FOLDER # 5 (Covering period 9 Mar 1966 - 19 Apr 1966) (INCOMING)

Inventoried on 20 July 1967. All items described on attached pages 5-1 through 5-5 are present in the folder except for items with the following numbers:

3
7
11
29
33
INCOMING MESSAGES

1. CONSEVENTHFLT 060918Z (Confidential)  
   Personal for LtGen WALT from Aadm HYLAND  
   Subj: Congratulations

2. COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG 061445Z (Unclassified)  
   Personal for LtGen WALT from RAdm WESCHLER  
   Subj: Congratulations

3. CG FMFPAC 092232Z (Top Secret) Removed placed in TS folder  
   Personal for Adm JOHNSON from KRULAK  
   Info: CG III MAF  
   Subj: Maximum in Country Maneuver Units

4. CG FMFPAC 092014S (Secret)  
   SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK  
   Subj: Navy Emergency Military Construction Program

5. COMUSMACV 191232Z (Secret)  
   From: Gen WESTMORELAND for Gen CHAE  
   Info: CG III MAF  
   Subj: 2d ROK Marine Brigade deploy to III MAF area

6. CG FMFPAC 110251Z (Confidential)  
   SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen WALT, MGens FIELDS, LEEK and MCCUTCHEON, and BGens VANSTOCKUM and BANNING from LtGen KRULAK  
   Subj: General officer assignment

7. CG FMFPAC 110242Z (Top Secret) Removed placed in TS folder  
   SPECAT Exclusive for MGen MCCUTCHEON info LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK  
   Subj: Disestablishment of 1st MAW (rear)

8. CMC-110212Z (Unclass)  
   Personal for LtGen WALT,  
   Info LtGen Krulak and Gen WESTMORELAND from Gen OR. ENE  
   Subj: Well Done III MAF Ops New York and Utah

9. CG FMFPAC 132342Z (Secret)  
   Personal for LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK  
   Subj: Diversion of Resources to the enemy

10. COMUSMACV 131033Z  
    Personal for Gen Moore and Gen WALT from Gen WESTMORELAND  
    Subj: Congratulatory Message for support at As Hau

11. COMUSMACV 120312Z (Top Secret MAC 2008) Removed placed in TS folder  
    Personal for Gen Walt from Gen Westmoreland  
    Subj: Gen. THI return
INCOMING MESSAGES

12. CHNAVADVGRP Saigon 160940Z (Confidential)
   Personal for LtGen WALT from RAdm WARD
   Info: RAdm WESCHLER
   Discuss Proposed ltr on COMNAVFORV' Tasking

13. COMSEVENTHFLT 180004Z (Confidential)
   Personal for RAdm WESCHLER and LtGen WALT from VAdm HYLAND
   Subj: Visit VAdm HYLAND

14. COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG 191140Z (Confidential)
   Personal for VAdm HYLAND, info LtGen WALT from WESCHLER
   Subj: Air Defense Installations on Monkey Mountain

15. CG FMFPAC 232126Z (Secret)
    SPECAT exclusive for LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK
    Subj: Marines not mentioned; Pacification Program

16. CG FMFPAC 232152Z (Secret)
    SPECAT exclusive for LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK
    Subj: Survival of Guerilla Infrastructure

17. CG FMFPAC 232212Z (Confidential)
    SPECAT exclusive for LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK
    Subj: Reallocation of III MAF Supplies and Equipment

18. COMUSMACV 240058Z (Unclassified)
    Personal for LtGen WALT from General WESTMORELAND
    Subj: Congratulatory Message

19. CG FMFPAC 260158Z (Secret)
    SPECAT Exclusive for Gen GREENE Info LtGen WALT and MGGen MCGUTCHEON
    Subj: Air Operations; Rolling Thunder Route

20. COMUSMACV 301312Z (Secret)
    Personal for LtGen WALT from Gen WESTMORELAND
    Subj: MGGen ROSSON Visit; concerning Anti Government Turbulence

21. COMUSMACV 021135Z (Confidential)
    Personal for LtGen WALT from General WESTMORELAND
    Subj: U. S. Personnel to avoid Political Situation

22. CG FMFPAC 022120Z (CONFIDENTIAL)
    SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen WALT, MGGen MCGUTCHEON AND MGGen VAN STOCKUM
    from LtGen KRULAK
    Subj: Utilization of KC-130 Aircraft

DECLASSIFIED
INCOMING MESSAGES

23. CG FMFPAC/IMAC (FWD) O40755Z (Confidential)  
Personnel for LtGen KRULAK, LtGen WALT, MGen MCCUTCHEON  
Subj: Utilization of C-130 Aircraft

24. CG FIRST MAW O41634Z (Confidential)  
Special Exclusive for LtGen KRULAK Info LtGen WALT and MGen VANSTOCKUM from  
MGen MCCUTCHEON  
Subj: Utilization of KC-130 Aircraft

25. COMUSMACV O21318Z (Secret)  
Personal for LtGen. MOORE, LtGen ENGLER, LtGen WALT, MGen. LARSEN,  
MGen. SEANAN, Adm. WARD, Col. MC KEAN, Col. HAMBLIN, Col. TIMOTHY,  
Col. MULLER, Col. BARTEN from Gen WESTMORELAND  
Subj: Closer Relationship with Vietnamese Military

26. SSO MACV 0505302 (Secret)  
Personal for LtGen. WALT III MAF from Gen WESTMORELAND Saigon  
Subj: U. S. Forces not to become involved in conflict

27. COMUSMACV 060435Z (Secret)  
Exclusive: Gen WESTMORELAND to Adm. HYLAND, Info to Gen. WALT  
Subj: Success of Operation JACK STAY

28. CG FMFPAC 0602232 (Confidential)  
Exclusive for LtGen. WALT from LtGen. KRULAK  
Base Development/Planning

29. CG FMFPAC 0602382 (Top Secret) Removed placed in TS folder  
Exclusive for MGen. MCCUTCHEON Info LtGen. WALT from LtGen. KRULAK  
Subj: Air Support Requirements

30. CG FMFPAC 0603432 (Secret)  
Exclusive for LtGen WALT, MGen. MCCUTCHEON and BGen Stiles from LtGen KRULAK  
Subj: Aerial Tanker Support

31. SSO MACV 062206 (Secret)  
Personal for LtGen WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND  
Subj: The Handling of TRI QUANG

32. SSO MACV 0620552 (Secret)  
Personal for LtGen WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND  
Subj: Secy MONAMARA desire to obtain information from Gen CHUAN

33. CG MAW 0702462 (Top Secret) Removed placed in TS folder  
SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen. KRULAK, Info LtGen. WALT  
Subj: Aircraft space still at premium; DANANG
INCOMING MESSAGES

34. COMUSMACV 081305Z (Secret)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Information obtained from today's Leadership Committee Meeting of FM, KY

35. COMUSMACV 081712Z (Secret)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Evacuation of Civilians, Danang

36. CG FMP PAC 090046Z (Secret)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT and MGen MCCUTCHEON from LtGen. KRULAK
   Subj: Air Sorties in LAOS

37. CG FMF PAC 090656Z (Secret)
   SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen. WALT from LtGen. KRULAK
   Subj: Force Requirements; CY 67

38. SSO SOG 060810Z (Confidential)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT and RAdm WESCHLER from BGen. CROWLEY, Saigon
   Subj: Port Problem

39. CG FMF PAC 100910Z (Secret)
   Exclusive for LtGen. WALT and MGen. MCCUTCHEON from LtGen. KRULAK
   Subj: Additional U. S. Air Support in Barrel Roll Area

40. COMUSMACV 120245Z (Confidential)
    Personal for Gen. MEYERS from Gen. WESTMORELAND
    Subj: Congratulatory Message for Gen MEYERS

41. CG FMF PAC 120441Z (Secret)
    SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen. WALT and MGen. MCCUTCHEON from LtGen KRULAK
    Subj: Close Air Support

42. COMUSMACV 121320Z (Secret)
    Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
    Subj: Assisting Gen DINH in returning DANANG back to normal

43. COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG 130410Z (Confidential)
    Personal for RADM WARD Info LtGen MOORE, VADM CLAREY, LtGen WALT
    RADM HOOPER, BGen. CROWLEY, Col. SCOTT
    Subj: Diversion of Ordnance carrying Vessels
INCOMING MESSAGES

44. CMC 132308Z (Unclassified)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. GREENE
   Subj: Congratulations, The Stephen Decatur Award
   ↑ MAC (FWD)

45. CG FMFPAC/132252Z (Confidential)
    SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen KRULAK. Info LtGen WALT and MGen MCCUTCHEON
    from Gen. VAN STOCKUM
    Subj: Utilization of KC-130 Aircraft

46. CG FMFPAC 140830Z (Confidential)
    SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen. WALT from LtGen. KRULAK
    Subj: Comments on Gen DINH

47. COMUSMACV 141222Z (Secret)
    Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
    Subj: Special Forces Camps

48. CG FMFPAC 150242Z (Secret)
    Personal for LtGen. WALT from LtGen. KRULAK
    Subj: Small Transport Aircraft Procurement

49. CG I FORCES NHA RVN 151315Z (Top Secret)
    Personal, MGen. LARSEN sends for Gen. WESTMORELAND, Info CG III MAF
    Subj: Future Operations

50. COMUSMACV 191207Z (Secret)
    Personal for LtGen. WALT and MGen. LARSEN from Gen. WESTMORELAND
    Subj: Operations Planning for DOXA
21 NOV 1966

I certify that I have received the following TOP SECRET documents from Major Rudolf S. SUTTER Staff Secretary, III Marine Amphibious Force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG IFFORCEV NHA RVN</td>
<td>151315Z</td>
<td>APR66</td>
<td>2 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FMAN</td>
<td>070248Z</td>
<td>APR66</td>
<td>4 of 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>060238Z</td>
<td>APR66</td>
<td>2 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMUSMACV</td>
<td>060435Z</td>
<td>APR66</td>
<td>2 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>120415Z</td>
<td>MAR66</td>
<td>1 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FMFPAC</td>
<td>092220Z</td>
<td>MAR66</td>
<td>3 of 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. V. CANZONIERI
Lieutenant Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

18 JUL 1968

I certify that I have received the following TOP SECRET documents from Major Orval J. CORRIVEAU Staff Secretary, III Marine Amphibious Force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG TRFDCW NHA RNH</td>
<td>151315Z</td>
<td>AFR66</td>
<td>2 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG KNO</td>
<td>070216Z</td>
<td>AFR66</td>
<td>4 of 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FIII PAC</td>
<td>050216Z</td>
<td>AFR66</td>
<td>2 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 USAGC</td>
<td>050135Z</td>
<td>AFR66</td>
<td>2 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 USAGC</td>
<td>120315Z</td>
<td>AFR66</td>
<td>1 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FIII PAC</td>
<td>110221Z</td>
<td>MAR66</td>
<td>3 of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG FIII PAC</td>
<td>092220Z</td>
<td>AFR66</td>
<td>3 of 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RUDOLF S. SUTTER
Major U. S. Marine Corps

DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

18 JUL 1966

I certify that I have received the following TOP SECRET documents
from Major Orval J. CORNWELL Staff Secretary, III Marine Amphibious
Force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>CG IFFORCEW NHV RN</td>
<td>151315Z</td>
<td>APR66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7</td>
<td>CG RAN</td>
<td>070218Z</td>
<td>APR66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/9</td>
<td>CG FIFPAC</td>
<td>060216Z</td>
<td>APR66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/11</td>
<td>COMMNAV</td>
<td>060335Z</td>
<td>APR66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/7/7</td>
<td>COMMNAV</td>
<td>120315Z</td>
<td>APR66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/7/</td>
<td>CG FIFPAC</td>
<td>120212Z</td>
<td>MAR66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/3/3/</td>
<td>CG FIFPAC</td>
<td>0922202</td>
<td>MAR66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RUDOLF S. SUTTER
Major U.S. Marine Corps
SECRET 13564 FROM: MACCO
FOR GEN WALT AND GEN LARSEN FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
REFERENCE: A. CG III MAF (TS) 170602Z
B. CG I FFORCEV (TS) 131315Z (NOTAL)
C. COMUSMACV (TS) 060239Z

PART I BBR ALL
1. TO DO XA OPERATION OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN A MAJOR ENEMY REDOUBT. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS THE DELTA TEAMS OPERATING IN THE DO XA WILL BE ABLE TO DEVELOP NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE UPON WHICH FINAL PLANNING CAN BE BASED.

2. IT IS DESIRED THAT THE OPERATION BE INITIATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BASED ON THE INTELLIGENCE REFERRED TO ABOVE. BECAUSE OF THE APPROACHING SW MONSOON WEATHER SEASON, MAY IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE LATEST ACCEPTABLE DATE IN THIS REGARD. IT IS NOT NECESSARY, HOWEVER THAT III MAF AND I FFORCEV OPERATIONS BEGIN ON THE SAME DATE, ALTHOUGH THEY MUST BE COORDINATED VERY CLOSERLY.

PART II FOR CG, III MAF
3. REQUEST YOU PROCEED WITH PLANNING TO CONDUCT AN OPERATION IN THE DO XA TO START NOT LATER THAN 1 MAY. MY DECISION ON YOUR PARTICIPATION MUST BE MADE BY 27 APRIL, AND WILL BE BASED ON YOUR FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS. MEANWHILE, PLEASE OBTAIN NECESSARY APPROVAL FROM CG I CORPS FOR A CROSS BORDER OPERATION INTO THE DO XA FROM KNOTUM PROVINCE.

PART III FOR CG, I FFORCEV
4. REQUEST THAT YOU PROVIDE THE DELTA TEAMS WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROFIT AS EARLY AS 23 APRIL, YOU SHOULD PROCEED WITH YOUR PLAN AS OUTLINED IN REFERENCE 3.

ST

Copy 3 of 3 copies
AS1K

4. IF THE EVENT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED BY THE DELTA TEAMS INDICATES THAT AN OPERATION IN THE DD XA CAN BE LAUNCHED WITH PROFIT AS EARLY AS 23 APRIL, YOU SHOULD PROCEED WITH YOUR PLAN AS OUTLINED IN REFERENCE D.

S/P

T
PERSONAL FOR

SECRET

MESSAGE FOR - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

VV DDKA423EVQVU MAB186
RR DDKE
DE YDYA 2263 1600242
ZNY SSSSS
R 1502422
FM CG FMPAC
TO DDKE/CG III MAF
BT
SECRET
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK
SMALL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT (U)
A. YOUR 060035Z
1. REF A POINTED OUT THE PROBLEMS IMPOSED BY THE LACK OF A
RAPID MEANS OF AIR TRANSPORTATION FOR COMMAND AND STAFF
SUPPORT.
2. CONCUR THAT SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE IMMEDIATELY.
3. AM ASKING CMC TO ATTEMPT TO GET T-59, OR OTHER SUITABLE MODEL
AIRCRAFT, FOR THE PURPOSE. REGARDS.
CP-4
BT
DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 FILE
COPIES 2&3 OF $ MAF

(THE IS COPY __OF__ 3 COPIES)

CG FMPAC      1502422/APR       CG III MAF

COPY 12 OF 25 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
MESSAGE FOR: SECRET
3d MaxDiv - 2100/2

V V MSB750UV PHN758V MAH32
PP RUNSM A 1911D 1041223
ZNY SSSS S
P 141222Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUNSMF/CG III MAF
INFO RUNSAB/CO 5TH SF GP
RUNSF/CG I FORCEV
DT
SEC RET 12936 FROM: MACCO
TO LT GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
SUBJECT: SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS (U)
REF: A. CG III MAF MSG Dlg 016006Z (TS) APR 66 (NOTAL)
B. LTR, MACJS, SER NO 000523, DTD 12 APR 66 (NOTAL)

1. YOUR REPORT OF OBSERVATIONS RESULTING FROM YOUR VISIT TO
SPECIAL FORCES INSTALLATIONS IN YOUR AREA IS APPRECIATED. IN
THIS REGARD, LETTER REFERENCE B HAS BEEN DISPATTCHED TO FORCE
COMMANDERS TO CLARIFY RELATIONSHIPS OF THE SENIOR US TACTICAL
COMMANDER WITH SPECIAL FORCES AND SOG PERSONNEL WHO MAY BE

PAGE 2 RUNSMA 1911D SECRET
LOCATED WITHIN THEIR CZ.

2. (S) WITH RESPECT TO RECOMMENDATION ON BA TO SF CAMP
CONTAINED IN REFERENCE A, I APPROVE INITIATION OF ACTION SEEKING
TO RELOCATE THIS CAMP ON MORE DEFENSIBLE GROUND IN THE SAME VAL-
LEY. REQUEST YOU PROCEED TO OBTAIN APPROVAL OF I CORPS
COMMANDER IN THIS RELATIONSHIP AND ADVISE ME SO THAT NECESSARY
STEPS CAN BE TAKEN WHERE TO OBTAIN FINAL APPROVAL BY JGS.

3. (S) REGARDING RECOMMENDATION ON THE GIA VUC SF CAMP,
THE COORDINATED III MAF/I FORCEV OPERATIONS VICINITY GIA VUC
SOON TO BE UNDERTAKEN SHOULD REDUCE ANY IMMEDIATE VC THREAT TO
THIS AREA. FURTHER, THE IMPROVED WEATHER CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT
I CZ DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WILL PROVIDE MORE FAVORABLE
CONDITIONS FOR AIR SUPPORT AND REINFORCEMENT TO THE CAMP
SHOULD IT BE ATTACKED. ON THIS BASIS, DECISION ON DISESTABLISH-
MENT WILL BE HELD IN ABYANCE FOR THE TIME BEING.

4. (S) DURING THE INTERIM, MAXIMUM EFFORT MUST BE PLACED
ON STRENGTHENING ALL CIDG CAMPS AND SPECIAL ATTENTION GIVEN TO
BRINGING CIDG COMPANIES UP TO FULL STRENGTH. IT WILL BE USEFUL
IN THIS REGARD, TO IMPRESS UPON YOUR COUNTERPART THE NEED FOR HIS
FULL SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH RECRUITING OF CIDG PERSONNEL. GP-4
R T/DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES = FILE COPY
COPIES 2 & 3 OF 3 COPIES = CG III MAF

COMUSMACV
P 141222Z/APR
SECRET

Please return to S/5 for file
COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
EXCLUSIVE

P 140830Z
FM: CG FMFPAC // MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //
TO: CG III MAF

CONFIDENTIAL

HERE ARE A FEW COMMENTS ON GENERAL Dinh, BASED ON MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH HIM. THEY MAY BE OF SOME VALUE TO YOU.

1. I BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH DINH FIRST WHEN HE WAS CG OF 11 CORPS AND HAD FREQUENT CONTACT WITH HIM DURING HIS SERVICE AS CG III CORPS, AS MILITARY GOVERNOR OF SAIGON AND AS A MEMBER OF THE CABINET.

2. THERE WAS NEVER ANY DOUBT IN MY MIND BUT THAT HE WAS SMART, NOR DID I EVER DOUBT THAT HE WAS AMBITIOUS AND AN OPPORTUNIST. I ALWAYS HAD A FEELING THAT HE WAS MORE OR LESS FRENCH ORIENTED.

3. AS A CORPS COMMANDER HE WAS AN EXHIBITIONIST, WEARING FANCY CLOTHES AND GENERALLY THROWING HIS WEIGHT AROUND. EITHER HE DRANK QUITE A BIT OR GOT A LOT OF MILEAGE OUT OF WHAT HE DID DRINK. HIS TROOPS LIKED HIM, AND HIS OFFICERS FEARED HIM BECAUSE HE WAS RUTHLESS.

4. HE WAS GIVEN TO EXAGGERATION IN CONVERSATION, AND TO PROMISING MORE THAN HE COULD DELIVER. DURING THE DEIM DAYS HE WAS LOCKED ON AS BEING LESS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD AMERICANS THAN MANY OF HIS CONTEMPORARIES.

5. I SPENT 3 DAYS WITH HIM LAST YEAR ON OKINAWA, AND FOUND HIM VERY MUSH SUBDUED IN COMPARISON TO HIS EARLIER CONDUCT. HE DRANK VERY LITTLE AND BOASTED NOT AT ALL. IT MAY BE THAT HE LOST SOME OF HIS STARCH DURING THE TIME HE WAS ON THE SHELF. ALL IN ALL, HOWEVER, I DON'T BELIEVE YOU WILL FIND HIM AS DEPENDABLE, BY A LONG SHOT, AS YOU FOUND GENERAL THI. REGARDS.

CG-4

DIST: COPY 1&2 OF 2 COPIES - CG III MAF

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM - CONFIDENTIAL

3d MarDiv - 2100/1

EXCLUSIVE

132252Z
APRIL

CG FMFPAC/1 MAC (FWD)

EXCLUSIVE FOR

COPIES 1&2 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM - CONFIDENTIAL

3d MarDiv - 2100/1

P 132252Z

FM: CG FMFPAC/1 MAC (FWD)

TO: CG FMFPAC

INFO: CG III MAF
CG FIRST MAF

CONFIDENTIAL SPEC EXCLUSIVE FOR LTCGEN KRULAK. INFO LTCGEN WALT AND MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM GEN VAN STOCKUM.

UTILIZATION OF KG-130 AIRCRAFT(U)

A: CG FMFPAC 022120Z
B: CG FMFPAC/1 MAC(FWD) 040755Z
C: CG FIRST MAF 0416342

1: REFS A AND B REFER.

2. THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN DANANG AT THE TIME OF MY VISIT PRECLUDED DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT PROBLEM WITH GENERALS WALT AND MCCUTCHEON. HOWEVER, DISCUSSIONS BY ME AND ACCOMPANYING STAFF WITH LOGISTICS AND WING PERSONNEL AT THE 3 COMBAT BASES; AN ANALYSIS OF CARGO Lifts SINCE LAST JULY AND A BIT OF CRYSTAL BALLING TO THE FUTURE REVEAL THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

A. AS REPORTED BY GEN MCCUTCHEON, I CONCUR THAT WE HAVE TAKEN A LONG STEP TOWARD AVOIDING DUPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED MAC CHANNEL CARGO ROUTES. DURING MARCH WMGR-152 LIFTED 550 TONS OF FSR CARGO INTO RVN, OF THIS 374 TONS OR 68% WAS TO CHU LAI, SIGNIFICANTLY 550 TONS IS BY FAR THE LARGEST MONTHLY LIFT SINCE OPERATIONS BEGAN IN RVN. THE AVERAGE MONTHLY LIFT JULY 65 THRU MARCH 66 WAS 271 TONS, THRU 12 APRIL WMGR-152 HAS LIFTED 130 TONS TO CHU LAI, AND WE HAVE ON HAND A BACKLOG OF AN ADDITIONAL 155 TONS WAITING AIRLIFT. OUR BEST PREDICTION FOR THE FUTURE INDICATES THAT THE CHU LAI REQUIREMENT ABOVE WILL SATURATE WMGR-152 Airlift Capability. THEREFORE AT PRESENT WE CAN AVOID DUPLICATING THE MAC CHANNEL CARGO ROUTE OKI TO DANANG BY LIFTING ONLY CHU LAI CARGO BY OUR ORGANIC KC-130. HOWEVER, TO SATISFY THE CHU LAI REQUIREMENTS WE WILL HAVE TO RESORT TO NUMEROUS SPECIAL THEATER AIRLIFTS BY THE 315TH WHICH COULD GROW INTO A SCHEDULED THEATER AIRLIFT SUCH AS WE NOW HAVE BETWEEN NAHA AND DANANG. WE WOULD THEN HAVE ESTABLISHED A THEATER AIR CARGO IN PARALLEL WITH THE VMGR-152 ROUTE TO CHU LAI.

B. SINCE HUE PHU BAI IS GROWING IN STRENGTH AND LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS, DIRECT FLIGHTS TO HUE COULD BE ACCOMMODATED IF FLSG A PASSED ALL EXCEPT EMERGENCY PRI 02 HUE PHU BAI REQUIREMENTS TO THIRD FSR. DIRECT SHIPMENTS COULD ACCUMULATE ON OKINAWA IN SUFFICIENT AMOUNTS TO MAKE DIRECT FLIGHT FEASIBLE. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE FLSG IN THE FUTURE WERE ESTABLISHED AS A FULL FLEeced FLSG PLENTY OF DIRECT CARGO COULD BE GENERATED ON OKINAWA. WMGR-152 THEN COULD SHIFT ITS FLIGHT PATTERN TO HUE PHU BAI.

3. IN SUMMARY, WMGR-152 SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON CHU LAI CARGO, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EMERGENCY LIFTS SCHEDULE ALL KG-130 CARGO FLIGHTS TO CHU LAI. 315TH SUPPORT WILL BE REQUESTED AS REQUIRED. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DEVELOPING SUFFICIENT CARGO FOR DIRECT SHIPMENTS TO HUE PHU BAI.

GP-4

DIST: COPY 1&2 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF
COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES - CG FIRST MAF

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
0 AND MATE HERE COMES 785 AND 786 ANSB785RUC2A341EHA665
RR RURSNF
DE RUECEN 326 1032368
ZNR EUU0U
P 132360Z
FM CMC
TO RURSNF/CG III MAF
INFO RUHLP/CG FMFPAC
ST
UNCLAS
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM GENERAL GREENE
RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM NAVY LEAGUE FOR RELAY TO YOU:
"OUR SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU ON YOUR SELECTION TO
RECEIVE THE NAVY LEAGUE'S STEPHEN DECATUR AWARD FOR
OPERATIONAL COMPEtENCE FOR 1966. THE AWARD WILL BE
PRESENTED AT VLE AWARD LUNCHEON OF THE NATIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE NAVY LEAGUE, MAY 26, 1966, SANTA MONICA,
CALIFORNIA. SIGNED: HONORABLE FRED NORTH, CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL AWARDS BOARD, MORGAN L. FITCH, JR., PRESIDENT,

PAGE TWO RUECEN 326 UNCLAS
NAVY LEAGUE OF THE U. S. " LETTER FOLLOWS. LET ME ADD
MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS AND THOSE OF THE ENTIRE MARINE
CORPS. THE STEPHEN DECATUR AWARD IS SYMBOLIC OF THE
OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION YOU HAVE MADE AND ARE MAKING TO
COUNTRY AND CORPS. WELL DONE AND WELL DESERVED.
WALLACE M. GREENE, JR., USMC, COMMANDANT.

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES = FILE COPY
       COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES = CG III MAF

CMC R 132308Z/APR
CG III MAF

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM - CONFIDENTIAL

MF 901 - 2000/000203

CO RUMSBY RUNSF K RUNSAG RUNSM A RUHLHL

DE RUMNNA 030 1030410

ZNY CCCCC

O 130410Z

FM CONN NavsupPact Danang

TO RUNSF K/CONN NavFDRY

INFO RUHLHL/CONSERV PAC

RUNSMA/COMUSMACV

RUHLHL/C G SEVENTH AIRFORCE

ZEN/CG III MAF

RUHLHL/CINC PACFLT

RUNSAG/35TH FIGHTER WING

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL FOR

RADM WARD INFO LGEN MOORE, VADM CLAREY, LGEN WALT,

RADM HOOPER, BGEN CROWLEY, COL SCOTT

1. INFO IN WED 13 APR STARS AND STRIPES CARRIED BY AP QUOTING ASD

SYLVESTER RE REDUCTION IN AIR STRIKES AND CONNECTING IT WITH BOMB

DISTRIBUTION AT DANANG, WHICH CAUSED DIVERSION OF ORDNANCE CARRYING

VESSELS, IS NEWS TO THIS COMMAND.

2. QUICK CHECK WITH COL SCOTT, SENIOR AF OFFICER DANANG, CONFIRMS

NO SPECIFIC SHORTAGE HERE AND THAT HE IS EQUALLY UNFAMILIAR WITH

STORY. COL BANKSON, USMACV PAO, INDICATES STORY NOT RELEASED AT

SAIGON AND THAT THEY WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PLAY IT DOWN SINCE THEY

ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH BACKGROUND FOR STORY.

3. FACTS ARE DANANG PORT HAS OPERATED AT SOME LEVEL EVERY DAY, HAS

OFFLOADED 1567 S/T AMMO DURING PERIOD 11 APR, AND THAT NO PRIORITY

ITEM REQUESTS HAVE GONE UNFULFILLED. SS GREAT FALLS VICTORY, WITH

AF AMMO, WAS SAILED FROM DANANG TO QUI NHON AND CAN RANH AND HAS

NOW RETURNED WITH ALL AMMO OFFLOADED. UNDERSTANDING AT TIME THIS

WAS ORDERED BY MT5SO SAIGON WAS THAT NEED THERE WAS GREATER THAN

HERE AND SAILING SHIP WOULD SAVE FLYING AMMO TO THESE AREAS.

4. LOCAL PRESS NOW INTERESTED IN DETAILS OF AP STORY. USING COMUSMACV

PAO GUIDANCE HAVE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

ALL TYPES OF MILITARY CARGO CONTINUED TO MOVE THROUGH DANANG

DURING THE PERIOD OF CIVIL UNREST WITH NO CRITICAL REDUCTION IN

OVERALL TONNAGE HANDLED. ONE AMMO SHIP, GREAT FALLS VICTORY, WAS

DIVERSTED FROM DANANG TO QUI NHON AND CAN RANH WHERE IT OFFLOADED

OF AMMO. IT HAS NOW RETURNED AND IS OFFLOADING OTHER CARGO HERE.

OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF MATERIAL MAINTAINED BY OUR ARMED FORCES ARE

OF COURSE, CLASSIFIED BUT THE LOGISTICS POSITION OF THE AREA

APPEARS GENERALLY ADEQUATE.

5. NOW OFFLOADING AT NORMAL CAPACITY AND NO CRITICAL SHORTAGES

KNOWN OR REPORTED.

GP-4

BT

DIST: A COPY 1 OF 3 FILE

COPIES 2 OF 3 CG III MAF

RUMSAG/CONNavSupPact Danang 130410Z/APR

CO CG III MAF

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
(PERSONAL TOP)

UUNSHA
DE UUNSHA 1600 1021325
ZNY SSSS
O 121302Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF
BT
SECRET 12676 MACJ00
FOR LT GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
REF: III MAF 112332Z APR 66.
1. WITH RESPECT TO OBJECTIVE OF ASSISTING GEN DINK IN HIS
AIM OF RETURNING DANANG TO NORMALCY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, I AM
IN AGREEMENT WITH YOUR POSITION, AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER,
WE MUST INSURE THAT RESTORATION OF NORMALCY IS ACCOMPLISHED
IN SUCH FASHION AS NOT TO PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE STRUGGLE
GROUP.

2. THE REMAINING TWO VNMC BATTALIONS HAVE, OF COURSE,
COMUSMACV O 121320Z/APR CG III MAF

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES SECRET
BEEN REDEPLOYED TO SAIGON. I DISCUSSED WITH GEN VIEW THE DESIRABILITY OF MOVING THE BATTALIONS TO QUANG NGOAI FOR USE IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC, BUT HE ADVISED HE WAS IN RECEIPT OF ORDERS FROM DIRECTORATE LEADERS TO RETURN THE UNITS TO SAIGON FOR POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONVENING TODAY OF THE GOVERNMENT SPONSORED POLITICAL CONGRESS.

3. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST CONCERNING ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING THE RECALL OF COL LOAN, I SPOKE TO GEN VIEW ON THIS SUBJECT AS WELL. HE IN TURN REFERRED THE MATTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. ACTION THEMSELVES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

4. INsofar as RETURN OF MILITARY EVACUEES TO THEIR BILLETS AND DUTY STATIONS IN DANANG IS CONCERNED, THE DANGER OF THEIR BEING CAUGHT BETWEEN THE VMNC BATTALIONS AND STRUGGLE GROUP FORCES HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. MEANWHILE, I CONSIDER IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE GO SLOWLY IN CONNECTION WITH RETURN OF MILITARY PERSONNEL TO DANANG. FOR THE TIME BEING YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RETURN ONLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE IS DEPENDENT UPON RESIDENCE IN BILLETS WITHIN THE CITY.

REMAINING PERSONNEL ARE TO BE ACCOMMODATED WITHIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE THE CITY, BY DEMONSTRATING OUR RETICENCE

PAGE 3. YYMWA 16000 D E S C R E T
TO RETURN MILITARY PERSONNEL TO THE CITY, WE GENERATE USEFUL PRESSURE AGAINST THE STRUGGLE GROUP WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISRUPTION OF NORMALCY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

5. YOUR GOAL OF REDUCING THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN DANANG IS CONSISTENT WITH MY OWN OBJECTIVE IN THIS REGARD. ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING YOU CAN DO TO ACCELERATE ATTAINMENT OF THE GOAL WILL STRENGTHEN OUR ULTIMATE POSTURE. THE MACV J-4 WILL CONSULT WITH YOUR STAFF Concerning PROVISION OF TENTAGE AND OTHER SUPPORT.

6. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FOREGOING, BOTH HUF AND DANANG WILL REMAIN OFF LIMITS FOR OTHER THAN OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE COPY
COPIES 2&3 OF 3 COPIES - G3 111 MAF

COPY____ OF____ COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
P 120441Z
FM: CG FMFPAC // MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY //
TO: CG II MAF
CG FIRST MAW

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT AND MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. I TOOK ON JOE MOORE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ADDITIONAL 30 SORTIES PER DAY FOR LAOS AND WENT THROUGH THE SAME GENERAL DRILL WHICH YOU GAVE HIM, PUTTING PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON MY CONCERN THAT THIS WOULD DISPERSE OUR ORGANIC RESOURCES, AND THUS UNBALANCE OUR TEAM. I ALSO HAMMERED ON THE MATTER OF THE LEVEL OF EFFORT WHICH WE ARE ABLE TO SUPPORT WITH PARTS, ETC.

2. MOORE'S RESPONSE WAS RATHER SURPRISING. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS NONE OF HIS DOING; THAT THE WHOLE THING HAD IT ORIGIN WITH WESTY; THAT HE, HIMSELF, UNDERSTOOD OUR PROBLEM, BUT THAT HE WAS UP AGAINST THE STOPS WITH HIS OWN RESOURCES, AND COULDN'T DO MORE.

3. I THEN WENT BACK OVER THE ORIGINAL GROUND AGAIN, AND SAID THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS MATTER FROM MY VIEWPOINT, BECAUSE IT INFRINGED ON THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY ON WHICH THE MARINE CORPS WAS ORGANIZED — WHICH IS TO SAY ONE HOMOGENEOUS AIR-GROUND OUTFIT, WITH ALL ELEMENTS ORGANIC. HE RESPONDED WITH THE SAME STORY — THAT HE WAS JUST DOING HIS BEST TO GET ALONG, AND THAT WESTY IS THE ONE WHO FEELS THAT WE DO NOT REALLY NEED THE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT WE SAY WE DO.

4. FROM THE ABOVE, YOU CAN SEE THAT I GOT NOWHERE. HOWEVER, IT MAY BE THAT THERE IS SOME TRUTH IN WHAT HE SAYS WITH REGARD TO WESTY NOT BELIEVING THAT THE MARINES NEED THE LEVEL OF AIR SUPPORT THAT WE OURSELVES FEEL WE NEED.

5. I WILL STAY ON TOP OF THE PROBLEM HERE, BUT WILL APPRECIATE ANY ADVICE OR INFO THAT YOU CAN GIVE ME THAT WILL HELP STIFFEN UP CINCPAC.

REGARDS
GP-4

DIST: COPY 1&2 OF 3 COPIES = CG III MAF
COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES = FIRST MAW

P 120441Z/APR
CG FMFPAC
CG III MAF

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM - CONFIDENTIAL
3d MarDiv - 2100/1

COMUSMACV.

THIRD PARTY PERSONAL FOR...

COPIES 2&3 OF 3 COPIES

APRIL

/\ 4/13

DECLASSIFIED
(PERSONAL FOR)

PP RUNSMF
DE RUKSMA 867U 1020250
2BY CCCC
P 128243Z ZFF-4
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMSAL/7AF
INFO RUNSMF/III MAF
BT
CONFIDENTIAL 12604 FM MACJOO
PERSONAL FOR GEN MEYERS FROM WESTMORELAND.

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

PRODUCTIVE RESULTS IN TIGER HOUND OPERATIONS OVER EASTER WEEK-END ARE INDICATIVE OF TWO FACTS: FIRST, THE ENEMY IS STRIVING DESPERATELY TO BUILD UP HIS LOGISTICS SUPPORT IN COUNTRY AND COMMITTING UNTOLD RESOURCES TO THIS TASK; SECOND, OUR ARound-THE-CLOCK EFFORTS ARE MAKING THE ENEMY PAY A HEAVY PRICE.

PLEASE CONVEY MY CONGRATULATION TO ALL CONCERNED FOR THEIR FINE PERFORMANCE. KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK. CONTINUED PRESSURE OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IS ALL IMPORTANT. GP-4

BT
DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE COPY
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF

COMUSMACV
P 128816Z/APR
283

CONFIDENTIAL III MAF
SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
II Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

READDRESS BY

PRIORITY

ORIGINATOR C, EMEPAC

UNIT AND NUMBER OF COPIES

FILE: 1-2 of 3

DATE: 10/09/72

MHR: 3 of 3

FIRST FOR RECON

SHIP: 1, RAD ENS

FLAG "A"

5TH COMM

ANCROSS

MCB-5

HAS III MAF

CRYPTO

REPRO INIT 6

CCOIC 6

CWO 6

CHR 6

COPY OF COPIES

SECRET
SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96501

EXCLUSIVE

DECLASSIFIED

P 180910Z
FM 03 FMFPAC
TO CG III MAF
CG FIRST MAF

// MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY//

SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT AND MGEO MCCUTCHEON FROM KUKI AK.

1. FOLLOWING QUOTES A PERSONAL FROM SHARP TO WESTMORELAND;

   QUOTE
   A COMUSMACV 12199/080825ZZ APRIL 1966.

   1. REF A ACKNOWLEDGES THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL US AIR SUPPORT IN
   BARREL ROLL AREA AND DISCUSSES COURSES OF ACTION BY WHICH THIS CAN BE
   ACCOMPLISHED TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL USE OF FIRST MAF AIRCRAFT.

   2. I HAVE RECEIVED THE NUMBER OF SORTIES FLOWN DURING MARCH AND
   FROM 1-7 APRIL IN LAOS AND RTE PK RG ROMAN AND FIND THE FOLLOWING:

   FOR MARCH
   STEEL TIGER BARREL ROLL
   7TH AF (THA BASED) 929 594
   7TH AF (SVN BASED) 1378 627
   1ST MAF 0
   TF-77 1010 193
   TOTAL 4521 1420

   FOR 1-7 APRIL
   774 L PLUS RTE PK RG ROMAN 1 BARREL ROLL
   7TH AF (THA BASED) 527
   7TH AF (SVN BASED) 813
   1ST MAF 928
   TF-77 269
   TOTAL 1872 63

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET
3. FROM THE ABOVE TABLES I NOTE THAT WHEREAS IN MARCH ABOUT 23% OF THE EFFORT IN LAOS WAS DEVOTED TO BARREL ROLL, SO FAR IN APRIL LESS THAN 4% OF THESE SORTIES HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO THIS AREA. AT THE PRESENT RATE THE TOTAL EFFORT IN LAOS AND RTE PKGE 1 WILL RUN OVER 8000/MO. WHILE THE PRIORITY OF EFFORT SHOULD WELL BE IN S/L AND RTE PKGE 1, IT DOES NOT SEEM LOGICAL THAT IT SHOULD BE ALLOCATED WITH SUCH A PREponderANCE OF THE TOTAL EFFORT IN THE SOUTH. I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT, AT THE PRESENT RATE OF 275 SORTIES PER DAY IN THE S/L AND PKGE 1 AREA, WE MAY BE WASTING ORDNANCE WHICH IS IN CRITICAL SUPPLY. IN AN AREA WHERE TARGETS ARE SMALL AND DIFFICULT TO FIND AS THEY ARE, IN MANY INSTANCES IT APPEARS TO ME THAT FLIGHTS OF TWO AIRCRAFT COULD ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULTS AS ARE NOW OBTAINED WITH FLIGHTS OF FOUR OR MORE. YOU SHOULD EXAMINE THESE PRACTICES AND, WHEREVER POSSIBLE, SET UP THE NECESSARY PROCEDURES TO CALL IN AIRCRAFT ON GROUND ALERT WHEN A QUOTE CATCH UNQUOTE IS BIGGER THAN THE SCHEDULED EFFORT CAN HANDLE.

4. AS FOR ADDITIONAL EFFORT BY THE FIRST MAW, RECORDS AVAILABLE HERE INDICATE THEIR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN EXPENDED AS FOLLOWS:

| SORTIES FOR DIRECT SUPPORT OF III MAF | 1845 | 510 |
| SORTIES FOR OTHER SUPPORT INCLUDING LAOS | 3307 | 586 |

IN VIEW OF THE RECENT DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR NEXT F-4 SQUADRON FROM APRIL TO JULY, IT MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE TO DRAW FURTHER ON THESE ASSETS AS THEY HAVE ADDITIONAL GROUND UNITS DEPLOYING INTO SVN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
CONFIDENTIAL SGG 0338
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN WALT AND

Dear Adm Weshler, from Brig Gen Crowley, Saigon

If port problem is creating undue shortages I am prepared to send you company of twenty LARC's with maintenance unit so that you can make more use of Red Beach Exit. Please advise.

Ok

Guy will recommend NAF

Ow
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK
CY 1967 FORCE REQUIREMENTS

1. THE BUDGETARY ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN JUNE AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL WILL REQUIRE A TENTATIVE STATEMENT OF FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CY 67. IN ANTICIPATION OF SUCH A REQUEST AND TO PROVIDE A REALISTIC LEAD TIME FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES TO INITIATE CAPABILITIES PROGRAMS TO MEET THESE ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS, SHARPHAS ASKED WESTMOORLAND'S VIEWS ON THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE OF PLANNING CONFERENCES:
   A. 25 APR-2 MAY. SAICON MADV CONFERENCE.
   B. 9-16 MAY. PAC COMPONENT COMDRS CONFERENCES HAWAII
   C. 17-24 MAY. HONOLULU CINCPAC CONFERENCE.

2. THE ABOVE SCHEDULE IS NOT FIRM, BUT SINCE THE PROPOSED SACY CONFERENCES DATE IS NOT FAR OFF, I WOULD APPRIECATE YOUR GENERAL ESTIMATES OF CY 67 REQUIREMENTS AS THEY ARE DEVELOPED. IN THIS REGARD I THINK WE SHOULD TAKE A HARD LOOK AT WHAT EACH TYPE OF UNIT HAS ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE, OR CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACCOMPLISH IN THE 1967 ENVIRONMENT.

REGARDS

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 2 COPIES: MAF
CG FMFPAC P 900656Z/APR LTGEN WALT

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT AND MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON
FROM KUPLAK.

1. A CRITICAL PIECE OF INFORMATION, WHICH MAY BE OF USE TO YOU IN CASE THE POLITICAL WAR EVER GIVES YOU TIME TO FIGHT THE ENEMY.

2. WE ARE RECEIVED HERE FROM COMUSMACV HEADQUARTERS TO SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN AL_CO TIES IN LAOS BECAUSE OF THE CRITICAL SITUATION THERE, AND SAYS THAT THE MARINES SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THIS EffORT. HE POINTS OUT THAT THE MARINE LEVEL OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT EXCEEDS CONSIDERABLY THE LEVEL PROVIDED TO THE OTHER US AND FREE WORLD FORCES, EVEN CONSIDERING THE LARGER SIZE OF OUR BATTALIONS.

3. WE THEN GOES ON TO SAY THAT HE IS NOT WHOLLY CONTENT WITH THE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS RESPECTING THE FIRST MAW, AND THAT JOE MOORE IS GOING TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH MCCUTCHEON RIGHT AWAY.

4. I HAVE DISCUSSED THE ABOVE WITH SHARP. HE MAKES TWO SIMPLE POINTS:
   A. THE LAOS REQUIREMENT IS GENUINE, AND WE MUST BE FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HELP TO MEET IT.
   B. HE IS ADAMANT THAT OUR CURRENT COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS ARE CORRECT, AND OUR AIR-GROUND PHILOSOPHY IS SOUND. HE INTENDS TO TELL WESTY SO BY PETER'S MESSAGE, AND TO RESIST ANY CHANGE IN POLICY.

5. MY APPRAISAL IS THIS:
   A. SO LONG AS WE DO NOT GIVE ANYONE A GOOD CASE FOR CLAIMING THAT WE ARE DRAGGING OUR FEET ON THE LAOS BUSINESS, I AM SURE THAT SHARP WILL STAND STRONGLY BEHIND PRESERVATION OF THE MAINE AIR-GROUND TEAM AND THE PRESENT COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS.
B. IF, HOWEVER, A PERSUASIVE CASE COULD SOMEHOW BE GENERATED, TO THE EFFECT THAT WE ARE NOT WORKING WITH MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY AS A PART OF THE OVERALL TACT, I DOUBT IF SHARP COULD SELL THE PRESSURE, HOWEVER HARD HE TRIED.

C. THEREFORE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO ENSURE THAT OUR RECORD IS ONE OF RESPONSIVENESS IN REACTION AND EFFICIENCY IN PERFORMANCE, REALIZING THAT, UNLESS HE CHANGES GREATLY, MOORE WILL CONTINUE TO ALLEG NON-COOPERATION AND INEFFECTIVENESS.

D. PLEASE KEEP ME INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS, AND I WILL DO MY BEST TO KEEP THE BOAT ON AN EVEN KEEL. REGARDS TO ALL.

CP

465
FLASH

(PERSONAL FOR)

Z Ø81712Z
FM COMUSMACV

TO CG III MAF

SE
SECRET 12246
PERSONAL FOR GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

REFERENCE III MAF Ø81516Z APR

1. REFERENCE MESSAGE ACKNOWLEDGED. YOUR PLAN APPROVED. PLEASE KEEP ME INFORMED ON PROGRESS YOU UNDERTAKING.

2. PRIOR TO ANY MOVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT FORCES INTO CITY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS BE COMPLETED. MATTER SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH SENIOR COMMANDER OF GOVERNMENT TROOPS AT DANANG WHO I ASSUME WILL BE GEN VIEU FOR THE TIME BEING.

CP=4

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES = FILE COPY
COPIES 2&3 OF 3 COPIES = CG III MAF

COMUSMACV Z Ø81712Z/APR CG III MAF

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

Z 061365Z ZFF4
FM CHIBSMACV
TO CG III MAF
ST
SECRET 12213 MACJOO
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND:
1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION STEMS FROM TODAY'S LEADERSHIP
COMMITTEE MEETING, LAST PORTION OF WHICH I ATTENDED AT REQUEST
OF PM KY.
2. GEN CHUAN HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND,
AND THE COMMITTEE HAS APPROVED THIS ACTION: IN ADDITION TO
STATING THAT ONLY THREE OFFICERS ON THE I CORPS STAFF SUPPORTED
HIM, CHUAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD LOST CONTROL OVER THE
POPULACE IN GENERAL AND THE DANANG SITUATION IN PARTICULAR. 

PAGE 2 UNSHA 839H SECRET
COMMITTEE NOW ACCEPTS THAT GEN THI ENJOYS THE LOYALTY OF THE
BULK OF THE I CORPS STAFF, AND THAT HE IS CONTROLLING THE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS FROM BEHIND THE SCENES. WHAT INFLUENCE HE EXERTS
OVER THE 1ST DIVISION IS UNCLEAR; CERTAINLY HE DOES NOT CONTROL
THE 2D DIVISION.
3. IT APPEARS THAT FOUR FACTIONS ARE VING FOR POWER: GEN
THI AND HIS FOLLOWERS, THE BDDHISTS, THE STRUGGLE COMMITTEE
AND THE VC. THE VC ARE ENDEAVORING TO INFLUENCE THE BDDHISTS
AND THE STRUGGLE COMMITTEE. MOREOVER, THEY ARE HARD AT WORK
"PREPARING THE BATTLEFIELD" WITHIN THE CITY OF DANANG BY INFILTRATION
IN THE HOPE THEY CAN TURN THE SITUATION TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.
4. THE COMMITTEE ACCEPTS THAT GEN CO HAS BEEN, FOR ALL
INTENTS AND PURPOSES, A HOSTAGE OF THE THI FACTION WITHIN I
CORPS HEADQUARTERS. THEY REQUESTED MY ASSISTANCE IN RETURNING
CO TO SAIGON, POINTING OUT THAT THEIR REQUEST FOR Q-130S TO RETURN
VIETNAMESE MARINES TO SAIGON TODAY WAS A RUSE DESIGNED TO MAKE
AVAILABLE AT DANANG AIRCRAFT ON WHICH CO COULD BE A RETURN PASSENGER.
GEN THI THEN REVEALED THAT THEY HAD PLANNED TO ASK ME TO PRE-
VAIL UPON YOU TO INVITE GO TO YOUR QUARTERS FOR DINNER THIS EVENING
AS A MEANS OF ENABLING CO TO TELEPHONE PM KY FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND
COMMISMACV
Z 061305Z/APR

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

LTGEN WALT

DECLASSIFIED
PAGE 3 UMSMA 839U S E C R E T

TO FACILITATE HIS ACCESS TO THE AIRBASE, FORTUITOUSLY, AS YOU KNOW, GEN VIEN MANAGED TO GET TO THE AIRBASE ON HIS OWN AND TELEPHONE THE PM FROM THERE. HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE PM TO RETURN TO SAIGON.

5. THE COMMITTEE INTENDS TO DISPATCH GEN VIEN AND A COMMAND GROUP TO DANANG TOMORROW MORNING. HOPEFULLY, VIEN WILL BE ABLE TO INSTALL HIMSELF IN I CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND ASSUME COMMAND OF ARVN, VNAP AND MARINE FORCES IN I CIZ. IT IS PLANNED THAT TWO RANGER BATTALIONS FROM THE SAIGON AREA WILL BE FLOWN TO DANANG TONIGHT OR TOMORROW BY VNAP OR AIR VIETNAMESE AIRCRAFT TO REINFORCE THE GOVERNMENT FORCES.

I DO NOT PLAN TO MAKE US AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

6. IN THE INTERIM PRIOR TO VIEN'S ARRIVAL, NOMINAL COMMAND OF THE CORPS RESIDES WITH GEN LAM WHO WILL REMAIN AT QUANG NAI. COLONEL THANH, THE 1 CORPS CHIEF OF STAFF, WILL BE THE SENIOR OFFICER IN THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

7. ON OR ABOUT 10 APRIL, THE COMMITTEE PLANS TO INSTALL LT GEN TON THAT DINH, PRESENTLY CO OF THE TRAINING COMMAND ARVN INSPECTOR GENERAL, AS CO, 1 CORPS. DINH IS A NATIVE OF HUE AND HAS COMMANDED BOTH THE 1ST AND 20 DIVISIONS IN HUE.

PAST OTHER ASSIGNMENTS HAVE INCLUDED COMMAND OF II CORPS AND III CORPS. I WOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE APPROPRIATE BIOGRAPHICAL DATA FORWARDED TO YOU.

8. GEN IS ALLEGED TO HAVE CALLED COL THANH AND INDIcATED HE WOULD NOT BE RETURNING. HE URGED THANH TO "KEEP THINGS QUIET."

9. DEPENDING UPON DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE JJS WILL DETACH THE 20 DIVISION FROM I CORPS AND ASSIGN IT TO II CORPS. AN APPROPRIATE BOUNDARY CHANGE WOULD ACCOMPANY THIS ACTION. YOU WILL BE INFORMED OF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION WE OBTAIN ON THIS POSSIBILITY.

10. THE AMBASSADOR HAS DECIDED THAT THE TIME HAS ARRIVED FOR THE EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIZENS FROM DANANG CITY.

However, since you and Thomsen are the people on the ground, he would like to insure your concurrence in this action. If you and Thomsen feel that this evacuation should take place, you should proceed to do so tomorrow at the earliest practical time in such fashion as to minimize Vietnamese reaction. If you and Thomsen feel that this step is ill-advised, you should make your views known. If possible, you should plan on taking care of the PADN at the airfield, at least temporarily. If
YOU CANNOT PROVIDE FOR THE PEOPLE INVOLVED, MR. THOMSEN, SHOULD NOTIFY THE US EMBASSY SO THAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO TRANSPORT THEM TO SAIGON AND TAKE CARE OF THEM HERE. IF MR. JORGENSEN'S REPRESENTATIVE WISHES TO LEAVE HIS PEOPLE IN PANANG CITY, THIS IS HIS PREROGATIVE.

11. THE STRATEGY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN ESSENCE IS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE STRUGGLE FORCES IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF HAVING THEM LOSE CONFIDENCE IN THEMSELVES, START SPLITTING APART AND ENTAILING THE WRATH OF THE PEOPLE. BY WORKING CAREFULLY THROUGH ADVISORS AND OTHER CONTACTS AND IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH MR. THOMSEN AND MR. JORGENSEN'S REPRESENTATIVE, PERHAPS WE CAN HELP. GENERAL FREUND IS ARRIVING TONIGHT TO ASSIST YOU IN ANY WAY HE CAN. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH HIM SEVERAL IDEAS.

12. IN EXTENSION OF MY COMMENTS DURING OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION EARLIER THIS EVENING, I AM FULLY AWARE OF THE SENSITIVE AND DEMANDING RESPONSIBILITIES YOU BEAR AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME. I HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN YOUR HANDLING OF THE SITUATION AND HIGHEST PRAISE FOR YOUR PERFORMANCE INDIVIDUALLY AND THAT OF YOUR COMMAND.

DIST: COPIES 1 OF 3 COPIES: FILE
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES: MAF

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

TO III MAF
ZEM
SECRET MAC 2723
PERSONAL FOR WALT FROM WESTMORELAND. DELIVER NO LATER THAN 0700 LOCAL TIME.

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PROVIDING THE INFORMATION AS BASIS FOR REPLY TO FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED LAST NIGHT FROM OFFICE CJCS. TO MEET DEADLINE SHOULD HAVE REPORT IN MY HANDS BY 1600 HRS TODAY.

QUOTE:
SECRET
CITE JCS 1833-66

1. SECRETARY McNAMARA WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO SEE IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION FROM GENERAL CHUAN OF I CORPS VIA GENERAL WALT. WHAT HE HAS IN MIND IS POSSIBILITY THAT WALT COULD USE CHANNEL OF CORPS COMMANDER TO CORPS COMMANDER APPROACH AT MILITARY LEVEL TO PROBE ON SUCH MATTERS AS CHUAN'S VIEW OF THE SITUATION AND OF THE MAIN FORCES AT WORK, HOW CHUAN SEES THE SITUATION DEVELOPING FROM HERE ON OUT IN TERMS OF MAJOR ALTERNATIVES, WHAT PART IH AND NHUAN ARE TAKING, WHAT VC INVOLVEMENT THERE IS, WHAT HE (CHUAN) HOPES AND THINKS SHOULD BE DONE, ETC.

2. IN THE PROCESS SEC DEF IS ANXIOUS THAT THE EFFORT TO OBTAIN THE INFORMATION DOES NOT "CROSS WIRES" WITH WHAT GVN IS DOING (AND PARTICULARLY AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OR IMPLICATION OF CONSTITUTING "NEGOTIATIONS"), AND PARTICULARLY SHOULD NOT INVOLVE ANY MOVEMENTS OR MEETINGS ON GENERAL WALT'S PART WHICH WOULD PUT HIM IN DANGER OF FALLING INTO HANDS OF STRUGGLE GROUP, BEING HELD BY THEM, ETC.

3. IF ANY INFORMATION IS GATHERED BY MEANS SUGGESTED ABOVE SEC DEF WOULD, OF COURSE, WANT IT TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO AMBASSADOR OR LODGE. FINALLY, IF THIS CAN BE DONE WITHIN TERMS OF PARAGRAPHS 2 ABOVE, SEC DEF WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE REPORT OF OUTCOME, INCLUDING ANY INFORMATION GAINED, BY 0800 A.M., THURSDAY, 7 APRIL, WASHINGTON TIME.

UNQUOTE.

062055Z

MASTER COPY

DECLASSIFIED
TO III MAF

ZEM

SECRET MAC 2725
PERSONAL FOR WALT FROM WESTMORELAND. DELIVER NO LATER THAN 0700 LOCAL TIME.

I SENT THE FOLLOWING INTERIM REPLY TO MESSAGE QUOTED TO YOU IN MAC 2723 DTG 062055.

QUOTE:
FROM WESTMORELAND TO GOODPASTER
SEC RET MAC 2724
REFERENCE JCS 1833-66

1. ALTHOUGH PREVIOUSLY I HAD INSTRUCTED WALT TO STAY ALOOF AND AVOID CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH PARTIES TO THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION, I INSTRUCTED HIM YESTERDAY TO SEEK OUT CHUAN IN AN EFFORT TO SMOKE OUT THE SITUATION. ALSO, I SENT MY CHIEF OF STAFF TO I CORPS YESTERDAY, AS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND TO PASS GUIDANCE FROM ME TO WALT.

2. WALT SPENT SOME TIME WITH BOTH CHUAN & CO AND FOUND THEM OUTWARDLY GETTING ALONG TOGETHER, AND APPARENTLY MAKING SOME PROGRESS IN MOLLIFYING THE ANTAGONISTIC PARTIES. UPON ROSSONS RETURN AT 2100 HRS YESTERDAY EVENING HE RELAYED TO ME THE SAME IMPRESSION.

3. PERHAPS THROUGH MISUNDERSTANDING, BUT MAYBE BY DEVIOUS DESIGN, A CONFLICT ON TACTICS DEVELOPED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON BETWEEN KY AND CO ABOUT HOW BEST TO APPROACH THE SITUATION. KY AND HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE THE CHIEF OF THE MSS, COL LOAN, WERE ON THE SIDE OF USING ACTIVE FORCE IN DA NANG; WHILAS CO AFTER TALKING TO CHUAN DETERMINED THAT THE MATTER MIGHT BE SOLVED WITHOUT PHYSICAL CONFLICT AND BLOODSHED WHICH WOULD BE INEVITABLE IF THE ARVN MARINES INVADED THE CITY OF DA NANG. MEANWHILE, KY HAS PUT LOAN IN COMMAND, BYPASSING CO ON THE PRETEXT THAT CO HAD GONE OVER TO THE SIDE OF CHUAN WHO HAD IN TURN SIDED WITH THE STRUGGLE GROUP.

4. LAST EVENING I TOLD WALT THAT THE TIME HAD ARRIVED FOR HIM TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE, AND URGED HIM TO TRY AND GET THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY PARTIES, NAMELY CHUAN, CO, LOAN AND THE VN MARINE TASK FORCE COMMANDER INTO A ROOM AND IN COMMUNICATION, ONE WITH THE OTHER. WE HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS WITH THIS TECHNIQUE IN PAST UPHANEALS AND I INFORMED WALT THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO GIVE IT A TRY.

5. WALT UNDERSTANDS FULL WELL THE CAUTIONS HE MUST TAKE AS POINTED OUT IN PART TWO OF YOUR MESSAGE.

THE EMBASSY HAS CONSTANTLY BEEN APPRISED OF MY INSTRUCTIONS.

DECLASSIFIED
I see the situation the Buddhists are putting great pressure on Ky and are attempting to strike a hard bargain with him designed to crack the unity that has prevailed within the leadership council, and to eliminate from the active scene several members who are unpopular with them, specifically Thiu and possibly so and Quang. It is within this context that I viewed with concern yesterday the conflict between Ky and co. Furthermore, Chuan and Nhu have great pressures on them from the local Buddhists and struggle group on the one side, and the government on the other. It is obvious that they are perplexed, but are apparently attempting to find some way of accommodating both parties and avoiding violence which could be very great since emotions are running high. Their efforts in this regard have accordingly been misunderstood by parties in the conflict which has tended to create accusations, rumors, and suspicions, and in the final analysis, has tended to exacerbate the situation. It was within this context that I asked Walt to become more actively involved on a commander to commander, soldier to soldier basis; but at the same time not impose himself to the point where, "wires would be crossed."

7. In summary, in my opinion, the key to the situation is the handling of Tri Quang. Whether Ky is sufficiently courageous and smart enough to handle this tough customer remains to be seen.

I shall report further by the deadline imposed.

End quote.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT AND NR OF COPIES</th>
<th>COPY NR</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 of 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 of 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RECEIVED ONE (1) SEALED ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1-2 OF 2 COPIES OF CG FMFPAC 060343Z/APR

TOR

COPY____ OF____ COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
EXCLUSIVE

THE PRESSURE HAS GROWN STEADILY FOR THE NAVY TO SET UP AN AERIAL TANKER UNIT OF ITS OWN TO SUPPORT TF 77. THE TREND, REFLECTED IN MUCH BACK-CHANNEL TRAFFIC, HAS BEEN TO TRY AND GET THEM OUT OF NEW PROCUREMENT. PREVIOUSLY, THIS IS A LONG TERM PROSPECT - IF IT EVER MATERIALIZES AT ALL. REF A IS CINPAC'S OUT AT THE BALL. REF B IS THE ORIGINAL CINPACFLT REQUEST.

MEANWHILE, IN REF C, COMSEVENTHFLT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT WE ARE REALLY THE ONLY IMMEDIATE SOURCE, AND BEGINS UNILATERALLY TO MOVE IN ON OUR RESOURCES. IF WE DO NOT TAKE THE OFFENSIVE NOW, WE ARE GOING TO loose out, SINCE NOBODY ELSE IS ON OUR SIDE.

FOR THIS REASON, I HAVE ADDRESSED THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO CINPACFLT TODAY. QUOTE: SUBJ: AERIAL TANKER SUPPORT FOR TF 77 REF: (A) CINPAC Ø30503Z (B) CINPACFLT 250442Z MAR 66 (C) COMSEVENTHFLT Ø31514Z (S) QUOTE.

1. I HAVE FOLLOWED THE MESSAGE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE NEED FOR TANKER SUPPORT FOR TF 77 OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE THE PROPOSALS WHICH RESULTED IN TRANSMISSION OF REFERENCE (A).

2. THE NEED FOR SHORE BASED REFUELING SUPPORT FOR FLEET AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM IS CLEAR, AS ARE THE CURRENT LIMITATIONS ON CARRIER-BASED REFUELERS. LIKEWISE CLEAR IS THE FACT THAT THE KC-130, OF WHICH THE TOTAL INVENTORY IS SMALL, MAKES AN EXCELLENT MEDIUM FOR THE REFUELING TASK. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT REFERENCE (B) IS IN REQUESTING ASSIGNMENT OF KC-130 AIRCRAFT DOES NOT PROPOSE THAT THEY BE PROVIDED FROM MARINE RESOURCES, IT IS A FACT THAT THERE ARE FEW OTHER SOURCES FROM WHICH THEY COULD COME WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE DELAY. NOTE, IN REFERENCE (C), THAT COMSEVENTHFLT HAS RECOGNIZED THIS REALITY IN DIRECTING PREPARATION OF A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR EMPLOYING MARINE KC-130 AIRCRAFT FOR REFUELING TASK FORCE 77 MISSIONS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
4. THE USMC KC-130S WERE PROVIDED FOR MARINE AERIAL REFUELING AND FOR COMBAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT. THOSE IN FMFPAC ARE BEING SO EMPLOYED NOW, AND THERE IS NO EXCESS CAPACITY. REFUELING TASKS, PLUS COMBAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT FLIGHTS LINKING NON-MAC CHANNEL AREAS CRITICAL TO OUR OPERATION WITH IWAKUNI, ATSUGI, FUTJIA, CHU LAI AND PHU BAI AGGREGATE FULL PROGRAM UTILIZING DIRECT SUPPORT OF OUR VIETNAM COMMITMENT.

5. APART FROM ALL OF THE ABOVE, I BELIEVE THAT THE COMBAT NEEDS OF TF 77 SHOULD BE ACCORDED HIGH PRIORITY; FURTHER THAT THOSE COMBAT NEEDS SHOULD BE MET PROMPTLY AND IN THE MOST EFFICIENT MANNER POSSIBLE. SPECIFICALLY, AS AN INTERIM UNTIL A MORE DURABLE NAVY ARRANGEMENT CAN BE EVOLVED, I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING:

A. CALCULATE THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF KC-130 TANKERS WHICH SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT OF TF-77.

B. AUGMENT MARINE RESOURCES BY AN EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF C-130S.

C. TASK THE MARINES TO PROVIDE TANKER SUPPORT FOR TF-77 AS REQUIRED.

6. THIS WOULD ENSURE THAT THE TASK IS ACCOMPLISHED WITH RESOURCES OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT, WHILE PRECLUDING DEGRADATION OF ESSENTIAL MARINE COMBAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT EFFORT FOR VIETNAM FORCES. THE COST TO THE MARINES WOULD BE IN AIR CREWS AND GROUND SUPPORT PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR OPERATION OF THE AUGMENTATION C-130 AIRCRAFT. UNQUOTE.

4. FOR ALL, TAKE THE ABOVE AS GUIDANCE. STILES USE THE FORMULA INCLUDED-THEREIN IN RESPONDING TO SUBPARAS 2E AND F OF REF C, MAKING PLAIN THAT AS IN THE PAST, IF A CRISIS FLEET REFUELING REQUIREMENT OCCURS VMGR 152 WILL COME THROUGH.

REGARDS

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 3 COPIES: MAF
COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES: FMAW
CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC P060343Z/APR LTCEN WALT & MCEN MCCUTCHEON

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
CONFIDENTIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

BASE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING (U)

A: CG III MAF 270818Z/FEB
B: CINCPACFLT 142351Z/MAR
C: CHNAVDVGRU SAIGON 310135Z/MAR

1. Refs A, B and C propose that COMNAVFORV perform base development functions in I CTZ.

2. I believe you would do well to resist any proposal by COMNAVFORV to delegate responsibility for base development planning to NAVSUPPAC. Such action would result in an inherent conflict of interest on the assignment of priorities or apportionment of funds wherein the desires of a junior commander might override the tactical requirements of the senior zone commander.

3. COMNAVFORV may nevertheless carry out the above responsibilities by establishment of a branch base development section in I CTZ independent of III MAF or NAVSUPPAC DANANG. In this regard, adequate marine representation is mandatory to insure III MAF of interests are protected. Personnel set forth in Ref A on proposed staffing of COMNAVFORV base development section should apply to I CTZ branch. I will support request for additional USMC personnel for staffing COMNAVFORV base development planning section in Saigon to handle Marine Corps portion of RVN-wide Navy Military construction and to protect III MAF interest.

REGARDS

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 2 COPIES: MAF

CG FMFPAC R 060223Z/APR

LTGEN WALT

Copy 1 of 2
Memorandum

From: Commanding General

To: C/S

Gen McCutcheon

L-3
I am delighted with the success of your team in Operation Jack Stay. I share their enthusiasm. Not only did the outstanding example of professionalism and integrated effort inspire our Vietnamese counterparts, it also dealt a severe blow to the Viet Cong.

In my opinion, our command arrangements were fully satisfactory and I am appreciative that we were able to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution to our respective requirements.

Further, I believe that the operation has been of the appropriate duration considering the mission and the hardships imposed upon the troops.

As to the future, I anticipate hard fighting by III MAF in the weeks ahead and having the SLF as a combat ready mobile airfield force will provide the required assurance of flexibility to meet contingencies ashore. Warm regards.

Page 2

Best regards,

[Signature]
SECRET

PERSONAL FOR KALT III MAF FROM WESTMORELAND SAIGON

MATERIAL QUOTED BELOW FOR YOUR INFORMATION.  YOU WILL NOTE THAT GUIDANCE CON-
FORMS TO INSTRUCTIONS YOU HOLD FROM ME.  QUOTE

ANOTHER ASPECT OF OPERATION WHICH CONCERNS US GRAVELY IS KY'S EX-
PLICIT THREAT TO SHOOT MAYOR OF DA NANG.  OUR EVIDENCE HERE SIMPLY
DOES NOT SUPPORT CHARGE THAT HE HAS DIRECT CONNECTION WITH VC, ALTHOUGH
GVN DOES HAVE CLEAR CASE FOR RELIEVING HIM AND MOVING AGAINST HIM
ON BASIS HIS LEADERSHIP OF STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AND REFUSAL TO ACCEPT
GVN ORDERS TO RESTORE ORDER IN DA NANG.  YOU SHOULD QUIR ALSO THAT
INTERVIEWS WITH CORRESPONDENTS PUBLISHED HERE PORTRAY HIM IN REASON-
ABLE AND FAVORABLE LIGHT.  OUR OWN NET JUDGMENT IS THAT HE IS OPPOR-
TUNIST AND PROBABLY EXTREMIST BUT NOT VC.  IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,
AND INDEED EVEN IF HE WERE IN FACT VC, WE BELIEVE ANY SUMMARY EXECUTION
BY GVN WOULD STRIKE EXTREMELY BAD NOTE AND TREMENDOUSLY DISCREDIT
GVN EVEN IF IT PULLED THE OPERATION OFF SUCCESSFULLY OTHERWISE.
WE URGED THAT THIS POINT BE MADE FORCEFULLY AND PROBABLY BY YOU PERSON-
ALLY THROUGH KALT DANE, AND ALSO TO KY IF WE HAVE WAY OF
REACHING HIM BEFORE ISSUE ARISES.

ONE FURTHER THOUGHT IS OBVIOUS DANGER THAT GVN MARINE BATTALIONS
WILL FIRE ON AND KILL CIVILIANS, POSSIBLY IN SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES.
WE WONDER WHETHER THEY HAVE TRAINING IN RIOT CONTROL AGENTS OR
CAN BE SUPPLIED BY US WITH SUCH AGENTS ON AS QUIET A BASIS AS POSSIBLE.
WE LEAVE IT TO YOU AND WESTMORELAND WHETHER THIS CAN BE DONE, BUT
BELIEVE IT MIGHT MAKE MAJOR DIFFERENCE BOTH IN LASTING EFFECTIVENESS
OF OPERATION AND IN WAY IT APPEARS HERE AND ELSEWHERE.

AS TO HOW OUR FORCES SHOULD CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN EVENT OF MAJOR
CONFLICT IN DA NANG OR POSSIBLY IN HUE, WE ASSUME YOU AND WESTMORE-
LAND HAVE ENSURED THAT OUR FORCES HAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTION NOT TO BE
COME INVOLVED IF POSSIBLE AND IN ANY EVENT TO USE ONLY MINIMUM MEA-
SURES NECESSARY IF DIRECTLY ATTACKED.  WE RECOGNIZE THAT OPERATING IN-
STALLATIONS MUST BE DEFENDED IN EVERY WAY, BUT IF YOU CONSIDER
OPERATING INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS MACV COMPOUND IN HUE IN DANGER OF
ATTACK, AND IF GVN CANNOT OR WILL NOT DEFEND, YOU HAVE AUTHORITY TO
ORDER EVACUATION TO AVOID OUR CASUALTIES OR NECESSITATE US FIRES ON
VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS.

POSSIBILITY ALSO EXISTS THAT GVN MARINE BATTALIONS MAY BECOME
INVOLVED IN CONFLICT WITHIN DA NANG OR CONCEIVABLY HUE OR MEET
DISSIDENT I CORPS FORCES ELSEWHERE AND THAT GVN MAY REQUEST HELP PER-
HAPS ON BASIS VC INVOLVEMENT, WE CANNOT FORESEE JUST HOW SUCH A SITU-
ATION MIGHT DEVELOP, BUT OUR PRESENT VIEW IS THAT US FORCES SHOULD NOT
REPEAT NOT BE USED IN ANY WAY WITHIN DA NANG OR HUE OR AGAINST DISS-
IDENT GVN FORCES.  ANY PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES SHOULD CERTAINLY BE DEALT
WITH ALONG THESE LINES, AND IN NO EVENT SHOULD USG FORCES BE AUTHORIZED
TO TAKE ACTION EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE WITHOUT DECISION HERE.
THIS OF COURSE DOES NOT REPEAT NOT IN ANY WAY LIMIT CONTINUING AUTHO-
RITY FOR USG FORCES TO CONDUCT NORMAL ANTI-VC OPERATIONS IN COUNTRYSIDE
OUTSIDE OF CITIES, PARTICULARLY AGAINST POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED VC UNITS
MOVING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION.  HOWEVER, EVEN HERE WE CAN SEE
SOME POSSIBILITY OF USG FORCES BECOMING ENTANGLED WITH DISSIDENT I
CORPS FORCES, AND GENERAL GUIDELINE SHOULD BE AVOID CONFLICT IF AT ALL
POSSIBLE WITHOUT SERIOUS SACRIFICE TO ANTI-VC MISSIONS.

AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT PRESS HERE IS ALREADY
GIVING BIG PLAY TO BURNING OF US JEEP IN SAIGON DEMONSTRATION.
IMPERATIVE THAT BOTH OUR FORCES AND EQUIPMENT BE OUT OF LINETOF
FIRE TO ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM, UNQUOTE

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.
PERSONAL FOR
PERSONAL FOR

SECRET

1. THE RECENT VIETNAMESE STUDENT DENTATIONS AMONG MANY OTHER SUBJECTS HAVE EXPRESSED RESENTMENT OVER US POLICIES IN VIETNAM AND REQUESTED THAT "THEY BE TREATED AS PARTNERS AND NOT DICTATED TO." WHILE AN ISOLATED INCIDENT, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER INFORMATION IT SEEMS TO REFLECT A LATENT CONCERN AMONG THE VIETNAMESE OVER THE OVERWHELMING ROLE PLAYED BY US/FREE WORLD FORCES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS. THIS IS AN AREA WHICH CONCERNS ME GREATLY AND ONE TO WHICH I DESIRE ALL COMMANDERS TO GIVE THEIR PERSONAL ATTENTION.

2. OUR OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM POSE A CHALLENGE GREATER THAN ANY WE HAVE FACED IN PAST WARS. THE ABSENCE OF AN OVER-ALL ALLIED COMMAND STRUCTURE AND THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONAL COORDINATION UNDER WHICH WE MUST OPERATE REQUIRES A KEEN APPRAISAL AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE VIEWPOINT OF OUR VIETNAMESE COMRADES-IN-ARMS. AFTER THE INITIAL RELIEF OVER RECEIVING REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE FREE WORLD IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY SENSITIVE TO THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR AND RESENT BEING BYPASSED OR SEEMINGLY IGNORED WHEN OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN AREAS FOR WHICH THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE. NORMALLY THEIR CONCERN OVER IMAGINED SLIGHTS COULD BE IGNORED AS "A TEMPEST IN THE TEAPOT." HOWEVER, IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE IN VIETNAM, WE MUST BE ALERT TO ALL POTENTIAL DIVERGENT INFLUENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE VC PROPAGANDISTS COULD WELL USE THIS POINT AS THE BASIS FOR A MAJOR PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO DISRUPT THE PRESENT CLOSE ARVN/US RELATIONSHIP.
There is therefore it is important that commanders re-view their relationship with the Vietnamese military with whom they are operating to insure they are working closely with their Vietnamese counterparts. The method of solving this problem will vary with the level of the organization and the personality of the individual dealt with. It is imperative that action be taken not only to include the ARVN military in planning for operations but that the ARVN commanders also be encouraged to contribute ARVN, RF, PF or CIDG forces to the operation.

The importance of conducting combined operations must be stressed. We must continue to emphasize that this is their war and we are here only to assist them. This must continuously be emphasized at all levels in the chain of command. It is just as important for the company or battery commander operating in a district to work closely with the district chief as it is for the US division commander to work closely with his ARVN division counterpart.

In many cases, due to the need for security, it is recognized that the plans which are covered with the Vietnamese commander will be general in nature. However, it is felt that such general conferences outlining the fact that a US unit will be operating in an area and asking the ARVN for a contribution of troops in order to make it a combined operation should go far toward generating an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation.

GP-4

BT

DIST: COPY 01 OF 3 COPIES FILES
      COPIES 2 AND 3 OF 3 COPIES

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

COMMUSMACV 03131BZ APR 66
SECRET

MESSAGE DISTRIBUTION CENTER
1st MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY
CG/1342

FROM: CG FIRST MARAC

TO: CG FMF/PAC

INFO: CG III MAG, CG FMF/PAC/IMAC FWD

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRUZA INFO LTGEN WALT AND BGEN VANSTOCKUM FROM MCCUTCHEON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

UTILIZATION OF KC-130 AIRCRAFT (U)

EXCLUSIVE

A. YOUR 022120Z

1. IN REPLY TO REFERENCE A CERTAIN STEPS HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN TO AVOID DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN TACLOG FLIGHTS AND MAC FLIGHTS. SINCE 15 FEBRUARY 1966 ALL CARGO DESTINED FOR CHU LAI FROM IWAKUNI AND OKINAWA AREA HAS BEEN FLOWN DIRECTLY TO CHU LAI. SEVEN FLIGHTS WERE MADE DIRECTLY TO CHU LAI DURING FEBRUARY AND 42 FLIGHTS DURING MARCH. THE PERCENTAGE WILL INCREASE WITH THE ARRIVAL OF 1ST MARDIV. IN ADDITION ONE HELICOPTER SQUADRON ROTATION WAS MADE DIRECTLY BETWEEN PHU BAI AND FUTERA LATE JAN - EARLY FEB.

2. AT THE PRESENT TIME TWO FLIGHTS EACH WEEK ARE MADE FROM DAMANG TO CURTIS POINT FOR E AND F SCHOOL, PERSONNEL TRANSPORTATION, AND LOGISTICS PURPOSES. AS SUPPLY POINT AT SURIQ BAY BECOMES MORE ACTIVE, LOGISTICS FLIGHTS TO CURTIS POINT WILL BE REQUIRED. THIS ROUTE WILL BE INFLUENCED IN THE NEAR FUTURE IF THE NAVY MAC CHANNEL IS ESTABLISHED.

3. CARGO DESTINED FOR RVW ORIGINATING IN IWAKUNI REMAINS ON THE SAME AIRCRAFT UNTIL ARRIVAL IN COUNTRY THEREBY ELIMINATING ADDITIONAL CARGO HANDLING.

4. PHU BAI IS NOT CONSIDERED AN ALL-WEATHER FACILITY AND FROM THE SAFETY STANDPOINT, REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE MADE THERE UNTIL WE HAVE A GOOD APPROACH SYSTEM. A MATOCA HAS RECENTLY BEEN INSTALLED AND IS BEING FLIGHT CHECKED NOW.

5. I BELIEVE THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM IS TO CONTINUE WITH SPECIAL FLIGHTS TO PHU BAI AND CHU LAI AS CARGO AND OTHER COMMODITIES DICTATE. A GOOD PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FLIGHTS ARE GOING TO CHU LAI NOW AND THIS FIGURE WILL INCREASE. WE CAN RESCHEDULE ENOUGH FLIGHTS TO BRING THIS ABOVE FIFTY PERCENT IF NECESSARY AND NOT CAUSE ANY GREAT INCONVENIENCES. FLIGHTS SENT TO PHU BAI AND CHU LAI MUST DEPART IMMEDIATELY FOR DAMANG DUE TO EXTREMELY LIMITED PARKING AT BOTH FIELDS.

CP4

DECLASSIFIED

MARCOR EYES ONLY

OR CLEAVER: KEITH B. M CUTCHEON, MajGen Commanding General

CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONAL FOR

VV MSA775692CIR475
PP RUNSNF
DE RUABRL 064A 0340650
ZNY CCCCC
P 040755Z
FN CG FMFPAC/MAC (FWD)
TO RUHLGR/CG FMFPAC
INFO RUNSNF/CG III MAF
RUNNARW/CG FIRST MAF
BT

CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONNEL FOR LTGEN KRULAK LTGEN WALT MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON
UTILIZATION OF C-130 AIRCRAFT (U)
A. YOUR 022120Z
1. AN REVIEWING SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS NOTED REF A. HOWEVER
TO MAKE MY COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS MORE MEANINGFUL I PLAN
TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH CG III MAF AND CG FIRST MAF.

2. WILL SUBMIT REACTIONS UPON MY RETURN.

GP-4

BT

LIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE
COPIES 2&3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF

CG FMFPAC/1 MAC(FWD) P 040755Z/APR

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM - CONFIDENTIAL

TO: CG III MAF
   CG FIRST MAF
   CG FMFPAC/1 MAC (FWD)

CONFIDENTIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT, MGEN MCCUTCHEON
AND BGEN VAN STOCKUM FROM LTGEN KRULAK. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. WHILE WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THE PAST IN PREVENTING INROADS INTO
OUR ORGANIC AIRLIFT CAPABILITY THERE ARE CONSTANT INDICATORS THAT THIS MAY
NOT ALWAYS BE THE CASE.

2. ONE OF THE MOST FREQUENT QUESTIONS IS - WHY DO WE FLY OVER MAC CHANNEL
ROUTES OR PARALLEL THESE ROUTES? THE ROUTES FROM KADENA TO DANANG IS THE
MOST PERTINENT CASE IN POINT. AS YOU KNOW, THIS ROUTE IS ALSO SERVICED
BY THE 315TH AIR DIVISION FLIGHTS FROM NAHA TO DANANG.

3. IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO REFUTE THESE INQUIRIES
IS TO SCHEDULE OUR FLIGHTS VIA OTHER ROUTES, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY THIS MAY
CAUSE INCONVENIENCES.

4. IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, IT IS MY VIEW THAT THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE
THIS IS TO CHANGE THE FIRST RUN DESTINATION OF THE DAILY TACLOG FLIGHT
FROM DANANG TO CHU LAI WHENEVER FEASIBLE. IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO ADD PHU
BAI TO THE ITINERARY OR TO ALTERNATE BETWEEN LANDING INITIALLY AT CHU LAI
AND PHU BAI AS CIRCUMSTANCES MAY DICTATE.

5. PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR REACTIONS.

REGARDS

GP-4

DIST: COPY 1&2 OF 2 COPIES - CG III MAF

CG FMFPAC

P 022120Z/APR

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
PERSONAL FOR

NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

(REDACTED)

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

PERSONAL FOR

NOT RELEASEABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS.

J3324 3324
00 UUMSJA
ZY ZSSSS SZH-1
MAE 484
00 KUMSNA
LE KUMSMA J77U 777U 0921150
ZY SSSSS
0 021135Z ZFF-4
FM CONUSMACV
TO CG III MAF
BT
SECRET N0FUUN 10438 FM; MACJOO
PERSONAL FOR GEN WALT, SIGNED WESTMORELAND
I KNOW THAT YOU ARE TAKING ALL POSSIBLE PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT U.S. PERSONNEL FROM BEING MANEUVERED INTO COMPROMISING POSITIONS WITH CIVILIAN DEMONSTRATORS. WE MUST ALSO BE ALERT TO AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED INADVERTENTLY IN THE TENSE POLITICAL SITUATION THROUGH THE PROVISION OF REQUESTED SUPPORT TO RVNAF. IN THIS REGARD, REQUEST THAT NO U.S. HELICOPTERS, PLANES, OR VEHICLES BE USED TO REDEPLOY RVNAF UNITS WHICH COULD LOGICALLY BE EXPECTED TO ASSIST IN CONTROLLING CIVIL DISTURBANCES WITHOUT MY EXPRESS PERMISSION. THIS APPLIES EQUALLY TO ANY GENERAL RESERVE UNITS THAT MIGHT BE AIR LIFTED TO YOUR AREA.
CP 4
BT
DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES-FE9E
COPY 2&3 OF 3 COPIES = CG III MAF

(PAGE ONE OF ONE PAGE)

COMUSMACV 0 021135Z/ APRIL CG III MAF

COPY 03 OF 03 COPIES
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
(PERSONAL FOR)

30/312
MARCH

COMUSMACV
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

2 "COPIES 2+3

(M)

COPY____ OF____ COPIES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF

FOR: CG

1. I opened this because it was referred to in a phone call by gen Rosson’s aide.

2. I have discussed with Gen Rosson.

VR

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

00 RUMSDN
DE RUMSMA 752U 0801325
ZNY SSSSS
Q 301312Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF
BT

SECRET 18066 FROM MACJ900
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND.
1. THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT TURBULENCE IN YOUR AREA, NOTABLY
IN DANANG AND GUE, PRESENTS THE VC WITH LUCRATIVE OPPORTUNITIES
TO TURN THE SITUATION TO HIS ADVANTAGE. I KNOW YOU ARE ALERT TO
THE LIKELIHOOD WE WILL SEEK TO CREATE INCIDENTS DESIGNED TO RO-
VOKE OUR FORCES, DEGRADE OUR POLICIES AND DISRUPT OUR MILITARY
POSTURE.

2. THE FOREGOING REINFORCES NEED FOR CONTINUED COMMAND
EMPHASIS ON ALERTNESS, CALM JUDGEMENT, FIRM DISCIPLINE AND

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 752U SECRET
RESTRAN ON THE PART OF US FORCES, WITHIN POPULATED AREAS
TROOPS SHOULD REMAIN OFF THE STREETS AND TRAFFIC HELD TO AN
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION REACHING ME THIS
EVENING SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF GUN INTERVENTION AT DANANG,
HEU AND POSSIBLY OTHER LOCATIONS IN I-CIZ WITH ELEMENTS OF THE
VIETNAMESE MARINE BRIGADE DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS.
SHOULD THIS OCCUR, THE POINTS OF EMPHASIS CITED ABOVE WILL
ASSUME INCREASED IMPORTANCE. WE SHALL, OF COURSE, KEEP YOU
INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD.

3. ON FRIDAY, 1 APRIL, I PLAN TO SEND BILL ROSSON TO DANANG
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WITH YOU AND OF
PASSING ON SOME SENSITIVE DOCUMENTATION OF PARTICULAR INTEREST.
DEPENDING ON EVENTS AT THE TIME, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR
ASSISTANCE IN FACILITATING HIS ONWARD MOVEMENT TO HUE TO ENABLE
HIM TO PUT A FINGER ON THE PULSE THERE. HE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH
YOU ON 31 MARCH TO COORDINATE THE ITINERARY. GP-4

BT

DIST COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES TO FILE
COPY 2-3 OF 3 COPIES CG 3RD MAF

COMUSMACV 0 301312Z/MARCH 66 CG III MAF
COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
EXCLUSIVE

CG FMFPAC
EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE INTO LTGEN WALT AND MJGEN MCCUTCHEON

McCutcheon

COPY ___ OF ___ COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

FM 28/458Z

TO CMC
INFO CG III MAF
CG 1ST MAF

SECRET SPECIFIC EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE INFO LTGEN WALT AND MAJGEN MCCUTCHEON FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. HAVE JUST BEEN ADVISED BY BG HUTCHINSON OF GINGPAC ACTION ON A COMUSMACV REQUEST THAT HE BE ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIR OPERATIONS IN ROLLING THUNDER ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AND TWO AREAS. SHARP HAS APPROVED THE REQUEST TO THE EXTENT THAT MACV ADV BE TASKED WITH CONDUCTING AIR OPERATIONS IN THE ROLLING THUNDER ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AREA WHICH EXTENDS SOME FIFTY MILES NORTH OF THE DMZ INTO NVN. THIS AREA IS DEFINED BY A LINE COMMENCING ON THE COAST AT 17°52N, 106°27E, ALONG AND INCLUDING ROUTE 106 TO ITS JUNCTION WITH ROUTE 109, NORTHWEST TO THE JUNCTION OF ROUTES 195 AND 15, DUE WEST TO THE LAOS BORDER. SORTIES FOR ROLLING THUNDER PACKAGE ONE WILL BE GENERATED PRIMARILY BY THAILAND BASED, POINT YANKEE CVA RPT CVA AND IN-COUNTRY BASED AIR ELEMENTS, TO ACCOMMODATE THE ADDED AREA RESPONSIBILITY, THE 3000 SORTIES NOW ALLOCATED TO MACV FROM OTHER THAN SVN BASED AIRCRAFT (THAILAND AND POINT YANKEE CVA) WILL BE UPPED TO 3500. AS IS NOW THE CASE, ADDITIONAL SORTIES FROM IN-COUNTRY ASSETS MAY ALSO BE UTILIZED, AS DETERMINED BY COMUSMACV.

2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CHANGE IS THE POSSIBLE IMPACT ON 1ST MAFW OPERATIONS. HERETOFORE ONLY USING EF-106 AND FIGHTER ESCORT AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN COMMITTED TO AIR OPERATIONS IN NVN. IN ADDITION TO IN-COUNTRY COMMITMENTS, THE WING HAS ALSO BEEN TASKED WITH PROVIDING 600 SORTIES PER MONTH IN LAOS. IT IS NOW POSSIBLE THAT THE WING MAY ALSO, FOR THE FIRST TIME, ENGAGE IN STRIKES IN NVN. IF THEY DO, THERE WILL BE THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPERATING UNDER TWO DISTINCT SETS OF RULES IN TWO DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS. WHETHER WESTY TASKS 1ST MAF OR NOT REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

3. GINGPAC IS READDRESSING HIS 262337Z ON THIS SUBJECT TO US TODAY AND I WILL READDRESS TO YOU CURR LEW AND KEITH JCS DOES HOLD THIS MESSAGE NOW, AS OF COURSE DO MACV AND 2ND AIR DIVISION.

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 4 COPIES TO MAF
       COPIES 3-4 OF 4 COPIES TO WING.
CG FMF PAC    0 28/458Z/MAR66    CG III MAF

DECLASSIFIED
FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF
FOR: CA

I opened this on the basis it might require quick action.

[Signature]
P 240058Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO CG III MAF

UNCLAS 39233 FROM MACJ00 PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WALT FROM WESTMORELAND
SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
   THE AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT AND CLOSE COORDINATION DISPLAYED
BY UNITS PARTICIPATING IN OPERATION TEXAS WERE OUTSTANDING.
CONGRATULATIONS

BT
DIST: 00P
DIST: 1 COPY FOR FILE
2 COPIES FOR CG III MAF

COMUSMACV

P 240058Z/MAR
LYGEN WALT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONDUCTIVE

COMMUNICATION CENTER
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 966Cl

DECLASSIFIED

EXCLUSIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIFIC EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK, MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

REALLOCATION OF III MAF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT (U)
A. MACV DIRECTIVE #415-2 OF 15 FEB 66
B. COMUSMACV 281302Z

1. REFERENCE B LOOKS LIKE TROUBLE TO ME, AND I AM NOT EVEN SURE THAT IT IS LEGAL. REFERENCE A DOES NOT GRANT THE MACV DIRECTOR OF CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR REALLOCATION OF III MAF ORGANIC SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT PURCHASED WITH O AND M FUNDS FOR SUPPORT OF YOUR OPERATIONS.

2. I BELIEVE YOU ARE FULLY JUSTIFIED, WHEN RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES SIMILAR TO REF B TO REPORT III MAF ORGANIC ASSETS ONLY WHEN SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THOSE III MAF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN PROGRAMMED TO MEET VALID OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

CP=4

DIST: 2 COPIES TO CG III MAF

CG FMFPAC P 232241Z/MAR LTGEN WALT

DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

1. By attached message CG FMFPac (TAB A) questions the legality of MACV query on III MAF On-Hand Quantities of tentage and lumber.

2. Pertinent portions of MACV Directive (TAB B) are as follows:
   a. "Authority (of the Director of Construction) extends to ... the adjustment of equipment, materials, and other resources as necessary to meet priorities established by COMUSMACV." (Par 3.b.)
   b. "Control of critical materials, Plant and Equipment. The Director of Constructions will specify items deemed critical, and maintain control thereon, to include allocation of such items."

3. Although CG FMFPac may be absolutely correct that this query may mean trouble, our reply (TAB C) did point out that the tents are earmarked for future requirements.

4. I believe we should ignore the past traffic (if we make an issue of it we are crying before we are hurt) and apply CG FMFPac guidance to future queries.

Very respectfully,

J. M. PLATT
Chief of Staff

APPROVAL

DISAPPROVAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCN</th>
<th>6.41</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRED</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ORIGINATOR:** C.G.F.E.M.F.A.C

**FILE**
1-2000

**MAF**
C

**WING**
DG

**DIV**
8-3

**NSA**
G-2

**FLSG**

**5TH COMM**

**ARK**

**DEF "J"**

**I CORPS**

**MCB-5**

**CRYPTO**

**INT**

**SEC**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

This should be used in own briefing where possible.

**SECRET**
SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

1. HERE IS A MOST IMPORTANT QUOTE FROM AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT:
   "QUOTE INDIAN ICC COMMISSIONER RAHMAN DISCUSSED HIS RECENT TRIP TO
   HANOI WITH US EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN SAIGON AND HAD THESE POINTS TO
   MAKE:
   1. NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS ARE BEGINNING TO BE MORE CONCERNED
      WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, BUT NOT YET TO THE POINT
      WHERE THEY ARE PREPARED TO CHANGE POLICY; AND
   2. THE CRUCIAL MATTER FROM HANOI'S STANDPOINT IS NOT THE VOLUME OF
      COMMUNIST CASUALTIES, BUT THE SURVIVAL OF THE GUERRILLA INFRA-
      STRUCTURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. RAHMAN BELIEVES HANOI WOULD BE
      PREPARED TO CONTINUE INFILTRATION AS LONG AS THE INFRASTRUCTURE
      EXISTS AND IS NOT DAMAGED OR DECIMATED. UNQUOTE.
   2. IT CERTAINLY BACKS UP OUR PHILOSOPHY THAT THE GUERRILLA IS THE
      CENTRAL TARGET.

REGARDS
CP-4

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 2 COPIES: CG III MAF
CG FMFPAC P 232215Z/MAR LTGEN WALT

Copy 2 of 2 Copies
SECRET
I have talked to Sam. We will increase his input through Embassy
Some. We also pay, however, that
parolee in Bin. Thinks is going well —
and thus impresses people — because
it is also "exclusive".

EXCLUSIVE

Secret
I have just read a long report from the Embassy in Saigon which summarizes progress in the pacification program. When it gets around to talking of the military contribution, I was amazed to see that the Marines are not even mentioned!

2. It says: Quote: At all echelons, U.S. advisors stress to their counterparts the importance of concentrating military forces, as well as other resources, in priority areas. Best example to date is Binh Dinh, where under Joint II Corps and Field Force/VN direction, concentration of military forces has played major role in giving current pacification (RD) efforts room in which to operate. (There are major elements of 3 DIVS now in Binh Dinh -- First Air Cav, ROK Capital Div, and ARVN Twenty Second Div.) Redeployments now underway around Saigon should in time produce same results. Unquote.

3. I guess doing ten times more than anyone else is not enough.

4. Visited twenty casualties from Operation Texas today. Badly shot up but wonderful spirits.

REGARDS

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 2 COPIES: CG III MAF
CG FMFPAC P 232126Z/MAR LTGEN WALT
CONFIDENTIAL

COMNAVSUPPACT

PERSONAL FOR VADM HYLAND, INFO LGEN WALT FROM WESCHLER

COPIES 2&3 OF 3 COPIES

191446Z
MARCH

COMUNICATION CENTER
II Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

PERSONAL FOR VADM HYLAND
INFO LGEN WALT FROM WESCHLER

COPIES 2&3 OF 3 COPIES

191446Z
MARCH

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

P 191446Z
FM COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG
TO RUMPUL/CONSEVENTHFLT
INFO ZEN/CG III MAF
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
FOR VADU HYLAND, INFO LGEN WALT FROM WESCHLER
1. VISIT WITH CDR HAWKINS AND PTF RIDE ARRANGED 220900H-1900H
LANDING BY HELO AT JUNK BASE ON OBSERVATORY ISLAND. LONGER VISIT
AS DESIRED.
2. WILL BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE BRIEF VI IT WITH LCDR SCOTT CTE
70-2.1.2 AND AIR DEFENSE INSTALLATION ON MONKEY MOUNTAIN, FOLLOWED
BY VISIT TO LCDR MOLAN, NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP, AND THE COAST GUARD
AND NAVY MARKET TIME FORCES, ALL IN CLOSE PROXIMITY. SWIFT BOAT
RIDE TO FLEET LANDING, THENCE TO QUARTERS FOR LUNC.

PAGE TWO RUMNA 051 CONFIDENTIAL
3. WILL HAVE ABOUT AN HOUR AFTER LUNCH FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR AIR PORT TO MEET 1500 TAKE OFF.
4. WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH GEN WALT SHOULD ANYTHING DEVELOP
OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN.

WARM REGARDS,

GFRAR

BT
DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES - MAF

COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG P 191446Z/MAR CG III MAF

Copy 2 of 3

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar 18</td>
<td>0001</td>
<td>PERSON FOR RADM WESCHLER AND LT GEN WALTON FROM VADM HYLAND</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Copies: 2 & 3
CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATION CENTER
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

P 180004Z
FM CONSEVENTHFLT
TO RUNNMF/NAVSUPPACT DANANG
RUNNMF/CG III MAF

BY
CONFIDENTIAL
FOR RADM WESCHLER AND LTGEN WALT FROM V-JM HYLAND

1. WILL ARR DANANG VIA HELO 220900H FOR VISIT TO MACSOG AND
   PTF BOATS.
2. WILL DEPT DANANG 221500H VIA P3A FOR CUBI.
3. FOR RADM WESCHLER, IF CONVENIENT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE LUNCH
   AND DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU.
4. FOR LTGEN WALT, NO PROBLEMS THIS TRIP AND WON’T INTERRUPT
   YOUR BUSY SCHEDULE UNLESS YOU SO DESIRE FOR ANY REASON.
5. WARM REGARDS.
   GP-4

DST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE
   COPIES 2 & 3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF
   NSA - TTY

CONSEVENTHFLT  180004Z/MAR  CG III MAF

Copy 3 of 3

CONFIDENTIAL
160940Z
MARCH

PERSONAL FOR LGEN WALT INFO RADN WESCHLER FROM RADM WARD

C/5 - Dec 10th

SRR will be with Gen Winterand

all day - Would appreciate our

meeting with Ward.

-SCUTCHEON
Inform Adm. Ward's OIC that

Unfortunately, unless Adm. Ward can
be reached, Dr. McNichol would be available.

Also inform Adm. Weschler.

[Signature]

P 160940Z
FW CNNAVADVGRP SAIGON
TO RMNF/CG III MAF
INFO RUNNA/CON NAVSUPPACT DANANG
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND KU
PERSONS FOR LGEN WALT INFORM ADM WESCHLER FROM RADM WARD
L. WILL BE IN DANANG AREA APPROX 1800 H TO 0100 H. IF
CONVENIENT WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS AT THAT TIME PROPOSED LETTER
TO COMUSNAVY ON CON NAVFORU TASKING (WCOPY OF WHICH IS HELD BY
CQ. BOYD) SO THAT WE MAY SUBMIT AGREED CG III MAF/CNNAVADVGRP
POSITION TO COMUSNAVY AT AN EARLY DATE. WARM REGARDS.
GP - 4

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE
COPIES 2/3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF

CHNAVADVGRP SAIGON P 160940Z/MAR CG III MAF

CONFIDENTIAL
P 131933Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUMSF/2AD
RUM MF/III MAF
BT
UNCLAS 09310 FROM MACJOO,
PERSONAL FOR GEN MOORE AND GEN WALT FROM WESTMORELAND.
SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE
THE AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY MARINE AND AIR FORCE UNITS
AT THE RECENT BATTLE OF AS HAU SPECIAL FORCES CAMP WAS EQUAL
TO ANY IN AVIATION HISTORY. THE REPEATED HEROIC DEEDS OF THE
TRANSPORT, FIGHTER AND HELICOPTER CREWS AND FAC'S, ACCOM-
PLOISHED UNDER EXTREMELY ADVERSE CONDITIONS, REFLECTS THE
UTMOST CREDIT ON THE CREWS THEMSELVES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
SERVICES. PLEASE EXTEND TO THESE COURAGEOUS AIRMEN MY
HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS.
BT
DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE
COPIES 2&3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF

COMUSMACV
P 131933Z/MAR
CG III MAF

WWWNE

Copy 1A of 3

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

364
P
CG FMC PAC

C/5
CG MAN
25-5
(EST - 81K)

(PERSONAL FOR)

SECRET
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK
I CORPS RESOURCES CONTROL (U)

1. THERE IS INTENSIFIED INTEREST AT WASHINGTON LEVEL ON THE
   QUESTION OF THE DIVISION OF RESOURCES TO THE ENEMY IN SVN.
   A GENERAL IMPRESSION EXISTS THAT THE DENIAL EFFORT HAS NOT
   SUCCEEDED IN REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VC AND SVN FORCES.
   THE FACT THAT THE PROBLEM IS WIDELY RECOGNIZED IS ATTESTED TO
   BY THE CONTINUING CAS AND MACV ECONOMIC WARFARE ACTIVITY AS

2. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE INCLUSION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN
   THE III MAF PACIFICATION INDICIA WILL BE OF VALUE IN FUTURE
   ANALYSIS OF THIS PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THERE IS A PRESENT
   REQUIREMENT FOR A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF CONTROL OF SVN
   RESOURCES IN I CORPS SIMILAR TO THE REPORT ON CONTROL OF U.S.
   SUPPLIES PROVIDED BY REF A.

3. THEREFORE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT INFORMATION BE PROVIDED THIS
   HQSRS TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEMS OF MOVEMENT, DISTRIBUTION,
   AND ACCOUNTING CONTROL FOR SVN RESOURCES (PARTICULARLY
   FOODSTUFFS) WITHIN AND OUTSIDE III MAF TAORS IN I CORPS. OF
   SPECIAL INTEREST IS THE DEGREE OF CONTROL WHICH THE PSD AND
   NATIONAL POLICE ARE ABLE TO EXERT OVER DISTRIBUTION OF SUCH
   RESOURCES AND THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THOSE AND OTHER AGENCIES
   CONCERNED TO THE COMMODITIES DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE OF THE
   JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL.

4. THE MOUNTAIN OF THIS UNDERTAKING IS FULLY REALIZED.

I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT DURING MY COMING
VISIT. REGARDS.

G E M X

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES: FILE
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES: MAF
PERSONAL FOR LGEN WALT, INFO LGEN KRULAK AND GEN WESTMORELAND FROM GEN GREENE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT AND NR OF COPIES</th>
<th>COPY NR</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FILE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>2&amp;3 OF 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIV</td>
<td>(PERSONAL FOR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TH CONB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET &quot;J&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CORPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCB-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRYPTO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAS III MAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR</td>
<td>MCMIC</td>
<td>CWO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED
(PERSONAL FOR)

R 110212Z
FM CMC
TO RUNMF/GG III MAF
INFO RUHLEP/GG FMFPAC
RUMSA/COMUSMACV
ST
UNCLAS
FOR GEN WALT, INFO GEN KRUULAK AND GEN WESTMORELAND
FROM GEN GREENE
WELL DONE
1. RECENT III MAF OPERATIONS NEW YORK AND UTAH HAVE BEEN
FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST AND PRIDE BY THIS HEADQUARTERS, HIGHER
AUTHORITY AND COUNTRY AT LARGE.
2. III MAF ABILITY TO DETECT, CONTAIN AND DESTROY EFFECTIVE VC
AND NASA FORCES CONTINUES TO BE HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL AND IS IN THE
IMAGE OF THE STANDARDS SET BY STARLITE AND MAINTAINED IN ALL

PAGE TWO HUECEN 152 UNCLAS
SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS THROUGH DOUBLE EAGLE.
3. ESPECIALLY EXEMPLARY HAS BEEN THE ADMIRABLE COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS WITH ARVN FORCES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO OUTSTANDING
SUCCESS OF NEW YORK AND UTAH. I AM PARTICULARLY PLEASED IN
THAT THESE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORY BOTH TO DESTROYING
ENEMY'S ABILITY TO IMPEDER ACHIEVEMENT OF GVN/US OBJECTIVES AND TO
KEEPING OPEN VITAL LOC'S.
4. WELL DONE, GENERAL WALLACE M. GREENE, JR., COMMANDANT,
U.S. MARINE CORPS
ST
DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES FILE
COPIES 2&3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF
CMC
R 110212Z/MAR
CG III MAF

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATION CENTER
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

P 110251Z
FM CG FMFPAC
TO CG III MAF
CG 1ST MARDIV
CG 3RD MAF
CG 1ST MAF
CG FMFPAC/FWD
CG FORTRPS FMFPAC

CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT, MGENS FIELDS, LEEK AND MCCUTCHEON, AND MGENS VAN STOCKUM AND BANNING FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

1. IN A CONVERSATION TODAY THE COMMANDANT OUTLINED THE FOLLOWING PROSPECTIVE GENERAL OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH THE WASHINGTON HIERARCHY AND I THEREFORE ASK YOU TO HOLD THEM CLOSE:

   A. NORM ANDERSON TO SECOND WING IN APRIL.
   B. VIRGIL BANNING TO HQMC IN JUNE.
   C. GEORGE BOYMAN TO DEP CG FMFPAC IN MAY.
   D. MARION CARL COMCAB EASTMIN APRIL.
   E. KEITH MCCUTCHEON TO HQMC IN MID-JUNE.
   F. BEN ROBERTSHAW TO FIRST MAF IN MAY.
   G. RALPH ROTTET TO HQMC IN JUNE.
   H. TOMMY TOMPKINS TO P.I. IN JUNE.
   I. MIKE RYAN TO 9TH MAB TENTATIVELY MAY, BUT PROBABLY EARLIER.

2. THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY SOME VACANT SPOTS, ON WHICH THE COMMANDANT HAS NOT YET MADE HIS DECISIONS. AS SOON AS I LEARN MORE I WILL BE IN TOUCH.

3. MY C-1 HAS JUST COME BACK FROM WASHINGTON, BRINGING WITH HIM TWO PERSONNEL CONCERNS FROM MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS. THE FIRST HAS TO DO WITH REENLISTMENT. WHILE WE ARE GETTING ALL THE NUMBERS THAT WE WANT, THE RETENTION RATE FOR SKILLED PEOPLE IS NOWHERE NEAR WHAT WE NEED TO SUPPORT OUR BUILD-UP. IF YOU CAN THINK OF ANY INCENTIVES WHICH WILL INCREASE OUR RETENTION RATE PLEASE LET ME KNOW. THE SECOND PROBLEM HAD TO DO WITH THE NUMBER OF RESERVE LIEUTENANTS WHO ARE REQUESTING REGULAR COMMISSIONS. APPARENTLY THE NUMBER IS FAR LESS THAN USUAL AND LESS THAN CMC HAD HOPED. HERE TO, IF THERE IS ANYTHING THAT YOU CAN THINK OF THAT MAY HELP IN THE OVERALL SITUATION LET ME KNOW. REGARDS.

CP-4

DIST: RECEIPT ONLY FOR FILES
COPIES 1 & 2 OF 3 COPIES TO MAF
COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES TO WING.
CG FMFPAC

DECLASSIFIED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CON.</th>
<th>270</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MED.</td>
<td>O-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGNTR</td>
<td>Comusmac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT AND NR OF COPIES</td>
<td>COPY NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FILE</td>
<td>MAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET &quot;J&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I CORPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRYPTO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED
OP 101210Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO ZEN/COM ROKV
INFO RUMWF/CG II MAF
RUMWF/CG FFORCEV
BT
SECRET 07613 FROM MACJOO
FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FOR GEN CHAE
1. IN OUR RECENT DISCUSSION OF FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF ROK
FORCES, WE AGREED THAT THE 2D ROK MARINE BRIGADE WOULD DEPLOY
TO THE III MAF AREA UPON BEING RELIEVED BY THE SECOND REGIMENT
OF THE NEW ROK DIVISION AT DONG BA THIN.
2. "IN THIS RESPECT, I BELIEVE THAT EARLY PLANNING FOR THIS
MOVE WOULD BE TO THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF ALL CONCERNED. I WOULD
LIKE TO SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT YOU CONSIDER MEETING WITH
GENERAL WALT, CG, III MAF, AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE SO THAT

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 1234C SECRET
THE 2D ROK MARINE BRIGADE'S DEPLOYMENT CAN BE PLANNED WELL IN
ADVANCE. SUCH IMPORTANT MATTERS AS LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE
BRIGADE AND ASSIGNMENT TO IT OF A TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
COULD THEN BE AGREED UPON AND THE DETAILED PLANNING INVOLVED
ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT.
3. IF THIS MEETF WITH YOUR APPROVAL, I WILL INFORM
GENERAL WALT THAT YOU OR GENERAL LEE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM
IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
GP=4
BT
DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES: FILE
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES: CG III MAF
COMUSMACV O P 101210Z/MAR
LTGEN WALT
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
CONFERENCE WITH BGEN DUNN, MACV ENGR (U)

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO APPRIZE YOU OF A CONFERENCE HELD WITH BRIGADIER GENERAL DUNN AT MACV HQ ON 25 FEB BY CINCPACFLT CEB OFFICER AND THE FMFPAC ENGINEER IN CONNECTION WITH THE NAVY EMERGENCY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM.

2. AS TO THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE CINCPACFLT INTEGRATED PRIORITY LIST OF CONSTRUCTION ITEMS RECOMMENDED FOR FUNDING BY THE FY 66 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION OR FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING IN CY 66, BRIGADIER GENERAL DUNN MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMENTS, STATING THAT HE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO ANALYZE IT. HOWEVER, HE MADE THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT POINTS:

A. HE EMPHASIZED THAT CONSTRUCTION STANDARD FOUR SHOULD BE ADHERED TO THROUGHOUT THE THEATER FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE BECAUSE LIMITATIONS ON CONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES PRECLUDE ATTAINMENT OF A HIGHER STANDARD. CONSTRUCTION STANDARD FOUR PRESCRIBES BUILDINGS WITH FLOORS FOR ALL PURPOSES EXCEPT TROOP HOUSING WHICH IS TO BE PROVIDED BY DECKED AND STRONG BACKED TENTS. IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR WATER BORNE SEWAGE. HE RECOGNIZED THAT OVERALL NATIONAL TENT SHORTAGES MAY REQUIRE RESORT TO TIN ROOF CONSTRUCTION IN LIEU OF TENTS IN SOME CASES.

B. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST OF THE CINCPACFLT CEB OFFICER THAT THE PRIOR UNITY OF EFFORT OF FOUR NMCBS BE RESERVED IN 1 CTZ FOR COMBAT SUPPORT OF 111 MAF WHEN REQUIRED, DUNN COMMENTED THAT THE 3 FORCE ENGINEER BNS (ULTIMATELY TO BE PROVIDED BY THE APPROVED FORCE BUILDUP) WOULD NORMALLY SUFFICE FOR COMBAT SUPPORT OF 111 MAF.

C. DUNN STATED THAT AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES ARE STILL PRESSING HARD FOR A JET AIRFIELD IN THE HUE AREA, BUT THAT REGARDLESS OF THE STATUS OF SUCH AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT, THERE IS A REQUIREMENT TO PROCEED WITH PORT DEVELOPMENT IN THE HUE AREA TO SUPPORT AN ANTICIPATED INCREASED LEVEL OF U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN 2 PROVINCES OF 1 CTZ. SPECIFICALLY, HE STATED THAT HE DESIRED TO EMPLOY NMCBS FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION TO SUPPORT THE INSTALLATION OF A PORT AT HUE.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DISTANCE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

DECLASSIFIED

(PERSONAL FOR)

LTGEN WALT
FM COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG
TO CG III MAF/NCC
BT

PERSONAL FOR GEN WALT FROM VESCHLER

1. ON OCCASION OF YOUR PROMOTION AND RETURN TO DANANG PLEASE
ACCEPT OUR RENEWED PLEDGE OF SERVICE, LOYALTY AND DEVOTION.
2. YOUR LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN AN INSPIRATION TO ALL OF US AND THE
ACHIEVEMENTS OF III MAF/NCC HAVE BEEN A FLAIR RECORD THAT
INSPIRATION AND LEADERSHIP HAVE PAID OFF. YOUR WELL MERITED
PROMOTION ACHIEVES OFFICIALLY WHAT YOUR COMMANDS HAVE ACCORDED
YOU LONG BEFORE IN THEIR HEARTS.
3. WE LOOK FORWARD TO NEW CHALLENGES WITH YOU.

BT

COMNAVSUPPACT DANANG             R 081446Z/MAR

LTGEN WALT

DIST: 1 COPY FOR FILE
2 COPIES TO CG III MAF
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM VADM HYLAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FILE</th>
<th>NAF</th>
<th>NAV</th>
<th>DIV</th>
<th>NSA</th>
<th>FLC</th>
<th>SIK CH</th>
<th>GKH</th>
<th>DET &quot;J&quot;</th>
<th>I CORPS</th>
<th>NCS</th>
<th>SIK</th>
<th>GKH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

SIGNATURE

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

R 060918Z
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO RUNHMF/CG III MAF
BI
CONFIDENTIAL / PERSONAL
FOR LGEN WALT FROM VADII KILAND
1. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR WELL
DESERVED PROMOTION AND MY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUCCESS.
GP-4
GT
DIST: 1 COPY FOR FILE
2 COPIES TO CG III MAF
COMSEVENTHFLT R 060918Z/MAR LGEN WALT

3083

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED