depart for BA TO at 0600 the next morning. At approximately 1900, two mortar rounds landed on the north side of the hill. During the next two hours, the VC dropped an estimated 100 mortar rounds on the hill, had strafed it with automatic weapons and had physically assaulted it with an estimated 150-200 men. Due to the mortar attack, the Americans and CIDG had trouble organizing a good defense or counter offensive. Everyone was broken up into small groups. When it appeared that the VC had taken the hill and that there was not a force large enough to launch a counter attack, the groups began to carry out the contingency for escape and evasion.

Most of the small groups moved away from the immediate area that night. At first light, they began their movement to BA TO. Along the way, small groups would link up with each other. Some of the men had been wounded, but they all moved slow enough so that everyone could make it to BA TO. The VC had search parties out attempting to pick up survivors. By 19 December, there were 4 USMC, 1 USSF, 2 LIEB, 1 Nung, and 17 CIDG, mission in action.

The VC were believed to have used a 57mm recoilless rifle and 60mm mortars. It is questionable as to whether they had 81mm mortars. The VC that assaulted the hill were wearing a variety of uniforms. Some had on black pajamas and black rain capes with a straw helmet covered with waterproofing material. Others had on camouflage utilities. Some of the VC were wearing cartridge belts with canteens and magazine pouches. It is believed that the VC in the black rain capes were North Vietnamese and that they were in command. The interpreter stated that some were speaking North Vietnamese and that others were speaking Montagnard. The assault force appeared to have good leadership and good discipline. Their attack was well planned and well executed.

8. OBSERVATIONS.

a. The VC sightings on the high ground are part of a combat outpost protecting the western approaches to the VUC LIEN area.

b. The villages at 639310 and 641313 are used to house VC in the VUC LIEN area. They were well concealed and probably could not be seen from the air. It is possible that there are several more in the area.

c. The suspected supply cache at 632312 is possibly one of several that the VC use to disperse their supplies.

d. The two large buildings 693315, are possibly used as a headquarters or for storing supplies or could possibly be a field hospital.

e. Some of the VC that attacked the patrol base were part of a main force unit. They were well trained and well disciplined.
f. The mortar attack on the patrol base dispersed the people and broke up their defensive posture. Had it not been for the mortars, the hill could possibly have been successfully defended.

9. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Had it not been for the attack on the patrol base, the operation would have been highly successful. The patrol base moved into an area from which the teams could operate out of and get into their objective areas undetected.

b. The patrol base remained in the same location for three nights which possibly contributed to the success of the VC attack. However, if the patrol base had moved, it would not have moved far because the teams were operating in the close vicinity, and the VC could have launched a similar attack on any hill in the area. The patrol base was on the best defendable high ground in the area.

J. C. LENKER
1stLt Flt Cmdr.
Overlay of Sighting on Operation #4

1st Dec Recon 3, Dec 1965
w/ Canal 5
OPERATION ORDER 5

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy. As briefed.
   b. Friendly. As briefed.

2. MISSION. To recover USMC MIA's and assist in the recovery of USSF and Vietnamese MIA's at or near BS 632337.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept. Move out in column with 30 CIDG of Co 122, 10 CIDG of Co 153, 10 CRP, 65 Nungs, 2 LLDB, 4 USSF, 3 AATV, and 1 Interpreter, to vicinity BS 630323. Establish a patrol base and proceed there from to BS 630323 with 40 CIDG, 10 CRP, 2 USSF, 1 Interpreter, and 2 LLDB. Locate and recover MIA's and return to BA TO, RVN.
   b. Sgt BLANTON. On order proceed from patrol base with the CIDG personnel to (BS 630323) and move to BS 630337. Locate and recover all Marine MIA and assist in the recovery of all other MIA's and return to the patrol base with the bodies for subsequent return to BA TO, RVN.
   c. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) Time of Departure: 210400H.
      (2) Time of Return: 211800H.
      (3) Return to patrol base WLT 211400H.
      (4) Exercise extreme caution in recovery of MIA's due to probable booby traps.
      (5) E & E Plan. If organized resistance with the enemy is made --
(a) **Enroute to and from patrol base.** Stay together and assist the main body in rappelling the attack and/or movement through to the objective area.

(b) **While conducting recovery of bodies.** Break contact and return to patrol base with CIDG personnel.

(c) Should the main body be dispersed and overrun, break into two and three man group and E & E to Camp BA TO -- approach the camp during daylight hours.

(6) Insure extreme caution is exercised when recoveries bodies or gear due to possibility of booby-trapping. Secure a line to each and move from its original position before proceeding.

4. **ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.**

a. Uniform and Equipment. Normal to include tiger stripe utilities.

b. Arms and Ammunition. Normal with at least 250 rounds per man.

c. Special Equipment.

(1) Four (4) grenades per man.

(2) One red panel per man.

(3) One (1) 30 foot section of line per man.

d. Rations. One meal per man.

e. Reports. Situation Report to Camp BA TO, RVN, each hour on the hour.

5. **COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS.**

a. Communications.

(1) One HT-1 with the recovery group and another with the Platoon CP.

(2) Red panels will be used to identify friendly units to orient aircraft during overflights should the main body become dispersed.
b. Command.

(1) Decisions made while on patrol will be arrived at jointly between the senior Marine, Platoon Leader of the Nung Force and the LLDB in Charge of the CIDG personnel.

(2) Sgt BAKER and I will remain at the patrol base site during the recovery of bodies.

S. L. OWENS
1stLt USMC
AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation Order 5-65
2. Ref: MAP, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheets
3. Patrol Composition:
   a. USMC 1stLt OWENS, S.L.
      Sgt BAKER, W.L.
      Sgt BLANTON, C.G.
      Cpl YOUNG, E.F.
      LCpl BROWN, M.L.
      LCpl CONSTANT, D.J.
      PFC WEINER, M.L.
   b. 30 CIDG from Co 122, 10 CIDG from Co 153, 10 CRP, 65 Nungs, 2 LLDB, 4 USSF, 3 Australians, 1 interpreter, and 2 Nungs (A-106).
4. MISSION. To recover USMC MIA's and assist in the recovery of USSF and Vietnamese MIA's at or near BS 62337.
6. Conduct of Patrol:
   a. Patrol route/ route of approach and return determined by security force (see overlay).
   b. Terrain: Hills covered with high grass, objective area Bald Hill.
   c. Obstacles: Fanji stakes in base area.
   d. Mines and booby-traps: None.
7. Enemy Information: See Narrative.
8. Results of encounter with enemy: See Narrative.
9. Significant Activities:
   a. Propaganda Analysis: N/A
   b. Hamlets Encountered: None
   c. Change in Tactics: None
d. Suspected Infiltration Routes: N/A

e. Miscellaneous: N/A

10. Was mission accomplished: Yes. However due to the confusion between the CIDG personnel the USSF MIA was left at the recovery site. Plans to recover his body on 22 Dec 1965 are being prepared.


Enclosure (1) Narrative
(2) Overlay
(3) Statements of personnel recovering bodies (copies)

S. L. OWENS
1stLt USMC
The patrol departed Camp BA TO, RVN, at 210510H and moved to a Camp outpost by 210615H and waited until it was light enough to proceed further.

At 210635H, the patrol departed for movement to the patrol base. Upon reaching the patrol base (211110H), the CIDG, 2 LLDB, 2 USSF, 1 interpreter, and 5 USMC, moved to BS 640329, in search of the MIA's. Enroute to the patrol base, one VCS was sighted at BS 646369. He continued to parallel the patrol for about 500 meters staying just out of small arms range.

Simultaneous with our arrival at the patrol base sight, two L-19's came "on station" to provide support. At 211300H, they sighted six VC at (BS 644329), and subjected them to rocket and automatic weapons fire. The pilots reported 1 VC KIA. The others were dispersed and did not cause further difficulties.

The recovery element of the patrol arrived at the site in which the MIA's were located at 211145H. Reports of findings were transmitted periodically and at one time it was reported "20 bodies were found". It was later learned that this was in error due to duplicity in countings by the personnel making the recovery. It was definite, however, that there were three Marines -- Sisson, Moore, and Joy, one USSF -- West, and nine CIDG, and one LLDB lieutenant located making a total of 14 bodies.

At 211245H, it was reported by USSF personnel, on the recovery site, that they were experiencing some difficulty in getting the CIDG to assist in recovery and preparation of US personnel for evacuation. Later the LLDB Sergeant allegedly rectified the problem.

At 211340H, helicopters requested for evacuation of the bodies, arrived and subsequently returned all, exclusive of the USSF Sergeant, to Camp BA TO. It is significant to mention that at 211435H, each group, USMC, CIDG, and USSF, reported all bodies had been evacuated.

The recovery party departed for the patrol base at 211435H, and arrived at 211500H.

At 211510H, the entire patrol departed for Camp BATO, and arrived at 211750H.

Immediately upon our return, Capt. Patton, Senior Advisor, USSF, Camp A-106, BA TO, RVN, informed me that Sgt. West's body (USSF) was not among those bodies returned.

Prior to and after our return the bodies of US personnel and the LLDB Lieutenant, were evacuated to Chu Lai, RVN.

S. L. Owens
1stLt USMC

DECLASSIFIED
Operation 5-65

Map: Vietnam 1:50,000
Series L70L, sheets 6755 II and 6755 III
2nd Plt. 15th ERCO
220950/9 Dec 1965 W/End 6

5-65: Owens, 15LT, USMC
OPERATION ORDER 1-65

Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet numbers 6656 I, 6756 IV

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.
   b. Friendly. -do-

2. MISSION.
   a. Conduct a recon of the objective area (overlay) to determine location and extent of VC activity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. 14 man recon platoon will depart camp 120500H and move overland to objective area, conduct recon, and move overland back to camp.
   b. Composition of Recon Plt.
      - Team 31 (Cpl Buchholz)
      1stLt Suttle - Plt Ldr
      GySgt Long
      HN Olsen
      Team 32
      Team 33
   c. Cpl Buchholz will remain in camp to assist in comm watch.
   d. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) ETD - 120500H
      (2) ETR - 131500H or 14 Dec 1965 depending on enemy sighting.
      (3) Route - see overlay
      (4) Debriefing - upon return to camp.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
   a. Rations - As prescribed by Platoon Leader.
   b. Arms and Ammo - minimum of 200 rds/man.
      (1) L-M-79 w/24 rds will be carried.

5. Uniforms - camouflage utilities.
CONFIDENTIAL

d. Equipment - as prescribed by Plt Ldr except as follows for med evac signaling.
   (1) yellow smoke - 1
   (2) red flank panel - 1
   (3) green lens flashlight - 1

e. Wounded - will be treated by corpsman and if necessary med evac will be effected.

f. POW - no POW's will be taken.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Equipment.
   (1) 1 - PRC - 25 w/2 batteries
   (2) 1 - PRC - 10 w/2 batteries
   (3) 2 - HT-1

b. Frequency - 39.4 for our reporting and air/ground frequency. The HT-1 frequency is preset crystal.

c. Call Signs.
   (1) Camp - Envious 18
   (2) Plt - Bulldog

d. Team code will be used to identify personnel if needed.

e. Reports.
   (1) Spot Reports - As they occur using detailed SALUTE format.
   (2) Sitrep
      (a) Scheduled contacts - At 0900, 1500, 2100, 0300 starting 120900 - give situation and present location.
      (b) Broadcast Times - At 0600, 1200, 1800, 2400, starting 120600.
   (3) Thrust Line - Base point is 360860 - base direction is north.
   (4) Check Points - Check points will be called in as plt crosses.

f. Base station will monitor continuously until completion of patrol.

W G SUTTLE
AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Operation Order 1-65

2. Ref: (a) MAP: Vietnam, sheet number, 6756 I, 6756 IV

3. Patrol Composition:
   a. 13 - USMC 1 - USN
   b. 1stLt Suttle - Patrol Leader

4. Mission:
   a. Conduct a recon of the objective area to determine location and extent of VC activity.

5. Time of Departure - 120500H CIDG Patrol 151000H

6. Time of Return - 131350H

7. Routes - see overlay

8. Terrain:
   a. The high ground, for the most part, is forested with a 30-35 foot canopy. The vegetation under the canopy is not thick and there is little ground cover. Areas of secondary growth are abundant. They consist of bamboo, elephant grass and thicket from 2-12 feet high. The hills are steep and rocky and the lack of ground cover makes them muddy and slippery. There are many landslide areas throughout the area of operations. There are many streams and old trails not shown on the maps. Movement is difficult at times due to the steep, muddy terrain and thick secondary growth.

9. Enemy:
   a. No signs of recent VC activity were observed. At the hut at 761847 was found an empty .50mm (.US) cardboard cartridge box and the bottom of a carbine magazine, however, these appeared to be several weeks old. A check of the known, old VC position on the ridgeline in the vicinity of 370865 was made and no recent activity was noted.

10. Map Corrections:
   a. Several old trails were found on the ridgelines in the area. Nearly every draw had a flowing stream in it from 2-20 feet wide.

11. Miscellaneous Information:
   a. Orange peels less than a week old were found at 362864.
   b. Leeches abound in the area and present a problem to troops.
12. Condition of Patrol and Equipment:
   a. Personnel - numerous leech bites but no complications.
   b. Equipment - good condition.
13. Conclusions and Recommendations:
   a. No signs of recent VC activity were observed on the high ridges and steep hills.
   b. Lug soled boots are essential in hilly muddy terrain.

W. G. SUTTLE
1stLt USMC
Op Order 1-65
Tra Bong

Operation Overlay
Map: Tra Bong 1:50,000, Series 1701, Sheet 6756 IV
W/B lute
15111 VSMC

Tra Bong

CK Pt #1
CK Pt #2
CK Pt #3
CK Pt #4

Obj Area

1st Rec Recon C, Dec 65
w/ Encl 7
CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION ORDER 2-65

Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet numbers 6656 I, 6756 IV.

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy - Current ISUMS and Intel briefing.
   b. Friendly - -do-

2. MISSION.
   a. Conduct a recon of the objective area (overlay) to determine location of VC 5th District HQ.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. 9 men our patrol will depart 150400 with CIOG Co on search/destroy mission. Upon reaching vicinity of objective area, our patrol will move independently to objective area and accomplish mission.
   b. Composition of Patrol.
      Team 32  Sgt Blankenship - Patrol Ldr
      Team 33  HN Olsen
   c. 1stLt Suttle and Sgt Schmitt will accompany one day CIDG Patrol.
   d. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) ETD - 150400
      (2) ETR - 171700
      (3) Route - see overlay
      (4) Debriefing - upon return to camp.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
   a. Rations - as prescribed by patrol ldr
   b. Arms and Ammo - minimum of 200 rds/man.
      (1) L-W-79 w/24 rds will be carried.
   c. Uniform - As prescribed by Patrol Ldr.

ENCLOSURE (8)
CONFIDENTIAL

iv. Equipment - As prescribed by Patrol Ldr except as follows for med evac signalling.

(1) 1 - yellow smoke
(2) 1 - red flank panel
(3) 1 - green lens flashlight

e. Wounded - Will be treated by corpsman and if necessary med evac will be effected.

f. POW - if unavoidable take a POW only if it will not jeopardize the Patrol.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Equipment to be Carried - minimum

(1) 1 - PRC-25 w/2 batteries
(2) 1 - PRC-10 w/2 batteries

b. Frecuencies - 39.4 Mc for our reporting and air/ground.

c. Call Signs

(1) Camp - Envious 18
(2) Patrol - Bulldog

d. Team code will be used for identifying personnel if needed.

e. Reports

(1) Spot Reports - As they occur using detailed SALUTE format.

(2) SitRep

(a) Scheduled Contacts - At 1500, 2100, 0300, and 0600 starting 151500 give situation and present location.

(b) Broadcast Times - At 1200, 1800, 2400, and 0600 starting 151800.

(3) Thrust Line - Base point is 450970 - base direction is north.

f. Base station will monitor continuously until completion of patrol.

W G SUTTLE
1stLt USMC
OpOrder 2-65
Tea Bong

Operation Overlay
Map: TeaBong 1:50,000 Series L701, Sheet 6756
W CS Battle 1
1st Lt USMC
1st Inf Recon Cpl 65 1036 36 10 64
1. Operation Order 2-65

2. Ref: (a) MAP: Vietnam, Sheet numbers, 6656 I, 6756 IV

3. Patrol Composition:
   a. 8 - USMC  1 - USN
   b. Sgt Blankenship - Patrol Leader

4. Mission:
   a. Conduct a recon of objective area (overlay) to determine location and extent of VC activity.

5. Time of Departure - base camp 150420H  CIDG Patrol 151000H

6. Time of Return - 171630H

7. Routes - see overlay

8. Terrain:
   a. The terrain on the north side of the river from the river to the foothills is composed of rolling hills out by many stream-filled draws. Old and new rice paddies are prevalent throughout the area. There are many scattered huts as shown on the map. The vegetation is mostly secondary growth and very dense in most areas making foot travel difficult and in some areas nearly impossible.

9. Enemy Sightings:
   a. No VC sightings were observed however the following observations were made.
   b. Huts in grid square 44P9 contained blue and khaki clothing similar to that worn by VC on OPERATION STARLIGHT. No personnel were around the area.
   c. Thach Bieb (1) (all sightings were fresh)
      (1) Hedgerow showed recent clearing as if in preparation for digging a position in it.
      (2) At the corners of fields and hedgerows were found many deep holes with dug out caves (see sketch) covered with brush and palm fronds.
      (3) A trench 30-40 meters long with a chest high fence in front formed by cutting a hedgerow down.
   d. There were no young men in any villages observed.
e. The patrol moved through several open areas and were observed by VN's. The VN's were startled, afraid, and openly hostile to the Americans.

f. A 50 cal machine gun was heard firing at 151115 H from the south side of the river. A Caribou (CV-2) was flying through the area at the time and the firing ceased when the Caribou went out of range.

10. Map Corrections:
   a. Villages were smaller than indicated on the map.
   b. Many trails exist throughout the area north of the river from Tra Bong to Thach Bieb.

11. Miscellaneous Information:
   a. High activity at night at An Hoa PF outpost on hill 141 (4786).
   b. East of objective area was heard an automatic weapon with exceptionally high rate of fire and was thought to not be a US type weapon.
   c. Ford across river east of Dang Plui. Small kids were observed crossing river even though torrential rains from 15-17 Dec. had considerably raised level of river.
   d. From north side of river opposite Dang Plui to the north of hill 71 (3508) runs an extensive trail network. The start of the trails have been recently camouflaged. Once you break through the camouflage, the trails widen out to 6-7 feet as they have been recently cut. Overhead cover is found on most of the trails. Travel from Dang Plui to hill 71 can be accomplished unobserved from the air by a large force with equipment in a short time if they have good knowledge of the trails. The trail runs generally close to the river.

12. Condition of Patrol:
   a. Personnel - good some immersion foot and hand, most were tired and slightly run down from constant movement through difficult terrain and constant wind and torrential rain. Numerous skin rashes and leech bites; no complications that rest and drying out will not cure.
   b. Equipment - good

13. Conclusions and Recommendations:
   a. Due to slow movement of CIDG Co during movement to vicinity of objective area, recon patrol lost several key hours thus preventing their checking out the NE section of objective area. Use of CIDG patrols to cover insertion of teams must be reevaluated.
   b. It is apparent the VC influence in the objective area is extremely strong due to preparation of positions and attitude of people.
c. Improvement of trail on north side of Tra Bong indicates possible future use by VC to attack Tra Bong.

W. G. SUTTLE
1stLt USMC
1. Brush in front of hedge row freshly cut, leaving stumps about chest high.

Rice Paddies
Located at coordinates BS 454894

1. Brush along hedge row freshly cut away.
2. Freshly dug trench line.
3. Cave 6' x 6' approx 15' deep with tunnel branching off, running in same direction as trench line.
4. Trail.
1. Large holes 6' x 6' and approximately 15' deep, covered with grass and twigs.

- Rolling Hills
- Hedge Row
- Rice Paddies

Located at coordinates BS 451891

12th Feb, Recon C, Dec 1965
W/ Encl 8
OPERATION ORDER 3-65

Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet Number 6656 I, 6756 IV.
Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy - Intel brief USSF
   b. Friendly - -do-
   c. Attachments/Detachments - none.

2. MISSION.
   a. Conduct reconnaissance of objective area to determine location, nature, and extent of VC activity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept. Depart camp 210700 in company with CIDC Combat Recon Platoon and proceed through village to objective area where patrol will leave CRP and proceed independently. CRP will recon eastern portion of objective area. Upon completion of recon return to camp. Duration of operation is dependent upon VC activity - maximum of 3 days.
   b. Patrol Composition.
      9 USMC 1 USN
      1st Lt Suttle - Patrol Ldr
      HN Olsen
   c. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) ETD - 210700
      (2) ETR - 231500
      (3) Route - see overlay
      (4) Debriefing - upon return to camp

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
   a. Rations - 4 "G" rations/man (stripped)
   b. Arms and Ammo - 1 M-79 w/24 rds
minimum 200 rds/man, minimum 2 fragmentary grenades/man, M-1/2 carbine as issued.

c. Uniform and Equipment
   (1) SOP
   (2) Med Evac Kit
      (a) 2 - yellow smoke
      (b) 1 - red air panel
      (c) 1 - green lens flashlight

d. Personal Effects - ID - SOP

e. Wounded - Med evac will be utilized if needed.

f. POW - Avoid taking POW's but if possible without jeopardizing safety of patrol, take POW and abort mission.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

a. Equipment
   (1) 1 - PRC-25 w/2 BA 386
   (2) 1 - PRC-10 w/2 BA 279
   (3) All comm equipment will be waterproofed for rain and stream crossings.

b. Call Signs
   (1) Camp - Envious 18
   (2) Patrol - Bulldog

c. Frequency
   (1) Recon report and air/ground 39.4 Mc
   (2) Monitored by camp 24 hrs/day

d. Scheduled Contacts
   (1) 0900, 1500, 2100, 0300
   (2) Report status and location.
e. **Broadcast**
   (1) 1200, 1800, 2400, 0600

f. **Threat Line**
   (1) Base Point 290900
   (2) Base direction - N is up

g. **Spat Reports/Evening Sightings**
   (1) When occur - use detailed SALUTE format.

h. **All air request/medevac through Envious 19.**

---

W G SUTTLE  
1stLt USMC
1. Operation Order 3-65

2. Ref: (a) MAP: Vietnam, Sheet numbers, 65-56 I, 65-56 IV

3. Patrol Composition:
   a. 9 - USMC 1 - USN
   b. 1stLt Suttle - Patrol Leader
      FN Olsen
      Team 31
      Team 32

4. Mission:
   a. Conduct reconnaissance of objective area to determine nature, extent, and location of VC activity.

5. Time of Departure: 210700H

6. Time of Return: 221500H

7. Routes: see overlay

8. Terrain:
   a. The terrain encountered was typical of the area, steep, rocky hills heavily forested with many areas of secondary growth. Travel through the area is extremely difficult and slow except through use of old trails and stream beds.

9. Enemy:
   a. No enemy sightings were observed.

10. Map Corrections:
    a. Many small streams are present. Nearly every major draw has one at this time.
    b. Numerous slide areas in the area.
    c. The contour interval is deceiving as there are many high hills (40-150 feet) that are not drawn or not easily discerned on the map.

11. Miscellaneous Information:
    a. Monteguard camps were found at 274280 and 273284. The camps were in good state of upkeep. They consisted of vines stretched between trees for hammocks or sanctuaries. There were present and firewood was stacked nearby. There appeared to be several chairs or tables in the areas. A typical site consisted of (see sketch) a framework for sleeping, cooking fire, and other frames for sitting etc.
The camp at 274°00 could support approximately 60 people and the one at 273°94 approximately 20. Both camps were alongside the Son La Thein and had good cover from aerial observation. There were no signs of recent use of either camp.

b. Old punji stakes were found at 291°77. Holes in the area indicate this was possibly the site of an old position. The area was heavily overgrown and had not been used in years.

c. New punji stakes were found at 273°92. They were on a finger at the edge of a slide area and had been positioned after the slide. No trails were in the area and it was not a natural route.

d. No signs of recent activity were seen on the road west of Tra Bong along the Suoi Tra Co.

12. Encounters With Enemy

13. Condition of Patrol:

a. Various skin rashes and infections are prevalent with all hands. No Complications are expected.

14. Conclusions and Recommendations:

a. The terrain encountered is best moved through utilizing available trails, ridgelines, and streams. As all are natural routes, patrols must exercise a high degree of security.

b. The good weather throughout the operation improved foot trafficability 100% through the area and made stream crossings much easier.

c. The CIDG Combat Recon Platoon was utilized to cover insertion of the patrol to the objective area and to cover part of the objective area. The proved effective in the insertion phase however their use on overnight patrols is still in question.

d. The Montoguard camps make ideal way stations or harbor sites for VC.

W. G. SUTTLE
1stLt USMC
Notes
1. Old Pumji Stakes
2. Large Camp
3. New Pumji Stakes
4. Small Camp

Overlay Op 3-65
Tet Box 1: 60,000, 6756 III
Tet Trung 1: 50,000, 6656 I
350 PCT, 1st Recce Dec 65
W & S: Battalion 1st LT USMC
W/Incl 9

DECLASSIFIED
PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: Chuckle-1

MAPS: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Sheet 6659 III, Series L-701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: (1) Off (13) En (1) USN

2. MISSION: To conduct an area reconnaissance of RZ #4 establishing day OP's and night ambush sites.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 051315H December 1965

4. TIME OF RETURN: 081130H December 1965

5. ROUTE: N/A

6. OBSERVATIONS: No visual or physical contact with the enemy was made.

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

(1) 3 days of extensive scouting and patrolling resulted in negative sightings of enemy or friendly forces.

(2) At 080900H (AT 848762) a booby trapped CHICOM grenade was found. It was placed in the brush along the side of the trail and anchored by means of band-aider straps tied to the grenade and the brush. A trip wire extended across the trail at a height of approximately 18 inches and was tied to a sapling. The booby trap was destroyed in place.

(3) Trails throughout the patrol's area of operations did not appear to have been used recently. Many are overgrown with vegetation.

(4) Communications with the AN/FRC-25 was generally good.

8. RESULT OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No contact was made.

9. CONDITION OF PATROL, INCLUDING DISPOSITION OF ANY DEAD OR WOUNDED: Fair.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

D. L. GRANNIS
lstLt 1st Recon Coy

11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: None.
Operation Order 477-65

Ref: (a) BnOpO 348-65

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Reference (a).

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.
   (1) Current INTSUM's, Coordinate with S-2 prior to departure for current information.

b. Friendly Forces.
   (1) Co A - RZ's 2 and 3 WEST of grid line 45. Primary Freq: 39.8.
   (2) Co C - RZ-6, Primary Freq: 46.9.
   (3) Force Recon, RZ-4, Primary Freq: 46.9.

c. Attachments and Detachments.
   (1) 2nd Plt (-), Co C, 3d Recon Bn.
   (2) 4th Plt (-), 3rd Force Recon.

2. MISSION. Company D and attachments conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in RZ's 4, 5 and 6 to determine extent of enemy activity.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Company D and attachments accomplish their assigned mission by maintaining area surveillance and patrolling in assigned RZ's as scheduled in paragraph 3b below. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

b. Patrol Schedule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Plt</th>
<th>RZ's</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 9-13 Dec 65</td>
<td>2nd Plt.</td>
<td>5 &amp; 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 9-13 Dec 65</td>
<td>3rd Plt.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 13-17 Dec 65</td>
<td>1st Plt.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 17-19 Dec 65</td>
<td>3rd Plt.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 13-18 Dec 65</td>
<td>Force Plt.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 13-18 Dec 65</td>
<td>3d Plt, Co C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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ENCLOSURE (11)
c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Refer to 3b above for commitment dates.

(2) Establish patrol bases in respective RZ's and conduct squad patrols as indicated in Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(3) Coordinate all adjacent patrol activities prior to departing Battalion CP.

(4) Patrol routes as indicated in Annex A (Operation Overlay) will be strictly adhered to. Any variation from assigned areas of patrol will be, first, coordinated with the Company Commander.

(5) Contact incoming patrols and conduct liaison, with special emphasis on their PB's, routes and enemy sightings.

(6) Coordinate with the respective infantry units into who's area you will be working.

(7) Coordinate with respective infantry FSCC prior to departure.

(8) Coordinate logistics requirements with Company 1st Sgt. maximum utilization of available vehicles will be used.

(9) All patrols will effect liaison with infantry unit located on Hill 41.

(10) Check patrol radio frequencies with Battalion Communications prior to departure to Battalion CP.

(11) Rules of engagement apply.

(12) Alpha Sierra Report will be made every hour. Alpha BRAVO reports will be submitted when setting in for extended periods of time and on order. Maximum effort to maintain communications will be made at all times.

(13) Be continuously alert for LZ's and RZ's.

(14) A complete and thorough briefing will be conducted by the Company Commander or his designated representative prior to departure.

(15) Be prepared to call and adjust artillery fire and air strikes, and to recommend infantry reinforcements as required.

(16) Submit list of patrol members to this CP prior to departure.
(17) Debriefing by Battalion S-2 immediately upon return to the Battalion area.

(18) Remember, aggressive reconnaissance is utmost in accomplishment of mission.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
   a. Sufficient CLASS I and V to sustain operation.
   b. Uniform and equipment in accordance with Company SOP.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.
   a. Radio Frequency: Primary 46.9; Alternate 44.3.
   b. Call Signs.
      (1) 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons — SCAT 1D, 2D, and 3D respectively.
      (2) Force Platoon — CHUCKLE 4.
      (3) 2nd Platoon, Co C — SCAT 2 CHARLIE.
      (4) Infantry Regiment — SCAT DELTA.
      (5) Relay — SCAT DELTA RELAY.
   c. Loss of Communications. After 12 hours return to Hill 41.
   d. Codes:
      (1) Thrust Line: As indicated in Annex A.
      (2) Authentication: CITY — STATE.

J. S. TARDY
Capt USMC
Commanding

Annexes: Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 477-65.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-2 (2)
3dMar (1)
3dMar FSCC (3)
1/1 (1)
1/3 (1)
3dReconBn (5)
Co D, 3dReconBn (6)
OPERATION ORDER 478-65

Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets 6558 I and 6658 IV
(b) BNOpO 349-65
(c) BNOpO 351-65

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Company D (Rein)
- Headquarters Section
- H&S Company (-)
- Det. Comm Plt
- Det. Med Section
- Det. ARVN Section
- 1st Platoon
- 2nd Platoon
- 3rd Platoon
- 1st Platoon, Force Recon

Capt. TARDY
Lt. BUBERT
Lt. MCDERMOTT
GySgt BUHL
Lt. BEST
Lt. PARKER

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.
(1) Reference (b).
(2) Current INTSUM's.

b. Friendly Forces.
(1) Company A, RZ-3.
(2) Company C, RZ-5.
(3) 12th Marines will provide artillery support.
(4) 1st MAV will provide fixed and rotary wing air support.

c. Attachments and Detachments.
(1) Task Organization.
(2) Effective on order.

---1---

ENVELOPE (12)
2. MISSION. Company D (Rein), conduct continuous reconnaissance in RZ-4, placing emphasis on the location of suitable routes, OP's, and LZ's SOUTH SOUTHWEST of HILL 995 (AT 821705) leading into the EASTERN end of Happy Valley.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) 3rd Platoon (Rein).

(a) Depart LZ FINCH on D-Day + 2 at L-Hour by helicopter and lift to vicinity (AT 832645).

(b) Proceed by foot and establish platoon PB vic HILL 795 (AT 808650).

(c) Locate and plot suitable routes, OP's, and LZ's from drop off point, with emphasis in GS's R065, R066, R165, and R166.

(d) Be especially alert to movement into and out of the EASTERN end of Happy Valley.

(e) Provide screening force for the company in assigned grid squares on order.

(f) On Order, proceed by foot to LZ vic (AT 832645) to be lifted out on or about 27 Dec 1965.

(g) Operation will be entirely conducted to the EAST of grid line 80 for a period of about six days.

(h) See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(2) 2nd Platoon (Rein).

(a) Depart LZ FINCH on D-Day at H-Hour by helicopter and lift to vic (AT 845724).

(b) Proceed by foot and establish platoon PB vic HILL 1279 (AT 800700).

(c) Locate and plot suitable routes, OP's, and LZ's from drop off point, with emphasis in GS's 8068, 8067, and 8069.

(d) Be especially alert to movement into and out of the EASTERN end of Happy Valley.

(e) On order, proceed by foot to LZ vic (AT 845724) to be lifted out.

DECLASSIFIED
(f) Operation will be entirely conducted to the EAST of grid line 80 for a period of about five days.

(g) Be prepared to relieve the 1st Platoon on or about 27 Dec 65, and to operate in RZ-4. Details to be announced.

(h) See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

31st Platoon (Rein).

(a) Depart LZ FINCH on D-2 at H-Hour by helicopter and lift to vic (AT 845724).

(b) Proceed by foot, locate and secure an area suitable for company PB vic HILL 995 (AT 821705).

(c) Dispatch one squad size patrol to depart HILL 995 on D-Day in time to reach helicopter LZ vic (AT 845724) to guide Command Group to company PB.

(d) Be prepared to provide company PB security.

(e) Locate and plot suitable routes, OP’s and LZ’s from drop off point, with emphasis in GS’s 8168, 8169, and 8170.

(f) On order, proceed by foot to LZ vic (AT 845724) to be lifted out.

(g) Operation will be entirely conducted to the EAST of grid line 80 for a period of about six days.

(h) See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

4th Headquarters Section.

(a) Depart LZ FINCH on D-Day at H-Hour by helicopter and lift to vic (AT 845724).

(b) Conduct link up with squad from 3rd Platoon and proceed by foot to company PB vic HILL 995 (AT 821705).

(c) When directed, proceed by foot to LZ vic (AT 845724) to be lifted out.

(d) Operation will be entirely conducted to the EAST of grid line 80 for a period of about five days.

(e) See Annex A (Operation Overlay).
(5) 4th Platoon, Force Recon.
   (a) Depart North Fort at 241500H Dec 1965, proceed by foot and
       conduct continuous squad size patrols in GS's 8377, 8274,
       8477, and 8474.

   (b) Particular emphasis will be placed on the TUNG SON Valley
       Area.

   (c) Return to North Fort not later than 0900H Dec 1965.

   (d) See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(6) Non-availability of helicopters will delay company operations
    until rescheduled.

b. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) Patrol routes as indicated in Annex A (Operation Overlay)
       will be strictly adhered to. Any variation from assigned
       areas of patrol will be first coordinated with the Company
       Commander.

   (2) This headquarters will coordinate with infantry FSCC prior to
       departure and with respective infantry units into who's area
       we will be working.

   (3) The company 1st Sergeant will be in charge of SCAT DELTA READ
       and will coordinate all logistics requirements.

   (4) 4th Platoon, Force Recon, is responsible for transportation
       and logistics requirements to sustain its own operation.

   (5) Rules of engagement apply.

   (6) A complete and through briefing will be conducted by the Company
       Commander prior to departure.

   (7) Accurate and timely reporting is of utmost concern to this command.
       Maximum effort will be made to maintain communications within
       platoons, with the Headquarters Sections and with SCAT DELTA.

   (8) Alpha Sierra Reports will be made to the Headquarters Sections every
       hour. Alpha BRAVO Reports will be made to the Headquarters Section
       when "Setting in" for extended periods of time. PB locations will
       be reported immediately upon establishment.
(9) Prior to activation of the Headquarters Section in the field, reports will be made directly to SCAT DELTA.

(10) Requests for artillery or air support will be made to the Headquarters Section. If approved, direct communications with SCAT DELTA is authorized. Be prepared to adjust artillery fire and air strikes as required.

(11) Insure that every man is thoroughly briefed on operation prior to departure.

(12) Remember, be aggressive, alert, and accurate. This is utmost in good reconnaissance.

(13) D-Day is 19 December 1965.

H-Hour is 1300  L-Hour is 1000  M-Hour is 1000

(14) One sniper rifle will be carried with the 1st and 2nd Platoons.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Sufficient Class I and Class V to sustain operations.

b. Uniform and equipment in accordance with Company SOP.

c. Requests for resupply will be made to the Headquarters Section as required.

d. Requests for MedEvacs will be made to the Headquarters Section.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.

a. Radio Frequency: Primary 46.9, Alternate 44.3

b. Call Signs:

(1) Headquarters Section SCAT DELTA 4
(2) 1st Platoon SCAT DELTA 1
(3) 2nd Platoon SCAT DELTA 2
(4) 3rd Platoon SCAT DELTA 3
(5) 4th Platoon, Force Recon CHUCKLE 4
(6) STAKEOUT SCAT DELTA
(7) Relay SCAT DELTA RELAY

--5--
(8) Inner-platoon call signs will be established as required in the following manner: Example: SCAT DELTA 2, this is SCAT DELTA 2-1 (Pronounced two-one, indicating 2nd Platoon, 1st Squad).

c. Loss of Communications.
(1) In case of loss of communications, continue to move to a new location until contact is made.
(2) In case of radio failure, return to Company FB.
(3) 4th Platoon, Force Recon, will return to North Fort is 12 hours lapse without communications.

d. Codes.
(1) Password/Countersign
   (a) Primary -- THIN HAIR
   (b) Alternate -- RED LABEL
(2) Thrust Line - 8167
(3) Force Platoon Thrust Line - 8575
(4) Authentication - CITY/STATE
(5) UOC: 0123456789 - BLACKNIGHT.

J. S. TARDY
Capt USMC
Commanding

Annexes: Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 478-65

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3 (2)
G-2 (2)
3rdMar (1)
3rdMar, FSCC (3)
1/1 (1)
1/3 (1)
3rdReconBn (6)
Co A (1)
Co C (1)
Co D (6)
Force Recon (1)
Recon Group Alpha (1)

TOTAL 26
PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: Punctuation 4

MAPS: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Sheet No. 6658 IV, Series 1-701

1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: (14) Enl (1) USN

2. MISSION: Establish OP in vicinity of grid square (AT 8668) and observe the valleys to the North and East.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 241400H - December 1965

4. TIME OF RETURN: 301030H - December 1965

5. ROUTE: Refer to Operation Order 478-65 (See Overlay)

6. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>COORDINATES</th>
<th>OBSERVATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>261045H</td>
<td>(AT 880678)</td>
<td>18 woodcutters entered the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261145H</td>
<td>(AT 880678)</td>
<td>29 woodcutters left the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270955H</td>
<td>(AT 880678)</td>
<td>60 woodcutters enter the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271100H</td>
<td>(AT 880678)</td>
<td>76 left in groups of 15 and 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271645H</td>
<td>(AT 878688)</td>
<td>Marines in Helo's landed and received automatic weapon fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271652H</td>
<td>(AT 873688)</td>
<td>1 round fired, sounded like M-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281615H</td>
<td>(AT 873688)</td>
<td>5 to 8 rounds semi-automatic fire, sounded like sniper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281745H</td>
<td>(AT 865668)</td>
<td>4 VCS entered ruins of church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290930H</td>
<td>(AT 871681)</td>
<td>30 men with weapons in rice paddy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. OTHER INFORMATION:

   (1) 261045H at (AT 880678) 18 woodcutters entered the brush and 29 came out and returned East.
(2) \( 270955 \text{H at (AT 880678)} \) 60 woodcutters in groups of 15 and 20 entered the brush and 76 came out and returned East.

(3) \( 281745 \text{H at (AT 885684)} \) 4 VCS wearing black with coolie hats entered the ruins of a church. Artillery fire was called with 3 direct hits on the church. None were seen leaving the area. They carried 6 rifles, 2 packs and 1 ruck sack.

(4) \( 290930 \text{H at (AT 871681)} \) 30 men wearing green uniforms and carrying weapons appeared through the fog. They appeared to be Marines. They disappeared in the fog at (AT 893678).

(5) The platoon carried 1 PRC 25 and used 2 batteries. The first battery was changed after 57 hours. They also had 2 PRC 10 radios, 1 did not work.

8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.

9. CONDITION OF PATROL, INCLUDING THE DISPOSITION OF ANY DEAD OR WOUNDED: Condition good, morale good.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: None.
Change number 1 to Operation Order 12-65

Ref: (a) CO, 3rdReconBn msg 291310H Dec 1965.

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen changes to Operation Order 12-65.

   a. **Paragraph 2.a.** Delete "30 December 1965 through 5 January 1966.

   b. **Paragraph 3.a.** Change the first sentence to read: "Upon receipt of this order and when directed about 30 December 1965, the platoon located at TRA BONG, RVN, will move overland by foot to Objective "N", Annex A (Operations Overlay), conduct reconnaissance operations of that objective for a period of five days and return."

   c. **Paragraph 3.c.** Delete entire paragraph and insert the following: "Upon receipt of this order and when directed about 30 December 1965, proceed overland by foot to Objective "N", conduct unilateral reconnaissance/surveillance operations of that objective for a period of five days and return."

---

W. C. SHAVER
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

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DECLASSIFIED
OPERATION ORDER 12-65

Ref: (a) MAI: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet numbers 6659 III, 6658 IV, and 6756 IV

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy. As briefed by the Intelligence Officer.

b. Friendly. As briefed by the Intelligence Officer.

c. Attachments/Detachments. None.

2. MISSION.

a. In coordination with U. S. Forces located at TRA BONG, RVN, conduct unilateral reconnaissance operations in the valley complex bounded by Grid Line BS 92 to the South, BS 39 to the North, BS 33 to the West, and BS 34 to the East. 30 December 1965 through 5 January 1966.


3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept. On 30 December 1965, the platoon located at TRA BONG, RVN, will move overland by foot to Objective "H", Annex A (Operations Overlay), conduct reconnaissance operations of that objective area and return by foot on 5 January 1966. On 30 December 1965, one platoon will depart Camp Merrell by helicopter to Landing Site "BLUE", conduct reconnaissance operations of Objective "T", Annex A (Operations Overlay), and be recovered by helicopter from Landing Site "GREEN" on 6 January 1966.

b. 2nd Platoon. At 000700H, move by helicopter from Camp MERRELL, to Landing Site BLUE, conduct reconnaissance/surveillance of Objective "T" through 5 January 1966, and be in position for recovery by helicopter at Landing Site GREEN at 060700H January 1966. Alternate insertion and recovery will be overland to or from FILL 41 (AT 96BCG).

c. 3rd Platoon. At 004300H, proceed overland by foot to Objective "T", conduct unilateral reconnaissance/surveillance of that objective area, and return to TRA BONG, RVN on 5 January 1966.

d. 4th Platoon. Continue present operations and upon recovery be prepared for subsequent employment.

e. Headquarters and Service Platoons.

(1) Provide support as required to include the continued security and administration of Camp MERRELL.

(2) Attach one Corpsman to each platoon for operations.

f. Supply Officer. Provide for the support required in paragraph 4, include requests made by the Platoon Commanders and Section Leaders as approved by the Commanding Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company.

g. Communications Officer.

(1) Provide communication operating instructions and support in accordance with paragraph 5.a.

DECLASSIFIED
(2) Establish and maintain relay sites as necessary to insure positive communications.

d. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) Landing Sites: BLUE (AT 850650) GREEN (AT 830930)
   (2) Thrust Lines: 2nd Platoon (AT 850650) 3rd Platoon (AT 830930)

(3) Specific Reconnaissance Observation Missions: As briefed by the Intelligence Officer.

(4) Platoon Commanders effect liaison with friendly units 24 hours prior to insertions.

(5) Include an Escape and Evasion Plan in each platoon operation order.

(6) Take VC/PAVN prisoners whenever possible.

(7) Debriefing of the Platoon Leader, 2nd Platoon will be accomplished by 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion S-2 Section, ASAP upon recovery.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

   b. Arms and Ammunition. As directed by Platoon Commanders.
   c. Rations. As directed by Platoon Commanders.
   d. Medical.
      (1) Seriously injured personnel will be evacuated at the discretion of the Platoon Commanders.
      (2) One Corpsman will accompany each platoon.
   e. Prisoners. All VC/PAVN prisoners will be evacuated ASAP.
   f. Reports.
      (1) The 2nd Platoon will submit overlay of primary and alternate routes, and their respective check points, both to and from their objective area 24 hours prior to insertion.
      (2) The 3rd Platoon will transmit by radio, shackled coordinates of their check points both to and from their objective area prior to insertion.
      (3) Platoons submit names of participating personnel to the Company S-3 prior to their insertion. The 3rd Platoon will transmit number and patrol leader only; however, all names of participating personnel will be kept on file at TRA BANG, RVN.
      (4) Situation reports, location/situations, will be submitted upon departure of each platoon and every hour thereafter.
      (5) 3rd Platoon prepare two copies of your operation order and after action report to be delivered to this headquarters ASAP on first available transportation upon your recovery.
      (6) All Spot Reports and/or sightings (SALUTE format) will be submitted in detail immediately upon their occurrence.
5. **COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS.**

   a. **Communications.**

      (1) _Frequencies and call signs._ As directed by Communications Operating Instructions.

      (2) Yellow smoke will be used to identify landing sites to effect helicopter recovery.

      (3) A red panel will be displayed to identify Teams/Platoons prior to and during air strikes.

      (4) _Challange and Password._ to be published immediately prior to a platoons insertion.

   b. **Command.**

      (1) The 3rd Platoon C.P. is located at TRA BONG, RVN, (BS 333878); however, the Platoon Commander will exercise control of his teams from within his objective area.

      (2) The Company C.P. will remain at Camp MERRELL.


Annex A (Operations Overlay)

DISTRIBUTION:

W. C. SHAVER
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding