Exclusive for LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK.
Subj: Spoiling the Planned Attack by the 324B Division.
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<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Source</th>
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<td>41.</td>
<td>151315Z Apr66</td>
<td>MajGen LARSEN sends for Gen WESTMORELAND, Info CG III MAF</td>
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<td>Subj: Future Operations DO XA Ops</td>
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<td>42.</td>
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<td>MajGen LARSEN sends for Gen WESTMORELAND, Info CG III MAF</td>
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<td>Subj: Future Operations DO XA Ops</td>
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<td>43.</td>
<td>120140Z May66</td>
<td>Personal for Adm JOHNSON, Info LtGen WALT and MajGen KIEN</td>
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<td>Subj: Batten Down and ARG/SLF</td>
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<td>44.</td>
<td>140301Z May66</td>
<td>Personal for LtGen KRULAK and LtGen WALT from MajGen KIEN</td>
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<td>CINCS Exclusive Message to CINCPAC &amp; COMUSMACV on Vietnamese Military Activities</td>
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<td>45.</td>
<td>170935Z</td>
<td>Personal for LtGen WALT from MajGen ROSSON</td>
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<td>Subj: Contact with Gen LAM</td>
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<td>46.</td>
<td>261030Z May66</td>
<td>Personal for LtGen WALT from Gen WESTMORELAND</td>
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<td>Subj: Mr. NICKERSON Embassy Arrival at Chu Lai</td>
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<td>47.</td>
<td>100616Z Jun66</td>
<td>Exclusive for Gens ENGLER, MOORE, WALT, KENNARD, SEAMAN, RAdm WARD &amp; Col MCKEAN from Operations in SVN involving Gen WESTMORELAND</td>
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<td>48.</td>
<td>040641Z Jul66</td>
<td>Exclusive for Gen GREENE, LtGen KRULAK and LtGen WALT</td>
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<td>Subj: CINCPAC Briefing for CODEL</td>
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<td>49.</td>
<td>152126Z Jul66</td>
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<td>Subj: Ambassador LODGE's Conversation with Prime Minister KY concerning Gen THI</td>
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<td>31.</td>
<td>CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>102337Z Feb66</td>
<td>2 4/2</td>
<td>MajGen MCCUTCHEON from LtGen KRULAK</td>
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<td>32.</td>
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<td>150241Z Feb66</td>
<td>2 g/2</td>
<td>MajGen MCCUTCHEON from LtGen KRULAK</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>180317Z Feb66</td>
<td>1 g/2</td>
<td>MajGen FIELDS, MCCUTCHEON &amp; BGen HENDERSON from LtGen KRULAK</td>
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<td>34.</td>
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<td>282130Z Feb66</td>
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<td>35.</td>
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<td>061930 Z Mar66</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>092220Z Mar66</td>
<td>3 a/3</td>
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<td>37.</td>
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<td>112024Z Mar66</td>
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<td>SPECACT Exclusive for MajGen MCCUTCHEON, Info LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>120315Z</td>
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<td>Personal for LtGen WALT from Gen WESTMORELAND</td>
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<td>39.</td>
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<td>CG FMAW</td>
<td>070248Z Apr66</td>
<td>4 a/4</td>
<td>SPECACT Exclusive for LtGen KRULAK, Info LtGen WALT from MajGen MCCUTCHEON</td>
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20. CG FMFPAC 010715Z Jan66 Hawaii Planning Conference

21. CG FMFPAC 050258Z Jan66 Exclusive for MajGen WALT Subj: Double Eagle

22. CTE 70.2.1.1 090715Z Jan66 Personal for MajGen WALT from BGen JONES Subj: Double Eagle Conflict Operations Prior Double Eagle

23. CMC 110001Z Jan66 Exclusive for LtGen MANGUM & LtGen KRULAK, Info Gen WALT from Gen GREENE MajGen WALT for LtGen Nominated

24. CTF 115 130611Z Jan66 Personal for MajGen WALT, Info BGen MCCUTCHEON & BGen CARL from RAdm WARD Hunter Killer Armed REOCE

25. CG FMFPAC 152152Z Jan66 Exclusive for Gens WALT, FIELDS, MCCUTCHEON & HENDERSON CMC Views on RVN

26. CMC 201448Z Jan66 Personal for MajGen WALT, BGen MCCUTCHEON Subj: Auth to wear MajGen

27. CTE 70.2.1.1 210730Z Jan66 Personal for MajGen WALT Disassociation with concept developed in MACV

28. CTF 79 250516Z Jan66 Personal for MajGen WALT Subj: Double Eagle

29. COMSERVPAC 281821Z Jan66 Personal for LtGen KRULAK, Info VAdm JOHNSON, MajGen WALT Subj: Port's Loading Capacity

30. ADMINO FMFPAC 032349Z Feb66 For LtGen KRULAK from MajGen KIEN CINCPAC Capabilities Planning Conference
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<th>No.</th>
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<td>COMSEVENTHFLT</td>
<td>180300Z</td>
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<td>For Gen WALT from RADm WILLIAMS Subj: Possibility of involving SLF in Contingency Operations</td>
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<td>071255Z Dec65</td>
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<td>222350Z Dec65</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>242113Z Dec65</td>
<td>$2_{4,3}$</td>
<td>For LtGen KRULAK, RADm HOOPER, Info VAdm HYLAND, Gen, WALT, &amp; Adm DAVIS from Adm JOHNSON Subj: PORT Capacity Danang</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>012150Z Jan66</td>
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<td>1. CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>052240Z</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fleet Support</td>
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<td>2. CG FMFPAC</td>
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<td>3. COMUSMACV</td>
<td>061150Z Oct65</td>
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<td>CINCPAC Meeting Certain Comments Regarding Marines</td>
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<td>5. CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>280120Z Oct65</td>
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<td>6. FMAW</td>
<td>291200Z Oct65</td>
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<td>Subj: Employment FMAW in RVN</td>
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<td>7. CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>(Comm lost DTG)</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Exclusive for Gen WALT, WADE and FIELDS</td>
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<td>Subj: Reflection on matters occurring subsequent to or as a result of visit</td>
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<td>8. CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>4Nov65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marble Mountain Attack</td>
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<td>Subj: Tactical Air Support Analysis</td>
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P 152/26Z

FM: 03 FMFPAC

TO: 03 III MAF

T O P S E C R E T

EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK

YESTERDAY AMBASSADOR LODGE TOLD THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF A CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH PRIME MINISTER KY REGARDING GENERAL THI. THE SUBSTANCE OF IT WAS THAT KY WAS UNABLE TO SWAY HIS COLLEAGUES CONCERNING LENIENCY FOR THI, AS RELATED TO THE OTHER FOUR MISCREANT GENERALS. KY SAYS THAT HE, HIMSELF, WAS RELUCTANT TO SEE THI PUNISHED. THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORATE HAVE NOW AGREED TO ALLOW THI TO GO TO THE U.S. FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. KY EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WAS NO TIME LIMIT IN THIS SOJOURN IN THE U.S., STATING THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO EMPLOY THI'S TALENTS IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. REGARDS.

GP-4

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ORIGINATOR: ADMNO FMPAC

CATEGORY: EXCLUSIVE

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C/S

Yin Rohitkesho

Kyle

Edward

Engish

RECEIVED: 04/06/01

JULY 66

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TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL GREENE, LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN WALT. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.
CINCPAC BRIEFING FOR CODEL (U)
1. REPRESENTATIVE THIS HEADQUARTERS ATTENDED SUBJECT BRIEFING THIS DATE.
DELEGATION CONSISTED OF THIRTEEN REPRESENTATIVES UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF REP JOHN M MURPHY. THE BRIEFING CONSISTED OF:
A. THE PACOM STORY (BACKGROUND)
B. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE.
C. CURRENT OPERATIONS.
D. LOGISTICS.
2. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARIZATION OF THE QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE VARIOUS CONGRESSMEN AND THE ANSWERS GIVEN IN RETURN.
WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF SMALL ARMS WITH WHICH THE VC ARE BEING OUTFITTED?
A. PRIMARILY CHICOM.
ARE THE STORIES APPEARING IN U.S. PAPERS WHICH STATE THAT VC PRISONERS TELL OF A DECLINE IN THE VC MORALE TRUE?
A. THIS IS TRUE OF THE VC PRISONERS NOT, HOWEVER, TRUE OF NVN PRISONERS.
WHO SELECTS THE TARGETS WHICH ARE STRUCK IN NVN?
A. THE FIELD COMMANDERS SELECT THE TARGETS. THE APPROVING AUTHORITY FOR STRIKING THESE TARGETS DEPENDS ON THEIR LOCATION.
WHAT IS THE TRUE STORY ON ARVN DESERTIONS?
A. DESERTIONS HAVE INCREASED OVER THE PAST YEAR DUE TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF YOUNG RECRUITS. THE PROBLEM IS THE INABILITY, DUE TO THE SYSTEM OF RECORD KEEPING IN OPERATION, TO TRULY ASCERTAIN WHETHER A PERSON IS A DESERTER OR JUST AMOL. VERY FEW DESERTERS DEFECT TO THE VC.
ARE ALL AIR STRIKES AUTHORIZED FROM WASHINGTON?
A. NO. GENERALLY ONLY TARGETS LOCATED IN TWO FIVE MILE DISTANCE OF HANOI AND A FIVE MILE RADIUS OF HAIPHONG REQUIRE APPROVAL FROM WASHINGTON.
WHAT CATEGORY OF TARGETS IN NVN HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO BE STRUCK YET PERMISSION HAS BEEN DENIED?
A. PORTS; CERTAIN POWER SOURCES; RECONNAISSANCE OF THE NI SECTOR.
DOES THE U.S. NOTIFY THE SVN GOVERNMENT OF EACH AIR STRIKE TO BE CONDUCTED?
A. NO.
ARE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR STRIKES COORDINATED WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE?
ONLY IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR STRIKES ARE INCLUDED IN THE STRIKE FORCES.
IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SECURITY LEAKS RELATIVE TO AIR STRIKES?
A. NO. WE KNOW THAT INFORMATION ABOUT ARC LIGHT STRIKES ARE CONVEYED TO HANOI AS THE AIRCRAFT TAKE OFF. THEIR EXACT DESTINATION HOWEVER IS NOT DIVULGED UNTIL THEY STRIKE.

THE NEW YORK TIMES STATES THAT THE CHICOMS HAVE RECENTLY INCREASED THEIR STRENGTH IN HUYN BY 20,000 PEOPLE. IS THIS CORRECT?
A. WE BELIEVE THE FIGURE TO BE CLOSER TO 40,000. THEY ARE MOSTLY NON COMBATANTS I.E. CONSTRUCTION BNS ETC.

HOW MANY OF YOUR STAFF (POINTING TO THE ROOM) HAVE SEEN DUTY IN HUYN.
A. (TWO PEOPLE HELD UP HANDS) THE REASON FOR THE SMALL NUMBER IS THAT THE REAL BUILD UP STARTED ABOUT ONE YEAR AGO. THE NUMBER WILL INCREASE AS THE 15 MONTH TOUR IS ENDED AND WE GET REPLACEMENTS ON OUR STAFF.

WHAT DO YOU ESTIMATE THE PERCENTAGE OF SUPPLIES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSPORTED THROUGH LAOS HAVE GONE BY TRUCK?
85-90 PERCENT.

WHY MUST WE RELY MOSTLY ON AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE FOR INTELLIGENCE IN HUYN. WHY CAN'T WE INFILTRATE FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES?
IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO INFILTRATE A COMMUNIST ORGANIZED COUNTRY. PEOPLE IN EVERY VILLAGE ARE ACCOUNTED FOR AND A STRANGER IS IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS.

IS ONE OF THE PURPOSES FOR WANTING TO DEPLOY MORE TROOPS TO PREVENT INFILTRATION IN SAIGON?
YES, BUT ALSO IN OTHER AREAS.

WHAT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS HAS CINCPAC MADE FOR THE BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG?
CINCPAC DOES NOT ADVOCATE A BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG.
SUCH METHODS OF DENYING PORT USE AS DESTROYING THE HARBOUR DREDGE, MINING THE HARBOUR OR DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED.

WHAT ARE THE MECHANICS OF COLLECTING CASUALTY DATA ON THE ENEMY?
THE DATA IS BASED ON ACTUAL BODY COUNTY COLLECTED THROUGH REPORTS FROM THE BASIC UNIT.

WHAT IS THE COST OF RUNNING AN ARC LIGHT SORTIE?
WE DO NOT KNOW.

DO WE HAVE A PLAN FOR WINNING THE WAR?
YES.

ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE CURRENT PROCEDURES BEING USED IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR?
YES. WE CAN'T HOPE TO KNOW ALL OF THE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH WAGING THIS WAR. GENERALLY WE BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT IS CORRECT IN HIS DECISIONS.
HAVE THERE BEEN ANY COMBAT OPERATIONS DELAYED OR CANCELLED DUE TO SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION?
CATEGORICALLY THE ANSWER IS NO. WE HAVE HAD PROBLEMS WITH MAL-DISTRIBUTION AND SHORTAGES OF PECULIAR TYPES BY OVERALL THERE HAS BEEN A SUFFICIENT SUPPLY.

HOW MANY NVN DIVISIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR COMBAT?
A. ELEVEN

HOW HAS THE BUILDUP IN SVN BY NVN TROOPS AFFECTED THE STATUS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN NVN?
IT HAS NOT AFFECTED THEM. WE BELIEVE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE CAPABLE OF RECRUITING, TRAINING AND INFILTRATING 15 BMS PER MONTH. SUPPORTING THEM IN SVN IS ANOTHER PROBLEM.

WHAT IS NEEDED TO WIN THE WAR?
MORE PRESSURE ON NVN.

WOULD INCREASED PRESSURE ESCALATE THE WAR?
WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE CHICOMS ARE INTERESTED IN LAUNCHING A FULL SCALE WAR.

DO YOU HAVE PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF SEA AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION?
YES.

HAS CINCPAC ASKED FOR A CALL-UP OF RESERVES?
CINCPAC HAS ASKED FOR FORCES WHICH ARE READILY AVAILABLE ONLY IN THE RESERVES, HOWEVER, A SUBSTITUTE FOR THOSE FORCES HAVE BEEN SUPPLIES IN SOME CASES (CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS VICE CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS) AND DELAYED IN OTHER CASES.

IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT VC OPERATIONS IN SVN ARE CONTROLLED BY A SVN ORGANIZATION?
NO. WE BELIEVE HANOI DIRECTS OPERATIONS.

IS THERE ANYTHING IN THE REPORTS THAT AIRCRAFT ARE OPERATING WITH LESS THAN A FULL LOAD OF AMMUNITION?
THERE HAVE BEEN CASES SUCH AS CHU LAI WHERE AIRCRAFT HAVE TAKEN OFF WITH SHORT LOADS DUE TO PART OF THE RUNWAY BEING UNUSABLE. WE HAVE ALSO HAD TO SUBSTITUTE ONE TYPE OF AMMO FOR ANOTHER. GENERALLY SPEAKING WE HAVE ENOUGH AMMO TO DO THE JOB.
DOES THE U.S. QUESTION PRISONERS? WHAT DO THEY SAY?
YES. THEY ARE AFRAID OF AIR STRIKES. WE HAVE HURT THEM BY HITTING THEIR
BASES WHICH HAVE BEFORE GONE UNTOUCHED. THEY ARE HUNGRY AND POORLY
SUPPORTED.

WHAT ARE THE STRUCTURES THAT ARE BEING DESTROYED IN LAOS LIKE?
THEY ARE BASIC SHELTERS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST RAIN.

HAVE THERE BEEN ANY ATTEMPTS BY NVN TO RUN AIR RAIDS INTO SVN?
NO.

HAS THERE BEEN ANY CHANGE IN U.S. PERSONNEL ROTATION POLICY IN THE PAST
YEAR?
NO.

SHOULDN'T A COMBAT INFANTRY MAN BE ROTATED EARLIER THAN A NON-COMBATANT?
NO. IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT EVERYONE IS EXPOSED TO DANGER.
IN ADDITION, THE INFANTRY FIGHTING IS SPORADIC AND THERE IS SOME
ROTATION BETWEEN STAFF AND COMBAT DUTY.

HOW MANY MARINES HAVE VOLUNTEERED TO EXTEND THEIR TOUR OF DUTY WITH
THE THIRD MAF?

WHAT IS THE NVN STRATEGIC POSITION? (A) IS THEIR PURPOSE TO DISRUPT
OUR ECONOMY?
(B) IS THEIR PURPOSE TO GET US COMMITTED HEAVILY IN ONE AREA THEREBY
PUTTING US OFF BALANCE?
NO TO BOTH QUESTIONS. 1 YEAR AGO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD VICTORY IN
SIGHT. THEY NOW HOPE THE U.S. WILL LOSE INTEREST AND DISSENGAGE.

WHAT MOTIVATES THE VC TO SHOW SO MUCH DEVOTION?
THEIR VERY RIGID DISCIPLINE. THE THEME SONG OF COMMUNISM I.E. ALL LAND
WILL BE DIVIDED, EVERYONE TREATED EQUALLY ETC.

3. THE ATTITUDE OF THE GROUP CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS INQUISITIVE.
THERE WAS NO TRACE OF BELLIGERENCY BY ANY MEMBER.
GP-4
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Marine Aviation Force
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San Francisco, California 94129

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OPSEC T SPECAT 1979 FN: MACJOO

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN ENGEL, NOBLE, WALT, KINNARD,

ZAR

ADDRESSES ON A STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. COMMUNICATIONS ON

PAGE 2 RUMSHA 463U T O P. S. C. R. T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

THIS SUBJECT WILL BE CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET EYES ONLY FOR APPROPRIATELY CONTROLLED DISTRIBUTION. ADDRESSES ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM SENIOR COMMANDERS UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION WHO NEED TO KNOW ON AN EYES ONLY BASIS OF THE CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE.

1. (TS) WHEN PLANNING OPERATIONS NEAR THE SUB/LADTHAM FRONT, CMUSMACV WILL BE KEPT INFORMED SO THAT APPROPRIATE COORDINATION CAN BE EFFECTED. THIS IS MANDATORY IN EACH INSTANCE.

2. (TS) IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, US FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED TO TAKE NECESSARY COUNTERACTIONS IN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY ATTACKS DIRECTED AT US/RVN/FUMA FORCES FROM LOCATIONS INSIDE LAOS WITH CMUSMACV BEING ADVISED. AN EMERGENCY SITUATION IS CONSIDERED TO EXIST WHEN, IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE COMMANDER, THE URGENCY FOR TAKING FURTHER COUNTERACTIONS IN SELF-DEFENSE OF US/RVN/FUMA FORCES PRECLUDES OBTAINING PRIOR APPROVAL. AS NECESSARY, SUCH COUNTERACTIONS MAY INCLUDE:

EXCLUSIVE
DECLASSIFIED

Page 3

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

Page 4

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET MAC 4232 EYES ONLY

PLEASE NOTIFY MR. NICKERSON AND ONE ASSISTANT FROM EMBASSY WILL ARRIVE AT CHU LAI THIS EVENING BY T-39 IN CONNECTION WITH SPECIAL PROJECT RELATED TO KY-THI MEETING TOMORROW. IT IS DESIRED THAT FIELDS COOPERATE AND HANDLE ON STRICTLY NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

NICKERSON WILL REPORT TO FIELDS.

SSG NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

100
FM SSO MACV
TO SSO III MAF
ZEM
TOP SECRET MAC 3936
PERSONAL FOR WALT DANANG FROM ROSSON SAIGON.

SUBJ: CONTACT WITH GEN LAM

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED THIS DATE BY EMBASSY FROM HIGHER US AUTHORITY IT IS DESIRED THAT YOU CONVEY TO GEN LAM AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY THAT HIGHEST LEVELS OF US GOVERNMENT ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO 2D DIVISION'S MAINTAINING SOLIDARITY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM.

2. REQUEST REPORT OF YOUR DISCUSSION WITH GEN LAM ON THIS SUBJECT AND HIS REACTION.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

105
TO CG FMFPAC
CG III MAF
BT

TOP SECRET PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK AND LTGEN MALT FROM MGON KIER. AND GIF. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

CJCS EXCLUSIVE MSG TO CINCPAC AND COMUSMACV ON VIETNAMESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES (U)

1. GEN WHEELER CJCS HAS PASSED AN EXCLUSIVE MSG TO ADM SHARP AND GEN WESTMORELAND CONCERNING RVN MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

2. GEN WHEELER REPORTS CONCERN IN WASHINGTON ABOUT WHAT APPEARS TO BE A VERY LOW LEVEL OF RVN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN RECENT WEEKS. THE CONCERN APPARENTLY COMES FROM SEVERAL CAUSES WHICH ARE NOT ALL COMBAT.

3. THE CAUSES OF CONCERN WHICH ARE OF A COMBAT NATURE ARE OUTLINED AS FOLLOWS BY CJCS:
   A. THE LOW CASUALTY LEVEL OF ARVN UNITS DESPITE SIZEABLE NUMBER OF BATTALION SIZE OR GREATER OPERATIONS; IT IS NOTED THAT THE VIETNAMESE KIA ARE LESS THAN THOSE OF U.S. FORCES DESPITE THE REVERSE RATION IN COMBAT OPERATIONS BEING CONDUCTED.
   B. DESPITE NUMBER OF ARVN OPERATIONS ON THE BOOKS, THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE ARVN CONTACT WITH VC, WHICH CAN BE CONTRASTED AS A LACK OF AGGRESSIVENESS AND DESIRE TO GET ALONG WITH THE WAR.

4. THE CAUSES OF CONCERN WHICH ARE NON-COMBAT FACTORS INCLUDE:
   (1) THE ACTIVITIES AND MACHTATIONS OF CERTAIN BUDDHIST CHAPLAINS AS REPORTED BY MACV AND BY THE EMBASSY.
   (2) THE IMPRESSION THAT I CORPS IS IN A SENSE NOW DETACHED FROM THE REST OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS COMPOUND BY THE FACT THAT GENERAL THI STILL REMAINS THERE AND GENERAL DINH STILL SEEMS NOT TO HAVE THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL OR MOVING IN A FAVORABLE DIRECTION, AND STRUGGLE GROUP ACTIVITIES AND ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS CONTINUE.

5. GEN WHEELER HAS ASKED CINCPAC AND COMUSMACV FOR THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE LOW LEVEL OF ARVN ACTIVITY OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS. SPECIFICALLY, HE HAS ASKED IF THE ARVN ACTIVITY IS BELOW THE NORM AND, IF SO, WHAT ARE THE CAUSES AND WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT.

COPY 1 OF 5 FILE
COPIES 2 & 3 OF 5 - CG III MAF
COPIES 4 & 5 OF 5 - CG OMPAC

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE
COPY 1 OF 5 COPIES

ADMINS FMFPAC
P 140301Z/MAY
CG III MAF
CG FMFPAC

COPY 1 OF 5 COPIES
COMMUNICATION CENTER
II Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California

(PERSONAL FOR)

HAS BEEN SENT

CG YYNA YYWB
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O 120140Z
FM CG FMFPAC
TO YYWB/CINPACFLT
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
YYNA/ADMIN FMFPAC
BT

TOP SECRET
CG03 RPT CG03
PERSONAL FOR ADM JOHNSON INFO LITGEN WALT AND MAJGEN KIER.
LTGEN KRULAK SENDS,
BATTEB DOWN AND ARG/SLF (C)
REF A, COMUSMACV 100121Z (TS)
B, COMUSMACV 011446Z (TS)

1. IF ND REF A DIFF CULT TO INTERPRET FIRST, IN REF B MACV SAYS THAT THERE ARE LUCRATIVE TARGETS FOR THE ARG/SLF IN THE CAPACITY OF WIDE RANGING SEABORNE STRIKING FORCE OFF THE I CTZ LITTORAL. THEN IN SOME APPARENT CONTRAST, IN PARA 3 OF REF A, HE SAYS THAT LUCRATIVE

PAGE TWO TOP SECRET
TARGETS ACCESSIBLE TO THE SLF, EXCEPT IN IV CTZ, HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXPLOITED, AND FURTHER THAT BATTEB DOWN AS SUCH IS OBSOLETE (PAPA 2 AND 5 OF REF A), AND THEN HE STATES THAT TARGETS SUITABLE FOR AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS WILL MATERIALIZE FROM TIME TO TIME (PARA 4 OF REF 4).
2. TAKING THE ABOVE STATEMENTS A LONE, IT WOULD BE HARD TO INTERPRET EXACTLY WHAT MACV IS SEEKING TO CONVEY TO CINCPAC. HOWEVER, AS REFERENCE A CONTINUES, THE INTENT MAY BE A LITTLE CLEARER:
A. HE STATES THAT HE WANTS A MORE RESPONSIVE PROCEDURE FOR COMMITMENT OF THE FORCE (PARA 4 OF REF A). IMPROVED RESPONSIVENESS COULD BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN EITHER REDUCTION IN PLANNING TIME OR IMPROVEMENT IN TERMS OF REACTION TO MACV NEEDS OF DESIRES.
B. THE LATTER WOULD SEEM THE MORE LIKELY, SINCE HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE DES RED PROCEDURE INVOLVES THE FORMULATION OF AN OUTLINE CONCEPT AND SUBSEQUENT SUBMISSION OF IT TO CINCPAC--NOT SUBSTANTIALLY MORE RAPID THAN CURRENT PROCEDURES.
C. HE DESIRES THAT MACV BE PRIME PLANNER, WITH SEVENTH FLEET SERVING ONLY IN COORDINATION (PARA 4 OF REF A).
3. MY REACTION IS THAT A PROPER COMMENT ON THE SUBJECT TO CINCPAC WOULD ADDRESS THE INCONSISTENCIES IN PARA 1 ABOVE, AND WOULD SAY THAT

CG FMFPAC
O 120140Z/MAY

3 or 5 COPIES TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
CINCPACFLT IS FULLY PREPARED TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF COMUSNACU, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF FLEET CAPABILITY AND ON BRIEF NOTICE.

WHEN SO DIRECTED BY CINCPAC-Whose Mobile Reserve, it must be renewed, is the instrument involved. Further, if, under the above conditions, NACV will communicate the targets, the purposes desired to be achieved and the timing involved, that CINCPACFLT will respond promptly.

SP-4

DT:
DIST: COPY 1 OF 5 COPIES - FILE COPY
      COPIES 2-3 OF 5 COPIES = CC FMFPAC
      COPIES 4-5 OF 5 COPIES = CC IIT MAF

NNNNVV
**EXCLUSIVE**

**TO:** LTGEN. KRULAK, FMF PAC

**FROM:** N/A

**REMARKS:** N/A

**FILE COPY:** #6822

**RECORD OF DISCLOSURE**

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**LEGEND**

- A = Action
- I = Information
- C = Confidential

**DECLASSIFIED**
Dear Lew:

Your message to COMUSMACV on use of the SLF (your 230616) hit CINCPACFLT pretty hard, and 7th Fleet's concurrence (his 231110) caused almost as much agitation.

Johnson sent for me and was stern in his assertion that my Marines had proposed violating amphibious doctrine for no good reason (the phrase "when directed by III MAF" griped him particularly.) He felt that we were seeking simply to use the SLF as another floating battalion of III MAF and not in the proper amphibious crises/emergency/reaction/reserve role, that we are creating a precedent for misuse of the SLF by I Field Force Vietnam in the future. He opined that this was actually going to happen unless we took steps to prevent it.

He said he was going to reprove 7th Fleet by message for going along with your proposal, and said he planned to write John Hyland in detail on what he regarded as the main problems in the past in SLF employment, with explicit instructions for the future. He did not elaborate.

I took issue with him on some of the doctrinal details to which he alluded, and I assured him that the Marines understand clearly the implications of creating undesirable precedents. I told him that we are on guard against it, emphasizing that if we err, we do so in a conscientious desire to get on with the war.

Personally, and beyond this, it is my belief that there is some lack of uniformity in our conception of how the SLF should be used. It is necessary that we articulate a party line, designed to ensure that this asset is employed at its full capability always, and that we all

TOP SECRET - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
approach it the same way;--you in your recommendations to MACV and your relations with Seventh Fleet; me in my advice to CinCPacFleet and my relations with Seventh Fleet.

Here, as I see it, is what the party line should be:

a. Starting off from the simple premise that everything we do--all of us--has to be measured in terms of making the best possible contribution to winning the Vietnam war, I believe that it is the flexibility and rapid reaction capability that distinguishes the SLF as being so valuable. I believe that protracted periods ashore in non-amphibious tasks do not fulfill this. I regard the SLF as capable of making its best contribution through the medium of amphibious maneuver, being committed where its seaborne mobility and seaborne logistic base can best be exploited. Initiation of an amphibious assault operation such as the early phase of Double Eagle, serving as a reserve maneuver force in a Starlite, or executing a Batten Down amphibious raid--all make the best of good sense to me.

b. Next, the SLF should fit in effectively with our unit rotation program. Our rotation plan was designed on the basis that units entering or re-entering RVN would be in the best possible condition. A reduction in the state of readiness of the SLF is to be expected and willingly accepted in connection with its execution of valid amphibious operations. However, I regard the readiness degradation connected with its use in routine operations ashore not to be consistent with what we are seeking, unless there is no other force available for the task, and unless we are willing to relinquish our sole mobile PACOM reserve for the purpose. The rotation program is a good idea. It is the envy of the Army, who wish they could do it too. However, it is already in enough trouble as a result of Westmoreland's lack of support. We have to close ranks to get it back in business as soon as possible, in the interest of keeping your command in the freshest possible state, both in people and equipment. This is policy, throughout the chain of Marine Corps command, up through the Commandant, and I know it has your support.

c. My final point is that we must not unnecessarily uncover the amphibious shipping related to the SLF. Certainly, the SLF should be used whenever a true crisis demands. However, if we use the SLF for routine or protracted activity ashore, it will just be a matter of time until we see a proposal to put soldiers in the shipping, because
TOP SECRET - MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

all of the available Marines have been maneuvered into RVN. I cannot believe that such a trend would do anything good for the war. In the end it would be bad.

These three points, it seems to me, must motivate both us and the Navy in our effort to get the most out of the SLF. They should be the basis, I believe, of a consistent party line. I do not know how this particular incident will come out, or what Johnson is going to say in his letter to Hyland. (I will tell you if I find out). Beyond this, we can talk at greater length on the subject when I get out there on my next visit, the second week in May.

Sincerely,

V. H. KRULAK
Lieutenant General, U.-S. Marine Corps
TOP SECRET 2604 AVF-CC MAJOR. GENERAL LARSEN
SENG FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

SUBJECT: FUTURE OPERATIONS (U)
1. (GS) CONVERSATION

OATH WITH III MAF THIS DATE INDICATE THAT
THEY WILL BE ENGAGED SHORTLY IN OPERATIONS WHICH MAY DELAY THEIR
PARTICIPATION IN A COMBINED OPERATION WITH I FFORCEV ALONG THE I -
II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE BOUNDARY. BECAUSE OF THE EXPECTED
COMMENCEMENT OF THE MONSOON SEASON IN MID-MAY, THIS OPERATION MUST
BEGIN

IN APPROXIMATELY 1 MAY IF WE ARE TO HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO
SEARCH OUT SUSPECTED AREAS THOROUGHLY AND DESTROY ENEMY WHO ARE
CG IFFORCEV NHA RVN

O 151315Z/APR
CG III MAF
2. (TS) AS AN ALTERNATE TO A COMBINED OPERATION WITH III MAF, IT IS PROPOSED THAT I FORCEN CONDUCT THE DO XA OPERATION UTILIZING UP TO TWO BRIGADES OF THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV. IF THIS ALTERNATIVE PLAN IS ACCEPTABLE, FURTHER PROPOSE TO ALLOW DELTA TEAMS TO CONDUCT THEIR SEARCH OPERATIONS IN DO XA FOR 7-10 days. THEY ENTER THE OBJECTIVE AREA 16 APRIL WHILE WE WAIT COMPLETION OF THESE DELTA OPERATIONS, 1ST AIR CAV WOULD CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN III CTZ NORTHEAST OF KONTUM FOLLOWING THIS, BETWEEN 23-25 APRIL, 1ST AIR CAV WOULD ENTER THE DO XA AND CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS. THIS PROPOSAL ASSUMES THAT CG, P ARVN CORPS WOULD AUTHORIZATIONS AN AREA OF OPERATIONS SUFFICIENTLY LARGE TO ACCOMMODATE TWO AIRMOBILE BRIGADES.

3. (S) HAVE CHECKED THIS CONCEPT WITH COLONEL NCKEAN, WHO AGREES.

4. (TS) APPROVAL OF THE ALTERNATIVE PLAN PRESENTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 WILL NOT PRECLUDE LATER PARTICIPATION BY III MAF IN THE EVENT THEIR OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS ARE REDUCED IN OTHER AREAS.

5. (S) IF THE ABOVE ALTERNATE PROPOSAL IS NOT APPROVED, IT IS PLANNED TO COMMIT UP TO TWO BRIGADES OF THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV INTO AN

PAGE 3 RUNMVF 1642 TOP SEC E L
AREA SOUTH OF CHEO REG BOUNDED GENERALLY ON THE WEST BY HAH 14, ON THE SOUTH BY HW 21, ON THE EAST BY JS GRIDLINE BQ 58 AND ON THE NORTH BY EW GRIDLINE AQ-BQ 90. THIS AREA INCLUDES THE CHU DLE YA AREA WHICH IS ONE OF THE BAS AREAS WHICH MUST BE REPORTED ON AS MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS.

6. (S) WHICHEVER ALTERNATIVE IS APPROVED WILL OF COURSE BE DISCUSSED WITH GEN VINH LOC AND WE WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ARVN PARTICIPATION. GP4

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE COPY
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF

DECLASSIFIED
# Subject

EXCLUSIVE FOR

# Routing

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**RECEIVED ONE SEALED ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 3 & 4 OF 4 COPIES OF CG FMAW 0702482 APR 66**

**DATE/TIME**

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**CEO**

**S&C**

**Other**

**Legend**

- **Action**
- **Information**
- **Comments**

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**Top Secret**

DECLASSIFIED
PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

FROM: CG FMW
TO: CG FARPAC
INFO: CG III MAF

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LIGEN KRULAK INTO LIGEN WALT FROM MCCUTCHEON.

A. YOUR 0602382.

1. APPRECIATE INFO IN REP A. HERE ARE SOME ADDITIONAL ITEMS AND COMMENTS.

2. SPACE STILL AT PREMIUM HERE DANANG. USAF IS BUILDING REVERTEMENTS IN NEW TRANSPORT AREA TO TAKE CARE APPROXIMATELY TEN OPERATION PA FROM SOUTHERN REVERTEMENTS. ESSENTIAL THAT NO MORE OF THIS SPACE BE OCCUPIED BY TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. CONTRACTOR WILL SOON START ON WEST RUNWAY VICINITY MARINE AIR FREIGHT. OUR TRANSPORTS WILL USE SOUTH TOUCHDOWN PAD. USAF AIRCRAFT PRESENTLY THERE PLUS ARAY OF MARINE AND RUSS BIRDS MUST RELocate TO EAST SIDE VICINITY PRESENT TRANSPORT AREA. EVENTUALLY WE WILL HAVE TO MOVE OUR 130 AND OTHER TRANSPORT OPERATIONS TO EAST SIDE BECAUSE WEST RUNWAY AND TAXIWAY WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR RAMP PURPOSE AND OUR PROGRAMMED TRANSPORT RAMP IS WAY DOWN THE PRIORITY LIST. OF COURSE WHEN WEST RUNWAY IS OPENED SO WILL PAD FOR MAG-11. THIS WILL TAKE CARE OF VMJ-1 AND FS SQDN PRESENTLY LOCATED ON NORTH TOUCHDOWN PAD PLUS MAG-13. MAG-11 PA SHOULD STAY PUT ON EAST SIDE WHERE THEY HAVE HANGER UNTIL OTHER WEST PAD IS AVAILABLE WITH FACILITIES.

3. HAVE HEARD RUMORS USAF PLANNING ON MOVING A-1 SQUADRON TO DANANG. OUSTAINED TO DO FAC WORK IN ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AREA.

4. OBVIOUS WE CANNOT TAKE TWO OR EVEN ONE MORE SQUADRON HERE. WE ARE LOSING TIME. SPACE NEXT WEEK AND WILL NOT GAIN ANY FOR AT LEAST THREE MONTHS. THE LOSS IS PRESENT MARINE AIR FREIGHT AREA.

5. AS FAR AS ROUTE PACK ONE IS CONCERNED I UNDERSTAND 7TH AF BRIEFED WESTY ON HOW THEY PLANNED TO DO IT. HE REPORTEDLY TOLD THEM TO DO SOME MORE PLANNING AND TO CONSULT WITH US SINCE WE WERE THE CLOSEST ONES TO THE AREA. NATURALLY THEY HAD NOT INCLUDED US IN THE DEAL. TO DATE THEY HAVE NOT CONSULTED US EITHER. I'M SITTING BACK ON THIS ONE WAITING TO SEE WHAT THEY COME UP WITH. MEANWHILE WE ARE PREPARING FOR THE JOB. THE SIMPLE WAY TO DO IT IS SAKE AS STEEL TIGER. THEY CAN MAKE SOME OF OUR DAILY SORTIES THERE JUST AS EASILY AS NEXT DOOR OR II CORPS ELSEWHERE. I CAN EVEN SUPPLY A FIELD GRADE PLANNER TO HELP THEM.

6. MARCH WAS OUR RECORD MONTH. FOR INFO HERE IS WHAT WE HAVE DONE IN 66 JET WISE.

TOP SECRET

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7. I'm cutting down to 1.2. Don't want to push KORs any higher and don't want to get in blind on Ordinance.

8. Guess you know AF strangled up to put in jet field at Hue. They were to come up here for conference but political sit forced postponement. Dunn was to chair it. Looks like it would force us off fixed entirely as far as KORs are concerned. Old problems still present — logistics and security. GPF.

---

DIST: TED MACDONALD 07/16/54

DRAPER/RELEASER: KEITH S. McCOLLUM, MAJOR
COMMANDING GENERAL
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS (U)

1. WE ARE IN RECEIPT OF INFORMATION VIA JCS AND CINCPAC RELATIVE TO CHANGES IN AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AND AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS. I BELIEVE THIS INFORMATION WILL BE OF INTEREST TO YOU.

2. THE AIR FORCE IS HAVING PROBLEMS MEETING THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR TF'S IN SEA. THEY HAVE PROPOSED MOVING BOTH AN F-104 AND AN F-102 SQUADRON INTO DANANG, Sending THE F4C SQUADRON PRESENTLY AT DANANG TO OPERATE FROM THAILAND. CINCPAC IS ON RECORD AGAINST THIS MOVE ONCE AGAIN TO OVERLOAD DANANG. HE HAS CONCURRED WITH A PROPOSAL TO MOVE THE F4C, BUT STATES IT MUST BE REPLACED BY ONLY ONE SQUADRON, PREFERABLY A 104 SQUADRON. IF CINCPAC'S RECOMMENDATION TO JCS IS APPROVED, THE AIR DEFENSE HOT PAD DURING DARKNESS AND INCLEMENT WEATHER WILL BE REPLACED WITH US BY DEFAULT. CINCPAC'S RATIONALE FOR THE POSITION ON THE ONE FOR ONE TRADE IS THE SLIPPAGE FROM JULY TO SEP ON THE PROGRAMMED BOD OF THE NEW RUNWAY AND FACILITIES, AND THE NEED FOR REPAIRS ON THE OLD RUNWAY. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THE AIR FORCE PROPOSED MOVING THE EXTRA SQUADRON INTO THE NEW TRANSIENT PARKING RAMP.

3. TO COMPOUND THE PICTURE FURTHER, MACV/CINCPAC HAVE COME UP WITH A REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL SORTIES ABOVE THOSE LEVIED IN THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE. THEY FEEL THERE IS A NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL 2000 TO 2500 SORTIES IN LAOS AND NVN.

4. YOUR SPLENDID EFFORTS IN SUPPORTING THE LAOS REQUIREMENTS ARE RECEIVING THEIR DESERVED ATTENTION AT CINCPAC, WHERE THEY ARE INCLUDED IN EACH MORNING'S BRIEFING. WITH THE CHANGING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ROUTE ONE IN NVN TO COMUSMACV, IT IS PRESUMED MARINE AIRCRAFT WILL SOON BE FRAGGED FOR MISSIONS IN THAT AREA.

5. WE CAN ASSUME FURTHER PLOTS BY THE AIR FORCE ON SPACE IN DANANG AND IN THAT LIGHT, I WOULD LIKE TO FURNISH HUTCH WITH AN UP-TO-DATE ANNOTATED AERIAL PHOTO OF DANANG. REQUEST YOU SEND ONE (1:30,000) ASAP AND THEN ONE EACH OF EACH MONTH UNTIL WE HAVE OUR SQUADRONS ABOARD. REGARDS

DIST COPIES 1 AND 2 MAF

COPIES 3 TO WING

CG FMFPAC

060238Z APR 66

CG

EXCLUSIVE
TOP SECRET MAC 2008

PERSONAL SECRET FOR GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

1. IF AND WHEN GENERAL THI RETURNS TO DANANG YOU SHOULD COMPORT YOURSELF WITH HIM AS FOLLOWS. WHEN HE ARRIVES AT THE AIRFIELD YOU, YOUR REPRESENTATIVE, OR OTHER US MILITARY OFFICIAL SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE ON HAND TO MEET HIM. YOU SHOULD EXTEND NO REPEAT NO INVITATION TO HIM FOR SOCIAL OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS UNLESS SUCH INVITATION HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY EXTENDED, IN WHICH CASE I WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED. IF YOUR PATHS CROSS DURING NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS YOU SHOULD BE COURTEOUS TO HIM AS YOU WOULD ANY OTHER VIETNAMESE OFFICER. IF GENERAL QHUIAN HAS A SOCIAL FORMATION TO BE ATTENDED BY GEN THI YOU SHOULD BE PRESENT IN DEFERENCE TO THE NEW CORPS COMMANDER. IF A CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY IS CONDUCTED YOU SHOULD REPEAT SHOULD BE PRESENT.

2. THE POINT IS THAT THI NO LONGER HAS ANY OFFICIAL STATUS AND SHOULD BE HENCEFORTH TREATED AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT AS AN OFFICIAL. ALTHOUGH HE SHOULD NOT BE OSTRACIZED WE MUST AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT AMERICANS PARTICULARLY OFFICIALS ARE IN ANY WAY SIDING WITH THI AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

RETYPEP BY SS0 CAPT PURCILLY ORIG ON FILE SS0

SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
FM: III MAF DUTY CRYPTOGRAPHER
TO: STAFF SECRETARY
SUBJ: CG FMFPAC 112024Z. T/S EXCLUSIVE FOR

SIR: IT IS REQUESTED THAT ON GEN WALT COPIES OF THE ABOVE MSG
THE FOLLOWING BE ADDED WHERE IT IS UNDERLINED.

IS YOUR FREEDOM FROM

R/S Sgt. C. E. Clausen
COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION RECEIVED COMPLETELY GARBLED. SVC HAS BEEN INITIATED AND CORR COPY WILL BE DIST UPON RECEIPT.

EXCLUSIVE

TO CG FIRST MAN
INFO CG III MAF

TOP SECRET SPEC T EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO LTGEN MALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

A. YOUR 070104Z
B. MY 2621302/FEB

1. I HAVE STUDIED YOUR COMMENTS IN REF A, CONCERNING THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF FIRST MAN (REAR). I AGREE THAT THERE ARE DISADVANTAGES INVOLVED, BUT THE OVERRIDING ADVANTAGES AS YOUR FREEDOM FROM RESPONSIBILITY OUTSIDE RVN. YOUR FULL ATTENTION CAN BE DEVOTED TO FIGHTING THE WING IN-COUNTRY, WITH THE ASSURANCE OF RESPONSIVE SUPPORT FROM THE FORCES ELSEWHERE.

2. WITH RESPECT TO STOP, THE RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE ASSUMED BY MAG-13 (REIN). THIS WILL REQUIRE THAT THE SPECIAL TRAINING PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES OF THE WING (REAR) BE TRANSFERRED TO MAG-13. I WANT TO STAY IN THE NUCLEAR BUSINESS, FOR ALL THE OBVIOUS REASONS, BUT THE UNCOVERED ARRANGEMENT NOW IN FORCE REALLY DONE THE USA LITTLE GOOD, AND IT DOES YOUR FORCES SOME DAMAGE. I AM RECOMMENDING TO CINC PACFLT THAT THE NUMBER OF TARGETS BE REDUCED, SO THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR WITHDRAWING IN-COUNTRY PILOTS FOR TRAINING WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY LESS. IF APPROVED, A MAXIMUM OF ABOUT 13 PILOTS WOULD HAVE TO BE QUALIFIED, WITH ABOUT 8 RETAINED IN IWAKUNI AND THE REMAINDER IN RVN.

3. THE FAR REACHING RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PERSONNEL, FISCAL AND LOGISTICAL ASPECTS OF THE FREQUENT UNIT TRANSFERS BETWEEN WING AND MAG ARE RECOGNIZED. FROM A FISCAL AND LOGISTICAL VIEWPOINT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO STABILIZE ESSENTIAL BILLS IN THE UNITS AT IWAKUNI AND ROTATE PERSONNEL ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS. SQUADRON ROTATION, ON THE OTHER HAND, OFFERS A LOT IN TERMS OF UNIT READINESS. WE CAN WORK THIS OUT EITHER WAY; KEEPING MAXIMUM UNIT COMBAT READINESS IN-COUNTRY AT THE PRIME CRITERION. BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT WITH WHEN ME WHEN I AM IN DANANG NEXT WEEK.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
4. I am mindful that any course of action we may adopt involves some risk, but on balance, I believe there is more danger in keeping the aircraft in the FMAW, directly available to MAGV. The demands for air transport are increasing as the AF and ARMY relative capabilities are diminishing. Therefore, stimulating MAGV to search for other assets which he can bring under his direct control. The VMGR separation is a logical product of the total lack of bed-down facilities, which precludes moving the VMGR into RVN, and of the fact that the squadron can better be utilized in tactical/logistical support of both the DIV/WING TEAM in RVN and the AIR/GROUND TEAM in OKI/JAPAN. As I stated in REF B, I intend to issue instructions to the 9TH MAB to ensure that the VMGR effort is responsive to your desires. Please be prepared to discuss details next week. Regards.

GP=4
PERSONAL FOR ADM JOHNSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK

SLF (U)

1. DURING HIS 7 MARCH DEBRIEF, ADMIRAL SHARP RAISED THE QUESTION OF HOW BEST TO FULFILL THE SLF FUNCTION, IN LIGHT OF COMUSMACV'S DESIRE FOR A MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MANEUVER UNITS IN COUNTRY. THIS MESSAGE ADDRESSES THAT QUESTION.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE COMBAT READINESS STATUS OF OUT-OF-COUNTRY FMFPAC BLT'S.

A. THE PRESENT SLF, BLT 1/5, COULD GO IN-COUNTRY ON 21

B. BLT 3/4 NOW ON OKINAWA, IS FULLY READY, AND SCHEDULED TO MOVE TO RVN ON 20 MARCH.

C. BLT 2/5, NOW ON OKINAWA, WILL BE READY EITHER TO ASSUME THE SLF TASK OR TO DEPLOY TO RVN BY 26 MARCH.

D. BLT 3/5, ARRIVING OKINAWA 26 MARCH, SHOULD TRAIN THERE UNTIL ABOUT 1 MAY, PRIOR TO ASSUMING THE SLF DUTIES OR GOING IN-COUNTRY.

3. THUS, IF BLT 1/5, WHICH HAS NOW BEEN THE SLF FOR LESS THAN TWO WEEKS, REMAINS IN THAT ASSIGNMENT FOR THE USUAL PERIOD OF ABOUT 2 MONTHS, BLT 3/5 WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSUME THE SLF RESPONSIBILITY UPON MOVEMENT OF BLT 1/5 INTO SVN. MEANWHILE, ABOUT 2 WEEKS HENCE, BLT 2/5 CAN BE DEPLOYED TO SVN (SHORTLY AFTER THE ENTRY IN-COUNTRY OF THE FIFTEENTH BLT, 3/4). THE ONLY FEASIBLE ACCELERATION TO ALL THE FOREGOING MOVEMENT WOULD BE TO LAND BLT 1/5 ON 21 MARCH, AND TO FOREGO THE SLF CAPABILITY UNTIL BLT 3/5 IS READY-ABOUT 1 MAY. THIS IS REGARDED AS UNDESIRABLE.

4. IT IS ACCORDINGLY RECOMMENDED, AS AN INITIAL STEP, THAT:

A. BLT 1/5 SERVE AS SLF UNTIL 1 MAY ENTERING SVN AT THAT TIME.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
B. BLT 2/5 DEPLOY TO SVN ON OR ABOUT 26 MARCH.
C. BLT 3/5 RELIEVE BLT 1/5 AS SLF ON ABOUT 1 MAY.

5. THE NEXT PROBLEM WILL ARISE WHEN IT COMES TIME TO
REPLACE BLT 3/5 AS SLF ON 1 JULY. AT THAT TIME, AND ASSUMING
NO ADDITIONAL FORCE AVAILABILITY FROM OUT SIDE OF PACOM,
THERE WILL BE THREE OPTIONS AVAILABLE:
A. VACATE THE SLF
B. MAKE A DIRECT EXCHANGE BETWEEN BLT 3/5 AND A BLT
FROM RVN.
C. WITHDRAW A BLT FROM RVN ABOUT 4 WEEKS IN ADVANCE,
TO AFFORD IT AN OPPORTUNITY TO REHABILITATE ON OKINAWA;
ABSORB REPLACEMENTS AND PREPARE TO ASSUME THE SLF
TASK.

6. A. OPTION A ABOVE WOULD INCREASE THE BATTALION STRENGTH
IN RVN, BUT WOULD DENY BOTH CINCPAC AND COMUSMACV A FLEXIBLE
AND READY RESERVE/CONTINGENCY FORCE.
B. OPTION B WOULD MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH IN RVN UNCHANGED,
BUT WOULD PLACE A UNIT IN THE SLF WHICH HAD EXPERIENCED THE
MATERIAL AND PERSONNEL LOSSES INEVITABLE IN COMBAT COMMITMENT.
IN ADDITION, THIS OPTION WOULD GENERATE IN-COUNTRY LOGISTIC

PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO RECONSTITUTING SLF MOUNT-OUT
SUPPLIES FROM LIMITED STOCKS IN RVN. IT WOULD ALSO EMBODY
DIFFICULTIES IN REPLACING WORN OUT SLF EQUIPMENT AND REPLACING
PERSONNEL ELIGIBLE FOR ROTATION DURING THE EMBARKED PERIOD.
C. OPTION C WOULD INVOLVE A TRANSITORY NUMERICAL
REDUCTION DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE, BUT WOULD ASSURE CINCPAC
OF A WHOLLY FIT RESERVE FORCE IN THE SLF, AND WOULD PROVIDE
COMUSMACV WITH A FLOW OF COMPLETELY REHABILITATED UNITS
IN EXCHANGE FOR COMBAT DEPLETED ONES.

7. THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO THE OVERALL EFFORT IS FOUND IN
OPTION C, AND ITS ADOPTION IS ACCORDINGLY RECOMMENDED.

GP-4
P 061932Z
FM CG FMPAC
TO CG III MAF

TOP SECRET SPECIFIC EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM
LTGEN KRULAK.

1. YOUR D1414006Z CAME AS QUITE A JOLT, AND I KNOW IT MUST TROUBLE
YOU. FOLLOWING ARE MY REACTIONS, FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH:
2. AS TO THE SLF, MY POSITION IS THAT IT IS BETTER TO BASE IT OUT
OF COUNTRY. TWO REASONS, FIRST, IT PROVIDES A READY CONTINGENCY
FORCE, CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SHORT NOTICE RESPONSE, SECOND, IT
PROVIDES A CONTINUALLY USEFUL ROTATION BASE, TO EXCHANGE WITH AND
REFRESH DEPLETED IN-COUNTRY UNITS.
3. AS TO COMUSMACV'S VIEWS EXPRESSED IN PARA 3:
   A. THERE ARE 120,000 GUERRILLAS IN SVN, ALONG WITH PERHAPS 70,000
ARMED MEN WHO COULD BE CALLED (MAIN FORCE), DESTRUCTION OF ALL OF
THE LATTER WOULD REALLY HAVE SMALL EFFECT ON THE FORMER, WHO ARE
WEVEN INTO THE FABRIC OF THE PEOPLE, FROM WHOM THEY EXTRACT MOST OF
THEIR SUPPORT. THEREFORE, I CANNOT SEE ANY VALIDITY IN THE STATEMENT
THAT JUST TO THROW THE MAIN FORCE OFF BALANCE IS GOING TO CAUSE THE
GUERRILLA EFFORT TO COLLAPSE.
   B. DAILY OFFENSIVE ACTION BY 50-75% OF YOUR FORCE- EVEN 50-75%
OF THE TACTICAL GROUND FORCE ALONE IS MORE THAN ANY ARMY SHOULD ASK
OF ITS TROOPS OVER THE LONG PULL. OF MORE CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS THE
INJUNCTION THAT YOU SHOULD TURN OVER THE SECURITY OF DANANG, CHU LAI
AND PHU BAI TO LOGISTIC AND HEADQUARTER/ELEMENTS WHILE REMOVING
THE PRESENT COMBAT UNITS FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST VC MAIN FORCE. APART
FROM THE FACT THAT YOUR SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIRE
MENTS ARE CRITICAL, AND THAT THE TROOPS INVOLVED ARE OVERWORKED.
NOW, THERE IS THE FURTHER FACT THAT THEY ARE ILL-EQUIPPED FOR THE
DEMANDING BASE DEFENSE JOB. BEYOND ALL THIS, DANANG IS THE MOST
SENSITIVE US AIR BASE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND IF WESTY WANTS YOU TO
RISK ITS PRECIOUS OCCUPANTS, TO THE EXTENT OF TAKING THE GROUND
DEFENSE FORCE AWAY FROM ITS JOB IN ORDER TO PURSUE MAIN FORCE UNITS,
HE OUGHT TO GIVE YOU AN ORDER IN WRITING. ONCE YOU RECEIVE IT, AND
HOWEVER LITTLE YOU LIKE IT, YOU SHOULD-AND I KNOW YOU WOULD- DO YOUR
LEVEL BEST TO CARRY OUT HIS INSTRUCTIONS EXACTLY AS HE DIRECTS,
BOTH IN LETTER AND SPIRIT. HOWEVER, THE HAZARD IS SO GREAT, AND THE
STAKES SO HIGH, THAT A DIRECTIVE OF THIS GRAVITY OUGHT PROPERLY BE
ON THE WRITTEN RECORD.
   C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ENCLAVES AT BOTH QUANG NGAI AND DUC PHO
IS REALLY GOING TO PUT THE SQUEEZE ON YOUR LOGISTIC SYSTEM. IT
WOULD SEEM MORE PRACTICAL TO START OUT AT QUANG NGAI ALONE, TO
BEGIN WITH. REGARDS.
CG=4

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CG FMPAC
P 061932Z/MAR66
CG III MAF

EXCLUSIVE
TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MGMC MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED, FOR SOME TIME, WITH THE IMPROPRIETY OF TAXING FIRST MAW WITH PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATION, DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, SUPPLY MANAGEMENT, ETC. OF AIR ELEMENTS IN IWAKUNI AND FUTEMA. LIKewise, THE OBLIGATION OF PROVIDING PERSONNEL TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE TWO WESTPAC AIR STATIONS IS CLEARLY NOT THE PROPER PROVINCE OF A WING IN COMBAT. I HAVE BEEN AIMING TOWARD A SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLEMS WHICH WILL STILL ENSURE THAT THE ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES OF OUT-OF-COUNTRY AIR ELEMENTS ARE RESPONSIVE TO WING REQUIREMENTS.

2. RELATED TO THE ABOVE, THE MATTER OF THE KC-130'S, 2ND AIR DIVISION WOULD LIKE TO GET A HANDLE ON THEM, AS WOULD MACV. THE LATTER HAS SAID SO, WITHIN THE LAST MONTH, IN TERMS OF WHAT HE DESCRIBES AS THE NECESSITY TO QUOTE POOL ALL IN-COUNTRY AIR TRANSPORT. UNQUOTE CLEARLY, COMBAT AND SERVICE SUPPORT OF THE WING AND DIVISIONS CANNOT COUNTERENANCE THIS.

3. WE ARE MOVING TOWARD A SOLUTION WHICH WILL MEET YOUR NEEDS WHILE STILL SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OUTLINED IN THE TWO PARAS ABOVE. IT AMOUNTS TO THIS:
   A. WE ARE GOING TO HAVE, CONTINUALLY, AN OUT-OF-COUNTRY MAB, COMPRISING AN RLTD AND A COMPOSITE MAG.
   B. IN ADDITION TO FULFILLING THE STATED CINCPAC STRATEGIC RESERVE REQUIREMENT, THE RLTD AND MAG WILL PROVIDE ROTATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THI MAWF, IN TERMS OF SQUADRONS FOR FIRST MAW, BLTS FOR THE DIVISIONS, AND SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL AND ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT, WHEN NEEDED IN SVN.
   C. IN ORDER TO PROTECT VMCF 152 FROM PREDATORY HANDS, IT WILL BE IN THE COMPOSITE MAG, BUT WILL BE DIRECTED TO PROVIDE SERVICES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, EXPRESSED DIRECT, BY CG FIRST MAW.
   D. IWAKUNI AND FUTEMA NOW HAVE OFFICIAL T/O'S. CGC WILL FULFILL THEIR PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS INDEPENDENT OF THE WING.

4. INITIAL MAG-13 WILL BE THE COMPOSITE MAG. LATE IN THE SUMMER, OR EARLY FALL, IT WILL MOVE INTO SVN, LEAVING ITS ATTACHMENTS TO BE ABSORBED BY MAG-15, WHEN IT DEPLLOYS.

5. ONE STEP IN BRINGING THIS TO PASS IS TO CLOSE FIRST MAW (REAR) TO THE WING PROPER IN SVN, WHEN YOU HAVE THE SPACE TO ACCOMMODATE THEM. THIS IS GOING TO HAVE TO RESPOND TO YOUR OWN JUDGEMENT.

6. AS WE CARRY ALL THIS INTO REALITY THERE IS ONE POINT ON WHICH I WANT TO BE CLEAR. IT IS THIS: THE OUT-OF-COUNTRY MAB IS GOING TO SUPPORT THE DIVISIONS AND WING, AND YOU NEED HAVE NO CONCERN THAT THERE WILL BE ANY DEGRADATION IN THEIR RESPONSIVENESS TO IN-COUNTRY NEEDS. I INTEND TO SEE THAT IT WORKS.

REGARDS
GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1&2 OF 2 COPIES: MAF
CG FMFPAC P 28213/Z/FEB MGMC MCCUTCHEON
2 2

DECLASSIFIED
P 180317Z

FM CG FMFPAC
TO CG FIRST MARDIV
CG III MAF
CG FMFPAC/1 MAC (FWD)

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGENS FIELDS, MCCUTCHEON
AND BEEN HENDERSON FROM LTGEN KRULAK

1. A FEW RANDOM TIDBITS.
2. CMC HAS PUT THE HEADQUARTERS CADRE OF 4TH MARDIV INTO BEING; NOT BECAUSE HE THINKS THE RESERVES ARE GOING TO BE MOBILIZED, BUT BECAUSE HE WANTS TO BE FULLY READY IF IT SHOULD HAPPEN UNEXPECTEDLY.
3. THE 5TH DIVISION HAS A HIGHER, AND MORE REAL, PRIORITY. PLANS ARE TO ORGANIZE IT BEGINNING IN MAY OR JUNE; TO HAVE IT UP TO SNUFF IN PERSONNEL IN 12 MONTHS AND IN MATERIAL IN 16 MONTHS.
4. WE HAVE ASKED — AS YOU KNOW — FOR A REGIMENT FROM 2D MARDIV, TO GIVE US A CONTINUING AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY IN OKINAWA IN JUNE, WHEN 1ST MARDIV IS FULLY CLOSED IN SVN. IF WE DON'T GET IT, WE WILL HAVE AN UNDERLAP OF FULLY 3 MONTHS, AWAITING THE 1ST REGIMENT OF THE 5TH DIVISION — AND THAT COULD SLIP A MONTH OR EVEN MORE. CONSEQUENTLY, I HAVE PRESSED FOR THE 2D DIV UNIT. THE JCS WILL BE DISCUSSING IT NEXT WEEK. BECAUSE OF UNREST IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND THE UNDERSTANDABLE DESIRE NOT TO DENUDE THE ATLANTIC, I WOULD PUT THE CHANCES ABOUT 50-50.
5. BLT 1/5 IS NOW EMBARKING IN PRINCETON, TO BECOME THE SLF. IT IS IN FINE SHAPE IN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT; IT HAS A HIGH PROPORTION OF VETERANS, BUT IT BADLY NEEDS AN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE BEFORE IT GOES TO WAR FOR KEEPS. PLEASE BE GUIDED BY THIS WHEN YOU ARE INVOLVED IN PLANNING FOR ITS USE.
6. THE AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING CONFERENCE SET UP BY CINCPACFLT ON OKI (SEE MY 170346Z) IS DESIGNED TO GET EVERYONE TALKING THE SAME LANGUAGE; TO CUT DOWN PLANNING AN REACTION TIMES, TO SMOOTH INTERNAL NAVY/MARINE RELATIONSHIPS, AND GENERALLY TO MAKE ALL OF OUR AMPHIBIOUS EFFORTS MORE EFFECTIVE IN PROSECUTING THE WAR. GIVE IT ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT, AND PUT YOUR BEST TALENT INTO IT, FOR THE VERY BRIEF PERIOD INVOLVED.
7. COMUSMACV IS STILL TRYING (WITH WARD'S HELP) TO SET UP A VIETNAMESE NAVY AMPHIBIOUS COMMANDO FORCE, TO DO RAIDS ETC UP TO BATTALION LEVEL. IT IS A SIMPLE PLAY TO CASTRATE THE VN MARINES. DO WHAT YOU CAN TO OPPOSE IT.
8. FALL-OUT FROM WASHINGTON MAKES PLAIN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS AWAKENING TO THE REAL VIRTUES OF A 2 PRONGED MILITARY/CIVIC PROGRAM TO FIGHT THE WAR, AND THAT PACIFICATION IS NOW ACKNOWLEDGED BY MANY AS THE HEART OF THE DEAL. IT IS COMING TO BE

CG FMFPAC

P 180317Z/FEB

MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON
UNDERSTOOD THAT COMBING THE GUERILLAS OUT OF THE PEOPLE'S HAIR, GIVING THE PEOPLE PROTECTION AND BEARING DOWN ON CIVIC ACTION ARE NOT JUST FUN AND GAMES, BUT ARE AT THE VERY CENTER OF THE BATTLE. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NEXT TO NOTHING IN THE PRESS ON WHAT WE ARE DOING IN THIS AREA. I BELIEVE THAT THE MOST FRUITFUL SECTOR OF THE PRESS FOR US TO WORK ON, IN THIS PARTICULAR RESPECT, IS THE WRITER WHO DOES NOT HAVE TO MAKE A DAILY FILING DEADLINE, BUT WHO CAN TAKE A LITTLE MORE TIME TO FOLLOW THE STORY THROUGH. (REPRESENTATIVES OF TIME, NEWSWEEK, ETC; WRITERS LIKE ANSOP, BEECH ETC.). BUT OF THIS ONE THING YOU MAY BE SURE; NOBODY IS GOING TO SELL THIS PRODUCT FOR US; WE HAVE TO DO IT OURSELVES, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THAT GOES FOR THE WHOLE PRESS RELATIONS FIELD. STATESIDE PAPERS NOW CONFINE THEMSELVES PRETTY MUCH TO RECOUNTING THE ADVENTURES OF THE 1ST CALVARY BECAUSE, I AM SURE, THAT IS THE ESSENCE OF THE SAIGON HANDOUTS. ANYBODY WHO HAS ANY IDEA OF HOW TO LICK THIS, LET'S HEAR IT.

9. TURNING TO LOGISTICS, I REALIZE THAT WE ARE PRETTY WELL SUPPLIED, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, BUT THERE ARE MANY AREAS WHERE JUST A LITTLE MORE EFFECT BY A KNOWLEDGEABLE CHAIN OF COMMAND CAN DO WONDERS. I WOULD LIKE TO ENERGIZE-TO EVEN A GREATER DEGREE THAN AT PRESENT- THE ATTENTION OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND UPON TRULY CRITICAL LOGISTIC MATTERS. WHEN I GET A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ONE OF YOU ON A CRITICAL PROBLEM, YOU CAN BE SURE THAT SOMETHING IS GOING TO BE DONE, AND I KNOW THAT WHEN I PASS IT TO CMC, HE GETS CRACKING. ON THE OTHER HAND, UNOFFICIAL, VAGUE AND UNVALIDATED BITCHING BY LOWER UNIT PEOPLE TO THEIR BUDDIES AT THE VARIOUS LEVELS ABOVE THEM, DOES NOTHING BUT WASTE WIND.

10. FURTHER, IN CONNECTION WITH LOGISTICS, I SENSE A GROWING DETERMINATION BY DOD TO METER VERY CLOSELY WHAT WE USE, AND WHAT WE SPEND. IN OTHER WORDS, THE DOLLAR BARREL IS NOT UNLIMITED. IN FACT, CMC TELLS ME THAT, EVEN WITH THE SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION, HE DOES NOT YET SEE HOW HE WILL BE ABLE TO MEET FMFPAC SPENDING AT THE CURRENT LEVEL. WHILE I FEEL THAT EVERY VALID NEED IS GOING TO BE FULLY MET, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE CAREFUL OF OUR GEAR AND SOLID IN STATING OUR REQUIREMENTS. YOU CAN DO A LOT TO HELP IN THIS AREA, IF YOU WILL BEAR DOWN ON SUPPLY DISCIPLINE IN THE LOWER UNITS, AND IF YOU WILL ENSURE THAT THE DOLLAR REQUISITIONS AND REQUEST ARE GIVEN A VERY THOROUGH COMMAND EXAMINATION, BEFORE SUBMISSION. INCIDENTALLY THE GAO IS AT MY HQ NOW, AND WILL BE HEADING WEST SOON. THEIR KEY INTERESTS ARE FULL RATE AND EXCESSES. AS TO THE LATTER, I KNOW WE TO HAVE SOME EXCESSES BOTH AT THE 3RD FOR AND IN THE DIVISIONS AND WING. OUR SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO REDUCE THEM (MY 1621422. FOR EXAMPLE) WILL HELP SOME, DAY IN AND DAY OUT COMMAND ATTENTION AT EVERY LEVEL WILL HELP EVEN MORE.

WARM REGARDS TO ALL.

GP-4

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150241

OG_FMF PAC

EXCLUSIVE FOR MGNE MCCUTCHEON FROM LT GEN KRULAK

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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RECORD

DECLASSIFIED
P 15/241Z //MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//
FM CG FMFPAC
TO CG III MAF

TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN KRULAK.
MARINE CORPS' EYES ONLY.

RELEASE OF SLF (U)
A. COMUSMACV 13:15/2
1. BLT 2/3 IS SCHEDULED TO BE REASSIGNED FROM SLF TO III MAF ON
28 FEB 66. BY REF A, SLF HAS BEEN REQUESTED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES FOR
AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING IN III CORPS DURING THE SECOND WEEK OF MARCH.
IN ADDITION I UNDERSTAND CTF 116 IS ANXIOUS TO GET OFF A COUPLE OF
DAGGER THRUST RAIDS IN THE DELTA ASAP.
2. I AM ANXIOUS TO SEE BLT 1/5, THE NEW SLF UNIT, GET IN AN
AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE BEFORE SHOOTING FOR RECORD. HOWEVER, THE PRESSURE
IS GOING TO BE VERY HIGH TO COMMIT IT, BOTH TO THE FFORCE7 JOB (REF
A) AND TO DAGGER THRUST.
3. THE HEAT ON 1/5 MIGHT DIMINISH SOMEWHAT IF YOU WERE ABLE TO
RELEASE 2/3 FROM OPERATION DOUBLE EAGLE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, IN
ORDER THAT IT MIGHT CONDUCT THE DAGGER THRUST OPERATIONS PRIOR TO
REPORTING TO III MAF ON 28 FEB. WILL YOU PLEASE CONSIDER THIS
AND GIVE ME YOUR REACTION. WARM REGARDS.
GP=4

DIST: COPY 1 AND 2 OF 2 COPIES—CG III MAF

PAGE ONE OF ONE PAGES
MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF

FOR: SS

G-2 comment attached
CG FM/FAC

EXCLUSIVE

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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R S M

1023372

A Show to 62, 63

65. Have 62

Prepare Barry Commercial

on 3.

ON 6'6'

O'Connell

English

12 Feb 66

Please return to MAF 58
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

For: Commanding General
From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Ref: CG FMFPAC 102337Z (Exclusive)

A report received on 9 Feb stated that recent photography revealed vehicles towing artillery toward RVN along Laotian route 9 east of TCHEPONE. There is no evidence or MACV report available in III MAF to indicate that artillery other than 120mm mortar has been infiltrated into ICTZ.

MACV has designated QUANG TRI as a priority reconnaissance area and within ICTZ visual aerial reconnaissance units and Special Forces have placed special emphasis on the area of interest. III MAF currently has aerial photo and Red Haze missions pending in suspected VC areas in QUANG TRI Province, including route 9.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

11 Feb 1966
PRIORITY

102337Z

FM: CG FMFPAC

TO: CG III MAF

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. THE PRESIDENTIAL MEETINGS HERE WERE KEENLY INTERESTING, AND HAD MUCH SIGNIFICANCE WHERE YOU ARE CONCERNED.

2. THE MAIN POINTS, IN WHICH YOU ARE INTERESTED, ARE THESE:
   A. THERE IS NO FOMING AT ALL CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S RESOLUTION TO BACK OUR WAR EFFORT. HE IS IN IT FOR KEEPS.
   B. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFORT HAS LAGGED, THE MILITARY EFFORT, AND IS DETERMINED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT.
   C. HE SPOKE ELEGANTLY ON THE FACT THAT PACIFICATION IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, AND THAT IT MUST BE PURSUED AS A COORDINATED MILITARY/CIVIL SHOULDERING FORWARD PROCESS; THAT, UNLIKE SOME HAVE CONTENDED, YOU CANNOT PACIFY WITHOUT THE ACTION OF THE MILITARY TO BOMB OUT THE GUERILLAS.
   D. HE IS INTENSELY INTERESTED IN THE CARE OF REFUGEES. THE THINGS YOU ARE DOING ARE JUST WHAT HE HAS IN MIND. WHAT YOU NEED TO DO IS TO INTENSIFY, EVEN MORE, YOUR EFFORTS, AND TO PUT GREATER PRESSURE ON THE GVN TO HELP.
   E. HE IS ALSO INTERESTED IN THE BLACK MARKET, WHICH IS NOW BEING TOUTED AS A BIG DEAL IN THE PRESS.

3. NEW SUBJECT: YOU READ US A MESSAGE, IN ONE MEETING, REPORTING THAT TOWED ARTILLERY HAD BEEN SIGHTED IN WESTERN GUANG TRI. IF THIS IS TRUE, WE HAVE A GREATLY INTENSIFIED SURVEILLANCE PROBLEM.

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

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CG FMFPAC P 102337Z/FEB MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON
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(PERSONAL FOR)
P 032345Z // MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
FM ADMINS FMFPAC // COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION AS RECD. SVC
TO CG FMFPAC UPON REQ
TOP SECRET AMC 1 REP AMC 2
FOR LTGEN KROULAK FROM LTGEN KIER
CINCPAC CAPABILITIES PLANNING CONFERENCE (U)
1. CINCPAC WAS BRIEFED TODAY ON THE RESULTS OF THE CASE TWO
COMPARISON OF CAPABILITIES VS REQUIREMENTS. THIS WAS THE CONFERENCE OUTLINE:
A. FORCES AND PHASING
   (1) PACOM WIDE
   (2) RVN. MANEUVER BNS. TFS. SERVICE SUMMARIES
   (3) PACOM RESERVE
B. AIR MATTERS
   (1) SORIE REQUIREMENTS
   (2) ALFA/CHARLIE PEDDOWN
   (3) ALFA/CHARLIE PHASE IN
C. LOGISTICS ASPECTS TWO. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ON FORCE
REQUIREMENTS AND CASERTES CAPABILITIES WERE PRESENTED BY THE
CINCPAC BRIFFERS:
A. FORCES AND PHASING
   (1) PACOM REQUIREMENTS - 445,000
   OF WHICH 273,000 ARE FOR RVN AND 172,000 FOR OTHER AREAS
   (2) THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 102 MANEUVER BNS TO
   MEET PACV REQUIREMENT CAN BE MET BY CASE 2 IN JAN 67. JC REQ
   0 TFS WILL BE AVAILABLE IN DECEMBER FOR CAS IN COUNTRY.
   (3) USMC PN DISPOSITION IS THE SAME AS IN CASE THREE,
   HOWEVER, THREE ROK MARINE CORPS BNS ARE REDEPLOYED TO 1 CTZ IN
   CASE TWO.
   (4) ARMY FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CASE TWO ARE FOR 196,
   000 OF WHICH THEY CAN ONLY EMPLOY 72 PERCENT OR 137,500.
   HOWEVER, ONLY 56 PER CENT OF THEIR LOG SUPPORT UNITS WILL BE
   AVAILABLE.
   (5) SHORT FALL UNITS BY SERVICE

USA
AIRC R SQDNS 2 MMCB
HFLO COS 35 0 NOTE FLOAT FORCE 1 NOTE
APTY 10 NAV BASE CAM RANH BAY 1
ENGR BN 9
AD/AW BNS 7
TOTAL PERS 54,000 TOTAL PERS 9,000
NOTE: CINC PACFLI STATES UNIT COULD BE PROVIDED DEC 86.

(6) A LENGTHY DISCUSSION ENSUED BETWEEN CINC PAC, BG GEN
DUPUY, AND MG EN BARKEN USA CENTERED ON MACV'S DESIRE TO HAVE
MAXIMUM DEPLOYMENT OF MANEUVER BNS DESPITE SHORTAGE OF ARMY LOG
UNITS. DA CONTENDS THAT MANEUVER BNS SHOULD NOT DEPLOY WITHOUT
APPROPRIATE LOG SUPPORT. MACV EQUATES 84 BNS WITH REDUCED LOG
SUPPORT TO 70 BN EQUIVALENT AND 102 BNS WITH REDUCED SUPPORT
TO INCLUDE THE EQUIVALENT. ARMY BROUGHT OUT FACT THAT IN CASE THREE,
41 PERCENT OF FORCES DEPLOYED ARE LOG SUPPORT, WHEREAS IN CASE II ONLY
29 PERCENT ARE LOG SUPPORT FORCES. MACV IS WILLING TO ACCEPT THIS ON THE
BASIS OF HAVING 102 BNS NOT ALL FULLY SUPPORTED IN COMPARISON TO
SMALLER NUMBER OF BNS FULLY SUPPORTED! DA STRONGLY OBJECTS TO
THIS AND INDICATED THAT CASE 2 IS A BAD PLAN.

(7) PACOM RESERVE.

(A) IN CASE 2, ARMY CAN NOT PROVIDE THE 31,000
TROOPS REQUIRED.

(B) IN CASE 2 USMC CAN PROVIDE 38,800 OF THE 41,700
REQUIRED.

(C) IN ESSENCE, THE PACOM RESERVE UNDER CASE 2
WOULD BE COMPOSED OF ONE NEF.

(3) SUMMARY.

(A) OF TOTAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PACOM, 55 PERCENT
CAN BE PROGRAMMED, 71 PERCENT OF RVN REQUIREMENTS CAN BE PROGRAMMED AND
39 PERCENT OF PACOM RESERVE CAN BE PROGRAMMED.

(B) AIR MATTERS.

(1) 30 SQUADRONS FOR IN-COUNTRY ARE INDICATED
FOR CASE 2 AND ARE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE PROGRAMMED GROUND
FORCES. (ONE OF THE 30 SQUADRONS IS A AIR DEF SQD AT DANANG)
THE 2 ADD SQUADRONS (OVER CASE 3 BEDDOWN) WOULD BEDDOWN AT CAM
RANH BAY AND HAN RANG. (WHILE THESE SQUADRONS WILL PROVIDE THE
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, NO MENTION WAS MADE OF THE REQUIREMENTS TO
PROVIDE OUT OF COUNTRY OPERATIONS, THERE APPEARS TO BE A
SHORTAGE OF 4 TO 5 SQUADRONS IN RVN IN CASE 2 TO SUPPORT A 102
BN ARRAY.)

(2) THE OVERRIDDING PROBLEM IN CASE 2, AS IN
CASE 3, IS AVIATION ORDNANCE.

(3) CASE 2 WILL REQUIRE 4 PERCENT MORE SORTIES THAN
CASE 3.

(4) BASE QUOTE YANKEE UNQUOTE DECISION STILL
PENDING ON BASE LOADING AT KORAT.

(5) MACV STATED RECENT REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL
C-47'S. CINC PAC INQUIRED OF BEDDOWN OF 94 C-47'S IN RVN WOULD
INTERFERE WITH TFS OPERATIONS. NO ONE COULD ANSWER THE QUESTION.
THIS MATTER WILL BE DEVELOPED BY CONFERENCE COMMITTEE.

(6) SORTIE REQUIREMENTS FOR LAOS BEING REDUCED
FROM 4500 TO 3000.
(C) LOGISTICS ASPECTS.

(1) CINCPAC J-4 STATED THAT TONNAGE WILL INCREASE 4 PER CENT OVER CASE 3. DANANG CAPABILITIES APPROXIMATE REQUIREMENTS AND NO PROBLEM IS FORSEEN. CINCPAC COMMENTED QUOTE JUST PARELY UNQUOTE SAIGON REMAINS A PROBLEM AND WILL NOT GET WEL UNTIL SEPTEMBER. OTHER PORTS PRESENT NO MAJOR PROBLEMS AND VUNG TAU WILL AID IN SOLVING THE SAIGON PROBLEM.

(2) CINCPAC COMMENTED THAT THE CONSTRUCTION PACKAGE FOR I CTZ WAS LARGER THAN OTHER CORPS AREAS AND QUESTIONED THE DIFFERENCE. PGEN DUPUY INDICATED THAT THE LOC CONSTRUCTION COST WAS NOT PROVIDED FOR II, III AND IV CORPS. CINCPAC DROITED THE COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE COSTS AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VARIOUS CORPS AREAS AND INCLUDE LOC COST FOR ALL CTZ.

(3) IN SUMMARY, THE BRIEFING DISCLOSED THE DA STRONG OBJECTION TO CASE 2 MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE SHORTFALL IN LOGISTICS SUPPORT FORCES, (IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE UNDERLYING REASON FOR DA'S OBJECTION IS THAT IT WEAKENS THEIR SUPPORT FOR CASE 1 AND MOPILIZATION.) IN ADDITION, THE SHORTFALL OF USAF TFS APPEARED TO BE GLOSTERED OVER IN THAT EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON THE 30 TFS AVAILABLE FOR COUNTRY. NO SPECIFIC MENTION WAS MADE TO THE USAF SHORTFALL IN CASE 2 ALTHOUGH IT WAS EVIDENT TO US.

(4) GENS WESTMORELAND AND STILWELL ARRIVED HONOLULU 2 FEBRUARY FOR BRIEFING ON CASE 2 AND 3 ON 3 FEBRUARY. SECDEF STILL PLANS ARRIVE HONOLULU FOR FINAL CAPABILITIES WRAPUP. THE ACT ETA OF SECDEF STILL UNKNOWN.

GP-4
R 281821Z
FM CONSERVPAC
TO YYMA/CG FMFPAC
INFO ZEN/CINCPACFLT
DDKE/CG I II MAF/NCC
ZEN/DIRPACDOCKS
BT
TOPSECRET
FOR LGEN KRULAK INFO ADM JOHNSON,
MGEN WALT, RADM DAVIS FROM RADM HOOPER
A. CINCPACFLT 242113Z DEC 65
1. IN REFERENCE A ADM JOHNSON ENJOINED US TO ENSURE
 THAT PORT AND LOADING CAPACITY REFLECT POSITIVE
 FEASIBILITY OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR TROOP UNITS CON-
 TEMPLATED FOR DEPLOYMENT.
2. LOGISTIC FEASIBILITY HAS BEEN STUDIED ON THE BASIS OF
 COMUSMACV PLANNING REQUIREMENTS OF 9 DEC 1965 FOR

PAGE 2 YYNB 5064 TOPSECRET
SUPPORT OF II A FORCES. FEASIBILITY WILL BE RE-EXAMINED
WHEN THE RESULTS ARE IN FROM THE REPROGRAMMING CONF-
ERENCE NOW BEING CONDUCTED AT CINCPAC HEADQUARTERS.
3. THE PORT CAPACITY OF DANANG WILL BE DEFICIENT
UNTIL THE FIRST DEEP DRAFT PIER IS COMPLETED. UNTIL
THAT TIME, SUSTAINING THE REQUIRED INPUT WILL BE DI-
FICULT. I CONCLUDE, HOWEVER, THAT THE THROUGH-PUT
OF DANANG WILL BE ADEQUATE. THIS CONCLUSION IS CON-
TINGENT ON PLANNED PORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
BEING COMPLETED PROMPTLY, AND ON LST'S BEING AVAIL-
ABLE TO REDUCE THE NEED OF USING DANANG AS A TRANS-
SHIPMENT POINT DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. INCREASED
THROUGH-PUT WILL REQUIRE DIVERSION OF
PERSONNEL FROM OTHER NAVSUPPAC TASKS UNTIL ADDITIONAL
PERSONNEL ARE APPROVED AND SCHEDULED IN PROMPTLY.
GP=4
BT
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COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES: MGEN WALT

CONSERVPAC R 2818217/JAN
MGEN WALT
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(PERSONAL FOR)

O 250516Z
FM CTF SEVEN NINE
TO DDKE/CG III MAF
BT
TOP SECRET LIMDIS
PERSONAL FOR MGEn WALT FROM MGEn FIELDS
DOUBLE EAGLE (U)
A. COMSEVENTHFLT 171432Z (NOTAL)
B. CG III MAF 210558Z (NOTAL)
C. CG THIRD MARDIV 211245Z (NOTAL)
D. CG TASK FORCE DELTA 231240Z (NOTAL)
E. NWP 22(A)
1. REF A IS INITIATING DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATION DOUBLE EAGLE AND
ASSIGNS CTG-76.6 AS CATF AND CTG-79.5 AS CLF.

PAGE TWO MMSB 010A TOP SECRET LIMDIS
2. REF B AND C DIRECTED THAT APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS TF DELTA CHOP TO
CATF (CTG-76.6) EFFECTIVE UPON EMBARKATION.
3. REF D DIRECTED TASK ORG CMDRS LISTED THEREIN TO CHOP TO CATF
(CTG 76.6) UPON EMBARKATION.
4. ORGANIZATIONS LISTED PARA ONE REF D ARE CONSIDERED TO BE LANDING
FORCE ELEMENTS AND IN ACCORD REF E SHOULD BE UNDER OPCON OF THE
DESIGNATED LANDING FORCE COMMANDER. IT IS THEREFORE SUGGESTED
THAT ORGANIZATIONS LISTED REF D BE DIRECTED TO CHOP TO CLF (CTG-79.5)
VICE CATF (CTG-76.6) UPON EMBARKATION.
5. WARM REGARDS, GOOD HUNTING.
GP-4
BT
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COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES - MGEn WALT

CTF 79 0 250516Z/JAN MGEn WALT
O 210730Z
FM CTE SEVEN ZERO PI TWO PT ONE PI ONE
TO RUMNAV/GG III MAF
BT
TO P S C R E T.
PERSONAL FROM BRIGDEN JONES TO MAJGEN WALT
A, COMUSMACV AT 010125Z
REFERENCE A PASEP TO YOU LAST NIGHT WAS DEVELOPED WITHIN THE J-3 SHOP
BY ARMY AND NAVY OFFICERS. NO MARINE OFFICER, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, HAS
ANY PART IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT.
AT A REGULAR TRI-WEEKLY, EVENING CONFERENCE IN LATE DECEMBER, J-3
PRESENTED THIS CONCEPT TO COMUSMACV. FOX PARRY WAS PRESENT AND STATES
THAT SUCH MATTERS AS COMMAND RELATIONS WERE NOT DISCUSSED. WHEN
THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WERE ASKED FOR COMMENT, FOX DECIDED AGAINST ANY

PAGE TWO RUOFFKE 343 TO P S C R E T.
OFF-THE-CUFF CRITICISM, BELIEVING IT BETTER FOR MARINES TO REMAIN
DISASSOCIATED WITH THIS CONCEPT WHICH THEY HAD NO HAND IN
DEVELOPING. COMUSMACV GAVE HIS APPROVAL TO CONTINUE DEVELOPMENT OF
THIS CONCEPT AT THAT MEETING. NEITHER FOX NOR MYSELF SAW THE
REFERENCE UNTIL YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WHEN YOUR PEOPLE
ASKED FOR A COPY. I BELIEVE THAT OUR POSITION HERE SHOULD CONTINUE
TO BE ONE OF DISASSOCIATION, EVEN IF OUR ADVICE IS SOLICITED,
WHICH APPEARS DOUBTFUL. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE CINCPAC LEVEL,
WHERE IT HAS ALREADY BEEN POINTEDLY INDICATED THAT THE CONCEPT
IS NOT NEW AND REQUIRES FURTHER DETAILED ANALYSIS, IS THE PROPER
ONE FOR BRINGING THIS SCHEME UNDER SEARCHING FOCUS. FULL OF GLORIOUS
WEAKNESSES, THE VERY PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN EVER GETTING THIS SCHEME
OFF THE GROUND ARE SUCH THAT IT IS LIKELY TO EXPIRE LONG BEFORE
IT EVER REACHES MATURITY. THE USMC EFFORT TO CONCENTRATE ALL
RESOURCES IN THE ICTZ SEEMS TO REINFORCE THIS PORTION OF
DISASSOCIATION. IT ALSO SUGGESTS THAT WE SHOULD NOT OPPOSE FORMALLY
WITHIN MACV ANY ARMY-NAVY SCHEME, PER SI., FOR COMING TO GRIPS WITH
DELTA PROBLEMS. IF YOU HAVE ANY DIFFERENCE VIEWS IN THIS REGARD, I
WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATIVE IF YOU WOULD PASS THEM ON TO ME.
NEW SUBJECT. RUN IS CONCERNED THAT DVN WILL EXERT PRESSURE ON

CTE 70-2-1.1

0 210730Z/JAN

MAJGEN WALT.
DANANG AND CHU LAI WITH IN-COUNTRY PAVN AND VIET CONG FORCES AND THEN LAUNCH AN ALL-OUT ATTACK ON QUANG TRI AND THUAN THIEN.

HAVING THESE TWO PROVINCES AND THE CITY OF HUE IN HAND, HE MAY THEN BE READY TO TALK PEACE. WE ARE DRAFTING A MESSAGE REQUESTING YOU PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THIS POSSIBILITY WHICH YOU WILL RECEIVE VERY SOON. I RECOMMEND THAT, IF POSSIBLE, PLAN BE DEVELOPED AND PRESENTED PRIOR TO YOUR FEBRUARY DEPARTURF. DUE TO HIS CONFIDENCE IN YOU, HE MIGHT BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT ANOTHER'S VIEWS, AND THEREFORE ASK YOU TO DELAY YOUR LEAVE. I'VE SEEN THIS HAPPEN. IN CONNECTION WITH ABOVE SUBJECT, WE ARE DRAFTING A MESSAGE TO CINCPAC OUTLINING THE ABOVE RATIONALE OF ENEMY POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION, NEED FOR PORT AND AIR FIELD FACILITIES AT HUE PHU BAI, AND RECOMMENDATION THAT CONTINGENCY PLANS BE DRAWN UP FOR AN IMMEDIATE REACTION IN THE FORM OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT NORTH OF THE SEVENTEENTH PARALLEL UTILIZING PACOM STRATEGIC RESERVES. WILL SEND YOU COPY.

WARM PERSONNEL REGARDS

RGP-THREE

BT

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COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES - MAJGEN WALT

2 3
R 201448Z

FM CMC

TO RUMNAW/CG FIRST MAW
INFO RUHLBP/CG FMFPAC
RUMMNF/CG 111 MAF // UNDERLINED PORTIONS AS RECI'D
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUECCF/BVKG/COMSEVENTHLT
RUABQL/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

BT

UNCLAS

FOR BG'EN K.B. MCCUTCHEON 05631/9903. ON 2 JAN IAW AUTH VESTED
IN CMC AND WITH APPR SECGAV, YOU ARE AUTH THE TITLE AND WEAR THE
UNIFORM OF A MAJGEN USMC THIS AUTH DEEMED IN BEST INTEREST MARCOR
AND IS WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT NO PANDL AS MAJGEN WILL ACCURE TO
YOU UNTIL ACTUALLY PRO TITLE TEN US CODE.

BT

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES - MAF
TAPE AND MAT - WING

CMC R 201448Z/JAN

MGEN WALT
P 152152Z // MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //
FM: CG FMFPAC
TO: CG FIRST MARDIV
CG III MAF
CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)
CG FIRST MAB
BT
TOP SECRET SPECAT. EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGENS FIELDS AND WALT; BGENS MCCUTCHEON AND HENDERSON FROM LT GEN KRULAK.

1. THE COMMANDANT WAS DEEPLY IMPRESSED WITH WHAT HE SAW IN VIETNAM. HE CAME THOROUGHLY CONVINCED THAT OUR APPROACH IS THE CORRECT ONE; THAT WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS; AND THAT ALL WE NEED IS PEOPLE, TIME AND A DECENT BREAK IN TERMS OF THE VIETNAMESE SUPPORT TO WIN AND WIN BIG.

2. HE WAS TAKEN BY THE MORALE OF OUR MEN, BY THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE JOB AND ENTHUSIASM TO GET ON WITH IT. HE IS CONVINCED THAT OUR LOGISTIC SYSTEM IS SOUND, ALTHOUGH HE IS MINDFUL OF THE THINGS WE NEED. THE SAME GOES FOR PERSONNEL.

3. I PRESSED HIM FOR THESE THINGS; -- HELP US TO GET ALL THE PHASE II FORCES INTO SOUTH VIETNAM ON SCHEDULE; GET AN UNCOMMITTED BRIGADE TO OKI TO SERVE AS A GENERAL RESERVE AND COMBINATION ROTATION BASE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM; BUILD US UP TO FULL T/O STRENGTH ASAP; FIND US SOME MORE UH-1E'S; PUSH THE CONUS SUPPLY SYSTEM TO MOVE THE GEAR QUICKLY.

HE AGREED WITH ALL OF THESE THINGS, AND I KNOW WE ARE GOING TO HAVE HIS HELP.

4. HE SHARES OUR VIEW, MORE THAN EVER, THAT WE DON'T WANT TO LET OURSELVES GET INTO A BATTLE OF ATTRITION WITH THE VC; THAT IN SUCH A STRUGGLE THE ODDS ARE TOO MUCH AGAINST US; THAT WE SHOULD WORK TO GET MORE KOREANS MIXED UP IN THE FIGHT.

5. CMC IS RECOMMENDING THAT THE CG III MAF BILLET BE ELEVATED TO THREE STAR, AND THAT A SEPARATE CG THIRD MARDIV BE AUTHORIZED. HE WILL ANNOUNCE THE IDENTITY OF THE SPECIFIC NOMINEES LATER, WHEN AND IF THE BILLETS ARE APPROVED.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
CG FMFPAC

P 152152Z/JAN

GEN WALT
6. He is generally satisfied with the proposed NCC arrangement, although he is mindful of the incipient hazard to the unity of our air-bash ground team. In this regards I took him to see CINCPAC and asked him to tell ADM Sharp that we are relying on him to see that the team is protected. He did so, and Sharp's reply was both favorable and strong.

7. All that taken the CMC trip was a beneficial one for all hands. Best regards to all of you.

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 2 COPIES: GEN WALT
TO PERSONAL FOR GEN WATI INFO GEN MCCUTCHEON AND GEN CARL
FROM RADM WARD
HUNTER KILLAR ARMED RECCF (A, MY 070430Z
1. REF A QUOTED FOR INFO:
"0 070430Z
FM: CTF 115
TO: CINCPACFLT
INFO: CONSEVENTHFLT

PAGE 2 RUMFL 7460PS EC R E T / /LIMDIS//
TOP SECRET
PERSONAL FOR VADM CLAREY INFO VADM HYLAND FROM RADM WARD
HUNTER/MILLER ARMED RECCF (S)
A. CINCPAC 059-342 NITLAL
1. CONCEPT OF USING NAVY ASW MAD GEAR FOR JUNGLE DETECTION
TRUCKS, AS EXPRESSED IN REF A, HAS BEEN WARMLY RECEIVED BY MACVJ3
STAFF. PLANNING NOW UNDERWAY TO DETERMINE COGNIZANT ACTIVITY,
IN-COUNTRY, FOR PROSECUTION OF TESTS. FORESEE CONSIDERABLE
MANEUVRING BY JRAT, USAF, USARV.
2. IN THE EVENT CINCPACLT INTENDS TO SUPPORT PROGRAM, I
CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT NAVY CONTROL RESOURCES INVOLVED
THIS APPLICATION. IT APPEARS THAT 52 BEST IN-COUNTRY VEHICLES
DUE SIZE AND EASE OF OPERATION. RECOMMEND WE SUPPORT THIS
EFFORT ALONG FOLLOWING GENERAL LINES:
A. CHNAVADVGRP/CTF 115 VOLUNTEER FOR TEST PROGRAM COG
USE JOHN SHEPHERD, AS TEST DIRECTOR, Q WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE
TO MACV STAFF AND WHOSE STRONG RDT AND E BACKGROUND AND FLEET
OPS EXPERIENCE COULD BULT JRAT ARGUMENTS FOR CONTROLLING.
B. FORM TEST TEAM IAW FOL:
(1) PETE AURAND FURNISH TWO, 52, WITH BEST TECH TALENT,
CTF 115 0 130611Z/JAN GEN WATI

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
CREWS AND SKELETON MAINT PERS FOR ABOUT 11 DAYS TAD TONNOU-UNDETERMINED IN-COUNTRY BASE. AT FIRST GLANCE CHU LAI APPEARS BEST BECAUSE OF SECURITY, AND ALL-MARINE MAINT FACILITIES. ESSENTIAL ALCON UNDERSTAND PETE NEVER LOSES OPCON OF ACFT, EXCEPT AS SCHEDULED ON DAILY BASIS IN TEST PROGRAM.

(2) CINCPACFLT FURNISH ALL DATA, AND KEY MAN, FROM DEC TESTS MENTIONED REF A. NO TIME TO RE-PLOW OLJ GROUND.

(3) EXTREMELY IMPORTANT INCLUDE ONE RECOGNIZED TECHNICAL AUTHORITY ON MAD INSTALLATION WHO KNOWS ITS WHIMS AND PECULIARITIES, AND WHO IS ABLE TO PEAK ITS PERFORMANCE (IF POSSIBLE) FOR PRESENT OBJECTIVE; AND TO RELIABLY INTERPRET SIGNIFICANCE DATA READ-OUTS IN ACFT. PREFERABLE THIS BE MILITARY, EITHER FROM SQUADRON/CVS/CINCPACFLT/ASFORPAC/ NATESCEN/NAVDEVCE, ETC.

(4) MJRCORPS OR ARMY GROUND TYPE FOR ADVICE ON VEHICLE DISPOSITION AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THREAT TO BE DETECTED.

(5) JRATA REP FOR DATA COLLECTION, REPORT-WRITING AND OTHER PAPER-WORK.

3. RECOMMEND LEW WALT BE ADVISED OF PROGRAM AS PERTAINS TO GROUND COMMANDER’S INTEREST. HE COULD CLOSE THE LOOP BY

VOLUNTEERING TRUCKS, PERSONNEL, RECOMMENDING ADEQUATE REMOOF TEST SITE AND PROVIDING TIE-IN WITH IT MAW. WARM REGARDS.

GP-1

2. CINCPACFLT HAS APPROVED INFORMALLY.

3. OTHER PERTINENT TFC BEING PASEP.

4. WILL ADVISE OF PLANS AND REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE BY SFP MSG.

WARM REGARDS

GP-1

BT

DIST: COPIES 1 OF 3 COPIES: FILE

COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES: MG/EN WALT
TO HWMC
FM CG
TO HQMC
OG FARPAC
INFO OG III MAF

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN MANGUM AND LTGEN KRULAK
INFO MGEN KALT FROM GEN GREENE.

1. RESULTS OF DISCUSSION WITH RESTMORELAND AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM 1. III MAF AGREED THAT BILLET OF OG III MAF SHOULD BE RAISED TO
LTGEN. KYLE TO RELIEVE KALT ASAP AS OG III DIV. MCCUTCHEON TO BE
FROCKED TO MGNC. KALT TO BE NOMINATED FOR LTGEN AND TO EXTEND
TOUR FOR ONE YEAR. KALT TO RETURN IN EARLY TO MAF CORPS FOR THREE
WEEKS IN EARLY SPRING FOR CONFERENCE AND R&R. MCCUTCHEON TO ASSUME
COMMAND III MAF DURING KALT'S ABSENCe. FIELDS TO MOVE HIS HQ TO I
CORPS FOLLOWING KALT'S RETURN. COMMENT BY CGC FROCK SIMPSON WITH
MCCUTCHEON.

ITEM TWO. NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER WESTY, YARD AND GREENE CONCURRED
IN PROPOSAL OG III MAF TO BE RELIEVED COMMAND OF NCC BY RADM
UPPER HALF LOCATED SAIGON. RADM LOWER HALF DEPUTY COMMANDER
NCC TO BE LOCATED DUNANG TO RUN PORT OPERATIONS. III MAF AIR GROUND
TEAM RELATIONSHIPS TO BE MAINTAINED. III MAF CONTINUES UNDER DIRECT
OPERATIONAL CONTROL COMUSNAVY, ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS TO
REMAIN DIRECT III MAF TO FARPAC. COMMENT CGC STRONGLY BELIEVE FLAG
OFFICER COMMANDING NCC SAIGON SHOULD BE CAREFULLY SELECTED VICE
ADMIRAL ASSIGNED ASAP.

ITEM THREE. AIR GROUND TEAM - IN SOMEWHAT HEATED DISCUSSION WITH
MOORE AT THIS HQ. CGC MADE MARCORPS POSITION PERFECTLY CLEAR.
MOORE STATED BEFORE OFFICERS HIS STAFF AND MINED THAT HE HAD NO
INTENTION WHATSOEVER OF BREAKING III MAF AIR GROUND TEAM TO ASSUME
OPERATIONAL CONTROL FIRST WING. ALL ASPECTS PROBLEM THOROUGHLY AIR.
BOTH THEN DISCUSS ENTIRE PROBLEM IN DETAIL PRIVATELY WITH WESTY.
WESTY ASSURED CGC THAT INTEGRATE AIR GROUND TEAM COULD BE MAINTAINED
AGAINST ALL ODDS. CGC STATED III MAF WOULD RECEIVE ALL ACROSS THE
BOARD OPERATION TO SOLUTION AVIATION PROBLEMS. COMMENT BY CGC.
MAINTAIN DETERMINED FOUR SQUARE POSITION. NO PARTISAN APPROACH.
WESTY MADE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT PrioriTY FIRST WING SUPPORT
MISSIONS COULD BE TO III MAF. AT SAME TIME HE SHOULD WILLINGLY
PROVIDE EXCESS SORTIES AND ASSISTANCE TO OTHER SERVICES AND SEEK
REASONABLE SOLUTION TO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF COMBINED AIR DEFENSE,
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL.

ITEM FOUR. CID LARAND-MARCORPS ORDER COL TAI FIELD HEAD OFFICE
FORCES FARPAC ASAP FOR ASSIGNMENT OG III MAF CID LARAND.

ITEM FIVE. FOR BRUTE ASUME YOU SAVE CGC RATION FIRE HOUSE PUNCH.
HOPE YOU HAD HAPPY BIRTHDAY AND WILL HAVE MANY MORE.

REGARDS TALLY

CP-3

DIST: COPIES 1-3 OF 2 COPIES: CG III MAF
CGC 1100012/JAN 66

DECLASSIFIED
PERSONAL FROM BGEN JONES TO MGGEN WALT

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
PERSONAL: FROM BG-JONES TO MG-WALT.
REF: PARAGRAPH OF CNO’S ITEM NO. 2, GCN-51265 IS
1. QUEST YOUR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FOLLOWING
PROPOSAL WHICH I BELIEVE CAN BE SOLD HERE.
2. THIS ENVISAGES AN AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION VICINITY VINCER PRIOR
TO DOUBLE EAGLE. SAME FORCES INVOLVED. CONCEPT OUTFRANATES MAXIMUM
ACTIVITY DANANG/CHULAI TO GIVE IMPRESSION OF LARGER FORCE THAN
ACTUALLY INVOLVED. FOR EXAMPLE, THIS COULD INCLUDE LANDING OF SLF
PERSONNEL AT CHULAI, HELI TO DANANG AND REEBARK, SORTIE TO ARRIVE OFF

PAGE TWO RUNIFKE 843T TOP SECRET
VINCH WITH ENOUGH DAYLIGHT TO CONDUCT CONVINCING DEMONSTRATION.
WITHDRAWAL UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS COVERED BY MAXIMUM
NAVY BEACHJUMPER EFFORT. THEN PROCEED TO EXECUTE DOUBLE EAGLE.
CP-THREE

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CTE 70-2-1-1 0 090715Z/JAN MG-WALT

WHNN
0 650258Z
FM CG FMFPAC
TO CG III MAF
BT
TOP SECRET
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEN WALT
FROM LTCEN KRULAK,
1. THE FOLLOWING MSG IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
QUOTE:
FM:COMSEVENTHFLT
TO:GINCPOACFLT
TOP SECRET
OPERATION DOUBLE EAGLE (U)
A. CG III MAF 200310Z DEC 65 PASEP
B. COMUSMACV 230735Z DEC 65 PASEP
C. CG III MAF 030938Z
1. CG III MAF BY REF A SET FORTH GENERAL CONCEPT OPERATION MAN-O-WAR
(SINCE CHANGED TO OPERATION DOUBLE EAGLE) INCLUDING REQUIREMENT FOR
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AND GUNFIRE SUPPORT AND REQUESTED WITH COMSEVENTHFLT.
2. COMUSMACV BY REF B APPROVED THE CONCEPT FOR OPERATION DOUBLE EAGLE
AND AUTHORIZED CG III MAF DIRECT LIASON WITH COMSEVENTHFLT.
3. CG III MAF BY REF C ARBITRARILY ASSIGN SC TG 79.5 AS CLF AND THE SLF AS
AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE OPERATION (REF A FIRST INDICATION OF ACTUAL
REQUIREMENT RECEIVED BY COMSEVENTHFLT).
4. WHILE COMSEVENTHFLT IS PREPARED TO RENDER ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT TO
COMUSMACV FOR OPERATIONS WHEN NEEDED DO NOT CONCUR WITH ASSIGNMENT OF
A SEVENTH FLEET COMMANDER OR SEVENTH FLEET FORCES AS AN INTEGRAL PART
OF AN IN-COUNTRY OPERATION. IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE UTILIZATION OF
SLF IN-COUNTRY EFFECTIVELY MOVES TO VIETNAM ONE OF THE THREE BLT

CG FMFPAC 0 650258Z/JAN MG WALT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

DECLASSIFIED
ASSIGNED CUSEVENTHLT AND ELIMINATES CUSEVENTHLT'S CONTINGENCY CAPABILITY. IF URGENTLY REQUIRED SLE COULD PROVIDE EMERGENCY SUPPORT FOR ONE OPERATION, BUT SHOULD NOT BE A BASIC PART OF IT.

5. AS A MATTER OF POLICY CONSIDER REF A TO BE OUTSIDE OF CHAIN OF COMMAND AND ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE FOR SUPPORT REQUEST IN THAT ANY SUCH REQUEST FOR SUPPORT SHOULD ORIGINATE WITH COMUSNAY AND BE ADDRESSED TO CINCPACFLT OR HIGHER AUTHORITY. RECOMMEND COMUSNAY BE ADVISED AND PARTICIPATION CTG 79.5 AND SLE AS PROPOSED BY CG III MAF NOT BE APPROVED.

SEVENTH FLEET WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY SHIPPING AND CATF FOR LANDING IN-COUNTRY FORCES, AND WILL PROVIDE ARG/SLF FOR SUPPORT IF REQUIRED. UNQUOTE.

2. THIS MSG HAS NOT BEEN ADDRESSED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AND SHOULD BE TREATED ACCORDINGLY.

GP-4

BT

DIST: COPY 1, 2, 0F 2 COPIES - MGEN WALT.
TO SECRET
HAWAII PLANNING CONFERENCE (U)
A. COMUSMACV 130152
B. III MAF 1505362 JAN
C. CINCPAC 231120Z JAN (PASEP)
D. CG FMFPAC 271956Z JAN
E. TELECON LTCOL SCHARNBERG 30JAN '66
PERSONNEL FOR COL AXTELL FROM COL GLIDDEN.

1. HAWAII PLANNING CONFERENCE ENTERING FINAL STAGES AND WRAP UP BRIEFING SCHEDULED FOR 5 FEB. HOWEVER USMC REQUIREMENTS NOW

PAGE 2 RUNKM 079 TOP SECRET
SUBMITTED FOR ALL THREE CASES WITH NO PROBLEMS SEEN. COL.
GLIDDEN, III MAF REP DEPARTS KUWAIT 0300 1FEB AND ARRIVES SAIGON
1400 2 FEB LOCAL TIMES).

2. REQUIREMENTS FOR USMC FORCES IN RVN HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED FOR CASES I, II AND III. CASE III (FORCES AVAILABLE FROM CONUS FORCE STRUCTURE INCLUDING ACTIVATIONS) PRESENTED TO CINCPAC 31 JAN.
CASE II SCHEDULED FOR 2 FEB., AND CASE I FOR 4 FEB. IN ALL CASES USMC REQUIREMENTS WERE ESSENTIALLY MET BY USMC CAPABILITIES. ONLY SIGNIFICANT USMC SHORTFALL IS 8TH HMM NOT AVAILABLE IN CY66 IN CASE III AND CASE II.

3. REQUIREMENTS FOR 10 USMC UVA/VMF SQUADRONS IN RVN MET NO REAL OPPOSITION. LACK OF OPPOSITION DUE TO LACK OF USAF SQUADRONS TO MEET SORTIE REQUIREMENTS. MACV AND 2AD WORKING LEVELS STILL BELIEVE 10 USAR SQUADRONS IS IN EXCESS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF USMC FORCES IN RVN.

GROUND RULES FOR COMPUTING SORTIE REQUIREMENTS AS FOLLOWS:
(A) USA/FWMA BMS 150 CAS SORTIES/BN/NO
(B) USMC BN 240 CAS SORTIES/NO DUE TO 4 COMPANIES/BN.
(C) SORTIE CAPABILITY 1.1 SORTIE/ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT/DAY.

4. LATEST BED DOWN OF SQUADRONS AT DANANG SHOWS 3 USAF.
SQUADRONS (INCLUDES B-57 AND IFAC AIR DEFENSE) AND 6 USMC. FINAL
BED DOWN OF USAF SQUADRONS IN CVN NOT SETTLED TO DATE AND USAF STILL
INTERESTED IN HUE PHU BAÏ. AT BRIEFING 31 JAN CINCPAC WAS INTERESTED
IN CAPABILITY OF MORE THAN 4 SQUADRONS AT CHU LAI WHEN PERMANENT
RUNWAY FINISHED AND HAS DIRECTED ANOTHER LOOK AT THIS POSSIBILITY.

5. RCC

REFS A AND B DISCUSSED PROPOSED CHANGES TO USMACV COMMAND
AND CONTROL STRUCTURE WHICH SEPARATED FUNCTIONS OF RCC AND III MAF
IN RUN. BY REF C CINCPAC HAS CONCURRED IN PROPOSALS
CONTAINED IN REF A. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE CHANGES
RECOMMENDED BY REF A WILL BE APPROVED BY JCS. USN PHASE II AND II A
REQUIREMENTS FOR RUN SUBMITTED IN PLANNING CONFERENCE AND UNDERWAY
INCLUDES 217 USN PERSONNEL FOR COMMAVFOR/NAVAL COMP COMMANDERS STAFF,
SAIGON WITH A DESIRED CLOSURE DATE APRIL-MAY 66. IN ANTICIPATION
OF APPROVAL CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT III MAF BE PREPARED TO
MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON MATTERS ADDRESSED BY PARA 3 AND 11
REF B.

6. PHASE II AND II A FORCES:

A. III MAF ICTZ MISSION REMAINS THE SAME I. F. TO MAINTAIN
THE SECURITY OF THE EXISTING THREE BASE AREAS; ASSIST RUNAF TO

PAGE 4 RUNKM 879 T O P S E C R E T
DELIVER THE PEOPLE FROM VC OPPRESSION WITH EMPHASIS ON THE HEAVILY
POPULATED AREAS; AND TO ENGAGE VC & PAVN FORCES IN ICTZ AS TARGETS
OF OPPORTUNITY. PRIORITY OF EFFORT REMAINS DANANG TO CHU LAI, THEN
DANANG TO HUE PHU BAÏ, FOLLOWED BY EXPANSION SOUTH FROM CHU LAI
AND NORTH FROM PHU BAÏ.

B. USMC PHASE II AND II A FORCES WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR III MAF
OPERATIONS IN ICTZ AS REQUESTED ALTHOUGH SOME SLIPPAGE WILL OCCUR
IN DEPLOYMENT DATES OF 2ND INCREMENT DF FORCE TROOPS, POSSIBLE
SHORTFALL OF US ARMY MANEUVER BNS MAY PREVENT REDPLOYMENT ROK
MARINE BRIGADE TO ICTZ AS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED.

C. ASSUMING ROK MARINE BRIGADE UNITS AVAILABLE TO AUGMENT 2
USMC DIVISIONS IN ICTZ IT WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR THE III MAF TO:

A. ESTABLISH GOALS THAT ARE ATTAINABLE WITH A FORCE OF 2
MARINE DIVISIONS (18BN'S)

B. DETERMINE IF ADDITIONAL FORCES WILL BE REQUIRED TO
ACCOMPLISH III MAF MISSION.

D. FOR PACIFICATION OPERATIONS IN ICTZ, AND BASED ON FORCES
AVAILABLE ICTZ AFTER PHASE II AND II A DEPLOYMENTS AND ASSUMING ENEMY
SITUATION AND GVN FORCES WILL NOT CHANGE APPRECIABLY,

(A) WHAT ARE GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS OF III MAF PACIFICATION.
(B) WHAT FORCES ARE REQUIRED IN TERMS OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS TO ACCOMPLISH PACIFICATION OF ICTZ COASTAL POPULATION BELT. ANSWER SHOULD BE IN INCREMENT, I. E., WITH SIX BNS CAN DO SUCH AND SUCH; WITH NINE CAN DO SUCH AND SUCH.

(C) WHAT IS MINIMUM NUMBER OF MANEUVER BNS SPECIFICALLY REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY OF BASE AREAS.

(D) IMPACT OF PF/RF CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS ON III NAF ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION.

GP-4
BI

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES - COL AXTELL

DECLASSIFIED
R Ø1215/Z
FM CG FMFPAC
TO CG FIRST MAN INFO CG III MAF

TOP SECRET Special Exclusive for BGEN McCUTCHEON INFO
MCEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BED DOWN DANANG (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 2ØØØ59Z
B. CG FMFW 222359Z
C. CINCPACAF 211859Z

1. In reference A it was reported that CINCPAC had made certain observations, which if put into effect could substantially alter the marine air bed down at Danang.

2. By reference B you have summarized certain advantages and disadvantages of marines assuming responsibility for the operation of the Danang airfield complex. You have further stated, in view of the numerous major marine corps efforts and undertakings that would be required, that the subject needs further exploration.

3. Reference C outlines a plan by CinCPACAF that would ultimately provide for the bed down of six marine fixed wing squadrons in Danang, by the use of the westside marine corps ramp, when the new construction is completed at Danang between April and June 1966.

4. In view of the foregoing development, there may no longer be any reason to consider the requirement to assume responsibility for Danang in order to insure adequate bed down. The problem areas outlined in references A and B should be explored, however.

Page one of two pages
IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE TOTAL IMPACT OF THE PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS BURDEN ON WING CAPABILITIES, SHOULD THE TASK BE ASSIGNED ULTIMATELY TO THE MARINE CORPS. THESE FACTS MUST THEN BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE OPERATIONAL AND QUASI-POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OR DISADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO CONTROL OF THIS FACILITY.

5. IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THIS SUBJECT, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A FIRM COMMITMENT FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY ON THE ULTIMATE MARINE CORPS ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TANANG, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME FOR YOU TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL USAF REPS.

6. IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT, WITHIN YOUR LIMITED RESOURCES AND UNDER THE CONDITIONS INDICATED ABOVE, YOU CONTINUE TO EVALUATE AND COLLECT INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THIS SUBJECT. PLEASE KEEP ME ADVISED OF YOUR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

WARM REGARDS,

GP-4

PAGE TWO OF TWO PAGES

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COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION AS RECEIVED SERVICE UPON REQUEST.

CG FWFPAC R 61215Z/JAN CC III MAF
TO RUHKM/CG FMFPAC
ZEN/CONSERVPAC
INFO RUABUL/CONSEVENTHFLT
RUMSDN/NCC/CG III NAF
ZEN/DIRCPODCOCKS
BT
TOP SECRET
FOR GEN KRULAK AND RADM HOOPER INFO VADM KYLAND, MGEN WALT AND
RADM DAVIS FROM JOHNSON
A. CINCPACFLT 140412
1. THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT PORT CAPACITY DANANG AND CHU LAI
WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. AT THE
SAME TIME, PHASE II DEPLOYMENTS ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE THE
POPULATION IN I CORPS AREA WITH AN ATTENDANT INCREASE IN SUPPORT
REQUESTS. SATURATION, IF NOT ALREADY HERE, IS RAPIDLY APPROACHING.
2. AT PREVIOUS CINCPAC DEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONFERENCES, THE

MAJORITY OF THE EFFORT WAS DEVOTED TO SCENARIO AND TROOP LIST
DEVELOPMENT. THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE LOGISTIC FEASIBILITY
WAS CONDUCTED AFTER THE FACT. IN HINDSIGHT IT NOW APPEARS THAT
LOGISTIC FEASIBILITY AND IN PARTICULAR THE PORT SITUATION, MIGHT
WELL HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED PRIMARY IMPORTANCE.
3. CONCURRENT WITH PLANNING NOW IN PROGRESS AND AT THE FORTHCOMING
PHASE II DISCUSSIONS I ENJOIN YOU TO ENSURE THAT PORT AND LOC
CAPACITY REFLECT POSITIVE FEASIBILITY OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR
TROOP UNITS CONTEMPLATED FOR DEPLOYMENT.
4. I REITERATE FROM REF A THAT RQMTS MUST BE IN BALANCE WITH
CAPABILITIES.
5. WARM REGARDS AND MERRY CHRISTMAS.

GP-4

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES- FILE

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CINCPACFLT

P 242113Z/DEC

MGEN WALT

TOP SECRET

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES
TOP SECRET

R 01215/Z
FM CC FMFPAC
TO CG FIRST MAN
INFO CC III MAF

//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO MGEN WALT FROM LGEME KRULAK MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BED DOWN DANANG (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 240459Z
B. CG FMAN 222350Z
C. CINCACAF 211850Z

1. IN REFERENCE A IT WAS REPORTED THAT CINCPAC HAD MADE CERTAIN OBSERVATIONS, WHICH IF PUT INTO EFFECT COULD SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER THE MARINE AIR BED DOWN AT DANANG.

2. BY REFERENCE B YOU HAVE SUMMARIZED CERTAIN ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MARINES ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION OF THE DANANG AIRFIELD COMPLEX. YOU HAVE FURTHER STATED, IN VIEW OF THE NUMEROUS MAJOR MARINE CORPS EFFORTS AND UNDERTAKINGS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED, THAT THE SUBJECT NEEDS FURTHER EXPLORATION.


4. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING DEVELOPMENT, THERE MAY NO LONGER BE ANY REASON TO CONSIDER THE REQUIREMENT TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR DANANG IN ORDER TO INSURE ADEQUATE BED DOWN. THE PROBLEM AREAS OUTLINED IN REFERENCES A AND B SHOULD BE EXPLORED, HOWEVER.

PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES
IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE TOTAL IMPACT OF THE PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS BURDEN ON WING CAPABILITIES, SHOULD THE TASK BE ASSIGNED ULTIMately TO THE MARINE CORPS. THESE FACTS MUST THEN BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE OPERATIONAL AND QUASI-POLITICAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO CONTROL OF THIS FACILITY.

5. IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THIS SUBJECT, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A FIRM COMMITMENT FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY ON THE ULTIMATE MARINE CORPS ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DANANG, I DO NOT CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME FOR YOU TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL USAF REPS.

6. IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT, WITHIN YOUR LIMITED RESOURCES AND UNDER THE CONDITIONS INDICATED ABOVE, YOU CONTINUE TO EVALUATE AND COLLECT INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THIS SUBJECT. PLEASE KEEP ME ADVISED OF YOUR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

WARM REGARDS.

CP-4

PAGE TWO OF TWO PAGES

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COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION AS RECEIVED SERVICE UPON REQUEST.

CG FMFPAC R 0121502/JAN CG III MAF
DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
X. Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96391

ORIGINATOR CINCPACFLT

DTG 2421137

THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION, THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER—OPNAV INST 5510.18.

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ACTIVITY SIGNATURE DATE

CONDA U.S. Gonzalez 25 Dec 65

S/5 Admiral Johnson 25 Dec 65

F. McColl 25 Dec 65

(THESE FORM BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF Basis MESSAGE)

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
P 242113Z
FM CINCPACFLT
TO RUKIN/CG FMFPAC
ZEN/CONSERVPAC
INFO RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUNDSN/CG/CG III MAF
ZEN/DIRPACDOCKS
BT
TOP SECRET
FOR LGEN KRULAK AND RADM HOOPER INFO VADM HYLAND, MGW WALT AND
RADM DAVIS FROM JOHNSON

1. THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT PORT CAPACITY DANANG AND CHU LAI
WILL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. AT THE
SAME TIME, PHASE II DEPLOYMENTS ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE THE
POPULATION IN I CORPS AREA WITH AN ATTENDENT INCREASE IN SUPPORT
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2. AT PREVIOUS CINCPAC DEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONFERENCES, THE

MAJORITY OF THE EFFORT WAS DEVOTED TO SCENARIO AND TROOP LIST
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4. I REITERATE FROM REF A THAT RQmts. MUST BE IN BALANCE WITH
CAPABILITIES.

5. WARN REGARDS AND MERRY CHRISTMAS.

GP-4

BT
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COPIES 2,3, OF 3 COPIES MGW WALT

CINCPACFLT P 242113Z/DEC
MGW WALT

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DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
II Marine Amphibious Force
FFO San Francisco, California 96601

ORIGINATOR CG FMAW

DTG 22230Z

The attached "TOP SECRET" message contains information of which the security aspect is considered paramount. The unauthorized disclosure of this information would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation, the special handling and custody of this message must be exercised in accordance with Naval Security Manual for Classified Matter—OPNAV INST 5510.1B.

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ACTIVITY SIGNATURE DATE

EXCLUSIVE

(This form becomes unclassified upon removal of basis message)

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DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

TO: CG III MAF
INFO: CG FMFPAC

SECRET/ VARINDE EYES ONLY I Q FPO

PRMWY FPO

AROM: 00 PIAW

TO:

NFO: CG II

··:-::~.~AT

EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN KRULAK INFO YGEN WALT FROM MCCUTCHEON

VANG AIRBASE (U)

CG FMFPAC 200059Z

THE WISDOM AND ADVISABILITY OF MARINES ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION OF DANANG AIRFIELD COMPLEX MAY WELL CENTER AROUND TWO MAJORT STUSS: FIRST WHETHER OR NOT WE CAN AFFORD THE EXTRA COSTS IN MAN POWER AND MATERIAL; AND SECONDLY, BUT PERHAPS MORE DIFFICULT OF ASSESSMENT, TO WHAT DEGREE WOULD WE DESIRE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN QUASI POLITICAL AS WELL AS INTERSERVICE ASPECTS ASSOCIATED WITH RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE VNAF WITH OSTEISIBLY ORNS AND OPERATES DANANG AIRBASE AND THE AIR FORCE WITH ITS EXISTING AIR ADVISOR ROLE THROUGHTOUT SVN.

PROBLEMS

A. BECOMING INVOLVED IN MANAGEMENT, OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF A NONEXPEDITIONARY AIRBASE THE SIZE OF DANANG WOULD BE A CONSIDERABLE UNDER- TAKING. THE COMPLEXITY AND MAGNITUDE OF OPERATIONS ARE COMPARABLE WITH LARGER MASTER JET MILITARY AIRFIELDS IN CONUS. WE HAVE DONE WELL WITH THE EXPEDITIONARY EFFORT AT CHU LAI WITH CONSIDERABLE OUTSIDE ENGINEER EFFORT. HOWEVER, WITH THE ADVENT OF A PERMANENT FACILITY IN THIS LOCATION WE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BECOME MORE INVOLVED IN FORMAL MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORTING ARRANGEMENTS. DANANG EXISTS AS A MAJOR GARRISON TYPE INSTALLATION WITH CONSIDERABLE FIXED PLANT EQUIPMENT. SOME FUNCTIONS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE RETAINED BY THE USAF, E.G., THE AC&W SQUADRON AT PANAMA; THE SEA AIR RESCUE EFFORT ASSOCIATED WITH SAR IN NORTH VIETNAM; THE G-123 AND O1 EFFORT WHICH WE COULD NOT REPLACE; THE DETACHMENT AT 8TH AERIAL PORT AND ITS DIRECT ASSOCIATION WITH MATS AND INTRA-THEATER AIRLIFT. HOWEVER, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE CUMULATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE OPERATIONS ALONE WOULD IMPEL THE USAF TO RETAIN MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BASE.

CG FMAW

PAGE (1) OF (3) PAGES
B. THESE TASKS INVOLVE MAJOR EFFORTS IN THE PUBLIC WORKS, COMMUNICATIONS, BASE SERVICES, AIR OPERATIONS, SUPPLY, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND COMPTROLLER FIELDS AS WELL AS AN OVERALL MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS. IN MY JUDGEMENT, THE FMAW DOES NOT NOW POSSESS THE PERSONNEL NOR MATERIAL ASSETS TO ASSUME SUCH RESPONSIBILITIES. MOREOVER, IT IS DOUBTFUL IN MY MIND THAT EVEN A CLOSURE OF IWAKUNI WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES. A PLAUSIBLE PLAN WOULD BE ENVOLVED WHEREIN THE ALREADY DEVELOPING DANANG NAVY PUBLIC WORKS CENTER MIGHT BE RECEPTIVE TO ASSUMPTION OF MAJOR SEGMENTS OF THIS TASK SUCH AS BUDGETING AND PUBLIC WORKS WITH MARINE PARTICIPATION LIMITED TO PROVISION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT COMPATIBLE WITH OUR EXPEDITIONARY ASSETS. (MATCU, CRASH CREW, TAFDS, ETC.)

3. IMPACT

A. TAKING ON ALL OR A MAJOR PART OF THE OVERALL RUNNING OF DANANG COULD HAVE SOME OR ALL OF FOLLOWING EFFECTS:

(1) CONCEIVABLY WITH AN INCREASED QUANTITY OF MARINE AIR AT DANANG, AND IN CONSIDERATION OF GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, MORE DEMANDS COULD BE PLACED ON OUR ASSETS FOR OUT OF COUNTRY SORTIES.

(2) GREATER DISPERAL AND BETTER OPERATING EFFICIENCY.

(3) SOME REDUCTION IN REQUIREMENT FOR CONSTRUCTION ON WEST SIDE OF FIELD, BUT NOT COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS ON WEST SIDE.

(4) ADVANCING ENTRY DATE OF BALANCE OF TEN SQUADRONS.

(5) OFFERING POSSIBLE PARTIAL SOLUTION TO POST WAR BASE PROBLEM.

(6) REDUCE OUR FLEXIBILITY AND FREEDOM OF ACTION BY TIEING US TO ONE MORE FIXED INSTALLATION.

B. UNDOUBTEDLY ATTAINING THE POSTURE AS MAJOR USER OF DANANG WOULD TEND TO PLACE US IN A MORE FAVORABLE POSITION FROM WHICH TO BECOME THE PREDOMINANT SUPPLIER OF TACTICAL AIR TO 1 CORPS ARVN AND 3RD COUNTRY FORCES. INCREASED MARINE INFLUENCE OVER PROVISION AND USE OF AIR WITHIN 1 CORPS SHOULD NATURALLY FOLLOW TOGETHER WITH SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN COORDINATION WITH, AND RESPONSIVENESS TO, 1 CORPS NEEDS.
4. NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, I BELIEVE THIS MATTER NEEDS FURTHER EXPLORATION PRIOR TO TAKING A FIRM POSITION. DUE TO NATURE OF THIS MATTER I HAVE PURPOSELY REFRAINED FROM OVERTLY DELVING INTO THE DETAILED SCOPE AND EXTEND OF USAF/VNAF ARRANGEMENTS. PERHAPS THERE IS FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN THE CINCPAC OR PACAF HEADQUARTERS WHICH WOULD ASSIST IN DETERMINATIONS. I CANNOT GIVE A VALID ANSWER TO POINTS YOU RAISE IN PARA 4D AND E WITHOUT TALKING TO LOCAL USAF REPS IN SOME DEPTH. IF YOU DESIRE THIS DONE, PLEASE ADVISE. WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOU MAKING A COUPLE OF STAFF OFFICERS AVAILABLE TO PARTICI-
PATE IN THE STUDY AS WE HAVE ALL WE CAN HANDLE AT THIS TIME.

GP-4

DIST: COPY 1;2, OF 2 COPIES - MGEn Walt
The attached "Top Secret" message contains information of which the security aspect is considered paramount. The unauthorized disclosure of this information would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. The special handling and custody of this message must be exercised in accordance with Naval Security Manual for Classified Matter - OPNAV INST 5510.1B.

Activity: III MAF Communication Center
Originator: CG FMF PAC
Copy: 2 of 5 copies

Activity: Signature: Date
5/5: Admiral Forrester: 20 Dec 65
6-3: (Signature): 21 Dec 65

Please return to Staff Secretary

Exclusive

(This form becomes unclassified upon removal of basic message)

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Top Secret

DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

TO CG III MAF
CG FIRST MAW

TOP SECRET SPECIAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEM WALT AND BGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES TO RVN, CINCPAC HAS MADE CERTAIN OBSERVATIONS WHICH, IF put INTO EFFECT, COULD SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER THE BASE LOADING OF DANANG AIRFIELD. CINCPAC ENVISIONS THAT ULTIMATELY:
   A. THE BASE LOADING AT DANANG WILL BE PREDOMINANTLY MARINE AIRCRAFT.
   B. ONLY ONE AIR FORCE F4C SQUADRON (FOR AIR DEFENSE OF THE DANANG AREA) PLUS THE C-123 AND O-1 TYPE AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE I CORPS AREA, WOULD REMAIN AT DANANG.
   C. ALL OTHER USAF AIRCRAFT WOULD BE RE-DEPLOYED TO OTHER BASES, EITHER CURRENTLY IN BEING OR PROGRAMMED.
   D. THE CURRENT VNAF AIRCRAFT BASE LOADING WOULD REMAIN AT DANANG.
   E. WHEN AND IF THE MARINES CAN ASSUME THE AIR DEFENSE MISSION IN THE DANANG AREA, THE USAF-F4C SQUADRON INCLUDED ABOVE WOULD ALSO BE MOVED FROM DANANG.

2. CONCOMITANT WITH THE ABOVE TENTATIVE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CINCPAC, WERE JUMPERS FROM THE AIR FORCE, THAT THE ABOVE CHANGE SHOULD ENTAIL THE MARINES ASSUMING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION OF DANANG AIRFIELD AND ALL OF THE ASSOCIATED SERVICES.

3. THE BENEFITS WHICH MIGHT EMERGE FROM SUCH A DECISION ARE OBVIOUS. HOWEVER, THE TOTAL IMPACT OF THE PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS BURDEN RESULT REQUIRES DETAILED ANALYSIS.

4. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I SOLICIT YOUR VIEWS ON, BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:
   A. THE WISDOM AND ADVISABILITY OF MARINES ASSUMING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION OF THE DANANG AIRFIELD COMPLEX.
   B. THE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH AN ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.
   C. THE OVERALL IMPACT OF SUCH A CHANGE IN CONCEPT ON THE CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE I CORPS AREA.
   D. TOTAL ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT SUCH A PROGRAM, ASSUMING MINIMUM AF PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR USAF UNITS REMAINING AT DANANG AS INDICATED IN PARA ONE ABOVE. IN THIS REGARD, OUR PHASE II SUBMISSION MADE TO CINCPAC INCLUDED TWO MARINE MAG'S WITH SIX FIXED WING SQUADRONS PLUS MV-22 AT DANANG.
   E. ESTIMATE OF TIME WHEN MARINES COULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR DANANG AS INDICATED IN PARA D ABOVE.

GP-4

DIST: COPY 1-2 OF 5 COPIES: MAF
COPY 3-5 OF 5 COPIES: MAW

DECLASSIFIED
PERSONAL FOR MAJ. GEN. WALT. FROM GEN. WESTMORELAND
IF THE GEN. IS AWAKE, DELIVER NOW -- IF HE IS NOT AWAKE, DELIVER
FIRST WAKING HOUR.

1. REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE, DTG 060959Z DEC. I CONCUR IN YOUR PLAN TO
INITIATE A BRIGADE-SIZE COMBINED OPERATION AGAINST THE VC FORCES
DESCRIBED. THIS IS IN KEEPING WITH THE CONCEPTS REFLECTED IN MY MESSAGE
ACIJE 42887, DTG 071302Z, SUBJECT: JANUARY AND FEBRUARY OPERATIONS.
WE SHOULD SEIZE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK AND DESTROY MAJUN,
VC/PAVN FORCES WHEREVER AND WHENEVER THEY CAN BE FOUND.

2. I HAVE REQUESTED AUTHORITY FROM CINCPAC TO EMPLOY THE SIEF IN
ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR DESIRES. YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED AS SOON AS THIS
AUTHORITY IS GRANTED.

3. WITH REGARD TO STANDBY AUGMENTATION OF HELICOPTERS, I HAVE DIRECTED
CG, PFORCEV TO PLACE HMM 363 ON A 6-HOUR STANDBY ALERT BEGINNING 10
DECEMBER AND CONTINUING UNTIL YOUR OPERATIONS IS COMPLETED. DIRECT
LIASON IS AUTHORIZED WITH CG, PFORCEV.

GP-4.
2/3

TOP SECRET

Copy #1
THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER--OPNAV INST 5510.16.

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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//DELIVER ONLY TO MAJGEN WALT//
1. Realizing that the Saigon meeting is going to be a most important one, the following paragraphs may provide you some helpful background.

2. Here are the things I think Sec Def is going to want to know from you:
   A. How are you doing; what you have accomplished, in specific terms.
   B. How you envisage the future; in terms of time-phased accomplishment, and in terms of U.S. Forces and RVNAF forces required, as well as logistic improvements needed.
   C. Coordination and authoritarian change you want to see with reference to the PF and RF to accelerate your progress.
   D. Wherever possible, you should quantify your statements to him. He responds to numbers times etc. in specific terms.

3. I recently wrote Sec Def a letter, to which he responded in very favorable terms. I quote parts of it, as useful background for your upcoming presentation. Quote first my conclusion that we are moving slowly toward victory derives from the same indices that are available to you. I give particular weight to those which exhibit growing GVN attention to rural construction, improvements in quantity of the RVNAF and increase in the flow of useful intelligence to us from the people. These things are hard to quantify, but they are all on a moderately favorable trend, as are most of the more readily measurable factors relating to casualties, weapons losses and VC defectors. Second, I conclude that the Viet Cong do not yet believe they are losing, because it is plain that the DRV and others are still pouring the power into SVN; and Communists do not reinforce a failure. They know that we have arrayed great strength against them in SVN, but they are not yet prepared to believe that we will stand behind that strength for a long time, if need be, so long as they are in this frame of mind, they feel justified in paying a big price for time, hoping that in the end, the calendar and Caucasian irresolution will whip us. Until they change their attitude, I believe we will see added infiltration of material and of PAVN forces, added efforts to improve the Laos corridor, more terrorism of the peasantry and more sacrificial aggressiveness against us. They have not yet been persuaded that Washington and Saigon of 1965 are any different from Paris and Hanoi of 1954. Needless to say, the Red's attitude will vary with their running estimate of the situation. As we hurt them more, as we give continuing evidences of long-pull toughness in SVN and long-pull reassessment at home, they are going to rethink the problem, but they will not convince easily, and they are going to continue to keep coming down from NVN on the one hand, and murdering majors on the other. Long after it is evident...
TO US THAT WE HAVE THEM LICKED. THIRD, I SAY THE U.S. MILITARY EFFORT IS PROPERLY ORIENTED, MEANING THAT, BY AND LARGE, WE ARE DOING THE RIGHT THING AND RELATING OUR EFFORTS CORRECTLY TO THOSE OF THE PVNAF. THERE HAS BEEN SOME TALK OF TWO DISSONANT APPROACHES TO SOLVING OUR MILITARY PROBLEM IN VIETNAM — THE SATURATION FORMULA, AS PRACTISED BY THE MARINES, AND THE MANEUVER FORMULA, AS PRACTISED BY THE ARMY. THIS IS FRIVOLOUS. BOTH SOUND SMOOOTH BOTH ARE NEEDED. IN THE SPARSELY POPULATED, MARGINALLY PRODUCTIVE INLAND REGIONS, THE RANGING MANEUVER TECHNIQUE IS THE ANSWER. IF YOU SHOOT ANYTHING THAT MOVES IN THE AREA AROUND PLEI ME, FOR INSTANCE, YOU WILL NOT BE FAR WRONG, BECAUSE IN THAT REGION THE POPULATION DOES NOT GO MUCH OVER 10 PER SQUARE MILE. ESS, IN ITSELF IS THE BATTLE GROUND, IN THE CLASSIC SENSE, YOU CAN MANEUVER AS YOU LIKE IN ORDER TO ISOLATE OR SURROUND ENEMY GROUPS. THIS IS THE CORRECT TACTIC, AND OUR FORCES THERE ARE APPLYING IT WITH SKILL, COURAGE AND EFFECTIVENESS. HOWEVER, YOU CANNOT SHOOT ANYTHING THAT MOVES IN THE RICH AREA SOUTH OF DANANG, WHERE THE POPULATION RUNS AS HIGH AS 1000 PER SQUARE MILE, MOST OF WHOM WANT TO BE AT LEAST NEUTRAL. HERE THE BATTLE GROUND IS IN THE PEOPLE'S MINDS. THE ENEMY IS MIXED IN WITH THE PEOPLE, WHO PROVIDE HIM — USUALLY RELUCTANTLY — WITH HIS MONEY, RICE, SANCTUARY AND INFORMATION. OUR TACTICS HAVE TO BE GOVERNED BY THIS ESSENTIAL FACT. WE HAVE TO ROOT HIM OUT, AND SEPARATE HIM FROM THE PEOPLE; WHICH IS TO SAY, FIGHT A GUERRILLA/COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR, AND CLEAN THE AREA UP A BIT AT A TIME. I WELL REMEMBER THOMPSON TELLING THEM THE SAME THING CONCERNING THE POPULOUS DELTA REGION, AND BESEECHING THEM TO CLEAR IT UP THROUGHLY, AS HE WENT ALONG. FINALLY, I SPEAK OF THE TWO FACTORS WHICH WILL GREATLY INFLUENCE THE LENGTH OF THE STRUGGLE. THE FIRST ONE IS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR PRESSURE ON THE DRV. THIS IS NOT JUST A FUNCTION OF NUMBERS OF SORTIES A DAY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE TARGETS ATTACKED, RATHER IT IS A MATTER OF CONVINCION. I BELIEVE THE DRV IS CONVINCED THAT THEY CAN TAKE WHAT WE ARE DEALING OUT NOW FOR LONGER THAN WE ARE DEALING OUT NOW FOR LONGER THAN WE ARE PREPARED TO DELIVER IT, AND HIS PART IN THE WAR IS NOT GOING TO DIMINISH UNTIL HE IS CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF BEING FRIGHTENED OFF BY SAMS OR BY AIRCRAFT LOSSES. THE CLOSING VISE OF ROLLING THUNDER IS A FINE TACTIC, BUT IT HAS TO KEEP CLOSING TO HELP DIVEST THE COMMUNISTS OF THEIR CURRENT CONVINCION THAT THEY CAN TOLERATE A PROTRACTED BATTLE BETTER THEN WE CAN. WE MUST NOT UNDERRATE THEIR STUBBORNNESS, NOR OVERLOOK GIAP'S ASSERTION THAT THEY SIMPLY HAVE TO LICK US IN VIETNAM, IF THEIR FORMULA IS TO SUCCEED. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, HOWEVER, IN CONTEMPLATING THE WAR'S DURATION, IS THE QUESTION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER. UNLESS THEY DO SOMETHING TO REDUCE THE CURRENT CONFLUSION OF THEIR PERSONNEL RESOURCES I SEE AN INordinately LONG STRUGGLE, WITH THE U.S. BEING FORCED TO PUT FAR TOO MUCH POWER INTO RURAL SECURITY OF THE HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS, BECAUSE OF GVN DEFICIENCIES. TODAY THE MANPOWER APPETITE GREATLY EXCEEDS THE SUPPLY OF COMBAT ELIGIBLES WHO ARE SUBJECT TO GVN CONTROL, AND COMPETITION IS KEEN. THE ARVN, VNAF, VNN, VNNC, RANGERS, SPECIAL FORCES, POLICE,

4. ONE THING FOR WHICH YOU SHOULD BE ON YOUR GUARD, -- THERE MAY NOT BE THE ENTHUSIASM YOU MIGHT EXPECT IN ALL QUARTERS, FOR EITHER THE MARINES' PERFORMANCE OR FOR HELPING US GET ALL THE FORCES WE NEED. REFERRING TO OUR LITTLE LIST OF CODE WORDS, THE PERSONS NAMED RUM AND GAMBLER HAVE EACH MADE A FEW CRITICAL COMMENTS IN PRIVATE. THE PERSON NAMED DANGER HAS BEEN ONE HUNDRED PERCENT IN OUR CORNER.

5. I KNOW YOU WILL MAKE A SOLID SUCCESS AT THE MEETING. LET ME KNOW HOW IT COMES OUT. GOOD LUCK AND WARM REGARDS,

GP-4

TOR __ NAVCOMMOPNET
26/2245H GVB

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COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES TOP SECRET

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RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

EXCLUSIVE

FOR MAJGEN WALT ONLY

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

From: CG FMFPAC
To: CG III MAF

//TOP SECRET//EXCLUSIVE, DELIVER ONLY TO MAJGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

A. COMUSMACV 170315Z

1. REF A LOOKS TO ME LIKE ANOTHER EFFORT TO GET MARINES INTO A STATIC DEFENSE SITUATION, PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE GOAL PILE SO THAT THE ARMY CAN FIGHT UNFETTERED. HOPE I AM WRONG.

2. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HEAR--AND ALL TOO OFTEN--THAT VOICES AT MACV ARE SAYING: "THE MARINES ARE NOT DOING MUCH SMALL UNIT PATROLS, BUT NO REAL PROGRESS IN KILLING VC, THEY ARE DEFENSE-ORIENTED, AND CAN SPARE PEOPLE TO GUARD THE ARMY REAR, SO IT CAN GO OUT AND FIGHT." THIS, OF COURSE IS ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE, BUT WE HAVE TO FACE THE FACT THAT IT IS BEING SAID, AND FURTHER, THAT IT IS PERCOLATING AS FAR BACK AS THE CINCPAC STAFF.

3. ALTHOUGH FRIVOLOUS, THIS IS DAMAGING TALK, BECAUSE IT COULD AFFECT ADVERSELY OUR PROSPECTS FOR THE EARLY INTRODUCTION OF THE PHASE III AIR/GROUND FORCES THAT WE BADLY NEED TO CARRY-OUT OUR VERY SOUND PROGRAM. FOR THIS REASON, IF FOR NONE OTHER, IT SEEMS TO ME, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE SOME SUBSTANTIAL AND DESTRUCTIVE CONTACT WITH THE VC AND SOON, IN ORDER TO UNDERSCORE TO EVERYONE THE REAL TRUTH OF THE MATTER -- WHICH IS THAT THE MARINES ARE NOT REPEATEDLY NEEDED TO SECURITY PATROLS ALONE, THAT THEY HAVE AN OFFENSIVE MOTIVATION TOO. BASED ON OUR FINE RECORD TO DATE WE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO PROVE THIS, BUT, UNHAPPILY, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE DO. I REALIZE THAT IT MAY NOT BE TOO EASY A THING TO SWING EITHER, SINCE IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CURRENT VC TACTIC IS TO FIGHT ON GUERILLA TERMS IN THE III MAF AREA, AND TO FADE AWAY FROM MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS WITH US.

4. EVEN IF YOU AGREE WITH WHAT I HAVE SAID, HOW BEST TO DO IT IS CERTAINLY GOING TO BE DIFFICULT. HOWEVER, HERE ARE A FEW THOUGHTS:

A. ONE WAY MIGHT BE TO ATTEMPT A SIZEABLE USMC/ARVN CONVERGING MOVE ON THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DOXA AREA (BSI092-3092) WHERE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES SOME HIGHER HEADQUARTERS MAY BE LOCATED. THIS, PRECEDED BY VERY HEAVY AIR PREPARATION BY B 52S AND FIRST MAF, MIGHT FLUSH THE VC OUT AND GET HIM INTO A BATTLE WITH ONE OF THE CONVERGING FORCES. I WOULD RATE THE LIKELIHOOD OF THIS SUCCEEDING AS NO MORE THAN FAIR.

//PAGE ONE OF TWO PAGES//
B. In connection with the foregoing, a movement up the Song Tra Bong, along which much VC activity has been indicated, might induce the VC to resist a threatened penetration toward their Doxa bases.

C. Conjecturing further, an attack on the VC on the nose projecting toward Chu Lai from Hill 726 (Ma Hang Ba, BS 4299) might conceivably be a spoiler for any VC planned attacks on Chu Lai. As you know, the 94th BN and 108th REGT HQ are unconfirmed probables in this area. Further possible spoilers in the Chu Lai region could be attacks on the following areas:

52D BN VIC (AS 7282), 29th BN VIC (BS 5273), 99th BN VIC (BT 2614), 96th BN VIC (BT 2523), 104/3 BN VIC (BS 6895), if you can pull together enough intelligence to make it reasonable.

D. Another formula might be to propose a large USMC/ARVN heliborne operation somewhere on the infiltration route in Western Quang Tri. Here too, unless the intelligence were very good, we might come up empty, with the possible exception of operations in the Ba Long Valley. There they seem to be pretty sensitive, and still in sufficient strength to make such an operation fruitful. The 926 BN VIC

***COMMNOTE: THIS IS THE FIRST OF TWO SECTIONS. FINAL SECTION WILL BE DISTRIBUTED UPON RECEIPT...***

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EXCLUSIVE

DECLASSIFIED
P 180366Z

FROM: COMSEVENTHFLT
TO: CG III MAF

//TOP SECRET//EXCLUSIVE
FOR MAJGEN WALT FROM WILLIAMS.

A. YOUR 171432Z
B. YOUR 161406Z

1. IN ANSWER TO REF A I PASSED REF B TO CINCPACFLT AND CTF 76 AS IT WAS NECESSARY TO ALERT THEM TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INVOLVING THE SLF IN THE CONTINGENCY OPERATION. THE INFO WAS PASSED AS A PERSONAL JUST AS YOU HAD DONE.

2. I WOULD NOT HAVE AUTHORIZED USE OF SLF WITHOUT TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF CINCPACFLT AND CERTAINLY ALL ADVANCE NOTICE COULD BE USED BY CTF 76, THERE WAS NO INTENT TO EMBARRASS YOU AT THE HONOLULU LEVEL.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE IF YOU WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP ME INFORMED OF POSSIBLE SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM SEVENTHFLT IN ORDER THAT RESPONSE MAY BE TIMELY AND MEET YOUR NEEDS. HOPE YOU REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT I IN TURN WILL HAVE TO ALERT NECESSARY FORCES AND KEEP CINCPACFLT INFORMED AS APPROPRIATE.

4. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

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180366Z/NOV65
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COMMUNICATION CENTER
E Mariner Amphibious Base
FPO San Francisco, Calif. 96100

FM: OGF FMFPAC
TO: CG FIRST MAW
INFO: CG III MAF

BT

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR BGEN MCCUTCHEON INFO MAJGEN WALT
FROM LTGEN KRULAK, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

A. CG FIRST MAW 061010Z

1. THANKS FOR INFO IN REF A. I CONCUR WITH PARA NINE.

2. REGARDING PARA 11, THE FIGURES SHOW THAT OUR BOMB STOCKS ARE
HIGH ENOUGH TO MANAGE BETTER THAN 0.5 TONS PER SORTIE. TO THE
EXTENT THAT THE NUMBER AND QUALITY OF TARGETS JUSTIFY IT, BELIEVE
YOU SHOULD INCREASE YOUR LOADS. OTHERWISE THE POSTWAR STATISTICS
ARE GOING TO HURT OUR BASIC AVIATION STRUCTURE.

REGARDS.

TOR

14/2442H ATH

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RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

SIGNATURE

DATE

11/12
TO: CG FR-LAH
TO: CG FR-LITAC
INFO: CG III MAF

PERSONAL FOR GEN KROLAK, INFO MAJ GEN VAIL FROM GEN MCCURDY

TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT ANALYSIS (U)

1. ATTENDED BRIEFING IN SAIGON TODAY ON SUBJECT STUDY. MACV STAFF
   PRESENTED YESTERDAY TO NESTORELAND. LITGEN MOORE AND I PLUS A FEW
   STAFF OFFICERS HEARD IT TODAY.

2. PURPOSE OF STUDY WAS TO ANALYZE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY VARIOUS
   SERVICES TO DETERMINE ADEQUACY AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON NUMBER
   SQUADRONS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT PHASE I AND II FORCES AND BASES WHERE
   SQUADRONS WOULD BE LOCATED.

3. BRIEFING COMPARED VMF, USAF, USN AND USMC BY SORTIE AND BOMB
   TONNAGE. WE WERE NOT TOO MUCH BELOW USAF IN SORTIES. USN LOOKED
   BEST ON SORTIE BASIS AND USAF ON TONNAGE BASIS.

4. CONCLUSIONS REACHED WERE:
   A. A FORCE OF 22 JET TACTICAL STRIKE SQUADRON EQUIVALENTS AND
      2 USAF A-1 SQUADRONS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE VMF A-1 FORCE, WILL BE
      SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ALL VMFA AND RVMAF GROUND FORCES AT THE SORTIE
      LEVEL COMPUTED.

   B. THE REvised CINCPAC PLANNING FACTORS FOR DETERMINING TACTICAL
      AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS APPEAR TO BE VALID.

   C. THE TACTICAL AIR UNITS OF ALL SERVICES ARE ADEQUATELY PERFORMING
      THEIR MISSIONS AND STATISTICAL DIFFERENCES IN THE RESULTS OF THESE
      MISSIONS STEM FROM A COMBINATION OF FACTORS.
TOP SECRET

MARCOR EYES ONLY

D. The USMC Tactical Air Units are not achieving an aircraft utilization rate equivalent to the USN and USAF.

E. A total of five USMC and 15 USAF Tactical Air Strike Squadrons should be deployed in-country to support the Phase I and II FAM and RVNAF Ground Forces. Two of the 15 USAF Squadrons are to be equipped with the A-1 aircraft.

F. The remaining four jet Tactical Strike Squadron equivalents should be provided by one USN Attack Carrier Air Wing continuously available for in-country strike missions.

G. The planned Air Base Construction Program, excluding Tuy Hoa, will be adequate for the deployment of in-country Tactical Air Strike Squadrons.

5. Recommendations of Study:

A. That a total of 20 Tactical Squadrons be deployed in-country. Two of these Squadrons are to be the USAF A-1 Squadrons presently in-country. The remaining 18 jet Squadrons should be divided as 5 USMC and 13 USAF. This Force, in conjunction with one USN Attack Carrier Air Wing and the USAF A-1 Capability will be adequate to provide the necessary Tactical Air Support.

B. That all Services be requested to program adequate flying hours to provide a 1.2 sortie rate for all type Aircraft.

C. That MACV recommend to CinCPac postponement in construction Tuy Hoa pending later analysis of need, Security Force Availability and adequacy of Engineer/Construction Effort.

D. That MACV state continuing requirement for one USN CVA to provide in-country support.

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6. IT WAS POINTED OUT BOTH YESTERDAY AND TODAY THAT WE ALREADY HAD
SIX JET SQUADRONS IN-COUNTRY. WESTMORELAND APPROVED.
7. MOORE WAS PLAINLY TAKEN ABACK AND SURPRISED AT CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HE WAS DEFINITELY OPPOSED TO. HE ATTACHED
VALIDITY OF INCLUDING USMC SORTIES; STATED USAF SHOULD SUPPORT USAF,
RVNAF AND 3RD COUNTRY; THAT USN CVA WAS NOT RESPONSIVE ENOUGH; AND
THAT THIS STUDY WAS JUST ANOTHER EXCUSE TO FIND SOME REASON FOR NOT
BUILDING TOY HOA THE NEED FOR WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY JUSTIFIED.
8. GEN DU PAY AND CROWLEY ARGUED AGAINST MOORE ON BOTH OPERATIONAL
AND LOGISTIC GROUNDS. I TENDED TO SIDE WITH MOORE ON NEED FOR AND USE
OF AIR. PLAIN TO ME THAT MACV DOES NOT WANT TO TIE UP A US BRIGADE
IN DEFENSE OF ANOTHER AIR BASE AND THAT QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION EFFORT
AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT WERE MAIN REASONS AT THIS TIME FOR DECISION TO
POSTPONE.
9. BELIEVE FUTURE EVENTS WILL MAKE MOST OF THIS ANALYSIS ACADEMIC AND
IN DUE TIME THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO GET THIRD SQUADRON AT DANANG A THREE PHASE II
SQUADRONS WILL HAVE TO WAIT ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION IN ANY EVENT.
10. DU PAY STATED PRIVately LATER THAT HE BELIEVES VC ARE ESCALATING
RAPIDLY AND THAT HVN DIVISIONS ARE IN PROCESS OF INFILTRATING. BELIEVES
ONE MAY HAVE BEEN AT PLE ME.
11. USN STRIKE SORTIE AVERAGE JULY-AUGUST-SEPTEMBER WAS ABOUT 1.5.
TONS PER SORTIE WERE 1.2 FOR SAME PERIOD. THESE FIGURES PROBABLY BASED
ONLY ON CVA ON THE LINE AND DISCOUNT TIME IN PORT. ONLY VALID BASIS
TO COMPARE THEIR OPERATIONS WITH FMNW IS TO LOOK AT ALL CVA FOR ENTIRE
MONTH. YOU MAY WANT TO CHECK THIS OUT ON BASIS BOMB TONNAGE AND VERIFY WHETHER WE ARE IN FACT GETTING FAIR SHARE. THEY ARE DROPPING 1.2 TONS PER SORTIE TO OUR O.5. IF WE HAD MORE THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO CARRY AND DROP.

12. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS STATED ABOVE WILL BE GIST OF A PERSONNEL FROM WESTMORELAND TO SHARP. CP-3

TOR 10-14 0-0-7 1-0-4 AU

KEITH B. MC CUTCHEON, BG CO
COMMANDING GENERAL

06/10/72 NOV 65

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25 NOV 1965

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TO 09 III MAF

FOF THE HUNGER OF A STAFF OFFICER

REFER TO RECON OPRTNS A并未 THF FO tNT THF J Vs

THF POLITICAL AND MILITARY RETRIEVE FROM THE VIET CON RESISTANCE

THF EVENTS OF 27-28 OCTOBER AT CHU LAI AND MARBLE MOUNTAIN RESU- LTING AS THEY DID, IN THE BREACHING OF SECURITY RINGS, THE DESTRUC- TION OF OR DAMAGE TO 63 AIRCRAFT AND IN SOME PERSONNEL CASUALTIES, HAVE ALREADY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DETAILED REPORTING. WHILE THESE EVENTS TO CRITICIZE THE U.S. EFFORT IN RVN, TO CITE THEM AS PROOF THAT THE VIET CON ARE INNOCENT AND TO CONTEND THAT OUR SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IS CONCEPTUALLY WRONG, THEREFORE, I FEEL IT DESIRABLE, WITHOUT BEING DEFENSIVE, IN RATIONAL, AND WITH SANGOR AS TO ANY MISTAKES OR SHORTFALLS, TO PUT THE MATTER IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE FOR YOU, AS WE SEE IT FROM HERE. IN SUM, WHAT WERE THE CAUSATIVE FACTORS AND INFLUENCES LEADING UP TO THIS AFFAIR, WHAT DID WE DO TO DILUTE THE VIET CON CHANCES OF SUCCESS PRIOR TO THE SABOTAGE ATTACKS, WHAT DID WE DO DURING THE ATTACKS, WHAT DO THESE ATTACKS PORTEND FOR THE FUTURE, AND FINALLY, WHAT MUST WE DO TO PREVENT THE REURRENCE OR DIMINISH THE IMPACT OF SIMILAR EFFORTS?

A. IT HAS BEEN PATENT, IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS, THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE QUANTUM JUMP IN OUR OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AND OUR SUCCESSFUL CIVIC ACTION EFFORT, WE HAVE IMPERILLED THE VC TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY ARE BEGINNING TO LOSE.

B. WE HAVE HURT THE VC BADLY WITH OUR GOLDEN FHANG OPERATIONS, WHICH PROTECTED THE RICE HARVESTS IN I CORPS. (ESTIMATES ARE THAT THE VC HAS LOST AS HIGH AS 50 PERCENT OF THE RICE AND RICE TAXES WHICH HE FORMERLY STOLE OR EXTORTED FROM THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THIS REGION.)

C. MARINE CORPS AND SVN ACTIVITIES IN I CORPS HAVE HURT THE VC TO THE POINT THAT HIS DESERTIONS ARE INCREASING SUBSTANTIALLY. HUNGER, FEAR OF AIR ATTACKS, AND INCREASED CASUALTIES FROM USMC/SVN OPERATIONS ALL ACCOUNT FOR THE LOOSER VC MORALE WHICH RESULTED IN 94 VC DEFECTIONS AND 158 POLITICAL RALLIES DURING THE MONTH OF SEP- TEMBER. (THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEFECTORS IN I CORPS FOR THE PRECE- DING 8 MONTHS WAS 24, WHILE THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF RALLIES WAS 74 FOR THE SAME 8 MONTH PERIOD.)

DECLASSIFIED
D. FINALLY, WE ARE WINNING THE PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE VJ THROUGH OUR JIVJ ACTION EFFORTS. THE FACT THAT THE "PEOPLE=SEA" IN WHICH THE "SUERRILA-FISH" SWIMS IS BEGINNING TO DRY UP IS SUBSTANTIATED BY THE FACT THAT WE HAD SEVEN INSTANCES OF VIETNAMESE PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE DIRECTLY TO MARINES DURING SEPTEMBER AND TWENTY-FIVE FIVE SUCH INSTANCES IN OCTOBER.

2. AS A RESULT, THE VJ WERE DRIVEN TO FIND A WAY TO REJUVENATE FOR INTERNAL MORALE PURPOSES. THEY NEEDED A DRAMATIC ACT ON WHICH THEY COULD BASE THEIR PROPAGANDA. ADDITIONALLY, THEY WANTED TO DAMAGE OUR MOBILITY AND JET AIR POWER, AND CONCURRENTLY, I AM SURE, THEY WISHED TO PUT US'S RESOLUTION TO THE TEST. TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR OBJECTIVES, THEY DETERMINED TO EXPLOIT THEIR OWN AREAS OF STRENGTH AND OUR AREAS OF WEAKNESS; AND THIS IS THE WAY THEY DESIGNED THEIR OPERATIONS ON THE NIGHT OF 27-28 OCTOBER.

A. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN MINDFUL OF THE VJ'S CAPABILITY TO SABOTAGE, RAID, OR MORTAR OUR KEY INSTALLATION, EVEN FROM WITHIN OUR TAORS. I HAVE EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT IT HASN'T HAPPENED SOONER, OR MORE OFTEN. IN THIS REGARD I AM REMINDED OF THE 2 105 Howitzers Captured at Ba Gia. They have never been recovered and it seems logical that one day they will be directed at Danang.

B. THE PRIME TARGET HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE DANANG JET AIRFIELD, AND NOW ITS NEWLY DEVELOPED SATILLITE FIELD AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN. IT IS AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH ADAPTS IDEALLY TO THE ABOVE TACTICS, BY REASON TO THE LARGE POPULATION (OVER 200,000) IN THE CITY OF DANANG, AND THE SOME 42 VILLAGES AND 208 HAMLETS COMPRISING

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TOP SECRET

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3. THE VIET CONG HAS SARELY WEIGED OUR POSTURE AGAINST HIS OWN OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIY, AND HAS DETERMINED THAT HIS PRIME STRENGTH LIES IN THE ABILITY TO INFILTRATE WITH SMALL HIGHLY TRAINED DEMOLITION TEAMS: PREPARING FOR THEIR OPERATIONS BY PIECIEAL, CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF THE EXPLOSIVES AND WELL REHEARSED SABOTEURS. HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT HIS BEST CHANCE TO MAKE AN INTERNATIONAL SPLASH IS BY USE OF SUICIDE TEAMS, COUPLED WITH LARGER DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS WHERE FEASIBLE. FURTHERMORE HE PERCEIVES THE VIRTUE OF USING THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE NONS0ON, AS HE DID AT SONG BENG, DONG XOA, DU GO, CH THANH, AND PAK SUT EARLIER THIS YEAR.

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| VC MWA | 74 | 53 |
| VC CAPTURED | 14 | 7 |
| VC SUSPECTS | 178 | 294 |

6. TURNING NOW FROM OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO DEFENSIVE MATTERS, THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE PREPARATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE 28 OCTOBER EVENTS.
A. Danang Airbase, the 12 BN 9th Marines is assigned to tactical defense of the airfield. The perimeter has 22 posts, which are alternated into over 150 separate bunkers which surround the airfield, except for a portion to the north east, controlled by VNAF. The battalion currently conducts a minimum of 16 night patrols and 12 day patrols to a distance of 1500 meters to the north, northwest, southeast, south, and southwest. All posts are tied in to the related CP with wire and radio. The battalion mobile reserve force is comprised of 1 company of 2/9 plus a provisional company from FLSE and MAG 11. In addition, each CO has a sector reserve force. The battalion CP is tied by wire to 6252d Fighter Wing, Army Aviation and to all Marine squadrons on field. The 2d BN 9th Mar is not responsible for internal security, all tenants being responsible for their own internal security arrangements.

B. Marble Mountain Air Facility. CO MAG 16 has named Installation Defense Coordinator of the Marble Mountain complex on 22 August 1965, with the responsibility of coordination between internal security measures by all units located in the Marble Mountain Air Facility complex. CO MAG 16, as installation defense coordinator, issued an installation defense plan on 10 Oct 65. The plan coordinated the internal security arrangements of MAG 16, USNH, NMOB 8, and NMOB 9 to facilitate the interchange of information, provide mutual support by coordinating and reinforcing fields of fire and by establishing special lines of communication. The MAG 16 perimeter security system consisted of 15 machine gun positions located along the northern, western, southern, and southeastern perimeter of the air facility, augmented by foot patrols in the area between positions. A total of 75 personnel were actually involved in perimeter security at the time of the attack. In addition, 25 personnel were involved in internal security, and 30 personnel were on alert in the working area. One provisional company was constituted from each squadron, is designated as reserve force. Squadrons within MAG 16 are tied into an alert wire system with the command center. Other units in the complex are tied into MAG 16 by both radio and wire.

(1) The Marble Mountain Air Facility lies within 1st BN 9th Marines Tactical Zone for overall defense. H and S 1/9, CO B(-) and CO C(-) are located 2300 meters south of the air facility at (BT 067713). 12 Platoon CO Q 3D at BN IS at (BT 078699). 1st Platoon CO 3rd at BN IS at (BT 078695). HQ, CO N and 2d Platoon CO A are at (BT 090565). and 3d Platoon CO A IS at (BT 078665). The remainder of the battalion is located south and west of the above positions. 1/9 conducts patrols throughout the Marble Mountain complex on an irregular but frequent basis, as for example the 1/9 GP to north of NCB 9 Cantonment as of 27 Oct, the first force recon CO is located on the sea coast 900 meters south of the MAG 16 MAT area.

(2) ARVN forces none.

(3) A regional force company of the 59th Battalion operates at Non Nuos (BT 067715).

(4) Navsupac maintains 2 skimmers and a MK 4 on random patrol of Danang Harbor, Inner Harbor and the Tourane River to the Museum Ramp. The Naval Advisory Group and the Vietnamese Navy maintain 1 vedette.
MARINE CORPS EYES

(1) SMALL MOTORIZED PATROL BOAT, ON PATROL FROM THE BRIDGE OVER THE TOURANE RIVER AT DANANG TO THE BRIDGE AT ROUTE 1. 1 VEDETTE MAINTAINS PATROL ON THE TOURANE RIVER FROM THE DANANG BRIDGE TO THE RIVER MOUTH. JUNK DIVISION: 14 PATROLS FROM THE AREA EAST OF HOI AN TO MARBLE MOUNTAIN. ALL TOLD, HOWEVER, I HAVE NEVER BEEN TOO SAGUINE ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE MARITIME EFFORTS, AND THE 27-28 OCT ACTIVITIES SUBSTANTIATED THIS CONCERN.

(5) ON THE NIGHT OF THE 27TH MAG 16 AIRCRAFT WERE DISPERSSED ON THE WEST PARKING MAT AND ON THE RUNWAY, TO GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH AVAILABLE PARKING SPACE. NO REVETMENTS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED IN THE AREA.

(6) THE CB CAMP CONTAINS BUNKERS ON ITS PERIMETER. THERE IS A COMMAND BUNKER INSIDE THE PERIMETER AND FOXHOLES THROUGHOUT THE CB CAMP. THE CAMP HAS DOUBLE APRON WIRE ON ALL OF ITS SIDES.

Q. CHU LAI AIRFIELD. THE CHU LAI BASE DEFENSE PERIMETER IS PROTECTED BY 2 INFANTRY COMPANIES, PLUS A PROVISIONAL COMPANY FROM PERSONNEL OF MAG 12. RESERVE FORCES ARE CONSTITUTED FROM THE SQUADRONS OF MAG 12. IN ADDITION, ON THE NIGHT OF 27 OCTOBER, 35 PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE AJFT LINE AREA. AT MAG 12 REVETMENTS HAVE BEEN ERECTED BETWEEN EACH 2 AIRCRAFT ON THE NORTH PARKING RAMPS (ADEQUATE TO ACCOMODATE 60 PLANES). SEVERAL OF THESE PROTECTED SLOTS WERE UTILIZED. HOWEVER, THE MAJORITY OF AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN MOVED OUT OF THE REVETMENTS, SOUTHWARD TO THE NEW PARKING AREA WHILE THE UNSATISFACTORY M9 M1 MATTING ON THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE PARKING RAMP WAS BEING REPLACED WITH NEW M2 MATERIAL. ADDITIONAL DISPERAL WAS NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO THE LIMITED PARKING SPACE AVAILABLE DURING PARKING RAMP REPAIR.
7. In the dark of the Moon, on the night of 27-28 October, the Viêt Cong executed their plan. Known details have been reported extensively. The general pattern predicted by intelligence sources on 2 October was, for the most part, followed. At Chu Lai, a suicide team of 11 VC with satchel charges infiltrated during darkness. Of these, all but 2 were killed or captured before reaching any vital area. These 2 were also killed on the north end of the strip, but not before they had gotten to the aircraft area. At Chu Lai, no mortar fire was experienced. At Danang, a battalion sorted from Happy Valley west of the Danang air base in the evening of the 27; was spotted, and dispersed by artillery fire. Southwest of Danang airfield a VC company was trapped and repelled by an alert ambush, some 6000 meters from the airfield. Meanwhile, 4 suicide teams of 15-20 VC each, landed by sea in the native area north of the Marble Mountain airfield, moved west across the peninsula, then moved south through the village area, and from there infiltrated into the air facility. One third were able to penetrate to the parking ramp, and to the new hospital which is under construction, where they inflicted significant casualties on MCB Nine. The VC might have inflicted more damage except that BLT 1/9 infantry/tank/artillery "alert" units spotted reinforcing Seaborne units, sinking five junks. The action lasted for some 30 minutes. Some 9 VC were KIA and 2 were captured but significant damage was done. At Marble Mountain friendly naval forces reacted by repositioning patrol boats along the Danang River, sending PT boats to China Beach area, and extending RVN junk patrols to cover China Beach area. As far as is known, the destroyer on patrol at Danang harbor entrance was not diverted. It did not fire any missions.

8. From all the foregoing I gone away with the general conclusion, vis a vis the attacks themselves, that there are weak spots that could need doctoring but, in the main, that all was done that could, or should have been done with the materials or forces at hand. Moreover, had our troops not been so active in areas extending some distance from the airfields themselves, the enemy thrust would have been greatly facilitated and his success would have been greater, particularly against the Danang airbase. My specific conclusions are this:

A. In the overall context of war we are hurt inconsequentially, despite the unfortunate losses in men and the costly losses in material. Our air effort has not been significantly diminished.

B. The 27-28 October action does not, by any means, represent the maximum effort of which the VC is capable, and I fully expect more violent suicide attacks aimed at seizing headlines and eroding our resolution. They should come soon and I still feel that Danang is the target. There are already indications. See my SITREP number 218, DTG 03343Z.

C. The general soundness of our plans and our close-in defensive arrangements around the three airfields was demonstrated but here are areas of weakness:

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Comm note: Underlined portion corrected by originator.
PATROLS, INSHORE MARITIME PATROL, RIVER PATROLS AND SHORE PATROLS.

D. THERE ARE AREAS WHERE MATERIAL, PERSONNEL AND OTHER SHORTAGES ARE EVIDENT. IN SOME INSTANCES, LEVERAGE MUST BE APPLIED TO ASSIST III MAF.--(1) AN AIRFIELD REVETMENT PROGRAM MUST BE PUSHED VIGOROUSLY AS WELL AS THE PROVISION OF PERMANENT FENCING, LIGHTING, AND OTHER FIXED PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES NOT NOW PROGRAMMED OR ON THE SCENE. REVETMENT ARE PLANNED AND PROGRAMMED FOR ALL ENCLAVES. PROGRAMMED TO PRESENT ARE 40 EACH FOR DANANG AND CHU LAI. ANOTHER 110 ARE PLANNED; 40 FOR CHU LAI AND 70 FOR MARBLE MT. IN THESE REGARD MY FORCE ENGINEER, COL HORN, IS IN WASHINGTON AT A MILCON CONFERENCE WHICH IS Jockeying FOR ADD-1. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET A PERMANENT FENCE AROUND DANANG AIR BASE FOR MONTHS. WE NEED THE SAME AT CHU LAI, AS WELL AS AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN AND AROUND THE NAVAL HOSPITAL. TOTAL COST PERHAPS 2,000,000 DOLLARS---SMALL PRICE WHEN WE CONSIDER THE VALUE OF WHAT IS BEING PROTECTED.

(2) WE NEED MORE CRITICALLY MATERIAL, TO FACILITATE LOCAL SECURITY MEASURES AND TO CONSERVE MANPOWER. THE APPROPRIATE REQUESTS, AS YOU KNOW, HAVE BEEN MADE, AND ALONG WITH EVERYONE ELSE, ARE EVIDENTLY VICTIMS OF A NATION-WIDE SHORTAGE.

(3) THE EARLY PROVISION OF PHASE II FORCES IS CLEARLY A NECESSITY. AT THE MINIMUM, ANOTHER INFANTRY BATTALION IS ESSENTIAL FOR MORE DEFINITIVE SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF MARBLE MT. AIR FACILITY AND THE NAVAL HOSPITAL. IN THE INTERIM, PERIMETER DEFENSES WILL CONTINUE TO BE AUGMENTED DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS BY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE OTHER REGULAR DUTIES DURING HAYLIGHT HOURS. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL MANNING PERIMETER DEFENSES HAS BEEN INCREASED SINCE 28 OCT, BY 10%. THIS OF COURSE, CAN ONLY BE MAINTAINED FOR A SHORT TERM PERIOD AND IS AT THE EXPENSE OF OVERBURDENING TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.

(4) THE SECURITY ELEMENT OF THE FIRST MAI STAND AT ONLY 24% OF T/O. IT OUGHT TO BE BUILT UP, AND I AM TAKING PEOPLE FROM OTHER WESTPAC FORCES TO DO SO.

D. CS III MAF NEEDS CLEAR CUT AUTHORITY TO DIRECT ALL U.S. ELEMENTS ON THE BASE TO COMPLY WITH DEFENSE DIRECTIVES AND TO CONTROL TRAFFIC ON AND OFF THE AIR BASE. THIS UNQUALIFIED AUTHORITY IS PRESENTLY LACING. LFW IS WORKING ON IT.

E. AN INCREASE IN RVNAF HELP IS NEEDED IN ALL BASE COMPLEXES.

AT PRESENT THE AIRFIELD DEFENSE BATTALION AT DANANG HAS ONLY 1 VN ATTACHED. III MAF HAS REQUESTED ONE RF COMPANY, OR EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF PF OR NATIONAL POLICE, TO AUGMENT DANANG BATTALION. THIS REQUEST HAS NOT YET BEEN APPROVED BECAUSE OF THE SHORTAGE OF PARAMILITARY FORCES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING IN THIS AREA.

F. COASTAL AND RIVER SURVEILLANCE, BOTH THE RVNAF AND USN EFFORTS NEED TO BE INTENSIFIED, BOTH AT DANANG AND CHU LAI.

G. ADDITIONAL MECHANICAL SURVEILLANCE DEVICES ARE NEEDED. IN THIS REGARD WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT ADDITIONAL SEISMIC INTRUSION DEVICES CAN BE PROVIDED ASAP AS WELL AS MORE AN-TPS 21, OR AN IMPROVED VERSION THEREOF.
11. ALL THE ABOVE IMPROVEMENTS TO INTERIOR SECURITY CANNOT, HOWEVER, BE PERMITTED TO DEGRADE OUR CURRENT SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY. WE MUST CONTINUE AN INTENSIVE PACIFICATION PROGRAM BETWEEN OUR MLR AND THE HARD-ENED BASE AREA. IF THE PEOPLE CAN BE ASSURED THAT THEY WILL BE PROTECTED AND THAT THE MARINES WILL NOT PULL BACK AND LEAVE THEM TO FEND FOR THEMSELVES, WE CAN EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE HELP FROM THEM IN THE FORM OF INFORMATION AND RESISTANCE TO THE VC. IF THE PEOPLE BELIEVE THEY ARE SAFE UNDER THE MARINES AND ARVN, INTRUSION BY VC WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT. THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN VERIFIED BY RESULTS IN THE LE M Y AREA AND ELSEWHERE. TO ACHIEVE A PROGRAM OF THIS NATURE REQUIRES TIME AND PERSEVERANCE. AVAILABLE ARVN STRUCTURE MUST BE CREATED BEHIND THE SHIELD OR MARINE FORCES POPULAR FORCES MUST BE INCREASED IN NUMBER AND STATURE. III MAF IS WORKING VERY HARD TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO ACCOMPLISH THESE OBJECTIVES. MEANWHILE UNTIL TOTAL PACIFICATION IS COMPLETED WITHIN THE AREAS OF MARINE RESPONSIBILITY, COMBAT TROOPS MUST CONTINUE TO BE USED TO AUGMENT BASE AREAS AT CHU LAI AND DANANG BUT ONLY TO THE DEGREE THAT THE TEMPO OF OUR PACIFICATION PROGRAM IS NOT DIMINISHED. ANY CONTRACTION OF OUR AREA OF PACIFICATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF COMBAT FORCES FROM THEIR PRESENT OFFENSIVE POSTURE FOR STRATEGIC AIRFIELD DEFENSE PURPOSES WOULD SET US BACK SIX MONTHS IN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE, ELIMINATE THE VIABILITY OF OUR FORWARD SHIELD AGAINST ARTILLERY FIRE AND LARGE SCALE ATTACKS, AND WOULD ENABLE THE VC TO REGAIN INFLUENCE OVER A CONSIDERABLE SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION.

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DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES: MAF COMM JEN
COPY 2-3 OF 3 COPIES: CG III MAF

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THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER—OPNAV INST. 5510.7B.

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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COMM NOTE: THIS MSG CONTAINS SECTION 2, 3, 4, 7 AND 8. SECTIONS 1, 5 AND 6 WILL BE DISTRIBUTED UPON RECIPT. THIS IS AN EIGHT SECTION MESSAGE.

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6. TURNING NOW FROM OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO DEFENSIVE MATTERS, THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE PREPARATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE 28 OCTOBER EVENTS.
A. Danang Airbase. The 2d BN 9th Marines is assigned to tactical defense of the airfield. The perimeter has 22 posts, which are alternated into over 150 separate bunkers which surround the airfield, except for a portion on the north east, controlled by VNAF. The battalion currently conducts a minimum of 16 night patrols and 12 day patrols to a distance of 1500 meters to the north, northwest, southeast, south, and southwest. All post are tied in to the related cp with wire and radion. The battalion mobile reserve force is comprised of 1 company of 2/9, plus a provisional company from FLSG and MAG 16. In addition, each co has a sector reserve force. The battalion cp is tied by wire to 6252d fighter wing, army aviation and to all marine squadrons on field. The 2d BN 9th Mar is not responsible for internal security, all tenants being responsible for their own internal security arrangements.

B. Marble Mountain Air Facility. Co Mag 16 was named installation defense coordinator of the Marble Mt complex.

// END OF SECTION 4//
SECTION 5,6 NOT RECEIVED YET
NEXT PAGE STARTS SECTION 7 AND 8//
PATROLS, INSHORE MARITIME PATROL, RIVER PATROLS AND SHORE PATROLS.
D. THERE ARE AREAS WHERE MATERIAL, PERSONNEL AND OTHER SHORTAGES ARE
EVIDENT. IN SOME INSTANCES, LEVERAGE MUST BE APPLIED TO ASSIST III
MAF.-(1) AN AIRFIELD REVETMENT PROGRAM MUST BE PUSHED VIGOROUSLY AS
WELL AS THE PROVISION OF PERMANENT FENCING, LIGHTING, AND OTHER
FIXED PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES NOT NOW PROGRAMMED OR ON THE SCENE.
REVETMENT ARE PLANNED AND PROGRAMMED FOR ALL ENCLAVES, PROGRAMMED TO
PRESENT ARE 40 EACH FOR DANANG AND CHU LAI. ANOTHER 110 ARE PLANNED;
40 FOR CHU LAI AND 70 FOR MARBLE MT. IN THESE REGARD MY FORCE ENGINEER,
COL HORN, IS IN WASHINGTON AT A MILCON CONFERENCE WHICH IS JOCKEYING
FOR ADD-1. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET A PERMANENT FENCE
AROUND DANANG AIR BASE FOR MONTHS. WE NEED THE SAME AT CHU LAI; AS
WELL AS AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN AND AROUND THE NAVAL HOSPITAL. TOTAL
COST PERHAPS $2,000,000 DOLLARS—SMALL PRICE WHEN WE CONSIDER THE
VALUE OF WHAT IS BEING PROTECTED.
(2) WE NEED MORE ORTIO NOT ON MATERIAL, TO FACILITATE LOCAL SECURITY
MEASURES AND TO CONSERVE MANPOWER. THE APPROPRIATE REQUESTS, AS YOU
KNOW, HAVE BEEN MADE, AND ALONG WITH EVERYONE ELSE, ARE EVIDENTLY VICTIMS
OF A NATION-WIDE SHORTAGE.
(3) THE EARLY PROVISION OF PHASE II FORCES IS CLEARLY A NECESSITY. AT
THE MINIMUM, ANOTHER INFANTRY BATTALION IS ESSENTIAL FOR MORE DEFINITIVE
SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF MARBLE MT. AIR FACILITY AND THE NAVAL HOSPITAL.
IN THE INTERIM, PERIMETER DEFENSES WILL CONTINUE TO BE AUGMENTED DURING
THE HOURS OF DARKNESS BY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE OTHER REGULAR DUTIES DURING
HAYLIGHT HOURS. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL MANNING PERIMETER DEFENSES HAS
BEEN INCREASED SINCE 26 OCT. BY 10%. THIS OF COURSE, CAN ONLY BE MAINTAINED
FOR A SHORT-TERM PERIOD AND IS AT THE EXPENSE OF OVERBURDENING TECHNICAL
PERSONNEL.
(4) THE SECURITY ELEMENT OF THE FIRST MAF STAND AT ONLY 24% OF T/O.
IT OUGHT TO BE BUILT UP, AND I AM TAKING PEOPLE FROM OTHER WESTPAC FORCES TO DO SO.
D. CG III MAF NEEDS CLEAR CUT AUTHORITY TO DIRECT ALL U.S. ELEMENTS
ON THE BASE TO COMPLY WITH DEFENSE DIRECTIVES AND TO CONTROL TRAFFIC
ON AND OFF THE AIR BASE. THIS UNQUALIFIED AUTHORITY IS PRESENTLY LACKING.
LW IS WORKING ON IT.
E. AN INCREASE IN RVNAF HELP IS NEEDED IN ALL BASE COMPLEXES.
AT PRESENT THE AIRFIELD DEFENSE BATTALION AT DANANG HAS EIGHT VN
ATTACHED. III MAF HAS REQUESTED ONE RF COMPANY, OR EQUIVALENT NUMBER
OF PF OR NATIONAL POLICE, TO AUGMENT DANANG BATTALION. THIS REQUEST
HAS NOT YET BEEN APPROVED BECAUSE OF THE SHORTAGE OF PARAMILITARY
FORCES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE. EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING IN THIS AREA.
F. COASTAL AND RIVER SURVEILLANCE, BOTH THE RVNAF AND USN EFFORTS NEED
TO BE INTENSIFIED, BOTH AT DANANG AND CHU LAI.
G. ADDITIONAL MECHANICAL SURVEILLANCE DEVICES ARE NEEDED. IN THIS
REGARD WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT ADDITIONAL SEISMIC INTRUSION DEVICES CAN
BE PROVIDED ASAP AS WELL AS MORE AN-TPS 21, OR AN IMPROVED VERSION
THEREOF.
11. ALL THE ABOVE IMPROVEMENTS TO INTERIOR SECURITY CANNOT, HOWEVER,
BE PERMITTED TO DEGRADE OUR CURRENT SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY. WE MUST CON-
TINUE AN INTENSIVE PACIFICATION PROGRAM BETWEEN OUR MIL AND THE HARD-
ENED BASE AREA. IF THE PEOPLE CAN BE ASSURED THAT THEY WILL BE PROTECTED
AND THAT THE MARINES WILL NOT PULL BACK AND LEAVE THEM TO FEND FOR
THEMSELVES, WE CAN, EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE HELP FROM THEM IN THE
FORM OF INFORMATION AND RESISTANCE TO THE VC. IF THE PEOPLE BELIEVE
THEY ARE SAFE UNDER THE MARINES AND RVNAF INFLTRATION SY? HE WILL

Page 6 of 7
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER - OPNAV INST. 5512c.1B.

ACTIVITY

III MAF COMM CENTER

ORIGINATOR
CG FNEPAC

CTG 27

DATE
27 OCT 65

COPY
1 OF 1

TOP SECRET

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ACTIVITY
Comm Cent.

SIGNATURE

DATE
27 Oct 65

EXCLUSIVE

Corrected copy

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
2 Marine Amphibious Force
FPF, San Francisco, California

//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//
//CORRECTED COPY//

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION OF TEXT CORRECTED BY THE ORIG.

FROM GG FMFPAC

TO GG FMFPAC

INFO GG FMFPAC/1 MAG FWD
GG FIRST MARDIV

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MGEn WALT INFO MGEnS WADE AND FIELDS.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE REFLECTIONS ON MATTERS OCCURRING SUBSEQUENT TO, OR AS A RESULT OF, MY RECENT VISIT.

2. OPERATIONS. - I AM GLAD YOU WERE ABLE TO IMPRESS WESTY WITH THE MAGNITUDE OF YOUR ACTIVITY. AT THE SAME TIME, I AM SURE THAT HE HAS NOT ALTERED HIS QUOTE FIND, FIX AND DESTROY.

THE BIG MAIN FORCE UNITS QUOTE IS REALLY THE ANSWER, AND THAT PATROLS, AMBUSHES AND CIVIC ACTION ARE ALL SECOND CLASS ENDEAVORS. MORE SUITABLE FOR THE ARVN AND THE PARAMILITARY, I DISAGREE WITH THIS, AND KNOW THAT YOU DO TOO. I BELIEVE THE III MAF THREE PART PROGRAM IS THE TICKETS —

A. SEPARATE THE VC FROM THE PEOPLE AND THE FOOD BY HIGH TEMPO PATROLS AND AMBUSHES; DAY AND NIGHT; DEEP AND CLOSE; ALWAYS WITH AIR SUPPORT.

B. BE ALWAYS ON THE ALERT TO ENCAP AND BEAT UP ON ANY VC UNIT WE MAY LOCATE; THE LARGER THE BETTER.

C. COMPLEMENT ALL THE ABOVE WITH A POWERFUL CIVIC ACTION/PSYWAR EFFORT, IN ORDER TO GAIN THE INTELLIGENCE NEEDED TO MAKE A. AND B. EFFECTIVE. IF WE STICK WITH THIS FORMULA, AND STRIVE TO BUILD UP THE LEVEL OF RF AND PF BEHIND US, I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL GRADUALLY PROVE OUR SCHEME TO BE SOUND. IN THIS CONNECTION, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO SET UP SEVERAL MORE COMBINED ACTION COMPANIES, LIKE LT MULLEN'S AT PHU BAI? THE IDEA HAS THE AMBASSADOR'S SUPPORT AND SHOULD UNDERSCORE THE EFFECTIVENESS WITH WHICH WE CAN TRAIN THE PF, DOING IT OUR WAY. ONE LAST POINT ON OPERATIONS. — THE TIME IS FAST COMING WHEN WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO PUT OUR NOSE INTO THE DOXA AREA. WESTY HAS MENTIONED IT TO ME TWICE. SUGGEST YOU CONTEMPLATE IT, IN TERMS OF AN INITIAL LIMITED SEARCH AND DESTROY INCURSION TEN OR TWELVE MILES WEST OF SHU LAI, FOLLOWING A BIG AERIAL MALLO.

EXCLUSIVE

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

DECLASSIFIED
3. I NOTE THAT WESTY EXPRESSED SOME OPTIMISM REGARDING FAVORABLE ACTION ON PHASE II DEPLOYMENTS. I HOPE HE IS RIGHT; HOWEVER, I PERSONALLY CONTINUE TO HAVE RESERVATIONS AS TO HOW MUCH WILL BE APPROVED. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HAVE EVIDENCE THAT CG SECOND AIR DIV IS ALREADY ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF USCJ JET SQUADRONS. I HAVE BROUGHT THIS TO CMC'S ATTENTION.

4. PERSONNEL MATTERS. - IT LOOKS NOW AS IF THIRD MARDIV SHOULD REACH 7/0 BY DECEMBER, IN CROSS NUMBERS; BUT IT WILL BE SHORT IN MANY OF THE CRITICAL SKILLS. IT LOOKS LIKE THE WING WILL BE SOMEWHAT SHORT IN NUMBERS, AND MORE SO IN SKILLS. I HAVE LAID THE SITUATION OUT IN A MESSAGE TO CMC, AND INTEND TO DISCUSS IT PERSONALLY WITH GEN GREENE LATER THIS WEEK. MEANWHILE I HAVE LAUNCHED A CAMPAIGN TO GET PEOPLE BACK TO YOU FROM THE HOSPITALS WITH ONLY SUCH DELAY AS IS UNQUESTIONABLY NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE IN GOOD PHYSICAL SHAPE. ALSO, IN MY DISCUSSION WITH CMC I WILL PRESS FOR THE PEOPLE NEEDED FOR THE AUGMENTED MAF T/C, AS SUCH AS POSSIBLE.

5. LOGISTICS. CHAN OLSON HAS BEEN AT BARSTOW WORKING UP THE PLAN FOR CRITICAL ITEM PACKAGES ("CRITIPAKS") ... "TO BE SHIPPED DIRECT TO BAttALIONS, SQUADRONS AND SEPARATE COMPANIES MONTHLY, I THINK THIS SCHEME WILL CUT THE WAREHOUSING BOTTLENECK GREATLY, AND WILL ENSURE A STEADY FLOW OF THOSE THINGS THAT EACH UNIT IS SURE TO NEED CONTINUALLY, THE PLAN DISCUSSED WITH, AND READILY AGREED TO, BY BARSTOW IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. H MAC WILL FURNISH BARSTOW A TRANSLATED CAR DECK LISTING THE DESIRED ITEMS TO BE PACKAGED FOR AND SHIPPED DIRECTLY TO EACH OF SOME 40 UNITS, INVOLVING 30 DAYS CONSUMPTION OF CRITICAL TOP PRIORITY MATERIAL.

B. INITIAL PLANS WILL PROVIDE FOR: (1) PRIORITY NUMBER TWO TYPE REQUISITION ACTION, IN ORDER TO INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF ALL NOS BARSTOW ASSETS.

(2) THE INITIAL SHIPMENT WILL GO BY AIR. SUBSEQUENT SHIPMENTS WILL GO BY SEA EXPRESS.

C. SPECIAL PACKAGING WILL BE PROVIDED TO SUPPORT EXPEDITIOUS DELIVERY OF THESE PACKAGES TO FORWARD AREAS. SPECIAL MARKINGS FOR EACH TYPE UNIT (TANK CO., INF BN., VMA. ENGR JO., ETC.) WILL BE PROVIDED TO INSURE THAT THIS DIRECT SHIPMENT MATERIAL IS NOT MIXED WITH SHIPMENTS TO THE FLOP OR FLOPS. AN IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVE WILL BE FORTHCOMING SOON. LET ME KNOW IF THERE IS A NEED FOR MORE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS, IN ANY AREA WHATSOEVER. THE RED
BALL PROGRAM IS BEGINNING TO PAY OFF. I BELIEVE, IF WE STICK
WITH IT, AND USE DIRECT SHIPMENT TO THE MAXIMUM, THAT WE ARE
GOING TO BE HEALTHY BEFORE LONG. WHILE RED BALL IS BEING PURSUED
STRICTLY ON AN INTERNAL FMFPJ3 BASIS, IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE
HONG CAN HELP, RED BALL ITEMS WILL BE INCLUDED IN OUR WESTPAC
SITREP, AND I KNOW THEY WILL GET PRIORITY COMMUNICATION.

5. INFORMATION MATTERS. — I GET MANY WARM COMMENTS ON THE CANDOR
AND GENUINENESS WITH WHICH IN MAP IS HANDLING THE PRESS. THEY
BELIEVE WHAT YOU TELL THEM. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ISN'T MUCH
IN THE PAPERS ABOUT MARINES NOW; FIRST BECAUSE WHAT WE ARE DOING
IS MOSTLY UNDRAMATIC; SECOND, BECAUSE THE HACV 210 DOES NOT SELL
OUR STOCK; AND THIRD, BECAUSE FEW NEWSMEN UNDERSTAND THE IDEA
BEHIND THE BALLANCED THREE-PRONG FORMULA DESCRIBED IN PARA TWO
ABOVE. I SUGGEST THAT NO AMOUNT OF REITERATION OF THAT FORMULA
FOR THE PRESS IS TOO MUCH.

6. REPORTS. — YOUR REPORTS GET STEADILY BETTER, AND THE USMC IS
GOING TO PROFIT HANDSOMELY FROM THEM IN THE LONG RUN. I NOTE
THAT LITTLE FROM YOUR WEEKLY SUMMARY (P32216Z) GOT INTO HACV'S
SUMMARY TO THE JCS (259700Z). HOWEVER, JUST KEEP SENDING IT IN,
ENSURING THAT IT GETS TO HACV ON TIME. ULTIMATELY WE WILL HAVE A
GOOD CASE BUILT UP TO ENHANCE FURTHER THE OVERALL REPORTING
SYSTEM. I PLAN TO SEND MY OPNS ANALYSIS OFFICER OUT TO GO OVER
WITH YOU AND YOUR STAFF, THE OBJECTIVES, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
AND OTHER FACES OF THE NEW FMFPJ3 HISTORICAL REPORT. ITS ACCURACY
AND VALUE DEPENDS TOTALLY ON THE QUALITY AND COMPLETENESS OF
INPUTS FROM YOUR SITREP AND OTHER REPORTS. REGARDS TO ALL.

SP-6

EXCLUSIVE

DIST: COPY 1 OF 1 COPY...MAG

COMM NOTE: THIS IS A CATEGORY "AG" MESSAGE. DTC HELD BY
CRYPTOCENTER.
THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER - OPNAV INST. 5810.18.

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DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR HIGH KPIK INFO ONLY! PLEASE FROM NO COUNTER

EMPLOYMENT PASS IN USE (U)

A. YOUR 2703552
B. CINCPAC 2702252 PEO
C. CINCPAC 2403433 AFR
D. MACV LOI DED 0643765
E. MACV DIRECTIVE No. 95-6 DED 1199145
F. NOUHE-UP COUNTER AIR DEFENSE AGREEMENT OF AUG65

1. THIS REPLIES TO REP A. YOU REQUESTED FACTUAL INFORMATION RELATIVE TO CERTAIN STATEMENTS.

2. A. FIRST STATEMENT QUOTE MAKES WERE FOLLOWING THEIR OWN DOCTRINE OF PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THEIR OWN FORCES AND THAT IN DOING SO NO COUNTERHAD GIVEN ONLY MINIMUM OF COOPERATION DEMAND.

B. FIRST PART IS TRUE AND I WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE LATTER PART IS FALSE.

YES, WE ARE FOLLOWING OUR DOCTRINE. BUT ALONG THE LINES PRESCRIBED BY REPS 2 AND C AND AS AMPLIFIED IN REPS D AND E. ROC MAP HAS FIRST CALL ON ORGANIC RESOURCES. EVERY MORNING WE CALCULATE OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR FOLLOWING DAY AND THEN ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF SORTIES WHICH WE COULD FLY TO SUPPORT OTHER FORCES. THIS FIGURE IS PROBABLE TO 2D AD ABOUT 1000. AS YOU CAN IMAGINE IT VARY PERCENTAGE OF SORTIES VARIES FROM DAY TO DAY. I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY REQUIREMENT TO IDENTIFY ANY MINIMUM NUMBER OF SORTIES.

C. COMMANDER 2D AN HAS ONLY SPOKE TO ME DIRECTLY OF SORTIE QUESTION ONCE. SAID WE WERE HOLDING OUT. I TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT, WE IDENTIFIED TO THE FACT DAILY WHAT WE COULD DO FOR THEM AFTER WE MET OUR OWN REQUIREMENTS. ON ABOUT THREE OR FOUR OTHER OCCASIONS I DEALD PERSONALLY WITH HIM ON SUBJECT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR DEFENSE RESOURCES. HE WANTED OPCOE. I DID NOT COOPERATE ON THAT ISSUE SINCE IT WAS CONTRARY TO REPS 2, 3, AND 4. WE ULTIMATELY CONCLUDED A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT TO REP F. ROC MAP REMAINS OPCOE AND MACV OF COURSE HAS OPCOE OF ROC MAP. I KNOW OF NO OTHER POINT ON WHICH WE AND I CONFERRED AND NOT AWARE OF ANY AREA WHEREAS HIS STAFF AND WE BELIEVE THE OTHER IS NOT COOPERATING.

3. STATEMENT QUOTE HE SAID FURTHER THAT WHILE MAKES GAVE HIM SORTIES THAT WERE LEFT OVER, AFTER THEIR OWN NEEDS WERE FILLED, THAT WE COULD NOT DEPEND ON THEM AS TO RELIABILITY OR NUMBERS. THAT HE HAD GOTTEN 60 OR 70 OR 60 BUT, THEY COULD NOT BE COUNTED ON FOR TOMORROW. I REMOTE.

B. AS DISCUSSED ABOVE THE NUMBER OF SORTIES IDENTIFIED TO 2D AD DOES VARY. THE NUMBER IS GIVEN AROUND 1000 THE DAY PRIOR TO EXECUTION. NATURALLY THERE ARE

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C. WE SERVE TO CARRY OUT THE MISSIONS TRAFFIC TO US. HOWEVER, CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT ALWAYS PREDICT IF. I ESTIMATE THAT PREDICT 1% OF THE MISSIONS TRAFFIC TO US ARE CONSIDERED AS WE FOR USE. ALONG THE REASONS ARE WEATHER, LAST MINUTE AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HIGHER PRIORITY REQUIREMENT. BY WEATHER I MEAN SUCH THINGS AS CROSS WIND COMPONENTS THAT CAN AFFECT A SAFE LAUNCH OF A AIRCRAFT OR INCREASED WEATHER. THE AVAILABILITY I MEAN TRAFFIC AIRCRAFT WITH DESIGNATED ORDINANCE LOAD DOES NOT CHECK OUT AS LAST MINUTE AND IS CANCELLED FOR SAFETY REASONS. BY HIGHER PRIORITY REQUIREMENT I REFER TO DEVELOPMENT OF MAP REQUIREMENTS FOR WHICH WE HAVE TO GROUND ALL AIRCRAFT TO SCRAMBLE.

D. ALONG THE SAME LINES NOT TO PROPERLY APPOINTED TO US ARE CANCELLATIONS OR DIVERSIONS DUE TO SUCH REASONS AS UNAVAILABILITY OF A USAF BIRD DOG, POOR TARGET AREA WEATHER OR DEVELOPMENT OF A HIGHER PRIORITY REQUIREMENT FROM TACG POINT OF VIEW. THANKS FOR YOUR COOPERATION. I WISH YOU ALL THE BEST.

4. A. STATEMENT OUT IS NOT GENERAL AS TO WHETHER THE CINC PAC DIRECTIVE WAS BEING CARRIED OUT OR NOT. UN清．

B. I PRESUME YOU MEAN REF C WHICH APPLIES IN PARTICULAR TO TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS TO VIETNAM. IT ALSO REITERATES POLICY PREVIOUSLY STATED IN REF B THAT COMMANDER 23 AD SHOULD ACT AS A COORDINATING AUTHORITY. REF B WAS ISSUED AFTER ALL OF US HAD A CHANCE TO CONSIDER AND ALL OF LII MAP RECOMMENDATIONS ARE INCLUDED.

5. A. STATEMENT OUT IS NOT GENERAL TO YOU EVER FOUR BONDS AND HALF THE TIME THEY CARRY THEIR BONES FRESH. FURTHER, THAT HARDS WERE FAR BELOW AIR FORCE IN ORDINANCE DROPPED AND SORTIES FLOW. UN清．

B. WE HAVE TO GET HUNGER OF BONDS USE OF NICE. WE WEAPONS TO FIT THE TARGETS. WE HAVE A WIDE SPECTRUM OF LOADS AND MANY TIMES WE CARRY MIXED LOADS, IE BONDS AND ROCKETS.

C. THE QUESTION OF BONE TONS DROPPED REALLY REQUIRES A CLOSE LOOK. YES, WE HAVE NOT DROPPED AS MUCH AS WE WERE CAPABLE OF. WHY NOT?

1) FIRST OF ALL IT IS NO SECRET THAT MANY KIA ASSETS WERE NOT ABUNDANT. I HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO USE ALL MY RESOURCES. WE HAVE USED FAT BONDS, MANY UNUSED, TO CONSIDER LOW DRAG LOADS. WE HAVE TRIED TO WEAPONS FOR THE TARGETS ASSIGNED AND DELIVER WEAPONS AS WAS REQUIRED AND NO MORE. WE HAVE Brought BACK ORDINANCE THAT WAS NOT PURPOSEFUL EXPENDED.

2) NEXT, THE NATURE OF THE TARGETS. TO GET A HIGHER RALLY OF STRATEGIES YOU HAVE TO GO FOR STRATEGIES. IN THE MAP AREA WE HAVE NOT HAD MANY SUCH TARGETS. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT WITHIN OUR TAOS STRATEGIES BELONG TO FRIENDSIES NOT THE WC.
THE VC USE TREES ON OCCASION AND HOLD PERHAPS THEREOF TOO BUT IT IS OUR POLICY TO AVOID THEM UNLESS OUR FORCES ARE PLACED ON FROM THEM. DOWNTIME VC STRUCTURES SUCH AS AMM FACTORIES IN ISOLATED AREAS ARE EXC. OUTSIDE OUR AREA WE TAKE TARGETS AS FRAGGED BY 2D AD. MANY OF THESE ARE DIFFICULT TO FIND SINCE THEY ARE SUSPECTED VC POSITIONS UNDER INSECT JUICE CANOPY. IN SUCH CASES WE CAN ONLY REPORT TARGET SATURATED OR DESTROYED OR SOMETHING. SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS ARE REPORTED IF OBSERVED. JSN M IS AN EXCITEMENT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAKE A VALID ESTIMATE FROM THE AIR. WE CAN SEND HEAD FROM WOUNDED OR THOSE ADEPTLY PREPARING?

3. THIRD, IT IS OUR POLICY TO PROVIDE JROG ESCORT FOR OUR HELO WHETHER THEY LEFT USAGE OR NOT. AND IS PERK. MANY TIMES THE ESCORT DOES NOT HAVE TO DROP AS DX TACTICALAPPRAIS. UNLESS SUCH ESCORT IS CHEAP INSURANCE AND IT WILL REQUIRE EVEN MORE ENSURING AS THE VC ACQUIRES MORE 50 CAL AND LARGER AA WEAPONS. THERE ARE ERRORS, FOR EXAMPLE, OF AA HOPPER BOUNDS EFFECTIVE TO 2000 FT. IF WE CAN USE ESCORT ACFT AFTER THEIR MISSION ON SECONDARY TARGETS OR TPQ HOURS IF CONDITIONS PERMIT, OTHERWISE THEY RETURN WITH ORDINANCE. NATURALLY SUCH SORTIES LOWER THE TONNAGE/SORTIE STATISTIC.

4. FOURTH, WE USUALLY CARRY HEAVY LOADS, IE, BOMBS AND ROCKETS. THE LATTER USUALLY DON'T APPEAR IN TONNAGE FIGURES.

5. FIFTH, A SMALL NUMBER OF OUR SORTIES ARE PURE AIR TO AIR SUCH AS AIR DEFENSE SCRUMBLE, CAP FOR TPQ'S, RESCAP, ETC. THESE TOO TEND TO LOWER TONNAGE/SORTIE STATISTIC.

D. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A BETTER INDICATOR TO MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS OF ORDINANCE EXPENDED AND SORTIES FLOWS. THESE STRUCTURES OR HOPPERS DON'T NECESSARILY MEAN NUCES. ERA IS A GUESS AT BEST.

E. AS FOR SORTIE COUNT, OUR BASIC MANAGEMENT STATISTIC IS FLIGHT HOUR UTILIZATION PER SQUADRON. IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT SNADES, SUPPLIES, FUEL, PERSONNEL AND OTHER SUPPORT IS PROGRAMMED AND MADE AVAILABLE. BUMPING UTILIZATION FOR THE 44 IS 36 HRS PER MONTH AND FOR THE 36 40 HOURS. I RAISED OUR PROGRAMMED UTILIZATION ON 1 SEP TO 120% FOR THE AA AND 50% OR 45 HOURS FOR THE 44 AND 36 HOURS FOR THE 36. I DID SO ON THE BASIS THAT (1) WE WORK 7 DAYS A WEEK WITH NIGHT WORK WHEREVER AND WHENEVER POSSIBLE, (2) OTHER UNITS COULD REDUCE BASKET THAN US, (3) WE WANTED GETTER ENHANCED TREATMENT BY THE SUPPLY SYSTEM. THIS UTILIZATION IS APPLIED TO ALL AIRCRAFT POSSESSED BY THE SQUADRON POSSESSED IN THE SENSE OF REDOQ. IT INCLUDES ALL ENDS ON BOARD BOTH IN AND OUT OF CONSUMER. THERE ARE NO EXEMPTIONS AT ALL TIMES AT COURSE ARE LIBEL. THIS VARIES FROM 75-90%. IT HAS NEVER EXCEED THE ANTICIPATED FOR THE ADVERSE CONDITIONS AND ENVIRONMENT WHERE WE OPERATE. WE HAVE GENERATED WITHIN PROGRAMMED FLIGHT HOURS VERY CLOSE TO ONE SORTIE PER DAY PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT. HIGHER ON BASIS OF OPERATIONALSYNTHETIC AIRCRAFT. WE CAN DO BETTER FOR SORTIE PERIODS. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING PERIOD 26-29 OCTOBER WE AVERAGED 2 56 SORTIES AND 2.2 HOURS PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT PER DAY. I DON'T KNOW WHAT 20 AD DID AS I AM NOT PROX TO THEIR FIGURES. WE CAN PEAK FOR LARGE OPERATIONS. WE CAN REDUCE DURING HOOPPER PERIODS. BUT OVER THE LONG Haul I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN SUSTAIN THE TEMPO WE HAVE SHOWN JULY-SEP. AND THIS INVOLVES MORE FACTORS THAN THOSE
DISCUSSED HEREIN. IT COVERS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF PROBLEMS WHICH ANY SQUAD OR MAC COMMANDER FACED DAY IN AND DAY OUT. YOU KNOW WHAT THEY ARE BETTER THAN

6. TABULATED BELOW ARE STATISTICS OF FLIGHT TIMES, UTILIZATION AND SORTIES FOR JULY-SEPTEMBER. OUR ON BOARD AIRCRAFT WERE RELATIVELY STABLE DURING THIS PERIOD.

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6. WITH THE ABOVE HOURS WE FLEW THE FOLLOWING SORTIES AND EXPENDED PENDING HOURS:

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6. A FURTHER BRIEF COMMENT IS WARRANTED ON FLIGHT HOURS AND SORTIES. THE ABOVE STATISTICS SHOW THAT WE HAVE AVERAGED ABOUT 1.4 HOURS PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT PER DAY AND A SORTIE RATE OF ONE PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT PER DAY. WE HAVE AVERAGED ABOUT 1.4 HOURS PER SORTIE. SUCH BREAD AND BUTTER MISSIONS AS CAS, HELICOPTER ESCORT, TQP-20 AND CAP HAVE BUILT IN TIMES ON STATION REQUIREMENTS. OUR TYPICAL INTERDICTION MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF 2ND AD, HOWEVER, ARE CHARACTERIZED BY SHORT FLIGHTS TO AND FROM TARGETS SANDBINING A SHORT PERIOD FOR ORDNANCE HOURS. THESE MISSIONS AVERAGE ABOUT 1.0 HOURS. THE INFERIENCE IS OBVIOUS. SORTIE RATE IS NOT THE ONLY YARDSTICK FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

6. FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN OCTOBER WERE INFLUENCED BY TWO FACTORS WHICH HAVE MARKEDLY ALTERED THE PATTERN DEVELOPED IN THE PRECEDING THREE MONTHS. THESE FACTORS WERE MONSOON WEATHER AND MAC-12'S FUEL CONTAMINATION PROBLEMS. OUR PROJECTIONS INDICATE THAT WE WILL FLY ABOUT 2600 IN-COUNTRY AIR SUPPORT SORTIES FOR ABOUT 2600 HOURS BY END OF MONTH. THE 2ND AD WILL GET SUPPORT OF ABOUT 760 SORTIES WHICH IS ABOUT THEIR RATE FOR JULY-SEPTEMBER. BUT THE WEATHER AND FUEL CONTAMINATION FACTORS COOLED THE TEMPO OF OPERATIONS. SEVERAL DAYS WHILE MAC-12 WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY ONLY EMERGENCY MISSIONS, THE CHU HAI CEILINGS, VISIBILITY AND CROSS WIND COMPONENTS ALMOST COMPLETELY SHUT DOWN MAC-12 OPERATIONS. OF COURSE ON THOSE DAYS THE 2ND AD DIV GOT FEW OR NONE OF ITS SCHEDULED SORTIES. CONCURRENTLY THESE FACTORS INFLUENCED US TO ALTER THE SCHEDULED SORTIES TO FAVOR III MAP OVER THE 2ND AD DIV. WITH FEWER RESOURCES AND A BACKLOG OF OUR OWN REQUIREMENTS BUILDING UP, THE 2ND AD DIV WAS SCHEDULED VERY AUSTERELY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. IT IS RELEVANT, HOWEVER, THAT ON THE DAYS WE IDENTIFIED A FEW SORTIES TO THEM THE WEATHER WAS SO BAD THAT THE SCHEDULE WAS SCHEMATICAL. WE HAVE TRIED TO BE COOPERATIVE IN RESPONDING TO 2ND AD DIV REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL SORTIES. WE FLEW 70 SORTIES TO SUPPORT THE RECENT

COPY

DECLASSIFIED
PART II

A. STATEMENT: טורמסuner AREA MANNERS ARE GETTING INTO HABIT OF GOING TO THE ARMY
AND ASKING THEM WHAT THEY WANT TO SEE IN ORDER TO AVOID CONFLICT TO 2D AD ADJUTANT.

B. NOT TRUE. ON PERSUADNGE THAT I HAVE GONE UP WITH THREE THINGS THAT
MAY HAVE LED HIM TO THIS CONCLUSION. A HIGHER AUTHORITY MIGHT HAVE CLARIFIED IT.

C. FIRST, WE DID BCO-BCO IN A COUPLE OF OUR DAAR REPORTS AND LIST FOUR
TPQ MISSIONS OUTSIDE OUR TACO AS BLUE BLAZERS. THE 2D AD CAUGHT THIS JUST
RECENTLY AND SENT US A LETTER. WE HAVE CALLED WHEN SIMPLER TO TELL HIM WE HURD
IN REPORTING THEY WERE NOT BLUE BLAZERS, THEY WERE IN DIRECT SUPPORT 01 MAF
AND HAD BEEN CANCELED BY 1 TOG.

D. SECOND, SINCE GEE WALT WAS ASSIGNED AS 1 CORPS SENIOR ADVISOR, WE
HAVE ASSIGNED LIAISON OFFICERS TO THE 1ST AND 2D ARMY DIVISIONS. WE ALREADY
HAD ONE AT 1 TOG. THESE ARE HELICOPTER PILOTS AND ARE THERE TO ADVISE ARMY ON HELICOPTER
SUPPORT WHICH WE ARE TASKED TO PROVIDE. NATURALLY THEY DO GET INTO HELICOPTER ESCORT
AND LB PREP TOO SINCE THIS IS PART OF OUR DOCTRINE. THE ESCORT & PREP IS IF
SUPPORT OF OUR HELICOPTER ALTHOUGH THE HELICOPTERS ARE CARRYING ARMY TROOPS.

E. THIRD, WE HAD ONE OPERATION IN PLANNING PHASE: A COORDINATED ARMY-MAF
JOB. ARMY WAS TO BE OUTSIDE OUR TACO BUT ADVANCE. WE HOPED TO PUT LARGE
AREA AND COORDINATE ALL AIR IN AREA. WE ALSO INTENDED TO REQUEST TACG TO FRAG
US TO SUPPORT ARMY BECAUSE OF AIRSPACE-CONTROL SITUATION. THE OPERATION FLOOD
CESSION WAS CANCELED BECAUSE RAINS. FLOODED MANEUVER AREA.

F. WE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT ARMY IN THE FUTURE.
IN SUCH CASES WE WOULD IDENTIFY THE SORTIES TO 2D AD AND REQUEST THEY FRAG US.
THAT WOULDN'T BE EASY, BUT I HOPE THEY WOULD SEE THE ADVANTAGE IN FRAGGING US IN 1 CORPS VICE ELSEWHERE.

G. A. STATEMENT QUOTE THAT 1 CORPS IS ONLY CORPS AREA WHERE AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS
ARE NOT FILLED. UNTRUE.

H. I CAN'T REALISTICALLY SPEAK TO THIS. WE WILL MAP REQUIREMENTS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH APPROVED POLICY. WE IDENTIFIED EXCESS SORTIES TO 2D AD. IT IS UP TO THEM
TO FRAG THOSE ALONG WITH OTHER ONES TO WHATEVER CORPS AREA HAS REQUIREMENTS. WE
HAVE BEEN FRAGGED QUITE OFTEN INTO 1 CORPS SO I CAN ONLY ASSUME THERE WERE NO
REQUESTS UNTREATED IN 1 CORPS OR IX CORPS HAD HIGHER PRIORITY. REFERENCE C IS MOST
PERHAPS HERE. CINCAP SPENT A LOT TO DO IF ASSETS WERE INADEQUATE. ABOUT
20% OF OUR INTERDICTED MISSIONS IN LAST SIX WEEKS WERE IX CORPS.

I. PERHAPS THIS SITUATION COULD BE REMEDIED BY ASSIGNING IX MAP THE AIR
SUPPORT TASK FOR ALL OF 1 CORPS. THIS IS WHAT THE 92 PLAN VISUALIZED, AND WE WOULD
WELCOME THE CHALLENGE, AIR DEFENSE INCLUDED. WITH WALT BEING SENIOR ADVISOR TO
THE IT IS NOT TOO FAR PITCHED EITHER.

J. SUCH PLAN SUPPORT OF ARMY FORCES WOULD PRECEDE USAF EFFORTS TO BE DIRECTED

TOP SECRET
COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES
PAGE (5) OF (6) PAGES

DECLASSIFIED
TO A GREATER EXTENT TO TARGETS IN OTHER CORPS AREAS. WHETHER THIS WOULD IMPLY A REDEPLOYMENT OF DANANG BASED USAF SQUADRONS WOULD REMAIN TO BE SEEN. ALL INDICATIONS POINT TO THE INCREASING FMAV SUPPORT OF ARVN AS A NATURAL EVOLUTIIONARY PROCESS, A PRODUCT OF THE NECESSARY AND PLANNED COORDINATION OF III MAF/ARVN EFFORTS TO BRING I CORPS COMPLETELY UNDER THE CONTROL. NO ABREPT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES FOR POLICY CHANGES APPEAR NECESSARY. THE INCREASING COORDINATION OF III MAF/I CORPS PLANNING AND FUNCTIONING WILL BE MATCHED BY CLOSER COORDINATION OF FMAV/I CORPS TOO AND BASIC PLANNING AND FUNCTIONING.

9. A. STATEMENT THAT EVM MARINE HOT PAD FIGHTERS AT DANANG ARE NOT DEPENDABLE.

B. KNOW OF NO REAL VALID BASIS FOR THIS CLAIM. MAG 11 STARTED STANDING AIR DEFENSE ALERT ON 9 SEP. SINCE THEN THERE HAVE BEEN SEVEN ACTUAL SCRAMBLES OF FOURTEEN AIRCRAFT AND 13 PRACTICE SCRAMBLES OF 26. EVERY sortie met the FIVE MINUTE CRITERIA. AS AN EXAMPLE ON 4OCT TWO F4'S WERE SCRAMBLED AGAINST AN UNIDENTIFIED TARGET. ALERT WAS 1116 LOCAL. THEY WERE AIRBORED AT 1118. HAD INITIAL CONTACT AT 1124. MADE ID AT 1127 AS U-2.

C. THE ONLY TIME OUR POSTURE WAS DEGRADED WAS DURING THE RECENT FUEL CONTAMINATION PERIOD 9-15 OCT. FOR THE FIRST TWO DAYS WE WERE OFF THE FIVE MINUTE ALERT BUT ON THE FIFTEEN WITH AGREEMENT TO BE SCRAMBLED ONLY IN ACTUAL ATTACK. ON THIRD DAY WE RESUMED NORMAL ALERT STATUS.

D. ON 1 JULY WHEN F102'S WERE CAUGHT IN SPEAK ATTACK AND ENTIRE HOT PAD AREA WAS OUT OF COMMISSION I VOLUNTARILY TOOK ALERT AND SO NOTIFIED THE GEC. THEY DID NOT OBJECT.

10. IN SUM, FMAV IS SUPPORTING III MAF TO REST OF ITS ABILITY. OUR TEMPO/ENCE-CAPABILITY IS USED TO SUPPORT 2D-AD AS THEY DIRECT. NOT ONLY IN COUNTRY BUT OUT. THE EPLO HAS SUPPORTED BOTH 2D AD AND TF 77. AND WE HAVE HELD BOTH WITH TANKER SERVICE. WE VIEW OUR MISSION AS SUPPORT TO DEFEND THE VC. WE STRIVE TO DO THE JOB PROFESSIONALLY.

TO D
30/09/50 GEC

KEITH B. MC CARTERSON, BGEN USMC
COMMANDING GENERAL

DIST: COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES: CG III MAF
COPY 3 OF 4 COPIES: CG FMAV

IMMEDIATE
29/12/02
THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER - OPNAV INST. 5250.16.

ACTIVITY

SIGNATURE

DATE

5/5

Paul Fremon

2/2/65
TOP SECRET

0 2705552
FM CG FMMPAO
TO CG III MAF
CG FIRST MAF

TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WALT AND BGEN MOJUTCHEON FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. THIS AFTERNOON THERE WAS A MEETING AT JINJPAJ, ATTENDED BY PAQAF, PACFLEET AND JINJPAO ON ROLLING THUNDER MATTERS. I WAS NOT PRESENT, SINCE THERE WAS NO CONTEMPLATED USMC INTEREST.

2. DURING THE DISCUSSION, GENERAL MOORE MADE OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF CARRIERS FOR IN-COUNTRY STRIKES, WHICH BROUGHT HIM SOON TO MAKE CERTAIN COMMENTS REGARDING THE MARINES, AS SOON AS THE MEETING WAS OVER, BOTH ADMIRALS SHARP AND JOHNSON REPORTED THEM TO ME. THEY WERE BRIEFLY, AS FOLLOWS:

A. THAT HE COULD NOT DEPEND ON THE MARINES; THAT THEIR SORTIES WERE OFTEN PROMISED AND THEN SCRUBBED.

B. THAT THE I CORPS IS THE ONLY ONE OF THE FOUR CORPS IN WHICH THE AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS ARE NOT FULFILLED.

C. THAT EVEN THE MARINES HOT-PAD FIGHTERS AT DANANG ARE NOT DEPENDABLE.

D. THAT GENERAL MOJUTCHEON IS HARD TO DEAL WITH.

3. I TOLD BOTH SHARP AND JOHNSON THAT EACH TIME I HAVE VISITED DANANG I HAVE TAKEN PAINS TO ENSURE THAT THE BASIC JINJPAJ DIRECTIVE ON THE APPOINTMENT APPORTlMENT OF OUR AIR RESOURCES WAS BEING RESPECTED BY FIRST MAFING, AND THAT I BELIEVE IT IS, HOWEVER, I STATED THAT, WITHOUT OBJECTION ON THEIR PART, I WOULD CONFRONT LTGEN MOORE AND OBLIGE HIM TO GIVE ME HIS BILL OR PECULARS.

4. I DID SO, TELLING MOORE THAT WHILE I WOULD NOT FOR A MINUTE SUGGEST THAT ADMIRAL SHARP OR ADMIRAL JOHNSON HAD BEEN INACCURATE IN THEIR REPORTING, I PREFERRED TO HEAR THE COMPLAINE FROM THE PLAINTIFF.

5. THE FOLLOWING DIALOGUE ENSUED,

A. MOORE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT COMPLAINING, MERELY STATING FACTS, AND THE FACTS WERE THAT THE MARINES WERE FOLLOWING THEIR OWN DOCTRINE OF PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR THEIR OWN FORCES, THAT IN DOING SO KEITH HAD GIVEN HIM A MINIMUM OF JOOPERATION.

B. HE SAID FURTHER THAT WHILE THE MARINES GAVE HIM THE SORTIES THAT WERE LEFT OVER, AFTER THEIR OWN NEEDS WERE FILLED, THAT HE COULD NOT DEPEND ON THEM AS TO REALISABILITY OR NUMBERS; THAT HE HAD GOTTEN 60 OR 70 OR 0 OR 4 BUT, THAT THEY COULD NOT BE COUNTED ON FOR TOMORROW.

C. AT THIS POINT I INTERRUPTED, AND ASKED HIM IF HE WAS TELLING ME THAT THE MARINES WERE NOT PERFORMING IN ACCORDANCE WITH JINJPAJ'S DIRECTIVE ON THE SUBJECT. HW SIS NOR GIVE ME A DIRECT ANSWER, STATING THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN AS TO WHICH DIRECTIVE I WAS REFERING.
WHEN I DID FIX IT SPECIFICALLY, HE STILL DID NOT REPLY CATEGORYCALLY AS TO WHETHER, IN HIS VIEW, THE DIRECTIVE WAS BEING CARRIED OUT OR NOT.

D. MOORE SAID THAT ANOTHER FACT WHICH DISTURBED HIM IS THAT, WHEN THE MARINES DO REPORT, THEY ARRIVE WITH ONLY FOUR BOMBS AND "HALF OF THE TIME THEY CARRY THEIR BOMBS BACK". I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS REFERRING TO THOUSAND POUND BOMBS, FIVE XERO ZERO POUND BOMBS, TWO FIVE XERO POUND BOMBS OR WHAT. HE REPLIED THAT MOSTLY THEY CARRIED 250 POUND BOMBS.

E. HE THEN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ANALYZING ORDNANCE CARRIED AND SORTIES FLOWN, AND THAT THE MARINES WERE FAR DOWN COMPARED WITH THE AIR FORCE IN BOTH AREAS. I ASKED HIM IF HE FELT THAT THIS WAS A PRODUCT OF WEAKNESSES IN THE TARGETING SYSTEM, PLUS A NATURAL RELUCTANCE TO DROP BOMBS AILESSLY IN THE JUNGLE WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF THERE BEING A TARGET TO HIM. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS TO BE MOST LIKELY, AND ALSO, "I AM SURE WE DROP A LOT OF BOMBS WHERE THERE IS NOTHING TO HIT BUT WE JUST GIVE THEM WHAT THEY ASK FOR".

F. MOORE THEN MADE THE SURPRISING ALLEGATION THAT THE MARINES ARE "GETTING INTO THE HABIT OF GOING TO THE ARVN AND ASKING THEM WHAT THEY WANT TO HIT IN ORDER TO AVOID COMING TO US". I REMINDED HIM THAT THE CONVERSATION HAD BEGUN WITH HIS STATEMENT THAT HE WAS NOT COMPLAINING, BUT STATING FACTS, AND ASKED HIM IF HE WAS SURE THIS WAS A FACT. HE SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO GIVE ME ANY SPECIFICS, AND THEN CHANGED THE SUBJECT BY SAYING THAT I SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSION BUT THAT THE FIRST WING WAST DOING A FINE JOB OF SUPPORTING THE MARINES, BUT THAT IT WAS THEIR
LACK OF CONTRIBUTION TO THE REMAINDER OF THE EFFORT WHICH CONCERNED HIM.

5. I THEN BROUGHT HIM BACK TO THE MATTER OF HIS STATEMENT THAT THE I CORPS IS THE ONLY ONE IN WHICH AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT FULFILLED, AND ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD GIVE ME SPECIFIC -- FREQUENCY, MAGNITUDE OF THE SHORTFALL, ETC. AFTER MUCH DIALOGUE HE FINALLY SAID THERE HAD BEEN TIMES WHEN HE HAD TO MOVE AIRCRAFT IN FROM OTHER CORPS TO I CORPS. WHEN I Pressed HIM FURTHER TO FREQUENCY HE SAID, "ONCE OR TWICE".

6. FOR KEITH -- IT IS Plain THAT WE HAVE A PROBLEM HERE AND I PROPOSE TO PURSUE IT WITH MOORE TO THE POINT WHERE HE EITHER REPUDIATES OR VALIDATES IN WRITING THOSE ASSERTIONS WHICH HE MADE TO SHARP AND JOHNSON. I INTEND TO DO THIS BY SENDING HIM A PERSONAL MESSAGE WHICH REQUIRES A REPLY. THE MESSAGE WILL HAVE IN IT A FACTUAL, AND WHOLLY SUBSTANTIATED, STATEMENT ON EVERY CRITICAL ITEM MENTIONED ABOVE, AND WILL EMBODY CERTAIN QUESTIONS FOR MOORE. WHILE I HAVE IN MY HEADQUARTERS MOST OF THE FACTS, I STILL WOULD LIKE YOU TO PURSUE EACH OF THE SUBJECTS IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH IN DETAIL AND SEND ME A FACTUAL MESSAGE ON THE WHOLE MATTER.

7. I WILL KEEP YOU FULLY ADVISED OF EVERYTHING I DO AND, MEANWHILE, DESIRE THAT YOU DO NOT TAKE OUT AFTER MOORE ON THIS SUBJECT.

8. FOR LEW. -- WHILE THIS IS LARGE A MATTER OF NONNAUTICAL STATISTICS, THERE IS ALSO THE WIDER MATTER OF MEASURING FULL AIR SUPPORT FOR THE GROUND ELEMENT OF YOUR COMMAND, AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF ALL ELEMENTS OF I MAF IN THE OVERALL UNITED STATES INTEREST. THIS, OF COURSE, IS YOUR AFFAIR, AND I KNOW YOU ARE VERY MINDFUL OF IT. ANYTHING THAT YOU CAN CONTRIBUTE ON THE OVERALL ASPECT OF I MAF OPERATION, WHICH WILL HELP ME IN MY PURSUIT OF THE TRUTH WITH MOORE WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED.

9. REGARDS TO ALL.

GP-4

TOR: 272/27H/WW-2/JAF
291/246H/WW-1/GE3

DIST: COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES: 3G III MAF
COPY 2 OF 2 CPDFS: 3G FIRST MAF

JOHN NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION CORRECTED BY ORIGINATOR.
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RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ACTIVITY: 3-3
SIGNATURE: [Signature]
DATE: 6 Oct
D 061150Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMPSAG/GEN WALT III MAF DA NANG
RUMSAB/GEN LARSEN FFORCIV VHA TRANG
BT
TOPSECRET 35109 WESTMORELAND SENDS FROM MACJOO
SUBJ: RELEASE OF 2D BN 7TH MARINES TO III MAF (U)
REF: WALT TO WESTMORELAND DTG 038618Z (TOTAL)
1. THE ORIGINAL ASSIGNMENT OF THE 2D BN 7TH MARINES TO
OPCON OF CG, FFORCIV ENVISIONED RETURN OF THIS UNIT TO III MAF
AROUND 15 OCTOBER. BY THE REFERENCED MESSAGE, CG, III MAF OUT-
LINES AN OPERATION PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE 2D BN 7TH MARINES
UPON ITS RETURN TO III MAF, URGES THAT IT BE RELEASED BY 15 OCT
AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, AND FURTHER REQUESTS THAT HE BE PROVIDED

PAGE 2 RUMSHA 3544U TOPSECRET 35109
A FIRM DATE WHEN THE BATTALION WILL BE RELEASED BY FFORCIV.
2. IN VIEW OF THE FORCES WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE TO CG,
FFORCIV BY 30 OCT, THE 2D BN 7TH MARINES WILL BE RETURNED TO
III MAF NO LATER THAN 30 OCT. DIRECTION BETWEEN CG, III MAF AND
CG, FFORCIV.
GP-4
BT
TOR: WH-2
9/6/2128H AES
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COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES - MAF

#6115#Z/OCTOBER 1965

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RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

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EXCLUSIVE
P 240205Z
FM CG FMFPAC
TO CG III MAF

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. THE PAST TEN DAYS HAVE SURFACED SEVERAL THINGS WHICH CAN HAVE A BIG EFFECT ON III MAF.

2. I HAVE SENSED, HERE AND THERE, FOR SOME TIME, A LITTLE RELUCTANCE CONCERNING PHASE II DEPLOYMENTS; A SORT OF TIMID HOPE THAT SOMEHOW THE SUBSTANTIAL COST IN MANPOWER MIGHT BE AT LEAST PARTLY AVOIDED. COMBAT SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN SEIZED ON HUNGRILY; COMFORT HAS BEEN TAKEN FROM THE FACT THAT ARVN RECRUITING IS UP, AND FROM THE FACT THAT THERE HAS BEEN ONE GOVERNMENT IN SVN FOR FOUR MONTHS. THE NET RESULT HAS BEEN TO GIVE SOME SUPPORT TO THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO PUT THE BRAKES ON MAJOR TROOP INCREASES. CONSEQUENTLY, I FEAR THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE AN UPHILL PULL IN GETTING ALL OF OUR PHASE II INCREASES. YOU CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT FROM WHERE YOU ARE; THE PROBLEM IS AT A MUCH HIGHER LEVEL, BUT AT LEAST I FEEL YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT IT.

3. NEXT, THERE ARE SOME - A FEW - WHO UNDERSTAND THE WISDOM OF THE PAINSTAKING CLEAR AND HOLD, CIVIC ACTION FORMULA. MANY MORE DO NOT. THERE IS, OF COURSE, THE UNCEASING ARMY PREACHING THAT PACIFICATION AS THE MARINES PRACTICE IT IS TOO SLOW, AND THAT THE TRUE GOSPEL INVOLVES GOING OUT AND BEATING UP ON THE VC MAIN FORCE UNITS - WITHOUT ANY SUGGESTION AS TO HOW YOU GO ABOUT CATCHING THEM. I KNOW THIS REASONING IS SPECIOUS; I KNOW THAT WHAT YOU ARE DOING IS EXACTLY RIGHT. NEVERTHELESS IT IS GOING ON ALL THE TIME, AND I AM QUITE SURE THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO UNDERTAKE SOME FORM OF MEANST OFFENSIVE EFFORT SOON, OR WE WILL BE UNDER FIRE FOR PUTTING ALL OF OUR EGGS IN THE PACIFICATION BASKET, AND PURSUING A COURSE SO LABORIOUSLY SLOW THAT IT CANNOT BE AFFORDED.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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4. While these are sobering thoughts, I still feel obliged to convey them to you. I am doing my best to put and keep the picture in perspective, = selling the point that our pacification - civic action efforts are efficient and are actually quite speedy, having really gotten started only in June; that they do indeed require substantial forces, but that they are paying off; and that we are continually alert for opportunities to entrap VC main force units - the larger the better - while being wily enough to avoid entrapment ourselves. But when all is said and done, we had better be looking around for an early target for a coordinated attack; an attack that you can give a name - even if it is only a shore - to: shore effort involving an LVT landing somewhere south of Marble Mountain.

GP-4

TOR: 25030CH/WW1/AN

DIST: COPY 1 OF 1 COPY...MAF

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
THE MESSAGE WILL BE DELIVERED ONLY TO GEN. KRULAK.

A: CG III RAF 305587
B: CG III RAF 5062307
C: CG III RAF 260102
D: CONSEVENTHFLT 707467

Yesterday I tried to contact you to tell you that REF A had caused a serious stir here in Pearl Harbor; and to advise you as to what needed to be done. Unfortunately, you were out, so I passed the word to Axtell. Subsequently, REF B was sent to give you an insight into the 7th Fleet reaction.

A: CINCACFLT, while incensed about REF A, was also annoyed at REF C. I had three discussions during the day, which ended up with CINCACFLT issuing a personal message to Vadm Byland telling him, in effect, to ignore the defects in theMessages involved, and to give you the support that you require. I doubt, however, if I will be able to accomplish this repeatedly, because Fleet is very mindful of the hazard to his forces embodied in violations of the basic intra-theater command arrangements.

I believe that REF A and B do have defects, although plainly unintentional. REF B gave evidence, on its face, of a request that HAC procure the necessary forces from outside its command, nor does it, under "assumptions" state that it is assure that HAC will procure them. It employs, in para 6, coordinating instructions which relate to forces not under III RAF command.

REF A goes into another man's command and selects a landing force command, and addresses the use of the things of CINCPAC's WestPac strategic reserve. This, of course, includes BLT 3/1, for whose readiness I am responsible. My part of the problem is, of course, not as serious as is the CINCPAC part, since I am willing to contend 3/1 to the job. However, the message is still defective in these basic areas.

REF B is a direct fall-out of my discussions with CINCACFLT and his back-channel to CINCACFLT. However, I do not wish to see REF A remain on the books, in our long-term interest, and in the long term interest of the Fleet. I therefore told Axtell that it should be cancelled and replaced by one which eliminates the deficiencies enumerated above.

Regards.