FIRST ENDORSEMENT on G0, 1st Force Recon Co ltr 3/RWC/JIC 5750 of 2 May 66 Ser. no. 017-66

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

1. Forwarded.

B. G. HUNTER
By direction
1ST FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Command and Staff Billets
(2) Operation Order 15-66 of 091500H April 1966
(3) Frag Order 32-66 of 120700H April 1966
(4) Frag Order 30-66 of 121200H April 1966
(5) Operation Order 1-66 of 162000H April 1966
(6) Operation Order 1-66 of 171230H April 1966
(7) Operation Order 3-66 of 181500H April 1966
(8) Operation Order 2-66 of 201030H April 1966
(9) Operation Order 1-66 of 210900H April 1966
(10) Operation Order 2-66 of 211000H April 1966
(11) Operation Order 6-66 of 212200H April 1966
(12) Patrol Report of 162315H April 1966
(13) Patrol Report of 201900H April 1966
(14) Patrol Report of 202200H April 1966
(15) Patrol Report of 210000H April 1966
(16) Patrol Report of 212100H April 1966
(17) Patrol Report of 232200H April 1966
(18) Patrol Report of 242315H April 1966
(19) Patrol Report of 250200H April 1966
(20) Patrol Report of 261900H April 1966

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted for the month of April 1966.

a. Organizational Data.

(1) Designation/Location. 3d Reconnaissance Bn., S/C No. 244-36

Please return to S/C *
(a) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-).

(b) Administration and logistical personnel at DA NANG, Republic of VIETNAM (RVN).

(c) The 2nd and 5th Platoons were chopped opcon 4th Marines at HUE/PHU BAI, Republic of VIETNAM (RVN), on 11 April 1966.

(d) The Command Group and the 1st and 3rd Platoons were relocated from DA NANG to HUE/PHU BAI, Republic of VIETNAM (RVN), on 15 April 1966, assumed command of Co B (Rein), 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, and assumed responsibility for the recon effort in the HUE/PHU BAI area while attached to the 4th Marine Regiment.

(e) The 1st Platoon was attached to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, for Operation VIRGINIA on 16 April 1966.

(f) The 4th Platoon joined the Command Group at HUE/PHU BAI, Republic of VIETNAM (RVN), on 19 April 1966.

(g) The 1st Platoon joined the Command Group at HUE/PHU BAI, Republic of VIETNAM (RVN), on 20 April 1966.

(h) The Command Group and the 1st through the 5th Platoons returned to DA NANG, Republic of VIETNAM (RVN), on 27 April 1966, at the same time relinquishing command of Co B (Rein), 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion.

(i) The Command Group and the 1st through the 5th Platoons were chopped opcon 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, GHI LAI, Republic of VIETNAM (RVN), on 29 April 1966.

(j) This unit has 2 teams attached to the SLF.

(2) Period Covered. 010001H April 1966 to 302400H April 1966.

(3) Command and Staff Billets. Enclosure (1).

(4) Average Monthly Strength. 7 officers, 126 enlisted, 7 USN enlisted.
b. Significant Events.

(1) Personnel.

(a) On 19 April 1966, the company sustained 2 WIA's and 1 MIA.

(b) On 20 April 1966, the MIA was recovered with no injuries sustained.

(c) On 21 April 1966, the company sustained 4 WIA's.

(d) On 23 April 1966, the company sustained 2 WIA's.

(e) On 24 April 1966, the company sustained 1 KIA.

(f) On 5 April 1966, 1st Sergeant R. F. SNYDER joined the company from 6th Force Reconnaissance Company I&I Staff, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, for 60 days OJT.

(g) On 26 April 1966, Captain R. W. CRAIN, joined the company as Operations Officer.

(h) On 27 April 1966, Captain J. J. CARTY, joined the company as Executive Officer.

[Signature]

J. A. COLEY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BILLET</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>SERNO/MOS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>COLEY, D.A.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>056695/0302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>PARKER, R.F.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>085283/0302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>LENKER, J.C.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>087585/0302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Officer</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>KOCH, G.A.</td>
<td>SSgt</td>
<td>1306806/0239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Officer</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>BEST, S.J.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Officer</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>GOEWEY, V.L.</td>
<td>MSGt</td>
<td>1113771/2539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>GRANTIS, D.L.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Platoon Commander, 2nd Platoon</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>RUNNELLIS, M.E.</td>
<td>GSgt</td>
<td>1088012/0369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Commander, 3rd Platoon</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>HENDERSON, W.T.</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Commander, 4th Platoon</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>HALL, K.R.</td>
<td>SSgt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Platoon Commander, 5th Platoon</td>
<td>1stLt</td>
<td>PAULL, J.T.</td>
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Enclosure (1)
Operation Order 15-66


(b) BnOp 349-65 w/Ch 1
(c) BnO 1500-1
(d) BnOp Plan 12-66
(e) 3rd Div OpO 368-66 (dtd 011200Z Apr 66)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization

a. Reference (b)


1. SITUATION


b. Friendly Forces. Reference (b).

c. Attachments and Detachments. Reference (e).

2. MISSION. 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Rein) establishes and maintains a reconnaissance network in the TAOR/RZ's of the DA NANG enclave and conducts reconnaissance/infantry reinforced operations against VC forces beyond the TAOR.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Reference (b).

b. Go A

(1) During the period 16-30 April 1966 inclusive, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in or WEST of RZ-3 and RZ-4 (above GL-75). Utilize 50% of available forces for such operations except during the period 17-25 April when 66% of available forces shall be utilized.

(2) Be prepared on order to execute reference (d).
(3) Be prepared to conduct 5 days training. Be guided in this training by the provisions of reference (c).

c. Co C. During the period 16-30 April 1966 inclusive, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in and WEST of RZ-5. Utilize 50% of available forces for such operations except during the period 17-25 April when 60% of available forces shall be utilized.

d. Co D (Rein)

(1) During the period 16-30 April 1966 inclusive, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in and WEST of RZ-4 (below GL-75) and RZ-6. Utilize 50% of available forces for such operations except during the period of 17-25 April when 60% of available forces shall be utilized.

(2) Be prepared on order to assume screening mission of Company A during their training period.

(3) Attach one platoon when directed in accordance with reference (e).

o. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Operate within supporting artillery range.

(2) Be prepared to call and adjust artillery fire. Make personal liaison with 12th Marines (S-3) for artillery coordination, after coordinating with cognizant Regimental FSCC.

(3) Shackle O-T azimuth when adjusting artillery.

(4) Submit company employment schedules by 151900H.

(5) Fire support and infantry reinforcement requirements will be effected by direct liaison with cognizant Regimental Commanders.

(6) Coordinate all missions with cognizant Regimental Commanders.

(7) Annex A to reference (b).

(8) Submit helicopter requirements and operation orders to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) not later than 48 hours prior to commencement of missions.

(9) Use varying means and times of entry and exit. Helicopter landing zones will normally be no closer than 3000 meters to objective area.
(10) Submit patrol roster to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) prior to execution of assigned missions.

(11) Cause patrol leaders to report to Battalion S-2 immediately on return to the unit area for debriefing.

(12) Be prepared to insert and/or extract by foot.

(13) If an air strike is requested and approved, display a single red panel at forward most position when aircraft are on station.

(14) Be prepared to recommend infantry exploitation or reinforcement and suitable primary and alternate landing zones for its entry.

(15) Each company in the DA NANG enclave shall report hourly to this Headquarters, the location and situation of each element of each patrol.

(16) Any patrol out of contact for a period of six hours shall abort its mission and return to camp.

(17) Each squad will carry at least one (1) entrenching tool. All trash and garbage will be buried and the sites camouflaged. Every effort will be made to obscure all evidence of patrol passage.

(18) Whenever possible, patrol leaders will be afforded opportunity for helicopter reconnaissance prior to insertion.

4. **ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

   a. Reference (b).

   b. Utilize long range patrol packet when available.

5. **COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS**

   a. Reference (b).

   b. Each platoon size patrol shall carry a PRC-25 for its primary means of communication. Inner platoon communications by PRC-10.

   c. Field relay sites will carry both primary and alternate means of communications.
d. Utilize battalion brevity code as promulgated by reference (b).

R. R. VAN CLEVE

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION

<p>| | | |</p>
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<tr>
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TOTAL                                     50
FRAG ORDER 32-66

Ref: (a) CoB OpO 1-66
     (b) Map Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheet 6460 I

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: 2nd Platoon 1st Force Recon, Lt. PAULL

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces. See current INTSUMS.
   b. Friendly Forces. See current OPSUMS.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance/surveillance operations in RZ 1. Determine and report all enemy movement in that area.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of operation: 2nd Platoon will depart 4th Marines CP LZ at 151700H by helicopter and lift to the vicinity of YD 596218. From there the patrol will proceed on foot along assigned patrol route in accordance with annex A (Operation Overlay). Recovery of the platoon will be affected by helicopter from a landing zone located at YD 523215 at 191800H.

   b. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) See reference (a).
      (2) See annex A (Operation Overlay).

   (3) Thrust change daily at 2400H.

   a. R+0 = 5122
   b. R+1 = 5621
   c. R+2 = 5120
   d. R+3 = 5317
   e. R+4 = 923
   f. R+5 = 5225

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
   a. See reference (a).
   b. Reports see annex B (Reports) to reference (a).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. Communications.
(2) Unit Brevity Code. See reference (a) and annex C (Unit Brevity Code) of reference (a).

(3) Shackles

```
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
E A O F M C H J L B
P D Q N U G K R T I
Y Z V X S W
```

(4) Call signals: Flt Hq - DIAMOND; 1st Sqd - TOPAZ

(5) Frequencies: Primary 41.3, Alternate 45.7, Conduct of Fire net PATABLY XRAY 35.3

b. Command. No change.

JAMES L. COMPTON
Captain US Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES.

a. Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL.

J.J. CASSITY JR.
LT. USMCR
Copy of 30 copies
1st Force Recon Co
Annex A (Operations Overlay) to Frag Order 32-66

LEGEND

O - HLZ
A - OP
PRAG ORDER 30-66

Ref: (a) CoB OpO I-66
     (b) Map Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheet 6560 III

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: 1st Platoon 1st Force Recon Cpt Runnells

1. SITUATION:
   a. Enemy Forces. See current INTSUMS.
   b. Friendly Forces. See current OPSUMS.
   c. Attachments and detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Conduct continuous reconnaissance/surveillance operations in RZ 2. Determine and report all enemy movement in that area.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation: 1st Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co, will depart 11th Marines OP 12 at 121730H and lift to YD 775090. From there they will proceed on foot to establish and maintain OP's as indicated in Annex A (Operation Overlay). Recovery of the platoon will be effected by helicopter from a landing zone at YD 764085 at 161800H.

b. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) See reference (a).
   (2) OP #1 is located at YD 749088.
   (3) OP #2 is located at YD 750085.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
   a. See reference (a).
   b. Reports: See annex B (Reports) of reference (a).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. Communications.
      (1) Two FBC-25 radios will be carried with sufficient batteries to sustain the operation.
(2) Unit Brevity Code. See reference (a) and annex C (Unit Brevity Code) of reference (a).

(3) Thrust lines. Change daily at 2400H.

- 13th - 7004
- 14th - 7111
- 15th - 7212
- 16th - 7314
- 17th - 7511
- 18th - 7408

(4) Shackles.

- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
- E A O F M C H J L B
- C D Q N U G K R T I
- Y Z V X S W

(5) Call signs. OP #1 ROCK; OP #2 PAPER.

(6) Frequencies: Primary 41.3, Alternate 45.7, Conduct of Fire net PAYABLE XRAY 35.3

b. Command. No change.

JAMES L. COMPTON
Captain US Marines Corp
Commanding

ANNEXES:

A (Operation Overlay)

OFFICIAL:

J.J. CASSITY
LT. USMC
Copy of 30 copies
CoB 3rd Recon Bn
Annex A (Operations Overlay) to Frag Order 29-66

LEGEND

O - HIZ
△ - OP

1st Fee Recon Co, April 6
F/32 Encl 4
OPERATION ORDER 1-66

Ref: (a) CoB OpO 1-66
(b) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheet number 6559 IV

Task Zone: H

Task Organization: 3rd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co, lstLt HENDERSON

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Forces. See current INTSUNS.
   b. Friendly Forces. See current OPSUNS.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance patrolling and surveillance operations in RZ 3. Determine and report all enemy movement in that area.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation. The 3rd Platoon, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, departs the 4th Marines CP LZ at 171800H April 1966, by helicopter and lifts to vicinity of YD 824013. From there, the platoon proceeds on foot along assigned patrol route in accordance with Annex A (Operations Overlay). Recovery of the platoon will be effected by helicopter from landing zone located at YD 834990 at 211800H April 1966.

   b. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) See reference (a).
      (2) See Annex A (Operations Overlay).
      (3) Thrust Lines:
         \[\begin{align*}
         \text{F} &= 8002 \\
         \text{Y} &= 8200 \\
         \text{X} &= 8498 \\
         \text{Z} &= 8402
         \end{align*}\]

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See reference (a).
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. Communications.

(1) Two AN/PRC-25 radios will be carried with sufficient batteries to sustain the operation.

(2) Unit Brevity Code. See reference (a) and Annex C (Unit Brevity Code) of reference (a).

(3) Shackles:

1 -- K C
2 -- F M
3 -- A P S X
4 -- L G
5 -- N B W Y
6 -- H Q
7 -- T J
8 -- I U
9 -- Z
0 -- O N V Z

(4) Call signs. Platoon -- CALLEON; Relay Station -- BRAVO RELAY

(5) Frequencies. Primary -- 38.7; Alternate -- 39.4. Conduct of fire net -- PAYABLE XRAY -- 36.2.

b. Command. No change.

W. T. HENDERSON
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Platoon Commander

ANNEXES:

A -- Operations Overlay

OFFICIAL:

J. C. LENKER
1st Lt USMC
Annex A (Operations Overlay) to Operation Order 1-66
OPERATION ORDER 1-66

Ref: (a) MAPS: 1:50,000, AMS, Series L701, Sheet numbers 6459 I, II; 6460 I, II; 6560 II, III, IV; 6461 II; 6559 I, II, III, IV  
(b) 3dMarDivO 343-65

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

Reconnaissance Group Bravo
Company "B", 3d Recon En  
2nd Plt, 1st Force Recon Co  
3rd Plt, 1st Force Recon Co  
5th Plt, 1st Force Recon Co

Major COLBY
Capt COMPTON
GySgt RUNNELS
1stLt HENDERSON
1stLt PAULL

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS.  
   b. Friendly Forces. Reference (b).  
   c. Attachments and Detachments. As required.

2. MISSION. Reconnaissance Group Bravo establishes and maintains a reconnaissance network in the reconnaissance zones of the HUE-PHU BAI enclave.

2. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operations. Reconnaissance units will operate in RZ’s 1, 2, and 3, to locate and report enemy movements, locations, and positions.  
   b. Company “B”. During the period of 16 - 30 April 1966, inclusive, conduct continuous reconnaissance operations in RZ 1 and 2, utilizing 50% of available forces. Capture at least one VC in each RZ.
   c. 2nd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co. During the period 21 - 25 April and 29 April through 3 May 1966, inclusive, conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ 3, and capture at least one VC.
   d. 3rd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co. During the period 17 - 21 and 25 - 29 April 1966, inclusive, conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ 3. Capture at least one VC.

ENCLOSURE (c)
e. 5th Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co. During the period 22 - 26 April 1966, conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ 1.

f. Coordinating instructions.

(1) Unit leaders will submit a patrol order and operation overlay not later than 48 hours prior to commencement of the operation.

(2) Operate within supporting artillery range.

(3) Be prepared to call and adjust artillery fire. Make personal liaison with 4th Marine FSCC, or 1/4 FSCC, as appropriate, and with 3/12 FDC.

(4) Shackle O-T azimuth when adjusting artillery fire.

(5) Be prepared to recommend infantry exploitation or reinforcement and suitable landing zones for its entry.

(6) Each patrol will report its location and situation hourly.

(7) Submit helicopter requests to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) not later than 48 hours prior to insertion. Whenever possible, patrol leaders will make a helo recon of the operations area.

(8) Use varying times of entry and exit. Helicopter landing zones will normally be not less than 3000 meters from objective area.

(9) Submit patrol roster to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) prior to insertion.

(10) Patrol leaders will report to the S-2 ASAP after recovery.

(11) If an airstrike is requested and approved, be prepared to display a single red panel to mark friendly position.

(12) If a patrol is out of contact for three hours, it will move to last position where communications was successful. If there is no contact for six hours, the patrol will abort its mission and return to camp.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS.

a. Uniform and Equipment. As directed by patrol leader.
b. Arms and Ammunition. As directed by patrol leader. Ammunition to be carried will not be less than 100 rounds per M-14 and 24 rounds per M-79. Each patrol will carry no less than 2 M-72 rocket launchers.

c. Rations. As directed by the patrol leader.

d. Special Equipment.
   (1) One pair of binoculars per team.
   (2) One PSR-1 per platoon.
   (3) One red panel per team.
   (4) One yellow smoke per team.
   (5) Patrols with primary observation post missions carry one M-79 spotting scope.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. Each platoon size patrol will carry an AN/PRC-25 radio for its primary means of communications. Inter-platoon communications will be by AN/PRC-10.
   b. When available, an AN/PRC-25 will be carried for use on the conduct of fire net.
   c. Communications will be according to the COI briefing prior to each patrol.
   d. Patrols in the field will send hourly situation and location reports and will monitor their radio continuously.
   e. Radio relay sites will be established as necessary.

   D. A. COLEY
   Major, U.S. Marine Corps
   Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

   Commanding Officer 5
   Company "B" 5
   2nd Plt, 1st FRC 3
   3rd Plt, 1st FRC 3
   5th Plt, 1st FRC 3
   File 2
   4th Marines
   S-3 2
   FSCC 2
   3/12 1
   3d Recon Bn 3
   G-3, 3d MarDiv 1
   30

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION ORDER 3-66

Ref: (A) Recon Group B OpO 1-66
     (B) Map Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets 6559IV & 6560III

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: 4th Platoon CoB 3rd RECON

1. SITUATION:
   a. Enemy Forces. See Current INTSUMs.
   b. Friendly Forces. See Current OPSUMs.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance patrolling and surveillance operations in
   RZ #11. Determine and report all enemy movement in that area. Particular
   effort is to be made in obtaining a prisoner.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operations. 4th Platoon CoB departs the 4th Marines CP LZ
      at 201800H April 1966 by helicopter and lift to vicinity of YD 777077. The patrol
      will then proceed along assigned patrol route in accordance with annex A
      (Operation Overlay). The platoon will be extracted from HLZ in vicinity of
      YC 804046. If there is no suitable LZ available be prepared to clear a zone.

Coordinating Instructions.

   1. See reference (A)

   2. Thrust lines change daily at 2400H.
      20th - 6905    23rd - 7310
      21st - 6907    24th - 7410
      22nd - 6808    25th - 7506

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
   a. See reference (A)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS.
   a. Communications.
      (1). See reference (A)

      (2). Two AN/PRC-25 radio's will be carried with sufficient batteries to
         sustain the operation.
(3). Unit brevity code will be employed.

(h). SHACKLES

1 - BOWY
2 - EK
3 - JP
4 - AT
5 - FLUZ
6 - IQ
7 - CRVX
8 - GM
9 - HS
0 - DN


(6). Frequencies. Primary - 36.7 Alternate - 39.4 Conduct of Fire

net PAYABLE TRF - 36.2

b. Command. No change.

JAMES L. COPTEN
Captain, US Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES
a. Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL

JOSEPH J. CASSIDY JR.
Lt. USMC
Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Recon Group Bravo Op 1-66
(b) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Sheet 1701, Sheet number 6559 IV

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: 2nd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co, Cpt. Runnels

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Forces: Current OPREPS.
   b. Friendly Forces: Current OPREPS.
   c. Attachments/Depots: None.

2. MISSION: Conduct reconnaissance/surveillance of PZ 3, to include the village in grid square 8759. Examine and report all enemy movement in that area. Particular effort is to be made in capturing a prisoner.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operations: 2nd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co, departs 4th Marines CP IZ at 2100H April 1966, by helicopter and lift to vicinity YC 855C15. The patrol then proceeds along route in accordance with Annex 4 (Operation Gunlay). The platoon will be extracted from the vicinity of YD 855C15.

   b. Coordinating Instructions:
      (1) See reference (a).
      (2) Thrust lines:

      | L  | M  |
      | 8002 | 9099 |
      | 8003 | 8003 |
      | 9003 | 8199 |

      (3) Daily points will be designated while moving. Action at the rally point will be to set up a 360 degree security perimeter.
      (4) Action in danger area. One team will scout out the danger area while being covered by the rest of the patrol.

ENCLOSURE (2)
4. **ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.**
   a. See reference (a).
   b. Individuals will carry C-rations for 4 days, plus two LPR’s.

5. **COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.**
   a. **Communications.**
      (1) See reference (a).
      (2) Two AN/TRC-25’s will be carried with sufficient batteries.
      (3) **Frequencies.** Primary 38.7, Alternate 39.4, Command of fire net, PAYAL 30.2
   (4) **Shackle.**
      
      | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 0 |
      |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
      | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
      | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R |
      | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
   (5) **Pronouns.**
      
      - LTM = SATCH
      - WTM = EXPERSON
      - MTM = LTR
      - MEO BVC = LITTLE RABBIT
      - EXTRATION = PEANUT BUTTER
   (6) **Callsigns.** PREPARE.

   b. **Command.** No change.

   [Signature]

   L. S. DENNIS
   Culinary Sergeant, I. S. Marine Corps
   Adjunct Leader

   **Notes:**
   a. (Operations Overlay)
Annex A (Operations Overlay) to Operation Order 2-66 201400H April 1966
Map Sheet 6559 IV

- = BLT
= CP
= Route
Operation Order 1-66

Ref: (a) Recon Group Bravo OpO 1-66
(b) Map; SH-56 number 6460 II, 1:50,000, Series L701

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy forces. Current INTSUMS.
   b. Friendly forces. Current OPSUMS.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. During the period 22 to 26 April 1966, conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations in RZ 1. Attempt to capture at least one VC.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of operation. The 4th Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co, will be helo-lifted from the 4th Marines CP LZ at 211800H April 1966, and dropped in the vicinity of YD 568233. The patrol will then move along the route in accordance with Annex A (Operations Overlay). The patrol will be picked up in the vicinity of YD 542225 at 251500H April 1966.

   b. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) See reference (a).
      (2) Thrust lines:
           
           T = 5323
           B = 5324
           H = 5320
           S = 5518
           W = 4924
           M = 5419

            (3) Rally points will be designated in the recon area.

            (4) Action in danger areas. One team will be the covering force for the point team when it checks out a danger area.

(a) See reference (a).
b. 

- 200 rds per M-14, 24 rds per M-79, 3 M-79, and 2 M-72.

- 2 days of MC1's, 3 days of LRPR.

5. **COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.**

a. Communications.

(1) Platoon will take two AN/PRC-25's and sufficient batteries.

(2) **Frequencies.** Primary 38.7, alternate 39.4, conduct of fire net 38.2.

(3) **Shackles.**

  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

  F C Z B X V J T A
  F I O U E L D R W
  K M Y G
  S N

(4) **Callsigns.** 4th Platoon -- HATEFUL, relay -- RATHOLE RELAY, base station -- RATHOLE BRAVO, artillery -- SEABROOK.

(5) **Codes.**

- **KIA** - COTCH
- **Med Evac** - PETER RABBIT
- **Extraction** - PEANUT BUTTER
- **Harbor Site** - SWITCHBLADE
- **Compromise** - BALONEY

b. **Communications change.**

---

**K. R. HALL**

Staff Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ANNEX:

A Operations Overlay

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Same as Operation Order 2-66
Patrol Route Overlay
Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) 3rd Mar Div OpO 343-65
(b) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheet numbers 6459 I, II, 6460 I, II; 6461 II, 6559 I, II, III, IV; 6560 II, III, IV

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

Reconnaissance Group Bravo
1st Force Reconnaissance Company
1st Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
2nd Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
3rd Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
4th Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
5th Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
"B" Company, 3rd Reconnaissance Bn

Major COLBY
Major COLBY
1stLt GRANNIS
GySgt RUNNELLS
1stLt HENDERSON
SSgt HALL
1stLt PAULL
Capt COMPTON

1. SITUATION.


b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Reference (a).

(2) 3/12 Battalion Artillery or Provisional Artillery Group provides artillery fire support.

(3) 1st Marine Air Wing provides fixed and rotary wing air support.

(4) Sparrow Hawk reaction force of reinforced squad size.

2. MISSION. Reconnaissance Group Bravo establishes and maintain a reconnaissance network in the HUE-PHU BAI TACR/RC's and conducts directed reconnaissance missions throughout the northern I Corps area.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Reconnaissance Group Bravo employs its elements in general support of the 4th Marines to gain intelligence.
information by establishing a reconnaissance net in the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR/RZ's. This task will be accomplished by aggressively patrolling the zones, and by establishment of observation posts along routes, rivers, and critical terrain features. Special operations will be conducted as directed.

b. Company "B".
   (1) General support, HUE-PHU BAI RZ's.
   (2) Be prepared to assume other missions.

c. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company Platoons.
   (1) General support, HUE-PHU BAI RZ's.
   (2) Be prepared to assume other missions.

d. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) RZ's: Annex B (HUE-PHU BAI RZ's).
   (2) EEI's: Annex A (Intelligence).
   (3) Reports required: Annex E (Reports).
   (4) Effective upon receipt.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Supply.
   (1) Prescribed Loads. The prescribed loads that will be taken on a platoon sized patrol will include:
      (a) No less than 100 rounds of ammunition for the M-14, carbine, or M3A1, and no less than 24 rounds for the M-79.
      (b) Two M-72 LAAW's.
      (c) One PSR-1.
      (d) One red panel for each team/squad.
      (e) One yellow smoke for each team/squad.
      (f) One pair binoculars or spotting scope for each team/squad.
(2) **Supply Sources.**

(a) Logistical support will come from the 4th Marine Regiment.

(b) Reconnaissance units will be supported by the units to which they are attached.

(3) **Control and Distribution.** Normal.

(4) **Resupply.**

(a) Operations of seven days or less will carry the necessary supplies for the duration of the operation.

(b) Operations requiring resupply will normally be resupplied by helicopter.

(5) **Captured Material.**

(a) Evacuate to this Headquarters for intelligence evaluation and disposition.

(b) Unless otherwise directed, live ordnance will be destroyed in place rather than evacuated.

b. **Medical.**

(1) Minor injuries will be treated in the field.

(2) Emergency medical evacuation will be made at the discretion of the patrol leader.

(3) Requests for helicopter evacuation will be sent to the reconnaissance liaison at the 4th Marines FSCC.

c. **Transportation.**

(1) Air requests for insertions, retractions, and recon overflights will be submitted prior to 0800 the day before the flight.

(2) Transportation will be utilized in both directions. Patrols being inserted and retracted on the same day will normally utilize the same transportation.

d. **Personnel.**

(1) Patrol leaders will submit a roster of their patrol to the S-3 prior to insertion.
(2) Report all casualties to this Headquarters by the most expeditious means.

(3) Captured VC will be evacuated to the 4th Marines CP in accordance with Annex A (Intelligence).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. Annex C (Communications-Electronics).

D. A. COLEY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES:
A (Intelligence)
B (HUE-PHU BA1 TAOR/RZ's)
C (Fire Support)
D (Communications-Electronics)
E (Reports)

DISTRIBUTION:

| G-3    | 1 |
| G-2    | 1 |
| 4th Mar S-3 | 1 |
| 4th Mar S-2 | 1 |
| FSCC   | 1 |
| Air Liaison Officer | 1 |
| 3rd Recon En | 5 |
| 1/4 S-3 | 2 |
| 3/4 S-3 | 1 |
| 1/1 S-3 | 1 |
| 3/12 S-3 | 1 |
| 2/1 S-3 | 1 |
| Commanding Officer | 2 |
| First Sergeant | 1 |
| Intelligence Section | 1 |
| Operations Section | 5 |
| "B" Recon S-3 | 2 |
| Each Platoon | 1 |
| Duty Watch Log | 1 |
| Radio Log | 1 |
Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref:
(a) Maps: AMS Series L701, 1:50,000, Sheet numbers 6459 I, II; 6460 I, II; 6461 II; 6559 I, II, III, IV; 6560 II, III, IV
(b) 3rdMarDiv: 343-65
(c) 3rdMarDiv: 2800.1E
(d) 3rdRecon: 349-65

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.
   a. See current periodic intelligence summaries.
   b. See periodic intelligence reports and estimates.
   c. See Recon Group Bravo patrol reports.

2. RECONNAISSANCE OBSERVATION MISSION.
   a. Determine exact locations of all Viet Cong units, camps, rest areas, training areas, special cultivation areas, supply points, weapons and ammunition storage areas.
   b. Determine the direction and techniques of movement of Viet Cong forces. (Special attention to infiltration of individuals or units by deceptive or covert means, to include tunneling).
   c. Determine Viet Cong communications and signal systems. Location of sites; types of equipment; antenna systems or farms; telephone equipment. (Special attention to signals used for the purposes of warning; breaking contact; opening fire; marking minefields; stake traps; and booby traps; and the use of drums, bugles, whistles, flares, lights, signs and markers; and use of carrier pigeons).
   d. Determine the Viet Cong defenses and countermeasures against reconnaissance, surveillance, and detection techniques and devices.
   e. Determine trafficability of road and trail networks, and waterways encountered. Include bridge type, location, construction and condition. Location of vehicular fording, ferrying, and swimming sites.
   f. Determine the location of obstacles and barriers, both manmade and natural.

A-1
g. Determine the location and extent of field fortifications. Weapons emplacements and bunkers, mines, and booby traps.

h. Determine the location, types, and number of crew sized weapons. (Special attention to artillery, heavy mortars and antiaircraft weapons).

i. Determine location and size of possible HLZ's. Record all trails not already indicated on the map.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. Will the Viet Cong attack the HUE-PHU BAI TAOR? If so, when? Where? In what strength? With what units?

b. Will the Viet Cong defend against USMC operations in Viet Cong held or Viet Cong controlled areas? If so, where? How? In what strength? With what units?

c. What defenses will the Viet Cong employ in and around their combat hamlets? (Special attention to their employment of automatic weapons and supporting arms, weak points/strong points in their defensive system, secret exits, hiding places for personnel and material, and tunnel patterns.

d. Will the Viet Cong employ artillery or heavy mortars to shell or support an attack upon the USMC position and installations at HUE-PHU BAI? If so, from what positions? When? On what targets? (Special attention to howitzers, heavy mortars, antiaircraft guns, and other large caliber weapons).

f. What are the road and bridge conditions and capacities?

g. What suitable helicopter landing zones exist in projected areas of operations around the TAOR? What is the capacity of these zones? If vulnerable to interdiction by ground fire, from what locations?

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.

a. References (1) and (6), provide basic guidance in the handling of captured personnel, documents, and material.

b. Captured Personnel.

(1) The term "prisoner of war" will not be used in connection with captives taken in counter-guerrilla operations against the Viet Cong since the Viet Cong are not foreign nationals, and this is
not a declared war. For operations in Vietnam, the term "Captive" will be used in reference to all prisoners taken by Recon Group Bravo elements.

(2) Classification of Captives. Due to the nature of counter-guerilla operations and the environment in which the enemy is found, captives taken in sweep operations will generally fall into one of several possible categories. In referring to captives, they will be classified by the following definitions:

(a) Viet Cong Captive (VCC). This term applies to members of the Viet Cong forces, auxiliaries to those forces, or Viet Cong cadre infiltrated into RVN in any form or by any means; spies, agents, or persons who speak a North Vietnamese dialect; and persons from other than North or South Vietnam; and any person taken captive while engaging in combat against any Recon Group Bravo elements, RVN, or allied unit under any circumstances.

(b) Very Important VCC. This term applies to important captives requiring flagging and special processing depending on intelligence requirements. VCC considered "very important" include VC officers (platoon leaders and above), intelligence agents, communications/crypto personnel, district level or higher political (or finance, recruiting, etc.), commissars of cadre. Very important VCC will be redefined periodically.

(c) Viet Cong Suspects (VCS). This term applies to collaborators, accomplices or others taken captive who, while not directly or conclusively known to have been engaged in combat against Recon Group Bravo elements, RVN or allied forces, are suspected of being Viet Cong, collaborators or accomplices by virtue of their unexplained presence or actions in or near the scene of action between Recon Group Bravo elements, RVN or allied forces and Viet Cong forces; or who, although unarmed, are suspected of having taken part in such action and have been captured in subsequent sweep operations; or persons whose unexplained presence, behavior or actions in or near Recon Group Bravo elements, RVN or allied unit positions or facilities arouses suspicion as to their legal status and intentions.

(d) Other Indigenous Captives. This term applies to persons captured by Recon Group Bravo elements under unusual circumstances. Their status will generally be in question at the time of capture due to lack of identification, their being encountered in an area of operations, or such other circumstances that require further investigation in order to clear them. Often this includes aged men, women or
children. These latter should not be categorized as VCS unless there is firm evidence of hostile or suspicious activity. They should not be indiscriminately evacuated as VCS. The great majority of captives including suspects are eventually cleared and returned to their villages.

(e) "Ralliers". This term applies to those individuals not engaging in combat who voluntarily surrender and rally to the cause of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam under the "Open Arms" or "CHIEU NOI" policy of the Vietnamese Government.

(3) Handling of Captives.

(a) All captives taken by Recon Group Bravo elements will be accorded firm, just, humane treatment at all times in accordance with the law of land warfare as derived from customs and treaties, such as the Geneva Convention, while the Viet Cong cannot be termed "prisoners of war" as defined by Article 4, Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, they will be treated humanely in the manner prescribed therein.

(b) Normal procedures in processing "prisoners of war" apply to the processing of captives taken in counter-guerrilla operations in Vietnam. Extreme care must be taken to ensure that friendly or potentially friendly civilians taken captive are not subjected to any treatment that might engender a hostile attitude on their part toward U. S. RVN, or Allied Personnel.

(c) Handling of captives will be firm at all times, but will not involve force beyond that necessary to defend against or subdue resisting Viet Cong Captives or Viet Cong Suspects. Captives will be led firmly, but gently when blindfolded. Special care must be exercised in the handling of captives who are blindfolded and tied when being moved or transported to or from aircraft or vehicles. These captives are helpless and must be assisted to prevent injury.

(d) Viet Cong Captives and Viet Cong Suspects will be bound in such manner as to ensure they cannot escape or harm either their captors, guards, interrogators, or other captives. Bindings will ensure security but will not be such as to cut off blood circulation, cut, injure, or otherwise cause pain. Captives will not be trussed in any way that is, could be, or may be, mistaken to be tortuous.
(4) Processing Captives.

(a) All captives will be searched, segregated, tagged and evacuated through the intelligence chain as expeditiously as possible. Innocent civilians will be separated from VC and VCS as quickly as possible.

(b) Captives taken by reconnaissance patrols working in support of a battalion or regiment will be evacuated to the collection point of the unit being supported. Captives taken into custody during general support operations will be evacuated to the collection point.

5. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

a. Standard reference maps will be utilized.

b. Requests for maps, charts, and photographs, will be submitted to the S-2, Recon Group Bravo.

6. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.

a. See references (b) and (c).

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

a. Patrol reports will be prepared immediately upon completion of assigned reconnaissance mission. Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant, and Team/Squad Leaders will report to S-2, Recon Group Bravo, for debriefing.

b. A copy of all patrol reports will be forwarded to cognizant commanders.

D. A. Colby
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as Operation Order 2-66.
Reconnaissance Group Bravo
PHU BAI, RVN
April 1966

Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheet numbers 6659 I, II; 6460 I, II; 6461 II; 6559 I, II, III, IV; 6560 II, III, IV

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS.
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) Artillery Support. 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, or by a provisional unit assigned.
      (2) Naval Gunfire Support. As would be assigned by Seventh Fleet.
      (3) Air Support. As required by the 1st Marine Air Wing.
   c. Attachments/attachments. None.

2. MISSION. Reconnaissance Group Bravo effect coordination with supporting arms and monitor support to its units in the field.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Artillery Support.
      (1) Artillery support requests will be sent from the field via one of two communications nets:
         (a) The Conduct of Fire net direct to the battery of guns covering the patrols operating area.
         (b) Artillery Battalion Cnd net direct to artillery battalion FDC.
         (c) The reconnaissance net to the reconnaissance liaison officer in the 4th Marines FSCC and then on to the appropriate FDC.
      (2) Artillery support requests will include the following:
         (a) Identification of observer.

C-1
(b) Location of target.
(c) Description of target — stationary or moving.
(d) Observer — target azimuth.
(e) Type of ammunition.
(f) Type of fuze.
(g) Control.

b. Naval Gunfire Support. When available, requests will be sent to the reconnaissance liaison in the 4th Marines FSCC. The liaison will submit the request to the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer of the 4th Marines.

c. Air Support.

(1) Requests for airstrikes will be sent to the reconnaissance liaison at the 4th Marines FSCC. The liaison will submit the request to the Air Liaison Officer of the 4th Marines.

(2) Airstrike requests will include:
   (a) Give location of target.
   (b) Description of target.
   (c) Attack heading.
   (d) Friendly location will be marked with a red panel.

(3) Helicopter requests for emergency pickup will be sent to the reconnaissance liaison at the 4th Marines FSCC. The request will be submitted to the Air Liaison Officer of the 4th Marines.

(4) The helicopter request will include:
   (a) Location of landing zone.
   (b) Time pickup is requested.
   (c) How the landing zone will be marked.
   (d) Whether the landing zone is secure.
   (e) How many helicopters can land in the zone.
(5) Landing zones will normally be marked with a red panel and with yellow smoke.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Operation Order 2-66
Annex D (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Reconnaissance Group Bravo OpO 2-66
(b) 3rdMarDiv O 92000.2D (COI)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy forces.
      (1) See Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-66.
      (2) The enemy is capable of imitative deception and/or jamming.

   b. Friendly forces.
      (1) See reference (a).
      (2) Command Posts.
         (a) Ashore.
         (b) Recon Group Headquarters -- YD 875132. Recon Platoons -- as directed.

2. MISSION. Reconnaissance Group Bravo provide communications that require the combined capabilities and support of 1st Force Recon Co and Co "B", 3rd Recon Bn and respond to requests for communications support from subordinate units.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Terminal Station. Receive all traffic from inserted platoons, or relay if employed, and deliver immediately to the Reconnaissance Watch Officer at the terminal station. Properly handle and transmit any outgoing traffic.
   b. Relay Station. Provide a continuous communications relay link between inserted platoons and the terminal station. Maintain copies of relayed messages for 72 hours.
Appendix 1 (Radio Callsigns, Switchboard Callsigns, and Frequencies) to Annex D (Communications-Electronics) to Reconnaissance Group Bravo Operation Order 2-66

Time Zone: H

1. RADIO CALLSIGN.

a. The following callsigns are available for use by Recon Group Bravo. Those designated have been assigned as indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOICE</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Spares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Force Recon Co</td>
<td>PUNCTUATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;B&quot; Co, 3rd Recon Bn</td>
<td>RATHOLE BRAVO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Plt, 3rd Recon Bn</td>
<td>RATHOLE IRON HORSE</td>
</tr>
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<td>2nd Plt, 3rd Recon Bn</td>
<td>RATHOLE HOMERUN</td>
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<td>4th Plt, 3rd Recon Bn</td>
<td>RATHOLE KELSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>NIGHT STICKER</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>4th Plt, 1st Force Recon</td>
<td>HATEFUL</td>
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<td>5th Plt, 1st Force Recon</td>
<td>KILLER KANE</td>
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<td>&quot;B&quot; Co, 3rd Recon Bn</td>
<td>RG6P</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1st Force Recon Co</td>
<td>ST. JOE BRAVO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. SWITCHBLADE CALLSIGN.

a. The following switchboard callsigns have been assigned and may be reached from the "AFTERGLOW" (4th Marines) switchboard.

|       | 1st Force Recon Co           | INDIAN SUMMER   |
|       | "B" Co, 3rd Recon Bn         | ST. JOE BRAVO   |

1-D-1
c. **Artillery Support Communications.** See Annex C (Fire Support).

d. **Air Support Communications.** See Annex C (Fire Support).

e. **Coordinating Instructions.**

   (1) **Radio.**

      (a) All stations will maintain continuous 24 hour watch on circuits.

      (b) Platoons will **check in immediately** upon insertion.

      (c) Platoons will call in sightings as they occur; otherwise, a SitRep every one hour.

      (d) Prior to insertion, platoons will be briefed on reports required and communications.

   (2) **Visual.** See Annex C (Fire Support).

4. **ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.**

   a. See reference (a), Paragraph 4.

   b. Resupply for terminal and relay station available from this Headquarters.

   c. Emergency repair service available for terminal and relay station from this Headquarters.

   [Signature]

   D. A. COLBY
   Major, U.S. Marine Corps
   Commanding

**APPENDIXES:**

1. Radio Callsigns, Switchboard Callsigns, and Frequencies

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Same as Operation Order 2-66
3. **Radio Frequencies.**

   a. The following radio frequencies are available for use within Recon Group Bravo. Those designated have been assigned as indicated.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assigned Usage</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Designator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Recon</td>
<td>(P) 2452</td>
<td>M-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(S) 2056</td>
<td>M-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Recon Bn Cdo</td>
<td>(P) 3148</td>
<td>M-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(S) 563.7</td>
<td>M-136</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Recon Bn TAC</td>
<td>(P) 39.35</td>
<td>M-362</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(S) 45.1</td>
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<td>(P) 2356</td>
<td>M-18</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>M-387</td>
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<td>1st Force Recon Air/Grd</td>
<td>246.5</td>
<td>M-526</td>
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<td>Recon Reporting</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>M-357</td>
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<tr>
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<td>50.5</td>
<td>M-462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The reassignment of call signs to platoons within the Recon Group will be made only by the Commanding Officer.

   [Signature]

   D. A. Colby  
   Major, U.S. Marine Corps  
   Commanding

**Distribution:**

Same as Operation Order 2-66
Annex E (Reports) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) 3rdMarDivC 3100.1A w/change #2

Time Zone: H

1. Reports sent from units in the field will be in accordance with Appendix 1 (Spot Report Format) and Appendix 2 (SALUTE Report Format).

2. The codewords used by patrols in the field will be in accordance with Appendix 3 (Codewords).

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as Operation Order 2-66

E-1
Reconnaissance Group Bravo
PHU BAI, IVN
April 1966

Appendix I (Spot Report Format) to Annex E (Reports) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) 3rd MarDiv 3100.1A w/Change #2

Time Zone: H

SPOT REPORT

ALPHA UNIT REPORTING
BRAVO LOCAL DTG
CHARLIE LOCATION (6 place coord)
DELTA INCIDENT
ECHO ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF DELTA
FOXTROT FRIENDLY KIA
GOLF FRIENDLY WIA
HOTEL FRIENDLY MIA
INDIA VC KIA
JULIET VC WIA
KIFO VC
LIMA VC
MIKE WEAPONS CAPTURED
NOVEMBER EQUIPMENT, DOCUMENTS CAPTURED

[Signature]
D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Operation Order 2-66
Appendix 2 (SALUTE Report Format) to Annex E (Reports) to Operations Order 2-66

Time Zone: H

SALUTE REPORT

S — Size
A — Activity
L — Location
U — Unit
T — Time
E — Equipment

Breakdown of the SALUTE format of reporting.

S — Size — The number of objects reported on; such as the number of men in a patrol, the number of boats in a river, the number of houses in a village, etc.

A — Activity — Exactly what is happening at the time of report.

L — Location — Report the exact location (coord) of the activity at the time of report.

U — Unit — First, determine if the unit is friendly or enemy. This can usually be determined by their uniform. It is normally difficult to determine what unit the enemy belongs to, so this segment of the report will usually consist of the enemy’s uniform.

T — Time — The exact time the activity is sighted.

E — Equipment — Leave nothing out, include what weapons and equipment the enemy has.

D. A. COLEBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Same as Operation Order 2-66
2-E-1
Appendix 3 (Code Words) to Annex E (Reports) to Operation Order 2-66 (NOTAL)

Time Zone: H

1. The following code words will be utilized in all tactical radio transmissions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Codeword</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harbor Site</td>
<td>SWITCHBLADE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Post</td>
<td>GUITAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>WATERCAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>SCOTCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>BOURBON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>BEER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Evac</td>
<td>PETER RABBIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>PEANUT BUTTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement</td>
<td>AJAX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Commanders must supervise their radio operators in the use of the above words. Frequently the meaning of the codeword will be compromised by too great detail in transmission. For instance: "We have reached our night SWITCHBLADES and will remain here until 0800 tomorrow". It is apparent you are in a night harbor site and this is just the information you want to keep from the VC. The same information can be conveyed, "SWITCHBLADE down 1.2, right 0.7", and no compromise will result.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Operation Order 2-66
Operation Order 6-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet number 6460 II, Series L701
(b) Recon Group Bravo OpO 2-66

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Provisi..[Il Company

Major COLBY
3rd Plt, lstForReconCo 1stLt HENDERSON
4th Plt, lstForReconCo Sgt RAFFKAMP
5th Plt, lstForReconCo 1stLt PAULL
FO Team

1. SITUATION.
   b. Friendly.
      (1) Artillery: 1/4 DS Artillery.
      (2) Air: Fixed wing on station for insertion and retraction.

2. MISSION. Recovery.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept. Land by helicopter at 250830H vicinity of YD 558217 (one helicopter LZ) with one recon platoon followed by the command party, 3rd Platoon and last recon platoon. Move east to N-S trail, then north along trail to recovery point. Move in same order south to retraction point vicinity YD 566234. Retract by helicopter about 251800H.
   b. 4th Platoon. Land first, secure LZ for remainder of force, lead force to vicinity of contact and recover body. Lead force back to retraction zone.
   c. 3rd Platoon.
      (1) Move as main body with command group.

Enclosure (1)
(2) Be prepared to react to contacts at any point of the force.

d. 5th Platoon. Provide rear guard force.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Resupply: None.

b. Evacuation and hospitalization: Serious cases evacuated by helicopter to "A" Medical.

c. Transportation: By helicopter initially then by foot.

d. Uniform: Utilities with jungle boots N/A. Flack jackets and helmets optional.

e. Prescribed load: Basic allowance and one bandolier for each man. 24 rounds/M-79. One M-72/recon team. 3 grenades/man.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. One AN/PRC-25 per platoon, 2 AN/PRC-25's for command group.

b. Frequencies and callsigns.

(1) Command Group: PUNCTUATE.

(2) 3rd Platoon: GALLEON.

(3) 4th Platoon: HATEFUL.

(4) 5th Platoon: KILLER KANE.


(6) Recon reporting: 387.


d. Thrust Line: Y -- 5523; T -- 5722.

e. Authentication: Challenge -- girls name; Answer -- Eastern state.
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

f. Shackles: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

CHALK BEG DJ
IONF RMQT
UYX Z

D. A. COLEY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX:

A. Operations Overlay

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding Officer: 2
- First Sergeant: 1
- Intelligence 1stPlt: 1
- Operations 1stPlt: 5
- 2/1 S-3: 1
- 220th Aviation Co: 1
- HMM-163: 1
- 3/12 S-3: 1
- 4th Mar S-2: 1
- 4th Mar S-3: 1
- 1/1 S-3: 1
- 1/4 S-3: 1
- 3/4 S-3: 1
- AO: 1
- ALO: 1
- FSCC: 1
- "B" Co Recon Bn S-3: 3
- Command Group: 2
- 3rd Plt: 2
- 4th Plt: 2
- 5th Plt: 2
- DWO: 1
- Radio Log: 1
- Div G-3: 1
- Div G-2: 1

36
Annex A (Operations Overlay) to Operation Order 6-66

No fire line or zone
PATROL REPORT

1. **STRENGTH, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT:**
   a. Composition: (13) Enl (1) USN.
   c. Special Attachments: None.
   d. Communications Equipment: (2) AN/PRC-25.
   e. Observation Equipment: (3) 7X50.
   f. Special Weapons: (2) Claymore Mines.

2. **MISSION:** Conduct continuous reconnaissance/surveillance operations in RZ 2. Determine and report all enemy movement in that area.

3. **TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN:** 121800H/161830H April 1966.

4. **ROUTE:** See patrol route overlay.

5. **OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:**
   a. Synopsis: 92 hours of patrolling and observation resulted in 96 civilians sightings. Largest group sighted were 11 men. No equipment or weapons were observed. No contact was made by this patrol, no casualties encountered.
   b. Enemy:
      (1) 140832H (YD 734110) observed eight men walking west. They had on white shirts, black PJ's with straw hats. No equipment was observed.
      (2) 140834H (YD 739106) observed three men working in the rice field. Uniform white shirts, black shorts and straw hats. All of them were cutting grass.
      (3) 141224H (YD 713106) observed five men resting on ground. All had on black PJ's and had large bags of rice.

ENDSCHEDULE (12)
(4) 141319H (YD 732107) observed three move into a draw. Two had on blue shirts with black bottoms. One man had PJ's. All had straw hats. No equipment was observed.

(5) 141320H (YD 732107) observed five men in a small boat approximately 20 feet long, heading upstream. Observed one small box in the boat. Three had white shirts, two with none. All wore straw hats. No equipment observed.

(6) 141458H (YD 723104) observed three men in boat heading east downstream. Two wore straw hats and black PJ's, one with no hat and white shirt. It was observed the boat was dragging bamboo behind it.

(7) 141630H (YD 730104) observed two men in a small boat heading west upstream. Both wore black shorts and white shirts.

(8) 150609H (YD 731006) observed one man and (2) children walking blind cattle in a southwest direction. All wore black PJ's and straw hats.

(9) 150702H (YD 725103) observed two men in boat heading east downstream. All had black shorts and white shirts. No equipment was observed.

(10) 150724H (YD 746110) observed eleven men working in the field. Five wore white shirts and black trousers. Six wore PJ's. All wore straw hats. No equipment was observed.

(11) 150916H (YD 757115) observed two men working in the rice field. Black PJ's, and straw hats. No equipment observed.

(12) 150934H (YD 742108) observed two men standing next to a tree. Uniform black PJ's and straw hats. No equipment observed. It appeared they were gathering firewood.

(13) 150850H (YD 741109) Four men were observed just standing around. No equipment observed.

(14) 150900H (YD 762124) observed five men working in the rice field. Uniform black PJ's, no equipment observed.

(15) 150902H (YD 763113) observed five men in rice paddy. They had on white shirts, black PJ's and straw hats. No equipment or weapons were observed.

(16) 151415H (YD 784116) observed five men standing in yard. Uniform was black PJ's. No equipment or weapons were noted.
(17) 151540H (YD 776103) observed three men going in a southeaster direction. All wore black PJ's. No weapons or equipment was noted.

(18) 151550H (YD 74110) observed two men in boat on river bank. Both were dressed in white shirt and black shorts. No equipment or weapons were observed.

d. Terrain:

(1) The terrain in general is covered with heavy overgrown elephant grass. This grass grows as high as six feet. The jungle canopy is up to 60 feet high. The brush is intermingled with vines and thorn bushes. Travelling through this terrain is very difficult. The average distance covered by patrol was 400 - 500 meters an hour.

(2) There were no map corrections.

d. Other Information:

(1) During 12 to 16 April a small tractor was observed at coordinates YD 746116. This tractor had a small trailer behind it. It was used by people in the rice field. This observation appeared very unusual to the patrol leader.

(2) The SONG HOU TRACH River was used moderately by small boats during the day and night. Some boats observed have four and five people in them.

(3) During the time the patrol was on the OP at YO 750088, they heard what appeared to be a motor of some sort. This motor was heard every morning and evening for approximately ½ hour each time. It could not be established from where the sound came. It appeared to have come from a northeast direction about 4,000 to 5,000 meters away.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL:

a. Morale: Good.

b. Physical condition: Good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Recommendation.
(1) Recommend overflight prior to insertion of patrols into the objective area.

(2) A large amount of water should be taken on patrols, since there is no water to be found on any of the hills.

b. Conclusions. None.

M. E. RUNNELLIS
OySgt USMC

ESERIETERS COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS: None.
Map Sheet 6560 III
1:50,000
1st Plt, 1st Force Recon Co.
Frag Order 33-66
12-16 July 1966
GySgt M. E. Runnells

HLZ

OP

Route of Patrol
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Frag Order: 32-66
Patrol: 5th Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
Debriefer: SSgt, 1st Force Recon Co
Map Sheet: 6460 I

(Patrol Report)

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT:
   a. Composition: (1) off (14) enl (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments: None.
   c. Communications Equipment: (2) AN/PRC-25s.
   d. Observation Equipment: (1) 6X20, (2) 7X50.
   e. Special Equipment: None.
   f. Special Weapons: (1) M-79.

2. MISSION: Conduct reconnaissance patrolling and surveillance operations in VC with particular attention to trail network and roads in the vicinity of VC 6793. Determine and report all enemy movement in that area.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 012000/271645H.

4. REMARKS: Sea patrol route overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF FRIENDS AND TERRAIN:
   a. Summary: 119 hours of patrolling and observations resulted in no contact with any VC. On two occasions, VC were heard by the plane. One large victims was made of about 50 to 60 VC and one sighting of 5 VC was indicated.
   b. Events:
      (1) 102000 (VQ 582.2C) the patrol heard 2 to 3 Vietnamese walking and talking. These people were moving south along the SONG 30 river. Weapons and equipment was not observed.
      (2) 1,21600 (VQ 582.2C) the patrol heard 3 to 4 people moving through the jungle approximately 100 meters away from the CP's position. No equipment was observed because of darkness.
(3) L807001 departed this location. At 131440H, made contact with an estimated 5 VC at YD 547216. This was a chance encounter. The VC came from the rear of the platoon. The rear point saw one VC and possibly the second one from a distance of 4 feet. The rear point fired 16 rounds of fully automatic M-14. Investigation revealed that the first VC was shot and wounded by a round hit his weapon and knocked it out of his hands. The second man was also shot and hit at least twice, he was killed. His body was checked by 1st Lt [name] and confirmed dead. This VC had on black PJ's and Ho Chi Minh sandals. No documents were found on him. This body was left laying on the trail. The patrol investigated the trail further down past the body and heard noise. Then moaning was heard and a continuous trail of blood was followed. The patrol continued down the trail to try to capture this wounded VC. After about 10 yards, they were fired upon by one VC with an automatic weapon. The patrol returned fire and broke contact. From this encounter 1 VC WIA body count, and one WIA.

(4) 201400H (YD 547232) observed 3 VC with small arms, uniform was black PJ's and Khaki. These VC were moving south. Two ambushes were attempted for these VC but both times the VC pulled to the side.

(5) 201600H (YD 547232) the platoon was surprised by an ambush when the platoon was spotted 50 to 40 VC moving south through a saddle. The patrol leader requested that the VC be taken under fire by the HUE. One member of the platoon fired 2 magazines of tracer M-64 in the direction of the VC position to mark the target for the HUE's. The HUE's took the VC under fire. No estimate of VC casualties could be made. All of the VC were observed to be carrying weapons, types unknown.

Terrain:

(1) Generally the terrain covered in the objective area is considered to be close to a tropical rain forest.

(2) Water sources: See overlay.

Other Information:

(1) The large trail was picked up at coordinates 552216. This trail was approximately 3 feet wide and can not be observed from the air. This trail was heavily used. The trail was followed for approximately 1,000 meters to coordinates 549214. It was observed that the trail was used as recent as 6 hours before.
(2) A small Catholic shrine is located on hill 350 in grid square 5621. It was interesting to note that no trails were leading up to it.

(3) An old harbor site was located on hill 548 in grid square YD 6421. This site had not been used for at least 4 months. This harbor site is about 40 yards wide by 500 yards long. It had a total of 60 to 70% concealment from the air.

(4) A resupply was attempted at YD 52932 and it was unsuccessful due to the fact that a water-bag was dropped from a height of 60 feet. This water-bag broke with the impact of the ground. A second resupply mission at a later time was successful.

6. REPORT OF ENCOUNTERS IN THE AREA: 1 VC KIA - body account. 1 VC WIA - blood stains on the trail.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale excellent; condition, good.

8. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
   a. patrolling: Patrole is carried on by only movement, no movement, normally along high ground, be limited to three days because of lack of water.
   b. The patrol should have at least 2 hours during movement to check in. On an OP it would be desirable to check in every hour; during movement, more time is needed to reach an ideal location on high ground to get good communications.
   c. Recommend that a patrol be inserted at a location close by a known VC route of infiltration route. Insertion should be made prior to day so that the patrol has time to reach its ambush site during daylight hours. It should be executed right after first light.

9. CONCLUSIONS: The VC do not live in the high ground. Most of the VC activity is found at the low ground. They may use the high ground for travel purposes only.

   [Signature]

   T. Hill
   First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps
   Patrol Leader

10. RECOMMENDATIONS: Concur with the patrol leaders.
Map Sheet 6460 II
Series L 701 1:50,000
5th Plt, 1st Force Recon Co.
Frag Order 32-66
15-20 April 1966
w/Cpl 13
1st Lt Paull

VC Contact

1st Lt Paul P. B. E. 13
**CAPTURED EQUIPMENT**

1. The below listed equipment was departed on 20 April 1966.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1100097.62 11.62 LMG Type 56 SELM 66 0376629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1100097.62 12 Submachine Gun Type 50 SEPA 009729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wt. Sait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Magazine Sait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Magazine for Type 56 Submachine Gun 300 rds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Magazine for G1100 Submachine Gun 50 with 35 rds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lin's Bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spare Bag Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pte. K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/4 Quot. Block Tl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hotel (Prep. with A 31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure (1)
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Patrol: 1st Plt, Co B, 3rd Recon E
Detriber: LT CASSIDY
Map: VIETNAM: Map Sheet 6969 ILI

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT:
   a. Composition: 16 till.
   b. Special attachments: none.
   c. Communication equipment: 1 AN/PRC-25 and a AN/ARC-10.
   d. Observation equipment: (2) PTO's.
   e. Special equipment: none.
   f. Special weapons: none.

2. LP ORD. Conduct continuous reconnaissance/surveillance in AO II and report the extent of enemy movement within that area.


4. SUBJECT: See Annex A for details.

5. SUMMARY:
   a. The patrol departed 4th Marines of IZ at 1626001 by helicopter and
      airdropped to YD 766006. The platoon moved west to YD 770008 where they
      harbored for the night.
   b. At 170015H, the patrol continued to move west to YD 751038 where
      they established a CP at 172038H. The platoon ran several small patrols in the
      immediate area to secure their position and then
      and harbored for the night at YD 751038.
   c. The patrol continued to maintain the CP established at YD 751038
      throughout the mission until just prior to retraction.
   d. At 191200H, the patrol moved to secure an LZ at YD 757077. They
      returned to the area at 202000H, and were retracted without incident at
      212000H and returned to 4th Marines CP II.

ENCLOSED (14)
6. OBSERVATION OF THE EMPLACEMENTS:

a. 160306C (YD 79429) sighted 16 men in boat. They were dressed in black and white PJ's and calico hats. Men appeared to be milling in the area and possibly digging. No weapons could be observed due to distance.

b. 160306C and 18 men in boat moving north on river to land at YD 79429. They were dressed in black clothes. No wings, calico hats.

c. 160306C and 19 men easterly at YD 79429. They were dressed in black clothes. No wings, calico hats.

d. 160306C and 12 boats moving north on river at YD 79416. No observed on a small river.

e. 160306C and 150 men easterly at YD 79420. The boats were well spread out. A total of 30 men were observed in boats and a number of PJ's and calico hats.

f. 160306C and 13 men on boats moving west on river at YD 79408. They were dressed in black and white PJ's and calico hats. The boat moved at YD 79402 and appeared to be moving on a trail located in the position.

g. 160306C and 14 men easterly at YD 79403. Weapons were observed. One observation aircraft receive 2 or 3 rounds of small arms fire from YD 79403.

h. 160306C 13 men deboarded boat and moved west to group of houses at YD 79412. They were black and white PJ's, no weapons visible.

i. 160306C 5 men unloading cargo and large baskets at YD 79403. They were dressed in black PJ's. One man appeared to be carrying mule with his mule in a small covered position and appeared to be heading south.

j. Throughout the period various of small arms fire including carbines, SMG, and RPG directed toward the firing position of grid square 79410. Firing observed from 1600 to 0200 each night.

k. Enemy located in the SYD 69432A water, vicinity of grid square 79410. Boats carried men and cargo, although weapons could not be identified. The leader of the patrol informed the patrol leader that the river was used as a supply route for the VC.

l. Nearing vicinity for patrol leader to withdraw...
a. On 3 June 1968 a fire mission was called on 3 VC unloading rice from a
wagon at YD 73219C. While adjusting artillery the VC left the
location hurriedly. No damage estimate made. 4 rounds of HE were
expended.

b. On 26 June 1968 a fire mission was called on 4 VC at YD 73216C. The VC wore
missing but appeared to be rice bags. One of them appeared to
be on fire. 1000 rounds of HE were expended. No damage
estimate made. VC withdrew prior to firing for safety.

c. 20 aircraft were fired at YD 75241C (2 aircraft), YD 74309C (2 aircraft),
and YD 76609C (2 aircraft).

d. Terrain was extremely difficult to move in. Elephant grass at
about 5 feet tall to 3 feet high and very thick. Average canopy 20 - 30
feet high. It rains 100% and 25%.

3. UNIT 120, 2-54th Arty. 54000.42N. 20

3. CS: Unit condition, excellence; morale, good.
Map Sheet 6559 IV
Series E 7A 1:50,000
Int. P.O. 30, 3rd Recon Lts
Rec'd April 30
Lt Col H. Martinez

---

Legend

Petrol Route
Trails Not Known on Map
Road
Stream

1st Recon, April 66
W/5me014

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

Patrol Report

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT:
   a. Composition: 11 cpl, 1 clt, 1 UH-1
   b. Special Attachments: None
   c. Reconnaissance Equipment: 2 A-10C-25's
   d. Communication Equipment: 1 HX29
   e. Vehicle Maintenance: None
   f. Casualty: 1 M-60 (L444)

2. MISSION: Conduct reconnaissance, patrolling, and surveillance operations
   a. Determine report all enemy movement in that area.

3. Date and Time: 1700Z, 27 September 1966

4. After-action: See patrol reports every hour.

5. OBSERVATIONS, WEATHER AND TERRAIN:
   a. SOUTH SIDE: Extensive enemy movement, including ambushes. End of trail located.
   b. CENTRAL TRAIL:
      i. Trail well-traveled, 4 to 6 feet wide.
      ii. Trail follows a ridge.
      iii. Trail is well-marked with tire tracks.

6. ENCLOSURE (15)

DECLASSIFIED
7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, outstanding; physical condition, good.

8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION:

a. Reconnaissance

From 1-4 N. to 1.3 miles at mile 1310. Particular attention to the 1st and 3rd platoon areas and where contact was made.

Note: Area heavily used by N.

Sgt. J. W. O'DONNELL
1st Platoon Leader, 1st Marine Corps

COMMANDING OFFICER, 1ST BATTALION, 8TH MARINES: Concurs with platoon leader.
one were boots. A firefight then started and lasted about 20
minutes. During this time, the platoon leader and one other
member of the patrol departed and saw three bodies laying on
the trail. It is believed that there were two automatic
weapons at the firelight. After the 20 minutes of the fire-
fight, the patrol withdrew. During withdrawal, no fire was
observed from the VC. Prior to the withdrawal, the patrol
made a break at a VC automatic position that was still
in action. After the explosions, no more fire was received
from the VC's. No positive identification was made of any of
the VC weapons. The platoon withdrew and regrouped. This was
from 30 meters down the trail. They walked for an hour and
was back before heading for the rally point, which was the OP
from where they had first seen smoke. Away to the north, two
of the three hills showed up, one man was still missing. (See
Appendix C for details.)

2. Terrain

C. terrain was generally check in this area. At times, the
terrain restricted movement to 100 meters an hour. The canopy
was 60 feet and hindered in places.


4. General Information

(1) At coordinates 094004, found a pigeon trap. This trap was
set up so that if it was tripped, the pigeon would be whipped
around with a sharpened stake pointed towards the possible
movement of a human catching him in the abdomen.

(2) At 360011, found a harbor area that could hold possibly a
company. This site could be observed from the air.

(3) There are several trails in the area bounded by grid square
3850. Most of the trails were heavily used, some of them had
2-3 trails on area as new as a few hours. Many old camp fires
were found in this area. Water was found in this area making it
ideal for a harbor site.

(4) Zeroed the sniper shot at 180001. The platoon was at 305011.
The shot came from approximately 1500 meters south of that
position.

5. After Action Report

3 VC KIA confirmed, 1 VC KIA
personnel. 1 155. Right for serious.
Debriefing of Corporal D. R. FOSTER

At approximately 194500H April 1966, the platoon was set up on an OP. The platoon was short on water so the Platoon Commander, 1st Lt W. T. Henderson decided to send seven men after water. The Platoon Commander took charge of this detail and we departed to coordinates XD 821003. We walked due east for approximately 70 meters when we came to a 75% drop. At this point we replenished our water and departed into the direction of the base camp. After a short distance, we came upon a large trail. This trail was approximately 6 to 8 feet wide, the foundation of which was solid rock. On both sides of the trail, the brush was very thick and the jungle canopy approximately 50 feet high. Observation of this trail cannot be made made from the air due to the density of the canopy overhead. After the detail reached this trail, we moved upon it towards the OP site for approximately 20 meters when we reached a bend. I was the scout out in front of the main body and observed a second bend just 10 meters away. At this point, I heard voices (time 1615 to 1630H). The voices came from what appeared to be 3 men. (Debriefers Comment: This is the opinion of the scout based on actual sighting of 3 VCs). I immediately contacted the detail of this and informed them to back up. We withdrew up the trail for about 30 meters when the platoon commander gave the order, "If there's more than 4 of them, let them pass; if less than 4, get them." At the same time I heard the Lieutenant give another order which sounded like, "three men move to one side of the trail and the other four move on the opposite side." The first 3 were designated as to what side to take cover. All of us moved to the side of the road designated. Myself and two men on the Lieutenant's side were in position, but the VC must have heard brush rustling on the opposite side. At this time, the VC were close by and were warned by the noise of the brush. One of the VC challenged the patrol in Vietnamese (English translation of the challenge is "Stop, raise your hands"). At this time, Corporal WHITE opened fire with one round from his M-14 and I observed that the first VC was hit. This VC dropped to the ground, screaming and no movement was observed from him after that. Only 3 VC were observed by me up until that point. As soon as the first shot was fired, the two that were still standing opened up, which sounded like automatic fire. From the first initial volley, of fire by the VC, I observed that Lance Corporal ROGI was hit but could not determine how badly. At this moment, all hell broke loose, with grenades and small arms fire. A burst of fire came close by me so I took cover. The initial fire fight lasted approximately 35 seconds. After a minute or two, I looked up and saw that I was by myself. Just after all was silent, I heard one VC running back towards the direction from which they originally came. He was yelling something that I could not understand. It appeared to me that he was trying to warn other VC that may be coming up from the rear. One half hour after the fight, I heard one group of two to ten, possibly more, VC talking and beating the brush all around me. I was never discovered and never actually sighted any of them. The sounds of the VC being present were heard all around me.

Enclosure (2)
that day and all through the night, up until I heard the helicopters fly overhead about 1100 on 30 April 1966. I departed my hiding place to find a suitable location to signal the helicopters. First I used my yellow smoke and then signalled by firing my M-79 grenade launcher. After 15 minutes, recovery was accomplished by one H-34 using a hoist.

Description of the VC observed prior to the firefight.

All three of the VC sighted wore dark green uniforms. I was unable to observe their headgear and the type of shoes they were wearing due to the obstruction of the brush. The first one was observed to have Ranger type suspender straps and a U.S. type cartridge belt with one claymore grenade stuck between his belt and trousers. Also, he had a general purpose bag hanging from his belt, possibly filled with ammo.

Only one weapon was identified by Corporal FOSTER, that was the weapon from the first VC. It was a French 7.5mm rifle M1936 (M.3-36).

David R. FOSTER
Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps
Platoon Scout

Additional comments by debriefer:

Corporal FOSTER stated that the time between contact with the VC and the breaking of contact was 35 seconds. The actual time from first contact until contact was broken was approximately 20 minutes.

G. A. KOCH
Staff Sergeant U.S. Marine Corps
Debriefer
Map Sheet 6559 IV  
Series L 701 1:50,000  
3rd Plt 1st Force Recon Co  
OpOrder 1-66  
17-20 April 1965  
1st Lt Henderson

VC Contact

Q LZ

LZ

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DECLASSIFIED
MAP CORRECTIONS.

1st Recon Co, Apr 66
w/ Anal 15
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT:
   a. Size and composition: (4) off, (35) enl, (3) USN.
   b. Special Attachments: (1) FO Team.
   c. Communications Equipment: (5) AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment: (3) 7X50's, (2) 6X30's.
   e. Special Equipment: None.
   f. Special Weapons: None.

2. MISSION: Recovery.


4. ROUTE: See patrol route overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
   a. Synopsis: During the 8 hours of movement to and from the objective area, one enemy contact was made with 3 VC. The primary mission was accomplished by recovering the body and returning it to "A" Medical. Four heat casualties were evacuated to "A" Medical.

   b. Enemy: A two man security was set up about 50 yards from the base camp. This security was overlooking the trail at YD 563224 when one of the members observed 3 VC about 50 yards from their position moving north on the trail. All of the VC had on khaki uniforms with Ho Chi Minh sandals and bush covers. All carried large ARVN type rucksacks. One man had a US Carbine and one had a ChiCom submachinegun Type 50. The other VC's weapon was not determined. Approximately 10 rounds of M-79 ammunition were fired at the VC. When the first round landed, the VC started to run away into the brush. It is unknown if the VC received any casualties.
c. Terrain:

(1) The terrain was covered with heavy underbrush but there were some open spots. In the valleys, large trees were encountered with the canopy up to 60 feet.

(2) Map Corrections: None observed.

d. Other Information:

(1) No artillery missions or air support was requested in support of this mission.

(2) The 4th Platoon was designated the point of the main body, with Sgt WHITFIELD's team at point. They arrived at the old ambush site at YD 557218. The main body set up base camp at the bottom of the objective area. The 4th Platoon found one set of binoculars and one spotter scope left behind the day before at the ambush site. The spotter scope was completely demolished from what appeared to be artillery support or the airstrike that had been called in the previous day. The point moved into position where the VC had been in the ambush of the day before. This area was searched and five locations were found where the VC had been sitting during the ambush. Three of these positions had expended cartridges, about 20 to 30 rounds of 7.62mm. These cartridges are the exact size of a ChiCom 7.62mm Assault Rifle, Type 56. In all three of these positions, blood stains were seen and marks where the bodies or wounded were dragged away through the brush. At the other two locations, expended ChiCom 7.62mm carbine type 53 or 56 were found. It is estimated that about 15 to 20 rounds were at these locations. No blood stains or drag marks were seen at these last two positions. A short distance away, a small open spot was located. At this spot a large blood puddle was on the ground. However, the security element did not investigate the area any further due to heavy underbrush throughout the area.

Sgt HAFERKAMP located SSGT HALL's body and it was noted that the body was in its exact position as last seen by him the previous day. The only thing unusual was that both SSGT HALL's watch and ring were missing. Prior to moving the body, a rope was tied around its arm and then pulled for 6 yards. This was to ensure that it was not booby trapped. After this, the body was placed in a poncho. It was difficult to carry it through the thick brush. A rope was then tied around the legs and was pulled through the brush and down a steep slope for about 150 meters, where a large bomb crater was reached.
They waited at this point for one hour until the helos arrived. One H-34 hovered over the crater and lowered a basket in which the body was placed and tied in. He was pulled up approximately 20 to 25 feet when the basket broke apart and SSGT HALL’s body fell to the ground. The line was lowered again and the body was strapped into the basket securely. The body was pulled up again to a height of about 50 feet when the main hoist strap broke and the basket with the body fell to the ground. After this incident, the helo departed the location since it was impossible to hoist the basket into the aircraft. The body was carried by the platoon down the steep cliff to the HLZ approximately 200 meters away. They arrived at the HLZ with no further incident. Five to ten minutes later, the helos arrived and pickup of the body, and the 3rd and 4th Platoons, was accomplished.

(3) Lost gear due to ambush initiated by the Viet Cong:

- 2 7X50 binoculars
- 1 AR-15 with approx 400 rds ammo
- 1 ARVN type rucksack with contents (unknown)
- 2 Frag grenades
- 12 magazines for the AR-15
- 1 diving watch, US issue
- 1 personal ring, approx value — $250.00
- 1 complete set of web gear

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: VC casualties, unknown; no friendly casualties.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, good; condition, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

J. HAFERKAMP
Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Platoon Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DESCRIBER:

a. Expended brass cartridges found at the ambush site were returned and compared with previous weapons and ammunition captured. These cartridges were checked and are from weapons as indicated in paragraph 5d(2).

b. All hoists, lifts, and baskets, straps and ropes, should have a periodical maintenance overhaul on all helos. It is apparent that this was not done on this aircraft.

DECLASSIFIED
o. In view of the location of blood stains and drag marks, at three locations and one large blood puddle, it is estimated that the possibility exists of up to 4 VC KIA (possibly).

d. The body of SSGT HALL was not searched since his wallet, COI, and other items were found in his pockets.

e. An airstrike and artillery was called in shortly after the platoon's withdrawal from the ambush position the previous day. This could have been the reason why the VC did not search the body.

NOTE

This Patrol Report should be used in close conjunction with the Patrol Report of Operation Order 1-66, dated 242345H April 1966, 4th Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co.

G. A. KOCH
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Debriefer
Reconnaissance Group Bravo
PHU BAI, RVN
252400H April 1966
Map Sheet 6460 II
Provisional Company

DECLASSIFIED
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT:
   a. Composition: (1) off (15) and (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachment: None.
   c. Communications Equipment: (2) AN/PRC-25.
   d. Observation Equipment: (1) 7X50.
   e. Special Equipment: None.
   f. Special Weapons: None.

2. MISSION: Conduct reconnaissance patrolling and surveillance operations in RZ 1. Determine and report all enemy movement. Particular attention is to be made to obtain a prisoner. Locate all possible HLZ's in area of patrol route and listing aircraft capacity and condition of the zone.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 191730H/231900H.

4. ROUTE: See route overlay.

5. OBSERVATIONS OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
   a. Synopsis: 95½ hours of patrolling and observation resulted in one contact of 4 VC. 5 possible HLZ's were observed and one old camp was located.
   b. Enemy:
      (1) 201030H (YD 540170) the patrol heard what appeared to be woodcutting 500 meters away. This was heard on only one occasion.
      (2) 221045H (YD 533179) the patrol stopped on a main trail to get its bearings when, 5 minutes later, the point heard some talking. 3 minutes after that 4 VC walked up to him. These 4 VC were in two groups of two each. The first 2 VC were about 10 to 15 feet in of the last two. The second group of VC could only barely be seen, since they were well behind the underbrush. The first two

DECLASSIFIED
observed had no weapons, and the second VC was not observed. When the first two were approximately 10 to 15 feet from the point, he challenged them in Vietnamese to stop. They kept on walking walking and the point challenged them again. This time the VC closest to the point looked up in surprise and it appeared that he smiled. The other VC turned around and began to run back in the direction from which he came. The other then turned also. At this instant the point opened fire with 3 automatic M-14's. They killed one instantly. The second died of wounds just seconds later during the time when the patrol was searching him for documents and equipment. One of the VC's was approximately 15 years of age, thin built, and wore a blue shirt and white shorts with Ho Chi Minh sandals. This one had a plastic type jungle helmet (pith helmet). The second one wore black shorts, a khaki shirt, no cover, and Ho Chi Minh sandals. This VC was pretty healthy and well built. (See inventory for list of items found on these bodies).

(3) 221100H (YD 535177) after the patrol departed the hasty ambush site, they heard what appeared to be 2 or 3 people at two locations. One was from the south and one from the west of their position, approximately 100 meters away. The patrol then moved out of this position for about 200 or 300 meters and the noise stopped.

c. Terrain:

(1) The vegetation south of the valley is very clear of underbrush with a 50 to 80 foot canopy. North into the valley, vegetation is about 10 to 15 feet high with small trees throughout. One stream runs through this valley with lots of water but is easy to cross. This stream looks to have sufficient water to last all summer. It is approximately 10 meters wide with heavy vegetation on both banks.

(2) Map corrections:

(a) (YD 527172) located an HLZ large enough for 3 helos. This HLZ needs to be cleared of tree stumps before use. They are from two to four feet high and about four inches in diameter.

(b) (YD 533171) one HLZ, large enough for two helos. It also needs to be cleared of tree stumps. This HLZ has a 30° gradient.

(c) (YD 544184) this HLZ was made by a bomb. It is a crater which needs filling and clearing of tree stumps.
(d) (YD 544185) this is a good HLZ with level ground and two inches of grass. It will accompany only one helo.

(e) (YD 551185) this is possibly large enough for one helo. This site was observed from the air.

d. Other Information.

(1) 201846H (YD 55116) I round of .30 caliber was heard fired southwest of the patrols position approximately 300 meters away.

(2) (YD 551172) an old campsite with foxholes on both sides of the trail. This trail was approximately 30 meters long. The foxholes were in different shapes and sizes.

(3) (YD 544185) located a large clearing with approximately 20 to 30 foxholes, all different types. They appeared to be quite old.

6. RESULTS ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: 2 VC KIA, body count. No friendly casualties.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, excellent; physical condition, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Some type of system should be made available to obtain better communications in RZ 1.

b. A pair of climbing spikes should be taken so that trees can be climbed with ease.

c. Aerial photos should be made available for platoons prior to going into the field.

d. When AO's make overflights of patrols, they should have shingles and thrust lines available

G. K. HUDEISON
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Platoon Leader

DEBRIEFER'S COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Patrols returning from the field should be debriefed not late than ½ hour after arriving at this station.
b. Any captured weapons, documents, and material, must be turned over to the Intelligence Section, Recon Group Bravo, immediately.

c. All items of captured documents and material must be turned over to the intelligence.

d. All patrols departing for a recon mission should check with the intelligence at least six hours prior to insertion to check if there is any change in the intelligence for these areas of operations.
EQUIPMENT CAPTURED

#1 MAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Blue sack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Red flashlight rigged with cells from BA-279.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pounds of rice rolled in cloth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cast net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Khaki hammock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Piece of white nylon 2' by 6'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Piece of light green plastic 5' by 6'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Medium bag with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Toothpaste and brush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two bottles of iodine tabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two lightbulbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bottle perfume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pair gray long trousers with belt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Black long sleeve shirt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Piece of black plastic material 4' by 4'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smelled like smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cook pot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bag salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bag meal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canteen of tea and honey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Piece of gray plastic 5' by 5'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Package (1#) of cooked rice wrapped in piece of green plastic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#2 MAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Green plastic bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fishnet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cook pot with cooked rice inside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Roll of raw tobacco in plastic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bags of meal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Green plastic bag of rice (dry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Light green plastic material 5' by 8'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pair light gray trousers with belt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Piece khaki cloth 4' by 6'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Piece of white material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Parachute shroud 6' long</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operation Order 1-66
Patrol: 4th Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
Debriefer: SSGT G.A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6460 II

Copy of 40 copies
Reconnaissance Group Bravo
PHU BAI, RVN
242345H April 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and composition: (11) enl (1) USN.
   b. Special attachments: None.
   c. Communications equipment:
   d. Observation equipment: (2) 7x50, (1) 6x30, (1) spotter scope.
   e. Special equipment: None.
   f. Special weapons: (2) LAAMS.

2. MISSION: During the period of 22 to 26 April 1966, conduct reconnaissance/surveillance operations in RZ 1. Attempt to capture at least one VC.


4. ROUTE: See patrol route overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
   a. Synopsis: 70 hours of observation and patrolling resulted in one ambush initiated by an estimated VC force of at least 10. This ambush resulted in one friendly KIA and unknown casualties inflicted to the VC.

   b. Enemy.
       (1) 240600H (YD 557218) all 11 men of the patrol were deployed in a 360 degree perimeter with two of them employed at an OP site 20 meters away from the main body. This OP site was in position to observe all movement on hill 204. The watch was changed every two hours on the OP. The harbor site (HATEFUL) was used to relay all messages between HOMERUN and the relay station. This

---1---

ENCLOSURE (9)
had been in use since 240600H. At 1530H the weather started to turn for the worse and visibility was approximately 20 feet. The surrounding terrain of the harbor site was thick underbrush. At 1540H, it started to rain very hard. This cut down the visibility more. At this time, Corporal SPIES looked into the direction of the heavy underbrush just 10 to 15 feet away when he observed what appeared to be a rifle muzzle sticking out from it. In just that split second, the VC opened fire. The first volume of fire was only with 2 automatic weapons, of an unknown type and caliber. Three of the members of the platoon closest to the VC returned a heavy volume of fire with automatic M-14 weapons. This firefight lasted about 10 seconds. The VC stopped firing first and the platoon followed suit. This cease-fire lasted about 30 seconds. During this time SSGT HALL gave the order to "Saddle up and don't fire unless you see something". SSGT HALL then walked up to the point where the first contact was made, he stood up into the direction of where the VC were and he said "Where are they?" At this instance the VC opened up with a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire. It was estimated that there were at least 5 automatic weapons firing at one time by the VC. There were only 3 men of the platoon in an advantageous firing position and all three of them opened up into the direction of the VC. None of the VC were actually ever seen. It was said by members of the patrol that the VC were heavily camouflaged. The exact number of VC in the area could not be established due to the heavy volume of fire. At this time SGT HAFERKAMP saw SSGT HALL fall on his back with large portions of his face blown away. Four members of the platoon confirmed that SSGT HALL died immediately of wounds received from VC automatic weapons fire. At this time, the fire was so heavy from the VC that it would have been impossible to take SSGT HALL's body out of the area. The assistant patrol leader gave the order to pull back. One by one the members of the patrol withdrew. Last to leave was SGT HAFERKAMP. A short distance from the ambush site the patrol found a steep dropoff in the route that they used for withdrawal. The patrol reached XD 55277 and found a fair LZ for one helo. All during the time from the ambush site to the HLZ, the patrol was without communications. Communications was re-established at the HLZ and the relay was informed of the situation, and helos were requested for pickup. At 1645H, pickup was completed.

c. Terrain:

(1) The terrain at the ambush site was very heavily overgrown with underbrush. The canopy was about 30 feet high. There was a steep drop off to the southwest.

(2) Map corrections:
d. Other Information.

(1) Aircraft was on station and communications were established with them and an airstrike was requested. The aircraft came in between the ambush site and the HIZ with excellent coverage of the target.

(2) Artillery was requested and at 1615H, about 3 rounds of artillery were fired to adjust. Those rounds were on target and a fire for effect was requested. The mission was cancelled, however, due to the fact that the helos were on station.

(3) One prominent trail is located at YD 564230. This trail is approximately 3 meters wide with thick vegetation on both sides of it. Many possible locations were found for ambushes on this trail.

(4) Periodically the patrol witnessed some type of jamming during the past two days. At times a Vietnamese woman could be heard over the radio. It appeared to the radio operator that this jamming came from close by.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: 1 USMC KIA. VC casualties are unknown.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, fair; physical condition, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

J. HAVERKAMP
Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps
Platoon Sergeant

DEBRIEFERS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.
Operation Order 2-66
3d Plt, Co B, 3rd
Recon Bn
Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000
Sheet 6460 II

MAP CORRECTIONS

HLZ
Trails
Operation Order 2-66
3rd Plt, Co. F, 3rd Recon Bn
Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000
Sheet 6460 II

PATROL OVERLAY

1st Fie Recon Co, Apr 66
W/anal 17
Reconnaissance Group Bravo
PHU BAI, RVN
24220Gh April 1966
Nrp Sheet 6460 II
4th Plt, 1st Force Recon Co

General location and disposition of USMC forces prior to ambush.

1st Sec Recon, Apr 66
w/ Encl 18
DECLASSIFIED

Reconnaissance Group Bravo
PHU BAI, RVN
242200H April 1966
Map Sheet 6460 II
4th Plt, 1st Force Recon Co

MAP CORRECTIONS
AND PATROL ROUTE OVERLAY

HLZ Trail

HLZ

OP

A-2

1st Plt Recon Co, Apr 66
W/Enclosure
Operation Order: 3-66
Patrol: 4th Plt, "B" Co, 1st Force Recon Co
Debriefer: SSGT G. A. KOCH
Map Sheets: 6559 IV and 6560 III

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT:
   a. Composition: (13) enl (1) USN
   b. Special Attachments: None.
   c. Communications Equipment: (2) AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment: (1) 7X50, (1) 6X30.
   e. Special Equipment: None.
   f. Special Weapons: (1) M-60, (1) M-79.

2. MISSION: Conduct reconnaissance patrolling and surveillance operations in RZ 2. Determine and report all enemy movement in that area. Particular attention is to be made in obtaining a prisoner.


4. ROUTE: See patrol route overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
   a. Synopsis: 82½ hours of patrolling and observation resulted in negative VC contact or sightings. 3 possible HLZ's were located.
   b. Enemy: None observed.
   c. Terrain:
      (1) Generally the terrain in the objective area is very rugged with the canopy as high as 75 feet. Heavy underbrush is found throughout this area. Distance covered in this terrain is about 75 to 100 meters in an hour.

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED
(2) **Map corrections:**

   (a) One small HLZ is located at YD 800053. This HLZ can accommodate one H-34. The approach is good from all directions.

   (b) A good HLZ is located at YD 786063. This HLZ is large enough for two H-34's. The approaches are good from all directions.

**d. Other Information.**

(1) At YD 798049, a small HLZ is located that could possibly land two helos. It needs some improvement, however, there are minor obstructions.

(2) A well used trail is located at YD 782039. This trail is about 4 to 5 feet wide. Observation from the air can not be made of this trail. The canopy over this trail is about 45 feet.

(3) At YD 800052 observed footprints along a creek bed. The imprints appeared to have been made from a man carrying a heavy load into the jungle.

(4) Along some of the trails in this area, it was noted that a branch had been pulled through a larger leaf. Both branches had leaves. This could possibly be some type of trailmarker.

(5) YD 776043 located some trees that were cut close to the bottom. Those cuts were made to get sap out of the trees.

(6) There were no artillery missions or airstrikes called in to support this mission.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY:** None.

7. **CONDITION OF THE PATROL:** Morale, good; physical condition, good.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:** None.

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**R.J. BOYDA**

Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

**DEBRIEFERS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:** None.

---2---
Reconnaissance Group Bravo
PHU BAI, RVN
250200H April 1966
Map Sheets 6559 IV and 6560 III
4th Plt, "B" Co, 3rd Recon Bn

- HLZ
- Patrol route
- Trail

A-1
1st Fco Recon Bn, Apr 66
W/Encl A
Operation Order: 2-66
Patrol: 2nd Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
Debriefeer: SSGT G.A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6559 IV

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT:
   a. Size and Composition: (11) enl (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments: None.
   c. Communications Equipment: (2) AN/PRC-25.
   d. Observation Equipment: (2) 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment: None.
   f. Special Weapons: (2) M-72 (2)

2. MISSION: Conduct reconnaissance/surveillance of RZ 3, to include the village in grid square 8999. Determine and report all enemy movement in that area. Particular effort is to be made in capturing a prisoner.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN: 221B15/261515H.

4. ROUTE: See patrol route overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
   a. Synopsis: 71 hours of observation and patrolling resulted in two VC contacts with one VC each time and 2 sightings.
   b. Enemy:
      (1) 250905H (YD 896001) observed one VC walking on road moving in a southeast direction. Uniform was black PJ's. A weapon could not be seen. He did not carry a pack.
      (2) 250920H (YD 896001) observed one man walking on road in a southeasterly direction. He was wearing black PJ's and white cover. No weapons or equipment was observed.
(3) 25150H (YD 896004) As the patrol moved through heavy terrain from one OP site to the next, it was fired upon by one VC with an automatic weapon from a distance 10 to 15 meters away. The patrol returned fire and expended approximately 100 to 150 rounds of ammunition.

(4) 252050H (YD 894011) While the patrol was in the harbor site, it heard one man approaching. At 2100, this VC walked upon the camp security and was fired at with 2 rounds of M-14 from about 6 feet away. The VC was killed instantly. The area was not searched until the next morning when the body was found. This VC wore black PJ's with Ho Chi Minh sandals. He carried one North Vietnamese modified 7.62 submachinegun (Type 50). See enclosure (1) for list of items captured.

c. Terrain:

(1) The terrain was covered with very thick underbrush intermingled with thorn bushes and vines. The canopy was about 10 to 15 feet high. Many small game trails were located throughout this area, but a human would have difficulty walking upon them. Only the major streams shown on the map had water in them.

(2) Map corrections: None.

d. Other Information: No artillery or airstrikes were called in or requested in support of this mission.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: 1 VC KIA. No friendly casualties.
(1) 7.62 submachinegun Type 50 and 1 ChiCom grenade were captured.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Morale, excellent; physical condition, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) It is not recommended that the M-72 be taken out in this type of terrain due to the possibility of injuring friendly troops because of the thick underbrush.

M. E. RUNNELLS
Gunnery Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Platoon Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER:

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DECLASSIFIED
1. This patrol was originally scheduled for insertion into RZ 3 on 21L800H April 1966. This insertion had to be canceled and re-scheduled for 24 hours later. See synopsis below for reasons of cancellation of insertion on original date.

As the helos approached the LZ at an altitude of about 15 to 20 feet the helos received automatic weapons fire. This fire was considered light to moderate. The direction of the fire was unknown. The helos pulled out from the LZ immediately and went to an altitude of about 1,000 feet and circled the area. The pilot asked the platoon commander if he would try again. The platoon commander answered with "yes". This time the helos approached from the north. When they were about 20 feet off the ground, the platoon commander sighted 4 VC with small arms at Y3 851994. He immediately took the VC under fire with his M-14. He could not observe if he scored any hits. At this time, the helos received automatic weapons fire again. This was again light to moderate. On the east bank of the SONG TA TRACH River, YC 854985, the platoon commander observed 30 to 40 VC on the rivers edge. Some of them were bathing. At this location, the jungle canopy was hanging over the rivers edge, which made observation of the enemy impossible from high altitudes. The gunner of the H-34 opened fire with his M-60 machinegun in the direction of the VC. It was unknown to the platoon commander if he scored any hits. The crew chief informed the platoon commander that an airstrike would be called in that they were going to abort the mission and head for the base.
**LIST OF CAPTURED EQUIPMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cartridge Belt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Canteen with cover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pair of Ho Chi Minh sandals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tobacco tin with 3 pieces of paper with writing on them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Piece of parachute cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sections of cleaning rod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Small containers of food, 4 wrapped in waterproof bags and 2 in tins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Canvas bag, small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Magazine pouch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>First-aid bandage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Knife sheath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>rounds of 7.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Magazines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Grenade (Chi com)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Grenade pouch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Modified 7.62mm Sub Machine Gun Type 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lighter was found with numerals 403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sandal repair kit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclosure (1)**
Operation Order 2-66
2nd Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000,
Sheet 6559 IV
Apr 66/Jul end 68