FOLDER # 3 (Covering period 20 Apr 1966 - 26 June 1966) (INCOMING)

Inventoried on 20 July 1967. All items described on attached pages 3-1 through 3-5 are present in the folder except for items with the following numbers:

17
23
24
25
31
44
INCOMING MESSAGES

1. COMUSMACV 201142Z (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from BGen. CROWLEY, MACV
   Subj: MAP Cargo

2. CMC 221557Z (UNCLASSIFIED)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. GREENE
   Subj: YES/ACTT Materials

3. CG FMFPAC 230112Z (SECRET)
   SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen. WALT from LtGen. KRULAK
   Subj: LtGen. KRULAK Comments on Saigon Conference

4. COMUSMACV 260138Z (SECRET)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Return of Military Personnel to DANANG

5. CONSEVENTHFILT 240530Z (SECRET)
   Personal for ADM. JOHNSON Info LtGen. KRULAK and LtGen. WALT from ADM. HYLAND
   Subj: Employment of SLF

6. COMUSMACV 260138Z (SECRET)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Return of US Military Personnel to DANANG

7. COMUSMACV 271000Z (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Reply to Request for Intelligence

8. CONSEVENTHFILT 280230Z (SECRET)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from ADM. HYLAND
   Subj: Info furnished on use of SLF

9. FIRST MARDIV CO 280915Z (SECRET)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from MGen. FIELDS
   Subj: Coordination Visit HQPAK 1st Air Cavalry Div

10. COMUSMACV 280255Z (UNCLASSIFIED)
    Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
    Subj: Congratulations on recent County Fair

11. ADMINO FMFPAC 280011Z (CONFIDENTIAL)
    SPECAT Exclusive for LtGen. KRULAK, Info LtGen. WALT, from MGen. KIER
    Subj: NBC TV Report on Shortages

12. COMUSMACV 021138Z May66 (SECRET)
    15056 From MACDC-Pe for LtGen. WALT
    Subj: Additional Air Facilities
INCOMING MESSAGES

13. COMUSMACV 0h1213ZMay66 (SECRET)
   1530Z for LtGen. WALT, MGen. LARSEN from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: ROK MARINE BDE (U)

14. CG FMFPAC 050232ZMay66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK
   Subj: Officer Personnel Status III MAF Hq.

15. CG I FFOR CEV 051205ZMay66 (SECRET)
   3218 AVF-OG MGen LARSEN sends for LtGen WALT
   Subj: Coordination Meeting (U)

16. CMC 051732ZMay66 (UNCLASS)
   Exclusive for LtGen. WALT and Info LtGen. KRULAK from MGen. WEEDEN
   Subj: Congressional Lt. H. P. HUDSON

17. CG FMFPAC 1tr of 27Apr66 (TOP SECRET) III MAF S&C #6822 Removed, placed in TS Folder
   For LtGen WALT from LtGen KRULAK
   Subj: Use of SLF

18. THIRD EN NINTH MAR 060735ZMay66 (UNCLASS)
   Personal for LtGen WALT, MGen KYLE, AND COL. SIMMONS
   Change of Command

19. CINCPAC 07145Z May66 (SECRET)
   For Gen WESTMORELAND and Gen WHEELER, Info LtGen WALT from Adm SHARP
   Subj: Airfield Site Selection, Vietnam (U)

20. CG FMFPAC 082058Z May66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for LtGen WALT Info MGen MCCUTCHEON from LtGen KRULAK
   Subj: Substitution of C-47 for C117

21. COMUSMACV 101108Z May66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for LtGen WALT from BGen CROWEY
   Subj: Ocean Shipping (U)

22. COMUSMACV 100232Z May66 (SECRET)
   Personal for LtGen WALT from BGen DUNN
   Subj: Airfield Site Selection, Vietnam

23. CG FMFPAC 120116Z May66 (TOP SECRET) Removed, placed in TS Folder
   Personal for Adm JOHNSON Info LtGen WALT and MGen KIER
   Subj: Batten Down and ARG/SLF

24. ADMHNO FMFPAC 120301Z May66 (TOP SECRET) Removed, placed in TS Folder
   Personal for LtGen KRULAK and LtGen WALT from MGen KIER
   Subj: CJCS Exclusive Message to CINPAC and COMUSMACV on Vietnamese Military Activities
25. SSO MACV 170935ZMay66 (TOP SECRET) Removed, placed in TS folder
   Personal for LtGen. WALT Danang from MGen ROSSON Saigon
   Subj: Contact with Gen. LAM

26. SSO MACV 181208ZMay66 (TOP SECRET)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT, Danang from MGen. ROSSON, Saigon
   Subj: Recall of Col. LOAN

27. CONSEVENTHFLT 191116ZMay66 (SECRET)
   Personal for Col. CHAISSON from Col. LOPRETE
   Subj: Adm. HYLAND visiting LtGen. WALT

28. SSO MACV 230700ZMay66 (SECRET)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Arrangements for meeting with Gen. WESTMORELAND and Gen THI

29. CG FMFPAC 240029Z (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from LtGen. KRULAK
   Subj: Effects of the Field Officer Shortage

30. CONSEVENTHFLT 250240ZMay66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for LtGen WALT from Adm. HYLAND
   Subj: Invitation to visit Flagship

31. COMUSMACV 261030Z May66 (TOP SECRET) Removed, placed in TS folder
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Mr. NICKERSON, Embassy arrival at Chu Lai

32. COMUSMACV 261112ZMay66 (SECRET)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Employment of 1st ARVN Division (U)

33. CG FMFPAC 270250ZMay66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal from LtGen. KRULAK to LtGen. WALT
   Subj: Increase of Field Grade Officers; request for

34. SSO MACV 270420ZMay66 (SECRET)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Meeting with Gen. DINH

35. CONSEVENTHFLT 280820ZMay66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from VAdm. HYLAND
   Subj: Transportation to Flagship

36. CONSEVENTHFLT 280840ZMay66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for RAdm. RICHARDSON Info LtGen. WALT from LtGen. WALT
   Subj: Departure time Danang
37. SSO MACV 310200ZMay66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Gen. CAO advised immediate return to Saigon

38. SSO MACV 310405ZMay66 (SECRET MAC H146)
   Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Gen. CAO will not be arrested, Gen. VIEN to meet Gen. DINH,
   Meeting between PM KY and Gen. THI

39. COMUSMACV 301115ZMay66 (SECRET)
   Personal to Adm. SHARP Info LtGen. WALT from Gen. WESTMORELAND
   Subj: Military Construction Program RVN (MILCON)

40. COMSEVENTHFLT 310600ZMay66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
    Personal for LtGen. WALT from Adm. HYLAND
    Subj: Invitation accepted

41. CG FMFPAC 312035ZMay66 (SECRET)
    Personal for LtGen. WALT from LtGen. KRULAK
    Subj: MACV contingency plan for 7th AF OPCON of all U.S. strike air
    assets in event of emergency (S)

42. COMUSMACV 061806ZJun66 (UNCLAS)
    Personal for Gen. LAM, C1 I Corps, from Gen. WESTMORELAND
    Subj: Congratulatory Message

43. CG FMFPAC 100606ZJun66 (SECRET)
    SPECAT EXCLUSIVE for LtGen. WALT from LtGen. KRULAK
    Subj: County Fair Operations

44. GENUSMACV 100616ZJun66 (TOP SECRET) Removed, placed in TS folder
    EXCLUSIVE for Gens ENGLER, MOORE, WALT KINNARD, SEAMAN, RAdm. WARD
    and Col. MCKEAN from Gen. WESTMORELAND
    Subj: Operations in SVN involving LAOS

45. COMNAVSUPPACT 101225ZJun66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
    Personal for EGen. CROWLEY Info LtGen. WALT and RAdm. WARD from
    RAdm. WESCHLER
    Subj: Cross-Service Funding vice Common Service Funding

46. CG FMFPAC 12305ZJul66 (SECRET)
    Exclusive for LtGen. WALT, Info Col. AXTELL from LtGen. KRULAK
    Subj: MCSO Stockage Objectives in RVN
INCOMING MESSAGES

47. CG FMFPAC I MAC (FWD) 2440610ZJun66 (CONFIDENTIAL)
Personal for LtGen. WALT from Gen. VAN STOCKUM
Subj: CG FMFPAC (FWD) I MAC Visit to III MAF

48. COMUSMACV 260800ZJun66 (SECRET)
SPECTAC EXCLUSIVE for Gen. WESTMORELAND from Adm. RIVERO
Subj: CNO visit to Vietnam

3-S
I certify that I have received the following **TOP SECRET** documents from Major Rudolf S. SUTTER, Staff Secretary, III Marine Amphibious Force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>JUN66</td>
<td>100616Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen WESTMORELAND Saigon</td>
<td>261030Z</td>
<td>1 of 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO MACV</td>
<td>181208Z</td>
<td>1 Copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO MACV</td>
<td>170935Z</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINC FMFPAC</td>
<td>MAY66</td>
<td>140301Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFPAC</td>
<td>MAY66</td>
<td>120140Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ltr to Gen WALT of 27Apr66, use of SLF TS Control #6822</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. V. CANZONILRI  
Lieutenant Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/o FDC, San Francisco, California 96602

18 JUL 1966

I certify that I have received the following TOP SECRET documents from Major Orval J. CORNABEAU, Staff Secretary, III Marine Amphibious Force:

CG MAGTF 100316Z JUN66 1 of 2
Gen WESTORDMAND Saigon 261030Z
SSC PACV 181205Z
SSC PACF 170935Z
ADNIO FIFPAC 110301Z MAY66 2 of 5
CG FIFPAC 120110Z MAY66 3 of 5
CG FIFPAC Ltr to Gen. MALT of 27 Apr 66, use of SLF TS Control 16322

RUDOLF S. SUTHER
Major U. S. Marine Corps
HOLDINGS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/o PPO, San Francisco, California 96602

18 JUL 1966

I certify that I have received the following TOP SECRET documents
from Major Orval J. COPELAND Staff Secretary, III Marine Amphibious
Force:

- Conmander 1260162 JUN66 1 of 2
- Conmander 1260162 Saigon 261066
- CSS LAY 181266
- CSS FAC 170366
- AOKNO FFPAC 180112 MAY66 2 of 5
- C3 FFPAC 180112 MAY66 3 of 5
- C3 FFPAC Ltr to Con MAPD of 27Apr66, use of SIF TS Control 06822

RUDOLF S. SUHR
Major U. S. Marine Corps
SECRET

(PERSONAL FOR)

DATE TIME GROUP 24 JUN 66
PRECEDENCE
ORIGINATOR
FILE COPY COPY NR OF COPIES
NAF COPIES/2 OF 2 COPIES

RECEIVED ONE (1) SEALED ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1 THRU 2
OF CNO (ORIGINATOR) 24 JUN 66 (DATE TIME) JUL 66 (MONTH YEAR)

(CRYPTOCEN FILE COPY)
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

1. I SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND FROM

2. (U)

3. (U)

4. [Redacted] yold me he had discussed my forthcoming trip to the

5. [Redacted] with you. I hope that the dates I have worked out

6. [Redacted] to Vietnam will be satisfactory to you and that I will

7. [Redacted] to you inconvenience. Oley passed on to me your kind

8. [Redacted] to be your house guest while in Saigon, which I accept

9. with great pleasure.

10. [Redacted] that the time I have allocated for the Vietnam part of my

11. [Redacted]

12. [Redacted]

13. [Redacted]
THE TRIP IS MUCH LESS THAN I OUGHT TO PROVIDE IN ORDER TO GET AS MUCH
BENEFIT AS I WOULD LIKE, HOWEVER I AM RESTRAINED BY THE FACT
THAT THE TOTAL TIME I CAN BE OUT OF WASHINGTON IS RATHER LIMITED
AND MY DESIRE TO VISIT AS MANY OF THE LOCATIONS IN THE WESTERN
PACIFIC AS WELL AS THE SEVENTH FLEET UNITS, AS I CAN, I HAVE NOT
BEEN IN THAT AREA SINCE I HAD COMMAND OF DESTROYERS IN SEVEN
FLIGHT IN 1958, AND MY LAST VISIT TO VIETNAM WAS IN 1954 SO YOU CAN WELL
IMAGINE THAT I HAVE PLenty OF CATCHING UP TO DO. ALTHOUGH I HAVE
SENT AN OFFICIAL MESSAGE TODAY WITH THE DETAILED ITINERARY, IN
WHICH I HAVE INDICATED SOME SPECIFIC AREAS OF INTEREST WHILE IN
VIETNAM, I WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU COULd FIND TIME TO WORK
OUT FOR ME THE KIND OF SCHEDULE WHICH YOU THINK WOULD BE MOST
USEFUL. I AM, OF COURSE, INTERESTED IN SEEING AS MUCH OF THE NAVY
AND MARINE CORPS ACTIVITIES AS I CAN, BUT IN VIEW OF MY FREQUENT
COMMISSION PARTICIPATION, I AM ALSO ANXIOUS TO SEE WHAT I CAN OF ARMY AND
AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES. I WOULD LIKE TO PUT MYSELF IN YOUR HANDS AND
I WILL BE DELIGHTED TO CARRY OUT WHATEVER SCHEDULE YOU
(SUGGEST),

ALTHOUGH I WILL HAVE SIX FLAG OFFICERS WITH ME ON THE TRIP,
I HAVE PLANNED TO TAKE ONLY TWO WITH ME TO SAIGON, RECOGNIZING
YOUR ACCOMMODATION PROBLEM. IF YOU PREFER, I CAN FURTHER LIMIT THE

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO MY VISIT THERE AND TO SEEING YOU, IF
THERE IS ANY EURAND I CAN DO FOR YOU HERE OR IN HAWAII, PLEASE DO
NOT HESITATE TO LET ME KNOW. WARM REGARDS.

R I R

COPY OF COPIES SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

(PERSONAL FOR)

DATE TIME GROUP 2406107
PRECEDENCE R
ORIGINATOR CC EMFPC I MAC (FWD)
FILE COPY COPY OR OF COPIES A
NAC COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES

RECEIVED ONE (1) SEALED ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 1 THRU 3
OF ORIGINATOR (DATE TIME) (MONTH YEAR)
(RECEIVED BY) (SIGNATURE) (TIME)

2406107 JUNE 66
DATE TIME GROUP MONTH AND YEAR

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL FOR

RR RUNNMF
DE RAABOL 319A 1753613
ZNY CCCC
R 249513Z
FM CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)
TO RUNNMF/CG III MAF
ST
CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONNEL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM GEN VAN STOCKUM
CG FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD) VISIT TO III MAF
1. THIS CONFIRMS MY PROPOSED VISIT TO YOUR COMMAND DURING THE PERIOD 27-29 JUNE. APPRECIATE YOUR PLANNED ITINERARY WHICH SATISFIES MY DESIRE TO BECOME BETTER ACQUAINTED WITH LOGISTICS.
2. PLAN TO ARRIVE A.M. 27 JUNE ABOARD REGULAR MARY MAC WC-130 MY PARTY CONSISTS OF COL C.M. ELLIS, MARINE LIASON OFFICER FOR CONSTRUCTION (OKINAWA) LTCOL W.C. SITICH, DPI OFFICER, MAJ J.M. HAMTER, JR. SUPPLY OFFICER, PLUS MY SELF AND MY AIDE, 1ST LT M. BUX.
6=4.
ST DIST: COPY 1 OF 2 FILE
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 MAF

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
P

CG FMFPAC

EXCLUSIVE FOR

COPIES 1-2 OF 4 COPIES

COPIES 3-4 OF 4 COPIES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

EXCLUSIVE

FROM CG FMFPAC
TO CG III MAF
INFO FORLOGCOND
RT

SECRET SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE FOR LIGEN WALT, INFO COL AKTELL FROM LIGEN KULAK, JCEO

STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES IN RVM (II)

A. COMUSMACV 260/444Z/FAY 66 (S)
B. COMUSMACV 011517Z (S)
C. CG III MAF 109444Z (S)

1. CINC PAC HAS REQUESTED COMMENTS FROM THE PACON COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND CG, FMFPAC ON REF A. REF 8 AND 9 AND OTHER ASSOCIATED CORRESPONDENCE HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF CONCERN HERE SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STOCK LEVELS IS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SERVICES. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INDICATORS, INCLUDING REF 8 AND 9, THAT THE UNITED AND UNIFIED COMMANDERS ARE MOVING MORE AND MORE INTO SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE LOGISTIC FIELD.

2. REF C PROVIDES YOUR RECOMMENDED STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES. I CONCUR WITH THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES; HOWEVER, CONSIDER FOLLOWING LEVELS MORE INDICATIVE OF REQUIREMENTS, STORAGE CAPABILITY, AND ACTUAL USE OF LEVELS OF SUPPLIES AS DEFINED IN JCS Pub 18.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>SAFETY LEVEL</th>
<th>OPERATING LEVEL</th>
<th>STOCKAGE OBJ</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
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<td>CLASS II</td>
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<td>CLASS III (PKG)</td>
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<td>CLASS III AND IIIA (BULK)</td>
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<td>CLASS V</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASS VA</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. TO INSURE A CONSOLIDATED MARINE CORPS POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOUR REPLY TO REF B:

A. TAKE NOTE OF THE SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESTABLISHING STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES.

B. PROVIDE THE STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES LISTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE AS BEING ADEQUATE TO SATISFY CURRENT REQUIREMENTS. DO NOT INCLUDE LEAD TIME IN SUBMISSIONS.

C. STATE THAT STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES ARE UNDER CONTINUOUS REVIEW BY YOUR HO AND CG, FMFPAC AND JMC, WITH THE GOAL OF OPTIMIZING FUTURE SUPPORT.
4. IN FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS OF STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE
IS PROVIDED IN RELATION TO REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF III MAF FORCES:
A. STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES, TOGETHER WITH EXISTING PIPELINE, MUST INCLUDE
SUFFICIENT MATERIAL TO SUSTAIN OUR PRESENTLY COMMITTED FORCE AND ASSURE
THAT IT HAS A CAPABILITY FOR REDEPLOYMENT IF REQUIRED. IN OTHER WORDS THIS
INCLUDES OUR MOUNT OUT AND MOUNT OUT AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS;
HOWEVER, THEY WILL NOT BE IDENTIFIED OR REFERRED TO AS SUCH.
B. AN INDEPENDENT CAPABILITY MUST BE RETAINED FOR III MAF TO RESPOND TO
ANY REASONABLE SITUATION.
C. STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES ARE BASED ON CURRENT III MAF OPERATING PROCEDURES
AND ARE ADAPTABLE TO THE SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS WHICH EXIST.
5. IT IS REQUESTED THAT ANY COMMENTS PROVIDED TO COMMNAVFORV ON III MAF
STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES, RELATE ONLY TO THAT SUPPORT OBTAINED FROM
NAVSUPPACT DANANG.
GP-4
97
DIST: COPIES 1 & 2 OF 3 COPIES - GP III MAF
COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES - FLC
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL FOR BGEN CROWLEY INFO LT GEN WALT AND RADM WARD FROM RADM WESCHLER

1. DEPT OF ARMY COMMON ITEM SUPPLY SYSTEM TEAM HEADED BY MR. GARDNER AND ACCOMPANYED BY REPS FROM USARPAC, FIRST LOG CMD, USARV AND YOUR STAFF VISITED NAVSUPPACT DA NANG 3 JUN

PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS PROBS ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY CROSS-SERVICE FUNDING VICE COMMON-SERVICE FUNDING. REPS FROM III MAF AND FORLOGCMD WERE ALSO PRESENT. WITH APPROX TWO HOURS AVAIL.

DISCUSSION COVERED ENTIRE WATERFRONT ON COMMON ITEM SUPPLY

PAGE TWO RUMNNA 056 CONFIDENTIAL

SYSTEM AS VIEWED BY VARIOUS REPS.

2. OUR DOMINANT IMPRESSION IS THAT ELEMENTS OF READINESS PREREQUISITE TO ASSUMPTION OF MISSION FOR I CIZ ARE NOT PRESENT. HOWEVER, DA TEAM TOOK REPEATED REFUGE IN STATEMENT DEPT OF ARMY HAS NO CHOICE SINCE SECDEF HAS DIRECTED IMPLEMENTATION. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF FORCES ACTUALLY ENGAGED WITH THE ENEMY IS TOO IMPORTANT AND VITAL TO BE SUBJ TO RISK OF NON-RESPONSIVENESS.

3. OUR EXPERIENCE IN COMMON ITEM PACKAGED POL SUPPORT FROM SECOND LOG CMD HAS NOT BEEN REASSURING. DA AND USARPAC REPS INDICATE THIS IS IN PART DUE TO PROCEDURAL PROBS. BUT THE POINT IS THAT PROCEDURAL DEFFCTS CAN BE JUST AS EFFECTIVE A BAR TO RESPONSIVE SUPPLY SUPPORT AS AN EMPTY PIPELINE. IT IS THE OVER-CENTRALIZATION AND DEPENDENCE ON SOPHISTICATED PROCEDURES (SUCH AS THE INVENTORY CONTROL CENTER'S ROLE) THAT ARE EMBEDDED IN THE COMMON ITEM SUPPLY PLAN THAT CAUSE THE MOST CONCERN.

ADEQUATE TIME FOR DEBUGGING AND TESTING OF PROCEDURES MUST BE PROVIDED. A CASE IN POINT IS THAT DURING THE PAST ELEVEN MONTHS THE PACKAGED POL SUPPLY PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN CHANGED SEVERAL TIMES BUT WITH RARELY NOTICEABLE IMPROVED

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RESPONSIVENESS.

4. ACCORDINGLY, WE RECOMMENDED, AND THE DA TEAM CONCURRED, THAT ANY DATE SET FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE I CIZ SHOULD BE A TARGET DATE ONLY WITH THE SPECIFIC STIPULATION THAT IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A JOINT WORKING LEVEL READINESS REVIEW PRIOR TO ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION SO THAT IF EITHER ARMY OR NAVY WERE NOT READY, THE TARGET DATE WOULD BE EXTENDED. REG YOU SUPPORT THIS CONCEPT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SAFEGUARD AGAINST PREMATURE IMPLEMENTATION.

WARM REGARDS,

GP-4

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 = FILE

COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES = MAF

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

P 100408Z
FM CG FMFPAC
TO CG III MAF

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN WALT FROM LGEN KRULAK MARINE
CORPS EYES ONLY
COUNTY FAIR OPERATIONS (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT FROM AN EMBASSY, SAIGON JUSPAO WEEKLY
ACTIVITIES REPORT FOR PERIOD 29 MAY-4 JUN IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFO:

POL WAR: HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL SERIES OF COMBINED MILITARY/PSYWAR/
CIVIC ACTION "COUNTY FAIR" OPERATIONS INITIATED BY 1ST INFANTRY
DIVISION IN JOINT US/ARVN OPERATION LAO SON II IN BINH DUONG.
EACH OPERATION BEGINS WITH MILITARY FORCES SURROUNDING HAMLET AT
NIGHT; THEN ALL RESIDENTS ASSEMBLED AND SCREENED AT DAWN BY VN
DISTRICT OFFICIALS, RF UNITS, NATIONAL POLICE AND ELEMENTS TO DETAIN
SUSPECTED VC, VC MILITARY AND POLITICAL CADRE, FALSE ID CARD HOLDERS,
DEserters. THEN VILLAGERS RECEIVE MEDICAL TREATMENT, FOOD AND TEMPORARY
ID CARDS WHILE TWO VC CULTURAL TEAMS AND 1ST INFANTRY BAND ENTERTAIN
POPULATION. PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEF ADDRESS PEOPLE AND ASSESS
THEIR DESIRE AND REACTIONS. UNQUOTE.

2. THE OBVIOUS CONCLUSION THAT READERS WILL DRAW FROM THIS STATE-
MENT IS THAT THE EXCELLENT CONCEPT WAS DEVELOPED BY 1ST INF DIV.
WITHOUT KNOWING THAT III MAF, IN FACT, DEVELOPED THE PROGRAM. THERE
IS NO QUESTION THAT MACV KNOWS THE FACT, BUT JUSPAO MAY NOT BE AS
WELL INFORMED. THERE WAS A SUGGESTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF SETTING
THE RECORDS STRAIGHT, YOU MIGHT INFORM COMUSMACV IN A SPECIAL WRAP-
UP REPORT GIVING DATES, UNITS, RESULTS, ETC. OF YOUR PAST COUNTY
FAIR OPERATIONS. AS AN ADJUNCT TO THIS REPORT TO COMUSMACV, YOU MIGHT
PRESENT A COPY TO THE JUSPAO REP ON YOUR JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL
AND REQUEST THAT HE SUBMIT THROUGH HIS CHANNELS, IN THE MEANTIME,
FROM THIS END I WILL POINT OUT, WHERE APPROPRIATE, THAT THE APRIL
REPORT OF III MAF OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM CONTAINED BACKGROUND INFOR-
MATION ON COUNTY FAIR OPERATIONS, AND THAT ITS CHRISTENING WAS BY
III MAF AND NOT THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION. REGARDS

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1 & 2 OF 2 COPIES - MAF

CG FMFPAC

CG III MAF

DECLASSIFIED
UNCLAS 19291 FROM MACJOO
PERSONAL FOR GEN LAM, CG I CORPS, FROM GEN WESTMORELAND.

SUBJ: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE

MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND YOUR MEN OF 3/6, 2ND DIVISION, FOR THEIR BRILLIANT SUCCESS IN OPERATION QUIET THANG 296 ON 30 MAY. THE QUICK EXPLOITATION OF RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE, THE DARING TACTICS EMPLOYED, AND THE ENERGETIC EXECUTION OF THOSE TACTICS HAVE GIVEN YOUR FORCES A MAJOR VICTORY. THE SPECTACULAR KILL RATIO AND HIGH NUMBER OF WEAPONS SEIZED IN THIS NIGHT ACTION SHOW YOU AT A SOLID BASE OF INTELLIGENCE, EXCELLENT TRAINING, AND BOLDNESS OF ACTION CAN ACCOMPLISH.

DIST: COPY 1 OF 4 FILE
COPIES 2-4 MAF

CMUSMACV P 061806Z
LINE 26

20F4
**SECRET**

**MESSAGE FORM - SECRET**

**3d MayDiv - 2100/2**

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CG 1ST MAW R

G.3 1ST MAW

IS going to

take care

of this?

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR LGTEN WALT FROM LGTEN KRULAK

LACK CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR 7TH AF OPCON OF ALL U.S. STRIKE

AIR ASSETS IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY (S)

A. YOUR 291505Z

B. 292055Z TELECON MY PTOOP LUDDE+CPT COLLINS III MAF

C. KD CTR

1. APPRECIATE THE CONCERN YOU VOICE IN RAF A.

2. IT WILL MAKE REPRESENTATION AT THIS LEVEL TO PREFERVE

THE NORMAL 1ST MAW OPCON ARRANGEMENT UNDER III MAF.

3. IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A COPY OF THE SUBJECT VLAN, AS

REQUESTED BY REF B. GP-4

20/3

SECRET
P 3106402
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CG III MAF // COMM NOTE: MSG CORRECTED BY COMM CEN
ST AS BEST AS POSSIBLE, WILL SVC UPON
CONFIDENTIAL REQUEST.
ST PERSONAL FOR GEN WALT FROM HYLAND

1. DELIGHTED TO ACCEPT INVITATION FOR THURSDAY JUNE SECOND.
WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY CAPTAINS BYEDAL AND GREER AND
COLONEL LOPRETI.
ST

COPY 1 OF 3: FILE
COPIES 2 & 3: MAF

COMSEVENTHFLT P 3106402/WAY LTGEN WALT

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

RR RUNSDN
DE RUNSMA 1385U 1520855
ZNY SSSSS
R 010852Z
FM COMUSMACV
INFO RUNSAG/NSA DANANG
RUMSDN/GS III MAF
P 30115Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO CINCPAC
RT
SECRET 12510
PERSONAL TO ADM SHARP FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
SUB: MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM RVN (MILCON) (U)
REF: MACV SECRET MSG 12002 DTG 260442Z MAY 66
1. (U) AS A FOLLOW-UP TO MY ESTIMATE OF THE CY67 FORCE
REQUIREMENTS, A REVIEW HAS BEEN INITIATED OF THE PROPOSED
SUPPORTING MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM (MCP) WITH A VIEW TO
VALIDATION OF THE PLANNING FACTORS USED.
2. (S) MY BASIC OBJECTIVE IS TO MEET THE MILITARY
NECESSITIES OF THE WAR. AT THE SAME TIME I AM GIVING FULL CON-

PAGE 2 RUNSMA 1385U SECRET

SIDERATION TO RELATED PROBLEMS INHERENT IN SUCH A LARGE PROGRAM,
E.G., INFLATION, AVAILABILITY OF LABOR, AND PORT CONGESTION. IN
THIS REGARD IT IS APPARENT THAT FIRM QUANTITATIVE PROGRAM REQUIRE-
MENTS WITH SUPPORTING DATA WILL BE REQUIRED BY SECDEF IN THE
NEAR FUTURE.
3. (S) AS AN INITIAL STEP, I HAVE STUDIED POSSIBLE
DECREASES IN STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES AND IN THE NUMBER OF DAYS IN
THE MEDICAL EVACUATION POLICY WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS:
A. STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES:
   (1) I AM SATISFIED THEY CAN BE REDUCED. I CANNOT
   CONCLUDE CLEARLY AT THIS TIME THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE LEVEL OF
   SUPPLIES MIGHT BE REDUCED.
   (2) DURING THE REVIEW OF STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES,
   CERTAIN PLANNING AND COST FACTORS WERE REVISED AND REFINED IN
   PROGRAM CAN BE REDUCED IMMEDIATELY BY APPROXIMATELY FIVE MILLION
   DOLLARS. THERE WILL BE OTHER SAVINGS, E.G., REDUCTION IN
   TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS.
(3) FOR YOUR INFORMATION, LT. COL. R. WOOD, USA, A
MEMBER OF MY STAFF IS THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH MY VIEWS ON THE
COMUSMACV 2 PC 1385 3011552/MAI STAFF SEC

DECLASSIFIED
SUBJECT OF STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES, AND WILL BE ARRIVING IN HONOLULU ON 30 MAY TO ATTEND THE PACOM PLANNING CONFERENCE.

B. NUMBER OF DAYS IN MEDICAL EVACUATION POLICY.

(1) I BELIEVE THAT THE CURRENT 30-DAY POLICY IS SOUND.

(2) OUT RELATIVELY LOW CASUALTY AND DISEASE EXPERIENCE AND CERTAIN REVISIONS TO CONSTRUCTION COST ESTIMATES HAVE CAUSED AN ADJUSTMENT IN BASIC PLANNING FACTORS. AS A RESULT THE HOSPITAL-FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS PORTION OF THE MCP CAN BE REDUCED ON THE ORDER OF 55 MILLION DOLLARS. IMPAIRMENT OF THE PRESENT EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE MEDICAL PROGRAM IS NOT FORESEEN.

C. THE GROSS RESULT OF THE ABOVE RECOMPUTATION OF STORAGE AND HOSPITAL PLANNING FACTORS HAS PROVIDED A TOTAL COST RESUCTION IN THE MCP REQUIREMENTS OF APPROXIMATELY 60 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS REDUCTION HAS BEEN MADE WITHOUT ADVERSE IMPACT ON COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OR THE HEALTH AND WELFARE OF PERSONNEL.

D. (S) I REAFFIRM THE GENERAL CONTENT OF REF MSG; AND DRAW YOUR ATTENTION SPECIFICALLY TO THE RECOMMENDATION FOR AN EARLY STUDY OF STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES. THIS STUDY, SPONSORED BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS, WILL BRING INTO CLEAR FOCUS SUCH IMPORTANT MATTERS.

AS THE FUTURE CAPABILITY OF OFF-SHORE BASES, THIS BROADER VIEW, INCLUDING YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE SCHEDULE FOR FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON SUPPLY SYSTEM, MAY INDICATE A RESPONSE AND SHIPPING TIME IN THE TOTAL PACOM LOGISTIC SYSTEM THAT WOULD ALLOW ME TO SUBMIT SPECIFIC AND SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN STOCKAGE LEVELS WITHIN RVN.

GP=4
SECRET MAC 4416
PERSONAL FOR GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND
THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS.
1. PLEASE GET WORD TO FREUND TO CHECK IN WITH CORCORAN AND YOU
PRIOR TO RETURNING TO SAIGON.
2. HAVE JUST TALKED TO GENERAL VIEN, AND HE ASSURES ME THAT CAO
WILL NOT BE ARRESTED UPON RETURN TO SAIGON, BUT HE ALLOWED TO RETURN
TO HIS QUARTERS AND REJOIN HIS FAMILY.
3. GENERAL VIEN WOULD LIKE TO MEET GENERAL DINH AT CHU LAI
TOMORROW AT 1030 HOURS AND REQUESTS THAT YOU GET WORD TO DINH
AND MAKE TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE TO HIM. PLEASE INFORM ME OF DINH'S
REPLY SO THAT I CAN PASS ON TO GENERAL VIEN.
YOUR COMMANDER AT CHU LAI SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DUPLICATE THE
SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT MADE FOR MEETING BETWEEN KY AND THI. IN DINH
SUGGESTS PHU BAI AS AN ALTERNATE MEETING PLACE YOU MUST DISCOURAGE
HIM FOR VIEN HAS ORDERS FOR MEETING TO TAKE PLACE AT CHU LAI.
160
DECLASSIFIED

Z 310200Z ZYH
FM SSO MACV
D SSO III MAF
ZEM

CONFIDENTIAL MAC 4409
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WALI FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO GENERAL CAO FROM ME:
   "SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HAS ASSIGNED GENERAL LAM AS COMMANDER, I
   ADVISE THAT YOU RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO SAIGON. GENERAL WALT
   WILL SEE THAT AIR TRANSPORTATION IS MADE AVAILABLE FOR YOU. GENERAL
   VIEN TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CONCERN AS TO YOUR
   SAFETY. UPON YOUR DEPARTURE FROM DA NANG, I WILL INFORM GENERAL
   VIEN IN YOUR BEHALF OF YOUR TIME OF ARRIVAL AT TAN SON NHUT."

2. FOR GENERAL WALT: I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ARRANGING TRANSPORTATION
   FOR GENERAL CAO. PLEASE HAVE YOUR HEADQUARTERS NOTIFY MY OFFICE OF
   CAO'S ETA SO THAT GENERAL VIEN'S OFFICE CAN BE ALERTED. IF PERSUASION
   TO ACCEPT MY ADVICE IS REQUIRED, YOU MAY TELL CAO THAT GENERAL VIEN
   HAS IMPLIED TO ME THAT HE, CAO, WOULD PROBABLY BE GIVEN ANOTHER
   ASSIGNMENT.

PLEASE REMEMBER IMMEDIATELY
125

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MFA 159SAB325 BBA234
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ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUNSBBFALKY-2
VV NSA254 ZSA605V MEX541 DDKA995V ULB1533.
PP RUNSBB
DE RUMFUL 048 1480655
ZNY CCCCC
P 280848Z
FM-CONSEVENTHFLT
TO RUNFUD/CTG 77.0
INFO RUNSBB/CG III MAF
CONFID

FOR RADM RICHARDSON INFO GEN WALT FROM NYLAND
A. YOUR 280851 NOTAL
1. UNABLE TO MAKE EARLY DEPARTURE SUGGESTED REF A WILL DEPART
BANG 291615H. WARM REGARDS.
BP-4

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CONSEVENTHFLT P 280848Z/MAY CG III MAF

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PP RUNSMF
ZNY CCCCC ZOV RUMSBB
VV N NSA274V WSA597VV ULD879
PP RUNSMF
DE RUNFIL 044 1450823
ZNY VCCCC
P 28082Z
FM-COMSEVENTHFLT
TO RUMSBB/CG III MAF

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR GEN WALT FROM HYLAND

1. MY FLAG LIEUTENANT WILL APR DAWANG BASE Ops 291045H VIA MY HELO
TRANSPORT YOU TO FLAGSHIP. SPACE FOR YOU PLUS ONE. ADDITIONAL
TRIPS AS NECESSARY. WAGM REGARDS

CP=4

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2 COPIES = CG III MAF

COMSEVENTHFLT
P 28082Z/MAY

CG III MAF

CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONAL FOR GEN WALL FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

1. IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR MEETING WITH DINH THIS AFTERNOON, DEPARTMENT OF STATE ADVISES THAT YOU NOT DIRECTLY MAKE THE POINT THAT HE, DINH, DOES NOT HAVE AMERICAN SUPPORT. SINCE THIS POINT IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OUR PRESSURE TACTIC ON DINH I BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE THE POINT INDIRECTLY AND YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DO SO.

2. IF DINH DOES NOT CHOOSE TO ACCEPT TRANSPORTATION AND RETURNS TO HUE, YOU CAN ASSUME THAT YOUR CONVERSATION WILL BE REPORTED TO TRÍ QUANG AND IT COULD BE MADE PUBLIC. YOUR DISCUSSION WITH DINH SHOULD TAKE THIS PROSPECZ INTO CONSIDERATION.

115
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

FROM

DDKE

TO

DDKE/CG THIRD MAF

PERSONAL FROM LTGEN KRULAK TO LTGEN WALT
OFFICER STATUS HQ III MAF

A CMC 212257Z

1. REF A. IN RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST TO THE COMMANDANT:

DOES NOT INCREASE THE NUMBER OF FIELD
GRADE OFFICERS INBOUND TO WESTPAC; HOWEVER, IT WILL
IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN JUNE THIS ACCELERATION
OF INPUT HAS CHANGED THE PLANNED INPUT X 6974
5-317-4534 THE FOLLOWING IS A RECAP OF THE INPUT

PAGE 2 YVNA 4614 CONFIDENTIAL

YOU CAN EXPECT BY MONTH

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2. THIS INPUT, AGAINST KNOWN LOSSES OF 19 OFFICERS
DURING THE SAME PERIOD, WILL BRING YOU TO A STRENGTH
OF 134 OFFICERS, VICE YOUR PRESENT STRENGTH OF 103 OFFICERS
WHILE THIS IS STILL SHORT OF YOUR OVERALL REQUIREMENTS OF
159 IT IS SOME IMPROVEMENT OVER YOUR PRESENT STATUS
3. THE NAMES OF THE OFFICERS INBOUND DURING THIS
PERIOD WILL BE PROVIDED BY LETTER MEANWHILE, I INTEND TO
CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS MATTER WITH THE COMMANDANT

WARM REGARDS

GP-4

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE COPY
COPIES 2 & 3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF

CG FMFPAC

R 270250Z/MAY

CG III MAF

DECLASSIFIED
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN WALT FROM GEN WESTMORELAND

SUBJ: EMPLOYMENT OF 1ST ARVN DIVISION (U)

1. (S-NOFORN) ALTHOUGH 1ST ARVN DIV HAS CONTINUED TO
   REACT TO VC ATTACKS DURING THE POLITICAL STRIFE IN I CTZ,
   REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT THE ORIENTATION OF THIS UNIT. ANYTHING
   WE CAN DO TO INCREASE THE STATURE OF GEN NHUAN AS THE DIVISION
   COMMANDER, OR HIS SUCCESSOR IF ONE SHOULD BE NAMED, MAY DRAW HIM
   CLOSER TO GVN AND ASSIST IN INSURING THE LOYALTY OF THE ENTIRE
   DIVISION TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND THE ANTI-VC CAUSE.

2. (S-NOFORN) NOW THAT THE GVN SEEMS TO HAVE PREVAILED IN
   DANANG AND QNNS, I AM INTERESTED IN INCREASING THE OPERATIONS
   AGAINST THE VC BY 1ST ARVN DIV. SUCH OPERATIONS APPARENTLY
   CONCEIVED AND CONTROLLED BY GEN NHUAN MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO HIS
   WINNING COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE FORCES IN THUA THIEN AND QUANG
   TRI PROVINCES, ESPECIALLY IF THE RESULTS OF THE OPERATIONS
   ARE FAVORABLE.

3. (S-NOFORN) REQUEST THAT YOU INITIATE PLANNING FOR
   ADDITIONAL COMBINED USMC AND ARVN OPERATIONS IN QUANG TRI
   PROVINCE DURING WHICH MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE
   US-5 FORCES AND THE 1ST ARVN DIV MIGHT BE FURTHER ENHANCED;
   THE DIVISION'S LOYALTY TO THE BATTLE AGAINST THE VC REESTAB-
   LISHED; AND ATTENTION OF CENTRAL VIETNAM DRAWN AWAY FROM THE
   STRUGGLE EFFORT. GP-4

BT

COPY 2 OFS

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

FOR LITGEN WALT FROM HYLAND

1. FLAGSHIP WILL BE OFF DANANG 29 MAY. IF THINGS ARE QUIET THERE, WOULD ENJOY HAVING YOU AND SEVERAL OF YOUR STAFF OFFICERS OUT. IF CONVENIENT YOU COULD ARRIVE BY HELO AT 1100 AND STAY FOR LUNCH. IN CASE YOU ARE UNABLE TO GET AWAY I PLAN TO HELO TO DANANG FTR ENTERPRISE VIA CIA ABOUT 1500. I COULD ARR DANANG 1400 GIVING US AN HOUR BEFORE I DEPART. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1 OF 3 COPIES: FILE
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES: MAF

CONSEVENTHFLT

R 250240Z/WAY

LITGEN WALT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK.

A. CG 212257Z
1. REF A RESPONDS TO MY PERSONAL ANALYSIS TO CMC MSG ON EFFECTS OF THE FIELD OFFICER SHORTAGE ON OUR OPERATIONS.
   IN RUN, IT ANALYSIS THAT THE REPORTING DATES FOR 17 OFFICER, ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR WESTPAC, WILL BE ADVANCED.
2. IN ADDITION, THE REF OPENS THE WAY FOR NOMINATIONS FOR SELECTIVE EXTENSION, IN COUNTRY, OF OFFICERS ABOUT TO COMPLETE THEIR REGULAR TOUR. THIS, YOU WILL NOTE, IS NOT MANDATORY, AND ALTHOUGH I APPRECIATE THE LEeway IT GIVES, I INTEND TO AVAIL MYSELF OF THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY THE COMMANDANT ONLY CASES WHERE;
   A. THE NEED IS ABSOLUTE AND UNQUESTIONABLE; AND
   B. WHERE I CANNOT FULLFILL THE NEED BY ANY OTHER MEANS FROM WESTPAC RESOURCES.
3. I BELIEVE THAT A 13 MONTH TOUR IS ENOUGH, WHILE A DEDICATED PROFESSIONAL OFFICER WILL CERTAINLY RESPOND DUTIFULLY AND LOYALLY TO A REQUEST TO REMAIN BEYOND HIS TIME, WHEN WE DO IT WE ARE EXHIBITING TO THE RANK AND FILE THAT IT MIGHT WELL HAPPEN TO THEM. THIS CANNOT HELP THEIR MORALE. I WOULD RATHER RUN A LITTLE SHORT THAN PART BREAKING FAITH WITH THE TROOPS.
4. NFG-I WILL KEEP CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOURS, AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE DIVS, WING AND THE FORLOGCKD. ANY TIME THAT THEY ANTICIPATED PERSONNEL FLOW PUTS ANY COMMANDER IN A POSITION WHERE HE CAN'T MAKE THE GRADE WITHOUT MORE HELP, I WANT TO KNOW ABOUT IT. THEN, IF I CANNOT HELP FROM MY OWN RESOURCES, AND IF WE CANNOT GET ADDITIONAL HELP FROM CMC, I WILL CONSIDER RECOMMENDING EXTENSIONS -- BUT ONLY THEN. WARM REGARDS

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1 OF 3 COPIES: FILE
       COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES: MAF

CG FWFPAC        P 240029Z/KAY        LTGEN WALT
2207/62 ZPA
RM 650 MACV
TO SSO III MAC
SECRET MAC 108

PERSONAL FOR MAJOR WALT FROM WESTMORELAND

1. I WOULD LIKE TO CONFERENCE WITH YOU AT CHU LAI TOMORROW AND PLAN TO
   ARRIVE AT APPROXIMATELY 0930. FOLLOWING MY ARRIVAL I CONTEMPLATE
   TELEPHoning BOSTON TO ASK HIM IF HE COULD CONTACT THI IMMEDIATELY AND
   ASK HIM TO FLY DOWN TO CHU LAI TO MEET ME. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU
   COULD ASSURE THAT BOSTON WILL BE AT HIS HEADQUARTERS BETWEEN 0930
   AND 1000, THAT HE IS PREPARED TO ASSIST THI IN GETTING TO PHU RAI
   AND THAT AN AIRCRAFT IS AVAILABLE THERE TO FLY HIM TO CHU LAI. EVERY
   EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO MAKE THI'S DEPARTURE, IF HE CHOOSES TO ACCEPT
   MY INVITATION, AS INCONSPICUOUS AS POSSIBLE SO AS NOT TO AROUSE SUS-
   PICION OR SPECULATIVE ANNOUNCEMENT OVER THE HUB RADIO. PLEASE KEEP
   THIS PLAN ON A NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

2. FOLLOWING MEETING WOULD APPRECIATE TRANSPORTATION BY HELICOPTER TO
   QUANG NAI WHERE I WOULD LIKE TO CONFERENCE WITH LAN AND HIS ADVISOR. FROM
   QUANG NAI WILL PICK UP MY OWN PLANE FOR VISIT TO KHAN DUC. IF
   WEATHER PERMITS, RETURN TO SAIGON.

3. LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
PERSONAL FOR

SECRET

PERSONAL FOR COL CHAISSON FROM COL LOPRETE

CONSEVENTHFLIT INFORMAL VISIT TO CG III MAF

1. IN OUR RECENT CONVERSATION ABOUT ADM HYLAND VISITING GEN

WALT. I INDICATED THAT 20 MAY WAS BEING CONSIDERED. ADM HYLAND

NOW BELIEVES THAT A DATE NEAR 06(MAY 5, 1955) IS NECESSARY.

MORE CONVENIENT. WILL KEEP YOU POSTED AND SUGGEST A DATE FOR

YOUR CONCURRENCE.

2. PLEASE PASS THIS INFORMATION TO TOM FIELDS.

GP-4

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 - FILE

COPIES 2-3 OF 3 - COL CHAISSON

CONSEVENTHFLIT 191416Z/MAY COL CHAISSON

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES
1. At 1940 hours this evening Ambassador Porter instructed me to inform you by secure means that the Prime Minister is recalling Colonel Loan from Danang and has assured General Cao that he enjoys the Prime Minister's full support.

2. The Ambassador desires exercise of care against disclosure of plan to withdraw Loan because of potential reaction thereto on the part of Loan and possibly others. He desires, moreover, that you continue, as you have done so masterfully, avoidance of entanglement in internal Vietnamese machinations.

So note: Deliver immediately.

105
SECRET

MESSAGE FROM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

PP RUNSMF
DE RUNSMA 1335E 1300235
ZNY SSSSS
P 100223Z
FM COMUSMACV
to CG III MAF

SEC R E T 16048 FROM: MACDC
FOR GEN WALT FROM GENHJN DUNN
SUBJ: AIRFIELD SITE SELECTION, VIETNAM (U)
REF: A. COMUSMACV MSG DTG 060512Z MAY 66.
B. C. NCPAC MSG DTG 072145Z MAY 66.

1. S&7 REFERENCE B IS A RESPONSE TO REFERENCE A AND IS
RECOPIED IN PART. QUOTE:

4. I APPRECIATE THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS ATTENDANT TO
HUE/PHU BAI AND THAT MUCH TIME MAY BE REQUIRED TO ACQUIRE THE
SITE, MOVE GRAVES, ETC. OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL NEEDS SHOULD

PAGE 2 RUNSMA 1335E SEC R E T
PREDOMINATE OUR ACTIONS. UNLESS THERE ARE PERMANENT OVER-RIDING
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IT APPEARS THAT HUE/PHU BAI IS STILL
THE BEST CHOICE FOR AN ADDITIONAL JET AIRFIELD IN RVN.

6. IF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE ADDITIONAL AIRFIELD IS
THUS TO BE SATISFIED AT TUY HOA, ADEQUATE OPERATIONAL TACTICAL
FIGHTER CAPABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY MUST STILL BE PROVIDED IN THE
I CORPS AREA. THEREFORE CONCUR IN THE IMMEDIATE UNDERTAKING
OF A PARALLEL RUNWAY AND SUPPORT FACILITIES AT CHU LAI TO ACCEPT
TWO ADDITIONAL MARINE SQUADRONS. FOUR MARINE SQUADRONS WILL HAVE
TO REMAIN AT DANANG, WITH SIX AT CHU LAI. IT IS NOT RPT NOT
FEASIBLE TO TRANSFER ALL MARINE SQUADRONS TO CHU LAI.

COMUSMACV
100529Z/MAY
CG III MAF

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
7. In addition, action will be continued to obtain Phu Bai as a future jet operating base. It is the only location found to date in I Corps that can be developed for best response to our operational needs. Believe every effort should be directed to obtaining this location for the earliest possible construction start date.

8. Recognize that improved port facilities are required for support of the Hue area. Current plans for construction of an LST port at Tan My will require major improvement of the road to Hue which is routed through the southern portion of the city. As an alternative, request comment as to the feasibility of dredging an LST channel across Dan An Hai (16 Dec 26° N 197 Deg 53° E) and providing pier/ramp facilities on the west shore adjacent to route one. Such an arrangement would reduce road requirements and obviate transit through Hue. Unquote.

2. (S) Reference para 5 of quoted message. This port is considered feasible from engineering standpoint, however, will require twice as much dredging as LST port at Tan My with same consequent increase in construction time. However, major construction advantage would be gained by eliminating requirement to upgrade road from Tan My to Highway One as well as political advantages of by-passing Hue. Request your comments on suggested port concept with particular emphasis on comparison this location to Tan My and question of security during construction and operation of port at this suggested site. Reply desired Mlt 111266.

May 66.
GP 4.

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DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL 16114

FROM: MACTM-A
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN WALT FROM 8/GEN CROLEY

SUSJ: OCEAN SHIPPING (C) 16114

1. (C) APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN OR ACTIONS THAT RESULT IN BACKLOADING OF SS EXTON AND DISCHARGE OF WASHOE COUNTY.

2. (C) THE EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS TO BACKLOAD THE SS EXTON WITH SOME 1,500-PLUS 750 LBS BOMBS AND CODPENENTS FOR BANGKOK WAS INITIATED UPON VESSEL REQUEST BY THE 7TH AIR FORCE, 8 MAY, TO MEET MUNITIONS REDISTRIBUTION DIRECTED BY CINC PAC (CINC PAC MSG (S) 0419692 MAY 1966). At the time the requirement was received, the EXTON was not completed discharge of listed munitions. NAMSUPPACT and 1ST TRAFFIC REGIONS IN DA NANG WERE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED BY TELEPHONE WITH VESSEL APPROVAL OF THE CARGO OFFERED, PERECO SUMMARIZED THE MUNITION REDISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS, THE EXISTING ORPHAN LIFT, AND THE AMOUNT OF CARGO. INSTRUCTIONS WERE ALSO ISSUED TO 1ST TRAFFIC REGION TO OVER THE INTERNAL NET. MTS THE CARGO CLEARANCE ORDER WAS SENT TO NAMSUPPACT BY MESSAGE UTC 075472Z MAY 1966.

3. (C) DISCHARGE OF UNIMAPA LOADED CARGO FROM THE WASHOE COUNTY WAS INITIATED BY COMMAND TASK FORCE 76 TO PERMIT VESSEL TO MEET AN URGENT NAVQ CCC REQUIREMENT OF A SPECIAL LST LIFT FROM SAIGON TO DIEN BONG ON 14 MAY 1966. THE TASK FORCE TRIED TO DISBURSE CCC WITHOUT SUCCESS. LT NOTE THAT THE CITED MESSAGE FROM CTF 76 ALSO DIRECTS THE WASHOE COUNTY TO RELoad THE RETROGRADE CARGO AT DA NANG UPON COMPLETION OF THE SPECIAL LIFT AND PROCEED TO CINCPAC.

4. (C) REGRET ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD IMPOSED BY THESE PRIORITY DECISIONS. THE TASK FORCE TO PROHIBIT SUCH WASTE OF EFFORT REGARDUS 8/GEN CROLEY CNF-4

LET

UNCLASSIFIED

20/3

Please, acknowledge
CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL FOR

VV USAF001GE
RR DD/CK
DE YNFA 1261 1252056
ZS Y C/CC/CC
R 082058Z
PM CG FM/FAC
TO DD/SE/CG III MAF
INFO DD/SE/CG FIRST MAF
SUB
CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONAL FOR LT GEN MALL INFO HGEN MC CUTCHEON FROM LT GEN KRULAK
SUBSTITUTION OF C-47 FOR C-117. (U)
1. YOUR COMMENTS CONCERNING THE SUBSTITUTION OF C-47 FOR C-117 AIRCRAFT
FOR C-117 AIRCRAFT ARE APPRECIATED.
2. THE REPLACEMENT OF C-117 AIRCRAFT WITH C-47 AIRCRAFT IS
PROBABLY NOT DESIRABLE, CONSIDERING ALL FACTORS:
A. THE C-47 HAS LESS CARGO CAPACITY, SPEED AND RANGE.
B. C-47 ASSETS, AS COMPARED TO C-117'S, ARE LIMITED. TOTAL
MARINE CORPS C-47 ASSETS ARE D, AND IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE

PAGE 2 YNFA 1261 CONFIDENTIAL
DESIRED NUMBER OF REPLACEMENT C-47'S COULD BE OBTAINED.
C. THE ATTENDANT REQUIREMENTS FOR EXCHANGE OF SUPPLY
SUPPORT WOULD PLACE ANOTHER BURDEN ON THE ALREADY OVERWORKED
SUPPLY SYSTEM.
D. I HAVE RECENTLY ASKED CGC TO CONSIDER ASSIGNMENT OF
A C-117 TO MCAS IWAKUNI VICE A C-47 FOR THE ABOVE REASONS.
CF-4
ST
COPY 1 OF 3 - FILE
COPIES 2-3 - CG III MAF
T&W - MAF
CG FM/FAC 0820582/MAY CG III MAF

(this is copy 3 of 3 copies)
SECRET

MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
5d MaxDiv - 2100/2

VV DJA63ERR
FP DUNKE
DE VYMA 1321 1291640
ZNY SSSS
P 091640Z
FM CG FMFPA
INFO DUNKE/CG III MAF
DDRE/CG FIRST MAY
R 072145Z
FM CINCPAC
TO RUEDA/JCS
RUNSNA/CONUSMACV
INFO RUHLKN/CINCPACAF
RUHLKN/CINCPACFLT
RUHLBP/CGFMFPA
DT
SECRET
FOR GEN WESTMORELAND AND GEN WHEELER FROM ADM SHARP
AIRFIELD SITE SELECTION; VIETNAM (U)
A. JCS 5460/272053Z APR
B. CONUSMACV 19521/060041Z
1. REF A STATES SECRET ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN REQUESTED
TO REMOVE STATE DEPARTMENT OBJECTIONS TO HUE/PHU BAI; SUGGESTS
DESIRABILITY OF EARLY ACQUISITION ACTION FOR HUE/PHU BAI AND TUY
HOA SIMULTANEOUSLY; AND SUBJECT TO CINCPAC DESIRES AND AVAILABILITY
OF CONSTRUCTION CAPABILITY, STATES THAT IT MAY BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO

PAGE 2 RUHLKN 359 SECRET
PROCEED ALSO WITH CONSTRUCTION AT BOTH SITES SIMULTANEOUSLY.
2. REF B CONTAINS A COMPARISON BETWEEN CHU LAI AND HUE/PHU
BAI, POINTING OUT ADVANTAGES OF EACH, AND RECOMMENDS CONSTRUCTION
OF TUY HOA USING TURNKEY CONCEPT; CONSTRUCTION OF PARALLEL RUNWAY
AT CHU LAI IN LIEU OF CONSTRUCTION AT HUE/PHU BAI; AND CONTINUED
DEVELOPMENT OF LST PORT AT HUE AS PLANNED.
3. THE CURRENT SATURATION OF AIRFIELDS THROUGHOUT VIETNAM IS OF
COURSE OF CONCERN, HOWEVER, THE GREATEST SATURATION EXISTS AT DANANG
AND TO RELOCATE UNITS FROM DANANG TO TUY HOA AND/OR CHU LAI TO
MAKE ROOM FOR ADDITIONAL AIR FORCE UNITS TO RESATURATE THIS BASE, IS
NOT THE ANSWER. DANANG IS SATURATED BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY TO
HEAVY OPERATING AREAS IN LAOS AND RTE PKGE ONE. THE BEST WAY TO
RELIEVE CONGESTION AT DANANG AND AT THE SAME TIME IMPROVE OUR OPER-
ATIONAL CAPABILITY IS THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ADDITIONAL AIRFIELD IN THE
DANANG, HUE/PHU BAI AREA.
4. I APPRECIATE THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS ATTENDANT TO HUE/PHU BAI
AND THAT MUCH TIME MAY BE REQUIRED TO ACQUIRE THE SITE, MOVE GRAVES
ETC. OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL NEEDS SHOULD PREDOMINATE OUR ACTIONS.
UNLESS THERE ARE PERMANENT OVER-RIDING POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
IT APPEARS THAT HUE/PHU BAI IS STILL THE BEST CHOICE FOR
CINCPAC & PAGE MSG 072145Z/MAY 6-3

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SECRET
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MESSAGE FROM SECRET DRAKE

AN ADDITIONAL JET AIRFIELD IN RVN.

5. CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE HAS BEEN EVIDENT TO SELECT BASE Z AND INITIATE ITS CONSTRUCTION. MUCH OF THIS PRESSURE HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS TUY HOA. OPERATIONALLY THIS SITE IS LOCATED IN THE WRONG DIRECTION FROM WHERE WE NEED ANOTHER AIRFIELD, AND IT WILL POSE SOME EXTREMELY DIFFICULT CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT PROBLEMS. THERE IS DOUBT WHETHER ANY TIME WILL BE SAVED BY BUILDING TUY HOA IN LIEU OF HUE/PHU BAI. HOWEVER, CAN AGREE TO TUY HOA AS THE BASE Z SITE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING:

A. CONSTRUCTION OF TUY HOA TO BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE AIR FORCE TURNKEY CONTRACTOR METHOD.
B. THIS CONTRACTOR TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COMPLETE TUY HOA COMPLEX, TO INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE AIRFIELD BUT CONSTRUCTION OF THE PORT FACILITY, BREAKWATERS, RAILROAD/ROAD RELOCATIONS, ETC.
C. THE CONTRACTOR TO MOBILIZE HIS OWN EQUIPMENT, MAN-Power, MATERIALS, DREDGES, ETC. NO IN-COUNTRY RESOURCES TO BE DIVERTED TO TUY HOA UNLESS THEY ARE IN EXCESS TO ALL KNOWN REQUIREMENTS.
D. SUPPLY OF LST'S IS LIMITED. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE THEM DAMAGED ON THE BEACH AT TUY HOA. THEREFORE, NO LST SUP-

PAGE 4 RULHq 8595695E C R E T
PORT TO BE PROVIDED THE CONTRACTOR. WE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING OWN SEALIFT, UNLOADING, BEACHING, BARGING, ETC. AS REQUIRED.

6. IF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE ADDITIONAL AIRFIELD IS TO BE SATISFIED AT TUY HOA, ADEQUATE OPERATIONAL TACTICAL FIGHTER CAPABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY MUST STILL BE PROVIDED IN THE 1 CORPS AREA. THEREFORE CONCUR IN THE IMMEDIATE UNDERTAKING OF A PARALLEL RUNWAY AND SUPPORT FACILITIES AT CHU LAI TO ACCEPT TWO ADDITIONAL MARINE SQUADRONS. FOUR MARINE SQUADRONS WILL HAVE TO REMAIN AT DANANG WITH SIX AT CHU LAI. IT IS NOT YET FEASIBLE TO TRANSFER ALL MARINE SQUADRONS TO CHU LAI.

7. IN ADDITION, ACTION WILL BE CONTINUED TO OBTAIN HUE/PHU BAI AS A FUTURE JET OPERATING BASE. IT IS THE ONLY LOCATION FOUND TO DATE IN 1 CORPS THAT CAN BE DEVELOPED FOR BEST RESPONSE TO OUR OPERATIONAL NEEDS. BELIEVE EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO OBTAINING THIS LOCATION FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION START DATE.

8. RECOGNIZE THAT IMPROVED PORT FACILITIES ARE REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT OF THE HUE AREA. CURRENT PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF AN LST PORT AT TAN MY WILL REQUIRE MAJOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE ROAD TO HUE WHICH IS ROUTED THROUGH THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE CITY. AS AN

PAGE 5 RULHq 8595695E C R E T
ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST CONUS/MACV COMMENTS AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF DREDGING AN LST CHANNEL ACROSS DAM CAN HAI (16 Deg 22'N 107 Deg 53'E), AND PROVIDING PIER/RAMP FACILITIES ON THE WEST SHORE ADJACENT TO ROUTE ONE. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD REDUCE ROAD REQUIREMENTS AND OBViate TRANSIT THROUGH HUE. GP-4.

BY

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PERSONAL FOR

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR GEN WALT, MAJGEN KYLE, AND COL SIMMONS

AT 1500H 6 MAY 1966 I RELINQUISHED COMMAND OF THE 4TH BN, 26TH MAR, IN THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION TO MAJ. THOMAS R. KELLY, USMC.

LTCOL W. W. TAYLOR SENDS,

DIST: 1 COPY - FILE COPY
2 COPIES - CG III MAF

THIRD BN NINTH MAR P 060735Z/MAY CG III MAF
EXCLUSIVE

P 0517322
RC: CMC
TO: NMBENS/CC III MAF
INFO: RUKLEP/CG FMFPAC

ICLAS PERSONAL

EXCLUSIVE FOR LT GEN WALT AND INFO LT GEN KRULAK FROM GEN WEIDE

1. HAVE CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST THAT 1ST LT. HENRY PARKER HUDSON
05033; BE RETURNED CONUS TO PARTICIPATE IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY COM-
MISSIONING CEREMONY OF JUNIOR ROTC UNIT JESUIT HIGH SCHOOL
NEW ORLEANS 17 MAY.

2. UNDERSTAND HUDSON WHO IS FORMER STUDENT JESUIT HS WAS WOUNDED
28 APR WHILE MEMBER D COMPANY, 2ND BN, 3RD MIR. IF RETURNED FOR
THIS PURPOSE WOULD PLAN GIVE HUDSON SHORT PERIOD LEAVE IF DESIRED
AND RETURN TO RUN FOR COMPLETION OF TOUR.

PAGE TWO RUEGEN 214 UNCLAS

3. REQUEST FOLLOWING INFO ASAP:

A. CURRENT LOCATION HUDSON?
B. PHYSICAL CONDITION WOULD RETURN CONUS AT THIS TIME BE
INJURIOUS HEALTH?
C. DOES HUDSON DESIRE TO RETURN IN THIS CAPACITY?
D. CAN COMMAND RELEASE HUDSON FOR THIS PURPOSE WITHOUT
SIGNIFICANT DETRIMENT?

BY

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 2 COPIES: MAF
CMC P 0517322/MAY LTGEN WALT
MESSAGE FORM - SECRET

CG RUMSVF 238 1251415

FM CG I FFORCEV NHA RVN
TO RUMSMF/CG III MAF DA NANG RVN
INFO RUMSMF/COMUSMACV SGN RVN
RUMSVC/CG USARV TSN RVN
RUMSVF/CG I FFORCEV AKE RVN
RUMSVL/CG I FFORCEV TSN RVN
RUMSVN/CG USARV TSN RVN
RUMSVF/CG I FFORCEV MW RVN
RUMSVC/CG I FFORCEV TSN RVN

SECRE T 3213 AVF-GC. MAJ GEN LARSEN SENDS FOR
LI GEN WALT.

SUBJ: COORDINATION MEETING (U)

REF: COMUSMACV MSG 15229, DTD 041113Z, MAY 66

1. (S) REFERENCE OUR SHORT CONVERSATION TODAY, SUGGEST
I FFORCEV SEND A SMALL TEAM TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON THE 10TH OR 11TH
TO DISCUSS THE OPERATION IN QUANG Nhai PROVINCE. AMONG THE SUBJECTS
WHICH SHOULD BE INCLUDED FOR DISCUSSION ARE:

A. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, TO INCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUPPLY BY SEA.

PAGE 2 RUMSVF 238 S E C R E T

B. CONSTRUCTION OF A C-130 AIRFIELD WITHIN THE AREA OF
OPERATIONS BY 1ST ARMY.
C. SELECTION OF TENTATIVE AREAS OF OPERATIONS.
D. SELECTION OF TENTATIVE INCLUSIVE DATES FOR THE OPERATION.
E. COMPOSITION OF FORCES.
F. INTELLIGENCE.
G. JOINT USE OF AIRFIELDS.
H. COORDINATION OF AIR SUPPORT.
I. CIVIL AFFAIRS.
J. COMMUNICATIONS.
K. ARTILLERY SUPPORT.
L. SPECIAL FORCES COORDINATION.
M. PSYWAR.

2. (C) WOULD LIKE TO BRING ALONG REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 1ST
LOGCOMD TO DISCUSS WITH YOUR LOGISTICAL EXPERTS SOME OF THE PROBLEMS
WHICH MAY BE ENCOUNTERED IN THAT FIELD.

3. (S) FOLLOWING THE MEETING, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT WE PERMIT
THE TWO DECISIONS WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTING THE OPERATION TO WORK AS
CLOSELY TOGETHER AS POSSIBLE AND TO DEVELOP FURTHER DETAILED PLANS.

S/S

CG I FFORCEV NHA RVN 0 051405Z/MAY/3

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MESSAGE FROM - CONFIDENTIAL

3d MarDiv = 2100/3

PP DDNE
ZMY CCCOC ZFD YMYA 2045
PP DDNE
DC YMYA 621 1250233
ZMY CCCOC
2952332
FM CG FMFPAC
TO DDNE/CG III MAF

CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK
OFFICER PERSONNEL STATUS III MAF HGS. (C)
A. YOUR 302346Z/APR (C)
1. I HAVE ANALYZED YOUR OFFICER PERSONNEL SITUATION
AND AGREE THAT YOU NEED ADDITIONAL FIELD GRADE OFFICERS
TO MEET THE WORKLOAD OF YOUR HEADQUARTERS.
2. YOUR RECOMMENDED I/O CHANGES HAVE GONE FORWARD
TO HQMC WITH A FAVORABLE ENDORSEMENT. THE REQUIREMENTS
STATED THEREIN, EVEN THOUGH NOZZAGGED

"Not Approved"

WSPAGE 2 YYNA 621 CONFIDENTIAL
BY CNC ARE BEING TREATED AS REQUIREMENTS BY MY STAFF.
IN OUR PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT. I WILL PURSUE APPROVAL OF THE
RECOMMENDED INCREASE WITH HQMC.
3. A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS HAS BEEN MADE OF THE
OFFICER PERSONNEL SITUATION FOR BOTH COMMITTED AND
UNCOMMITTED FORCES OF FMFPAC. I WAS ABOUT TO SEND IT TO
YOU IN THIS MESSAGE. HOWEVER, IT IS SO DETAILED
AND COMPLEX AND, LIKE ALL STATISTICAL ANALYSES, SO
SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISINTERPRETATION, THAT I HAVE DECIDED
TO HAVE MY G-1 REP. PREPARED TO GO INTO THE WHOLE
MATTER ON AN EYEBALL BASIS WITH YOUR PEOPLE, AS WELL
AS WITH THE DIVISIONS, THE FLC AND WING.
4. I AM CONVINCED THAT CNC IS GOING TO MEET OUR GROSS
REQUIREMENTS; HOWEVER I HAVE NO ILLUSION HE WILL BE
ABLE TO FULFILL COMPLETELY THE RANKS AND SKILLS WITH
THOSE WELL QUALIFIED, HIGH CALIBER PERSONNEL OF WHOM
YOU SPEAK. THERE ARE GOING TO BE SUBSTITUTIONS.
5. WE ARE WORKING ON HQMC TO ACCELERATE MOVEMENT OF
OFFICERS ALREADY SLATED FOR WESTPAC AS WELL AS TO
DIVERT OTHERS THAT ARE NOT NOW SLATED FOR WESTPAC.

PAGE 3 YMYA 621 CONFIDENTIAL
THESE EFFORTS WILL HAVE SOME BENEFICIAL EFFECTS AND,
AS MY G-1 WILL RELATE NEXT WEEK, YOUR SITUATION IS
GOING TO IMPROVE STEADILY. HOWEVER, DESPITE ALL WE
CAN DO, IT IS NOT GOING TO MEASURE UP TO YOUR OPTIMUM
NEED. THIS IS ONE OF THE NUMEROUS MATTERS ON WHICH I
WISH TO SPEAK PRIVATELY WITH YOU NEXT WEEK.
GP=4
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: RKR MAIN RE EDE (C)

1. (S) THE FLUID EMBRY SITUATION IN I CTZ AND II CTZ MAKES IT INADVISABLE TO MOVE ANY ELEMENT OF THE RKR MAIN RE EDE AT THIS TIME.

2. (S) A RAPIDLY CHANGING TACTICAL SITUATION COULD REQUIRE THE MOVEMENT OF THIS BRIGADE ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. IT IS NECESSARY THEREFORE THAT CONTINGENCY PLANS TO DEPLOY THE BRIGADE WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER NOTIFICATION BE KEPT CURRENT BY III FOR AND I FORCEn.

APR

AT

COPY 2 OF 3 COPIES
SECRET 15056 FROM: MACDC-PO FOR GEN WALT
SUBJ: AIRFIELDS, I CTZ (U)

1. (S) AS A RESULT OF RECENT INVESTIGATION BY MACV SITE
SELECTION COMMITTEE FOR ADDITIONAL AIR FACILITIES FOR EARLY
BEDOWN TFS IN I CTZ, IT APPEARS THAT EXPANSION CHU LAI MAY
BE DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVE TO CONSTRUCTION COMPLETELY NEW AIR-
BASE AT HUE/PHU BAI. THEREFORE COMUSMACV DESIRES COMMENTS
CC; III MAF ON THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL. REQUEST REPLY NLT.
43122% MAY.

2. (S) OLCC CONTRACTOR WOULD CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL.

Permanent Runway at Chu Lai, Parallel to One Now Under-
Construction, with Buo Late This Calendar Year. Concept
Would Include Movement Majority of Elements First Marine
Air Wing From Danang Main to Chu Lai, With 1st MAW Being Sole
Occupant Chu Lai Airbase. 7th AF Would Then Become Principal
Occupant Danang Main; 1st MAW Occupancy Danang Main Would
Be Limited as Necessary to Support Tactical Operations.

Copies 2 of 3 Copies

CVV SMJ30
22

PRIORITY

CG, PHIPAC

PHUSNACV

0211382

MAY66

SECRET

AIRFIELDS, 1 CTZ (U)
MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF

FOR: Staff Sec

Hold in file.

No action required yet.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF
FOR: Gen McCutcheon

1. Attacked affair in Operation TEXAS.

2. Among those, MacWest, Moreland talked was Les Brown who claimed not having delayed force had said nothing about a bomb shortage.

3. Would appreciate whatever pertinent info can be furnished.

UR

[Signature]
CONFIDENTIAL SPICAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LGEN KRULAK, INFO LGEN WALT, FROM MGEN KIER. AN304. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. FOLLOWING QUOTES SECDEF MSG (251946Z) TO COMUSMACV. INFO CINCPAC. ANMEM SAIGON, JUSPAC SAIGON. QUOTE:
UNCLASS DIF 9235 YFQ0. OAD (PA) FOR 10.

SUBJECT: NBC TV REPORT ON SHORTAGES.

1. NBC-TV VIETNAM REVIEW ON APRIL 24 HIGHLIGHTED THE BOMB SHORTAGE IN VIETNAM. PERTINENT EXCERPTS FROM THE SHOW FOLLOW: QUOTE THERE IS A BOMB SHORTAGE IN VN. ONE PLACE IT HAS BEEN FELT IS AT THE U.S. AIR BASE AT DANANG. HERE IS A REPORT FROM DAVID BURRINGTON IN DANANG. (FILM CLIP) BURRINGTON: ONE SIGN THAT THE PRESS HAS TOUCHED A SENSITIVE NERVE IS THE SUDDEN BLACKOUT OF INFORMATION AND THAT'S WHATS HAPPENED HERE AT THE DANANG AIR BASE. ON APRIL 15, THE ORDER WENT OUT FROM HIGHEST SOURCES. NO ONE COULD TALK ABOUT THE BOMB SHORTAGE HERE. LAST MONTH, FOR EXAMPLE, DURING AN OPERATION SOUTH OF HERE, GEN. WESTMORELAND QUOTED SOME MARINE OFFICERS AFTER A MAJOR BATTLE WHICH OCCURED WHEN A BATTALION LAUNCHED BY CHANCE IN FRONT OF A WELL-DUG IN VC HEADQUARTERS. THE MARINES FOUND THEMSELVES UNDER INTENSE FIRE, AND CALLED FOR AN AIR STRIKE. QUOTE WAS IT SUCCESSFUL? UNQUOTE, THE GEN. ASKED, AND THE ANSWER WAS: "NO." WHAT WAS NEEDED WERE THOUSAND-POUND BOMBS WITH DELAYED ACTION FUSES, AND NONE WAS AVAILABLE. MANY MARINES WERE KILLED TAKING THAT HEADQUARTERS, AND IT SEEMS SAFE TO ASSUME THAT SOME MIGHT HAVE BEEN SPARED HAD THE RIGHT KIND OF BOMB BEEN ON TARGET. UNQUOTE.

2. YOU MIGHT WANT TO LOOK INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH TRIGGERED OFF THE REPORT BY BURRINGTON. WE COULD APPRECIATE ANY AMPLIFICATION REGARDING THE ALLEGED DISCUSSION BETWEEN GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND THE MARINE OFFICERS PLUS THE CHARGES THAT MANY OF THE MARINES KILLED MIGHT HAVE BEEN SPARED IF THE RIGHT BOMBS WERE AVAILABLE. BY UNQUOTE.

GP-4

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 2 COPIES: MAF
ADMNO FMFPAC P 2800117/APRIL LGEN WALT
MEMORANDUM

From: Major General MCCUTCHEON
To: Brigadier General PLATT

Subj: Class V(A) status during operation Texas

1. The status of large bombs and delay fuzes at both Danang and Chu Lai during the period of operation TEXAS (21-24 March) as follows:

   **BOMBS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>1000 lbs</th>
<th>2000 lbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 21</td>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 22</td>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>927 (77 rec'd)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23</td>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>927</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 24</td>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>923</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. No delay fuzes were used during this period. The status was as follows:

   **Electrical:**
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>1371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>2217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   **Mechanical:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danang</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Our records show that during the period in question we expended the following ordnance in support of Operation TEXAS.
### CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>250# GP/FRAGS</th>
<th>500# GP</th>
<th>1000# GP</th>
<th>500# NAPALM</th>
<th>2.75/5&quot; RKT PKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Mar</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TONS</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRAND TOTAL TONS - 150 TONS**

4. No heavy bombs were specifically requested, however 32 were expended. No delay fuzing was specifically requested and none was used. Napalm was specifically requested, on occasion and was used.

---

Keith B. Mo Ochs
SUBJECT: General V(4) status during operation 1521.

1. The status of large issues and delay items at both Hawaiian and Okinawa during the period of Operation 1521 (24-28 April) is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 21</td>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>1076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item 2</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22</td>
<td>Item 3</td>
<td>1355</td>
<td>1355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item 4</td>
<td>027</td>
<td>027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 23</td>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td>035</td>
<td>035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 24</td>
<td>Item 2</td>
<td>035</td>
<td>035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25</td>
<td>Item 3</td>
<td>035</td>
<td>035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item 4</td>
<td>035</td>
<td>035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. No delay items were noted during this period. The status was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td>1071</td>
<td>1071</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item 2</td>
<td>0217</td>
<td>0217</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item 3</td>
<td>0564</td>
<td>0567</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item 4</td>
<td>0567</td>
<td>0567</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. Your remarks show that during the period in question we expounded the following outcomes in support of Operation 1521.

DECLASSIFIED
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>200% GP/VESS</th>
<th>100% GP</th>
<th>20000+ GP</th>
<th>2000+ TAPAL</th>
<th>2.75+ TAPAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL | 70 | 30 | 32 | 22 | 22 |

**SUBTOTAL 100 - 150 KMS**

4. No heavy bombs were specifically requested, however 10 were expended. No delay during was specifically requested and none was used. Heavy was specifically requested on occasion and was used.

**PART II: BC OMISSION**
MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF

FOR:

Can West eat day before dry
lamb & delay fuse.

Pete, Brunson, Lou, Charles,
FX Kelley.

What about FX - what do
you need to blow canister?
FX 1000 - 2000 lb bombs w/delay
fuse. An academic geni -
no concern that 700 were not
available.

Only one civilian present.
MEMORANDUM
FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF
FOR:
Gen. W. met Wang in Shanghai
Chairman accompanied Gen.
W. on land.
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WALT FROM GENERAL WUSTHOFFMAN
REFERENCE: III MAF 27/422

YOUR SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF THE MOST RECENT CONTEST IS APPRECIATED. MY CONGRATULATIONS ON THE CONTINUING SUCCESS OF THIS IMAGINATIVE PROGRAM.
SECRET

MESSAGE FOR - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

IDIV 814MS
ZNY SSSES
O 200915Z
FM FIRST MARDIV COC
TO III MAF COC
BT
SECRET
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN VALT FROM MG27 FIELDS
COORDINATION VISITPAH 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIV
A. CG III MAF MSG 2508422
B. CG I FORC V MSG 220717Z
1. THE ADC FIRST MARDIV VISITED THE CG, 1ST AIR CAV DIV AT 1400H
27APR AT AN KHE TO DISCUSS FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS. HE DID THIS
IN CAPACITY OF REPRESENTATIVE OF FIRST MARDIV AS WELL AS
OF TASK FORCE EKRAY. INFORMATION WHICH FOLLOWS FROM THAT
VISIT WAS REPORTED BY THE ADC FIRST MARDIV ON HIS RETURN.
2. AFTER NOTIFYING MGEN KINNARD AS TO THE PURPOSE OF THE

PAGE TWO FIRST MARDIV SECRET
VISIT, AND SHOWING HIM A COPY OF REF (A), KINNARD EXPRESSED
MODERATE SURPRISE AS TO ITS CONTENTS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED
HAVING HAD GENERAL INFORMATION OF THE 26 APRIL MEETING AMONG
GENERALS WESTMORELAND, VAUT, AND LARSO, BUT ALLEGEDLY HAD
NOT BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR A 1ST AIR CAV
DIV/III MAF COORDINATED OPERATION WITHIN THE SPECIFIC DO KA
AREA BOUNDARIES DELINeated IN REF (A). HE STATED THAT HIS
DIVISION HAD IN FACT BEEN CONSIDERING AN OPERATION IN
CONJUNCTION WITH FIRST MARDIV EFFORT, BUT QUOTE WE HAVE BEEN
THINKING IN TERMS OF 1 JUNE, BUT CERTAINLY NOT 1 MAY ENQUOTE.
3. AT THE TIME OF THIS VISIT, ONE OF THE THREE BRIGADES OF
THE 27TH IR CAV DIV HAD THAT SAME DAY LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE
OPERATION IN THE PLATEAU CI AREA, NE OF KONTUM. A SECOND
BRIGADE COMMITMENT WAS CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT TO THE
NORTH AND NW OF AN KHE. TT

O BY TRIMPS AVAILABLE AT THIS
TIME ALRE THOSE OF A THIRD BRIGADE, THEN ACTING AS RESERVE
AT AN KZ.
4. MG27 KINNARD MADE NO MENTION OF HAVING RECEIVED REF (B)
WHICH DIRECTS HIS COORDINATION WITH CO, IIIC MAP. AT THAT TIME
THE FIRST MARDIV ALSO SHAD NOT BEEN A RECIPIENT OF THAT MSG

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PAGE THREE FIRST MARDIV SECRET

ALTHOUGH THE MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED BY READDRESS FROM CG III MAP LATER THAT SAME DAY.

5. IMPRESSIONS RECEIVED BY THE ADC WERE THAT THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV CONSIDERS THAT IT NOW, IN PRESENT DISPOSITIONS, XMLS IN FACT OPERATING WITHIN THE FRINGE OF A LOOSELY DEFINED DO XA AREA. KINNARD SEEMED PREPARED TO CONSIDER FURTHER NORTHWARD OPERATIONS INTO THE AREA DESCRIBED IN REP (A), IF SO DIRECTED, ALTHOUGH A RECOGNIZED LOGISTIC PROBLEM WOULD HAVE TOOE FACED.

6. THE CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV WAS INFORMED THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WHICH MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE COORDINATED WITH III MAP WITHIN THE DELINEATED DO XA AREA, FIRST MARDIV OPERATIONS AS CURRENTLY DIRECTED BY REP (A) WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AS SCHEDULED.

GP=4

ST

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MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MaxDiv - 2100/2

OWKHP
DE 1DIV PS-2 LN-15 TO RD's
NORTH AND NW OF AN KHE. THE ONLY TROOPS AVAILABLE AT THIS
K

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(PERSONAL FOR)

564

P

Com. SEVENTH FLT.

28 ø 2 3 ø 2

App

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SECRET
MESSAGE FORM - SECRET
3d MarDiv - 2100/2

(PERSONAL FOR)

PP RUMSF
DG RHAUBUL 014B 1130250
TAY AS355
D 260216Z
SPECIAL
TO RUMSF/CG III MAF

SECRET
PERSONAL FOR LGEN WALT FROM HYLAND
A. YOUR 260216Z
1. APPRECIATE VERY MUCH THE INFORMATION IN REF MSG. HOPE TO SEE YOU SOON AFTER SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. BEST REGARDS.
CP 4

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES - FILE
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF

COMSEVENFLEET 280294/APP CG III MAF

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

3d MarDiv - 2100/2

(PERSONAL FOR)

564        2802382
P

Conseventh Fl

2802382 APR

G. S. Jr.

RECEIVED ONE (1) SEALED ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES OF CONSEVENTHFLT. 2802382

SECRET

COPY____ OF_____COPIES
SECRET

1. UNIT #2-3 Shall have facilities moved from city to DANANG.
2. UNIT #4 and #6 Shall have facilities moved from Danang to DANANG.
3. In accordance with this interim return of military personnel, unit's ultimate objective is billeting of all military personnel other than advisors out of city.
4. It is recognized that certain individuals, namely military police, signals and port personnel, will require return to DANANG immediately and will be billeted in the city for the foreseeable future.

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SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
III Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

(PERSONAL FOR)

UV DD KA 8955V UL 778

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION AS RECEIVED WILL SERVICE UPON REQ.

SECRET
PERSONAL FOR ADM JOHNSON INFO LGN KRULAK FROM NYLAND
A. YOUR 252223Z
B. CG III MAF 230616Z
C. MY 251119Z
D. MY 190552Z

1. APPRECIATE REF A. THE MINOR DEVIATIONS FROM STANDARD DOCTRINE AND THE LESS THAN IDEAL PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT OF SLF (RICE HARVEST PROTECTION) CONTAINED REF B WERE PICKED UP BY MY STAFF BUT I DECIDED TO SEND REF C TO INDICATE A COOPERATIVE WILLINGNESS TO COMSEVENHLFT P 240530Z/APR CG III MAF

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES

DECLASSIFIED
SUPPORT CONUSMACV RATHER THAN TO QUESTION WHETHER PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT OF SLF WAS WORTHWHILE. THE TECHNICALITY AS TO TO NEW RTSE LANDING AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE CORRECTLY PULLED OUT IN

THE INITIATING DIRECTIVE,

2. SINCE I HAVE BEEN ON THE SCENE IT HAS BEEN IDEAL TO FIND OUT IN GOOD TIME WHAT IS BEING PLANNED FOR ARG/SLF IN MACV HEADQUARTERS OR IN III MAF HEADQUARTERS. REF D IS ONE EXAMPLE OF MY EFFORTS TO BE PATIENT YET KEEP INFORMED. IT WAS SEND AFTER ARG/SLF WAS UNDERWAY FROM SUBIC FOR STATION OFF DANANG.

3. IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME NOW THAT BETWEEN CONUSMACV AND CG III MAF THERE WILL ALWAYS BE AN OPERATION OF THEIR CHOICE ON THE HORIZON FOR THE SLF. FROM THE VIEWPOINT THAT THEY ARE BEST JUDGES OF WHERE AND WHEN HELP IS NEEDED ASHORE IN THE RUN THIS WILL PERHAPS RESULT IN BEST UTILIZATION OF ACP/SLF. MY INTENTION IS TO WATCH PROPOSAL CLOSELY AND TO INSIST THAT ACTUAL OPERATIONS ARE EXECUTED STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE (SUP-22(a)). AT THE SAME TIME I INTEND TO CONTINUE THE EFFORT ASSOCIATED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF OUTLINE PLANS FOR BATTEN DOWN OPERATIONS, ALTHOUGH CONCURRENCE OF CONUSMACV IN THESE PROPOSALS ALWAYS COMES VERY SLOWLY. I WOULD PREDICT WE WILL NEVER ACTUALLY EXECUTE ONE UNLESS IT IS SO HANDLED

PAGE THREE MNSUL 017B SECRET

THAT IT IN EFFECT APPEARS TO BE THROUGH CONUSMACV OR CG III MAF INITIATIVE.

4. CONSIDER BEST TACTICS FOR ME IS TO CONTINUE THROUGH IMPROVED LIAISON TO ATTEMPT TO INDUCE CONUSMACV AND/OR III MAF TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF FUTURE PLANS FOR ARG/SLF, PRINCIPALLY SO POCAN DO A BETTER JOB OF SUPPORT. DO NOT INTEND TO GET INTO MERITS OF WHERE AND WHEN IN RUN SLF CAN BE UTILIZED BEST SINCE SUCH JUDGMENTS ARE BETTER MADE BY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR LAND BATTLES. OF COURSE I WILL ALWAYS RESERVE FOR MYSELF THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THEIR USE BASED ON MILITARY FACTORS SUCH AS FEASIBILITY OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.

BEST REGARDS.

GP=4

BT

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COPIES 2 & 3 OF 3 COPIES - CG III MAF

COPY 3 OF 3 COPIES
SECRET

TO MG III MAF

SECRET

WITH REFERENCE TO CG II MAF 2209402 APR 66.

1. AGREE YOU SHOULD BEGIN TIME-PHASED RETURN OF MILITARY PERSONNEL TO DANANG; HOWEVER, ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS BILLETING OF ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL OTHER THAN ADVISORS OUT OF CITY.

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OBJECTIVE, THOSE UNITS WHOSE FACILITIES ARE NEARING COMPLETION OR WHICH CAN BE HOUSED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME IN FACILITIES OUTSIDE OF DANANG SHOULD NOT BE RETURNED. RATHER, THESE UNITS SHOULD REMAIN IN PLACE AND MOVE DIRECTLY INTO THEIR NEW FACILITIES.

3. IN REGARD TO THOSE UNITS FOR WHICH NO FACILITIES OUTSIDE DANANG WILL BE AVAILABLE WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, THEY MAY BE RETURNED GRADUALLY TO THE CITY.

4. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS, NAMELY MILITARY POLICE, SIGNAL AND PORT PERSONNEL, WILL REQUIRE RETURN TO DANANG IMMEDIATELY AND WILL BE BILLETED IN THE CITY FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

GP-4

SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

PRIORITY

EXCLUSIVE

FROM: CG FMFPAC
TO: CG III MAF

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN WALT FROM LTGEN KRULAK
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY. DELIVER ONLY TO LTGEN WALT.

A. CG III MAF 228/9/42Z/ APR.
1. I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST REF A. IN LIGHT OF DISCUSSIONS OF THE
SAVE NATURE WHICH ARE GOING ON HERE, THE STRIKE FORCE IDEA HAS
BEEN KICKED AROUND BY THE ARMY PRETTY FREELY. UP TO NOW IT HAS
COTTEN NO SUPPORT. REALLY, THEY ARE INTERESTED IN EASING OVER INTO
LAOS.

2. I CANNOT AGREE WITH YOU HERE. IN PARA 6, YOU SAY THAT AT LEAST
EQUAL EFFORT MUST BE PLACED IN THE POPULATED AND THE MOUNTAINOUS
AREAS. I BELIEVE THAT ONLY SUCH RESOURCES SHOULD BE COMMITTED TO
THE ATTRACTION BATTLE IN THE MOUNTAINS AS CAN:
(A) BE PROFITABLY EMPLOYED IN DESTRUCTING CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BASE
AREAS, AND (B) BE SPARED FROM THE DECISIVE JOB OF SEPARATING THE
GUERILLAS FROM THE PEOPLE. AND IN MY VIEW, IT IS GOING TO BE A LOT
LESS THAN EQUAL EFFORT.

3. FROM WHAT YOU SAY, I BELIEVE THAT YOU MAY HAVE SHAKEN LAISSEN A BIT -
BUT PROBABLY NOT MUCH YET. HE KNOWS THAT HE HAS AN AWFUL LOT OF
SUPPORT FOR WHAT HE IS DOING AND THAT, AT LEAST UNTIL YOUR DISCUSSION,
WESTY WAS ON HIS SIDE. TO THE EXTENT THAT WESTY EXPRESSED OPEN
APPROBATION OF WHAT WE ARE DOING, YOU SHOULD SEEK TO GET HIM TO
REPEAT IT - PIECEMEAL, VERSATILY, IN WRITING, OR ANY OTHER WAY.

4. LAISSEN CERTAINLY HAS NOT RUN OUT OF TARGETS, WHAT HE HAS IN MIND
IS TO GENERATE AN OPERATION WHERE HIS AIRMOBILE TROOPS CAN PERFORM
ON A COMPARATIVE - AND COMPETITIVE - BASIS WITH THE MARINES, AND HE
MAY ALSO HAVE IN MIND GETTING HIS HANDS ON SOME OF YOUR TROOPS.

5. RECENTLY I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CAUSE SHARP TO Waver A BIT IN HIS
CONCEPTION THAT THE FIRST CAV HAS THE PRIME FORMULA. I WILL STAY
WITH IT, BECAUSE WHAT HE SAYS TO WESTY INFLUENCES (BUT BY NO MEANS
COVERS) WESTY'S DECISIONS. SO PLEASE KEEP ME CLOSELY INFORMED OF
ANY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA COVERED IN YOUR MESSAGE. CP-4

COMM NOTE: UNDERLINED PORTION PARAGRAPH 5 RECEIVED GARbled.

DIST: COPY 1 AND 2 CG III MAF

CG FMFPAC 23/8/412Z/ APRG6

CG III MAF
SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
II Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96601

EXCLUSIVE

443
P
CG FMFPAC

230412Z
APR

C.W.

(MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY)

(DELIVER TROUTGEN WALT ONLY)

95

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COPIES OF CG FMFPAC 230412Z/APR

SECRET

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Return to S/LS

(ORIGINAL)

446

ROUJ,LNE

CMC

(ORIGINAL)

PERSONAL FOR

S/L - 8

Y-5 - 86LJ

CMC 221557Z/APR

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CMC 221557Z/APR.
MEMORANDUM
FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF
FOR: CK

1. Attached personal reference so that confirmations on MAP cargo were signed by KG and 20 April.
2. I have notified Action Wheeler to wire Hamblin.
   6.4.
3. No further action required.

or

[Signature]
DECLASSIFIED

RE: RUCSAC
DE: RUEGEN III 1121557
ZNY: ZEEEZ
R: 2215572
F: CMC
TO: RUCSAC/CG III MAF
INFO: RUCSAC/CG DND DND

UNCLASSIFIED
A: YOUR 151013Z (ROYAL)

PERSONAL FOR LMC: WALT FRM GENERAL GEKK

I. INFORMATION RECEIVED THIS HS FROM LOCAL, STATE/AID

OFFICIALS INDICATES THAT THE ENTIRE REMAINING 563.65 TONS
OF YES/ACTI MATERIALS EXCEPT GYPSUM WALLBOARD, SEAL
CORN AND DRUGS WILL BE CONSIGNED TO MACV AND USAG.
SALONI. BOOKING FOR SHIPMENTS TO RUK HAS BEEN MADE ABOARD
THE S.S. HASTINGS SAILING FROM SAN FRANCISCO ON 1 MAY 1965.
SUGGEST LIASON BE ESTABLISHED WITH MACV CIVIL ACTION.

PAGE TWO RUEGEN III UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICER AND DIRECTOR DS/CR/SAIAC TO REQUEST EQUITABLE
SHARE OF ACTI MATERIALS ALLOCATED TO THE ROYAL JAPAN

2. GYPSUM IS NOT INCLUDED IN ACTI INVENTORY. GYPSUM
WALLBOARD NOT BEING SHIPPED DUE TO PRESENT STATE OF
DETERIORATION AND UNSUITABILITY FOR CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES.
DRUGS BEING SHIPPED SEPARATELY SINCE SPECIAL HANDLING AND
DISTRIBUTION IS REQUIRED.

3. MY STAFF PRESENTLY NEGOTIATING WITH LOCAL PRIVATE
RELIEF AGENCY FOR APPROXIMATELY 18,002 POUNDS OF DONATED
MEDICINES TO BE SHIPPED VIA PROJECT HANDPASPA REQUEST
APPRIS THE H/Q DESCRIPTION AND TYPE OF MEDICATIONS MOST
URGENTLY NEEDED.

4. CARE/USER REPORT EXCELLENT AND MUST USEFUL. WIDEST
DISSEMINATION ALL RESERVE UNITS AND POST AND STATION PAPERS
PROGRAMMED.

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 - FILE

COPIES 2-3 OF 3 - CG III MAF

CMC 2215572/APR

CMC II MAF

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 13743 FROM MACV

SUBJ: MAP CARGO

FROM GENERAL CROWLEY TO GENERAL WALT

REFERENCE: III MAF MSG. DTG 132432Z, SUBJ AS ABOVE.

1. RESTRICT ON MOVEMENT OF RVNAF SUPPLIES TO I CORPS

AND HOLDING UNDER US CUSTODY OF ANY MAP DISCHARGED CARGO AT

CA MANG WAS DECISION OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF. RVNAF. MACV

WAS REQUESTED TO AND DID SUPPORT THIS ACTION.

2. THIS RESTRICTION WAS LIFTED 20 APRIL ON ORDERS OF THE

CHIEF, JOINT GENERAL STAFF. NORMAL RE SUPPLY ACTION IS TO BE

PAGE 2 UUMSMA 2941D CONFIDENTIAL

RESTORED IMMEDIATELY. MAP CARGES HELD IN CUSTODY

SHOULD BE RELEASED TO 1ST AREA LOGISTICS COMMAND.

3. FAILURE TO CLEAR MACV ACTION DIRECTLY WITH YOU WAS

DISCUSSED WITH GENERAL PLATT BY COLONEL CONDIT (MACV J-3

REPRESENTATIVE ON 19 APR 65). IN THE FUTURE YOU WILL

EXAMINE

OF ANY SUCH ACTION.

BT

NNNN

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Representative on 19 Apr 56). In the future, you will be advised of any such action.

Et

Mmm