1ST FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Command and Staff Billets
(2) Task Unit Charlie OpO 2-66, 242010H June 1966
(3) Task Unit Charlie OpO 2-66, 012325H July 1966
(4) Task Unit Charlie Patrol Report 2-66, 022100H July 1966
(5) Task Unit Charlie Patrol Report 3-66, 031500H July 1966
(15) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 5-66

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(49) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 27-66, 152200H July 1966
(64) Det A, ReconGrpBravo Patrol Report 41-66, 221240H July 1966

---2---

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1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted for the month of July 1966.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA.


      (1) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company provided the command and staff elements for Detachment "A", Reconnaissance Group "B", which is
made up of the following units:

(a) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company.

(b) Company "A" (-), 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion.

(c) 2nd Platoon, Company "D", 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion.

(d) 5th Platoon, 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company.

(e) 3rd Platoon, Company "B", 1st Reconnaissance Battalion.

(2) In the interest of historical continuity the pertinent operational data of the other units in Detachment "A", Reconnaissance Group Bravo, is included in this report. However, it should be noted that all statistical data covers 1st Force Reconnaissance Company only unless otherwise stated.

b. Location.

(1) Administration and logistical personnel at DA NANG, RVN.

(2) Command Group (-) and the 2nd Platoon relocated to DONG HA, RVN, as the nucleus for Detachment "A", Reconnaissance Group Bravo.

(3) On 5 July 1966, 1st Platoon departed HUE/PHU BAI, RVN, and reported to Commanding Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company at DONG HA, RVN.

(4) On 8 July 1966, the 6th Platoon arrived at DA NANG, RVN, from duty with the SLF.

(5) On 10 July 1966, the remainder of the command and staff departed HUE/PHU BAI, RVN, and reported to Commanding Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, DONG HA, RVN.

(6) On 11 July 1966, the 6th Platoon departed DA NANG, RVN, and reported to Commanding Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, DONG HA, RVN.

(7) On 14 July 1966, the Command Group (-) departed DONG HA, RVN, reported Commanding General, Task Force Delta, CAM LO, RVN, and assumed responsibility for the reconnaissance effort associated with Operation HASTINGS.

(8) On 15 July 1966, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Platoons, returned to CHU OR this company from 1st Marine Division, CHU LAI, RVN. They reported at DA NANG, RVN.
On 18 July 1966, the 3rd and 4th Platoons departed DA NANG, RVN, and reported to Commanding Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, CAM LO, RVN. The platoons then further reported to 1st Force Reconnaissance Company Operating Base in DONG HA, RVN.

On 29 July 1966, the 5th Platoon reported to Commanding Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, CAM LO, RVN, and further reported to 1st Force Reconnaissance Company Operating Base, DONG HA, RVN.

The following information on other units of Detachment "A", Reconnaissance Group Bravo is also submitted:

(a) On 9 July 1966, the 2nd Platoon, Company "A", 2nd Platoon, Company "D", 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, reported to Commanding Officer, Detachment A, Reconnaissance Group Bravo, DONG HA, RVN.

(b) On 20 July 1966, Company "A" (-), 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Platoons, left DONG HA, RVN, to return to DA NANG, RVN, to OPCON 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion.

(c) On 20 July 1966, the 5th Platoon, 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company and the 3rd Platoon, Company "B", 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, departed OPCON Detachment "A", Reconnaissance Group Bravo, DONG HA, RVN, and reported to OPCON SLF, U.S.S. PRINCETON.


d. Command and Staff Billets. Enclosure (1).

e. Average Monthly Strength. 10 officers, 120 enlisted, and 8 USN.

3. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.

a. Personnel.

(1) Captain W. S. OSTRIE, Operations Officer, joined this company 4 July 1966.

(2) 2ndLt J. G. HART, 1st Platoon Commander, joined this company 9 July 1966.

(3) Captain J. J. CARTY, Executive Officer, rotated to CONUS 26 July 1966.
(4) Captain W. L. LOWERY joined this company 29 July 1966. Assigned as Executive Officer.

(5) This company sustained 2 WIA's as a result of enemy actions during July.

(6) Awards received by individuals during this period for actions while engaging the enemy are as follows:
   (a) 1 BSM

(7) Awards recommended, or pending for this period are as follows:
   (a) 4 BSM's
   (b) 3 NCM's

b. Training.

   (1) 5th Plt conducted intensive refresher training 18-28 July 1966.
   (2) Entire company participated in Operation Hastings.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL. 1 through 31 July 1966 Detachment A Recon Group Bravo was under the command of the Commanding Officer, 1st FRC.

5. CLOSE COMBAT.

   a. A total of 65 patrols were conducted by Det A RecGrpBravo during this reporting period; in the Northern part of QUANG TRI Province, RVN. 38 of these patrols were by 1st FRC.

   b. The results of Det A RecGrpBravo activities during July 1966 are as follows:

   | NVA | KIA Confirmed | 113 |
   | NVA | KIA Probable  | 194 |
   | NVA | WIA Confirmed | 41  |
   | NVA | WIA Probable  | 323 |

1st Force Recon Company accounted for:

   | NVA | KIA Confirmed | 89  |
   | NVA | KIA Probable  | 163 |
   | NVA | WIA Confirmed | 41  |
   | NVA | WIA Probable  | 321 |

D. A. COLBY
DECLASSIFIED

Operation Order 2–66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM 1:50,000; AMS Series L701, Sheet numbers 6361 I and 6361 II
(b) Task Unit Charlie Operation Order 1–66
(c) Reconnaissance Group Bravo Operation Order 3–66 w/Ch # 1

Task Organization:
1st Platoon, "A" Company, 3rd Recon Bn

1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) Reference (b).
      (2) Artillery support will be provided by "H" Battery, (rein) 3rd Bn, 12th Marines; Located at CAM LO.
      (3) Air support as required; by the 1st Marine Air Wing.
      (4) Attachments/detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance in the CAM LO area of QUANG TRI Province to locate and positively identify suspected VC units operating in that region. To locate and report infiltration routes running from the North and capture one prisoner.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation.
      (1) Operation Overlay.
      (2) 1st Platoon "A" Company, 3d Recon Bn, executes insertions by helicopter, into CAM LO area of QUANG TRI Province. Platoon fulfills the reconnaissance mission in a clandestine manner, operating principally from OP's in the objective area. Period of operation will be about 68 hours. Extraction will be by helicopter from predesignated landing zones.

   b. 1st Squad.
      (1) Reference (b); Annex "(a)."

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(2) Conduct reconnaissance mission as directed by Platoon Commander.

c. 2nd Squad,

(1) Reference (b) Annex (a).

(2) Conduct reconnaissance mission as directed by Platoon Commander.

d. Coordinating Instructions,


(2) TOD: Annex A Operation Overlay.
TOR: Annex A Operation Overlay.

(3) Thrust Lines,

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<tr>
<td>XRay TL</td>
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(4) Fixed wing CAS is available "on call" location of target will be given using thrust line - XRay TL - 0863.

(5) If platoon is out of radio contact for a period of two hours, unit will return to last position communication was effective. After three hours, UH-1-E aircraft will conduct an overflight and try to re-establish communications. If communications is not established abort mission and return to artillery firing position.

(6) Submit patrol rosters and itemized listings of serialized items to this headquarters (Attn: 3-3), prior to insertion.

(7) In addition to the code words contained in reference (c), the following will be utilized.

- Request UH-1-E gunship support: ADDER
- Request fixed wing support: AJAX

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Reference (c).

5. COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS.

a. Reference (b), Paragraph 4.
The following shackle shall be used:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
J C I K E M D W L B
X Q T H O N P F G A
Y Z S R U V

Authentication shall be made by requiring authentication of any letter, reply will be another in the same column of the shackle: Viz: Authenticate "C", I authenticate "C", "C".

D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES:
A (Operation Overlay)

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Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 I and 6361 II

TOD: 291800H
TOR: 011300H

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D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
Operation Order 2-66
Patrol: 1st Plt, "A" Co, 3d Recon In
Debriefier: MSGT B. A. SPENCER
Map Sheet: 6361 I 6361 II

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (1) officer, (14) enlisted, (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. (1) Sniper.
   c. Communication Equipment. (1) AN/PRC-10, (1) AN/PRC-25.
   d. Observation Equipment. (3) 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. None.

2. MISSION. To conduct combat patrol/observation post in the QMN LQ area of QUANG TRI Province to locate and report VC units operating in the region. To locate and report infiltration routes running from the North and capture one prisoner.


4. ROUTE. See Patrol Route Overlay.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. Prior to extraction in the LZ (YD 083616), several spots were accomplished by each aircraft. Upon extraction patrol moved in a Southeast direction. Approximately thirty (30) minutes later (011830H), the 3rd member of the patrol, observed an estimated fifty (50) VC vicinity of (YD 082641). The VC were moving in a Northeast direction, along a trail, in a column, well dispersed. (Comment: The VC did not fire at the recon patrol when visual contact was established. It is the opinion of the patrol leader that the reason the VC did not fire was because of the possiblity of an additional friendly force in the area). Upon the commencing of withdrawal of recon, the VC split into two (2) groups, one moving to the Northeast and behind recon's positions while the second group moved on line from the East toward recon's position. The target was marked by rifle grenades with WP.

END(3)
B. **Enemy.** The VC were wearing a mixed of khadi and green uniforms; all were wearing banna leaves or brush. One (1) automatic weapon (type unknown) was observed; all VC were armed. Enemy unit was well disciplined and appeared to be hard core. The only firing was by the VC at the gunship on the second run.

c. **Terrain.**

(1) The terrain in the patrol area consisted of elephant grass 5' to 6' high with areas of brush 3' high. Trails in the zone were well worn with the majority of the trails 3' wide and powdered surface. The area adjacent to the trail had been walled down (a possible harboring site). No attempt had been made to cover their tracks, cooking fires and sleeping areas.

d. **Other Information.** Farmers (male) were plowing fields with water buffalo and did not attempt to run at the approach of the helicopters. Grass "hooches", in the area were in various state of repair - from completely destroyed to newly constructed. Rice paddies in the area were dry. Activity (farmers) appear to be between 1700 and last light.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** Negative results with the enemy.

7. **CONDITION OF PATROL.** Condition and morale of the patrol was excellent.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

a. Two "gunships" instead of one be on station and to remain until released by the reconnaissance unit.

T. J. TERRESEONNE

ANNEXES:

Annex A (Patrol Route).

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Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay) to Operation Order 2/66
Ref: Map Sheet number 6361 I 6361 II

Task Unit Charlie
DONG HA, RVN
012225H July 1966

DECLASSIFIED

T. J. TEUEDONNE

ROUTE OF MARCH
0 HLL

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PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, OCCLUSION, EQUIPMENT.
   (1) officer, (1) enlisted, (1) USN.
   (b) Special Attachments. (1) Sniper.
   (c) Communication Equipment. (2) AN/PRC-25's.
   (d) Observation Equipment. (2) 7x50's.
   (e) Special Equipment. None.
   (f) Special Weapons. (1) Winchester model 70 with scope, (2) M-60's, (2) Claymore Mines.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance in the CAM 10 area of QUANG TAI Province to locate and positively identify suspected VC units operating in that region. To locate and report infiltration routes running from the North and capture one prisoner.


4. ROUTE. Landing Zone (YD 083615).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   (a) Synopsis. Upon insertion 2 VC were sighted in the LZ and as the helicopters lifted off the VC were taken under fire, killing one of the VC.
   (b) Enemy. 021800H (YD 083615) Upon landing in the insertion LZ, 2 VC wearing no camouflage utilities were sighted. The VC immediately hit the ground and as the helicopters lifted off 20 rounds of M-60 automatic fire were directed at the VC wounding one. The wounded VC did not get up from the ground, but the other ran to the tree line. No packs or weapons could be seen on either VC.
   (c) Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the LZ was a dry rice paddie with 4 foot bushes around the edge. Behind the bushes was a treeline with trees of approximately 30 feet in height.

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(2) Map Correction. None.

d. Other Information.

(1) To the South of the LZ approximately 100 meters was a bunker and 3 or 4 huts. Due to the short time in the area, very little could be observed about the bunker or huts.

(2) **Air support consisted of (1) UH-1E gunship and (3) A-4 Skyhawks. The UH-1-E gunship fired rockets and M-60 machinegun. The A-4's dropped 12 napalm bombs and fired 600 rounds of 20mm. 30 105mm howitzer rounds were fired in support of this mission.**

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. (1) VC KIA.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, excellent; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

T. J. TERRENOE
**CONFIDENTIAL**

Operation Order: 3-66  
Patrol: 2nd Plt, 1st Plt  
Debrief: Sgt D. A. SPENCER  
Map Sheet: 67612  

**PATTERN REPORT**

1. **SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.**
   
   a. Size and Composition. (2) enlisted, (1) USN.  
   b. Special Attachments. None.  
   d. Observation Equipment. (2) 7x50's.  
   e. Special Equipment. None.  
   f. Special Weapons. (2) M-79's.

2. **MISSION.** Conduct observation post/combat patrol and capture one prisoner in assigned area of operation.


4. **ROUTE.** Amer A (Patrol Route Overleaf).

5. **OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.**
   
   a. Suspect:
      
      (1) Seven hours in the zone with one contact. Patrol was inserted vicinity XG 006661 at 050000H. Leaving L2, patrol headed in a PTO's direction, crossing a stream and continued up the hill toward position of OP-1 (XG 00666) patrol set in position and approximately 2 minutes after departure of Hal's, noises and voices were heard along the stream from vicinity of XG 00666 to 00665).

      (2) At approximately 050000H, an estimated five VC were heard talking to one another in the L2.

      (3) 030000H guns were called in to silence the area (XG 006652) where talking and whispers (M-79 type whistle) were heard being blown.

      (4) Between 030000H and 043000H the area remained quiet. At 043000H an estimated 45 people were heard talking back and forth to each other between coordinates XG 006663 and XG 006666.
4. **Terrain.** The stream (location of crossing TD 00766) was approximately 6 feet wide, 1 foot deep, flowing North, rocky bottom (3" to 6" rocks); flowing at 2 knots and clear. The LZ was approximately 200x300 yards with stumps and poles ranging from 3 to 10 feet high throughout the LZ. A 4 foot high fence (made from hardwood trees) enclosed the LZ. There were approximately 20 fire sites (not fresh) vicinity of TD 00766. An open area (raster wall shapes) barbed wire had been strung around the clearing. One log with cut wilted leaves were observed in the same area. Generally, the vegetation was not heavy; trees in the area were spaced and ranged 40 to 50 feet high. Slopes were generally between 40 to 50% The area of extraction had been under cultivation with crops consisting of peppers, sugarcane, red peppers and squash.

6. **RESULT OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** See Paragraph 5b.

7. **CONDITION OF PATROL.** Physical condition, excellent; morale, good.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

   a. Recon insertions be accomplished at first light instead of just prior to darkness. Longer period of time for terrain and observation.

   b. Helicopters be equipped with rope ladders. (patrol had to jump from helicopter 6 to 10 feet from ground)

   J. L. JENKINS
   Staff Sergeant 1st Class, Marine Corps
   Patrol Leader

Conclusions and Recommendations of.Reviewer:

1. Due to the compromising circumstances a pre-mature extraction of Recon patrol on 3 July 1966 in Recon Zone A was required. It was discovered during the extraction phase that the unit was extracting elements that the patrol was approximately 2500 meters to the Northwest of the proposed insertion point.
zone. The actual patrol location was North of the Southern DMZ boundary. This was confirmed by the pilots. However, the above error can be attributed to the close similarity of the terrain and navigational map corrections available of the proposed and actual area of insertion. The extraction was successfully completed without incident.

J. A. VANCE
Operation Order 1-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series 1/101, Sheet number 3650 II
(b) 1st Force Recon Company Operation Order 3-66
(c) Detach "A", Reconnaissance Group Bravo Operation Order 1-66

Task Organization:

1st Plt, 1st Force Recon Co
SSgt McCAULIFFE

1. SITUATION

   a. Enemy Forces

      (1) Ref (c).

      (2) Current INTSUM's.

   b. Friendly Forces

      (1) Ref (c).

      (2) Artillery Support. Provided by Battery H (rein), 3d BN, 12th Marines located at CAM 104.

      (3) Air Support

         (a) Helicopters on alert at DONG HA.

         (b) Fixed wing on request from 1st Marine Air Wing.

      (1) Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION

   Conduct reconnaissance operations in reconnaissance zone B, QUANG TRI Province to locate and positively identify suspected VC units operating in that region. Locate and report infiltration routes from North VIETNAM.

3. EXECUTION

   a. Concept of Operation

      (1) Annex A (Operation Overlay).

      (2) One team and the Platoon Commander inserted in the BAN HINH area to observe and report VC activity in the valley to the North.

---1---

SSgt McCAULIFFE

1st RECON COMPANY
The operation will be conducted in a clandestine manner, primarily from OP's. Artillery and/or strikes will be called on likely groups of VC. Period of operation will be approximately 20 hours. Extraction will be by helicopter from predesignated landing zones.

b. Team II. Conduct operations as directed by Platoon Commander.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Patrol Route: Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(2) TOD: 061900H
   TOR: 071500H

(3) Thrust Lines:
   TLM 0161
   TIN 9959
   TLX 0060 (Use only for air targets).

(4) Fixed wing CAS and TPQ support is available on call. Allow a minimum of 30 minutes. Target location will be given using TLX only.

(5) If out of radio contact for a period of two hours, return to last position where communications were affected. After three hours, an overflight will be made to try to reestablish communications. If communications is not reestablished within 3½ hours of initial loss, abort the mission and return to the artillery firing position.

(6) Submit patrol rosters and itemized listings of serialized items to this headquarters (Attn: S-3), prior to insertion.

(7) In addition to the code words contained in Recon Group Bravo Operation Order 3-66, the following will be utilized.

Request UH-1E gunship support: ADDER
Request fixed wing support: AJAX

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. References (b) and (c).

5. COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS.

a. Reference (b).

b. Call Sign: NIGHTSTICKER.
c. The following shackle shall be used:

```
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
 B J Q S C A E K D I
 F M N W G O T L P H
 R Y U
 V    X
 Z
```

d. Authentication shall be made by requiring authentication of any letter. Reply will be another letter in the same column of the shackle; Viz: Authenticate "M", I authenticate "N", "U".

D. A. COLEY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES:
A(Operation Overlay)

DISTRIBUTION:

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Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order I-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6163

Time Zone: H

1st Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co

For period of 061500H to 071500H July 1966

Patrol Route

- MLZ
- OP
- Artillery Concentrations

D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ADL

Det "A", RecGrpBravo
DONG HA, RVN
051600H July 1966

DECLASSIFIED
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   
a. Size and Composition. 1 officer and 4 enlisted.
   
b. Special Attachments. None.
   
c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25.
   
d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   
e. Special Equipment. None.
   
f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79 and 1 M-72.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance operations in HZ B, QUANG TRI Province, to locate and positively identify suspected VC units operating in that region. Locate and report infiltration routes from North VIETNAM.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   
a. Synopsis. 1 hour and 43 minutes of reconnaissance patrolling resulted in one ambush, yielding 4 VC KIA.
   
b. Enemy. 090720H (XD 995524) the patrol had set a deliberate ambush at this position, but after 20 minutes began to move to a better ambush position. The patrol assembled on the trail and prepared to move when movement was heard along the trail to the west of the patrols position. The patrol re-assumed their ambush position and waited another 15 minutes when 1 VC moving along the trail in an easterly direction, moved into the killing zone of the ambush. The ambush was sprung, killing 4 VC. 2 other VC were observed moving towards the patrols position before the ambush was sprung, but when the firing began, these men seemed to move back into the undergrowth seemingly
uncertain of the number of men in the ambush. Due to the size of the patrol, and movement heard to the west of the patrols position, the patrol immediately moved to an HLZ and was extracted. The VC were wearing blue-gray camouflage utilities, floppy hats, and carried small packs. Weapons carried appeared to be 2 ChiCom 7.62mm DPML Degtyarev Type 53 automatic rifles, 1 Soviet 7.62mm rifle M1991/30, and 1 unidentified weapon.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the insertion HLZ consisted of elephant grass approximately 10 feet high, intermingled with thorns and vines. Movement in this area was fair. The terrain along the patrol route was heavy underbrush with a 30 foot canopy overhead. Movement in this area was limited to trails.

(2) Map Corrections. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay). The patrol located one trail approximately 2 feet wide running E-W. The trail appeared to be well used and could not be observed from the air. Along the north side of the trail, 2 strands of communication wire was found at a height varying from 4 to 6 feet from the ground. This wire appeared to be used for guiding night movement.

d. Other information.

(1) No artillery or air support missions were requested in support of this patrol.

(2) 1 M-72 was lost on this patrol due to the hasty departure from the ambush location.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 4 VC KIA (confirmed).

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. M-72's should not be carried on patrols that are to operate in dense jungles, due to the hampering of movement through the underbrush.

2. UH-1E slickships should always be available for immediate extraction of team size patrols, as they were in this case.
3. An exploitation force should be used in this area due to the apparent ease with which the VC move along the trails.

J G. HART
Second Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER.

1. Request TPQ-10 missions in this area.

2. Request H&I fires along the trail indicated on the operation overlay.
Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay) for Patrol Report to Operation Order 1-66

Ref: (a) Map Sheet 6361 II
Operation Order 2-66

Ref:
(a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) 1st Force Recon Co Operation Order 3-66
(c) Det A, Recon Group Bravo Operation Order 1-66

Task Organization:
2nd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co
2ndLt FREITAS

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.
   (1) Reference (c).
   (2) Current INTSUMS.

b. Friendly Forces.
   (1) Reference (c).
   (2) Artillery. Provided by Battery "H" (Rein), 3rd BN, 12th Marines, located at CAM LO.
   (3) Air Support.
      (a) Helicopters on alert at DONG HA.
      (b) Fixed wing on request from First Marine Air Wing.
   (4) Attachments/Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ C-5, QUANG TRI Province to locate and positively identify VC units operating in that region. Locate and report infiltration routes from North VIETNAM. Direct supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.
   (1) Annex A (Operation Overlay).
2. Insert platoon in LZ Co2 to observe and report VC activity. The operation will be conducted in a clandestine manner primarily from OP's. Supporting arms will be called on likely groups of VC. The period of the operation will be approximately 48 hours. Extraction will be by helicopter from a predesignated LZ.

b. 2nd Platoon. Conduct operations as directed by platoon commanders.

c. Coordinating Instructions.
   
   
   
   (3) Thrust Lines:
   
   TLJ = 0747
   TLX = 0647
   TLX = 0816 (use only for initial request for air support from Detachment "A").

   (4) Give coordinates in clear when directing CAS.

   (5) If out of radio contact for a period of two hours, return to last position where communications were effected. After three hours, an overflight will be made to try to re-establish communications. If communications is not re-established within 3 1/2 hours of initial loss, abort the mission and return to the artillery firing position.

   (6) Submit patrol rosters and itemized listings of serialized items to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3), prior to insertion.

   (7) In addition to the codewords contained in Recon Group Bravo Operational Order 3-66, the following will be utilized:

   Request UH-1E gunship support: ADDER
   Request fixed wing support: AJAX

   (8) Fixed Wing CAS and TPQ support is available on call. Allow a minimum of 30 minutes. Target location will be given using TLX only.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. References (b) and (c).
5. COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS.

a. Reference (b).

b. Callsign: PRINCESS.

c. Frequencies: Primary — 49.6, Alternate — 47.5.

d. The following shackle will be used:

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
A B C D E F G H I J
K L M N O P Q R S T
U V W X Y Z
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e. Authentication shall be made by requiring authentication of any letter. Reply will be another letter in the same column of the shackle; viz: Authenticate "N", I authenticate "T", "T".

--3--

ANNEX:

A (Operation Overelay)

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Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Map sheet 6361 II

Time Zone: H

2nd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co

For period of 061630H to 081000H July 1966
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 11 enlisted, 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. 1 sniper.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25.
   d. Observation Equipment. 3 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. 3 M-14 incendiary grenades.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-1 with scope, 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ C-5, QUANG TRI Province to locate and positively identify VC units operating in that region. Locate and report infiltration routes from North VIETNAM. Direct supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 41 1/2 hours of patrolling and observation resulted in negative VC sightings and contacts.
   b. Enemy. None.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the patrol area consisted of thick underbrush about 12 feet in height, intermingled with vines and thorns. The canopy in this area was approximately 30 feet high. Movement in the area was limited to ridgelines and stream beds.
(2) **Map Corrections. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).**

(a) The patrol discovered one trail about 2 feet wide running NE-SW. It appeared to have been used recently. The trail could not be seen from the air.

(b) Another trail running E-W was found by the patrol. This trail was approximately 2 feet wide and appeared not to have been used recently. This trail could not be seen from the air.

(c) A cultivated area was found near the stream, with a trail running parallel to the stream near this cultivated area. The trail was well used and could not be seen from the air.

d. **Other Information.**

(1) (YD 063166) 2 or 3 areas were found to be levelled on the side of the hill large enough to accommodate one sleeping man. A bamboo pen, approximately 10 feet in diameter, which was well used and could be used to contain pigs was also found at this location. This area had not been used in the last month.

(2) 061930H (YD 0645) 2 rifle rounds fired in quick succession were heard. The rounds appeared to be some type of signal.

(3) 062130H (YD 057460) a man was heard yelling, followed by the trumpeting of an elephant. Movement was heard in this area throughout the night, as well as the next night. Artillery missions were called on this area on the nights of 6 and 7 July, with no damage assessments made, rounds could not be observed.

(4) 062300 automatic weapons fire was heard to the west of the patrols position. No determination of the area in which these rounds were fired could be made.

(5) 062300H and 062400H (YD 062459) 2 mortar rounds were heard at each of the given times falling into the area of the patrols insertion HLT.

(6) 072230H (YD 05145) the patrol heard what sounded like 6 to 8 outgoing 81mm mortar rounds.

(7) 4 artillery missions totalling 12 rounds were fired in support of this patrol. Target could not be observed and no damage assessment could be made.

---2---
6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
   a. Reconnaissance patrols should be equipped with collapsible 2 quart water bags.

   N. E. Jennings
   Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
   Patrol Leader
Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay) to Patrol Report for Operation Order 2-66

Ref: (a) Map sheet 6361 II

--- Map corrections (trails)
Operation Order 3-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Recon Group Bravo Operation Order 6-66
(c) Det "A", Recon Group Bravo Operation Order 1-66

Task Organization:
1st Platoon, Co "A", 3rd Recon Bn  1stLt TEREBONNE

1. SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Forces.
      (1) Reference (a).
      (2) Current INTSUMS.
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) Reference (c).
      (2) Artillery. Provided by Battery "H" (Rein), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, located at CAM 10.
      (3) Air Support.
         (a) Helicopters on alert at DONG HA.
         (b) Fixed wing on request from First Marine Air Wing.
      (4) Attachments/Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance operations in Reconnaissance Zone C, QUANG TRI Province, to locate and positively identify suspected VC units operating in that region. Locate and report infiltration routes from North VIETNAM. Direct supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity. Observe stream valleys to the west and north, and the flatlands to the northeast.
3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) Annex A (Operation Overtone).

(2) Insert platoon in RZ C to observe and report VC activity in area. The operation will be conducted in a clandestine manner primarily from OP's. Supporting arms will be called on likely groups of VC. The period of the operation will be approximately 48 hours. Extraction will be by helicopter from a predesignated LZ.

b. 1st Platoon, "A" Company. Conduct operations as directed by platoon commander.

c. Coordinating Instructions.


(2) TOD, TR. Annex A (Operation Overlay).


(4) Give coordinates in clear when directing CAS.

(5) If out of radio contact for a period of two hours, return to the last position where communications were effected. After three hours, an overflight will be made to try to re-establish communications. If communications is not re-established within 3½ hours of initial loss, abort the mission and return to the artillery firing position.

(6) Submit patrol rosters and itemized listings of serialized items to this Headquarters (Attn: 8-3), prior to insertion.

(7) In addition to the codewords contained in Recon Group Bravo Operation Order 3-66, the following will utilized:

- Request UH-1E gunship support: ADDER
- Request fixed wing support: AJAX

(8) Fixed Wing CAS and TPQ support is available on call. Allow a minimum of 30 minutes. Target location will be given using TLX only.

1. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. References (b) and (c).
5. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. Reference (b).
   b. Callsign: PARTY LINE.
   c. Frequencies: Primary -- 49.6; alternate -- 47.5.
   d. The following shackle will be used:
      
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      |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
      | Y | O | N | W | A | I | H | E | T | S |
      | Z | M | L | K | X | C | D | R | F | G |
      | F | J | Q |   |   |   |   |   |   | U |
      | B |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | V |
   e. Authentication shall be made by requiring authentication of any letter. Reply will be another letter in the same column of the shackle; viz: Authenticate "J", I authentioate "J", "H".

[Signature]

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX:
A (Operation Overlay)

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DECLASSIFIED
Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 3-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Map Sheet 6361 II

Time Zone: H

1st Plt, Co "A", 3rd Recon Bn

For period of 081600H to 100900H July 1966

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DECLASSIFIED
Operation Order 4-66

Patrol: 1st Plt, Co "A", 3rd Recon Bn
Debriefer: 1stLt C. F. HUBERT
Map Sheet: 6361 I

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 1 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. 1 sniper.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25, 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 3 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 M-79's, 1 M-60, 1 Shotgun, 2 claymore mines, 1 Winchester Model 70 with scope.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance in NZ G to locate and positively identify suspected VC units operating in the region. To locate and report infiltration routes running from the North and capture prisoners.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 25 hours of patrolling and observation resulted in one VC sighting on which one artillery mission was called, probably killing 12 VC.
   b. Enemy. 051115H (YD 998571) patrol observed 12 VC wearing green camouflage utilities, and carrying packs and unidentified weapons. The VC were heading NE across the Thin Lwin River. 11 rounds of 155mm howitzer were fired on the target with excellent coverage yielding 12 VC KIA probable.

   [Signature]

   (SnedCO)
(2) OYAPISH (YD 072/68) the patrol was reinserted and immediately observed 2 VC on a hillside near the HLZ. The VC opened fire on the helicopters. The first helicopter pulled out of the HLZ and signalled the second helicopter to do the same. The second helicopter attempted to pull out before landing, but lost engine power. To lighten the load, the helicopter jettisoned fuel, but crashed while doing so and almost immediately burst into flames. The other helicopter landed to assist the burning one (YD 059/65). All but one man escaped the burning helicopter.

c. The terrain in the area where the helicopter crashed was light canopy approximately 6 feet high with thick underbrush beneath. Movement in this area was poor.

d. Other Information. None.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 1 USMC KIA and 4 USMC WIA's.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, fair; morale, fair.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

T. J. TERRIGONE
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader
Patrol Report

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. **Summary**: 1 officer, 14 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. **Special Attachments**: None.
   c. **Communication Equipment**: 2 AN/PRC-25.
   d. **Observation Equipment**: 3 7x50's.
   e. **Special Equipment**: None.
   f. **Special Weapons**: 9 M-60, 2 M-79's, 1 shotgun, 2 claymore mines.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ C, QUANG TRI Province, to locate and positively identify suspected VC units operating in that region. Locate and report infiltration routes from North VIETNAM. Direct supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity. Observe stream valleys to the west and north, and the flatlands to the northeast.


4. ROUTE. Not applicable.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. **Summary**: Two attempted insertions of this reconnaissance patrol, resulted in one VC contact and one USMC KIA and four USMC WIA.
   b. **Enemy**.
      (1) 081630H (YD 055429) the patrol landed in the predetermined insertion HZ and received fire from 2 automatic weapons and numerous small arms. The platoon was in the HZ approximately 45 minutes before it was extracted.

---
(2) 051755H (XD 006555) the patrol heard one carbine round to the west of their position, then movement of an estimated 10 to 15 VC from the east. The group on the east was heard to fire one carbine round and then movement was heard to the west of the patrol. The carbine rounds seemed to be a signal between the two units. The patrol withdrew to an HZE at XD 998552 and was extracted.

(3) The CH-46 that was flying in support of the extraction, received fire from one large caliber weapon and 5 or 6 smaller weapons and proceeded to drop thermite grenades around the enemy position and return fire. The fire caused by the grenades trapped the VC and one M-79 round was fired into the area where the large caliber weapon was firing. After the explosion of the M-79 round, the large caliber weapon was not seen to fire any more. Fixed wing aircraft on station, used napalm and rockets on the trapped VC.

d. Terrain

(1) The terrain in the patrol area consisted of elephant grass about 6 feet high along with wooded areas with trees approximately 20 feet high. The wooded areas contained hardwood, bamboo, and thick brush with vines. Movement in the grass was good, while movement in the wooded areas was extremely difficult.

(2) Map Corrections. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

(g) One trail about 1½ meters wide running E-W was located on the ridgeline running up the west side of Hill 254. At the top of the hill, the trail split to the north and south slopes of the hill and then came together on the eastern side.

e. Other Information

(1) (XD 994558) an area with numerous huts surrounding a catholic church was burning due to an artillery mission fired in the area. Numerous small arms were heard being fired in this area.

(2) Numerous fighting holes were located on the western portion of Hill 254, but appeared not to have been used recently. (Annex A Patrol Route Overlay).

(3) Two artillery missions totalling 31 rounds were fired in support of this patrol. One air support mission was flown after the extraction of the patrol.
6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 12 VC KIA Probable.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Thermite grenades are an effective method in dry areas to trap the VC until supporting arms can be used for neutralization.

2. .50 caliber machine guns are an effective self defense weapon on the CH-46 helicopter. The M-60 lacks the range and power necessary for effective fire power.

T. J. TERREBONNE
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader
Annex A (Parallel Route Overlay) to Patrol Report for Operation Order 4-66

Ref: (a) Map Sheet 6361 I
Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; MAS Series L701; Sheet numbers 6361 I, II
(b) 1st Force Recon Co Operation Order 3-66
(c) Detachment "A", Recon Group Bravo Operation Order 1-66

Task Organization:

2nd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co

2ndLt FREITAS

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) Reference (c).

(2) Current INTSUM's.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Reference (c).

(2) Artillery Support. Provided by Battery H (Rein), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, located at CAM 10.

(3) Air Support.

(a) Helicopters on alert at DOG HA.

(b) Fixed wing on request from 1st Marine Air Wing.

(b) Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ B-3, vicinity of XD 9361, QUANG TRI Province to locate and identify VC units operating in that area. Locate VC routes of infiltration from North VIETNAM. Direct supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity. Obtain one prisoner.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Annex A (Operation Overlay). One team and platoon commander will be inserted in the vicinity of 9361 to report VC activity in stream valley. The operation will be conducted in a clandestine manner.
primarily from OP's. Artillery and/or air strikes will be called on likely groups of VC. Period of operation will be approximately 72 hours. Extraction will be by helicopter from predesignated landing zones.

b. Team 21. Conduct operations as directed.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Patrol Route: Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(2) TCD, TOR: Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(3) Thrust Lines: Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(4) Fixed wing CAS and TPQ support is available on call. Allow a minimum of 30 minutes. Target location will be given using "LX only."

(5) If out of radio contact for a period of two hours, return to the last position where communications were effected. After three hours, an overflight will be made to try to re-establish communications. If communications is not re-established within 3½ hours of initial loss, abort the mission and return to the artillery firing position.

(6) Submit patrol rosters and itemized listings of serialized items to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3), prior to insertion.

(7) Use codeword list dated 6 July 1966.

(8) CAS and artillery will be directed in the clear.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. References (b) and (c).

5. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. Reference (b).

b. Callsign: FIELD CLERK.

c. Frequencies: Primary - 50.5; alternate - 32.5.
d. The following shackle shall be used.

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e. Authentication. Authentication shall be made by requiring authentication of my letter. Reply will be another letter in the same column of the shackle; Viz: Authenticate "N", I authenticate "N", "M".

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX
A (Operation Ovaly)

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Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 5-66

Ref: (a) Map sheet 361 I, II

Period covered: 100000H to 101500H July 1966

D. A. GOLK
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

A-1

1st Fd Recon C, Jul 66
w/ end 13

DECLASSIFIED
Operation Order: 5-66
Patrol: Team 21, 2nd Plt, 1st PRC
Debrief: 1st Lt C. F. HUBERT
Map Sheet: 6361 II

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 enlisted and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance operations in HZ B-3, vicinity of XD 9361, Quang Tri Province to locate and identify VC units operating in that area. Locate VC routes of infiltration from North VIETNAM. Direct supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity. Obtain one prisoner.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 1 hour and 45 minutes of reconnaissance patrolling/observation resulted in 3 VC sightings.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 100710H (XD 939606) the patrol sighted 2 VC heading east in the stream bed. 1 VC was wearing dark purple-black trousers, rolled up, and the second was wearing dark purple-black trousers rolled up and a shirt of the same material. This man also wore a khaki flop hat. No packs or weapons could be observed on either of these 2 VC. They were both approximately 5'5" tall.
(2) 100730H (XD 929609) a rasping type noisemaker could be heard to the west of the patrols position. At this time, the wind shifted and the odor of urine could be detected.

(3) 100731H (XD 939606) along the stream bed to the east and west of the patrols position, movement and the rattling of equipment could be heard. It sounded as if canteens were being filled.

(4) 100732H (XD 939606) the patrol observed 2 VC heading west in the stream bed. The first VC was wearing khaki shirt and trousers, no pack or weapon was seen. The second man was about 6 feet tall wearing new khakis, barracks cover, and patent leather equipment. This VC was not wearing a pack, but carried an automatic weapon and appeared to be an officer.

(5) 100735H (XD 939606) movement was heard all around the patrols position and then the patrol sighted 25 VC heading east in the streambed. They were wearing dark purple uniforms, matching or khaki covers and packs of assorted sizes. All carried weapons, but due to limited visibility, identification could not be made.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the insertion HLZ consisted of elephant grass about 1 foot high with some scrub trees 3 feet high. In the ambush area, the vegetation was thick vines, torns and bushes, with a 30 foot canopy overhead, movement in this area was difficult.

(2) Map correction. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

(a) One trail 1 to 1 1/2 feet wide running E-W was located. It appeared to have been used recently, but not heavily.

(b) The stream bed running E-W seemed to be the main avenue of travel in this area.

d. Other Information.

(1) At 100800H at XD 938606, the helicopters received ground fire. This was upon extraction of the team.

(2) No artillery or close air support missions were requested in support of this patrol.

(3) One AN/PRC-25 tape antenna and base was lost on this patrol.
6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

N. E. JENNINGS
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER.

1. This area appears to have been used as a bivouac area for a regularly organized unit.

2. Request TPQ-10 mission at XD 935606 and along stream bed running E-W from this position.

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay) to Patrol Report for Operation Order 5-66
Operation Order 6-66

Ref:  
(a) Map of VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6351 III  
(b) Recon Group Brave Operation Order 6-66  
(c) Deleguent A, Brown Group Brave Operation Order 6-66

Task Organization:

2nd Plt, 1st Force Recon Co  
2ndLt FREITAS

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.
   
   (1) Reference (c).
   
   (2) Current INTSUMS.

b. Friendly Forces.
   
   (1) Reference (c).
   
   (2) Artillery. Provided by Battery H (Rein), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, located at CAI LO.

   (3) Air Support.
       
       (a) Helicopters on alert at DONG HA.

       (b) Attachments/Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. To conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ B-2 CONGO TIM Province, to locate and identify VC units in area. Locate and report infiltration routes from North VIETNAM. Direct supporting arms on targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

   (1) Annex A (Operation Overlay).

   (2) Insert team 22 in RZ B-2. CPs will be used as the primary means of insertion. Observe SOUL TIM HIN Stream valley. The period of operation is approximately 9 hours. Extraction from pre-designated LZ by helicopter.
2. 2nd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co. Conduct operations as directed by platoon commander.

3. Coordinating Instructions.

   (1) Reference (c).

   (2) Patrol Route: Annex A (Operation Overlay).

   (3) TCI, TCR: 650600H, 111500H July 1966.


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Reference (b) and (c).

5. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

   a. Reference (b).

   b. Two AN/PRC-25 radios will be carried.

   c. Callsign: GROUCHO MARX.

   d. Frequencies: Primary - 50.5/ alternate 32.4.

   e. The following shackle will be used.

      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

      F A E G H I J K L M

      T U V W X Y Z

      Q N W L M K

      S R

   f. Authentication shall be made by requiring authentication of any letter. Reply will be another letter in the same column of the shackle; viz: Authenticate "S": I authenticate "S", "Q".

                       [Signature]

       D. A. COLE
       Major, U. S. Marine Corps
       Commanding

--2--
A (Operation Overlay)

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Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 6-66

Ref: Map Sheet 6361 II

TLR 8757
TLS 9156
TLX 8956

→ PATROL ROUTE

→ HLC

A-1

DECLASSIFIED
Operation Order 7-66

Ref: (a) Map VIETNAM; 1:50,000; A05 Series L741; Sheet number 0361 II
(b) Recon Group Bravo Operation Order 6-66
(c) Det "A", Recon Group Bravo Operation Order 1-66

Task Organization:

2nd Plt, 1st Force Recon Co 2nd Lt FRITIAS

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.
   (1) Reference (c).
   (2) Current INTSUS.

b. Friendly Forces.
   (1) Reference (c).
   (2) Artillery. Provided by Battery "H" (Rein), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, located at CA; LO;
   (3) Air Support.
      (a) Helicopters on alert at DON HA.
      (b) Fixed-wing on request from First Marine Air Wing.
   (4) Attachments/Detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ B-1 to locate and identify VC units in area. Locate infiltration routes from North. Capture 1 prisoner. Direct supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. Annex A (Operation Overlay). Insert team 21 in RZ B-1. Entry will be by parachute from a CH-46. Extraction will be...
by helicopter from a predesignated HLZ. The period of operation will be approximately 16 hours.

b. 2nd Platoon, 1st Force Recon Co. Conduct operations as directed by platoon commander.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

   (1) Patrol Route: Annex A (Operation Overlay).
   (2) TCD, TER: 140200, 141500 July 1966.
   (3) Thrust Lines: Annex A (Operation Overlay).
   (4) References (b) and (c).
   (5) Long range rations are authorized.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. References (b) and (c).

5. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

   a. Reference (b).
   b. Two AN/PRC-25 radios will be carried.
   c. Callsign: FIELD CLERK.
   d. Frequencies: Primary -- 50.5; alternate -- 32.4.
   e. The following shackle will be used.

```
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
 R G O I U G S N K E
 Z I A N D H L F T P
 V Q Y M
 P J
```

   f. Authentication shall be made by requiring authentication of any letter. Reply will be another letter in the same column of the shackle; viz: Authenticate "D", I authenticate "M", "U".

   [Signature]
   D. A. COLBY
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
ANNEX:

A (Operation Overlord)

DISTRIBUTION:

CO 2/1                               2
2/1 S-3                               7
3rd Recon In                           2
1st FRC                               3
2nd Plt, 1st FRC                       3
File                                    10

Total                                   27
Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 7-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AHS Series L701; Sheet number 8361 II

Period covered: 110000H to 140000H July 1965

TLJ 73 54
TLK 72 64
TLX 72 53

□ JUMP ZONE
○ HLT
△ OP
→ PATROL ROUTE

D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

A-1

1st Fe 2 2 Recom Comp. 66
W/Chck 17
1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 5 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ B to locate and identify VC units in that area. Locate infiltration routes from the North. Capture 1 prisoner. Direct supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 11 ½ hours of patrolling and observation, the team made no contacts or sightings. No air support or artillery missions were requested in support of this patrol.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was very easy to move in. The low ground in grid squares 9252 and 9352, consists of grass approximately 3 feet high. This area can also be used for an HLZ and can hold an unlimited number of H-34's at any one time. On the high ground, small trees were encountered up to 30 feet high but the valley could be easily observed from the teams location in the high ground.
(2) Map Corrections. None.

d. Other Information.

(1) 141509H (YD 923524) while the patrol was moving towards the high ground, they heard one man yelling in the valley at a distance of 500 to 800 meters away. This man was not observed.

(2) Two ambushes were set during the hours of daylight. One was at XD 925528 and 921520. Both with negative results.

(3) The patrol noted an extremely large amount of insects in the operation area. It was also noted that this area was extremely quiet throughout.

(4) The patrol was out of communications for more than two hours, due to no relay site or relay aircraft over the area.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, poor.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

N. E. JENNINGS
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 8-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; Series L701; Sheet number 6361 XX
(b) Det A, RedrPravdo 0-6 1-65
(c) RedrPravdo 0-6 3-65

Task Organization: 1st Plt, 1st ForBnCo

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.

3. EXECUTION:

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-EXTERNALS.
   a. Reference (b) and (c).
   b. Call sign: FIELD CODE, NIGHTSTICKER
   c. Frequencies: 50.5, 32.4.
   d. Shackle:

   
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
   D E C J B F G H A I
   M T S R L K P C W
   V X X U Z W

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in same column of shackle.

   [Signature]

   D. A. COLE
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer and 9 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50 and 1 spotting scope.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 3 claymore mines.

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 17 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol observed 3 armed VC, heard numerous voices and sounds of signals indicating that heavy VC activity was present in the objective area, and a definite sound of vehicular traffic twice, during the patrol. One air support mission was requested and made by HUE/PHU BAI aircraft on 3 VC observed.

   b. Enemy. 130830H (YD 068596) the patrol sighted 3 VC approximately 30 meters to the north of their position. The VC were moving in an easterly direction. 2 of the VC were wearing black PJ's and the third had light colored PJ's. Weapons were observed but definite identification could not be made of the weapons due to the heavy underbrush. It appeared to the patrol, these VC were looking for them.
c. Terrain. The terrain in the objective area was found to be very mountainous with slopes up to 60°. Travel in the jungle was considered fair to poor and only 150 meters an hour could be covered at times. The canopy reached up to 60 feet at various locations. Spots were found where brush and grass was burned off making travel very easy but dangerous due to lack of concealment.

d. Other Information.

(1) 122100H (YD 066594) the patrol heard sounds that appeared to be a signal by hitting two bamboo sticks together. The sounds came from approximately 300 meters in a southwesterly direction and they lasted approximately 10 to 15 minutes.

(2) 122200H (YD 066594) while the patrol was at this location, they heard what appeared to be wooden type horns being blown. The sounds started at the west end of the valley and ended on the east end. One hour elapsed while the horns were blown 23 times. These sounds lasted 2 to 3 hours.

(3) 122300H The patrol heard the sounds of motor vehicles. It was stated by the patrol leader to be definitely trucks of some sort. Actual location and movement could not be established due to the echo in the valley. It was estimated to come from the south.

(4) Between the hours of 130215H to 130445H while the patrol was in the harbor site when they heard voices from all directions ranging in distance from 30 to 200 meters away from their position.

(5) 130545H The patrol departed the harbor site and moved in to the OP site at coordinates YD 068596. After 15 to 20 minutes they heard loud sounds coming from the direction of the harbor site they had just abandoned moments earlier.

(6) 130500H (YD 068596) the patrol heard once again the sounds of truck traffic. Once again the exact location and movement could not be determined.

(7) 130845H It appeared to the patrol that they were in the midst of VC, 40 meters away. Gunships were called in. Also a SPARROWHAWK was requested. 3 VC were observed in close proximity of the patrols position. The VC were taken under fire by gunships. While making the first two passes, the helos received moderate automatic weapons fire from one unobserved position. Machine gun fire by helos had excellent coverage of the target. A total of 8 passes were made by the 2 gunships.
(8) After SPARROWHAWK landed, the patrol checked out the area where the 3 VC were last seen. Blood blotsches were located indicating that at least one VC was WIA by air.

(9) Extraction was accomplished without any further incidents.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 1 VC WIA, no friendly casualties.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Gunships should not be called in for an airstrike if SPARROWHAWK is on the way. If so done, it gives the VC the chance to get away.

J. G. HART
Second Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
DECLASSIFIED

Operation Order 9-66

Ref: 
(a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 -
(b) Det A, RecIPravo 1-66
(c) RecIPravo 0p 3-66

Task Organization: Team 21, 2nd Plt, 1st FRC 66

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.

3. EXECUTION:

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: FIELD CLERK.
   c. Frequencies: 50.5, 32.4.
   d. Shackle:
      
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      D N I W A G C K E J
      P H S B L T W C U R
      F Y Z M
      X V

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer: any letter in the same column of the shackle.

   
   
   
   
   

   

   D. A. COLBY
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 5 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PHC-25.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. None.

2. MISSION. To conduct reconnaissance operations in RZ B-2, QUANG TRI Province, to locate and identify VC units in the area. Locate and report infiltration routes from North VIETNAM. Direct supporting arms on targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 7 hours and 20 minutes of reconnaissance patrolling/observation resulted in 2 VC sightings and one enemy contact yielding 2 VC WIA.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 110820H (XD 899560) the patrol sighted 5 VC moving SE along the trail parallel to the stream at this location. It was noted that 3 rocks were piled to act as a trail marker. Two of the VC were observed to be wearing black shorts and khaki shirts, the last man was wearing blue shorts, a white shirt, and light colored soft cover with a blue stripe around the edge. All of

---
the VC had packs, 2 rucksacks and 3 blanket rolls slung diagonally across the body. All were wearing cartridge belts but only the last man could be seen carrying a weapon, a US carbine. All carried branches over their heads to hinder observation from the air.

(2) 110830H, URL-E gunships were requested to make strafing runs to flush the VC into the patrols position for a capture. It was noted that after each strafing run a large volume of fire was returned from the ground, so it was assumed that all the VC were carrying weapons. On the last rocket run, it was noted that a direct hit was made on the last observed position of the VC.

(3) 111255H (XD 899560) the patrol observed 5 VC moving NW along the stream. 4 were wearing black shorts and shirts, 1 was wearing black shorts and a khaki shirt. All had cartridge belts and what appeared to be ChiCom carbines. The VC were taken under fire by the patrol, in an attempt to wound and capture one. Two VC were wounded but managed to slip away from the area.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the objective area consisted of scrub trees and shrubs 8 to 12 feet high and some elephant grass. The ground was very rocky, but movement was good.

(2) Map Corrections. One trail running NW-SE along the stream was located. It was 2 meters wide and well used, but could not be observed from the air. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

d. Other Information.

(1) (XD 899560) a small cultivated area used for raising tomatoes was found.

(2) Water buffalo in the area preceded the VC movement, but actions of the animals gave away the location of the VC.

(3) One URL-E gunship support mission was run in support of this patrol.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 2 VC WIA.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

---2---
8. RECOMMENDATION.

(a) Only one radio be carried on small patrols.
(b) Insertions be made at daybreak or before.

D. G. ROBIN
Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 4 enlisted and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PHC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.


4. ROUTE. None.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 46 minutes of reconnaissance patrolling resulted in one VC contact.
   b. Enemy.

   (1) 120604H (XD 998647) as helicopter approached the insertion LZ, fire was received from XD 998655. The helicopter hovered over the LZ and the patrol started disembark when 5 or 6 VC were seen at XD 999647 running towards the helicopter firing their weapons. The VC were wearing light colored shirts, no packs, and all had weapons. Trousers could not be observed due to the height of the grass. The helicopter lifted off, but 2 members of the patrol were already on the ground and 2 away from the immediate area. The two men established radio contact with aircraft and moved to suitable LZ at XD 996647 without incident and were extracted.
(2) 120650H (XD 996647) upon extraction of the two men, the UH-1-E slickship heard small arms fire from a distance of about 300 meters.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the patrol area consisted of elephant grass 12 to 15 feet high with vines and thorns intermingled. Movement through this area is poor.

(2) Map Corrections. None.

d. Other Information.

(1) 7 to 8 bedding down areas were observed between the insertion and the extraction LZ. 3 of these areas could accommodate up to 10 men, the others could hold 2 men each.

(2) Many game trails were seen throughout this area, but none could accommodate human traffic.

(3) 3000 pounds of napalm, 157 rockets, and 1000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, was fired in support of this patrol.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. The rate at which the VC came towards the helicopter, indicate a high degree of training and discipline.

W. S. Jennings
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader
Operation Order 10-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series 2701: Sheet number 6381 I
(b) Det A, Bravo Bravo QP O 1-66
(c) Bravo Bravo QP O 2-66

Task Organization: 1st Plt, A Company

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).
2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.
3. EXPECTATION:
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsigns: PARTY LINE.
   c. Frequencies: 50.6, 32.4.
   d. Shackles:

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
   K Q F C Z L I B T W
   N E M D J R X N V G
   C Z S Y P U

   [Signature]
   D. A. Colby
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (1) officer, (11) enlisted, (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. (1) Sniper Team.
   c. Communication Equipment. (2) AN/PRC-25.
   d. Observation Equipment. (2) 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. (2) Claymore mines, (1) M-60, (2) Winchester Model 70's with scope.

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operations; Identify VC units operating in area.


4. ROUTE. Not Applicable.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis: Prior to insertion the helicopters received heavy automatic and small arms fire from an unknown number of Viet Cong on the ground close to the HLZ. No heavy weapons were observed being used.

   b. Enemy. As the helicopters approached the HLZ at YD 035638 heading East to West, The helicopters were at approximately 100 feet altitude when they received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from various positions around and in close proximity of the HLZ. Heavy volumes of fire were returned by both helicopters and the embarked patrol with unknown results. One heavy weapons position was observed 75 to 100 meters away from the HLZ and this position was such that it could fire into the HLZ. The weapon was never actually identified and it appeared that it did not open fire on the aircraft. One VC was observed behind this gun. Fighting holes and dug-in positions were noted along the stream bed in the valley between coordinates YD 035639 and YD 033639. It was from this general location that fire was received. In addition fire was also received through the canopy. 3 VC were: seen approximately 50 to 75 meters away from the heavy caliber weapon's position, wearing khaki...
and green. No weapons were observed. Patrol helicopter received one hit in aircraft, damage unknown.

c. Terrain. Terrain appeared to be heavily overgrown with the canopy possibly up to 60 feet.

d. Other Information.

(1) One main trail was observed approximately 1 to 1.5 meters wide running along the stream bed. This trail had numerous small trails branching off and heading into the underbrush. One of these trails that appeared to be heavily used ran through the HLZ.

(2) Two possible secondary HLZs observed on previous recon overflights were noted to have wooden fences built in a circular pattern. No livestock was observed in these. These fences were not observed on previous overflights.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. VC unknown; no friendly casualties.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, excellent; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) When VC activity is observed and reported artillery and TPQ missions should be used as soon as possible when reported.

(2) Possible insertion times should be changed to beginning of morning civil twilight.

T. J. TERRERELLE
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER.

1. During the actual overflight for the insertion the pilots reported heavy interference of frequency 50-5. This came from Vietnamese speaking people. When pilot stated that insertion was canceled all interference was stopped. This interference lasted approximately 20 minutes total.

G. A. KOCH
Operation Order 11-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS
Series L/Cl: Sheet number 6361 I
(b) Lot A, Red-Bario 066 1-66
(c) Red-Bario CC 3-66

Task Organization. Team 24, 2nd Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operations; identify VC units operating in area.

3. EXECUTION:

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. Reference (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: CROTON MARX.
   c. Frequencies: 50.5, 32.4.
   d. Shackles:

   
   
   
   
   
   

   

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in same column of shackle.

   D. A. COLBY
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding
1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 4 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-72.

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 10½ hours of patrolling and observation negative contact or sightings were made by this team. No artillery or air missions were requested in support of this team.

   b. Enemy: None observed.

   c. Terrain.

      (1) The terrain in the objective area was found to be very heavily overgrown with brush and vines. Some thorn bushes were encountered. The canopy averaged up to 30 feet. Up to 300 meters an hour could be covered at times in this terrain.

      (2) Map Corrections. One well used trail was noted running along the stream in a northwest to southeast direction. This trail was about 3 feet wide and could not be observed from the air.

   -1--
d. Other Information.

(1) 11-1210H (XD 933605) the team observed one old man and a little girl travelling from northwest to southeast along the trail. No weapons were observed.

(2) 11-1330H (XD 933606) the team heard noises from what sounded like woodchopping. This chopping lasted about 15 minutes, then it stopped. The area was not checked out.

(3) 11-1350H (XD 933607) the team observed an old hut in the treeline. A wooden fence was observed surrounding this hut. It appeared that it had not been used for some time.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

D. J. ROBIN
Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

DECLASSIFIED
Operation Order 12-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet numbers 6461 III
    (b) Det A, RecGrpBravo OpJ 1-66
    (c) RecGrpBravo OpJ 3-66

Task Organization: 2nd Flt, "D" Co

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.

3. EXECUTION:

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PIKE.
   c. Frequencies: 50,5, 32.4.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      A T C M H R P B K D
      L F Q Y E W S G U N
      O J X I
      V Z

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

   [Signature]

D. A. COBLEY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (2) officers (31) enlisted, (2) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. (2) AN/PRC-25's, (2) AN/PRC-10's.
   d. Observation Equipment. (3) 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. None.

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 28 hours of patrolling and observation the patrol made contact with an estimated force of 4 VC. Resulting in 3 VC KIA confirmed and 1 VC MIA possible.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 150800E YD 082485 The patrol was set in an ambush position when they heard voices coming from a Southwesterly direction. An estimated 4 VC were seen approaching the ambush position when the patrol opened up with automatic weapons killing 3 and wounding 1 possible. Weapons and equipment captured in Annex B.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area is considered to be fairly open. Grass up to 6 feet was encountered with some brush and trees. Along the river beds the terrain was considered to be very thick brush.
      (2) Map Corrections. None Observed.
d. Other Information

(1) The patrol departed D-5 area with one company of ARVN's. This was a stay behind mission. At 141315H YD 085455 the patrol split from the ARVN force continuing their own assigned mission.

(2) YD 085436 The patrol found some type of trail marker, pointing towards the main road. This marker consisted of a foot long bamboo stick pointing towards the road with one notch cut at the opposite end.

(3) Ambush was set at coordinates YD 089430. The patrol was in this position from 142000H to 150600H. Negative results.

(4) The patrol set in 2 ambushes at YD 085484 and the 2nd at 082485. The patrol made contact with 4 VC at the latter indicated coordinates.

(5) It was observed that the VC ambushed carried the automatic weapon at sling arms and the two pistols were in the holsters with plastic wrapped around the weapon.

(6) Extraction was accomplished by 2 CH-46's at 150945H at coordinates YD 086486 without further incident.

(7) No artillery missions or air support was requested in support of this patrol. 3 rounds of adjusting fire were requested.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.

3 VC KIA Body Count
1 VC WIA Possible
No Friendly Casualties

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition; good, morale; good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(a) One artillery unit was assigned in support of this patrol. During the time the patrol was in the objective area artillery support was shifted to a different unit. This unit did not have the Op Orders to properly support the patrol. When artillery was requested it took approximately 30 minutes for the first round to hit the target. It is recommended that the necessary units have the necessary Op Orders to support the mission.

G. V. B. BEST
Captain U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

DECLASSIFIED
Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
### Annex B: List of Captured Equipment

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AK-47 Automatic Serial No. 5475463 w/4 magazines &amp; cleaning gear</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pairs of Green Sneakers</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pistols Serial No. 8H 1026 1949 Serial No. 6465 1945 w/holsters &amp; 5 magazines</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>pair 6x30 Serial No. M30P 23805</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Flash light</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Canteen</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Knives unknown Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bags Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operation Order 13-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, RecGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) RecGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 6th Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.

3. EXECUTION:

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: QUIZ 7,ME.
   c. Frequencies: 50.5, 32.4.
   d. Shackle:

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</tbody>
</table>

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Order: 13-66
Patrol: 6th Plt, 1st Force Recon
Debrief: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6361 II

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer and 4 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50:
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in area.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN. 121415H/131045H.

4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 20 hours of observation and patrolling, the team made negative contact and/or sightings. No airstrikes or artillery missions were requested in support of this patrol.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain. The terrain in the objective area is covered with thick brush intermingled with vines and thorns. Medium to thick canopy was noted averaging 25 to 30 feet high. The ground was extremely rocky with steep slopes. Average rate of movement for this patrol was 150 meters an hour.
   d. Other Information.
      (1) No artillery fire missions were requested in support of this patrol.

DECLASSIFIED
6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Insertions and extractions should be made during twilight hours.

2. When a patrol is inserted and where not compromised during insertion or during the actual patrol, efforts should be made to extend the patrol in the field for a short period of time.

[Signature]

A. R. CARLISLE
Second Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 14-66

Cancel Operation Order 10-66

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS
Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, RecGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) RecGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 1st Plt, "A" Co

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PARTY LINE.
   c. Frequencies: 47.5 and 50.5.
   d. Shackle:

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   \]
   \[
   C \ Z \ S \ Y
   \]
   \[
   P \ U
   \]
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

[Signature]
D. A. COLEBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (1) officer, (11) enlisted, (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. (2) Snipers.
   c. Communication Equipment. (2) AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. (3) 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. (2) Sniper rifles, (5) lbs C-4, (2) Claymore mines.

2. MISSION. To conduct reconnaissance operations. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. During 23 hours of patrolling and observation the patrol made 3 individual sightings totaling approximately 90 VC, no contact was made. Numerous small trails and 1 large well used trail were observed in the objective area. Two fire missions were called in support of this patrol with undetermined results.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 132230H YD 035583 The patrol spotted 30 VC moving in a Northeast direction, approximately 15 meters from patrols position. Due to darkness they could not observe VC but could hear equipment and weapons making noise.
      (2) 132240H YD 039588 The patrol observed 3 yellow lights located 1500 meters from patrols position on a 30° azimuth. Heard sounds of what was believed to be a communications engine generator start. The lights were on for 20 minutes and the engine ran for 60 minutes, the engine was also noted to occasionally change gears.
(3) 140100H XD 035583 The patrol observed a second group of 30 VC moving in same direction on same trail as previous group.

(4) 140130H XD 035583 The patrol observed a third group of 30 VC using the same trail, and moving in the same direction.

(5) 140300H XD 024583 The patrol called in a fire mission on a suspected VC position. 16 rounds of 155mm were expended with excellent coverage on the target area. Results were undetermined due to inability to check out the objective area.

(6) 141020H XD 035598 The patrol observed movement in a possible VC position. A fire mission was called expending approximately 20 rounds of 155mm with very good coverage of objective area. Results could not be determined due to distance of area from patrols position.

(7) Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay and Map Corrections).

(a) XD 035583 The main trail in the objective area was 2 meters wide and ran from SW to NE. This appeared to have been used for sled transportation of heavy loads. This trail had numerous markings and signs along it. The trail appears to have been used recently.

c. Terrain.

(1) The objective area consisted mostly of elephant grass, 3 feet high and a canopy of 40 to 50 feet. It was honeycombed with fresh trails.

(2) Map Corrections. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay and Map Corrections).

d. Other Information. None.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, fair; morale, fair.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) Recommend TPQ mission on objective area due to vivid evidence of being used for main route of egress and ingress.

T. J. TERREBONNE
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

LEGEND

(C) = H L Z'S

-----: PATROL ROUTE

-----: MAP CORRECTION (TRAIL)

→ : DIRECTION OF PATROL
Operation Order 15-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, RecGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) RecGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 61, 6th Plt, 1st PRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).
2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.
3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: GROUCHO MARX.
   c. Frequencies: 47.5 and 50.5.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      L T A R J E Y M W F
      I B X K U O G C Z V
      N D H P
      S
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEBY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding
OPERATION ORDER: 15-66
Patrol: Team 6r, 6th Plt, 1st FRC
Debriefer: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6361 II

COPY 14 of 27 copies
Det A, ReconGrpBravo
CAM 10, RVN
141900H July 1966

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 5 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 19 hours of patrolling and observation, the team made no actual VC contact or sightings, however, heavy VC activity was heard throughout the objective area during this patrol. One artillery and one air support mission was called with excellent coverage of target for both, no damage assessment was made and there were no friendly casualties. Enemy casualties are unknown.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) Between the hours of 1500 and 1800 on 13 July 1966, the patrol heard 4 to 6 VC talking a short distance from their location at YD 036637.
      (2) 131830H (YD 038638) while the team was in an OP and a bush position, they heard voices of approximately 15 VC to the NE of their position not further than 100 meters away.

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DECLASSIFIED
(3) 131830H (YD 038634) heard sounds and voices of approximately 20 VC about 50 meters away from their position. These voices came from the east.

(4) 131830H (YD 039633) the team heard movement and voices from an estimated 15 VC approximately 150 meters away from their position. None of these VC were seen.

(5) 131900H (YD 032641) the patrol heard a column of VC estimated to be at least a company in size moving east northeast, along the SONG NGAN to coordinates YD 039641. At this coordinates they left the stream and moved east southeast into the valley. None of the VC were ever seen, but at one time, it sounded to the team that a small security element came as close as 25 meters to the teams location. During the movement of the VC, it sounded to the team as if the VC were carrying something heavy since they walked very laboriously and at times they heard some type of equipment or heavy weapon being banged on small trees, accidently. The actual type of weapon or equipment could not be determined.

(6) 132000H to 132030H (YD 036639) during this time, the team heard at least a platoon size force walking along the river in the same direction that the larger force had gone earlier. However, this force appeared to be considerably quieter and more cautious then the larger force.

(7) All night long, while the team was in the harbor site, they heard sounds of movement of VC all around them. It appeared to the team that these VC may have been looking for them. The location of the harbor site was YD 036634.

(8) 140800H (YD 036638) the team started to move towards the H LZ for extraction. During the movement, some noise was made by the patrol due to heavy underbrush. Shortly they heard loud screams and shouts of VC about 30 meters away. The VC were moving towards the teams' position. No contact was made.

c. Terrain.

The terrain in the objective area was found to be very thick underbrush intermingled with vines and thorns. Some open spots can be found, but not large enough for a helicopter to land in. The canopy averaged approximately 30 feet high. Up to 300 meters an hour can be covered. Water can be found in the main stream in the valley and some creeks running from the mountains into the main stream. The stream itself averages 15 to 20 meters wide and has a depth of 1 to 3 feet. No leeches were encountered in the objective area, but many mosquitoes are present. Both sides of the stream bank has thick elephant grass up to 8 feet high going inland up to 40 meters in some locations. Numerous small trails were encountered.
(2) Map corrections. One large heavily used trail, 3 feet wide, was located. This trail was used during the time the team was in the Objective area. Both sides of the trail have thick brush and some of the trail can be observed from the air (Annex A Patrol Route Overlay).

d. Other Information.

(1) The team was inserted at YD 03638 without incident. However, after the helicopters gained altitude, some distance away, it appeared to the team that the aircraft were fired upon by small arms.

(2) At 131830H, the patrol requested a fire mission on one of the 3 targets that they had. One round of adjusting fire was called in on the first target but with that round it appeared to have a direct hit on the 3rd target. Fire for effect was requested, it was not fired due to a larger target in the area.

(3) At 131900H, the patrol called in a fire mission on the suspected company size VC unit moving in column at the stream. Fire for effect was called with excellent coverage of the target. No damage assessment was made. Unknown results.

(4) During the movement to the H滋 for extraction, the patrol was followed by an unknown number of VC. The team called in gunships and marked the target for them. The gunships fired rockets and machine guns covering the target excellently. The results are unknown. No more VC were heard behind the patrol.

(5) While the patrol was in the objective area, they heard VC at various locations and from time to time, larger groups would arrive at these locations for a short time and then depart. It appeared that the VC were either receiving directions or these locations were waiting stations for them.

(6) Extraction of the team was accomplished without further incident at YD 03638. One UH-1-E had to hover over a bomb crater to accomplish pickup.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. No friendly casualties, enemy casualties are unknown.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

--2--
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) Recommend not to take a 5 men patrol out into that general area.

B. M. DONALDSON
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 17-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS
    Series L701; Sheet number 6261 I
(b) Det A, RedGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) RedGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 22, 2ndPlt, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: FIELD CLERK.
   c. Frequencies: 47.5 and 50.5.
   d. Shackle:
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      N F Y O B A P D T I
      L X V K M W J S H R
      C E Z G Q U
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

   D. A. COLBY
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding
1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 4 enlisted and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79, 2 WP rifle grenades.

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 35 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol made negative sightings and/or contacts. No artillery or air support missions were requested in support of this patrol.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was very thick brush intermingled with vines and thorns. The canopy was found to be up to 50 feet high. Travelling was very laborious due to the thick underbrush and only 150 to 200 meters could be covered an hour.
      (2) Map Corrections. None were noted.
   d. Other Information.
      (1) 152025H (XD 991647) the patrol heard 2 shots being fired in rapid succession, approximately 500 meters east of their position.
(2) (XD 998641) the patrol located an old abandoned harbor site. This site could hold up to a company, but indications were that it had not been used for some time. No fighting holes or trenches were observed around this area.

(3) No artillery or air support missions were requested in support of this patrol.

(4) The team encountered great communication difficulty due to deep valleys and heavy vegetation.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, fair; morale, fair.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. No indications were present of recent VC activity in this area.

D. G. ROBIN
Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 18-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 I
    (b) Det A, RecGrpBravo OpO 1-66
    (c) RecGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 62, 6thPlt, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: QUIZ GAME.
   c. Frequencies: 47.5 and 50.5.
   d. Shackle:

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   M A K H L F X B P G
   E Z O U D J T I S R
   Q Y V W
   N C

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

   D. A. COLBY
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding
Operation Order: 1866
Patrol: Team 62, 6th Plt, 1st PIR
Debrief: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6261 I

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer and 4 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 AR-16 and 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. The patrol was in the objective area for one and a half hours during which time they heard voices from at least two different locations. Gunships were called in and requested to strafe suspected VC position. No actual contact or sightings were made during this time.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 150555H (XD 975600) as the team moved away from the HIZ, they heard loud voices from at least 3 VC. These voices came from the general location of the HIZ some 50 meters from the team position.
      (2) 150620H (XD 974596) the team heard voices of at least two VC talking in a normal tone. These VC were only 50 to 100 meters away. None of the VC were ever observed.
c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the objective area was sparsely wooded with small trees and brush. Movement on the high ground could be made with ease. Along the streambeds, thick brush intermingled with vines was encountered. The canopy was estimated to be approximately 15 to 20 feet high.

(2) Map Corrections. One freshly cut trail was located running from north to south connecting two small streams from X.D 975594 to 975595. This trail was approximately 3 feet wide but it could not be observed from the air. Indications were that this trail had been used as recently as 6 hours.

d. Other Information.

(1) The team had no communication with PUNCTUATE during the time they were inserted. Communication was established with PLAYBOY and PLAYBOY relayed all messages.

(2) 150635H the team called in gunships to strafe suspected VC position. Machine guns and rockets were used. Unknown results, no damage assessment was made of the area.

(3) 150640H gunships were running low on fuel so the team leader requested extraction due to the fact that they were compromised. Extraction was accomplished without further incident at coordinates X.D 975598.

(4) There was no artillery mission fired in support of the team.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. Enemy casualties unknown, no friendly casualties.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Morale, outstanding; physical condition, outstanding.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

K. T. CARLISLE
Second Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader
Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)

97
60
59
98

O - MLZ

Patrol Route
Operation Order 19-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS
    Series L701; Sheet numbers 6361 I
(b) Det A, RecGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) RecGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 1st Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe enemy activity in the valley to the northeast and southwest; call supporting arms on targets of opportunity; capture at least one VC in operating area.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: NIGHTSTICKER.
   c. Frequencies: 47.5 and 50.5.
   d. Shackle:
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      X & Y & D & V & & & & & & \\
      Z & & & & & & & & & P \\
      \end{array}
      \]
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (1) officer, (4) enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   d. Observation Equipment. (1) 7x50; (1) Spotting scope.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. (3) Claymore mines.

2. MISSION. Observe enemy activity in the valley to the Northeast and Southwest; call supporting arms on targets of opportunity; capture at least one VC in an operating area.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. The patrol was scheduled for insertion into YD 009604. However, VC activity was observed in close proximity of the HLZ. Secondary HLZ was found at coord YD 035605. Shortly after insertion, the patrol observed 1 VC in the treeline and heard 4 more. Some moments later they observed a group of 8 VC and a 2nd group of 6 VC. All wearing camouflage uniforms with automatic weapons. Gunships were called in and strafed VC positions with M-60 and rockets. VC were firing at the patrol and helicopters during the extraction.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 150740H (YD 009604) The patrol was approaching this HLZ when they observed 3 VC sitting under a tree a short distance away from the HLZ. Two of the VC were observed running towards a gulley into the streambed carrying weapons. The third was observed to have some type of radio with a hand set. Type of radio is unknown.
      (2) 150750H (YD 035605) The patrol found a second HLZ and landed with...
out incident. They moved South to Southeast when they heard voices of approximately 5 VC and observed 1 VC just momentarily on the opposite site of the HLZ.

(3) 150755H (YD 035606) The patrol moved Southeast when the point stopped. The point observed one group of 8 VC moving North and a second of 6 VC moving Southwest, all were only a short distance away from the platoon. All of the VC observed carried weapons, and it appeared to the platoon that they were automatic. Camouflage uniforms and camouflage flop covers. It appeared to the platoon that the VC were trying to outflank the patrol. Extraction was requested.

c. Termination.

(1) The terrain in the objective area was mainly elephant grass up to 6 feet high. The patrol was never able to leave the HLZ. But the terrain in the surrounding area of the HLZ was very thick underbrush intermingled with vines and thorns. Canopy was up to 30 feet in height.

(2) Map Corrections.

(a) One large HLZ was located at coordinates YD 035605. This was an extremely large HLZ, 150 meters North to South and 250 meters East to West. HLZ was covered with elephant grass 6 feet high.

d. Other Information.

(1) Gunships were requested in support of this patrol. Rockets and machine guns were fired on suspected and confirmed VC position with excellent coverage of target. Friendly position was marked with signal mirror. During the time gunships were firing at the patrol with automatic weapons. Fire was received during the entire time of the patrol's extraction.

(2) There was no artillery fire missions called in support of the patrol.

(3) The patrol sustained 3 non battle casualties during the time of extraction.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. Friendly casualties; none. Enemy casualties; unknown.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition; fair, morale; fair.

DECLASSIFIED
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) This is the 3rd time the patrol had been in this general area. During these times the patrol always made contacts and sightings with well disciplined and trained VC forces. All the time there VC were contacted or sighted it was observed that the VC were definitely wearing the uniform and carrying the weapons of hard core units.

J. Q. HART
Second Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.
Operation Order 21-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L/01; Sheet number 5361 II
(b) Det A, RecGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) RecGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 1st Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observation post and radio relay site on THON KHE TRI.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation;
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: NIGHTSTICKER.
   c. Frequencies: 47.5 and 49.6 Maintain radios on both.
   d. Shackle:

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
   D A I B F Q H N P E
   Y J G O R W M C V L
   K S X Z
   T U

   Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

   D. A. COLBY
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding

   Encl (41)
1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 13 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. 2 communication operators from SUBSCRIBER, 2 engineers, and 2 snipers.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 2 7x50's, 1 spotter scope, 1 BC scope, and 2 Starlight scopes.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 18 claymore mines and 10 M-72's.

2. MISSION. To set up an observation post/radio relay site on THON KHE TRI, Hill 290.


4. ROUTE. Not applicable.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. For 212 hours of observation on Hill 290, the platoon was in an excellent position to observe in a 360° perimeter. During this time, the platoon called numerous fire missions on VC targets with excellent results; 28 VC KIA confirmed and at least 50 VC KIA probable. No actual contact was made by the platoon with the enemy. There were no friendly casualties.

   b. Enemy.

   (1) 161730H (XD 997568) observed 15 VC walking in the valley with weapons, packs, green uniforms and helmets. A fire mission was called with excellent effects; 15 VC KIA confirmed. These VC KIA's were actually observed falling to the ground and lying there.
(2) 162330H (XD 978568) the OP sighted VC flashlights in valley, probably looking for bodies of first fire mission. A fire mission was called with excellent coverage of the target. A total of 4 volleys were fired. VC casualties are unknown.

(3) 170040H (XD 978568) observed lights again in the valley. A fire mission was called into the area with excellent coverage of the target. Unknown VC casualties.

(4) 170314H (XD 978568) heard unusual sounds and activity in the same vicinity of the previous fire missions. Called in a fire mission in the same general vicinity with excellent coverage of the target. VC casualties are unknown.

(5) 170330H (XD 975507) spotted a campfire but it was out of artillery range. Fire mission was then cancelled.

(6) 170900H (XD 969552) observed one man dressed in black PJ's, no weapon observed, followed by two more dressed in green utilities, entering a house in the village. These troops were later observed carrying weapons in the same vicinity. A fire mission was requested but not approved.

(7) 171045H (XD 997568) observed 15 to 20 VC in open, carrying weapons, packs and wearing green uniforms. Fire mission called with excellent coverage on target. 8 VC KIA confirmed.

(8) 171746H (XD 997568) observed an unknown number of VC in the treeline. All observed had weapons. It was estimated to be at least 7 VC. A fire mission was called with excellent effect on target. VC casualties could not be observed due to vegetation in the area.

(9) 172115H (XD 018593) observed 2 VC cooking rice along a ridgeline. A fire mission was called with excellent coverage on target.

(10) 182130H (XD 993546) the patrol spotted numerous VC campfires on the ridgeline in the vicinity of XD 543996. Called in a fire mission. A total of 60 rounds were expended from POLISH and CHIN STRAP with excellent coverage on the target. Unknown VC casualties. All campfires observed went out within a short period of time during the fire mission.

(11) 190256H (XD 007553) fired a fire mission in suspected VC area. Friendly troops found VC harbor site, trenchline and a suspected VC hospital in that area. Mission fired had good effect on target.

(12) 192136H (XD 969552) observed an unknown number of VC sitting around cooking fire. No weapons or equipment could be observed due to darkness. A fire mission was called with excellent coverage of target.
(13) 201930H (XD 979598) observed approximately 10 VC moving west along a trail. No weapons or equipment was observed. Fire mission called with excellent coverage on target. Results are unknown.

(14) 210630H The patrol heard 7 shots being fired 500 meters from the OP on an azimuth of 070°. These shots were believed to be signal shots.

(15) 210915H the patrol heard what appeared to be digging approximately 150 meters SE of the OP. Could not determine exact location.

(16) 211330H (XD 969551) observed lights in the same house where the VC had been observed entering the previous day. Fired fire mission. House received a direct hit and was completely demolished.

(17) 211335H (XD 969551) fired a fire mission on suspected VC harbor site. This mission was fired the same time item 16 was fired with excellent coverage of the target.

(18) 211805H (XD 968559) observed 8 VC carrying weapons wearing green uniforms moving in a NE direction. A fire mission was called with excellent coverage on target.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain at the OP site was very thick underbrush which was cleared to good all around the observation post. The hill itself had steep cliffs which made it almost impossible to climb.

(2) Map Corrections. None observed.

d. Other Information.

(1) During the time the hill was occupied, it served as an excellent observation and relay station. It was also noted that this hill would be easy to defend against a ground attack.

(2) It was noted that when friendly troops moved into the general vicinity of the OP site, the VC activity slackened quite heavily.

(3) During the time the platoon was at its OP site, they received one non-battle casualty.

5. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 28 VC KIA confirmed and 50 VC KIA probable, all from artillery missions. There were no friendly casualties.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, fair; morale, good.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. It is recommended that this OP site be used as a permanent OP site.

2. The starlight scope used on this OP is considered an excellent piece of equipment. It proved to be of definite value and should be used extensively on future such sites.

J. G. HART
Second Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader
Operation Order 23-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000; AMS
    Series L701; Sheet number 5361 II
(b) Det A, FmrGrp Bravo OpO 1-66
(c) RecGrp Bravo OpO 2-66

Task Organization: 2nd Plt, A Co; 2nd Plt, D Co

SITUATION. Reference (b).

MISSION. Reconnaissance Patrol/observation. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.

EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

b. Calculating Instructions. Ref (b).

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. References (b) and (c).

b. Callsign: INDIAN.

c. Frequencies: M 456 = 49.6
   M 357 = 38.7
   M 440 = 47.5
   M 462 = 50.5

d. Stackle:

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

   0 A B C D E F G H I J
   K L M N O P Q R S T
   U V W X Y Z

e. Authentication: challenge; any letter: answer; any letter in the same column of the stackle.

D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
Patrol Report

1. **Size, Composition, and Equipment:**
   
a. Size and Composition: (2) Off., (32) enl., (2) USN
b. Special Attachments: (2) NWV Guides
c. Communication Equipment: (2) AN/AC-25, (2) AN/PRC-10
d. Observation Equipment: (4) 7x50's
e. Special Equipment: None

2. **Mission:** Reconnaissance patrol/observation. Capture one VC in area of operation; identify VC units operating in the area.

3. **Time of Departure/Return:** 160300H/191400H July 1966

4. **Route:** Annex A (Patrol route overlay).

5. **Observation of Enemy and Terrain:**
   
a. Synopsis. 80 hours of reconnaissance patrolling/observation resulted in 4 VC sightings totalling 8 VC. Negative contact was made by this patrol.

b. **Enemy:**
   
   (1) 160615H (YD 091597) 2 people following patrol with flashlights. The people followed the patrol to the stream at the given coordinates, but when the patrol crossed the stream, the lights weren't observed again.

   (2) 160820H (cp 096595) 4 VC were observed bathing in the river at these coordinates. After leaving the water, they entered the wooded area 100 meters north of the river, fired one shot and appeared to be searching the area. They then proceeded to the village where four more shots were heard. Two of the VC were wearing dark green utilities with rain hats, one had a utility jacket with black shorts. 2 packs and 3 unidentified weapons were observed.
(3) 16173C (YD 068508) one man observed moving east on trail, but due to the distance, uniform and equipment could not be observed.

(4) 19140H (YD 058698) one man observed moving west on trail wearing green utilities with no equipment observed due to distance, appeared to be the same man that was sighted earlier.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain was covered with elephant grass 6 to 10 feet high with thorns and vines interwined. Movement through this area was extremely difficult in many areas.

(2) Map Corrections. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

(a) At YD 0558, one trail running along DONG KIO ridgeline. The trail was 1 to 1½ meters wide, had not been used recently, and could not be observed from the air in most places.

(b) At YD 060592, one trail running E-W about 1½ meters wide, not heavily used recently, and could not be observed from the air.

(c) At YD 064590, one trail running N-S 1½ meters wide, used heavily by wood cutters as evidenced by much cut timber in the area.

(d) At YD 067304, one heavily used trail running E-W on the north side of the KHE M11 River. This trail was 1½ meters wide and had been heavily used over a long period of time. It could not be observed from the air.

(e) At YD 064397, one slightly used trail running E-W to the main trail which runs N-S as shown on the map in the same vicinity. This trail could not be observed from the air.

(f) At YD 092598, one well used trail 1½ meters wide running N-S. It could not be observed from the air.

d. Other Information: (YD 065506) on hill 100 were located several freshly dug covered fighting holes which appeared to be occupied from a distance, but on closer inspection proved to be vacant. These positions had been constructed within the last week, and used within the last 24 hours.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTER WITH THE ENFM: None

7. CONDITION OF PATROL: Physical condition, Good; Morale, Good
8. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

G. V. Best Jr.
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 24-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 I
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 6th Plt, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe and report enemy re-entry into objective area SONG NGAN Valley vacated by 2/4. Be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy units.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation;
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).
   c. Administration and Logistics. Ref (b).
   d. Command and Communications-Electronics.
      a. References (b) and (c).
      b. Callsign: QUIZGAME.
      c. Frequencies: 47.5 and 50.5.
      d. Shackles:

        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
        H A F W I B U M D N
        L J S C G V O K X R
        Z Y P E T Q

e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the challenge.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.

a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 7 enlisted, and 1 USN.

b. Special Attachments. None.

c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.

d. Observation Equipment. 2 7x50's.

e. Special Equipment. None.

f. Special Weapons. 2 M-72's, 1 claymore mine, 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Observe and report enemy re-entry into the objective area SONG NGAN Valley vacated by 2/4. Be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy units.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.

a. Synopsis. 18 hours of patrolling and observation resulted in negative contacts and/or sightings with the enemy. No artillery or air support missions were requested in support of this patrol.

b. Enemy. None observed.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the objective area had been burned clear of all vegetation except on the tops of hills, where the canopy was approximately 20 feet high. Under the canopy the underbrush was sparse, making movement good.
(2) Map Corrections. From YD 056664 to YD 057668 a trail was located. It was about 2 feet wide and appeared no to have been used in the last several weeks. This trail could not be observed from the air.

d. Other Information. (YD 058665) 2 foxholes about 4½ feet deep were found. One was an automatic weapons position and the other was a fighting hole. They both appeared to have been dug recently.

6. ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, excellent; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

K. T. CARLISLE
Second Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER.

1. The mission of the patrol was accomplished in that the enemy did not appear to have re-entered the area vacated by 2/4.

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Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

[Patrol Route Overlay Diagram]
DECLASSIFIED

Operation Order 25-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 1st Plt, A Co

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe LANG TRI Valley.
   Report all enemy movement in objective area, be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy units.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PARTY LINE.
   c. Frequencies: 49.6 and 38.7.
   d. Shackle:

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
   C J D L G M A I P E
   K F O W N B Y R H T
   X Z S Q
   V U

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

   D. A. COLEY
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding
Operation Order: 25-56

1st Inf 1st MAC

Operation: 1st Lt. C.F. Harpert

Imp. Sheet: 03.1 11

1. OBJECTIVE

a. Size and composition: (1) officer, (19) enlisted, (1) W.O.

b. Special attachments: None

c. Communication Equipment: (2) S/INC-25

d. Observation Equipment: (1) 7x50's

e. Special Equipment: None

2. Above: Observe L/Cpl 1st Valley. Report all enemy movement in a active area, be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy units.

3.URREX 171400/171400

4. Notes: Not applicable

5. COMMUNICATION OF BREAK W/T. 1st Lt.

a. Summary: One hour of attempted insertion of the patrol resulted in 3 VC sightings. The patrol was not inserted due to a number of VC in the area.

b. Enemy:

(1) 171345 (X 95/397) The patrol was circling area looking for an insertion H/L, then a column of 35 to 40 VC moving S/S was observed. The VC were wearing dark uniforms with soft covers, one with a straw hat. They carried packs, but some could not be observed due to the distance.

(2) 171345 (X 95/397) Patrol was still looking for an insertion H/L when 6 groups of 6 VC each were observed. They were wearing green uniforms, flip hats, packs and rifles. They did not appear to be moving.

(3) 171305 (X 952/01) The patrol was still airborne when 5 VC were sighted. They were wearing dark uniforms, with no equipment observed. They appeared to be sitting in some sort of dug in position along the tree line. The patrol fired 150 rounds of 25mm. from the helicopter, possibly neutralizing one VC.

--1--
c. Terrain

(1) The terrain in the area was heavy grass about 70 feet high. The open areas had very short grass, but were so small that a C-47 could not land.

(2) Map Corrections: None

d. Other Information: None

6. ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE WEEK: 140 MA 1650.

7. ODDITIES OF T&D: Physical condition; fair morale; fair

CONCLUSIONS and ATTACHMENTS.

(1) Area should be T&J as soon as possible.

(2) Area seems to be an access route to the C&I area.

[Signature]

J.J. Terrebonne
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps

corol Leader
Operation Order 26-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; M&S Series L701; Sheet number 6961 I
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 22, 2nd Plt, 1st PRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).
2. MISSION. Arc Lite assessment.
3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: FIELD CLERK.
   c. Frequencies: 47.5 and 50.5.
   d. Shackle:

   ![Shackle Diagram]

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

   ![Authentication Scheme]

   Sg. A. COLBY
   Maj. USMC Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition: 5 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PSC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-72.

2. MISSION. Arc rifle assessment.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 5 hours of patrolling, the team made no actual enemy sightings or contacts. The team made observation that there had been VC activity in the area but not for the past 24 to 48 hours. One large trenchline and two fighting holes were located. Signs of drag marks and blood spots were noted various times.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was found to be very mountainous with slopes up to 60°. Travel in the low ground was very laborious. The terrain at the low ground was thick brush with numerous thorn bushes and vines intermingled with elephant grass. The canopy in the low ground was up to 15 feet high. In the high-ground the terrain is very much the same, minus the elephant grass and the canopy was up to 50 feet in height. The maximum distance covered during this patrol was 180 to 150 meters an hour.

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DECLASSIFIED
Map Corrections. One large heavily used trail was found at YD 019638 going south, southwest along the river to YD 014634. This trail was 3 feet wide with thick brush and vines on both sides. It was noted that this trail had been used as recently as 24 to 48 hours. 70 to 80 per cent of this trail is covered by jungle canopy.

d. Other Information.

(1) 2 large fighting holes were noted at coordinates YD 015637. These holes were 5 feet deep and 1½ feet wide and 4 feet long.

(2) 1 trenchline was found running parallel with the main trail at coordinates YD 018637. This trenchline was approximately 25 to 30 meters long. 2 of the bombs from the arc fire strike had direct hits on this trenchline.

(3) At 4 different locations, it was observed by the team, that something had been dragged through the brush. Further investigation revealed that blood spots were present. Most of these drag marks were in close proximity of the trail and riverbed at YD 017633.

(4) Numerous times while the patrol was moving through the objective area, large and small blood spots were noted, at least 7 such locations were found, some of which had a trail of blood. None of these were investigated further due to limited time.

(5) One large harbor site was found within 30 meters of 3 large bomb-craters. This site was large enough to hold 10 to 15 men. Blood spots were noted at this harbor site. One single rock was found with slight blood stains on it. This harbor site was located at YD 006633.

(6) Numerous locations were found in the objective area where small trees had been cut by a machete or axe. These trees were cut approximately 1 foot off the ground and only one of every ten were cut so as to not disturb the canopy.

(7) 5 holes were found in the shape of a fighting hole, but these were only approximately 1½ to 2 feet deep, indicating that these were used possibly as a hasty shelter from bombs, artillery, or airstrikes.

(8) 4 pieces of some type of metal were found by the team. It appeared that these were aluminum alloy. They were definitely not of any type of weapon, due to these shapes. It appeared that these came off a helicopter or some type of motorized. These were approximately 1 foot long and 6 inches wide. No markings or writing was found on them. These were next to a bomb crater at YD 018634.
6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** None.

7. **CONDITION OF PATROL.** Morale, excellent; physical condition, excellent.

8. **CONCLUSIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS.**

   a. Answers pertaining to the essential elements of information requested for this report.

   (1) Craters and impact area noted had 100% damage to vegetation within a radius of 20 to 25 meters, 25 to 45 had 50% damage, and less than 2% greater than 50 meters. Some damage, however, was noted to trees and brush up to 100 meters from the center of impact.

   (2) No installations, tunnels, or craters, were found in the objective area. Fortifications were found (See items d.(1), (2) and (7) for detailed information on these).

   (3) Except for the trenchline located at WD 0169, which had 2 direct hits, there was no damage to fortifications.

   (4) It appeared that the VC had no knowledge of this strike. There were no apparent indications of any previous knowledge.

   (5) All indications were that the VC had received casualties from this strike, due to blood spots and drag marks observed in the objective area.

   b. Missions such as this should be assigned within 6 hours after the strike to make proper damage assessments of the area.

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**S. O. REE**

**U. S. Marine Corps**

Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

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**DECLASSIFIED**
Operation Order 27-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM 1:50,000; AMS Series 1701; Sheet number 6361 II (b) Det A, RecGrpBravo OpO 1-66 (c) RecGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 1st Plt, A Co

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe enemy activity along highway 9, also coordinate with the prepared to direct supporting arms on targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operations.
   b. Coordinating instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PARTY LINE
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6 and 38.7
      (2) Artillery: 36.2
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      C J D L G M A I P E
      K F O W N B Y R H T
      X Z S Q
      V U
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
    a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 12 enlisted, and 1 USN.
    b. Special Attachments. None.
    c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
    d. Observation Equipment. 2 7x50's.
    e. Special Equipment. None.
    f. Special Weapons. 2 M-79's and 1 M-60.

2. MISSION. Observe enemy activity along highway 9, also stream to NW. Be prepared to direct supporting arms on targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
    a. Synopsis. 30 hours of reconnaissance patrolling/observation resulted in three VC sightings and no enemy contacts. Five fire missions were called with excellent coverage on the targets, resulting in 14 VC KIA (Probable).
    b. Enemy.
       (1) 181400H (XD 995488) the patrol sighted 12 to 15 VC dressed in green utilities and khaki uniforms moving NE across rice paddies. No weapons or equipment could be observed. Artillery was requested and was fired with good coverage on target. 2 VC were observed running into the bushes, it is assumed that the remainder were KIA.

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(2) 191250H (XD 983507) 2 VC wearing black PJ's and straw hats were observed standing in a rice paddy. Weapons and equipment could not be observed. Artillery was requested and was fired with good coverage on target.

(3) 191532H (XD 993504) observed 2 VC entering hut at this location. VC were wearing black PJ's, but no weapons or equipment could be seen. Artillery was requested and was fired with excellent coverage on target, neutralizing it.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the objective area was covered with elephant grass from 3 to 8 feet in height with some thorns and vines. Overall movement was good through this area.

(2) Map Corrections. None.

d. Other Information.

(1) 190645H (XD 991504) the patrol heard voices near their position. Artillery was fired on the position where the voices came from. No voices or movement were heard after the artillery mission.

(2) 191703H (XD 967502) the patrol heard 2 carbine shots and movement at this location. Artillery was fired and no movement was heard after this time.

(3) The patrol observed a network of 1 1/2 foot wide trenches and 4, 4x4 spider traps, 3 automatic weapons positions and 3 mortar positions at XD 967503. The positions appeared to have been occupied recently.

(4) 5 artillery missions totalling approximately 80 rounds were fired in support of this patrol with good coverage on target in all cases.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 14 VC KIA (Probable).

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good. Morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

T. J. TERRELL
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

DECLASSIFIED
Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 28-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; Series 1701; Sheet number 5361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 22, 2nd Plt, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Are Lite assessment; capture one VC in area of operation; direct supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation;
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: FIELD CLERK.
   c. Frequencies:
      b. Artillery: 36.2 and 37.0.
   d. Shackle:

   
   

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

   
   

   

   L. A. CR ford
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding
Operation Order: 28-66
Patrol: Team 22, 2nd Plt, 1st Fg
Debriefee: S/Sgt G.A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6361 II

Patrol Report

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT:
   a. Size and Composition: (4) enl. (1) USN
   b. Special Attachments: None
   c. Communications Equipment: (2) AN/ARC-25
   d. Observation Equipment: (1) 7x50's
   e. Special Equipment: None
   f. Special Weapons: (2) Rifle Grenades

2. MISSION: Arc Lite assessment; capture one VC in area of operations; call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL: 190600H/191210H July 1966


5. OBSERVATION OF AREA AND TERRAIN:
   a. Synopsis: The patrol was inserted twice during which no actual contact or sightings were made by the patrol. On the 2nd insertion gun ships opened fire with machine gun and rockets on VC targets. Patrol was extracted due to sighting made by aircraft.
   b. Enemy: None observed.
   c. Terrain: The terrain in the 1st objective area was found to be very thick brush with canopy 15-25 ft. high. Movement was considered easy due to the lack of secondary undergrowth. Distance covered was 300 to 400 meters an hour. Hills up to 50 degree's slope were found in the objective area.
   d. Other Information:
      (1). 190630H (YD003595) the patrol made the 1st insertion. This was accomplished by helo hovering a prox. 7-10 ft. off the ground, and the team had to jump into the ILZ. One man sprained his ankle but continued the mission. Patrol was extracted at 190930H at (YD003597) due to no arc lite strike in the area.
(2) 121120H (YD 012600) The patrol was inserted and immediately gunships opened fire 300 to 500 meters S and south of the HLZ. Pilots informed patrol to stay in the HLZ and be prepared for extraction. About 5 minutes later patrol was extracted without further incident. The Patrol heard gunships firing machine guns & rockets.

(3) If the second HLZ the team noted one heavily used trail approx. 3 ft. wide. Direction of trail could not be observed.

(4) The Patrol lost the following equipment due to jumping from the helo into the HLZ.

1. Hop shot each 6961 I and 6961 II
1 M-26 Frag grenade
1 Rifle sling
1 Utility cover

(5) Bomb craters observed from halo's appeared to be all along the high ground with only a few in the valley's.

(6) RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: None

(7) CONDITION OF PATROL: Phys. goc.1, Morale good.

(8) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

Sgt. ROBIN
Sevent, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 28-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 3rd Plt, 1st PRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Surveillance of enemy activity in streambeds to southeast; capture at least 1 prisoner, be prepared to call in supporting arms on targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation;
   b. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) Reference (b).
      (2) Pennant Wner 22 will provide artillery support with 4.2 battery.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Call sign: JAILFON.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5 and 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: M 328 — 35.3.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      P M C F S F E B Y X
      0 G U T A Q J Z V T
      W Z
   e. Authentication: challenge any letter; answer any letter in the same column of the challenge.

   Maj, C.C., Marine Corps
   Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 9 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7×50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79 and 1 M-72.

2. MISSION. Surveillance of enemy activity in streambed to southeast; capture at least one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 69 hours of patrolling and observation, the platoon made no contacts and/or sightings. Two well used trails were located in the objective area. No artillery or air support missions were called in support of this patrol.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was found not to be too thick, as may be generally the case in this location. Secondary growth was easy to penetrate. Some vines and thornbushes were encountered. Elephant grass was very thick along the low ground and reached up to 7 feet in places. The canopy was up to 40 feet in height in the high ground. Approximately 300 to 400 meters an hour was accomplished when travelling.

--1--
(2) **Map Corrections. (Patrol Route Overlay).**

(a) One heavily used trail was located. This trail was approximately 2 feet wide and well used. It was estimated that this trail had been used as recently as 24 hour prior. It could be observed from the air.

(b) A second trail was located. This trail was noted from a distance of 200 meters from the patrol's position. It appeared that this trail also was well used. It was again observed after the patrol was extracted.

d. **Other Information.** None.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** None.

7. **CONDITION OF THE PATROL.** Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

1. It appears to the patrol leader that Hill 254 at coordinates XD 94517, could possibly be used for an excellent OP site overlooking all of the river valley to the north and its approaches.

S. J. BEST
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

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Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)

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Operation Order 30-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series 1/201; Sheet number 361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(r) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 4th Plt, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION: Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Conduct surveillance of enemy activity along Route 9, and also the KHE DONG Stream to the east; capture one VC in area of operation; call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions:
      (1) Reference (b).
      (2) Pennant Winner 22 will provide artillery with 4.2 battery.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS:
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: HATEFUL.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5 and 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: M 326 -- 35.3.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      M L B D O J Z E S
      F P N Q K A T X I V
      Z G W H
   e. Authentication: request; any letter; answer; any letter on the same column of the shackle;
   f. NIGHTSTICK will act as radio relay as needed.

D. A. COPY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 6 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25’s.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50, 1 6x30.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Conduct surveillance of enemy activity along route 9, and also the KHE DONG Stream to the east; capture one VC in area of operation; call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 70½ hours of reconnaissance patrolling/observation resulted in no enemy contacts and/or sightings.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The high ground in the patrols area of operation was covered with elephant grass 6 to 15 feet high with thorns and vines intermingled. Travelling through this area was limited to 100 meters per hour. The terrain in the valleys was covered with a canopy ranging from 10 to 30 feet high and brush with vines intermingled beneath this canopy. Travelling in this area was limited to 200 meters an hour.

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(2) **Map Corrections.** None observed.

d. **Other Information.**

(1) XD 956509. It appears that the VC have been using the saddle running SE to NW at these coordinates as a route of travel between the valleys on either side. Punji stakes were seen on the west side of the trail which would stop movement in this direction. It appears to be an ambush position, as one fighting hole was also observed at this location.

(2) 220930H (XD 952505) the patrol heard one round of small arms fire at the coordinates indicated, about 1000 meters from their position.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** None.

7. **CONDITION OF THE PATROL.** Physical condition, fair; morale, good.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.** None.

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**J. T. PAULL**
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 31-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 62, 6th Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Arc Lite assessment; capture at least one VC; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation:

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Reference (b).

(2) One UH1-E gunShip and one UH1-E slickship will be on station at all times.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. References (b) and (c).

b. Callsign: QUIZGAME.

c. Frequencies:

(1) Recon: 47.5 and 49.5.

(2) Artillery: None available.

d. Shackle:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
E D C F J A B I G H
K T U V L Q W P R M
N S Q
X Y Z

e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (1) officer (3) enlisted (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. (2) AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. (1) 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. (1) M-79.

2. MISSION. Arc lite assessment; capture at least one VC; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During this mission the patrol set down twice in the objective area. Both times the team checked within 100 meters of the HLZ. No contact or sighting was made. The team spent approximately 45 minutes in the objective area.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain. The terrain in the objective area was found to be very thick vegetation with vines and thorns. Distance that could be covered was 150 to 200 meters an hour. Canopy was up to 15 ft high.
      (1) Map Correction. None observed.
   d. Other Information.
      (1) The patrol landed in two different locations in the objective area, one at XD 942603 and the 2nd at XD 930609.
      (2) XD 930609 the patrol observed an old abandoned harbor site. This site could hold approximately 5 to 7 men. Two lean-tos were loc-
(3) Bomb craters were observed all throughout the objective area from the air no damage could be observed.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical Condition: good, morale: good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

K. R. CARLISLE
2ndLt, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER. None.
Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 32-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L761; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 22, 2nd Plt, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe EW VC movement in valley; capture at least one VC in area; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) Reference (b).
      (2) Pennant Winner 22 will provide artillery with 4.2 battery.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: FIELD CLERK.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5 and 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: Pennant Winner 22:
         (2nd En, 1st Mar) -- M 328
         Polish -- M 345 37.0.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      F O D K N B T E P H
      M L Z A G V J I C Q
      W S X
      Y U
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.
   f. NIGHTSTICKER will act as radio relay as needed.

D. A. COOLY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
Operation Order: 32-66
Patrol: Team 22, 2nd Plt, 1st FRC
Debriefer: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6361 II

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 5 enlisted and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/FRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 WP rifle grenades.

2. MISSION. Observe E-W VC movement in the valley; capture at least one VC in area; be prepared to call in supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 36 1/2 hours of patrolling and observation, the team made no contact with the enemy. On two occasions they heard VC movement. Three trails were located indicating heavy usage with fighting holes along each one. No artillery or air support missions were requested in support of the patrol.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 191930H (XD 979598) while the team was in the harbor site, they heard at least 10 VC moving by the teams location approximately 100 meters away. They appeared to be moving west to east. During their movement, the team heard equipment banging and the VC were talking pretty loud at times. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, the team heard a heavy fire fight coming from the
direction the VC were moving. It appeared to the team that the VC had walked into an ambush with friendly troops.

(2) 212000H (XD 978605) observed tracers being fired from a machine-gun position at coordinates XD 987604. It appeared to the team that this machinegun was firing all along into the valley. Also M-79 and automatic weapons firing was heard coming from the same general location. This firing lasted approximately 3 minutes and then it stopped suddenly. The team observed that the machinegun position was heavily mortared by friendly units with excellent effects.

(3) 220100H (XD 978606) while the team was in the harbor site, they heard approximately 5 to 8 VC moving east to west just above the teams location, about 50 meters away.

(4) (XD 984600) the patrol was extracted from the HIZ when they received moderate automatic and small arms fire at the helos. These rounds came from the same general location as that of the machinegun position noted the previous day.

o. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the objective area is thick underbrush intermingled with vines, thorns, and elephant grass, throughout the valley and low ground. In the high ground, the terrain is the same except it's lacking the elephant grass. The slopes are up to 45° and the canopy is 20 to 25 feet high.

(2) Map Corrections.

(a) One large freshly cut trail was located leading from XD 974600 to XD 980600. This trail was about 2 feet wide and was heavily used. Freshly dug fighting holes were all along this trail spaced and alternating on both sides every 20 meters. The dirt was still loose on the mounds of these fighting holes. This trail could not be observed from the air.

(b) Just 20 to 25 meters from the first trail, a heavily used second trail was located running parallel to the first. This trail is approximately 1 meter wide with fighting holes located along it also spaced 20 to 30 meter apart. These holes also appeared to have been dug recently. Tracks were seen on this trail that could have been from a heavy caliber machinegun. The wheels were spaced about a foot to a foot and a half apart. It appeared that these tracks were two to three days old.
d. Other Information.

(1) The team observed that the objective area, especially throughout the valley and along the trails, indicate heavy movement by VC units. Also at some locations along the high ground, small branches had been broken and grass trampled down, indicating recent movements.

(2) No artillery or air support was requested to support this team.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Request that the area be used as TPQ targets especially along the trails indicated in this patrol report.

D. G. ROBIN
Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader.

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
DECLASSIFIED

Operation Order 33-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; MAS Series L701; sheet numbers 6361 I and II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo Opo 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo Opo 3-66

Task Organization: Team 61, 6th Plt, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe NW and NE of vicinity 0961; capture at least one VC in area; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation;
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: GROUCHO MARX.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5 and 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: Polish -- M 345 37.8.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      P F K R G C J M B I
      H S A T C W X D U V
      Y Z N L
      Q E
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.
   f. NIGHTSTICKER will provide radio relay as needed.

D. A. COBLE
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (4) enlisted, (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   d. Observation Equipment. (1) 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. (1) M-79.

2. MISSION. Observe NW and NE of vicinity 0961; capture at least one VC in area; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 73 hours of reconnaissance patrolling/observation resulted negative VC sightings or contacts.
   b. Enemy. None.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) Top of hills are burned off due to air and artillery strikes, in the areas which were not burned off, elephant grass about 18 feet high with brush, vines, and thorns intermingled. Movement was limited to 100 meters per hour.
      (2) Map Corrections. XL 050619. The patrol observed one trail about 1 meter wide running N-S. The trail does not appear to have been used recently. It could not be seen from the air except in areas that were burned off.
   d. Other Information.
      (1) No air or artillery support missions were requested in support of this patrol.

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(2) One heat casualty was incurred near the conclusion of the patrol.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition; good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Insertion LZ should be closer to OP site due to extremely difficult movement in this type of terrain.

2. At least 6 canteens per man are required for a 3 day patrol in this area due to difficult terrain and heat.

E. M. DONALDSON
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)

\[ \text{Diagram of patrol route overlay} \]
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and composition. 1 officer, 15 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50 and 1 spotter scope.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. None.

2. MISSION. Set up an observation post in the vicinity of YD 092619 and observe the trail to the northwest.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 42 hours of reconnaissance patrolling/observation resulted in negative enemy sightings or contacts.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was covered with elephant grass 6 to 10 feet high with some vines and thorns intermingled. Movement was good along most of the patrol route.
      (2) Map Corrections. None.
   d. Other Information.
      (1) YD 094623 The patrol observed one bedding down area capable of

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accommodating 3 people. It appeared to be 7 to 10 days old.

(2) YD 092619 In the area where the patrol set up their OP, 2 fighting holes about one week old were noted.

(3) No artillery or air support missions were requested in support of this patrol.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, excellent; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

D. W. O'DONALD
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order: FragO by radio
Patrol: 3rd Plt, Co B, 1st RecBn (FERVENT & BROADMINDED)
Debriefer: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6361 II

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 21 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 3 7x50's and 1 6x30.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Infantry Weapons. None.

2. MISSION. 3rd Plt, Co B, will establish OP's in the vicinity of YD 086598 and YD 067606.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 42½ hours of observation, no contacts and/or sightings were made by either team. Trenches, bunkers, and fighting holes were found at one of the OP locations.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain around the OP sites was found to be very thick brush intermingled with vines and thorns. The canopy was 20 feet high. In the valleys the terrain was overgrown with thick underbrush and elephant grass, making it difficult for the team to observe the surrounding area.

DECLASSIFIED
d. Other Information.

(1) While at the OP site at coord YD 067608 the team observed fighting holes and bunkers on the same hill as the OP site. Some of these bunkers were reinforced with logs and dirt. It appeared these bunkers had been occupied as recently as a week or 10 days ago. None of these were destroyed by the team.

(2) (YD 082622) The OP observed a building of some sort which appeared to have a thatched roof. This was observed from a distance of 2,000 meters. No activity was observed around this building.

(3) Observation from the OP could only be made to the north-northwest and north east due to heavy vegetation on the OP.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, fair; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

1stLt GREEN
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 34-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L70; sheet number 6361 I
  (b) Det. A, RecompBravo OpO 3-66
  (c) RecompBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 2ndSqd, 3rdPlt, B Co, 1stRecon

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe from NW to NE in area of operation; capture 1 prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) Reference (b).
      (2) GROUCHO MARX (47.5, 49.6) will be operating in vicinity of 0961.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: BROADMINDED.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH -- M045 - 37.0.
          M037 - 26.2.
      (3) GLIMMER -- M04 - 42.0.
   d. Shackles:

   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. Doley
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (1) officer, (19) enlisted, (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. (2) AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. (3) 7x50's, (1) 6x30.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. (4) M-721s.

2. MISSION. Observe from NW to NE in area of operation; capture 1 prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms fire on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synoposis. During 65 1/2 hours of patrolling and observation the patrol made negative enemy contact or sightings. 2 artillery fire missions were called on suspected enemy positions.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain. The terrain in the objective area was found to be very thick undergrowth, intermingled with vines and thorns. This heavy vegetation was only encountered in certain areas. Generally movement was very good and distances up to 1,000 meters were covered by the patrol at times.
      (1) Map Corrections. None observed.
   d. Other Information.
      (1) Numerous well used trails were found throughout the objective area. Most of these were 1 meter wide and larger. Some freshly beaten down small trails were also located in this area.
The patrol located what appeared to be an old harbor site. This site could hold 20 people but had not been used recently. Some fighting holes were around this area but had been covered up.

One VC flashlight was found at coordinates XD 088660. This flashlight was found on a very well used trail along this location.

While the patrol was in the harbor site they heard what appeared to be a loud speaker from a distance of 1,000 to 2,000 meters away in the general vicinity of XD 091659. One fire mission was called and 16 rounds expended. The loudspeaker was not heard after the fire mission.

The patrol observed a light that could have come from a match. A fire mission was called with excellent coverage of target. No damage assessment was made.

Results of encounters with the enemy: None.

Condition of patrol: Physical condition, excellent; morale, excellent.

Conclusions and recommendations: None.

J. B. GREEN
1stLt, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Additional comments by debriefer: None.
Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 36-66

Ref: (a) Map; VIETNAM; 1:50,000; ANS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 62, 6thPit, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe to the north. Seek evidence of VC battalion in area; capture 1 prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms to the south on targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operations.
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: QUIZGAME.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH - M328 - 35.3.
       HS9 - 38.9.
   d. Shackle:

   
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COOLY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (1) officer, (3) enlisted, (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   d. Observation Equipment. (1) 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. None.

2. MISSION. Observe to the north. Seek evidence of VC battalion in area; capture 1 prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms to the south on targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 1 hour of reconnaissance patrolling resulted in 1 VC contact in which 2 USMC WIA were sustained. One nonbattle casualty was received when deplaning.
   b. Enemy. 230835H YD 060680 The patrol was approximately 300 meters east of its insertion LZ when 4 adjustment mortar rounds were received. After the VC had adjusted on the patrol, 4 volleys of 5 rounds each were received. It was noted that between volleys an adjustment was made moving the impact area 50 meters or less each time, probably in an attempt to stop any effort by the patrol to escape. The patrol moved to the general area of the insertion LZ and was extracted. No VC were seen during this action, but the rounds came from the NE where no friendly units were located. 2 USMC WIA were sustained.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The area in which the patrol was operating was covered by canopy 15 to 20 feet high with light undergrowth. Movement was fair in this area. Open areas consisted of burnt elephant grass.
(2) **Map Corrections.** None.

d. **Other Information.**

(1) **Lost Equipment.**

1. Marine Corps Haversack with C rations and 60 rounds .62 ammunition.

(2) No artillery or air support mission were requested in support of this patrol.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.**

(1) 2 USMC WIA

7. **CONDITION OF PATROL.** Physical condition, fair; morale, excellent.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.** None.

K. R. CARLISLE  
2ndLt, U.S. Marine Corps  
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).
Operation Order 37-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series 1701; sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 2nd Plt, D Co

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance of stream valley to SW; capture 1 prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PIKE.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH - M328 - 35.3,
           M69 - 38.9.
           Pennant Winner Conduct of Fire -
           4.2" mortar - M328 - 35.3.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      M H B G F K E O S L
      D R N P A W T I C V
      Q Z U J Y X
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer and 4 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communications Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 WP rifle grenades.

2. MISSION. Observe stream valley to the NE and SW in objective area; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 69 hours of patrolling and observation, the platoon made no enemy contact and 1 VC sighting. One old harbor site was located. One artillery mission was called in support of this team, it had excellent coverage of target. 4 VC KIA probable resulting.
   b. Enemy. 240920H (XD 953545) the patrol observed 4 VC with weapons, wearing khaki and black shorts, moving into a treeline. An artillery mission was called in and had excellent coverage of the target. No damage assessment was made.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in this area was found to be very mountainous. Heavy underbrush was encountered with vines and thornbushes. The canopy averaged 8 to 10 feet. Approximately 200 meters an hour was covered.

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(2) Map Corrections.

(a) At XD 948549 a very well used and defined trail was found. It is located well under the canopy and could not be observed from the air. It ran generally in a west to southeast direction possibly leading into the streambed to the south.

(b) At XD 949547, the patrol moved into the valley when they noticed an old dried up streambed. This streambed is now used as a trail. It was noted that this trail was approximately 5 feet wide and was very heavily used.

d. Other Information. It was noted that the general vicinity of grid squares 9454 and 9455 had numerous harbor sites. All of the harbor sites found could hold 8 to 15 people. All of these were usually in the high ground or the low ground. It is estimated that none of these had been used in the past 10 days.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 4 VC KIA probable, no friendly casualties.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, fair; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

D. W. O'DONNELL
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).
Operation Order 38-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L70; Sheet numbers 6361-7II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo Op 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo Op 3-66

Task Organization: Team 51, 5th Plt, 3rd FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe stream valley to NE and SW in objective area; capture 1 prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation;
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PARTY LINE.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH - M328 - 35.3,
          M59 - 38.9.
          Pennant Winner Conduct of fire -
          4.2" mortar -- M328 - 35.3.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      I U B J G M F P O W
      S H K A L T N V C Q
      R D Z E
      Y X
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding
1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 14 enlisted and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communications Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 M-79's, 2 M-72's.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance of stream and valley to SW; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 71 hours of patrolling and observation, the team made no enemy sightings and/or contacts. No artillery or air support was requested in support of this patrol.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was found to be very thick underbrush intermingled with vines and thorns. The canopy was extremely high, estimated to be up to 70 feet. The slopes were approximately 40°. Travel was extremely difficult and only about 200 meters an hour was accomplished.
(2) Map Corrections. One trail was located at XD 951586. It is approximately 2 to 3 feet wide and was well used. This trail led in the direction of Hill 510, to the northeast. It was estimated that the trail had not been used recently.

d. Other Information.

(1) The HLZ that was used for insertion, at XD 953582, was not a good one. The slopes were very steep and the elephant grass was up to 25 feet high. This was the only HLZ in the general vicinity so it had to be used but should not be used again in the future.

(2) 252100H (XD 950584) the patrol had on man that needed to be med evac, due to bee stings. This man was allergic to bee stings and his body broke out in a rash, and later went into convulsions and shock. At 2345H, the med evac helicopter arrived on station and pickup was accomplished by hoist.

(3) There were no artillery or air support missions requested in support of this patrol.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That the operation order should be distributed at least 24 hours in advance of the insertion. This is so that proper planning and briefing of all teams and patrol members can be made.

2. This area definitely had no signs of recent VC movement or occupation.

M. PAKKER
Staff Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 39-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A ReconGrpBravo Op0 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo Op0 3-66

Task Organization: 5th Plt (-), 3rdFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe stream valleys in area; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: CHEMICAL.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH - M28 - 35.3.
      M59 - 38.9.
      Pennant Winner Conduct of Fire:
      4.2" mortar -- M28 - 35.3.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      Q L H D S M E P I F
      G V A R Y C J B Z X
      K O W U
      T N
   e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

   D. A. CO'BY
   Major, U. S. Marine Corps
   Commanding
Operation Order: 39-66
Patrol: 5th Plt (-), 3rd FRC
Debriefer: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6361 II

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 9 enlisted and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 6x30.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 M-72's.

2. MISSION. Observe stream valleys in area; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 69 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol made two contacts and heard numerous VC at a possible VC base camp. No artillery or air support was requested. One VC contact resulted in 2 VC KIA confirmed and 2 VC WIA probable.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 221300H (XD 934573) the patrol located a well used trail at this position and set up in an ambush position. They were in this position for 3 hours when two VC appeared. When the VC were approximately 50 meters away, one member of the rear security fired two shots in the direction of the VC. The VC disappeared, however, into the heavy underbrush. 2 carbines were observed. Uniforms were skivie shirts and black shorts, no covers.

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(2) XD 930750 the patrol heard chopping. It appeared to be woodcutting or possibly building. This chopping was heard for about 3 hours before it stopped.

(3) 221430H (XD 932572) while the patrol moved through the thick underbrush, they heard one man yelling and numerous voices not more than 75 meters away from their position. The patrol wanted to get into a better location to observe, so they departed into a streambed. (See next item for incident).

(4) 221600H (XD 932572) as the patrol moved along this streambed, 4 VC were observed in the streambed only 50 meters away. They were wearing scivie shirts and black shorts with no cover. One of the VC appeared to be carrying a pistol and the others had some type of weapon. The two point men opened fire on the VC killing 2 and wounding 2. As the patrol was getting ready to retrieve weapons, they heard loud voices on both sides of the bank and the sound of what appeared to be a machine gun being set into position, so they departed the area.

(5) 241345H (XD 938578) the patrol heard approximately 6 VC moving into a streambed. These VC were actually not observed. Once the VC were in the streambed, all noise stopped from that direction. The patrol waited in the same general vicinity for two hours and then departed.

(6) 250930H (XD 932572) as the patrol moved to the general vicinity for extraction they had to bypass the area where all the sounds were heard the previous day. Once again the voices were heard in the same area.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the objective area is considered to be thick underbrush intermingled with vines and thorns. The canopy was found to be 8 to 15 feet high. Travel in this area was considered to be very slow and only 100 meters an hour could be covered.

(2) Map Corrections. One streambed was located at XD 941576. This stream was leading to the general direction of south, into a larger stream.

d. Other Information. No artillery or air support missions were fired in support of this patrol.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 2 VC KIA confirmed, 2 VC KIA probable.
7. **CONDITION OF THE PATROL.** Physical condition, good; morale, excellent.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

1. Request TPQ missions in an area generally within 200 meters of XD 932572. This is definitely a location of a harbor site, waiting area, or a VC base camp.

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**C. B. HOPKINS**
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

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Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 40-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 22, 2ndPlt, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. To investigate secondary explosions caused by TPQ's at XD 938602; capture one VC in area of operation; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: FIELD CLERK.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (2) PENNANT WINNER 22: 35.3.
      PENNANT WINNER EN TAG: 44.7.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      NFJALHMBIP
      DKUQOEGSC
      RZXTW"

DECLASSIFIED
e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLBY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding
Operation Order: 40-66
Patrol: Team 22, 2nd Plt, 1st FRC
Debriefer: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 435 I

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 4 enlisted and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Special Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 rifle grenades.

2. MISSION. To investigate secondary explosions caused by TPQ’s at XD 938602; capture one VC in area of operations; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 1 1/2 hours of assessing damage around coordinates XD 938603, negative sightings and/or contacts were made with the enemy. Nothing unusual was found or located that could cause a secondary explosion during a TPQ strike.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was found to be thick secondary growth with vines and thorns. The canopy was up to 30 feet high. Slopes were 40° to 45° overgrown with thick underbrush.
      (2) Map Corrections. One medium used trail was located running from XD 938603 to XD 938601. This trail ran over a ridgeline and was

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under a heavy canopy. At times this trail was reinforced with sticks to make steps out of it, due to the steep slope.

d. Other Information.

(1) One small possible harbor site was located at XD 937603. This could hold 2 people, but had not been used recently.

(2) One trenchline was observed at XD 939604. This trenchline was about 2 feet wide and about 30 meters long. It appeared that the trench was refilled with dirt.

(3) Area Lite Assessment.

(a) Bomb craters observed were approximately 6 feet deep clearing a jungle area of approximately 30 meters.

(b) In one of the craters, 3 large pieces of metal were found, each about 7 inches by 6 inches and 1/16 of an inch thick. It appears that these pieces may have come from the bomb.

(c) No further damage was noted that could give indications of secondary explosions in the area.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That this area be checked out more thoroughly.

D. G. ROBIN
Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (4) enlisted, (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   d. Observation Equipment. (1) 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. (2) Rifle grenades.

2. MISSION. To investigate secondary explosions caused by TPQ's at XD 938602; capture one VC in area of operations; and be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 3 hours of patrolling and observations the team made no enemy sightings or contact. No indications were found that could have caused secondary explosions by TPQ mission.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was thick secondary growth intermingled with vines, thorns, and elephant grass. The canopy averaged 10 to 30 feet in height. Slopes were up to 40° making movement for the team very difficult and only 100 meters an hour was accomplished.
      (2) Map Corrections. One large trail was noted under the canopy. This trail was approximately 1 meter wide and had not been used recently. The trail was located at coordinates XD 931609 and ran NW to SE.
d. Other Information.

(1) One large fenced off area was located at XD 920609, giving indications that it may have been a pasture. This area was approximately 300 meters in diameter. The fence consisted of bamboo and sticks. No livestock was noted to be in this pasture.

(2) Heaviest concentrations of bomb craters were located at XD 920609 covering an area of 400x200 meters. Some of the craters appeared as close as 6 to 10 meters apart.

(3) No apparent indication was found that could have caused the secondary explosion in the objective area.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

Sergeant ROBIN
PATROL LEADER

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER. None.

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Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

1. First insertion & extraction point
2. Second insertion point
3. Second extraction point
--- Trail 1 meter wide (little to no use in past three months)

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DECLASSIFIED
Operation Order 41-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpJ 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpJ 3-66

Task Organization: 3rd Flt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe Highway # 9 for enemy activity. Capture 1 prisoner, be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation.
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Call Sign: GALLEON.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6
      (2) Polish: 37.0, 38.9
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      A K F J B L G P H C
      T R E S M N D O Q
      U V Y Z
      W X
   e. Attachments. 2 Snipers.

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DECLASSIFIED
e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 3 officer, 11 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. 2 snipers.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/FRC-25, 1 AN/FRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 2 7x50's, 1 spotter scope.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79 and 1 M-72.

2. MISSION. Observe Highway 9 for enemy activity; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 74 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol made no contacts and a total of 14 VC were sighted. One fire mission was called on a VC sighting with excellent coverage. No damage assessment was made. No air support was requested in support of this patrol.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 241224H (ID 001491) the patrol observed 8 VC crossing route 9. When they were first noted they were in two groups of 4. Uniforms observed were black PJ's and Phakies. Weapons were observed but it could not be determined what type. A fire mission was called on these VC with excellent coverage of the target. The results are unknown.
(2) 261130H (XD 991492) observed 6 VC moving south to north and then turning off into a northeasterly direction crossing an open field. One round of adjusting fire was called. When the first round hit, all of the VC moved to route 9 and started running south along it. Requested fire for effect, but was informed by artillery that they could not fire the mission at this time. 15 to 20 minutes elapsed when the artillery was prepared to fire, but it was too late due to the target being out of sight.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the high ground in the objective area was covered with elephant grass 4 to 6 feet high, and some sparsely wooded tree-lines intermingled with underbrush. In the low ground heavy underbrush intermingled with vines, thorns and elephant grass was found. Very steep slopes were encountered. The canopy averaged 40 to 50 feet. Leeches were found in the low ground.

(2) Map Corrections.

(a) Map shows 3 houses at XD 991493. Actually there is a regular village on both sides of route 9. 26 houses were observed.

(b) XD 997481 was a build up area of at least 30 houses on both sides of route 9.

(c) XD 010480 a large village was noted. At least 40 to 45 houses are located here. Nothing on the map indicated the presence of this village.

d. Other Information.

(1) 251050H (XD 991496) the patrol observed 4 suspicious people just sitting along the side of route 9. No weapons or equipment was noted. After some time, they split up into two groups of 5 and 6 and moved into opposite directions along the road. It appeared that some had packs in their backs. They were approximately 500 meters from the patrol.

(2) On two occasions it was observed that some people along route 9 were swinging an arm rather stiffly. This could probably mean that they were carrying some type of weapon up their sleeve.

(3) On the 25th at 11:35H, the patrol observed heavy activity at XD 991439. This was very unusual since this was the only time a large group of people were observed at this location at any one time. It was estimated to be at least 40 to 50 people. Some of these appeared to have packs. It was noted that all of them just walked around in the village, never entering any huts.
(4) (XD 979480) the patrol found a small trail leading west to east. 
This trail was about 1 foot wide but it was noted that every 5 
meters, 3 distinctly sliced cuts were made in the trees along 
the trail.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, fair; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. It is extremely important that at least one of the pilots that was on 
the overnight, be present on the insertion.

S. J. BEST
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER.

1. The item listed in 5.(d)(2) is a known tactic employed by the VC in 
the CHU LAI area.

G. A. KOCH
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Debriefar

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 8 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. 2 snipers.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 3 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79, 1 Winchester M-70, and 1 M-1 with scope.

2. MISSION. Establish an OP in vicinity of 085639 and maintain observation to the north and east; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 39 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol made no contacts and/or sightings. No artillery or air support was requested in support of the patrol.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The majority of the vegetation in the objective area was found to be burned off. Most of this area consisted of rolling hills covered with small trees and scrub brush. Grass was from 1 to 6 feet high. Movement and observation throughout the area was considered excellent.

DECLASSIFIED
(2) Map Corrections. None observed.

d. Other Information. 250110H (TD 083639) while the patrol was in the harbor site, an artillery mission was called by a friendly unit. This mission was over the patrols harbor site. One short round exploded approximately 200 meters from the patrols position causing the harbor site to receive shrapnel. There were no friendly casualties.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, excellent; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. No signs of VC activity or movement was observed throughout the objective area.

C. F. BUBERT
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 43-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, RecGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) RecGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 4th Plt, Tm 22, 2nd Plt, 1st Plt

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Relief on station of Nightsticker and primness on Observation Post and relay site on THON KHE TRI.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: HATEFUL.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: 35.3, 42.65.
   d. Shackles:

   **ALPHA**          **BRAVO**
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
   A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

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e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 11 enlisted, 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. Engineers.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50, 1 BC scope, 1 spotter scope.
   e. Special Equipment. 2 Starlight scopes.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Relief on station of NIGHTSTICKER and PRIDNESS on observation post and relay site on THON KHE TRI.


4. ROUTE. OP site at XD 979559.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 212 hours of observation, the OP made no enemy contacts and/or sightings. One artillery fire mission was called on a suspected VC location.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain at the OP site was very thick underbrush which was cleaned off to give this OP an excellent all around observation. This hill has steep sides on it and is almost impossible to climb.
(2) **Map Corrections.** None observed.

d. **Other Information.**

(1) 250730H (XD 962532) the OP spotted 40 to 50 Mountagnards moving NE on route (. PENNANT WINNER was notified and these people were intercepted.

(2) 310900H (XD 941549) one fire mission was called on a suspected VC harbor site consisting of 3 huts. No VC activity was observed. The artillery fire had excellent coverage of the target, results are unknown.

(3) XD 998559) observed one bridge that was completely destroyed. The bridge can be bypassed. Observed friendly troops wading in 1-foot of water crossing the stream.

(4) XD 981544 located a partially destroyed bridge. Observed buffalos crossing the bridge. To bypass this bridge would be difficult due to steep ravines on both sides of the stream.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** None.

7. **CONDITION OF THE PATROL.** Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.** None.

J. T. PAULL
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader
Operation Order 44-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 1st Sqd, 3rd Plt, B Co, 1stReoBravo

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe the RAO VINH River valley and the secondary road to the northeast; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation:

b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. References (b) and (c).

b. Callsign: FERVENT.

c. Frequencies:

(1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.

(2) Artillery: POLISH — 35.3, 42.65.

d. Shackle:

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D. A. COLEY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

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PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (1) officer, (2) enlisted, (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   d. Observation Equipment. (1) 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. (3) Claymore mines.

2. MISSION. Observe the RAO VINH River valley and the secondary road to the northeast; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. 46 hours of reconnaissance observation/patrolling yielded negative enemy sightings or contacts.
   b. Enemy. None.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) Rolling hills covered with new grass about 2 to 3 feet high. Area had been burned off recently. Movement was excellent.
      (2) Map Corrections. None.
   d. Other Information.
      (1) YD 101489 Trenchlines and fighting holes were located at this position. The positions appeared to be old and hadn't been used recently.
      (2) No artillery or air support missions were requested by this patrol.
6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

J. B. GREEN
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).
Operation Order 45-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A1, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 21, 2nd Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe the stream valley to the south and the SUOI TIEN TIEN stream valley; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PRIMNESS.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH -- 37.0,
          PENNANT WINNER 22 -- 35.3.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      0 H Q E T B K I G W
      U X C L V Z P A Y D
      F R N X
      M J

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o. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer and 4 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. 1 officer attached from HQMC.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Observe the stream valley to the south and the SUOI TIEN HIEN Stream Valley; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 73½ hours of patrolling and observation, the team made a sighting of an estimated battalion size enemy unit. Artillery and air support were requested. Both artillery and air had excellent coverage of the target. 58 VC/NVA KIA confirmed, 35 VC/NVA WIA confirmed, and at least 50 VC KIA probable by the artillery fire. Air-strike damage assessment could not be made due to the team's movement out of the area of observation. The airstrike was, however, on target and at least 200 VC/NVA were still in the area.

   b. Enemy.
      (1) 271125H (XD 923531) while the patrol was at the OP site, they spotted 2 VC/NVA moving west across the stream. These VC/NVA
holding onto a vine which was tied on both sides of the stream. It was estimated that the stream was approximately 15 feet wide and two feet deep. An artillery mission was called in, but by the time the fire for effect could be given, 13 more VC/NVA appeared in the same area. The rounds were never quite on target. The VC/NVA moved out of sight.

(2) 271300H (XO 919529) observed 16 VC/NVA moving into a treeline. All of these were carrying packs and uniforms were mixed with khakis and black PJ's. No weapons were observed. A fire mission was called in on the VC/NVA with excellent coverage of the target. Damage could not be assessed due to the vegetation.

(3) 280645H (XO 923528) called in an artillery mission on 2 VC/NVA crossing stream at the same location as the day before (XO 919529). During adjusting, 5 more VC/NVA appeared in that location. It appeared to the patrol that the adjusting fire did not bother these VC/NVA since they kept on walking as though nothing had happened. When fire for effect was called in, the artillery was right on target. The uniforms were khaki shirts and black shorts. No weapons were observed at this time. The patrol noted at least 3 VC/NVA were KIA and two WIA. At this time, the patrol called in 5 volleys of artillery. During the firing, they observed at least 45 more VC/NVA appearing at the location. More artillery was called with excellent coverage and more VC/NVA appeared. At this point the patrol counted over 75 VC/NVA in the vicinity of the impact area. The patrol noted that the VC/NVA picked up their KIA/WIA and moved them from XO 917528 to XO 919529. All movement of the dead and wounded was observed to be from the west bank of the river towards the east bank. All non-wounded moved across the west side of the river to pick up the dead and wounded to return them to XO 919529. During all this mass confusion, the patrol called in more artillery, all of which had excellent coverage on target. VC/NVA were seen through through the air, up into trees, and floating down the stream. They started literally running in circles as the artillery rounds came into their position. The patrol was unable to get an exact count of the dead and wounded, but observed at least the 58 claimed and possibly more. The wounded were seen being carried across the backs of comrades. Many of the wounded and their carriers, became KIA's as the artillery would fall among them. It was during this confusion that the patrol observed some VC/NVA coming back with as many as 5 or 6 weapons each. The patrol could count at least 150 VC/NVA and they estimated that there could be 200 more.
The patrol could only observed limited area on both sides of the stream, but many more VC were believed to be in the jungle on either side of the stream. By this time, the air support was on station and the patrol moved out of the area of observation so that air strikes could be called in.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the objective area was considered fair for movement. The patrol covered approximately 150 to 200 meters an hour. The canopy varied from 30 to 50 feet, and at the higher locations got up to 100 feet. The slopes had an average of 45° to 75° gradient. Most of the area was very difficult for movement, in the low ground.

(2) Map Corrections. One very well used trail approximately 4 feet wide was located at XD 926530. This trail runs northeast to southwest. It is well hidden under the jungle canopy and cannot be observed from the air.

d. Other Information.

(1) 261020H (XD 925528) the patrol found 3 covered graves, each one of which appeared to be as recently made as one week prior. Each one of these graves could possibly hold 2 people each.

(2) 261055H (XD 925528) while the patrol was in the OP position, some type of wood on wood pounding noise was heard, coming from approximately 500 meters away. It came from a west to west direction and lasted about one hour. It appeared that it was some type of signal or possibly some sort of construction.

(3) 261515H (XD 925528) Heard the pounding noise again from the same location.

(4) 261527H Heard one single shot fired southwest of their position approximately 600 to 700 meters away.

(5) 261825H (XD 928536) the patrol heard voices when they were at their harbor site. A fire mission was called and two volleys were fired. No more voices were heard coming from the location.

(6) 271035H (XD 925535) one harbor site was located. It was estimated that 100 to 150 troops had been in the area. It appeared that this harbor site had not been used in a week.
(7) 271555 one shot was heard being fired west of the OP's position approximately 500 meters away. This shot came from the same general location of the first round heard the previous day.

(8) 281417H (XD 922524) in the vicinity of the stream junction, the patrol heard one VC/NVA shouting. An artillery mission was called saturating the area.

(9) 281515H (XD 921529) to XD 922524) the patrol heard voices in seven different locations. Artillery was called in the area silencing all voices.

(10) During the night of 28 and 29 July, the patrol heard voices coming from XD 924524. No artillery was called due to the closeness of the patrol's harbor site.

(11) During the initial action, the patrol noted 5 VC/NVA carrying large baskets on their shoulders. These baskets were about 2½ to 3 feet high, 1½ feet wide, and 1½ feet long. Also numerous amounts of supplies and medical gear were noted be taken in the general vicinity of XD 919530.

(12) 60 to 80 rounds of artillery fired were actually observed to hit directly or within 100 meters of the target.

(13) Aircraft on station was controlled by AO. One 2,000 pound bomb was dropped on target, and the patrol requested to cancel further drops of these heavy bombs due to shrapnel and rocks from this bomb being thrown into the patrol's position. Numerous 250 pound bombs were dropped on the target, but the patrol could not make a damage assessment due to their relocation prior to the airstrike. All bombs were reported to be on target by the AO.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 58 VC/NVA KIA probably by artillery, 50 VC/NVA KIA probable by artillery, 35 VC/NVA WIA confirmed by artillery. VC/NVA casualties by air unknown, but excellent coverage of the target by the bombs was made. There were no friendly casualties.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, excellent.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. It appears that the VC may have had a VC/NVA base camp or hospital site at XD 919530.

O. BISHKO
Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER.

1. Movement observed by the patrol of the VC/NVA units and activity around the general vicinity of XD 919530, indicates that a VC base camp of at least a battalion size is located in the area.

2. During the initial action, the patrol observed all wounded and dead being taken out of the danger zone at all costs by the VC/NVA and moved to that same general location, indicating that there is a possibility of caves, tunnels, and most of all it is highly probable that a VC hospital or aid station located there.

3. It is highly recommended that an infantry unit be utilized for exploitation of this area.

4. Considering the accuracy and volume of fire from the artillery, the VC/NVA casualties are considered extremely conservative.

G. A. KOCH
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Debriefer

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 46-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 2ndSqd, 3rdPkt, B Co, 1stReconBn

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe VC activity vicinity of Highway 9; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation.
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: BROADMINDED.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH -- 37.0, 35.3.
   d. Shackle:

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
   H D U Q P J E B I O
   R G Y F C T W N V A
   X M S K L Z
e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 10 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communications Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 2 7x50's and 1 6x30.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-72, 2 claymore mines, and 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Observe VC activity vicinity of Highway 9; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 67½ hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol made one sighting of one VC/NVA. An artillery mission was called with results unknown. No contact was made with the VC/NVA units.
   b. Enemy. 261800H (YD 073553) the patrol observed one VC/NVA wearing black PJ's, no cover, with weapon, type unknown due to the distance. The patrol called in a fire mission with unknown results. No damage assessment was made of the target area.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in this area was found to be fairly easy to move through when in the high ground. The vegetation consisted of mainly elephant grass with some brush. Very little canopy
was encountered in the high ground. In the low ground the canopy was approximately 20 feet high, secondary growth was very thick, intermingled with vines and thorns, making travel very difficult. The slopes were up to 50°. The elevation averaged approximately 200 meters.

(2) **Map Corrections.** Two intermittent streams as shown on patrol route overlay were located.

d. **Other Information.**

(1) There is lots of evidence of woodcutters using the general vicinity, especially north of NUI KEEM (Hill 250).

(2) No indications were noted of any VC/NVA units in the objective area.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** None.

7. **CONDITION OF PATROL.** Physical condition, fair; morale, good.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.** None.

SSGT STOWE  
U. S. Marine Corps  
Patrol Leader

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Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 47-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 1st Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Ref (b).

2. MISSION. Observe VC activity vicinity of Highway 9 paying particular attention to the ridgeline north of the highway; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation.
   b. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) Reference (b).
      (2) Make liaison with the ARVN at D-5 prior to insertion. Give them a copy of this order.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: NIGHTSTICKER.
   c. Frequencies:
      (a) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (b) Artillery: POLISH -- 37.0, PENNANT WINNER 22 -- 35.3.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      M F G L C K D H A O
      Y U E T N B R S Q I
      V X J P
      Z W

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e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

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D. A. COLBY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding
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(2) **Map Corrections.** None observed.

d. **Other Information.**

(1) At 27164H, the patrol had two men non-battle casualties that needed to be med evacuated. Med evac was accomplished without incident.

(2) (XD 979519) the patrol observed one thatched house with livestock in the close vicinity. No people were observed at this location.

(3) (XD 992519) while the patrol was in the harbor site, they heard some noise. An artillery mission was called. No more noise was heard after the mission.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** None.

7. **CONDITION OF THE PATROL.** Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

1. No indications were noted in the objective area of recent VC/NVA present.

J. G. HART
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order: 47-66
Battle: 1st Platoon, 1st FRC
Debrief: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6361 II

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 6 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments: None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50, 1 spotter scope.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 M-72's and 3 claymore mines.

2. MISSION. Observe VC activity vicinity of Highway 9 paying particular
   attention to the ridgeline north of the highway; capture one prisoner;
   be prepared to call supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 66 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol
      made no contacts and/or sightings. One artillery fire mission was cal-
      led on a suspected VC position with unknown results.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) Mountainous terrain with slopes up to 60° was encountered. The
      vegetation was mostly elephant grass in the high ground with
      some brush and thorns. The canopy averaged 20 to 40 feet. In
      the low ground vegetation was very thick making movement very
difficult.

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DECLASSIFIED
Operation Order 48-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 I
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 51, 5th Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Arc lite assessment in river valley NE and SW in vicinity 9464 to evaluate enclosure (1)'s list of EEL's.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PARTY LINE.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH -- 35.3, 42.65.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      D F J Q S C O G K F
      M Y E B S N Z T A W
      H X V R
      U I

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e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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List of EEI's

1. Date and location of B-52 strike.
2. Describe the type of terrain and vegetation in the area.
3. What were the effects of the bombs on the vegetation and terrain?
4. What installations, tunnels, fortifications and caches were found in the bomb target area?
5. What were the effects of the bombs on the installations, tunnels, fortifications, and caches? (i.e., burning, blast, fragmentation, secondary explosions). Include approximate crater size.
6. Were there indications of foreknowledge of the strike?
7. What enemy units were in the bomb target area prior to, during, and after the bomb strike?
8. What casualties were inflicted on VC/PAVN personnel by the bomb strike?
9. What evasive or protective techniques were employed by the enemy during the strike?
10. What were the psychological effects of the strike on VC/PAVN? On civilians?

11. Have any VC/PAVN rallied due to the strike? How many? Have any civilians returned to GVN control? How many? Describe their complete reactions to the air strike(s).
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 5 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 2 AN/PRC-25's.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-72.

2. MISSION. Arc Lite assessment in river valley NE and SW in vicinity of 9464 to evaluate enclosure (1)'s list of EEL's.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 4 hours of patrolling in the objective area to assess the damage of arc lite, the patrol made two insertions in the objective area. At the first insertion, ko 940643, the patrol moved southwest. They located a VC base camp with numerous fighting holes, huts, and leaeto's, indicating that this area had at least two companies in it. The bombs of the arc lite were right on target. Numerous direct hits were scored on the fighting holes. Blood stains on trees and brush indicated that the VC received heavy casualties from the strike.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was found to be fairly thin underbrush with a high canopy of 70 to 80 feet. Steep slopes
were encountered with a gradient of 45°. The secondary undergrowth consisted of brush, vines, and thornbushes. These were very little hindrance for the patrol. Distance covered by the patrol was 350 to 400 meters an hour. Some leeches were encountered in the low-ground and valleys. Water was found in numerous streams throughout this area.

(2) Map Corrections.

(a) One exceptionally large, heavily used trail was located at XD 939644. This trail was at times 2 meters wide and was well under the canopy. Generally, the trail was running south-southwest to XD 937643, then due south from that location into the valley.

(b) There were numerous other smaller trails throughout the area, most of which were heavily used, some of which contained elephant dung.

(c) Two new creeks were located, one at XD 931641 and the other at XD 933645. Both streams ran down into the valley in a southeasterly direction.

d. Other Information.

(1) The patrol made two insertions during this patrol, both of which were unopposed and without incident. The HL2's used for insertions were bombcraters and the team had to jump from the helicopters from about 6 to 8 feet. Insertions and extractions were at XD 940643, and XD 933646.

(2) 261210H (XD 939645) the patrol found a VC base station with at least 50 fighting holes counted. These fighting holes were spaced approximately 5 meters apart and staggered. A great variation in size was noted. Some of these holes were 5 feet deep, 3 feet long, and 1½ feet wide, while others were only 1½ to 2 feet deep, 2 feet long, and 2 feet wide. Each one of the holes had an elevated bamboo mat approximately 1 to 1½ feet off the ground, these too varied in size. Some of these could sleep two men, the others only one. Numerous blood stains and spots were located. Some bandages with blood on them were also found. Two imprints of what appeared to be some type of heavy caliber weapon were found next to a horseshoe shaped fighting hole.

(3) XD 933642. Large amounts of elephant dung and two spots of blood were found in the same area as the second HLZ. This area also had numerous, small, well used, trails, but it appeared that none of these had been used in the past week.
(4) Information pertaining to Essential Elements of Information, that was requested for this mission is listed below:

**ALPHA**  
Date and location of the B-52 strike.

Grid square covered by the patrol were XD 9364 and 9464.

**BRAVO**  
Describe the type of terrain and vegetation.

The terrain was generally mountainous with 45° slopes. The canopy was up to 80 feet high in the high ground and 40 to 50 feet in the low ground. The vegetation was fairly easy to penetrate in the high ground, some vines, scrub brush, and thorn bushes, were found. In the low ground, it was much thicker making movement at times very difficult.

**CHARLIE**  
What were the effects of bombs on the vegetation and terrain.

It appeared that various fuses and bombs were used. Some craters were observed to be 6 to 10 feet deep, while others were less, possibly indicating a point detonating type fuse. Point detonating appeared to have done the greatest amount of damage to the vegetation in the area, clearing an area in radius of up to 35 meters. Large trees, approximately 24 inches in diameter, were observed to be broken off 10 to 15 feet high when close to the center of the explosion. Damage was observed at greater distances to small trees and brush up to 100 meters from the center of impact. It was noticed that the heaviest concentrations of craters were at grid squares XD 9364 and 9464. One area at XD 938642 had at least 20 to 25 craters within a radius of 100 meters.

**DELTA**  
What installations, tunnels, fortifications, and caches were found in the bomb area.

See item 5.d.(2) for detailed information.

**ECHO**  
What were the effects of the bombs on the installations, tunnels, fortifications, and caches.

The arc lite strike is considered to have done great damage to the installations and VC base camp at XD 940643. 5 large craters were observed within a 50 meters radius. Two of these appeared to have hit the center of the camp and fighting holes. Considering that these fighting holes were spaced and staggered 5 meters apart, as they are on
either side of the craters, 10 to 15 such locations were completely demolished.

FOXTROT Were there indications of foreknowledge of the strike.

It appeared that the VC/PAVN units at this location knew nothing of the strike until it occurred.

GOLF What enemy units were in the bomb target area prior to, during, and after the bomb strike.

By the appearance of the camp, the spacing of the holes, the huts, and the possible placement of heavy caliber weapons, also the police of the camp was perfect, only leaving behind blood stains, bandages, and gauze, it appears that this unit was a well trained and disciplined force.

HOTEL What casualties were inflicted on VC/PAVN personnel by the bomb strike.

All indications are that these units received heavy casualties from these strikes, considering that they would have covered these blood trails otherwise. It also appeared that the VC may have rested above the ground level on the bamboo mats before and possibly during the strike as it was indicated at various locations by blood on these mats.

INDIA What evasive or protective techniques were employed by the enemy during the strike.

It is not known if evasive techniques were employed, but it appeared that the VC made full use of the fighting holes during this strike.

JULIETT What were the psychological effects of the strike on VC/PAVN or civilians.

Unknown.

KILO Have any VC/PAVN rallied due to this strike? How many? Have any civilians returned to GVN control? How many? Describe their complete reactions to the air strike.

Unknown.
6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, excellent; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. It is felt that this general location of VC camp should be checked out more thoroughly by a reconnaissance or infantry unit. It may prove to be of value and possibly locate the graves or other signs indicating a more exact damage assessment.

G. A. KOCH
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
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Operation Order 49-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A; ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 5th Plt (-), 3rdFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Conduct surveillance of VC activity along Highway 9; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: CHEMICAL.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH -- 35.3, 36.6.
      (3) PUNCTUATE RELAY -- 47.5.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      D L A M F Q I H Y E
      N V O K C J B F G X
      R Z T U
      W C

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e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

Maj. A. COLEBY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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| 3/12      | 2 |
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| 5thFlt, 3FRC | 3 |
| U.S. Adv, D-5 | 2 |
| File      | 23 |
1. **SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.**
   
   a. **Size and Composition.** 10 enlisted and 1 USN.
   b. **Special Attachments.** None.
   c. **Communication Equipment.** 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. **Observation Equipment.** 1 7x50 and 1 spotting scope.
   e. **Special Equipment.** None.
   f. **Special Weapons.** 2 grenade launchers and 2 M-72's.

2. **MISSION.** Conduct surveillance of VC activity along Highway 9; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.


4. **ROUTE.** Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. **OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.**
   
   a. **Synopsis.** During 51 hours of patrolling and observation the platoon made one contact with at least 6 VC sighted. This contact resulted in 5 VC KIA confirmed, 1 VC KIA probable, and 4 friendly WIA's. Artillery and air support was requested on suspected VC positions in the same general vicinity.

   b. **Enemy.** 291840H (XD 975479) the patrol was moving towards a harbor site in 6 to 7 foot elephant grass approaching a treeline. The point had just entered the treeline when one bolt was heard going home. Immediately 6 single shots were fired from concealed positions in the treeline approximately 15 to 20 meters away from the patrols position. Also 3 grenades were thrown by the VC, exploding behind the patrol 6 to 8 feet. It appeared that these grenades were not fragmentation since they did no damage to the patrol. The patrol

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immediately returned a heavy volume of fire flushing the VC out of their concealed position. 6 VC were observed running away into the brush. The patrol fired full automatic at point blank range, killing 5 and probably also the 6th one. The platoon also threw 5 grenades at the VC position during the initial contact. Contact was broken initially by the VC, as the patrol leader made an estimate of the situation, more voices were heard from the direction in which the VC initially retreated. At this time the patrol pulled back to a more secure position to call in artillery and air support. Both were there in a short time and it was observed that both were on target of the suspected VC position.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the objective area consisted of rolling hills with some deep ravines. Generally the vegetation in the high ground consisted of elephant grass up to 8 feet high. In the low ground, brush and small trees were encountered. Movement within the low ground was considered fair to good.

(2) Map Corrections. None observed.

d. Other Information.

(1) YD 001479 the patrol noted one large village not shown on the map. This village had at least 20 huts within the complex, and heavy activity of people was observed in that vicinity.

(2) It was observed that the village at XD 991493 and 996480, were completely deserted. No activity was observed during the time the patrol observed these villages.

(3) Numerous harbor sites and punji traps were found throughout the operation area. It was noted that the traps were very old and harmless. Harbor sites had not been used for at least a month.

(4) Extraction was requested by the patrol due to the compromise and contact made with the VC. At 291750H, the patrol was extracted at XD 972479 without further incident.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 5 VC KIA confirmed, 1 VC KIA probable, 4 USMC WIA (not serious).

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

L. L. FLORES
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY DEBRIEFER.

1. The tactics employed during and after the contact by the VC, in addition to the uniforms, of black PJ's tops and khaki shorts, no covers, plus bolt action weapons, give a strong indication that the VC encountered were not NVA but local force guerillas. It is also of interest to note that this is the first such encounter made with local force since the reconnaissance elements have been operating in this vicinity both during and prior to Operation HASTINGS.

G. A. KOCH
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Debriefer

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 50-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series 1701; sheet numbers 6361 I and II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo Op0 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo Op0 3-66

Task Organization: 2nd Plt, D Co

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Investigate signs of VC activity in valley in objective area, capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on VC targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PIKE
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH -- 35.3, 36.6.
      (3) HATFUL will relay.
   a. Shackles:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      V G K C J B M I L P
      H A T W F O N E U D
      S R Y Q
      X Z
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o. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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**Total:** 23
CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Order: 50-66
Patrol: 2nd Plt, D Co
Debrief: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 6361 I & II

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 15 enlisted and 2 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 2 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 M-79's and 3 M-72's.

2. MISSION. Investigate signs of VC activity in the valley in the objective area; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms fire on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. TIME OF DEPARTURE/RETURN. 271830H/300940H July 1966

4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 63 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol made one actual actual sighting of 2 VC. Numerous voices were heard throughout the objective area. Old VC camp sites with fighting holes and huts, and one large heavily used trail was located. No artillery missions were fired. Air support consisted of gunships firing in the suspected VC positions both prior to and during the extraction.
   b. Enemy. 280830H (XD 933608) the patrol checked an area where rounds had been heard. They observed 2 VC just entering a thick brush. The last VC they observed had on green utilities, carrying an M-1 rifle. These two were moving in a southwesterly direction.

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c. Terrain.

(1) Generally the terrain in the objective area consists of thick underbrush with vines and thorns. The canopy was up to 40 feet. Movement was very laborious due to the mountainous terrain with slopes averaging 55° and thick vegetation.

(2) Map Corrections.

(a) XD 933619 to 934617. The patrol located a large, heavily used trail leading to these coordinates. This trail was at least two meters wide. In locations where it had a real steep gradient, steps were built into it. Buffalo chips were also noted along this trail.

(b) Numerous small trails were noted leading west from Hill 261 but these trails were not well or recently used.

d. Other Information.

(1) 280740H (XD 934612) the patrol heard two distinct voices saying in Vietnamese "Let's go out there". The patrol followed them for approximately 200 meters to XD 934617.

(2) (XD 939617) the patrol located an OP site. Around this vicinity they found fighting holes and huts. It appeared that this campsite had not been used recently. This OP site is an excellent one for observation.

(3) (XD 932607) an old VC camp site was located. This site had approximately 15 fighting holes and all of them were well and deeply dug. Huts and lean-tos were also in this area. This campsite is estimated to be able to hold up to a company sized unit. It was estimated that this camp had not been used in the past 2 weeks. Just 75 meters from the campsite, the patrol found an animal trap with a live pig in it.

(4) (XD 925605) one more campsite was located. This one had 12 to 15 fighting holes and numerous huts and lean-tos. No signs were found in this site of recent activity or occupation.

(5) 282030H (XD 935608) while the patrol was at the harbor site, they heard voices once more very distinctly, approximately 100 meters away going southwest. During the VC conversation, one of the patrols members heard the words of mortars being mentioned, but the entire text could not be determined.
(6) (XD 934617) when the patrol was extracted, they observed 3 VC moving towards the general vicinity of where the HLZ was. All of these VC had weapons and were wearing green utilities and one had a bush hat.

(7) Gunships on station were directed towards suspected VC positions. It was noted that rockets and machinegun fire were on target.

(8) One heat casualty was in the patrol, but this casualty completed the patrol until extraction.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. It appears to the patrol that there is a heavy concentration of VC forces in the general area. Request TPQ or possibly arc lite strikes on the area.

2. It is of interest to note that one of the members in this patrol speaks and understands Vietnamese, which made it able to overhear parts of the conversations.

M. PARKER
Staff Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 51-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; sheet number 6361 I and II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 2nd Sqd, 5th Plt, 3rd FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Arc Lite assessment in vicinity XD 8863. Investigate elements of EBI's contained in enclosure (1).

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PARTY LINE.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH -- 35.3, 42.65.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      D Z K R B J I E Y N
      S L C V M F Q O X
      T A W U
      P G
e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLBY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding
1. **SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.**
   
a. **Size and Composition.** 5 enlisted.

b. **Special Attachments.** None.

c. **Communication Equipment.** 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.

d. **Observation Equipment.** None.

e. **Special Equipment.** None.

f. **Special Weapons.** 1 M-72 and 1 rifle grenade launcher.

2. **MISSION.** Arc Lite assessment in vicinity XD 8863. Investigate elements of essential information contained in enclosure (1) of Operation Order 51-66.


4. **ROUTE.** Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. **OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.**

a. **Synopsis.** During 2½ hours of making arc lite assessments in the objective area, the team made no enemy contacts and/or sightings. No indications were found that VC/PAVN had been in the area of the strike prior, during, or after the arc lite strike. The heaviest concentration of craters noted was in grid square 8863.

b. **Enemy.** None observed.

c. **Terrain.**

   (1) The terrain in the objective area was found to be very mountainous with slopes up to 45°. Very heavy canopy was noted but only about 12 to 15 feet high. Elephant grass was the major vegetation within this area, it grew up to 10 feet. Secondary growth
consisted of scrub and thorn bushes. About 200 meters an hour was covered due to this secondary growth.

(2) Map Corrections. None observed.

d. Other Information.

(1) During this mission the patrol was inserted twice into the objective area. Both insertions and extractions were unopposed.

(2) The patrol found one Mountangard woodcutters knife and basket in the objective area.

(3) The essential elements of information requested from this airborne assessment mission are listed below:

1. Date and location of B-52 strike.

   The heaviest arc light concentration appeared to have been in the vicinity of grid square 8863.

2. Describe the type of vegetation and terrain in the area.

   See item 5.c. for detailed terrain information.

3. What were the effects of the bomb on the vegetation and terrain?

   It was noted that the vegetation within a 35 meter radius was completely destroyed. Up to a radius of 50 meters, damage was noted to be 50 to 60% to the vegetation. Large shrapnel chunks were noted throughout this area. Some of them were embedded in trees up to 100 meters from the impact area. Large craters were noted throughout this area. Some of them were 15 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth.

4. What installations, tunnels, fortifications, and caches were found in the bomb target area?

   The only installation observed in the objective area were regular huts. At least 10 of these were noted in the general vicinity. Some of them were completely destroyed while others were not touched by the arc light. No indications were present that these huts had been recently occupied. Also numerous fences made of bamboo and brush were in the area. Some of these were destroyed. No livestock was located inside these enclosures.
5. What were the effects of the bombs on the installations, tunnels, fortifications, and caches? (i.e., burning, blast, fragmentation, secondary explosions). Include approximate crater size.

At least three of these huts had been completely destroyed by this strike. Some of the others had been burned to the ground. Three were still intact. There was no more apparent damage done to the installations.

6. Were there indications of foreknowledge of the strike?

None noted.

7. What enemy units were in the bomb target area prior to, during, and after the bomb strike?

No indications or signs of any units were present in the bomb strike area.

8. What casualties were inflicted on the VC/PAVN personnel by the bomb strike?

No signs of any casualties were found.

9. What evasive or protective techniques were employed by the enemy during the strike?

None observed.

10. What were the psychological effects of the strike on VC/PAVN? On civilians?

Unknown.

11. Have any VC/PAVN rallied due to the strike? How many? Have any civilians returned to GVN control? How many? Describe their complete reactions to the air strike(s).

Unknown.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, excellent; morale, good.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Pilots should be briefed on the EEI's of the arc-lite, and requested to guide teams on the ground to possible locations or suspected damage areas.

2. One man should be assigned in the aircraft as a possible spotter for the teams on the ground.

D. CASNER
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 53-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet Number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: Team 53, 5th Plt, 3rd FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Conduct surveillance of VC activity along highway 9 and SONG QUANG TRI River, also secondary road running NW and SE; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PARTY LINE.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH — 35.3, 42.65.
   d. Shackle:
      
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      D N X H Q J E L G Y
      0 I B P U M Z R W C
      A V F T
      S K

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e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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| File     | 7 |
|          | 23 |
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 5 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50, 1 6x30.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 M-72's and 1 rifle grenade.

2. MISSION. Conduct surveillance of VC activity along Highway 9 and the SONG QUANG TRI River, also secondary road running NW and SE; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 40 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol made negative enemy contacts and/or sightings. No artillery or air support missions were requested in support of this patrol.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the objective area was very mountainous with slopes up to 80°. Vegetation consisted of very thick underbrush intermingled with vines and thorns. Various tops of the mountains had cleared areas consisting of elephant grass up to 10 feet high. Movement was very difficult and at times, only 100 meters an hour could be covered.

DECLASSIFIED
(2) **Map Corrections.**

(a) One large trail, heavily used, was located by the patrol hidden well under the canopy. This trail could not be observed from the air. The trail was 2 meters wide and runs in the general direction from Hill 552 to the southwest (Patrol Route Overlay).

(b) (XD 650146) was located one fairly good sized village in this valley. This village is not listed on the map.

d. **Other Information.**

(1) (XD 025478) the patrol located 3 huts in excellent shape, well hidden under the canopy. These huts appeared to be recently occupied. One small mountain stream ran right by these huts.

(2) Numerous bomb craters were observed in grid square 7402. No apparent damage was done by these craters.

(3) Three locations were found where the vegetation had been burned off and a fence was built around each one. No livestock was noted in the area.

(4) The trail that was located, and is noted on the patrol route overlay, is an ideal location for a possible ambush site.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** None.

7. **CONDITION OF THE PATROL.** Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

1. No signs of recent VC/NVA activity was noted in the vicinity of the objective area.

F. E. CASNER  
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps  
Patrol Leader
Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 55-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series LQ01; Sheet number 6361 I
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 3rd Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance of objective area in vicinity 0250. Observe valley running generally NW to SE. Capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy target of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operations
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: GALLEON.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH — 35.3, 42, 65.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      N J R B S X G V I O
      K C T M H L W D A P
      Y Q Z V E

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D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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Total: 23
Operation Order: 55-66
Patrol: 3rd Plt, 1st FRC
Debriefer: SSgt G. A. KOCH
Map Sheet: 636I-1

PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 10 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. 1 UPI photographer.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50 and 1 spotter scope.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79, 2 M-122's, and 1 WP rifle grenade.

2. MISSION. Conduct reconnaissance of objective area in vicinity 0250. Observe valley running generally NW to SE; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 61 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol made no enemy contacts and/or sightings. No artillery or air support missions were requested in support of this patrol.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain was generally easy to move in, no steep slopes or ravines were encountered. The vegetation consisted of mainly elephant grass with some scrub brush in the high grounds. The low ground was very thick with secondary growth intermingled with elephant grass and thorns. The canopy was 30 to 40 feet.
(2) **Map Corrections.** None observed.

d. **Other Information.**

(1) (YD 038505) Hill 325 appeared to have been used as recently as a week or two ago as an OP or campsite for an ARVN unit. Numerous "C" ration cans, sardine cans, and various other items were found at this location, none of which indicate to be from VC/NVA units. Also found were numerous fighting holes and bamboo shelters in the area.

(2) Hill 325 is considered to be an excellent observation post. However, limited observation exists from the hill into the low ground due to heavy vegetation.

(3) One photographer representing UPI accompanied this patrol. It was observed that this man did not hinder the patrol in any way.

6. **RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.** None.

7. **CONDITION OF THE Patrol.** Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

1. No signs or indications were found that the VC/NVA units had used this vicinity in the past 2 to 3 weeks.

S. J. BEST  
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps  
Patrol Leader
Operation Order 56-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; NNS Series L701; sheet number 6361 I and II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 6th Plt, 1st PRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Arc lite assessment in vicinity of 8961. Conduct assessment in accordance with Enclosure (1), EEI's.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS:
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: QUIZGAME.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH - 35.3, 42.65.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      I F T H D K O C L R
      G X J A S E Z M B N
      P W Y U
      V Q

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D. A. COLBY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer and 4 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 ZN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Arc Lite assessment in vicinity of XD 8961. Conduct assessment in accordance with EEL's.


4. ROUTE. Inner A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 2 1/2 hours of patrolling the arc lite area to assess the damage, no enemy contacts and/or sightings were made. There were no indications that had been in the general area. The team made three different insertions and extractions, all of which resulted in negative information.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain in the vicinity of the objective area was found to be very mountainous with slopes up to 50°. The vegetation in the low ground consisted of scrub brush and tall elephant grass up to 6 feet high. In the high ground, the vegetation was thick secondary growth intermingled with thorns and vines. The canopy was 30 to 40 feet high. Movement was considered to be slow throughout the area of operations.
(2) Map Corrections. None observed.

d. Other Information.

(1) No indications of recent activity of VC movement was noted in the entire arc lite strike zone.

(2) Some huts were found in the strike zone, but no indications of recent use were present.

(3) Information pertaining to the B-52's requested from this mission is listed below.

1. Date and location of B-52 strike.

   The main concentration of the arc lite strike was noted in grid squares XD 8761, 8767, 8861, and 8862.

2. Describe the type of terrain and vegetation in the area.

   See paragraph 5.(c)(1) above for detailed information.

3. What were the effects of the bombs on the vegetation and terrain?

   The effects noted, within 15 meters of the impact, were 100% of the vegetation was destroyed. 20 to 30 meters had 50% damage, and more that 30 meters had 35% and less damage to the vegetation. Shrapnel penetrated trees up to 10 inches in diameter within 50 to 65 meters of the impact area. Defoliation was noted up to 50 meters and in some cases, more. It was noted that within a radius of 50 meters of the impact, treetops were destroyed 50%, disturbing the canopy extensively. The depth of the craters were approximately 10 feet and they were up to 5½ meters wide.

4. What installations, tunnels, fortifications, and caches were found in the bomb target area?

   Only the afore mentioned huts were found in the vicinity of the bomb craters. No other installations or tunnels were found.

5. What were the effects of the bombs on the installations, tunnels, fortifications, and caches? (i.e., burning, blast, fragmentation, secondary explosions). Include approximate crater size.
One of the three huts found in the area was completely demolished by a bomb. No apparent damage was done to the other two, due to the great distance of craters found from these huts.

6. Were there indications of foreknowledge of the strike?
   No indications were noted.

7. What enemy units were in the bomb target area prior to, during, and after the bomb strike?
   No evidence or indications were noted.

8. What casualties were inflicted on VC/PAVN personnel by the bomb strike?
   No evidence or indications were noted.

9. What evasive or protective techniques were employed by the enemy during the strike?
   None observed.

10. What were the psychological effects of the strike on VC/PAVN? On civilians?
    Unknown.

11. Have any VC/PAVN rallied due to the strike? How many? Have any civilians returned to GVN control? How many? Describe their complete reactions to the air strike(s).
    Unknown.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, excellent; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

K. T. CARLISLE
Second Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

--3--
Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 57-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconOrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconOrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 5th Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe Highway 9 and the SONG CAM LO River, also the high ground to the north of Highway 9 and river; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: KILLER KANE.
   c. Frequencies:
   (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
   (2) Artillery: POLISH - 35.3, 42.65.
   d. Shackles:

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
   B D M K C N E Y O J
   P L A V Z W S F X T
   G I U R Q H

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D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. (1) officer, (11) enlisted, (1) USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   d. Observation Equipment. (3) 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. (1) M-79, (2) LAW.

2. MISSION. Observe highway 9 and the SONG CAM LO River, also the highground to the North of highway 9 and river; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 69 hours of patrolling and observation the platoon made 3 sightings totaling 9 VC. Numerous voices were heard a total of 8 fire missions were called resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA confirmed and 5 VC/NVA KIA probable. There were no friendly casualties.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 310645H YD 028556 Observed one man dressed in kahkis carrying an M-1 rifle moving along tree line. Called in fire mission. First 2 rounds of adjusting fire were close. Observed the VC crossing road at YD 026562. Two rounds of VT were called exploding over him. 7 more rounds were called the VC/NVA fell and was observed laying at that spot the rest of the day.
      (2) 010840H YD 024560 First observed 3 VC appearing, this number goes to 10. They were wearing a mixture of khaki and green utilities. It appeared that these were searching the area around the demolished bridge for something. Fire mission was requested but refused.
by artillery since they thought that they may have friendly.

(3) 011845H YD 026562 Observed 5 VC/NVA in the open around the bridge. These were wearing khaki's and what appeared to be weapons. Fire mission was called with excellent coverage of target. 5 VC KIA probable.

c. Terrain.

(1) The terrain in the objective area consisted mainly of elephant grass intermingled with vines and some thorns. Elephant grass was approximately 3 to 7 feet high and movement was considered easy. Canopy averaged 20 to 25 feet in height. Many small trails were located throughout this area but mainly consisted of small animal trails.

(2) Map Corrections. None.

d. Other Information.

(1) 310630H YD 028556 Observed 1 man wearing khaki's walking Southeast. Appeared to be heading towards the patrol. Unable to observe weapon. No equipment was noted. This individual entered treeline and disappeared.

(2) 310645H YD 028556 One man entered treeline wearing khaki's and appeared to be carrying a weapon wrapped in cloth on his shoulders. This man was moving Southeast.

(3) 311720H YD 027557 The patrol heard what appeared to be 10 to 15 voices. One fire mission was called. 30 rounds expended on target excellent coverage of target. Unknown results.

(4) 011430H The patrol heard a large volume of fire from S/A and automatic weapons, occasionally grenades were heard. The sounds came from the direction of 2nd Bn, 1st Marines.

(5) 011500H YD 034568 2 women were observed carrying large sticks with baskets. These women appeared to be walking towards YD 024560 where the first 3 VC were sighted. These women were not observed to depart that area. The patrol requested verification if friendly in area of YD 027557. No friendly were in area. Fire mission was called approximately 80 rounds of artillery was expended with excellent coverage of target. All voices ceased. At 1930h shortly after firing stopped approximately 4 to 5 voices were heard yelling in that vicinity.
6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY.

1. VC/NVA KIA Confirmed
2. VC/NVA KIA Probable
3. There were no friendly casualties.

7. CONDITION OF PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. It is believed by the Platoon Leader that the vicinity of the objective area is possibly a supply point or harbor site. With possibly entrenchments as evidenced by activity after the fire mission.

b. This area should be exploited by possibly a search and destroy mission.

G. F. BUBERT
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 58-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; sheet number 6361 II
(b) Bat A, ReconGrpBravo OpO L-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 6th Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Arc lite assessment in vicinity of 8851 and valley running generally east and west.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: QUIZGAME.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH - 35.3, 42.65.
   d. Shackle:

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e. Authentication: challenge| any letter answer| any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding
PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer and 4 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communications Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Arc lite assessment in vicinity of 8851 and valley running generally east and west.


4. ROUTE. Was never inserted. The area of the arc lite strikes was observed outside of the requested objective area.

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. The patrol departed for the objective area in helicopters. Upon arriving over the vicinity of XD 8851, they found that no arc lite mission was flown there. Two bomb areas were found some distance away. These areas were checked from the air, but all indications were that this bomb drop was at least a week old.
   b. Enemy. None observed.
   c. Terrain.
      (1) The terrain, from the air, appeared to be very rugged, with a high canopy. In the valleys, they noted very thick secondary growth.

DECLASSIFIED
(2) Map Corrections. None observed.

d. Other Information.

(1) The objective area was checked out from the air and no bomb
  craters were found in the area. Two locations were found, one
  in grid square 8949, 1,000 to 1,500 meters south. This one had
  water in the craters and indications were that this drop was
  accomplished sometime ago. The second bomb drop area was about
  3,000 meters NE. This area also indicated that the air strike
  had been done sometime ago.

(2) Negative sightings was made in both areas and nothing was noted
  that would indicate anything suspicious from the air. The patrol
  returned without being inserted in the arc lite area.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, excellent; morale, excellent.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

K. T. CARLISLE
Second Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

--2--
Operation Order 59-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 2-66

Task Organization: 3rd Plt, 1stFRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe area to north of objective area; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: PRIMNESS.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 49.6, 47.5.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH - 35.3, 42.65.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      V C Q B F K E J H M
      P W A Q Y G S D T X
      N R Z I L U

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authentication: challenge; any letter
answer; any letter in the same column
of the shackles.

D. A. Colby
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer and 6 enlisted.
   b. Special Attachments. 2 snipers.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 2 7x50's.
   e. Special Equipment. None.
   f. Special Weapons. 2 sniper rifles type M-70, 2 M-72's, and 1 M-79.

2. MISSION. Observe area to north of objective area; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. During 96 hours of patrolling and observation, the patrol made sightings of a total of 42 persons and no enemy contacts. One man in the patrol took sick and was medevac'd. Several small trails were observed in the objective area which appeared to be mainly used by woodcutters. One large trail was observed, which appeared to be recently well used by US troops and Vietnamese.
   b. Enemy.
      (1) 311044H (XD 069572) patrol observed 8 people standing along side of road who appeared to be waiting for someone or something. They were dressed in black and white mixed PJ's and were carrying no equipment.
(2) From 311044H to 030645H, the patrol observed numerous persons who appeared to be either woodcutters or farmers. In general, most of these people were wearing black PJ's with white hats.

c. Terrain.

(1) The objective area consisted mostly of small scrubs and sparse vegetation intermingled with patches of elephant grass. Movement was very easy and maximum distance could be covered.

(2) Map Corrections.

(1) Numerous small trails were observed, used apparently by woodcutters.

(2) Trail located at 053837 showed signs of recent use by US troops and VC (Patrol Route Overlay).

d. Other Information. 021700H: (YD 045586); one med evac due to sickness. Returned to base camp for treatment.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. None.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, good; morale, good.

8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Patrol leader recommends extraction times be made between 1600 and 1800. Also recommends that M-72's (LAW) not be carried on patrols due to past experience of malfunctions and time factor in getting it into action.

J. P. FREITAS
Second Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)
Operation Order 60-66

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM; 1:50,000; AMS Series L701; Sheet number 6361 II
(b) Det A, ReconGrpBravo OpO 1-66
(c) ReconGrpBravo OpO 3-66

Task Organization: 1st Plt, 1st FRC

1. SITUATION. Reference (b).

2. MISSION. Observe valley running east and west, also to the north; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms on enemy targets of opportunity.

3. EXECUTION.
   a. Concept of Operation:
   b. Coordinating Instructions. Ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Ref (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
   a. References (b) and (c).
   b. Callsign: NIGHTSTICKER.
   c. Frequencies:
      (1) Recon: 47.5, 49.6.
      (2) Artillery: POLISH - 35.3, 37.0.
   d. Shackle:
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
      D H A F G B E I C J
      N K M Q L P O R U W
      S X V Z  Y  T

DECLASSIFIED
e. Authentication: challenge; any letter; answer; any letter in the same column of the shackle.

D. A. COLEY
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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PATROL REPORT

1. SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND EQUIPMENT.
   a. Size and Composition. 1 officer, 7 enlisted, and 1 USN.
   b. Special Attachments. None.
   c. Communication Equipment. 1 AN/PRC-25 and 1 AN/PRC-10.
   d. Observation Equipment. 1 7x50 and 1 spotter scope.
   e. Special Equipment. 1 air panel.
   f. Special Weapons. 3 claymore mines, 2 M-72’s, 1 M-79, and 1 rifle grenade launcher.

2. MISSION. Observe valley running east and west, also to the north; capture one prisoner; be prepared to call in supporting arms fire on enemy targets of opportunity.


4. ROUTE. Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay).

5. OBSERVATION OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN.
   a. Synopsis. The patrol was inserted and approximately 35 minutes after insertion, they made contact with an estimated force of at least 3 VC, resulting in 1 USMC WIA. VC casualties are unknown.
   b. Enemy. The patrol was inserted at XD 928513 and moved south-southwest from this location. As they approached a treeline, the point stopped the patrol for four minutes, while informing the patrol leader that he smelled something. After not hearing anything suspicious, the patrol walked approximately six more meters, when the point warned the patrol by yelling "Cocks!", 3 VC/NVA were soon. Two of them were throwing grenades and the third firing an automatic weapon, type unknown. The patrol returned fire with 40 rounds of M-16 fire, causing the VC/NVA to break contact. Extraction was requested and completed without further incident. All of the VC/NVA were wearing dark green camouflaged utilities with covers.

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c. Terrain. The terrain in the objective area was found to be very dense elephant grass 8 to 10 feet high. This vegetation thinned out some close to the treeline. Within the wooded area, the vegetation was thick underbrush with elephant grass, vines, and thorns. The canopy in this area was 25 feet high.

(1) Map Corrections. None observed.

d. Other Information.

(1) (XD 925513) The patrol observed smoke in this valley while in the process of flying over the objective area prior to insertion.

(2) (XD 928515) Noises were heard coming from the valley which appeared to be pots and pans clanking.

(3) (XD 928519) One large hut was seen from a distance of 300 meters. No activity was observed around this hut.

(4) Gunships were called in to strafe suspected VC positions with excellent coverage of target.

6. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY. 1 USMC WIA (not serious), VC/NVA casualties unknown.

7. CONDITION OF THE PATROL. Physical condition, fair; morale, fair.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. There is definitely VC/NVA in this vicinity as indicated by the smoke in one valley, the noise of pots and pans, and the actual contact made.

J. G. HART
Second Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps
Patrol Leader

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY THE DEBRIEFER.

1. The VC/NVA unit the patrol made contact with could have possibly been a VC/NVA security post, listening or outpost for a large base camp in the general vicinity. It also cannot be overlooked that this could have been a reconnaissance element.
It is of interest to note, this contact was in fact only 1,500 meters due south of the large battalion sized VC/NVA unit sighted on 28 April. For detail of this sighting, see patrol report 45-66 dated 271500H July 1966.

G. A. KOCH
Staff Sergeant, U. S. Marine Corps
Debriefer

Annex A (Patrol Route Overlay)