# OUTGOING MESSAGES

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<th>DTG</th>
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<tr>
<td>261345Z Aug65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Subj: Reaction of Certain ARVN Generals in Saigon to MC Victory at VAN TUONG</td>
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<td>061110Z Aug65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Operations CAM NE Hamlet</td>
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<td>Conference held between Jt. ARVN General Staff. &amp; Counterparts 2Sep65</td>
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<td>241217Z Sep65</td>
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<td>Release of 2dBn, 7th Marines to III MAF</td>
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<td>141100Z Oct65</td>
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<td>Personal for General WESTMORELAND Brief of a few terms of interest</td>
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<td>Personal for LtGen KRULAK General WESTMORELAND's Visit</td>
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<td>Personal for LtGen KRULAK NHA TRANG Commanders Conference</td>
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<td>080828Z Nov65</td>
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<td>Personal for General WESTMORELAND from MajGen WALT Subj: Heightening of VC Action</td>
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<td>081610Z Nov65</td>
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<td>Personal from MajGen WALT to Gen WESTMORELAND Subj: Continuing &amp; Heightened VC Action</td>
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<td>Personal for Gen ROSSON from RAdm WILLIAMS Subj: Capture of VC OP Order</td>
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<td>171432Z Nov65</td>
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<td>Exclusive - for RAdm WILLIAMS from Gen WALT Subj: Passing of Personnel to CFF 76 &amp; CINCPAC</td>
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14. 2508302 Nov65  Personal for General WESTMORELAND
    Instr to provide Reaction forces in support of
    CG I Corps

15. 2511162 Nov65  Personal for General KRULAK
    Readdressal of III MAF 2508302

16. 060959Z Dec65  Personal for General WESTMORELAND
    Subj: Outpost HIEP DUC

17. 272350Z Dec65  Personal for LtGen KRULAK & BGen MCCUTCHEON
    Subj: Danang Airbase

18. 070106Z Jan66  Personal for VAdm HYLAND
    Subj: Double Eagle

19. 100712Z Jan66  Personal for BGen JONES
    Subj: Amphibious Demonstrations

20. 260304Z Jan66  Personal for BGen JONES
    Subj: PAVN Activity

21. 140944Z Feb66  Pass to MajGen WALT, Personal for LtGen KRULAK
    Info MajGen WALT from BGen MCCUTCHEON
    Subj: Operations - Visitors to III MAF Summary

22. 151112Z Feb66  Exclusive - for LtGen KRULAK from BGen MCCUTCHEON
    Subj: Firming Plan Final Phase Double Eagle

23. 191348Z Feb66  Personal for LtGen KRULAK from BGen MCCUTCHEON
    Subj: March - April Operations

24. 230002Z Feb66  Exclusive - for LtGen KRULAK, Info Gen WALT from
    BGen MCCUTCHEON
    Subj: Visit of MajGen ROSSON

25. 240542Z Feb66  Exclusive - for LtGen KRULAK from BGen MCCUTCHEON
    Subj: Deployment of Additional Squadrons
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<td>281344Z Feb66</td>
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<td>Subj: Capsule Report to LtGen WALT</td>
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<td>Subj: Significant Events</td>
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<td>SPECACT Exclusive for LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT</td>
<td>Political Danger Signs and Situation at ASHAU</td>
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<td>Subj: General THI's Dismissal</td>
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<td>Personal for Gen WESTMORELAND from LtGen WALT</td>
<td>Subj: Inspection of CIDG Camps</td>
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<td>Personal for Gen ROSSON from LtGen WALT</td>
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<td>Subj: Employ GRC Marines</td>
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<td>Personal for LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT</td>
<td>Subj: Operations in Close Proximity to DMZ (S)</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>181206Z Aug66</td>
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<td>Exclusive for Gen GREENE, LtGen KRULAK from MajGen FIELDS</td>
<td>Complete Text of Message from Gen WESTMORELAND in Hawaii to LtGen ROSSEN in Saigon</td>
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<td>280642Z Sep66</td>
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<td>Subj: Utilization of Personnel</td>
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<td>Subj: Operations in Quang Tri</td>
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TOP SECRET
OUTGOING MESSAGES

41. 101314Z Jan67  2  Personal for LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT
   Subj: Areas of CMC Interest During Visit to III MAF

42. 140250Z Jan67  2  Personal for Gen GREENE, info LtGen KRULAK
   from LtGen WALT
   Subj: Readout on Visit by UNDERSECNAV

43. 250320Z Jan67  2&3 of 3  Personal for Gen. GREENE and LtGen KRULAK
   from LtGen. WALT
   Subj: Informal Discussions with Gen. TAYLOR

44. 080344 Feb67  1&2 of 2  SPECAT Exclusive for MGen's NICKERSON, ROBERTSHAW
   KYLE from LtGen. WALT
   Subj: SecDef's interest in the Guerrilla Enemy

45. CG III MAF 191232Z Mar67(1) Personal for Gen GREENE, LtGen KRULAK from
   LtGen WALT
   Meeting with Gens WHEELER AND WESTMORELAND
   19Mar67

46. CG III MAF 010618Z Apr67(2) Personal for LtGen KRULAK from LtGen WALT
   Subj: Force Requirements

47. CG III MAF 050900Z Apr67(3) Personal for LtGen KRULAK, info MGen ROBERTSHAW
   from LtGen WALT
   Subj: Employment of SVN based A-6A Acft

48. CG III MAF 130700Z Apr67 (2) Personal for Gen GREENE and LtGen KRULAK
   from LtGen WALT
   Introduction into country of the MC Forces
   now comprising 9th MAB

49. CG III MAF 261046Z Apr67 (3) Personal for LtGen HEINTGES from LtGen WALT
   Practice Nine

50. 061036ZMay67   2  Personal for MGen HOCHMUTH from LtGen WALT
   Subj: Military Operations in the Vietnamese
   DMZ (U)
HAS BEEN SENT

MAY 67

CG III MAF

158 19

881546Z

CG III MAF

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MAY 67

881546Z

TOP SECRET

#3 burned 20 Apr 68
PERSONAL FOR MGEN HOCHMUTH FROM LGEN WALT

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE VIETNAMESE DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ) (U)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTED RE SUBJ FROM OTHER SOURCES:

QUOTE

2. (TS) YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATION IN
THE DMZ AS FOLLOWS:

A. OPERATIONS BY US/FWMAF GROUND FORCES MAY BE CONDUCTED IN THE DMZ
SOUTH OF THE PMDL. US/FWMAF GROUND FORCES MAY RETURN FIRE ACROSS THE
PMDL BUT WILL NOT ADVANCE NORTH OF THE DEMARCATION LINE.

B. TACTICAL AIR STRIKES MAY BE CONDUCTED IN THE DMZ BOTH NORTH
AND SOUTH OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE (PMDL).

C. ARTILLERY FIRE (LAND AND NAVAL) MAY BE DIRECTED AGAINST VALID
MILITARY TARGETS IN THE DMZ BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE PMDL.

3. (S) THE FOREGOING APPLY TO US/FWMAF FORCES ONLY. US MILITARY
PERSONNEL IN POSITIONS TO INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN OR NEAR THE DMZ
BY THE RVNAF WILL MAKE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO ASSURE THAT SUCH

PAGE 2 RUMSDEN 0517 TOP SECRET
OPERATIONS REMAIN WITH THE SAME LIMITATIONS AS APPLY TO US/FWMAF FORCES.

UNQUOTE

2. JOHN CHAISSON HAS ADVISED THAT GEN WESTMORELAND INDICATED THAT HE
DOES NOT REPEAT NOT WANT INTRODUCTION OF RECON OR MANEUVER ELEMENTS
TO BE ACCOMPLISHED GRADUALLY, WHEN THE DMZ IS BREACHED IT IS TO
BE IN FORCE TAKING MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE.

3. ABOVE IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION AND PLANNING. AN EXPECTING
CONFIRMATION FROM COMUSMACV MOMENTARILY.

GP=3

BT

NNNN
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CON: 174

DTG: 261046Z

MONTH: APR 67

ORIGINATOR: CG III MAF

CATEGORY: (PERSONAL FOR)

FILE: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

MAF: RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 283 OF 3

COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 261046Z APR 67

RECEIVED BY: __________________________ DATE/TIME: __________________________

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DTG/MONTH 261046Z APR 67
HAS BEEN SENT

(Personal for)

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN HEINTGES FROM LTGEN WALT
A. CONUSMACV MSG CITE 13010 DTG 191125Z APR67
1. REF A RECEIVED HERE WITH CONCERN PREVIOUS MACV POSITIONS, FROM OUTSET OF PRACTICE NINE, HAVE:
A. CONSISTENTLY PROTECTED INTEGRITY OF MARINE CORPS FORCES IN NORTHERN PORTION ICTZ (I.E., HAVE INSURED THAT FORCES NOW IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI HAVE NOT UNDULY BEEN TIED TO ANY OF THE PROJECTED BARRIER SYSTEMS.)
B. RECOGNIZED REQUIREMENT FOR SIGNIFICANT FORCES OVER AND ABOVE THOSE NOW IN PLACE TO CONSTRUCT AND MAN WHATEVER SYSTEM IS FINALLY ADOPTED.
2. REF A DEPARTS FROM THE FOREGOING IN TWO SIGNIFICANT RESPECTS:
A. WHILE IT PURPORTS MERELY DELAY ARRIVAL OF THE TOTAL FORCE ADDITION OF TWO AND ONE THIRD DIVISIONS, IN FACT IT REDUCES THE LEVEL BY ONE BRIGADE SINCE IT INDICATES THAT THE FIRST ADDITIVE BRIGADE

PAGE TWO RUMSDON 1936 TOP SECRET
RECEIVED IS TO REPLACE THE 1ST OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIV, WHICH HAS NOT YET ARRIVED ICTZ) AND RETURN IT TO IFFORV. NET RESULT OF THIS ACTION IS A REDUCTION OF PROJECTED FORCE LEVELS BY ONE BDE SINCE INCOMING BDE IS MERELY AN EVEN TRADE FOR ONE ALREADY HERE AS PART OF THE OREGON TF DIVISION.
B. IT PUTS THE 3D MARDIV IN THE POSITION OF INSTITUTING THE PRACTICE NINE PLAN, WHILE AWAITS THE ARRIVAL AT SOME FUTURE TIME OF AN ADDITIONAL DIV WHICH PRESUMABLY WOULD THEN FREE IT FOR MORE MOBILE AND PRODUCTIVE DUTIES.
3. REF A TENDS TO MISLEAD ADDITIONALLY BY STATING (PARA 4) THAT CURRENT (OREGON) DEPLOYMENTS IMPROVE THE DENSITY OF COMBAT FORCES IN THE NORTHERN THREE PROVINCES SIGNIFICANTLY. ATTENTION IS INVITED TO THE FACT THAT THE FIVE USMC BATTALIONS FREED AS A RESULT OF OREGON DEPLOYMENTS TO CHU LAI AND QUANG NGAI, THREE ARE TO BE EMPLOYED, AT LEAST INITIALLY, ON THE QUANG TIN/QUANG NAM BORDER AREA SOUTH OF DA NANG, AND ONLY TWO HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 3D MARDIV NORTH OF HAI VAN PASS. ADDITIONAL TASKS IN THE OFFING, PRACTICE NINE AND PREPARATION OF A FORWARD ASSAULT FIRING BASE FROM WHENCE TO PLACE ARTY FIRE INTO A SHAU VALLEY, WILL MORE THAN ABSORB THESE ASSETS.
4. IT IS MORE AND MORE APPARENT THAT PRACTICE NINE WILL SHORTLY BE
WITH US. THE TIME WHEN IS ACTUALLY COMMENCES TO DRAW DOWN IN PLACE ASSETS HAS BEEN ACCELERATED BY THE RECENTLY APPROVED ARVN PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-INFLTRATION BELT. A TEN KM BELT OF CLEARED AREA, INITIALLY 200 METERS WIDE IS NEARING COMPLETION BETWEEN GIO LINH AND CON THIEN. THE NEXT STEPS ARE INSTALLATION OF TOWERS, WIRE STRONG POINTS, MINES, SENSORS AND COMMUNICATIONS. WHEN THIS COMES TO PASS, THE REQUISITE MANPOWER TO MAN EVEN A SIMPLE INSTALLATION WILL DWARF ASSETS AVAILABLE, AND FIX EVEN THIS LEVEL OF ASSETS IN PLACE. UNLESS THIS SITUATION IS CORRECTED, THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN NORTHERN ICTZ WILL ALMOST IMMEDIATELY DISAPPEAR.

5. I AM NOT OMITTING FROM CONSIDERATION THE AUTHORIZATION TO EMPLOY THE SLFS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN. THE FLEXIBILITY AND REACTION TO OPPORTUNITY WHICH THEY PROVIDE US WILL PROVE INESTIMABLE AS THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN WEARS ON, THEY SHOULD NOT BE EMPLOYED HOWEVER IN THE PRACTICE NINE BUSINESS, EXCEPT IN AN EXPLOITATION ROLE. THESE ELEMENTS THEREFORE WILL BE ACTIVELY EMPLOYED WHEREVER REQUIRED IN AN OFFENSIVE FASHION, BUT DUE TO THEIR TEMPORARY AVAILABILITY ARE NOT NOW AT LEAST CONSIDERED AS A PORTION OF THE PERMANENT FORCE STRUCTURE OF I CIZ.

6. I STRONGLY URGE THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO:

A. RESTORE THE BDE DISCUSSED IN PARA 2A ABOVE TO THE LIST OF REQUIRED FORCE LEVELS FOR I CIZ.

B. INSURE ARRIVAL ON SITE OF THE FORCES REQUIRED TO INSTALL AND MAN THE PRACTICE NINE SYSTEM BEFORE CONSTRUCTION OF MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM COMMENCES.

GP-4
BY

PAGE TWO OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET
HAS BEEN SENT APR 67

FILE & COPY 1 3 COPIES

MAF & RECEIVED (1) ENVELOPE SAID TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3 OF 3

RECEIVED BY: __________________________ DATE: ____________________

#3 burned 7/6/68

DECLASSIFIED
PERSONAL FOR
HAS BEEN SENT

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MAJGEN ROBERTSHAW FROM LTGEN WALT
EMPLOYMENT OF SVN BASED A-6A ACFT
A. CG FMFPAC 290352Z MAR 67
B. CG III MAF 280946Z MAR 67
C. CINCPAC 240512Z MAR 67
D. CG III MAF 310101Z MAR 67
   1. THE FOLLOWING REPLIES TO PARA 4 OF REF A.
      A. UNDERLYING FACTORS EXPRESSED IN REF A NOT FULLY KNOWN PRIOR
         TRANSMITTED TO REF B. MY REPLY WAS BASED ON THE CURRENT REQUIREMENTS
         OF III MAF WHICH INCLUDES THE VITAL AND NECESSARY INTERDICTION OF LAND
         AND WATER ROUTES LEADING INTO I CORPS. SINCE REF C IMPLIED THAT A-6A
         WEAPON SYSTEM COULD BE BETTER UTILIZED, SUFFICIENT SUPPORTING DATA
         WERE INCLUDED TO SHOW MORE CLEARLY THAT INTERDICTION OF MOVING LAND
         AND WATER BORNE TARGETS AT NIGHT AND DURING PERIODS OF ADVERSE WEATHER
         IS VITAL TO THE INTEREST OF III MAF AND CAN BE PERFORMED ONLY BY THE
         A-6A WEAPONS SYSTEM. ALL FULL SYSTEMS A-6A COMBAT SORTIES, EXCEPT
         EMERGENCY SUPPORT OF SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS, HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY
         ALLOCATED TO TALLY HO/ROLLING THUNDER.
      B. THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST A-6A SQUADRON IN SVN PROVIDED III MAF
         WITH A NIGHT AND ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY FOR ARMED RECONNAISSANCE THAT
         PREVIOUSLY HAD NOT BEEN AVAILABLE. DURING THE SQDN'S INITIAL NINETY
         DAYS IN COUNTRY, ITS FULL POTENTIAL WAS NOT REALIZED. HOWEVER, IN-
        CREASED SYSTEMS REALIBILITY AND AIRCREW FAMILIARITY WITH THE RADAR
         PRESENTATIONS OF SVN AREAS IMPROVED THE PERFORMANCE OF III MAF A-6A'S.
         RECENT RESULTS EXTREMELY GRATIFYING.
      C. THE A-6A IS PRESENTLY FRAUGHT FOR EIGHT FULL SYSTEMS SORTIES
         PER NIGHT IN THE RP ONE AREA. DURING FEB AND MAR, AN AVERAGE 4.5 FULL
         SYSTEMS WERE ACCOMPLISHED WITH A SLIGHT INCREASE DURING MAR TO JUST
         OVER AN AVERAGE OF 5 PER NIGHT. THIS NUMBER WILL INCREASE AS SECOND
         SQDN BECOMES AVAILABLE. DURING THIS PERIOD THE A-6A CONDUCTED 269 FULL
         SYSTEMS SORTIES IN RP ONE AND STRUCK 872 TARGETS. ANTI ATTACKS WERE
         MADE ON 70 MOVING TARGETS DURING FEB AND 284 DURING MAR, INDICATING THE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SURVEILLANCE EFFORT

D. The employment of all available A-6A full systems sorties in RP ONE has been necessary to extend the III MAF capability to reduce the infiltration of enemy supplies and equipment into ICTZ. This effort is considered as direct support of III MAF ground forces. The number of moving targets attacked during the period cited emphasizes the importance of the specialized surveillance provided by the A-6A and dictates the need for continued support of the present program with those sorties currently available.

2. Ref C established USMC ground forces' support as having highest and overriding priority in utilization of A-6A ACFT. Accordingly, the interdiction program outlined in Ref B is considered essential.

3. Ref D reported initial liaison/coordination for employment III MAF A-6A assets as Ref C. As a start, estimate can identify two all systems sorties/night to III AF for use against navy nominated targets in RT area north of RP ONE. It is planned that as additional full systems sorties become available, number identified to III AF for Rolling Thunder will increase but commensurate with the needs of III MAF. Measures to insure proper coordination currently underway. Target date initial mid/north Rolling Thunder mission 11 April. GP-3 BT
HAS BEEN SENT

(PERSONAL FOR)

SECRET PERSONAL FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN VALT

1. THOUGH HASTILY DEVELOPED, AM PROVIDING HEREIN OUR VIEWS ON INTRODUCTION INTO COUNTRY OF THE MARINE CORPS FORCES NOW COMPRISING 9TH MAB.
2. WITHOUT BELABORING THE POINT, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE EFFECTS ON AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE, OKINAWA REAL ESTATE, PACOM STRATEGIC RESERVE POSTURE, AND ACCESS TO AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING. THESE MATTERS ARE NOT ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY HERE EXCEPT AS THEY INTRUDE THEMSELVES DURING THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, OUR FEELING BEING THAT OTHERS ARE IN A BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS THESE MATTERS.
3. REGARDLESS OF ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH FOR KEEPING THIS VIRTUALLY COMBAT READY MARINE CORPS REGIMENT OUT OF COUNTRY, THE FACT REMAINS THAT WE HAVE A FIGHT GOING ON NEARBY, AND THIS SIGNIFICANT FORCE IS NOT IN IT. OUR RATIONALE STEMS FROM THIS CIRCUMSTANCE.

PAGE TWO DDIX 976

4. WESTY EXPECTS THE FOLLOWING PERFORMANCES FROM ME DURING THE GOOD WEATHER PERIOD FROM NOW UNTIL THE MONSEASON, AND IS IN THE PROCESS OF AUGMENTING 9TH MAF STRENGTH TO PERMIT THESE THINGS TO BE UNDERTAKEN:
   A. AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST BASE AREAS 114, 115, 116, IN THE NORTH AND THOSE SMALLER BASE AREAS LYING GENERALLY SOUTH AND WEST OF CHU LAI.
   B. ACTIONS TO NEUTRALIZE OR DESTROY, BY PHYSICAL OCCUPATION, OF THE GROUND IF NECESSARY, ENEMY EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN SECTORS OF I CORPS, THIS INCLUDES CURRENT INROADS INTO VIETNAM FROM LAOS THROUGH BASE AREAS 606 AND 607; AND IN PARTICULAR THE A SHAU VALLEY.
   C. A POSTURE IN THE DMZ AREA WHICH PERMITS IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO ANY ENEMY INITIATIVE WHICH THREATENS QUANG TRI, DONG HA AND KHE SANH.
   D. CONTINUING AND AGGRESSIVE SUPPORT FOR THE ARVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN.
   E. PRACTICE WINE.
5. THE FORCES NOW BEING PROVIDED IN OPERATION OREGON WILL PERMIT TASKS IN A, C, AND D, ABOVE. OUR STUDIES OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE WEST INDICATE THAT IF OUR CURRENT RECON AND AIR EFFORTS AGAINST A SHAU ARE NOT ENOUGH, AND INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY MAY WELL BE INSUFFICIENT, A REGIMENT WILL BE REQUIRED TO UNDERTAKE A CAMPAIGN INTO THE A'SHAU VALLEY.
6. TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTION AT HAND, 9TH MAF HAS BEEN STRONGLY IN FAVOR
PAGE THREE DDK E 978 T O P S E C R E T
OF THE OUT OF COUNTRY ROTATION PROGRAM WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF THE 9TH MAB PERMITS. THE MORALE AND MATERIEL BENEFITS WE RECEIVE FROM THE PROGRAM HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE. NEVERTHELESS, AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE MAKING EXTENSIVE DEMANDS ON WESTMORELAND FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES, WE BELIEVE MARINE FORCES SHOULD BE DISPOSED SO THEY CAN MORE DIRECTLY SUPPORT THE ACTION IN COUNTRY. IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL, WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE FLEXIBILITY IN TACTICAL AS WELL AS LOGISTICAL FIELDS WHICH THE SLF'S GIVE US. SIMILARLY, WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE BENEFITS WHICH A CONTINUATION OF SOME FORM OF OUT OF COUNTRY ROTATION CAN PROVIDE. WE THEREFORE HAVE SOUGHT A WAY TO EMPLOY THE BULK OF THE FORCE, YET RETAIN A PART OF THE ADVANTAGES WHICH ROTATION GIVES, EMPLOY FLEET ASSETS AT THE SAME TIME WE EMPLOY TROOP ASSETS, AND STILL LEAVE A BASIS FOR MEETING FLEET SCHEDULING PROBLEMS. IN BRIEF THIS PLAN WOULD:

A. EMPLOY BOTH SLF'S IN ICTZ AS CONTINUING FLEET SUPPORTED BLT'S, INCLUDING HELO SQNS. (SHIP UPKEEP WOULD BE A PROBLEM, BUT SOME ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS CAN BE INTEGRATED INTO A CAREFULLY PREPARED OPERATING SCHEDULE.)

B. USE THE THIRD BLT AS A ROTATION UNIT ON OKINAWA, KEEPING IT IN AN AMPHIBIOUS READY ROLE.


PAGE FOUR DDK E 978 T O P S E C R E T

A. EMPLOYING MOST OF THE FORCE MOST OF THE TIME.

B. USING THE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING, BUT STILL PROVIDING UPKEEP TIME.

C. KEEPING BOTH SLFS IN A POSITION FROM WHICH THEY CAN READILY BE CONSTITUTED INTO A PACOM STRATEGIC RESERVE ROLE.

D. PROVIDING SIGNIFICANT PROTECTION TO EXISTING AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE.

GP-4
BT

NNNN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
TOP SECRET

CG: 001
HAS BEEN SENT

DTG: 010618Z
APR 67

ORIGINATOR: CG III MAF

(PERSONAL FOR)

MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

FILE & COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

KAF: RECEIVED 1 ENVELOPE HANDED TO CONTAIN COPIES 2-3 OF 3
COPIES OF CG III MAF MESSAGE 010618Z APR 67

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(1) COPY PROVIDED 26a BASE JAW CG:
INSTRUCTIONS:

DTG/MOON: 010618Z APR 67

TOP SECRET
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CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS CONTROL CARD
5 Mrp Day 5511/3

CLASSIFICATION | SERIAL | DATE | BUCK TAG NO.
TOP SECRET      | 0106182 | APR67 | PERSONAL MARINE CORPS

FROM:
CG III MAF

SUBJECT: PERSONAL FOR LGEN KRULAK FROM LGEN WALT
FORCE REQUIREMENTS

DATE TO | SECTION | SIGNATURE | DATE RETURNED | INITIAL
2APR67 #2 HQMC

(To H. B. LEBOUL, Jr.)

(Over)

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A PURPOSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS WAS TO INSURE THAT WE WOULD ALL BE IN CONSONANCE, IN RESPONSE TO FORCE STRUCTURE PROBLEMS, THE AGREED POSITION: A THIRTY INFANTRY BATTALION MANEUVER FORCE; TWO AIRCRAFT WINGS; AND, EQUIVALENT COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT WAS TO BE DESCRIBED AS THE REQUIREMENT. ONLY THE ADDITIVE AVIATION COMPONENT: A MARINE AIRCRAFT WING—BUILT AROUND TWO FIXED WING SQUADRONS AND TEN HELICOPTER SQUADRONS—SPECIFIED AS MARINE UNITS; THE ADDITIVE NINE BATTALIONS WERE NOT IDENTIFIED AS MARINE SINCE THE COMMANDANT INDICATED THAT THEY COULD NOT BE PROVIDED.

B. IF THE POSITION OF THE MARINE CORPS HAS CHANGED, REQUEST THAT I BE ADVISED. THIS WOULD PERMIT ME TO EXPRESS THE REQUIREMENT FOR A MARINE DIVISION.

3. FORCE REQUIREMENTS ARE CATEGORIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. CY '67 FORCES WHICH WERE DISALLOWED FOR DEPLOYMENT TO SVN BY SEC DEF IN HIS NOVEMBER '66 ACTION.

B. OTHER REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HAVE GENERATED SINCE THIS NOVEMBER ACTION, AND ARE NEEDED TO BALANCE THE CURRENT IN-COUNTRY FORCE STRUCTURE.

C. THE ADDITIVE PROGRAM PROVIDING FOR THE SITUATION DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE 'B EXCLUDING PRACTICE NINE.

(1) IN AGGREGATE, THE III MAF FORCE STRUCTURE SHOULD BE THREE AND
PAGE THREE RUMSDN 026 I O P S E C R E T

ONE-THIRD DIVISIONS, TWO AIRCRAFT WINGS, AN EQUIVALENT BALANCE OF COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS, AND AN INCREASE IN THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENTS OF THE HQ, III MAF.

4. A. TO OVERTAKE THE SHORTFALL BETWEEN THE CURRENT IN-COUNTRY STRUCTURE AND THE DESIRED STRUCTURE, THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENT EVOLVES:

(1) THE UNFILLED CY 67 REQUIREMENTS REMAIN VALID EXCEPT IN THE AREA OF DATA PROCESSING WHICH SHOULD BE REAPPRAISED.

(2) TO THE ABOVE AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THE CURRENT IN-COUNTRY FORCE STRUCTURE BALANCE, SHOULD BE ADDED:

- FOUR 155MM HOW BTRY (TOWED)
- AUGMENTATION, FIRST RADIO BN
- ONE MARINE DIVISION SHORE PARTY BN: THIS IS A NEW REQUIREMENT.

IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO TWO AREAS. FIRST, LIMITATIONS IN THE CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE DO NOT ADEQUATELY MEET THE REQUIREMENT FOR LSA'S AT THE VARIOUS FIXED SITES (KHE SANH, DONG HA, HUI DAU, ETC.) AND CONCURRENTLY PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT REQUIRED IN THE LZ'S DURING HELICOPTER ASSAULT OPERATIONS. SECOND, IT WOULD PROVIDE A BROADER BASE FROM WHICH THE SHORE PARTY UNITS COULD BE DRAWN AS REINFORCEMENTS TO THE INFANTRY BATTALIONS ROTATING TO OKINAWA.

(3) TO COMPLETE THE BUILD UP TO THE DESIRED LEVEL WILL REQUIRE:

PAGE FOUR RUMSDN 026 I O P S E C R E T

(A) ONE U.S. DIVISION (ARMY OR USMC)
(B) FORCE TROOP UNITS TO INCLUDE:

- ONE COMMUNICATION BATTALION
- ONE ARTILLERY BN: ONE (35MM/175MM GUN BTRY (SP), ONE 8" HOW BTRY (SP), ONE 155MM HOW BTRY (TOWED)
- ONE SEARCHLIGHT BTRY
- ONE FORCE ENGINEER GROUP HQ
- ONE FORCE ENGINEER BN
- ONE BRIDGE CO
- ONE FORCE MOTOR TRANSPORT BN REINFORCED WITH ONE AMPHIBIAN TRANSPORT CO
- ONE FORCE RECON CO
- ONE MILITARY POLICE BN
- ONE HOSPITAL COMPANY
- ONE DENTAL COMPANY
- ONE CIVIL AFFAIRS CO (-)
- TWO CI TEAMS
- TWO ITT TEAMS
- ONE INTERP TEAM
PAGE FIVE RUMSDN 026 TOP SECRET
(C) THE MARINE WING SHOULD INCLUDE:
- MARINE AIRCRAFT WING HQ GROUP
- HQ AND HQ SQDN
- MAW SUPPORT GROUP
- HQ AND MAINTENANCE SQDN
- MAW EQUIPMENT AND REPAIR SQDN
- TWO VMFA AND/OR VMA (AW) (P-4/A-6 ACFT)
- ONE MAG (VH)
- HQ AND MAINT SQDN
- MARINE AIR BASE SQDN
- THREE HMM
- TWO HMM
- ONE VMQ
- TWO MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNITS

(D) HQ, III MAF - AUGMENTATION (104)

5. WITH REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 4A (C), YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THE FORCE UNITS ARE AN EXTRAPOLATION FROM THE CURRENT IN-COUNTRY FORCE STRUCTURE/REQUIREMENTS. A DETAILED STRUCTURE OF THE INCREASED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FORCE LOGISTIC COMMAND HAS NOT BEEN DEVELOPED. WHETHER THIS LOGISTIC REQUIREMENT CAN BE BEST MET BY ANOTHER FSR OR OTHER STRUCTURAL CHANGE TO

PAGE SIX RUMSDN 026 TOP SECRET
FLC IS NOT DETERMINED. IT IS ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, THAT COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT INCREASES BE ACCOMPANYED BY AN EQUIVALENT BALANCE IN THE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS.

6. THE SEQUENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMUSMACV FY 68 REQUIREMENTS IS TYPICAL OF ANY CRASH PROGRAM COMPLICATED BY TIME AND SPACE PROBLEMS. COLONEL WEST, III MAF LIAISON OFFICER TO COMUSMACV ATTENDED A CONFERENCE ON THE FY 68 REQUIREMENTS ON 15 MARCH. THERE HAD BEEN NO EARLIER INDICATION OF A FORCE REQUIREMENTS CYCLE. GUIDANCE AS FOLLOWS WAS RECEIVED AND FOLLOWED:

QUOTE:

GUIDANCE HANDOUT ON MACV FORCE REQUIREMENTS CY 1968(U)

PART I - OPTIMUM FORCE
MAJOR FORCE  NO. BNS  CTZ  LOCATION
INF DIV  10  I  QUANG TRI
ACR  3  I  QUANG TRI
INF DIV  9  I  QUANG NGAI
INF BDE  3  II  N. BINH DINH
MECH BDE  3  II  PLEIUV
INF BDE  3  II  VIC BAN ME TUDT
BT

PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES
PERSONAL FOR LGN N. MULAH FROM LGN WALT. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
MECH BDE 3  II  BINH THUAN
AIR MOBILE DIV III 3 BIEN HOA (N OF R/SZ)
PLUS ADDITIONAL NAVY FORCES FOR IV CORPS AND NECESSARY
COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO ROUNDOUT THE ABOVE PACKAGE.
PART II - MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE
1. THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE IDENTIFIED FOR THE NAVY CV GB FORCE
REQUIREMENT IS:
   2 INF DIVISIONS
   1 ARMORED CAVALRY REGT.
   5 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS.
2. TO ASSIST THE COMPONENTS IN DEVELOPING THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
   FORCE IDENTIFIED ABOVE THE FORCE WILL BE EXAMINED IN TWO PARTS - THE
   PRACTICE NINE FORCE AND THE QUANG NGAI FORCE.
3. PRACTICE NINE FORCE
   A. A NEED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN PRACTICE NINE FOR ONE DIVISION

AND AN ACR IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE AS A CONTAINMENT FORCE.
B. THE MISSION OF THIS DIVISION WILL BE TO MAN A STRONG POINT
AND OBSTACLE SYSTEM IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE WEST
OF HIGHWAY 1 TO THE LAOTIAN BORDER.
C. MAJOR FORCES REQUIRED:
ARMY
1 INF DIV W/9 INF BNS. NOTE 1  2 CONST BNS NOTE 3  3 TACTICAL FIGHTER
   SQUADRONS
   1 ACR 2 LST NOTE 3
   1 FA BN 105MM HOW, TOWED NOTE 2  6 LCU NOTE 3
   1 FA BN 155MM HOW, TOWED
   1 FA BN 175MM GUN, SP NOTE 2
   1 FA BN 8" SP
   1 ADA BN AW, SP NOTE 2
   2 AV CO (AML)
   1 AV CO (AMM)
   1 AV CO (HV HELO)
NOTE -1: STANDARD 3 COMPANY BATTALION
NOTE -2: THESE TWO BATTALIONS WILL BE DEPLOYED TO III CTZ TO REPLACE
THE TWO BATTALIONS ALREADY DEPLOYED FROM III CTZ TO THE I CTZ.
NOTE - These units have been identified in the Practice Nine Plan.  

D. The following considerations should be kept in mind when developing this force package.

(1) Secretary of Defense has approved MACV's Practice Nine Plan of 26 Jan 67 and has tasked JCS to furnish recommendations for the additional forces requested in the plan.  The additive forces identified in the plan are a part of this force package.

(2) There is no requirement for an air base at Hue/Phu Bai or other locations in ICZ.  The three TFS will be stationed at Phu Cat.

(3) There is no requirement beyond those presently planned in Practice Nine to increase the port capability to support these additional forces.

(4) National Route 1 from Danang to Dong Ha will have to be upgraded to a 2 lane Class 35 all weather road to permit maximum use of the highway.  Movement from Danang will require the use of 5-ton cargo trucks because of the torturous nature of the Hai Van Pass.  Use of the nations railroad will be utilized when security conditions and operational conditions permit.

(5) Construction requirements for this force will be in accordance with the criteria established in existing MACV Directives.

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Page Four RUMSDN 063 T O P S E C R E T

For construction in RVN.

(6) The Division minus one brigade with its normal supporting units and the ACR are requested to arrive in-country during the first quarter of CY 68.  Use March 68 planning purposes.

(7) Logistic support of this force will be in accordance with MACV Dir. 10-11, 15 Jun 1963 and MACV Dir 701-9, 22 Nov 1966.

4. Quang Ngai Force:

A. The enemy threat in the southern portion of ICZ requires that an infantry division be employed in Quang Ngai Province.

B. The mission of this division will be to conduct offensive operations in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces to:

(1) Destroy enemy forces and base areas.

(2) Secure the land leg's south to II corps boundary.

(3) Create an environment for revolutionary development.

C. Major forces required:

Army

1 Inf Div w/10 BN's

1 FA BN 105mm How Towed

1 FA BN 155mm How Towed

1 FA BN 170mm Gun SP

Air Force

2 Tactical Fighter squadrons

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PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES
NOTE 4: 8 INF BN W/4 LINE CO'S, 1 INF BN (MECH) AND 1 TANK BN.
D. THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DEVELOPING THIS FORCE PACKAGE:

(1) THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF AN AIR BASE.
(2) THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR AN INCREASED PORT CAPABILITY
AT CHU LAI. IT IS BELIEVED THAT CHU LAI WILL HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO
SUPPORT THIS FORCE.
(3) UPGRADING OF HIGHWAY 1 FROM CHU LAI SOUTH TO II CORPS
BOUNDARY WILL BE REQUIRED.
(4) CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS FORCE WILL BE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN EXISTING MACV DIRECTIVES FOR
CONSTRUCTION IN RVN.
(5) THE DIVISION IS REQUESTED TO ARRIVE IN-COUNTRY DURING THE
SECOND QUARTER OF CY 68; USE JUNE 68 FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.
(6) LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THIS FORCE WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
MACV DIRECTIVE 10-11 AND 70-9.

5. INCLUDED IN THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE ARE THE FOLLOWING NAVY
UNITS REQUIRED IN IV CTZ:
3 APB'S
2 RAS
1 ARL

6. THE COMPLETED FORCE PACKAGE WILL BE SUBMITTED ON hAWS TO J31 BY
C0B 15 MARCH. UNQUOTE.
WARM REGARDS, LEV
GP=4
BT

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES
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PERSONAL FOR GEN GREENE, LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT
MEETING WITH GEN WHEELER AND WESTMORELAND 19MAR
1. AT 0850, SUNDAY 19MAR, AT MACV HQ I HAD A PRIVATE TEN MINUTE
MIG WITH GEN WHEELER AND THEN ONE HOUR AND FIFTEEN MIN CONF WITH
HIM, GEN WESTMORELAND, LTGEN BROWN, BG CHAISON, ONE COLONEL
(TRAVELING WITH GEN WHEELER), COL BARRETT AND COLONEL READ.
DURING THE PRIVATE MIG GEN WHEELER ASKED ME TO GIVE HIM MY
IDEAS ON HOW THINGS WERE GOING IN I CORPS SINCE HIS LAST VISIT
THREE IN JAN. I BRIEFLY OUTLINED THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY AND TACTICS
USED IN I CORPS SINCE TET. I COVERED THE ACTIONS INVOLVING 1ST
VC AND 21 NVA REG'T'S ACTIONS IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE - THE ROCKET
ATTACKS AGAINST THE DANANG AIRBASE AND THE ATTEMPTED ATTACKS
AGAINST CAMP CARROLL AND DONG HA. I EXPLAINED BRIEFLY HOW WE
COUNTERED EACH OF THESE ATTEMPTS AND THE RESULTS. I THEN DISCUSSED

PAGE TWO DDKE 1449 TOP SECRET

THE ENEMY'S STRONG REACTION TO THE RD EFFORT AND TOLD HIM HOW
I BELIEVED THIS WAS THE ENEMY'S MAIN EFFORT - HIS SECONDARY
EFFORT BEING HIS EMPLOYMENT OF NVA - AND MAIN FORCES - HE SAID
HE WAS INCLINED TO AGREE. HE SAID THE SENIOR ADVISOR IN FOURTH
CORPS HAD TOLD LTGEN BROWN THAT THE SAME WAS HAPPENING DOWN THERE.
2. PRIOR TO SEEING GEN WHEELER, I HAD A PRIVATE MEETING WITH
WSTY DURING WHICH I POINTED OUT AGAIN OUR SERIOUS NEED FOR MORE
TROOPS IN I CORPS. I EMPHASIZED TO HIM THE ALL OUT EFFORT BEING
MADE BY THE ENEMY AGAINST THE DISTRICT HQS, THE RD TEAMS AND THE
RF/PF FORCES IN AN EFFORT TO HALT THE RD PROGRAM. HE SAID HE
JUST COULD NOT GIVE ME ANY HELP IN ADDITIONAL TROOPS AT THE
PRESENT TIME. I WAS TOLD LATER BY HIS STAFF MEMBERS THAT HE HAD
MADE THE STATEMENT YESTERDAY THAT US FORCES MIGHT HAVE TO SACRIFICE
THEIR SUPPORT OF THE RD EFFORT IN ORDER TO HAVE TROOPS ENOUGH TO
CLEAR OUT BASE AREAS AND FIGHT THE NVA AND MAIN FORCES. I AM STILL
CONVINCED HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RD EFFORT
IN WINNING THIS WAR.
3. DURING THE CONFERENCE BRIEFINGS WERE PRESENTED BY THE III
MAG PARTY ON:
   • INTELLIGENCE UPDATE
B. Recap of Mortar/Rocket Attacks in Ctz
C. Enemy Attacks Against District Hqs, RD Cadres, and RF/PF Outposts (i.e. the RD Program Itself).
D. Recap of ARVN Fires Into and North of DMZ
E. Situation in Southern Quang Ngai Province
F. The Problem of a Shau Valley

4. An Intelligence Update Covered Recent Events Particularly in North Quang Tri Area, Addressed Enemy Losses, Movements, Order of Battle and Probability That Our Actions Near Cam Lo. Com Thien and Gio Linh Spoiled a Significant Coordinated Attack on Camp Carroll and Dong Ha. It Concluded That the Enemy Order of Battle in North Quang Tri Remains the 32d Div and the 341 Div; Measurably Strengthened by Resupply Effected During Tet Standdown.

5. All Present Evidenced Lively Interest in Particulars of Enemy Rocket Attack Camp Carroll Due to Nature and Apparent Power of Rocket Warhead Explosives.

6. III MAF View That Recent Attacks on Dist Hqs, RD Cadres, and RF/PF Outposts Represented a Strategy of Deliberate Response Against RD Program Itself Appeared to be Accepted by Gen Wheeler.

6. In Discussion of Conditions in South Quang Ngai the Brief

Page Four DDKE 1449 TOPSECRET

History of Events Since Insertion of III MAF Elements in Duc Pho. Progress Made, Including Changed Attitude on Part of People. Requirement to Expand Logistic Capability for Possible Future Operations of Larger Scope Was Stressed, culminating in Restatement of Requirement for Additional Regiment to Control Area from Mo Duc to II Corps Boundary.

B. ComUsMacV Indicating Acceptance of Points Made and Stated a Number One Priority for Construction of the C-130 Capable Air-Strip Some 8 Km South of Duc Pho. He Was Undecisive as to Additional Troops for the Area, But Stated Acceptance of the Requirement Therefor. He Did However Later Instruct Gen Chaisson to Study Further the Problem of Making Additional Troops Available for a Time When Bad Weather in the South Curtails Operations. (I Have Little Faith in Bad Weather as a Source of More Troops).

- The Subject of a Shau Valley Provoked a Lively Discussion. Our Presentation Involved a Plan to Put Forces on the Ground Again in a Shau (a Plan Directed to Be Prepared by Westy) Noting That at Least a Regiment (US), plus 3 ARVN Ranger Bns Would Be Required, as an Alternative We Proposed a Continuing Recon Effort Coupled With Air Attacks and Employing Special Forces Recon Assets
PAGE FIVE DDKE 1449 T O P S E C R E T

An increase of one company over number now programmed for I Corps would be required. Despite his obvious desire again to control this valley physically, Westy (who is admittedly emotional on the subject as a result of the "defeat" there last March) agreed with our alternate, and directed a restudy of special forces assets to permit its execution. This is important because it avoids a tie down of our meager assets to an extremely modest objective. However, Westy did end up by saying we should run a battalion size raid in the valley and also study feasibility of building a road from HuZ to AsHau. When I asked him if either of these projects had priority over the work that must be done in the DMZ area or Buc Pho area he said, "No". Gen Wheeler did not participate at all in the AsHau discussion and only asked questions on our appraisal of the enemy situation during the briefing.

So after the conference was over, Gen Wheeler spoke to me privately again for a few minutes. He complimented us on our work in I Corps again stated he felt the enemy was doing his best to oppose our RD effort. He expressed his appreciation for the briefing he had given him. Westy's final remark to me was that he was

PAGE SIX DDKE 1449 T O P S E C R E T

Headed for Guam and would do all he could there to get all the forces we had asked for in I Corps. Very resp'y, Lew

GP-4

by

NNNN

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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TO:

M. J. R. INGALL

ORIGINATOR: CG. III MAF

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TO CG FIRST HARDIV
CG FIRST NAV
CG THIRD HARDIV
BY
TOP SECRET
SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN’S NICKERSON, ROBERTSHAW, KYLE FROM LTGEN
HALT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

A, CG PNPAC 080522Z FEB 67
1. GEN KRUULAK IN A PERSONAL QUOTED IN REF A AS FOLLOWS QUOTE:
1. WHILE IN WASHINGTON I TALKED TO A LOT OF PEOPLE IN THE POLICY-
MAKING BUSINESS, FROM THEN I DERIVED A FEW SIGNIFICANT IMPRESSIONS:
A, MOSTLY, THEY ARE AWARE THAT WE ARE WINNING, AND FACE UP TO
THE FACT THAT THE PROCESS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE DRAMATICALLY FAST.
 HOWEVER, THERE IS AN ALMOST INDESCRIBABLE HUNGER FOR EVIDENCE OF
PROGRESS.

B. A FEW, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PARTICULARLY, ARE BECOMING
MINDFUL OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GUERRILLA ENEMY, AND OF THE
GREAT PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN FIGHTING HIM. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SAID
THAT HE WAS SURPRISED THE VC DID NOT START BEARING DOWN ON
GUERRILLA OPERATIONS A YEAR AGO.

C. THERE IS NO GREAT DISPOSITION, ON THE PART OF THE MOST
INFLUENTIAL CIVILIAN OFFICIALS, TO INCREASE GREATLY OUR COMMITTED
TROOP STRENGTH. IN FACT, THERE SEEMS TO ME TO BE A STRONG DESIRE
TO TRY AND RAISE ON WHAT WE HAVE, OR VERY LITTLE MORE. THIS
VIEW DOES NOT HAVE ANY MILITARY SUPPORT.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH THE LAST POINT MADE ABOVE, MY OWN FORECAST
IS THAT WE WILL NOT SEE GREAT TROOP INCREASES, BUT THAT THERE
WILL BE SOME RELIEF. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS PLAIN THAT
III MAF IS MORE THAN FULLY EXTENDED TO DO THE JOBS THAT NEED
DOING IN I Corps. YOUR FLEXIBILITY IS LARGELY GONE, BECAUSE OF
THE 200 MILE FRONT AND THE FIXED OBLIGATION - DNZ, BASE
SECURITY, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, ETC. I EXPLAINED THIS.
WHEREVER THERE IS AN AUDIENCE. HOWEVER, AT OSD, I GOT VERY
LITTLE FavorABLE REACTION. ONE TINY EXCEPTION: AFTER HEARING
MY PITCH ON CACS, MCNAMARA SAID HE WOULD GIVE US AS MANY
MARINES AS WE NEED FOR THE CACS PROGRAM. HAPPY TET. UNQUOTE.

GP-4
67
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DTG: 250320Z J

MONTH: JAN 67

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TO CMC
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MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY
PERSONAL FOR GEN GREENE AND LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT

1. FOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF TWO HOURS OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH I HAD WITH GEN TAYLOR AT HQ, III MAF ON 23 JAN. THE GROUP WAS SMALL, INCLUDING TWO ARMY LTCOLS WITH TAYLOR, AMBASSADOR KOREN, HIS CIA MAN, MY POLAD, CHIEF OF STAFF, AND BGEN CHAISON. TAYLOR'S EXPRESSED PURPOSE WAS TO RECEIVE A GENERAL "UP DATING". HE GUIDED THE DISCUSSION BY ASKING QUESTIONS, BEGINNING WITH HOW DID I SEE THE 1967 MILITARY CAMPAIGN?

2. MY REPLY, THAT 1967 WOULD SEE MAXIMUM EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARD REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, KICKED OFF A SERIES OF QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ARVN ORGANIZATION FOR THIS, THEIR STATE OF TRAINING, THEIR ATTITUDES AND WHO WOULD RUN IT. I TOLD HIM THAT THE ARVN HAD EARMARKED 14 BATTALIONS FOR THE JOB, THAT A FORMAL AND REALISTIC TRAINING COURSE WAS WELL UNDER WAY FOR THESE AND EVENTUALLY, ALL ARVN FORCES, THAT GENERAL LAM WAS PERSONALLY DIRECTING THE EFFORT AND THAT HE AND HIS OFFICERS WERE COMPLETELY AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY BEHIND THE PROGRAM. I THEN TOLD HIM OF OUR PLANS TO SUPPORT THE RD PROGRAM BY TAKING OVER SOME OF THE ARVN OUTPOSTS AS WELL AS CONTINUING OUR OWN CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS.


4. TAYLOR ASKED A FEW QUESTIONS REGARDING THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN I CORPS BUT DID NOT DWELL ON THE SUBJECT.
5. HE THEN TURNED TO THE OVERT MILITARY SITUATION, SHOWING GREAT
INTEREST IN THE SITUATION AT THE DMZ, MY REVIEW OF OPERATIONS
HASTINGS AND PRAIRIE, AND THE BARRIER PLAN. HE APPEARED SURPRISED
TO LEARN THAT AT PRESENT THE CONTEMPLATED BARRIER PRESENTED BY
MACV WAS TO BE LITTLE MORE THAN FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. HE
INQUIRED ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF III NAF UNITS THROUGHOUT THE
I CORPS AND ONE OF HIS STAFF MEMBERS WROTE THESE DOWN. AS AN
ASIDE, MY POLAD MADE AN UNSCHEDULED BUT CONVINCING SPEECH AT THIS
POINT REGARDING WHAT WE COULD DO IN I CORPS WITH MORE MARINES.
6. FINALLY, AND IN LOW KEY, TAYLOR MADE INQUIRY ABOUT THE
ENEMY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION. HE QUESTIONED THE ACTUAL POTENCY
OF THE MANY ENEMY "BASE AREAS", INCLUDING THE 12 IN I CORPS.
HE ALSO QUESTIONED THE PREVAILING INFILTRATION FIGURES AND THE
ACCEPTANCE OF KNOWN ENEMY UNITS AS BEING AT FULL STRENGTH. IN
RESPONSE I POINTED OUT THAT OUR OWN APPRAISAL HAD LED US TO VERY
SIMILAR CONCLUSIONS ALTHOUGH THESE WERE NOT WIDELY HELD.
7. IN SUMMARY I THINK WE LEFT WITH HIM THE FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS:
(A) THAT WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE SHORTEST PATH TO VICTORY
LIES IN ELIMINATING THE GUERRILLA FROM THE POPULATED AREAS AND
REPLACING HIM WITH A STRONGER, MORE PROSPEROUS AND HEALTHY
CITIZENRY, LOYAL TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.
(B) THAT THIS EFFORT IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN
PLAN FOR 1967, PROMULGATED BY THE JCS AND OUR ARVN COUNTERPARTS
IN I CORPS ARE VIGOROUSLY AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY PURSUING IT.
(C) THAT THE PROVISION OF MORE FORCES WOULD SHORTEN THE TASK.
(D) THAT ALL OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND ALL OF THE U.S. AGENCIES
IN I CORPS WORK TOGETHER IN COMPLETE HARMONY AS A TEAM.
GP-4
BT
CGN: 074  
FILLER 007

DTG 140250Z  
MONTH JAN 67

ORIGINATOR: CG III MAF

CATEGORY: (PERSONAL FOR)

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DTG/MONTH 1013:14Z JAN 67
**Subject:** AREAS OF CMC INTEREST DURING VISIT TO III MAF

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**Remarks:**

For comment, recommendation and/or clarification, submit comment or recommendations by 0800 11JAN67 in following format:

SUBJECT DISCUSSION/RECOMMENDATION III MAF POSITION

If no comment, recommendation or clarification required please chop.

RETURN TO III MAF S&I
EXCLUSIVE

FROM: LTGEN WALT

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DTG: 280642Z. Z MONTH: SEP 66

FROM: LTGEN HALE

FILE: COPY. EDELER: 10 COPIES

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CG III MAF 280642Z SEP 66

RECEIVED BY: [Signature] DATE/TIME: 282305

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27Y TTTT
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TO KUHLB PN CG FMFPAC
BT

TOP SECRET
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT
A. CG FMFPAC 182301Z
B. CG FMFPAC 262341Z
C. CG III MAF 032334Z MAY

1. I HAVE REVIEWED AGAIN OUR UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL AND UNITS TO
DETERMINE IF SAVINGS CAN BE MADE. MOST OF THE SUBJECT WAS EXPLORED
IN SUBMITTING REFERENCE C AND, GENERALLY SPEAKING, MY OPINIONS
HAVE NOT CHANGED.

2. LOOKING AT THE GROUND UNITS, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE
POTENTI:

A. THERE HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE TIMES WHEN CERTAIN COMBAT
SUPPORT UNITS ARE NOT FULLY EMPLOYED. THESE INCLUDE THE TANKS, ONTOS,
AND LVTs. YET, THERE ARE JUST AS MANY TIMES WHEN ALL OF THE ABOVE
ARE VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF AN OPERATION. IF WE ARE AT A CRUCIAL
PERSONNEL POINT, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO DEACTIVATE (IN ORDER) AN
LVT COMPANY, AN ANTI-TANK COMPANY AND A TANK COMPANY IN EACH DIVISION.
HOWEVER, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND AGAINST SUCH ACTION, BASED ON
OPERATIONAL NEEDS.

B. ALL OF OUR HEADQUARTERS ARE HEAVY, HOWEVER, IN THE FACE OF THE
ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO TWO SENIOR HEADQUARTERS,
AND THE HEAVY INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIC ACTION, I SEE NO CAPABILITY TO
REDUCE THE COMMAND, CONTROL AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS.

C. IN THE LOGISTICS COMMAND, THERE ARE NO UNITS OR PERSONNEL
SAVINGS APPARENT. CO, PLC STATES THAT ANY CURTAILMENT IN THIS AREA
WOULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY THE REDUCTION IN SERVICES PROVIDED.

3. ON THE AVIATION SIDE, ANY REDUCTIONS BELOW CURRENT PROGRAMMED
STRENGTH WOULD HAVE TO COME AFTER A CALCULATED ACCEPTANCE OF RISK IN THE
AIR-DEFENSE POSTURE. AGAIN, IF WE ARE AT THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, WE MIGHT
HAVE TO ACCEPT A ONE LAAM BATTALION CAPABILITY. OUR AIR DELIVERY
PLATOON IS NOT USED EXTENSIVELY BUT WHEN WE NEED IT WE NEED IT BADLY.
ALL OF OUR EMERGENCY PLANS CALL FOR ITS EMPLOYMENT.

4. IN DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT OF PERSONNEL WITH OUR SENIOR COMMANDERS
I DETECT A FEELING, WHICH I HOLD MYSELF, THAT, GENERALLY SPEAKING,
WE ARE IN SHORTER SUPPLY OF BODIES TO DO ALL OF THE WORK THAN WE ARE IN SKILLS (WITH SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTIONS ALREADY REPORTED). SHORT-TERM SAVINGS MIGHT BE ACCRUED BY TEMPORARILY REDUCING THE PIPELINE BY LETTING MORE MEN COME OUT WITHOUT SPECIALIZED TRAINING.

REGARDS, L.E.W.

GP - 4

BT
CG III MAF
EXCLUSIVE

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Signed

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CG III MAF
TO GNC
CG FMFPAC

TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN GREENE, LTGEN KRULAK FROM MGNC Felds. MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. FOLLOWING ARE COMPLETE TEXTS OF MESSAGES FROM WESTMORELAND IN HAWAII TO ROSSEN IN SAIGON.

2. D1G 150607Z AUG 66

A. DURING MY SESSION WITH THE PRESIDENT, HE READ A MEMORANDUM BY DR. KISSINGER THAT DISPLAYED AN INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FRONT IN VIETNAM WITH RESPECT TO REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) PLANS AND PROGRAMS. THIS MEMORANDUM IS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT INTELLECTUALS IN HIGH PLACES ARE BECOMING DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ADVISING THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS ON THE DETAILS OF OUR BUSINESS. I THINK WE ARE ONLY BEGINNING TO SEE THIS.

B. ACCORDINGLY, I WANT TO TAKE SPECIAL STEPS TO REGAIN AND MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THIS MATTER. THEREFORE, I REQUEST THAT YOU INITIATE IMMEDIATELY TO ACTIONS:

1) FIRST, GET WORD TO LARSEN, SEAMAN, AND DESOBY THAT I WANT TO REVIEW WITH THEM THEIR PLANS FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND THE FIRST OF THE YEAR AND THEIR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THE FIRST OF THE YEAR WITH RESPECT TO SUPPORTING AND HOPEFULLY ACCELERATING RD.

2) HAVE ALREADY HAD ONE SUCH SESSION WITH GENERAL SEAMAN BUT HIS PROGRAM HAS MASTLY PULLED TOGETHER AND HE IS CONTINUING TO REFINIE IT. THESE PROGRAMS SHOULD INVOLVE A PRACTICAL CONCEPT ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARVN TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE AS WELL AS REGIONAL FORCES, POPULAR FORCES, AND AN INCREASED NUMBER OF OUR UNITS SUPPORTING RD. IN THIS CONNECTION, I VISUALIZE PERHAPS HALF OF OUR MANEUVER BATTALIONS BEING COMMITTED TO TAOR MISSIONS ENCOMPASSING BASE SECURITY AND AT THE SAME TIME SERVING TO SPREAD SECURITY RADIIALLY FROM THE BASE AND THEREBY INCLUDING AS MUCH POPULATION AS POSSIBLE.

HAS BEEN SENT.

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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IN OTHER WORDS, AS FAR AS PRACTICAL, U.S. AND V.N. TROOPS IN II, III AND IV CORPS SHOULD CONSIDER FOR THE FUTURE THE PATTERN THAT NOW OBTAINS AROUND DA NANG. IN CONNECTION WITH THE I CORPS, STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO INVOLVE ARVN TO A GREATER EXTENT IN AREA SECURITY AS OPPOSED TO SITTING IN THEIR COMPOUNDS AS A REACTION FORCE AND CONDUCTING OCCASIONAL SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS. AS I REVIEW THE PLANS OF OUR FORCE COMMANDERS, I WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE KNOWN MY VIEWS IN GREATER DETAIL AND TO PROVIDE FURTHER GUIDANCE. I AM NOT SUGGESTION THAT WE REDUCE IN ANY WAY OUR PLANNED CAMPAIGNS AGAINST VC BASE AREAS AND MAIN FORCE UNITS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WITH SUFFICIENTLY TROOPS WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO BOTH, REALIZING THAT TROOPS ON TAOR DUTY CAN BE RE-EQUIPPING, DOING SOME TRAINING, AND STILL BE AVAILABLE TO REINFORCE FROM TIME TO TIME OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

DEVOTING AS MUCH FORCE AS WE CAN AFFORD TO AREA SECURITY IN THE TAOR AND THE RESULTANT SUPPORT TO REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE ARVN, AND THE ESSENTIALITY OF TAKING THE OFFENSIVE TO THE ENEMY BY STRIKING HIS MAIN FORCE UNITS AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY AND INVADING HIS BASE AREAS.

C. THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS ARE IMPORTANT UNDERTAKINGS AND MY GUIDANCE IN MARGINAL AT BEST. DO THE BEST YOU CAN TO GET THESE MATTERS OFF THE GROUND AND I SHALL GIVE FURTHER GUIDANCE UPON RETURN. AS YOU HAVE NOTED, SEVERAL OF MY RECENT MESSAGES HAVE RELATED TO THE SEVERAL SUBJECT OF TROOP EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS.

3. DTG 165620Z AUG 66

A. AS WE PROJECT INTO THE FUTURE, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE CLEARLY FORMULATE A CONCEPT FOR THE USE OF FORCES AND PROCEDURES FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT SO AS TO GET THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE PRODUCTION FROM OUR TROOPS TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF TOTAL RESULTS. TOTAL RESULTS CAN BE MEASURED IN TERMS OF POPULATION GIVEN SECURITY, TERRITORY CLEARED OF ENEMY INFLUENCE, VC BASES ELIMINATED, AND GUERRILLAS, LOCAL FORCES, AND MAIN FORCE UNITS DESTROYED. FURTHER, SUCCESS WILL BE MANIFEST BY THE OPENING OF ROADS AND THE FLOW OF GOODS TO MARKET. OF COURSE, THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS, BUT I BELIEVE THE FOREGOING ARE THE PRIMARY ONES.

B. WE HAVE HAD ENOUGH EXPERIENCE TO DATE TO COME UP WITH AN EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE CONCEPT ON THE USE OF OUR FORCES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE MAXIMUM OVERALL SUCCESS. AS AN EXAMPLE, I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE LEARNED THE VALUE OF LONG-RANGE PATROLS WHICH SERVE TO AVOID THE COMMITMENT OF LARGE FORCES INTO "DRY HOLES". WE HAVE LEARNED THE VALUE OF KILLING GUERRILLAS AND PROVIDING SECURITY TO AREAS CONTAINING IMPORTANT INSTALLATIONS AND POPULATED BY NUMBERS OF PEOPLE.

WE HAVE DEVELOPED TACTICS FOR OPENING AND USING ROADS AND TURNING THE ENEMY AMBUSH TO OUR ADVANTAGE. WE HAVE LEARNED THE VALUE OF B-52 STRIKES IN ORDER TO ECONOMIZE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS AND TO SAVE CASUALTIES IN THIS REGARD. I AM HOPEFUL THAT MY RECENT CABLE ON THE B-52 PROGRAM WILL RESULT IN QUICKER REACTION AND GREATER ASSETS AT ANY ONE TIME.

IN THE MEANWHILE, WE MUST PLAN A GETTING ALONG WITH THE PRESENT EFFORT FOR AT LEAST SIX TO NINE MONTHS.
2. I WANT TO INSURE THAT THE ABOVE THOUGHTS ARE TAKEN INTO FULL
CONSIDERATION BY OUR PLANNERS IN DEVELOPING THE NORTHEAST MONSOON
CAMPAIGN PLAN AND THE CY 67 PLAN. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE MUST START
A SALES CAMPAIGN IN THE ARVN TO SHAPE THEIR THINKING THE WAY WE WISH
THEM TO DO.

3. SPECIFICALLY, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE NOT USING LONG-RANGE
PATROLS IN THE NUMBERS THAT WE SHOULD NOR ARE
THESE PATROLS AS WELL TRAINED AS REQUIRED BY SUCH A
DEMANDING AND HAZARDOUS MISSION. SOME TIME AGO I ASKED
THE A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY BE MADE OF THIS MATTER AND I
GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE STAFF MAY BE DRAGGING THEIR
HEELS. WOULD YOU PLEASE REJUVENATE THIS EFFORT AND
SURE YOURSELF THAT WE ARE THINKING REALISTICALLY AND
BE IN CONNECTION WITH OUR APPROACH TO THIS IMPORTANT
ISSUE.

4. CID 696402 AUG 66
A. THE FOLLOWING GENERAL STATEMENTS MAY BE HELPFUL
TO YOU IN SATISFYING THE TASKS PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED BY
ME. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SUMMARIZE
SUCCINCTLY OUR BASIC STRATEGY, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS,
AND POLICIES IN OUR EFFORTS TO MAKE KNOWN TO CIVILIAN
AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO.

STATEMENT OF STRATEGIC CONCEPT
DURING THE PERIOD 1 MAY 1965 TO 1 NOVEMBER 1965
OUR TASK HAS TO (BUILD UP OUR COMBAT AND LOGISTICAL FORCES,
LEARN TO) EMPLOY THEM EFFECTIVELY, GAIN CONFIDENCE IN OUR-
SERVES IN FIGHTING IN THE COUNTER-INSLRGENCY AND SOUTHEAST
ASIA ENVIRONMENT, GAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE
IN OUR MILITARY SKILLS, COURAGE AND ABILITY AND PROTECT
OUR INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES FROM DESTRUCTION BY THE ENEMY.

DURING THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER 1965 TO 1 MAY 1966
OUR OBJECTIVES WERE TO EXTEND OUR DEPLOYMENTS TO THE
NORTH; EXERCISE OUR LOGISTICS IN SUPPORTING TROOPS
IN SUSTAINED COMBAT; INDOCTRINATE COMMANDERS ON THE
ATTITUDE AND TECHNIQUES OF SUSTAINED GROUND COMBAT;
INTENSIVELY INTERDICT BY AIR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS
LEADING FROM NORTH VIETNAM TO SOUTH VIETNAM; DISRUPT
ENEMY BASES BY B-52 STRIKES; DENY THE ENEMY RICE BY
MILITARY OPERATIONS OR CAPTURING CACHES IN STORAGE
AREAS; INCREASE OUR SURVEILLANCE ALONG THE COAST; AND
INITIATE A PROGRAM OF PATROLLING CERTAIN VITAL INLAND
WATERWAYS. IN SUMMARY, OUR PURPOSE WAS TO DISRUPT THE
ENEMY'S EFFORTS TO PREPARE HIS BATTLEFIELD, TO THROW HIS
PLANS OFF BALANCE WHERE POSSIBLE BY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS,
AND AT THE SAME TIME GAIN EXPERIENCE AND SELF-CONFIDENCE
IN THE ENVIRONMENT.

DURING THE PERIOD 1 MAY TO 1 NOVEMBER 1966--
THE SOUTHWEST MONSOON SEASON -- OUR STRATEGY IS ONE OF CON-
TAI NMENT OF THE ENEMY THROUGH OFFENSIVE TACTICAL OPERATIONS
REFERRED TO AS "SPOILING ATTACKS", AT THE SAME TIME
UTILIZING ALL FORCES THAT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR
AREA AND POPULATION SECURITY IN SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT. ENEMY ACTIVITY HAS BEEN OF SUCH MAGNITUDE
AND INTENSITY THAT FEWER TROOPS COULD BE
NOTED TO
GENERAL AREA SECURITY AND SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOP-
MENT THAN VISUALIZED AT THE TIME THE PLAN WAS PREPARED.
DURING THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER 1966 TO 1 MAY 1967 --
THE NORTHEAST MONSOON SEASON -- OUR STRATEGY WILL BE ONE
OF A GENERAL OFFENSIVE WITH MAXIMUM PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO
AREA AND POPULATION SECURITY IN FURTHERANCE OF REVOLUTION-
ARY DEVELOPMENT. THE AVAILABILITY OF FORCES TO SUPPORT
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
REQUIREMENT FOR ADEQUATE FORCES TO ATTACK ENEMY MAIN
FORCE UNITS AND TO INVOLVE HIS BASE AREA. MAXIMUM EMPHASIS
WILL BE GIVEN TO THE USE OF LONG-RANGE PATROLS AS A MEANS
OF FINDING THE ENEMY AS A BASIS FOR QUICK REACTION B-52
AND TACTICAL AIR STRIKES AND FOLLOW-UP OPERATIONS BY
GROUND TROOPS IN ADEQUATE NUMBERS TO THOROUGHLY SEARCH THE
AREA. SUSTAINED COMBAT BY THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF GROUND
MANEUVER ELEMENTS WILL BE THE POLICY. THIS STRATEGY WILL
INVOLVE THE OPENING, CONSTRUCTION, AND EXTENSIVE USE OF
ROADS AND A BEGINNING TO THE OPENING AND RECONSTRUCTION
OF THE NATIONAL RAILROAD.

GP-4

ST
READRESSAL FORM

III MAF 2110/3

CCN: 1671

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

DTG: 261440Z

FROM: CG III MAF

TO:

INFO: PERSONAL FOR GEN ROBERTSHAW

PERSONAL FOR GEN KYLE

READRESSAL OF

ORIGINATOR: CG III MAF

DTG: 251320Z

MONTH/YEAR: JUL66

SUBJECT: OPERATIONS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO DMZ (S).

RELEASED BY

DECLASSIFIED
PERSONAL FOR GEN KRULAK FROM GEN WALT

OPERATIONS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO DMZ (S)

A. YOUR PHONE CONVERSATION OF 24 JULY 1966

B. CHUSMACV 23 074-1Z (TS) (PASEP)

C. CINCPAC 23 0012Z (TS)

1. BY REFERENCE A YOU ASKED IF WE HAD BEEN INHIBITED IN ANY WAY IN
OPERATION HASTINGS BY PROXIMITY TO DMZ.

2. REFS B AND C BY AUTHORIZING AIR STRIKES IN DMZ AND AWS NGF IN
SOUTHERN HALF OF DMZ REMOVED THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INHIBITIONS TO

PAGE TWO DDKE 531 TOP SECRET

CURRENT OPERATIONS.

3. WITH RESPECT TO OPERATIONS ON THE GROUND, TROOP MOVEMENT
IS GREATLY RESTRICTED IN THIS AREA BY EXTREMELY
RUGGED TERRAIN (BY FAR THE WORST WE HAVE EVER ENCOUNTERED) AND LACK
OF LANDING ZONES. THE DMZ IS AN INHIBITION PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE
IT CANNOT BE PINPOINTED THEREFORE A NATURAL TENDENCY EXISTS TO
KEEP WELL CLEAR OF IT TO AVOID VIOLATION OF THE PROHIBITION
ON MANEUVERING INTO DMZ FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF ATTAINING OBJECTIVES
IN SVN.

4. UNDER REVISED RULES I CANNOT STATE THAT DMZ HAS BEEN A
SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO OPERATION HASTINGS TO DATE.

GP-4

ST

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET SHARE TO FOLLOW

TO: MACVEY

CC: MACVEY

170845Z

T. P. C. F. ET SENSITIVE INFORMANTS
OFFICER QUESTIONS WAIT TO MAJ GEN THULSON

1. III MAR COULD EFFECTIVELY EMPLOY AS MANY ECOM MARINES AS CAN
   EFFECTIVELY BE SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY. AT LEAST ONE BRIGADE WOULD
   BE MOST WELCOME.

2. THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT EXISTS. WITH RESPECT TO THE OVERALL
   DEPLOYMENT OF THE INTRUSION OF ECOM COMBAT TROOPS INTO VIETNAM,
   THIS IS A POLITICAL MATTER BEYOND THE RUMLIETY OF III MAR. IF THE
   DECISION IS NAPO, HOWEVER, I SEE NO POLITICAL PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO
   III MAR. IN FACT ADDITION OF IIIK AND ECOM TROOPS COULD STRENGTHEN U.S.
   POSITION.
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN LINDIS
FROM LTGEN WALT TO MAJGEN TILLSON
A. COMUSMACV 161440Z

1. III MAF COULD EFFECTIVELY EMPLOY AS MANY GRC MARINES AS CAN
   EFFECTIVELY BE SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY. AT LEAST ONE BRIGADE WOULD
   BE MOST WELCOME.

2. THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT EXISTS WITH RESPECT TO THE OVERALL
   QUESTION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF GRC COMBAT TROOPS INTO VIETNAM.
   THIS IS A POLITICAL MATTER BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF III MAF. IF THE
   DECISION IS MADE, HOWEVER, I SEE NO POLITICAL PROBLEMS PECULIAR TO
   ICTZ. IN FACT, ADDITION OF ROK AND GRC TROOPS COULD STRENGTHEN
   U.S. POSITION.

CP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
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RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

HANDLE THE ATTACHED RECORD AND SIGN THIS RECORD.

Signature

Date

FILE

DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
PERSONAL FOR GEN ROSSON

SUBJ: CONTACT WITH GEN LAM

MEETING took place at Chu Lai Airbase. My polad was present.

I began conversation by stating I was very concerned over apparent disunity developing in armed forces and disastrous consequences it could have on war against VC. I said I hoped Second Division would not have such problems; that it would remain loyal to Government and not become involved in politics. I stated that highest levels of US government attached great importance to his division’s maintaining solidarity with GVN.

General Lam assured me that the Second Division was loyal to the Government and would have no problems; only problems, according to General Lam, would occur if Government force should attempt to take direct action against Buddhists in pagodas. In this unlikely event General Lam warned, he would not be able to control his Division; they would rise up; as would "all other Divisions". Lam reminded me that Diem’s demise was directly attributable to the similar actions.

As far as the current situation in First Division was concerned, Lam said, there are many possible solutions. Government could stop logistics and pay; could also send new division commander landing him and staff at regimental C.P. north of Hue and make official announcement over radio for all unit commanders to be loyal to him. Issue would be purely military; no political or religious issue involved.

The best solution, according to Lam, would be to bring General Thi back as Corps Commander. Lam called Thi very anti-Communist and very pro-American stating that two of Thi’s children were...

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IN THE UNITED STATES, BECAUSE OF POPULARITY HE COULD BRING AREA
BACK TO NORMAL. IN LAM'S OPINION, THIS WOULD BE "BEST" SOLUTION.

6. TURNING TO SUBJECT OF GENERAL CAO, LAM ASKED US TO TRANSMIT HIS
REGRETS FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO ATTEND CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY.
LAM SAID HE HAD A VERY LARGE OPERATION IN QUANG BIN PROVINCE WHICH
HE HAD TO COMMAND. BUT, HE SAID, HE KNEW GENERAL CAO WOULD UNDER-
STAND BECAUSE THEY WERE VERY CLOSE FRIENDS. IN LAM'S VIEW CAO'S ONLY
PROBLEM IN CENTER WOULD BE HIS CATHOLIC BACKGROUND. LAM ALSO MENTIONED
THAT KY HAD ASKED HIM TO ACCEPT COMMAND OF I CORPS. LAM SAID
HE COULDN'T ACCEPT POSITION BECAUSE PREVIOUSLY HE HAD ACTED AGAINST
STRUGGLE ELEMENTS IN QUANG NGAI AND HE WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE AS CORPS
COMMANDER AS A RESULT.

7. I CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY THANKING GENERAL LAM
FOR ENCOURAGING PICTURE OF SITUATION IN SECOND DIVISION, I SAID IT WAS
REASSURING TO ME TO KNOW GENERAL LAM AND HIS DIVISION SUPPORTED
GOVERNMENT AND WERE CONCENTRATING ON FIGHTING VC. I EXPRESSED
REGRET, HOWEVER, THAT LAM WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND CHANGE OF
COMMAND CEREMONY.

8. IT WAS LEARNED IN EARLY AFTERNOON THAT, IN OPINION
OF SECOND DIVISION SENIOR ADVISOR, THERE WAS NO PROBLEM REGARDING AN
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**Legend**

- **A** - Action
- **I** - Information
- **C** - Comments

**Personal for GEN Westmoreland from LT GEN Walt**

**Record of Disclosure**

Each person who handles the attached document shall sign this record.

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PERSONAL FOR

Has been sent

P 151514Z
MG III MAF
TO: RUSMA/CONFANCY

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM LGEN WALT

1. IN A MEETING WITH THE SENIOR I CORPS CHAPLAIN THIS MORNING CALLED
   FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING CIVIC ACTION, MY III MAF CHAPLAIN
   REPORTED THE FOLLOWING TO ME AS A RESULT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE
   VENERABLE THICH MINH CHIEU, CHIEF BUDDHIST CHAPLAIN OF I CORPS.
   VENERABLE THICH MINH CHIEU REQUESTED A CONFERENCE WITH ME THIS
   15 MARCH 1966 AT 1600. HE STATED AT OUTSET THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO
   TALK ABOUT OUR CIVIC ACTION WORK BUT TO TALK ABOUT VERY IMPORTANT

PAGE TWO RUNSON 182 TOP SECRET

SITUATION, HE STATED THAT BECAUSE OF OUR PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIP HE
FEEL THAT HE HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO TELL ME THE "INSIDE STORY" ON
THE GEN THE SITUATION.

DURING THE FOLLOWING 20 MINUTES HE TOLD ME THE FOLLOWING:

A. GEN THI DISMISSAL WAS INSTIGATED BY GEN CO.
B. THE CG'S OF II CORPS, IV CORPS, THE MARINES AND AIR
   CORPS ARE WITH GEN THI.
C. A VOTE WAS TAKEN BY 36 GENERALS BEHIND CLOSED DOORS ON
   THIS DISMISSAL. VOTE WAS 50 FOR EJECTION WITH 6 BLANK VOTES. GEN'S
   DONG (AIRBORNE) AND GEN KHANG (MARINES) STATED THEY CAST BLANK
   VOTES BECAUSE THEY KNEW GEN THI WAS A GOOD MAN.
D. CHIEF OF THE UNITED BUDDHIST INSTITUTE IN SAIGON VISITED
   GEN THI'S OFFICE ON 14 MAR TO SEEK SOME SOLUTION.
E. THE SOLDIERS IN I CORPS WILL NOT ACCEPT THE DISMISSAL.
   MANY WANT TO COME IN FROM THE OUTPOSTS NOW.
F. 60 PERCENT OF ARVN IN I CORPS ARE BUDDHISTS. THEY ARE
   WELL LED AND WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS DISMISSAL. THEY WILL KEEP STRU-
   GGLING FOR HIS RETURN. HE REPEATED THIS TWICE.
G. IF SOLDIERS DEMANDS ARE NOT MET THERE WILL BE ARMED

CG III MAF

P 151514Z/MAR

CG III MAF
DECLASSIFIED

Top Secret

Communication Date

TCP S. T.

Commander 1st Corps

DECLASSIFIED

Page Four

from Gen Thu being replaced. I told him of the above information

I had received from my Chaplain. He stated that he believed things
were settling down in I Corps and that even though most of the
people deeply regretted the loss of Gen Thu, as he himself did,
he was his position after having talked with Gen Thu on the phone
that it was best for the country not to cause trouble over the
matter. He seemed confident that the armed forces would not partic-
ipated in demonstrations. He blamed only 10 percent of the
people for trying to cause trouble. He feels confident the trouble
will diminish over the next few days. General Chua also stated
that a delegation of two Buddhist leaders, Thich Nhui Hue, Budd-
hist leader Quan Van province, and Thich Manh Dao, assistant to
Chief Buddhist Service I Corps Tactical Zone had met with him
this morning. He advised them that their actions were not in the
best interest of the country, that they could hamper military
effort. He asked them to stop their agitations. The Buddhist
leaders agreed to do so.

He said Thu had not come to Danang...that they had stated that
either he or Ky must now go for good of the country and that he
was prepared to make the personal sacrifice."
3. CHUAN SEEMED TO BE TALKING WITH A GREAT DEAL OF SINCERITY.
I ASSURED HIM THAT AS I CORPS COMMANDER HE HAS MY FULL
SUPPORT SAME AS I HAD GIVEN TO GEN THI. HE STATED HE WAS GOING
TO DO HIS BEST TO CARRY OUT HIS OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
IN ALL RESPECTS.

4. I CAREFULLY EXPLAINED TO GEN CHUAN OUR POSITION OF NEUTRALITY
ON THE POLITICAL PROBLEM AND HOW WE ARE, OBLIGATED TO SUPPORT
WHOEVER MAY BE DESIGNATED AS LEGAL AUTHORITY BY THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION.
WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. VERY RESPECTFULLY

LEW
CP-4

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COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES - M CG: 111 MAF
DECLASSIFIED

TO: F.T.C.R.W.

RE: PERSIAN ORIENT MEETING ON ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDIAN OFFICE IN TIBET.

FROM: 

I called on Mr. K. today and he told me that the new ruler of Tibet has asked for an appointment with me. He was visibly upset and disturbed by the news of his predecessor's dismissal.

The new ruler predicts that there will be many resignations from official positions and support for this. This includes the executive staff, all political leaders, and possibly others.

It is important that you support the newly appointed ruler.

I also understand that the new ruler may seek to oust those who oppose his appointment. It is important that you and others support the newly appointed ruler.

I will keep you informed of any other developments as they occur.

11015

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P 1000002Z

FM: CG III MAF
TO: CG FMFPAC

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM LTGEN WALT.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. OUR CONVERSATIONS AT LUNCH YESTERDAY WERE LIMITED PRIMARILY TO
POLITICAL DANGER SIGNALS WHICH WERE SHOWING UP IN WHICH MY COUNTER PART
SEEMED TO BE THE PRINCIPAL TARGET DUE TO ALLEGED INSUBORDINATION. SHORTLY
AFTER MY CONVERSATION WITH YOU WESTY CALLED TO SAY HE THOUGHT THINGS WERE
GETTING BACK TO NORMAL AND I WAS TO SPEAK TO NO ONE CONCERNING DETAILS OF
OUR CONVERSATIONS YESTERDAY WITH THE AMBASSADOR. CONSEQUENTLY AT PRESENT
I AM LIMITED IN WHAT I SAY ABOUT IT AND ACTUALLY I KNOW VERY LITTLE OF THE
DETAILS OF THE PROBLEM AND IT APPARENTLY AROSE JUST BEFORE NOON YESTERDAY.

2. I TALKED WITH WESTY JUST BEFORE A FEW MINUTES ON MY WASHINGTON VISIT –
HE WAS MOST INTERESTED IN WHO I HAD SEEN AND THE TOPICS OF OUR CONVERSATIONS.
I STRESSED THE INTEREST FROM THE TOP DOWN IN CIVIC ACTION. HE IS COMING
UP ON THE 13TH TO SEE ME AND SPEND MOST OF THE DAY. THE AMBASSADORS ENTIRE
ATTENTION WAS ON THE POLITICAL DANGER SIGNS. HE WAS VERY CONCERNED.

3. SITUATION AT ASHUA LOOKS BAD AND THE WEATHER WAS DOWN TO ABOUT 200
FOOT CEILING. REGARDS LEW.

CP-4

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EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MCCUTCHEON

EXCLUSIVE
P 080022Z
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MCCUTCHEON.
MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY.

1. COMUSMACV IS ANXIOUS TO CLEAR OUT VC IN RUONG SAT AREA, A VANGROVE
SWAMP SE OF SAIGON AND JUST WEST OF GAP ST. JACQUES. IT HARBORS VC WHO
HAVE BEEN FIRING ON SHIPS GOING UPRIVER TO SAIGON AND IS CONSIDERED A
HAVEN AND SUPPLY ROUTE. COMUSMACV HAS DIRECTED THAT USMC FORCES BE USED.
A CONFERENCE WAS HELD BY J-3, AT WHICH ADM WARD, GEN JONES AND LNO
ATTENDED. IT WAS RESOLVED AT THE CONFERENCE THAT EMPLOYMENT OF SLF WAS
MOST SUITABLE, ALTHOUGH THE OPERATION COULD NOT TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO
1APR66. THIS WILL BE SO PROPOSED TO COMUSMACV BY J-3 AND CHIEF NAG. IN
THE EVENT COMUSMACV DOES NOT WANT TO DELAY THAT LONG, THE REQUIREMENT
MAY BE PLACED ON III MAF TO PROVIDE A FORCE OF 1 BN MINUS 2 CO'S
REINFORCED, FOR LIFT BY 2 LSD TO CONDUCT AMPHIB LANDINGS IN
COORDINATION WITH ARVN AND USA FORCES IN THE AREA SOME TIME BEFORE THE
END OF MARCH.

2. JOE MOORE IS AFTER ME AGAIN FOR SOME STATISTICS. BELIEVE WE CAN
PROVIDE BUT IT DOES MEAN EXTRA WORK. WILL ONLY GIVE IT FOR SORTIES
WE FLY IN SUPPORT OF 2D AD.

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 2 - CG III MAF

CG III MAF

P 080022Z/MAR 66

CG III MAF

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1 2
TOP SECRET SPECIFIC EXCLUSIVE FOR LTCENS KRULAK AND WALT FROM MCCUTCHEON.

1. SHARP AND WESTMORELAND ARRIVED LATE 4 MARCH AND CANCELLED OUT ON SCHEDULED ITINERARY. I BRIEFED BOTH FOR 15 MINUTES ON CURRENT OPERATION UTAH, LAST WEEKS OPERATIONS UP NORTH AND CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING TAXIWAY AND RUNWAY. WESTMORELAND PROMISED TO GET DUNN AND WOODING UP TOMORROW TO TAKE PERSONAL LOOK AT PROBLEMS. I EMPHASIZED WE NEED MORE EQUIPMENT IN DANANG AREA TO GET JOBS DONE AND NOT JUST JUGGLE EXISTING ASSETS.

2. SHARP POSED A QUESTION THAT CAUGHT ME SHORT. HE SAID OKINAWA MAB SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE SLF FOR A PERIOD AND WANTED TO KNOW MY REACTION TO MOVING ALL OKINAWA BATTALIONS IN COUNTRY AND FIELDING SLF OUT FROM HERE. I SAID I HADN'T CONSIDERED THIS BUT WAS UNDER IMPRESSION PLANS PROVIDED FOR CONTINUING SLF. OTHERWISE HIS SCHEME LOOKED WORKABLE BUT I COULD NOT ANALYZE PROS AND CONS ON THE SPUR OF MOMENT. DON'T KNOW YOUR VIEWS ON THIS BUT BELIEVE THIS IS ONE YOU AND PACFLT SHOULD FIELD.

3. SHARP DEPARTED AND WESTMORELAND THEN CONFERRED WITH ME FOR ANOTHER 15 MINUTES. HIS MAIN PITCH WAS WE WERE NOW ENTERING PERIOD WHEN WE MUST CONDUCT SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS AGAINST MAIN FOR VC UNITS. IF WE COULD KEEP THEM OFF BALANCE THE GUERRILLA EFFORT WOULD DRY UP, STATED WE SHOULD HAVE 50-75 PER CENT UNITS ENGAGED AT ALL TIMES. LEAVE DEFENSE OF BASES TO LOGISTIC AND HEADQUARTERS TYPES. FURTHER STATED HE DEFINITELY WANTED TO SEE AND APPROVE OUR DEPLOYMENT PLAN FOR TWO MARINE DIVISIONS IN COUNTRY. STATED HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AT LEAST TWO BATTALIONS AT PHU BAI, A REGIMENT AT QUANG NHAI, THE ROK BRIGADE WHEN IT IS PASSED TO OUR OPCON AT DONG PHO SOUTH OF QUANG NHAI AND AN INTENSE EFFORT TO KEEP THE ROADS OPEN.

4. I POINTED OUT OUR RECENT OPERATIONS UP NORTH PROVED WE COULD REACT ON SHORT NOTICE IN STRENGTH WHEN WE HAD GOOD INTELLIGENCE AND FURTHER CITED TODAY'S ACTION DOWN SOUTH. FURTHER POINTED OUT WE HAD TWO BATTALIONS AT PHU BAI NOW AND A REGIMENTAL COMMAND GROUP AND STILL FURTHER I SAID WE HAD BEEN WORKING ROUTE ONE WITH FREQUENCY EVER SINCE HARVEST MOON.

5. HE INDICATED HE MIGHT COME UP ON 18TH. I COUNTERED THAT WALT WOULD PROBABLY RETURN THAT DAY. WE PARTED WITH NO DATE SET.

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I hosted their final dinner and invited key Joint Coordinating Council members. General Thi could not attend because of commitments with Ky. This morning the party visited Chu Lai then departed for Pleiku. The Chinese, of course, left presents for all generals and several others. We reciprocated and gave every member of the party some token which included appropriate plaques plus a personal momento. We gave the junior officers elephant hide wallets and the general officers marble desk plaques with their names and a MAF insignia inscribed on it. We presented the commandant with an elephant hide attaché case appropriately inscribed.

4. A flood of visitors continues. Admiral Sharp and Gen Westmoreland will arrive within the hour. Also, LtGen Spivey of the joint staff plus two other generals plus Brigadier General Williams, director of Army Aviation.

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CG III MAF

P 408022/MARCH66

CG III MAF

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FINAL PAGE OF TWO PAGES
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGENS KRULAK AND WALT FROM MGON MCCUTCHEON

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1. The Joint Coordinating Committee met 22 Feb. I requested members to consider the idea of having the Public Safety Committee or a special committee take cognizance of items which might fall under the general heading of better business practices. What I really had in mind is anti-black market activities. In the meantime we have a study group within III MAF analyzing this problem further.

2. Four times in the last week we have sent units to support ARVN units on their request. Once on the 22nd in the southern part of Danang Taor where we sent a company, once on the 25th just east of the Phu Bai Taor, once on the 26th when we sent a battalion minus several kilometers north of Hue and once again on the 27th east of the Phu Bai Taor. Each one was carefully considered and the pros and cons analyzed before we committed our own resources. Right now we have a good fight going east of Phu Bai.

3. The visit of the Chinese Marines developed some complications. Saigon originally elected a hands-off policy. They are you back in the act so the party will be here only two days in addition to the arrival date; two days in the second corps area; two days in Saigon and one day returning to Taiwan. Prior to this change I had seen General Thi and he had offered to take them part of the time so as a net result III MAF will actually have them about a day and a half plus three evenings. The generals will be billeted on the hill and the rest in my senior BQ. Appropriate refreshments will be offered and there will be invitational dinners each evening. One dinner will include General Thi, the mayor and high ranking US civilians who support the pacification program. Believe everything is under control in this department.

CG III MAF

P 281644Z/FEB 66

CG IX MAF

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4. HAVE SEEN GENERAL THI SEVERAL TIMES. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST
BY THE MAYOR OF HUE, I CHANGED THE LIBERTY UNIFORM FOR HUE TO
CIVILIAN CLOTHES. GENERAL THI AGREED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA.
5. AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, ABOUT 1800 ON THE 24TH AN ARVN DRIVER
TOOK A CRANE ACROSS THE DANANG RIVER BRIDGE AND DAMAGED IT TO SUCH
AN EXTENT THAT IT HAD TO BE CLOSED FOR TRAFFIC. USA AND NVA
TURNTED TO AND DID A MAGNIFICENT JOB IN RESTORING THE BRIDGE TO
DUTY ON 27TH FEBRUARY. THEY REMOVED THE OLD SECTION AND REPLACED
IT IN KIND.
6. GENERAL MEINHOFER SPENT ALL 26 FEBRUARY IN THE AREA. BRIEFED
HIM ON THE 6-2 AND G-5 SITUATION AND OUR CONTINGENCY PLANS AND IN
PARTICULAR ON THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES. HE AND I THEN VISITED
THE FIRST ARVN DIVISION AND SPENT SOME TIME WITH GENERAL CHUAN.
GENERAL CHUAN HAD AN ACTIVE WEEK WITH THREE ENGAGEMENTS NORTH,
WEST AND SOUTH OF HUE. MACV IS VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN KEEPING THE
RAILROAD OPEN FROM DANANG TO HUE AND WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED
WITH RECENT RASH OF INCIDENTS IN THE PHUOC LOC AREA JUST NORTH OF
AI VAN PASS. MACV THOUGHT WE SHOULD TAKE MORE ACTIVE PART AND
PUT A SMALL FORCE IN THAT AREA. I FLEW GENERAL MEINHOFER ALONG THIS
STRETCH AND HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE A DIVISION TO
INSURE THAT THE LINE STAYED OPEN. NEVERTHLESS, THEY ARE INTERESTED
IN KEEPING THE LINE OPEN FROM DANANG TO HUE.
7. BILL JONES CAME UP ON THE 26TH AND CONFIRMED THAT MACV WAS
INTERESTED IN KEEPING THE RAILROAD OPEN. IN HAVING PLANS TO PUT
A BRIGADE AND/OR DIVISION NORTH OF THE AI VAN PASS AND IN PLANNING
FOR AN OPERATION IN THE DIEN AREA.
8. MANY VISITORS DURING THIS PERIOD MOST IMPORTANT MAJOR GENERAL
LANDSALE AND MR. COHEN FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. BRIEFED THEM
ON CIVIC ACTIONS IN GENERAL AND THE FIVE VILLAGE PROGRAM IN
PARTICULAR TOOK THEM TO NINTH MARINES FIVE VILLAGE AREA AND JOINT
PSYWAR CENTER. TONIGHT GENERAL ENGLISH WILL HOST THEM AT DINNER AND
WE HAVE INVITED THE U. S. MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COORDINATING
COMMITTEE SO THAT WE CAN PARTICIPATE IN A U. S. BULL SESSION.
REGARDS
GF=4

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PRIORITY 246542Z EXT GC

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///MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY///

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY FOR LIEUT KEULIK FROM MOGUTCHEON

A. CG PAPAC 212203Z

1. REFERENCE (A) INDICATES FIRST SQUADRON OF MAG-13 TO DEPLOY APRIL. APPRECIATE THIS DATE HAS BEEN IN PLAN SINCE LAST FALL. AT THAT TIME HOWEVER WE WERE NOT SURE HOW MANY SQUADRONS WE WOULD GET AND WE WANTED TO START AS EARLY A DATE AS POSSIBLE FROM READINESS STANDPOINT. AT SAME TIME WE TRIED TO THE SQUADRONS TO AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES.

2. LATEST INFO ON STATUS CONSTRUCTION IS AS FOLLOWS: FOUR SQUADRONS PARKING RAMP APRIL; TAXI JAY MAY; THREE SQUADRON PAD JULY: PARALLEL RUNWAY JULY. THESE ARE OPTIMISTIC AND WILL PROBABLY SLIP.

3. FOLLOWING ALL HAVE A BEARING ON DEPLOYMENT DATE OF NEXT JET SQUADRON TO DANANG:

A. THERE IS NO RAMP SPACE AVAILABLE NOW.

B. THE NORTHERN TOUCH DOWN PAD OCCUPIED BY 235 AND MAG-1 HAS DEVELOPED CRACKS AND WILL REQUIRE REPAIR. AM TRYING TO HOLD OFF AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL WE DETECT THE MAGNITUDE OF PROBLEM. COULD BE FAIRLY EXTENSIVE JOB.

C. TRANSPORT OPERATIONS WILL HAVE TO MOVE TO EAST SIDE IN APRIL.

D. LAM ETRY ON FIELD MUST MOVE TO MAKE SPACE FOR MAG-13 COMPARTMENT AREA. ONLY SITES ARE HAI VAN PASS, HILL 55 OR AREA SOUTH OF MARBLE MT. HILL 55 LOOKS MOST PROMISING AND MOST IMMEDIATE.

CG 111 MAF  P 246542Z/FEB66  CG 111 MAF

PAGE 1 OF 2
E. OTHER UNITS NOW BILATERED ON MAC-13 REAL ESTATE MUST MOVE AT TIME MAF HQ RELOCATES EAST OF RIVER.

F. DANANG NOW BASSS SEVERAL UNITS NOT KNOWN ABOUT LAST FALL WHEN APRIL DATE WAS PICKED: SIX AC-47, EIGHT CH3C, TEN F5, FOUR C130 FLAME SHIPS, AND INCREASED TRANSIENT TRANSPORT LOAD AND AN INCREASE IN NAVY TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT.

G. TEMPO OF OPERATIONS REACHED 30000 MOVEMENTS IN JAN. DOUBT IF THERE IS A BUSIER SINGLE RUNWAY IN THE WORLD.

4. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RECEIVE ALL UNITS DEPLOYED TO DATE READY OR NOT AND HAVE MANAGED TO MAKE DO. IT HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT STRAIN AND PAIN HOWEVER.

5. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT APRIL NOT BE CONSIDERED A MANDATORY DATE AND THAT WE DO THE DEPLOYMENT TO COMPLETION OF WEST SIDE PARKING RAMPS AS A MINIMUM.

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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P 230002Z
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
INFO MARCORB CAMLEJ

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MGREN WALT
FROM MCCUTCHEON MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

MARCORB CAMLEJ NOT ADLEE PASS TO MGREN WALT HQ MARINE CORPS

1. MAJEN ROSSON VISITED 18 FEB AND WANTED TO BE BRIEFED ON CONTINGENCY
   PLANS IN NORTH AND ESPECIALLY ON LOGISTICS ASPECTS. COL PARRY ACCOMPANIED
   ROSSON AND REMAINED BEHIND TO BRIEF SELECTED STAFF OFFICERS ON SOME OF THE
   LATEST MACV PHILOSOPHY ON HOW TO WIN THE WAR. REDUCED TO SIMPLIEST TERMS
   IT IS THIS: DEFEND LESS AND ATTACK MORE WITH A GREATER PERCENTAGE OF FORCE
   THAN NOW BEING UTILIZED.

2. PARRY ALSO POINTED OUT THAT MACV'S DESIRES RELATIVE TO THE TWO PROVINCES
   HAS CHANGED SLIGHTLY. INSTEAD OF DEPLOYING AN ARMY BRIGADE OR DIVISION TO
   QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN MACV NOW VISUALIZES A MARINE DIVISION MOVING INTO
   THAT AREA WITH AN ARMY BRIGADE OR BRIGADES TOTALING FIVE BATTALIONS REPLACING
   THAT DIVISION WITHIN OUR PRESENT ENCLAVES. WE WILL PROBABLY GET A DIRECTIVE
   TO SUBMIT A PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. PARRY ALSO ADDED THAT WESTMORELAND WAS
   INTERESTED IN GETTING PACOM RESERVE MAB AS A POSSIBLE FORCE FOR TEMPORARY
   USE IN THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES.

3. ALSO RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM MACV ASKING US TO INITIATE PLANNING FOR AN
   OPERATION IN THE DO XI AREA. THIS TIES IN WITH HIS ABOVE STATED PHILOSOPHY
   OF DEFENDING LESS AND ATTACKING MORE.

4. IT IS OBVIOUS FROM THIS BRIEF SYNOPSIS THAT WE ARE AT ODDS WITH MACV
   AND THE ARMY WITH OUR BASIC STRATEGY, PHILOSOPHY AND CONCEPT OF HOW TO
   GET THIS DONE. TRUE WE HAVE STATED THAT WE NEED 10 BATTALIONS TO DEFEND
   THE ENCLAVES AND ANY NUMBER OVER THAT WILL BE USED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE
   OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE ENCLAVES. THIS IS IN FACT NOW GOING ON IN
   DOUBLE EAGLE. UP TO NOW, HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT UNCOVERED ANY VC INSPIRE OF
   THE FACT THAT THE INTELLIGENCE FORECAST WAS GOOD. WE MAY HAVE FOUR BATTALIONS
   IN EXCESS OF OUR 10 RIGHT NOW AND MORE IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS BUT THE FACT
   REMAINS THAT OUR LIMITED HELICOPTER ASSETS ARE DESTINED TO REMAIN LIMITED
   EXCEPT FOR THE GAINING ON ONE SQUADRON. ONE OF THE DECIDING FACTORS IN HOW
   MUCH ATTACKING WE CAN DO OUTSIDE OF THE ENCLAVES WILL BE THE AVAILABILITY OF
   CHOPPERS AND NOT THE AVAILABILITY OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS.
5. Visited Double Eagle area on 19 and 21 Feb. Spent some time with General Thi and took him aboard the LPH Valley Forge so he could get some insight on the ship based Helo Operations. He was very much impressed and enjoyed the trip.

6. On 26 February attended MACV Commanders Conference at Nha Trang. General Westmoreland reviewed the highlights of the Honolulu Conference. Roy Wehrle of the Embassy Staff gave an update on the economy situation in Vietnam. In November he stated the situation was serious but he was now forced to state it was critical. Westmoreland then opened new thoughts and stated that we now have enough troops to start an operation against the VC bases and we must take the offensive. He said that it wouldn't be long before people back home will be asking what are we doing with all the troops now in country and we must be able to answer that we have stepped up the operational rate. He thinks that we have only used from 50 to 75 percent of our combat potential. Relationship of these remarks to those above, of course, is obvious.

7. Visitors for the period 19-21 Feb included Bishop Hines of the Episcopal Church and BGen Bright who was sent out by the Department of the Army to give them some advice on material handling equipment. He is a Reserve Officer from Boston on 45 days active duty. Also visited by Congressmen Teague, Cohelan and Zablocki. These three were interested in pacification program and the first two were entertained at dinner one evening by Mark Gordon. General Thi and General English were there and reported a very profitable discussion following dinner.

CP-4
PERSONAL FOR

P 191348Z
FM CG III MAF
TO YNYA/CG FMFPAC
BT
TOP SECRET LIMDIS PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MCCUTCHEON
MARCH-APRIL OPERATIONS
A. COMUSMACV 021130Z NOTAL
B. CG III MAF 130030Z NOTAL
C. CG III MAF 151112Z
1. REF A CONTAINED GUIDANCE FOR OPERATIONS DURING MARCH AND APRIL
IN RVN. IN GENERAL, REF A STATES THAT MAJOR COMMANDS ARE EXPECTED
TO UNDERTAKE OPERATIONS TOWARD DESTRUCTION OF MAJOR VC UNITS,
supply installations, base areas, and command and control facilities.
COMMANDS ARE URGED TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE IN OPERATIONS OF GREATER
MAGNITUDE AND DURATION. AFTER RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS SUCCEED IN
FINDING THE ENEMY THEY ARE EXPECTED TO REMAIN WITH THEM UNTIL MAJOR
FORCES CAN BE DEPLOY TO FIX AND DESTROY THEM. READY RESERVES MUST
BE AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES EVEN IF THIS REQUIRES THAT A
STAND DOWN OF LOCAL OPERATIONS IS REQUIRED. FLEXIBLE TACTICAL PLANS
MUST BE DEVELOPED TAKING FULL ADVANTAGES OF OUR SUPERIOR MOBILITY
AND FIREPOWER. IN 1 CTZ III MAF HAS BEEN TASKED TO CONDUCT:
A. AN OPERATION TO LOCATE AND DESTROY VC FORCES AND THEIR BASE
AREAS IN THE BORDER AREA IN QUANG NAM AND QUANG BINH PROVINCES;
CODE NAME ADAM.
B. AN OPERATION TO LOCATE AND DESTROY VC FORCES AND THEIR BASE
AREAS IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES; CODE NAME ANGUS.
2. REF B REPORTED BN AND LARGER OPERATIONS FOR MARCH. RESUME AS
FOLLOWS:
A. OPERATION SWIFT WING (REPORTED IN FEB OPNS)
   (1) LOCATION: HAPPY VALLEY (ZC 1266) AND SONG CON VALLEY
       (ZC 1255).
   (2) OBJECTIVE: DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS;
       OPEN SONG CON VALLEY (ZC 1255) TO GVN INFLUENCE.
   (3) DURATION: FIVE DAYS COMMENCING O/A 26 FEB,
CG III MAF
P 191348Z/FEB
MCGEN MCCUTCHEON

DECLASSIFIED
A. Operation Winter Rice (Revision of Operation Silver Spoon)
   (1) Location: An Hoa (at 8747) Area.
   (2) Objective: Destruction of enemy forces and installations threatening An Hoa industrial area; open lines of communications from An Hoa to Hoi An.
   (3) Duration: Five days commencing 0/A 5 March.
   (4) Forces: 1st Regt (REIN); Reserve, 1 BN (REIN).
   (5) Support required: None.

B. Operation Adam
   (1) Location: Border area Quang Nam-Quang Tri provinces.
   Specific area to be determined as intelligence develops. Present intelligence places 1st VC Regt west of Tam Ky (BT 1425) and 36th Regt (VVA) (probable) in Hiem Duc area (BI 0550).
   (2) Objective: To locate and destroy major enemy forces, installations and supplies.
   (3) Duration: 10-15 days commencing 0/A 20 March.

Page Four DDKE 345 T O P S E C R E T L I M D I S

(4) Forces: One Regt (REIN) in coordination with at least two ARVN BNS. Reserve, one BN (REIN).

Ref C amplified Operation Adam. CMUSMACV has authorized this to be a continuation of Double Eagle. Therefore Adam will not be used as a code name. Operation initiated 19 Feb.

4. Operations for April are required at CMUSMACV by 15 March 1966.

GP-4

BT

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P 151112Z
//MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY///
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TO CG FMFPAC
BT

TOP SECRET//SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MccUTCHEON
A. YOUR 151/241Z
1. HAVE BEEN FIRMING UP PLANS FOR FINAL PHASES DOUBLE EAGLE AND IMMEDIATE FUTURE. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES TWO VC REGIMENTS IN GENERAL VICINITY HARVEST MOON AREA. INTENTION IS TO HIT IN STRENGTH WITH DOUBLE EAGLE FORCES WITHOUT DELAY. HAVE DISCUSSED WITH GENERALS THI AND LAM AND ARVN WILL CONDUCT SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION IN AREA (WEST OF TAM KY).
2. NEED SLF BATTALION AND HELOS TO PULL IT OFF. SENT REQ FOR SAME TO MACV BY LTR AND COURIER IN FORM COL CHAISSON MAF G-3. HE BRIEFED KEY MACV STAFF AND THEY WERE ENTHUSIASTIC. MACV WAS ALREADY CONSIDERING SPOILING ATTACK IN THAT AREA AND OUR PROPOSAL GOT JUMP ON THEM.
3. MACV INTENDS TO SEND MSG TO CINCPAC REQ SLF BE HELD FOR EXTENSION DOUBLE EAGLE OPNS UNTIL 26FEB. WHEN YOU CITE SAME IT PERTAINS TO OPNS OUTLINED PAR ONE ABOVE.
4. MACV PLANS NO MENTION OF THIS OPERATION UNTIL LAUNCHED. WILL RESTRICT TO FEW KEY STAFF OFFICERS. THI WILL NOT INFO JCS UNTIL LAST MINUTE. WE ARE ALSO HOLDING CLOSE FOR MAX SURPRISE.
5. BELIEVE ABOVE WILL HAVE PRIORITY OVER DAGGER THRUST AND PRECLUDE ACCOMPLISHING INTENT REF A WHICH ARRIVED AFTER ABOVE WELL ALONG IN PLANNING.

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P 151112Z/FEB66
MGEN MccUTCHEON

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TO TOP SECRET
CMC NOT ADDEE PASS TO MGEN WALT
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK INFO MGEN WALT FROM MCCUTCHEON.
1. OPERATION DOUBLE EAGLE NOW IN WANNING PHASE. GEN'S PLATT AND
ENGLISH AND STAFFS WORKING ON FUTURE PLANS. LIAISON WITH THI AND
LAM HAS BEEN EFFECTED. THI VISITED OPERATIONAL AREA ON 11FEB.
ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN AN LAO VALLEY AS HE WAS CAPTURED THERE
IN 1946. THI, LAM, PLATT AND ENGLISH ALSO MOITED FROM CORPS
BOUNDARY NORTH ON ROUTE ONE FOR FEW MILES AND OBSERVED ROAD
REHABILITATION BEING CONDUCTED BY MARINE ENGINEERS.

PAGE TWO RUMSDN 022 TOP SECRET
2. MR. ROBERTSON IS NOW SENIOR CAS MAN IN ZONE, SPECIFICALLY
CHARGED WITH SUPERVISION NEW RURAL CONSTRUCTION CADRES. HE WILL
SIT ON JCC. COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP NOW COMPLETE.
3. SECRETARY FREEMAN IN ZONE 12FEB. VISIT HOSTED BY AID. I MET
AND ESCORTED PARTY TO CIB. JOINT AID-MAF BRIEFING. KEEVER DID
USUAL OUTSTANDING PITCH ON CA. BUFFET DINNER LATER AT MARC
GORDONS VILLA. THI ATTENDED, INTERESTING AND LIVELY DISCUSSION
FOR TWO HOURS. SECRETARY SOLD ON OUR APPROACH. WOULD LIKE TO
SEE AGRICULTURE AFFORDED HIGH PRIORITY. JCC ALREADY WORKING ON
THIS.
4. US AMB TO PHIL BLAIR VISITED 13FEB. RECEIVED OPERATION-CIVIC
ACTION BRIEF AND VISITED LE MY AND 9TH MARINES. THI MET PARTY
AT LE MY AND HELD 20 MINUTE DISCUSSION. BLAIR ALSO SOLD ON CONCEPT.
5. OTHER VISITORS INCLUDE BGEN DEANE NEW C'S FFORCEV AND RADM
ZUMWALD OF CRUDESFLOT 7.
6. FIRE IN DOGPATCH NIGHT 13FEB. DESTROYED 20 SHACKS AND TOOK
OUT WIRE COMMUNICATIONS FORWARD. ONLY FEW MINOR CASUALTIES
REPORTED. THESE TREATED. COMM BACK IN. SITUATION IN HAND.
7. GENERAL YU VISIT NOW POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. PROBABLY MARCH.

PAGE THREE RUMSDN 022 TOP SECRET
8. OPERATION "REDHEAD" IN DATO AREA HAS NOT REACHED REPORTED
POW CAMP AS YET. POOR WEATHER IN IMMEDIATE AREA PRIMARY
REASON FOR LACK OF FASTER PROGRESS. PROSPECTS OF REACHING CAMP
GOOD BUT FINDING POW, LOW. WILL ADVISE RESULTS LATER.
GP-4

DIST: COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES TO FILES
COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES TO MAF

HAS BEEN SENT

MGEN MCCUTCHEON
HAS BEEN SENT

0100712Z
FM CG III MAF
TO RUNFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL FOR BEEN JONES FROM MG WALT
A. CTE 702-1-1 MSG 000712Z
B. CINCPAC 060736Z
1. AN AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION VICINITY VNUK WOULD, OF COURSE,
REQUIRE A CHANGE IN NATIONAL POLICY WITH RESPECT TO ACTIONS
AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. OBVIOUSLY THIS IS AN AREA BEYOND MY
COMPETENCE TO COMMENT. HOWEVER, PRESUMING SUCH A CHANGE IN
NATIONAL POLICY IS IN PROSPECT, IT IS DUBIOUS IF AN EFFECTIVE
DEMONSTRATION COULD BE MOUNTED PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF DOUBLE

PAGE TWO RUNSDN 477 TOP SECRET

2. PRESENT SCHEDULES ARE GEARED TO A TENTATIVE D-DAY FOR
DOUBLE EAGLE OF 25 JANUARY. IT IS NECESSARY TO ADHERE AS CLOSELY
AS POSSIBLE TO THIS DATE FOR SEVERAL REASONS INCLUDING:
A. DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LOWER QUANG NGAI PROVINCE
REQUIRES A MAJOR COUNTERSTROKE IN THIS AREA AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.
B. COORDINATED OPERATION IN II CORPS AREA ARE SCHEDULED FOR
THIS TIME FRAME.
C. AVAILABILITY OF OUT-OF-COUNTRY TROOPS AND AMPHIBIOUS
SHIPPING. (DOUBLE EAGLE COULD NOT BE SCHEDULED EARLIER THAN
25 JAN FOR THIS LAST REASON.)
3. ACCEPTING THE D-DAY FOR DOUBLE EAGLE AS BEING RELATIVELY
FIXED AT 25 JANUARY AND ASSUMING THAT THE SAILING OF EMBARKED
FORCES FROM OKINAWA TO SVN COULD BE ACCELERATED, THE
PERIOD 21 TO 23 JANUARY MUST BE RULED OUT BECAUSE OF THE
FORTHCOMING TET TRUCE. REF B DIRECTS THAT NO MILITARY OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS, WITH NARROW EXCEPTIONS, WILL BE INITIATED
IN SEASIA DURING TET. SPECIFICALLY, REF B AUTHORIZES ONLY
THE CONTINUANCE OF REECE MISSIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM DURING
CG III MAF
0100712Z/JAN 66

3 3

DECLASSIFIED
4. It is difficult, therefore, to see how a demonstration
against Vinh could be fitted into constraints posed by
announced policy and problems of time and space. Presuming
that these could be overcome and that a demonstration is
scheduled, it is strongly recommended that it be conducted
entirely with out-of-country resource. The concept outlined
in Ref A of landing the SLF at Chu Lai, moving it to DaNang
by helo, and re-embarking is not favored because it would
degrade III MAF’s capabilities for current and impending
operations, particularly with respect to helicopter
availability.
5. For the above reasons, it is recommended that the proposed
amphibious demonstration not be pursued at this time.

Warl regards Walt.

GP-4
BT

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      COPIES 2-3 OF 3 COPIES: MAF
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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

TO DDHUL/CONSEVENTHFLT

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL FOR VADM HYLAND FROM MAJGEN VALT

OPERATION DOUBLE EAGLE (U)

CG III MAF 030538Z

1. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT PARA 2 REF A HAS CAUSED CONSEVENTHFLT
   SOME CONCERN IN THAT IT HAS BEEN INTERPRETED AS TASKING THE
   SEVENTH FLEET BY III MAF. III MAF WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DICTATE
   OR SUGGEST THE COMPOSITION AND COMMAND OF A LANDING FORCE TO BE
   CONSTITUTED FROM OUT-OF-COUNTRY FORCES.

2. THE PURPOSE OF PARA 2 REF A WAS TO OUTLINE THE III MAF CONCEPT

PAGE TWO DDE 01 TOP SECRET

FOR THE LANDING FORCE AND TO REQUEST THAT CONCURRENT AND PARALLEL
PLANNING BE INITIATED.

3. IF CONSEVENTHFLT CONSIDERS IT INAPPROPRIATE FOR III MAF TO
   ADVANCE THIS CONCEPT OR THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO
   EFFECT DIRECT LIAISON, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT CONSEVENTHFLT FERRY TO
   III MAF TAKING EXCEPTION TO PARA 2 REF A.

4. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THE
   OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF YOU ON III MAF ACTIVITIES. BIST WISHES. WALT
   SP-4

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CG III MAF 0 070162/Jan 3/8

DECLASSIFIED
CG III MAF

1-82

EXCLUSIVE HAS BEEN SENT
FM CG III MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
INFO CG FIRST MGR
BT

TOP SECRET SPECIFIC EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN KRULAK AND BG WALT MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

DANANG AIRBASE (U)

A. CG FMFPAC 200050Z
B. CG FIRST MGR 222350Z

1. RFF A REQUESTS AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS INHERENT IN THE MARINES ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION OF DANANG AIRFIELD AND ALL ASSOCIATED SERVICES.

2. RFF B PROVIDES AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS AND IMPACT, ALL OF WHICH ARE CONCURRED WITH, AND SUGGESTS FURTHER EXPLORATION OF THE MATTER IS NEEDED PRIOR TO TAKING A FIRM POSITION. RECOMMEND THAT WE SET OUR SIGHTS ON THE LONG RANGE GOAL OF ASSUMING CONTROL OF DANANG AIRBASE AND STEER OUR COURSE ACCORDINGLY. IT WILL OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE EXPENDITURE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSETS SOME OF WHICH MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FROM FMFPAC RESOURCES. REGARDS

CP-4

BT

DIST: COPIES 1-2 OF 2 COPIES: MAF
TAPE AND MAT TO WING

CG III MAF

P 272350Z/DEC 65

C/S
MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF

FOR: DCP C6

Request comment

DCP C6 comment.

Same reason apply. I have started my care.

For C6

We receive a
MEMORANDUM

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF III MAF

FOR: (1)Dep GC
     (3) GC

For approval

I do not concur.

There is no doubt in about who is serious right now. Some ambiguities may be cleared up, but others are certainly going to take their place. If we do not provide ADEQUATE ASSETS, could be a morning of hell w/2 A.D. My opinion is on those. Let's think before not have.
Same as before.
DECLASSIFIED

To: Ops Sec

Sub: PERSONAL FOR OGEN

Deliver during working hours

1. Since outpost of 1st corp was overrun on 18 Nov, at subsequent to the bitter fighting in that vicinity, the indications of enemy buildup and threatening intelligence (AT 91249), Veliyan (BT 818279), and Que Son (AT 84349), 1st vac rect as been identified as operating within this area of following districts.

2. In view of foregoing planning has been initiated to fore IGABE, size combined operation under command of Gen Henderson. 11th MAF and BNS will be employed by Gen TH N LIN. Will furnish HREB VN BNS.

3. Considering the total Vc force that could be encountered, highly serviceable material will be made available to reserve as is the exploitation of the enemy or request is therefor that there will be moved into position as is the reserve not later than 10 Dec with authority and on equities of CG III MAF. Request also that direct liaison be developed and that SLF be improvised to establish temporary as is at item and (BT 65581) and Thang Binh (BT 17242) are out of decouner. Over of search and clear operation will be substantial. In that operation. In that operation, in the event of a successful operation. In the event of a successful operation, the size of the operation, the nature, and the exploitation will be extremely important. Therefore, Stand-by Urgent for BNS SLF will be considered essential and the element extremely important. Therefore, minimum of 50 traffic and that the plans be held to strict need-to-know.

4. In respect, Gen has been stressing secrecy and therefore, expect that no information will be passed to JCS until execution. P-5

060959Z Copy #1

Top Secret
CONFIDENTIAL

TO: PERSONAL FOR GEN. ARABAC FROM MAJGEN WALT.

THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL WAS SENT TO GEN. WESTMORELAND THIS DATE.

QUOTE PERSONAL FOR GEN. WESTMORELAND FROM MAJGEN WALT UNQUOTE.

COMMS YC 211162

I. IN REF A YOU ADVISED US THAT JGBS HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT III MFH AS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE RESERVE REACTION FORCES IN SUPPORT OF OR 1 CORPS OF UP TO TWO BATTALIONS.

WE HAVE, OF COURSE, PROVIDED SUCH FORCES SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST AND HAVE ALWAYS ACCEPTED THIS AS A CLEAR AND DEFINITE RESPONSIBILITY.

Indeed, we have a family of operations plans addressed to just such contingencies. Also, as you know, we consider our mobile reserve capability to be two battalions on twelve hour notice and we ordinarily will have one of these battalions available on six hour notice at either Chu Li or our name.

2. WE MONITOR 1 CORPS' OPERATIONS VERY CLOSELY, TRYING TO ANTICIPATE POSSIBLE CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE. IN THIS RESPECT, THE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MY STAFF AND 1 CORPS' ADVISORY GROUP IS INVALUABLE. WE DO HAVE SOME COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS, BUT THESE ARE BEING SOLVED.

We have had a good testing of our procedures this past week in our response to the Hiep Duc and Thach Tru Outpost attacks.

A. MANY THINGS WENT WRONG WITH THE RELIEF OF HIEP DUC.

1 CORPS, BECAUSE OF POOR COMMUNICATIONS AND INCOMPLETE STAFF PROCEDURES, LOST NEARLY A WHOLE DAY ON 17 NOV BEFORE REALIZING SOMETHING WAS AMISS.

Hiep Duc. He then responded to their request and moved the relieving force by helicopter on the afternoon of 18 NOV. Marine ground forces were not requested until 20 NOV.

BY THAT TIME, THE MONSOON CONDITIONS HAD TURNED FROM BAD TO WORSE AND WE COULD NOT GET IN WITHOUT BATTALION ALTHOUGH WE TRIED FOR TWO DAYS.

2. THE RELIEF OF THACH TRU WENT CONSIDERABLY BETTER.

ALTHOUGH THERE WAS STILL CONSIDERABLE ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT. INITIAL REPORTING ON THE MORNING OF 22 NOV WAS VERY FRAGMENTARY AND CONFUSING. AT ABOUT 1200 HRS, GEN THI ASKED FOR MARINE GROUND HELP. THE NEXT HOUR WAS SPENT BY MY STAFF AND MYSELF IN GETTING ENOUGH INFORMATION TO COMMIT A BATTALION INTELLIGENTLY.

THINGS WENT FAIRLY SMOOTHLY, AND THE FIRST COMPANY OF 3BN 7TH MARINES WAS ON THE FRONT. GROUND WEST OF THACH TRU BY 1330 HR.

DESPITE EXTREMELY MARGINAL FLIGHT CONDITIONS, TOTAL ELAPSED TIME FROM INITIAL REQUEST UNTIL OUR ARRIVAL WAS FOUR AND ONE HALF HOURS. WE WILL NEVER KNOW FOR SURE, BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT THE ARRIVAL OF THE MARINES CAUSED THE ENEMY TO BREAK OFF CONTACT AND ABANDON ANY FURTHER ATTEMPT TO TAKE THACH TRU. THIS WAS VERIFIED BY A PRISONER.

A PAVN CORPSMAN WE CAPTURED THE FOLLOWING DAY.

DECLASSIFIED
ADEQUATE BUT NOT EXCEPTIONAL. WE SEIZED THE AREA BELIEVED TO CONTAIN THE REST OF VC. WE CAPTURED TWO PAVN PRISONERS AND FIFTEEN LOCAL VC TOGETHER WITH ONE 30 CAL MG, 4 AUTO RIFLES AND FOUR SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLES. ALSO ONE LIVE ROUND 75 MM RECOILLESS THE ARVN MECHANIZED COLUMN THAT HAD STARTED THE DAY BEFORE FROM QUANG NEAL WAS VERY SLOW IN MOVING AND DID NOT CLOSE ON THACH TRU UNTIL LATE AFTERNOON ON THE 23RD.

5. I WAS PREPARED TO COMMIT THE 3DRN 30MAR AND PURSUE.


8. I AM UNDECIDED AS TO ANY WAY I AM CONVINCED IT WAS A PAVN UNIT.

9. WE ARE NOW EXPLORING OUR PROCEDURES TO SEE HOW WE CAN IMPROVE OUR RESPONSE TIME. AS WAS POINTED OUT ABOVE, \[ \text{HIERPHONG REQUESTED THACH TRU CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PART OF VIC THI AND HIS COMMANDERS THAT WE ARE AVAILABLE AND WILL RESPOND. WE IN TUM\} WILL} \text{ BE QUICKER TO VOLUNTEER OUR HELP.}


\[ \text{TOP SECRET} \]

\[ \text{MISTAKE OVERLINE WAS ON THE MACHINE OUTGOING TAPES- FLIES} \]

\[ \text{GER} \]
T O P S E C R E T
PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM MAJGEN WALT
A. COMUSMACV 231116Z

1. IN REF A YOU ADVISE US THAT JGS HAS BEEN INFORMED
    THAT III MAF HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE
    RESERVE REACTION FORCES IN
    SUPPORT OF CG I CORPS OF UP TO TWO BATTALIONS.

2. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, PROVIDED SUCH FORCES,
    SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST AND HAVE ALWAYS
    ACCEPTED THIS AS A CLEAR AND DEFINITE RESPONSIBILITY.
    INDEED, WE HAVE A FAMILY OF OPERATIONS PLANS ADDRESSED TO
    JUST SUCH CONTINGENCIES. ALSO, AS YOU KNOW,
    WE CONSIDER OUR MOBILE RESERVE CAPABILITY
    TO BE TWO BATTALIONS ON TWELVE HOUR NOTICE AND WE ORDINARILY WILL
    HAVE ONE OF THESE BATTALIONS AVAILABLE ON SIX HOUR NOTICE
    AT EITHER CHU LAI OR DA NANG.

3. WE MONITOR I CORPS OPERATION VERY CLOSELY, TRYING TO
    ANTICIPATE POSSIBLE CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE. IN THIS REGARD, THE
    CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MY STAFF AND I CORPS ADVISORY
    GROUP IS INVALUABLE. WE DO HAVE SOME COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS,
    BUT THESE ARE BEING SOLVED.

4. WE HAVE HAD A GOOD TESTING OF OUR PROCEDURES THIS PAST
    WEEK IN OUR RESPONSE TO THE
    HIROP DUC AND THACH TRU OUTPOST ATTACKS.
    MANY THINGS WENT WRONG WITH THE RELIEF OF HIROP DUC,
    I CORPS, BECAUSE OF POOR COMMUNICATIONS AND INCOMPLETE STAFF
    PROCEDURES, LOST NEARLY A WHOLE
    DAY ON 17 NOV BEFORE REALIZING SOMETHING WAS AMISS AT
    HIROP DUC. WE THEN RESUMED TO THEIR REQUEST AND MOVED IN THE
    RELIEVING FORCE BY HELICOPTER ON THE AFTERNOON OF 18 NOV. MARINE
    GROUND FORCES WERE NOT REQUESTED UNTIL 20 NOV.
    BY THAT TIME, THE MONSOON CONDITIONS HAD TURNED FROM BAD TO WORSE
    AND WE COULD NOT GET IN WITHOUT BATTALION ALTHOUGH WE TRIED
    FOR TWO DAYS.

5. THE RELIEF OF THACH TRU WENT CONSIDERABLY BETTER,
    ALTHOUGH THERE WAS STILL CONSIDERABLE ROOM FOR
    IMPROVEMENT. INITIAL REPORTING ON THE MORNING OF 22 NOV WAS VERY
    FRAGMENTARY AND CONFUSING, AT ABOUT 1200H, GEN THI ASKED FOR
    MARINE GROUND HELP. THE NEXT HOUR WAS SPENT BY MY
    STAFF AND MYSELF IN GETTING ENOUGH
    INFORMATION TO COMMIT A BATTALION INTELLIGENTLY.
    THINGS THEN WENT FAIRLY SMOOTHLY AND THE FIRST COMPANY OF
    3D BN 7TH MARINES WAS ON THE HIGH GROUND WEST OF THACH TRU BY
    1630H DESPITE EXTREMELY MARGINAL FLIGHT CONDITIONS. TOTAL
    ELAPSED TIME FROM INITIAL REQUEST UNTIL OUR ARRIVAL WAS FOUR AND
    ONE HOUR. WE WILL NEVER KNOW FOR SURE, BUT I AM
    CONVINCED THAT THE ARRIVAL OF THE MARINES CAUSED THE ENEMY TO BREAK
    OFF CONTACT AND ABANDON ANY FURTHER ATTACK TO
    TAKE THACH TRU. THIS WAS VERIFIED BY A PRISONER
    A PAVN CORPSMAN, WE CAPTURED THE FOLLOWING DAY.

6. OUR ACTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, 23 NOV WERE
    ADEQUATE BUT NOT EXCEPTUAL. WE SEIZED THE AREA BELIEVED TO
    CONTAIN THE REGT'LS. WE CAPTURED TWO PAVN PRISONERS AND FIFTEEN
    GUNS, TOGETHER WITH ONE 30 CAL MG & AUTO RIFLES, AND FOUR
SEMI AUTOMATIC RIFLES, ALSO ONE LIVE ROUND 75MM RECOILLESS, THE
ARMY MECHANIZED COLUMN THAT HAD STARTED THE DAY BEFORE FROM QUANG
NGAI WAS VERY SLOW IN MOVING AND DID NOT CLOSE ON THACI TRU UNTIL
LATE AFTERNOON ON THE 23RD.
6. I WAS PREPARED TO COMMIT THE 3/BN 3UMAR AND PURSUE.
GEN LAM DIDN'T FEEL IT WAS GOOD TACTICS SINCE THE ENEMY WAS ALREADY
IN THE FOOTHILLS AND THE WEATHER WAS MARGINAL. I COULD HAVE USED
3/3 AND 3/7 AND DONE IT ALONE, BUT MY SUPPLY LINE
FROM CHU LAI WAS BETTER THAN FORTY MILES AND MY CLOSEST RESERVE
WAS AT DANANG, NEARLY ONE HUNDRED MILES. I HAD A TOTAL OF ONLY
THIRTY-ONE HELOS AVAILABLE DUE TO HEAVY USAGE AND GROUND
FIRE DAMAGE. IF THE SLF HAD BEEN AVAILABLE
WE COULD HAVE GIVEN THE PURSUIT A GOOD TRY BUT AGAIN THE WEATHER
WAS CONTINUOUSLY MARGINAL FROM 0 TO 1000 FT CEILINGS
THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD; NAVAL GUN FIRE SAVED THE DAY AT THACI TRU.
BUT THE DESTROYERS WOULDN'T HAVE REACHED INLAND TO WHERE WE
BELIEVED THE VC WERE HEADING. WE DID USE OUR AIR CAPABILITY TO
MAXIMUM EXTENT DURING THE 22ND 23RD AND 24TH
ON THE 23D SEVENTEEN PERSONNEL TARGETS WERE HIT BY AIR AND ALL
POSSIBLE ROUTES OF EGRESS WERE INTERRUPTED ON THE 24TH POSSIBLE
ASSY AREAS WERE HIT.
THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT WHAT THE ENEMY
WITNESSED INTO THE MOUNTAINS TOWARD BATO ON THE NIGHT OF THE 22D
AND 23D. THE ARVN SEEM TO FEEL THEY HAVE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
THE 95TH REGT AND ONE BN OF 16TH REGIMENT OF THE 325A DIVISION.
I AM INCLINED TO AGREE ANYWAY I AM CONVINCED IT WAS A PAVN
UNIT.
7. WE ARE NOW EXPLORING OUR PROCEDURES TO SEE HOW WE
CAN IMPROVE OUR RESPONSE TIME AS WAS POINTED OUT ABOVE;
CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS LOST AT HIEP DUC AND SOME TIME AT THACI TRU
BEFORE OUR HELP WAS REQUESTED. I THINK THERE IS NOW A
CLEARER UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF GEN THI AND HIS COMMANDERS
THAT WE ARE AVAILABLE AND WILL RESPOND. WE IN TURN WILL BE
QUICKER TO VOLUNTEER OUR HELP.
8. I DON'T THINK THAT WE HAVE SEEN THE LAST OF THIS TYPE OF
ATTACK. G-2 4 CORPS ACCEPTS THE 325TH ALFA PAVN DIVISION AS BEING
IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE AND THE RECONSTITUTED 1ST VC REGT AS
BEING SOUTHEAST OF DANANG. WE CAN GUESS THAT
THE ENEMY WILL MAKE THE MOST OUT OF THE REMAINDER OF THE
MONSOON SEASON. VERY RESPECTFULLY, WALT.
THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER--OPNAV INST. 5515.1B.

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ACTIVITY

SIGNATURE

DATE

EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET
CCN 1222
PRIORITY 121432 NOV 65

FM: C3 III MAF
TO: CO SEVENTHFLT

SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE FOR PERSONAL FROM MAJ WALT TO RADM WILLIAMS

A. MY 161400Z

//TOP SECRET//

1. REGRET MY REP A. PERSONAL TO YOU AND MAJ WALT ON A VERY SENSITIVE
SUBJECT WAS, ACCORDING TO A TELCON FROM HONOLULU, QUOTED AND PASSED TO
CTF 76 AND CINCPACFLT.

2. PURPOSE OF MY PERSONAL TO YOU WAS TO PROVIDE TIMELY BACKGROUND INFO IN
CASE A CONTINGENCY REQUIRED USE OF SLF.

RELEASED BY

TOD SAH
171020H SEC

DIST: COPY 1-2 OF 2 COPY: 23 III MAF

COMM NOTE: THIS MSG CHANGED FROM PERSONAL FOR TO EXCLUSIVE FOR
BY THE CWO WITH APPROVAL OF CWO.

P 171432Z/NOV
Z161400Z
FM CG III MAF
TO COMUSMACV
INFO COMSEVENTHFLT

SECRET
PERSONAL FOR MAJGEN ROSSON INFO PERSONAL FOR RADM WILLIAMS

1. 2D ARVN DIV YESTERDAY CAPTURED VC OP ORDER INDICATING 2D VC
   REGT WITH ESTIMATED FOUR BATTALIONS PLANS BAITING TRAP BY ATTACKING
   RF OUTPOST 67 KM SOUTH SOUTHEAST OF CHU LAI AT (BS 704428) AND
   THEN AMBUSHING RELIEVING COLUMNS ALONG ROAD (BS 712432) TO
   (BS 766462). 2D ARVN DIV CONSIDERS OP ORDER VALID AND IS PLANNING
   AMBITIOUS COUNTER OPERATION TO COMMENCE 0630H ON 17 NOV WITH
   EXTENSIVE AIR STRIKES FOLLOWED BY INTRODUCTION OF FOUR BATTALIONS
   BY GROUND AND HELO BEGINNING AT 1000H.

2. WILL HAVE ONE REINFORCED MARINE BATTALION AT CHU LAI ON ONE HOUR
   ALERT, READY TO RESPOND TO ARVN CALL FOR REINFORCEMENT OR
   EXPLOITATION. HAVE NOT VOLUNTEERED THIS FORCE AND WILL NOT OFFER IT
   UNLESS REQUESTED AND UNLESS SITUATION CLEARLY INDICATES DESIRABILITY OF

DECLASSIFIED
3. If additional reinforcement or exploitation force is required, request consideration be given to possible commitment of SLF presently standing by in floating reserve for Blue Marlin.

4. Understand that there is no knowledge of this projected operation at MACV and we do not know if JGS has been informed. Therefore, for obvious reasons, 2D ARVN DIV PLAN, and particularly possible US ground support, should be closely held until battle is joined. Warm regards Walt.

GP-4
CON: 

PRIORITY: 08/61 D Z Nov65

FROM: CG I MAF

TO: CONMACY

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM GEN WALT

1. MANY INDICATORS OF CONTINUING AND HEIGHTENED VC ACTION AGAINST DAMANG ARE BEING RECEIVED. OUR MOST COMPREHENSIVE REPORT FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE INDICATES A LARGE SCALE ATTACK AGAINST THE DAMANG AIR BASE AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS DURING THE DARK OF THE MOON, BETWEEN 20 AND 25 NOV. REPORTEDLY, IT WILL FOLLOW THE USUAL PATTERN OF MORTAR ATTACKS AND SUICIDE DEMOLITIONS SQUADS. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE NUMEROUS REPORTS ABOUT ATTACKS TO COST AGAINST BILLETES, BOS AND PLANNED ASSASSINATION OF HIGH OFFICIALS PLUS A STEP UP IN TERRORISTIC ACTS. JUST TODAY A VILLAGE CHIEF WAS KIDNAPPED IN THE VICINITY OF MARBLE MOUNTAIN.

2. I AM HAVING A LONG TALK WITH GEN THI ON THE FOREGOING. HE IS ALSO CONCERNED AND IS INCREASING OUR SECURITY MEASURES. HE HAS ALSO PROMISED TO ASSIST IN ENSURING THAT RIGID CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE TRAFFIC ON AND OFF THE DAMANG AIRFIELD ARE ENFORCED.

3. I FEAR THAT I MAF MUST BE PARTICULARLY ALERT FROM NOW UNTIL THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. HOWEVER, IN BEING ORIENTATED TO COUNTER EXTRAORDINARY VC EFFORTS AT SUICIDE PENETRATIONS AND BOMB-THROWING EXERCISES, WE MUST NOT OVER-REACT TO THIS HEIGHTENED THREAT. I DO NOT INTEND, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SHORTEN MY MIKE, IN ORDER TO GAIN MORE TROOPS FOR REAR AREA (DECLASSIFIED)
INSTALLATION. IF III MAP WERE TO FEMALE DIVISION TROOPS IN FORWARD AREAS, IT WOULD NOT ONLY BE A GREAT SATISFACTION TO THE VC, BUT ALSO WOULD BE A BREACH OF FAITH WITH THE VILLAGERS WHO WE HAVE ASSURED THAT IN FORCES HAVE COME TO STAY. THEIR LINE DEFENSES ARE BEING TIGHTENED, UNITS ARE BEING IN BELSE AM SIDDLE. I AM INITIATING THE PATROLLING BY THE INFANTRY ELEMENTS TO 2000 METERS IN FRONT OF THE HIR AND HAVE INCREASED THE NUMBER OF AMBUSHES AND LISTENING POSTS. DEEP PATROLLING IS NOT BEING NEGLECTED BUT IS BEING EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISHED BY THE DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION, THE FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY.

2. TWO BATTLE COMPANIES HAVE BEEN DISPLACED FROM CHU LAY TO DAKHAO. ONE HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE SECURITY OF THE AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS. THE OTHER IS CIRCLING THE PERIMETER OF THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY.

3. THE MARBLE MOUNTAIN COMPLEX CONTINUES TO BE AN AREA OF GREAT CONCERN TO ME. SEE THIRD HAVING ALL THE VILLAGES IN THE VICINITY CLEARED OF VC. NO VILLAGE THREAT, ESPECIALLY VILLAGE, BEING USED AS BIAS OF OPERATIONS. WILL RELOCATE THE POPULATION ELSEWHERE.

4. RELATING TO THE 25 NEW AIRMEN ON MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIRFIELD, AN AGENT REPORTED VC LOSSES WERE 25 KILLED IN ACTION, 20 KIA AND HURT IN BOMBING VILLAGE, 20 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, AND 32 SLIGHTLY WOUNDED. THE 25 MIA RECOVERED OUT VERY CLOSELY WITH OUR COURTS OF 170 VC KIA AND 500 KIA' WOUNDED. THIS OF COURSE, IS JUST THE MARBLE AIR FIELD ATTACK, BUT THE CONTRA AIR, ATTACK, NOT THE TECHNOLOGICAL ATTACK, FOR THE CHU LAY ATTACK.

5. I HAVE A NUMBER OF GOOD THINGS TO REPORT. THE SKELETAL INTRUSION DETECTORS HAVE JUST ARRIVED AND ARE BEING INSTALLED TO CRITICAL AREAS TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING OF ANY MOVEMENT. WE'RE IN USE NOW AROUND CARCHAR AIR BASE. 370 HOMES HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED BY MARAUDITY. I AM ALSO ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THE INITIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE 25TH BATTALION WHICH
Which has moved in behind the 9th Paratroops, Quang Nam Special Sector is getting off to what I think is a good start in its pacification program for this Vam District. Also, Blue Hel Cao seems to be on the track. Its execution should dampen VC activity in the vicinity of Tan Ky and Hu Qu and help the general situation between Danang and Chu Lai. After, Blue Hel Cao, we will have the desired posture for our twelve battalions: one at Phu Bai, six at Danang, five at Chu Lai. Thus, as we have said, will give us a readily available mobile battalion at both Danang and Chu Lai. We are pursuing your suggestions relative to the few camps to be established by the Special Forces. They should be useful not only for deep reconnaissance but also as temporary operational bases. I am particularly interested in erected in the Thong Duc Camp south west of Ein and would hope that it could be activated ahead of the scheduled date of 19 March. As to the immediate future, I am watching the report of VC activity, on and west of the Danang Taos, and the report in any intelligence that indicates units have been located or are moving through an area, and strikes (179 - ASMAT) and artillery fire will be aggressively employed to destroy units and disrupt their plans. Of course, when any unit is definitely identified and located, I will use where force is necessary to destroy it. Best Regards, LAM
Memorandum

From: Commanding General

To: c/s Here’s the 7560 Picture Check it

DECLASSIFIED
Dear

This is the newspaper photo which I mentioned in my message of this morning.

The error "1st Cavalry troops" was quickly pumped on by the Army.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
Viet Cong prisoners, lashed together with hands tied behind their backs, are marched to Da Nang by U.S. 1st Cavalry troops following a major search-and-destroy mission called "Operation Black Snake."
PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM MGEN WALT

1. MANY INDICATORS OF CONTINUING AND HEIGHTENED VC ACTION AGAINST DANANG ARE BEING RECEIVED. ONE Humerous REPORT FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE INDICATES A LARGE SCALE ATTACK AGAINST THE DANANG AIR BASE AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS DURING THE DARK OF THE MOON, BETWEEN 20 AND 29 NOV. REPORTEDLY, IT WILL FOLLOW THE USUAL PATTERN OF MORTAR ATTACKS AND SUICIDE DEMOLITION SQUADS. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE NUMEROUS RUMORS ABOUT ATTACKS TO COME AGAINST BILLETS AND BOGS AND PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS OF

2. I HAVE HAD A LONG TALK WITH GEN THI ON THE FOREGOING. HE IS ALSO CONCERNED AND IS INCREASING RVN SECURITY MEASURES. HE HAS ALSO PROMISED TO ASSIST IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH RIGID CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE TRAFFIC ON AND OFF THE DANANG AIRFIELD.

3. IF FEEL THAT III MAF MUST BE PARTICULARLY ALERT DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. HOWEVER, WHILE BEING ORIENTED TO COUNTER EXTRAORDINARY VC EFFORTS AT SUICIDE PENETRATION AND SABOTAGE EXERCISES, WE WILL NOT OVER-REACT TO THIS HEIGHTENED THREAT. I DO NOT INTEND, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SHORTEN MY MLR IN ORDER TO GAIN MORE TROOPS FOR REAR AREA (FIXED INSTALLATION) SECURITY. IF III MAF WERE TO PULL BACK DIVISION TROOPS IN FORWARD AREAS IT WOULD BE NOT ONLY A GREAT SATISFACTION TO THE VC, BUT IT ALSO WOULD BE A BREACH OF FAITH WITH THE VILLAGERS WHOSE ASSURANCE THAT US FORCES HAVE COME TO STAY. FRONT LINE DEFENSES ARE BEING TIGHTENED, UNITS ARE DIGGING IN DEEPER AND BETTER. I AM LIMITING DEEP NIGHT PATROLLING BY THE INFANTRY BATTALION ELEMENTS Forward OF THE MLR AND HAVE INCREASED THE NUMBER OF NIGHT AMBUSHES AND LISTENING POSTS IN THE MLR AREA. DEEP PATROLLING IS NOT BEING NEGLECTED But IS BEING

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EFFECTIVE CONCEALMENT \*\*\*,

2. Two rifle companies of 3/3 have been displaced from Chu Lai to Danang. One has been added to the security of the ammunition supply points. The other is supplementing the perimeter defense of the marble mountain air facility.

5. The marble mountain complex continues to be an area of great concern to me. Gen Thi is having all the villagers in the vicinity carefully screened. He has promised that, if there is any question about these villages being used as VC bases of operations, he will relocate the populace elsewhere.

6. As a matter of interest, relative to the 28 Oct attack on marble mountain airfield, an agent has reported that the VC losses were 25 missing in action, 20 KIA and buried in Hoa Hie village, 20 seriously wounded, and 14 slightly wounded. The 25 MIA checks out with our count of 17 VC KIA and 5 VC captured. This of course, relates to only the marble mountain air facility attack, not the collateral attacks nor the Chu Lai attack.

7. Encouraging factors include: Some of our seismic intrusion detectors have just arrived and are being installed in critical areas to provide early warning of any ground movement. I believe they will prove helpful around the airfields. I am encouraged by the initial performance of the 59th RF battalion which has moved in behind the 9th Marines. Quang Nam special sector appears to be off to a good start in its pacification program for Hoa Vang district. Blue Marlin seems to be on the track. After Blue Marlin, we will have the following posture for our twelve battalions: one at Phu Bai, six at Danang, five at Chu Lai. We are pursuing your suggestions relative to the new camps to be established by the special forces. They should be useful not only for deep reconnaissance but also as temporary operational bases. I am particularly interested in the Thuong Duc camp south west of Danang and would hope that it could be activated ahead of the scheduled date of 15 March.

3. As to the immediate future, I am watching the report of increased VC activity southwest of the Danang TAOR on the receipt of intelligence that indicates units have been located outside villages or are moving through an unpopulated area. Air strikes (TPQ-ASRAT), artillery fire and if feasible infantry units will be aggressively employed to destroy the enemy and disrupt.
THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER - CPNAV INST. 5812.1B.
PERSONAL FOR LTGEN KRULAK FROM MAJ GEN WALT

MAF TRADG COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE

1. GEN WESTMORELAND CONVEYED A COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE AT MAF TRADG ON 24 OCTOBER. AMONG THOSE PRESENT WERE MAJGEN J. O. SEAMON, CG 1ST INF DIV; MAJGEN S. R. LARSON, CG FFORCEN; MAJGEN H. W. O. KIMMARD, CG 1ST AIR CAV DIV; MAJGEN G. L. NEYERS, DEP CDR 2D AIR DIV; MAJGEN B. STERNBERG, MAG 6-3; BRIGGEN J. NORTON, DEP CG, USARV; BRIG GEN J. C. COLLINS, MACV ACTING J-3; BRIGGEN E. W. WILLIAMSON, CG 173D ABN BDE; RADM N. G. WARD, CZF 115; COL G. A. BARTEN, SA IV CORPS; COL T. C. MATTHIAS, D/SA II CORPS; COL A. T. MONTONE D/SA III CORPS; COL W. A. MC KEAN, CG 5TH SF GRP; CAPT A. C. KURTZE, AESUPPACT; AND COL J. S. TIMOTHY, 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN.

ATTENDING WITH ME FROM MAF WERE MCCUTCHEON, ST CLAIR, AND SIMMONS.

2. WESTMORELAND ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO HAVE SUCH CONFERENCES ON ABOUT A MONTHLY BASIS. THIS ONE WAS INTENDED TO DEVOTE TO RAISING CERTAIN "RED FLAGS", TO CAUSE AN AWARENESS OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS, TO ALERT THE ANTENNAE OF THE COMMANDERS TO THESE POSSIBLE PROBLEMS. WESTMORELAND'S METHOD WAS TO DELIVER A SET SPEECH ON EACH OF THE FIVE PROBLEM AREAS AND THEN TO INVITE GENERAL DISCUSSION. MUCH OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY WAS RATHER BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL. ALSO I THINK MAF SHOULDS ADVANTAGE IN ALL THE AREAS HE DISCUSSED.
3. "RED FLAG ONE" CONCERNED TROOP MORALE. HE SAID MORALE IS HIGH NOW. BUT WE MUST BE ALERT TO PITFALLS. HE LISTED THE INGREDIENTS OF GOOD MORALE AS LEADERSHIP, A GOOD INFORMATION AND INDOCILITRIZATION PROGRAM, AN ADEQUATE PX SYSTEM, ADEQUATE AND OPEN CHANNELS FOR HANDLING COMPLAINTS, FIRM DISCIPLINE, AND RECREATION. ALL OF THESE WERE ELABORATED UPON. ON RECREATION HE SPOKE OF BOTH THE IN-COUNTRY PROGRAM AND OUT-OF-COUNTRY R AND R. THE PHILIPPINES, TAIWAN, AND TOKYO ARE NOW OPENING UP. IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS ARE NOT A SUBSTITUTE, HE SAID, FOR OUT-OF-COUNTRY R AND R. BUT THE BEXERCORD HOTEL, WITH 500 BEDS, HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN SAIGON FOR LEAVE AND LIBERTY. OTHER INGREDIENTS OF MORALE HE MENTIONED WERE FOOD AND FOOD PREPARATION, AWARDS (HE HAS ASKED FOR AUTHORITY FOR DIVISION COMMANDERS TO GIVE UP TO THE SILVER STAR), PUNISHMENTS (SHOULD THE TABLE OF MAXIMUM PUNISHMENTS BE PUT ON A MARITIME BASIS?); HEALTH (THE MEDICS ARE DEDICATED BUT TEMPERIMENTAL, THEIR MORALE NEEDS BOOSTING; MALA COULD DEFEAT A DIVISION WITHOUT A SHOT BEING FIRED), AND SUPPLY SHORTAGES (THIS IS A SERVICE MATTER BUT HE WANTS TO BE KEPT INFORMED). GEN KINNAIRD SAID HE NEEDED TENTS AND THIS LED TO A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF HOUSING AND BILLETING. HIS MAP'S PROGRAM OF MOVING FROM TENTS TO STRONG BACS TO ROOFING HAS BEEN HELD UP AS A GOOD WAY TO PROCEED. THERE WAS ALSO TALK OF NEEDED AUTHORITY FOR ISSUE OF CLOTHING IN KIND. WE HAVE OUR PROBLEMS BUT WE DO SEEM WELL AHEAD OF THE OTHERS. I'VE FORWARDED A LTR REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO ISSUE TWO SETS (ADDITIONAL) OF UTILITIES TO TROOPS WHO ARE "RED FLAG ONE" WAS RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE VIETNAMESE. HE STRESSE THE DELICACY OF THE US POSITION. IN CIVIC ACTION, WE CAN'T OVERWHLEM THE GVN. HE GAVE A FAVORABLE NOD TO II>' MAP'S PROGRESS. WE TALKED ABOUT CURRENCY, THE USE OF NPC, CONCERN OVER INFLATION AND BLACK MARKETS. HE WARNED AGAINST "SHARPIES" IN UNIFORM. US SERVICE PERSONNEL ARE FORBIDDEN TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCE. TROOPS SHOULD BE URGED TO SEND SURPLUS
HONEY HONE. "BACKLASH" REPORTS WERE TALKED ABOUT AS WAS TRAFFIC, ACCIDENTS, AND CONTROL OF VEHICLES.

5. "RED FLAG THREE" WAS SECURITY. VC PENETRATION HAD TO BE ACCEPTED AS UNIVERSAL. VN LIAISON PERSONNEL AND INTERPRETERS WERE PARTICULARLY SUSPECT IN VIEW OF VC'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION OF PENETRATING THE US MILITARY. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY WAS A PROBLEM. SO WAS LOOSE TALK, PARTICULARLY TO THE PRESS. OTHER SECURITY RISKS WERE DOMESTIC HELP, PROSTITUTES, AND HEAVY DRINKERS.

6. "RED FLAG FOUR" CONCERNED RURAL CONSTRUCTION. GVN POLICY WAS THAT THE US WOULD FIGHT THE VC MAIN FORCE AND GVN WOULD DO THE PACIFICATION. IT WASN'T THAT SIMPLE, TII HAF WAS DOING A "MAGNIFICENT JOB" AND THE OTHER COMMANDERS SHOULD VISIT THEM. WATCH OUT FOR VN SENSITIVITIES; DON'T GET IN THE POSITION OF COMPETING WITH THE VN. KIMJUNG RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER "SEARCH AND CLEAR" OPERATIONS DIDN'T LEAVE AN AREA IN A WORSE SITUATION THAN IT WAS IN. WESTMORELAND SAID LET'S NOT CONFUSE "SEARCH AND DESTROY" (WHICH APPARENTLY IS WHAT 1ST AIR CAV IS TO DO) WITH "SEARCH AND CLEAR." BESIDES THE HIGHLAND SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. THE PF PROBLEM WAS DISCUSSED. WESTMORELAND MENTIONED THE USE OF US CADRES. HE SPOKE HIGHLY OF LT EX AND THE COMBINED ACTION COMPANY AS BEING ONE WAY OF DOING IT.

7. "RED FLAG FIVE" CONCERNED MILITARY OPERATIONS. HERE THE ADVICE WAS DON'T UNDERESTIMATE THE VC. EMPLOY IMAGINATION AND INGENUITY. THIS IS A VIETNAMESE WAR BUT THE VN CAN'T WIN WITHOUT US AND THEY KNOW IT. UNITY OF COMMAND IS LACKING BUT WE HAVE EVOLVED ACCEPTABLE TECHNIQUES AND Viable ARRANGEMENTS FOR WORKING TOGETHER. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY, BUT IT LOOKS LIKE WE ARE ON A WINNING CURVE AND IT IS ACCELERATING. PUT
MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE VC. DON'T LET UP. ALSO DISCUSSED WAS B-52 EXPLOITATIONS. STRIKES ARE ON AN ALMOST DAILY BASIS. THEY NEED TARGETS. DISTRIBUTION OF HELICOPTERS WAS DISCUSSED. THERE ARE 13 US ARMY AIR- MOBILE COMPANIES AND 6 USING UH-34 SQUADRONS IN-COUNTRY. TWELVE MORE ARMY COMPANIES ARE ON THE WAY, SHOULD ALL BE HERE BY MARCH 1966. UNTIL THEN, THERE WILL BE "TEMPORARY REALLOCATION" OF ASSETS. OTHER ODDS AND ENDS WERE MENTIONED INCLUDING NAVAL GUNFIRE, SPECIAL FORCES, AND COMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS.

8. WESTMORELAND SUMMED UP BY GIVING HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF THINGS IN EACH CORPS AREA:

A. I CORPS. THINGS WERE MOVING FORWARD IN GOOD STYLE. BA LONG VALLEY CAMPAIGN WAS MOST IMPRESSIVE. WITHOUT DOUBT, I CORPS WITH III MAF SUPPORT HAS THE INITIATIVE.

B. II CORPS. VC IS IN DIVISION STRENGTH IN BINH MINH AND WILL SEEK TO EMBARRASS THE 1ST AIR Cav. B-52 EXPLOITATION MUST BE DEVELOPED. IN THE HIGHLANDS THERE IS STEPPED UP INFILTRATION, PROBABLY 2500 PER MONTH AND THEY ARE PAVN. PAVN SHOW A TENDENCY TO STAND UP AND FIGHT AND THIS IS GOOD. ENEMY AT PLEI ME ARE PAVN WITHOUT QUESTION. THEY HAVE PLENTY OF .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS AND 1ST Cav HAD TO EXPECT TO LOSE HELICOPTERS.

C. III CORPS. THERE WAS A VC DRIFT TOWARDS THE II/III CORPS BOUNDARY. HE LOOKED FOR A VC DIVERSION IN III CORPS AREA.

D. IV CORPS. MORE VC IN IV CORPS THAN IN THE REST OF SOUTH VIETNAM PUT TOGETHER, BUT IV CORPS HAD THE INITIATIVE.

E. VC OBJECTIVES FOR THE WINTER OFFENSIVE:

(1) SEIZE AND STOCK PILE RICE.
(2) SECURE INFILTRATION CORRIDORS FOR MEN AND EQUIPMENT.

(3) THEY BADLY NEED A VICTORY FOR MORALE PURPOSES; MAY DO SOMETHING RASH OR FANATIC.

9. TWO SHORT PAPERS WERE PASSED OUT. THESE WERE:

A. PLANNING AND CONTROLLING COMBINED OPERATIONS BY REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND UNITED STATES FORCES.

3. UNCLASSIFIED SYNOPSIS OF TACTICAL AIR FIRE POWER STUDY.

10. WILL AIRMAIL COPIES OF THE ABOVE TO YOU.

GP-4

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P 280308/0CT
THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER - CPNAV INST. 5510.1E.

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ACTIVITY

SIGNATURE

DATE

6

24 Oct
TOP SECRET

COMMUNICATION CENTER
II Marine Amphibious Force
FPO San Francisco, California 96801

PRIORITY 2308207

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC/ I MAC (FWD)

HAS BEEN SENT

PERSONAL FOR LTCEN KRULAK FROM MAJGEN WALT (MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY)

GEN WESTMORELAND'S VISIT

1. AS I HAVE APPRISED YOU, GEN WESTMORELAND SPENT THE BETTER PART OF 20 AND
21 OCTOBER WITH US. THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO MY INVITATION THAT HE VISIT I
CORPS TACTICAL ZONE TO HEAR AND SEE THE STATUS OF THINGS. THE VISIT WAS
A SUCCESS. HE SEEMED PLEASED AND REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE IN
III MAF AND THE JOB IT WAS DOING.

2. AFTER DINNER IN MY MESS ON 20 OCTOBER, A NUMBER OF STAND-UP BRIEFINGS
WERE PRESENTED, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, THESE BRIEFINGS, WITH EXCEPTION OF THE
SPECIAL FORCES PRESENTATION, COVERED MATERIAL FAMILIAR TO YOU:
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING QUANTANAM PROVINCE, TIME-FRAMED FORECAST OF
FUTURE OPERATIONS, OPERATION GOLDEN FLEECE, III MAF'S CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM,
MARINE AIR CONCEPTS AND ORGANIZATION, AND SPECIAL FORCES PLANS AND PROGRAMS.

3. THE SPECIAL FORCES PLANS AND PROGRAMS BRIEFING WAS THE SURPRISE ITEM.

ON THE BASIS OF A TELEPHONE CALL FROM WESTMORELAND'S MILITARY SECRETARY
THIS ITEM WAS ADDED AT THE LAST MINUTE. LTCOL ROSS, WHO COMMANDS THE SPECIAL
FORCES IN I CTZ, DID THE BRIEFING. MOST OF THE BRIEFING WAS ROUTINE AND
COVERED MATERIAL THAT HAD BEEN PROVIDED DURING MY RECENT VISITS, WHICH
TOTALLED TWO AND A HALF DAYS, TO SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS AND ACTIVITIES IN I
CORPS. THE SURPRISE WAS WHEN LTCOL ROSS ANNOUNCED A PROGRAM FOR FIVE NEW

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Camps in the Piedmont. The locations and activation dates are as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>PRIORITY</th>
<th>CAMP</th>
<th>OPENING DATE</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
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<td>Tien Phuoc</td>
<td>25 Nov 65</td>
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<td>ET 115138</td>
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<td>Minh Loeng</td>
<td>15 Jan 66</td>
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<td>15 Mar 66</td>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>ZC 140535</td>
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<td>15 May 66</td>
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<td>Hiep Duc</td>
<td>15 Jul 66</td>
<td>Quang Tin</td>
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4. This program was as much a surprise, I believe, to St Clair as it was to me. Boss had actually submitted the program to I Corps Advisory Group on 20 October. It was equally obvious that Westmoreland knew about the program. He said that he had specifically asked for the special forces briefing because these new camps should serve as eyes and ears for III MAF and I CORPS operations and should in fact, serve as advance combat bases when needed. He deprecated the value of the present border camps, saying, in effect, that he thought they did little to control crossborder traffic and had little relation to I Corps operations. Of course, I couldn’t agree more.

5. I believe these Piedmont camps can be of real use to us provided they serve as a means for the basis of operations for expanded aggressive patrols would be by the units assigned mission of patrol to keep us informed on VC activity and to harass and spoil their activities. However, I am going to question the priority of activation. In fact, Gen Westmoreland himself questioned why priority was being given Quang Tin camps when Quang Nam was the real key to I Corps. I’m going to recommend first priority be given the camp at Thuong Duc which is west of Danang Taor in Happy Valley—an avenue of approach of great importance to us.
6. It appeared that Gen. Westmoreland deliberately used this approach--
that is, having Gen. Ross brief and then emphasizing the integration of
special forces activities with the total I Corps effort--as a means of further
breaking down the barriers. Special forces try to maintain between their programs
and the larger effort. Westmoreland made it very clear that special forces were
under OPCON of XIX MAC through I Corps Advisory Group. Ross got the message.

7. After our briefings were completed, Westmoreland made some remarks of his
own. As I've noticed before, his remarks were obviously carefully prepared
and presented quite formally. In his own language, he had three points to
address.

A. First, concerned marine operations. His concern was that as we expanded
our TACORs we used up more and more of our assets in their protection, leaving
less and less for mobile operations. He said that he expected a battalion
size or larger mobile operation on a frequency of at least once a week. We
pointed out that our time-phased forecast of future operations held the level
of battalions required to develop and protect the TACORs at 10 battalions and
with the reassignment of 2/7 and introduction of additional battalions our
capability for mobile operations increases almost geometrically; that is,
one battalion now, two when we get 2/7 back, five when the 1st Marine Arrives,
and finally eight battalions when phase II deployments are complete. (Inciden-
tially, he was optimistic concerning approval of phase II deployments.)

In sum, while the Marine Corps accepts our coastal enclave concept and recognizes
the strategic importance of the coastal region and particularly Quang Nam
province, he is also insistent that we execute inland mobile operations, where-
ever we can locate and fix a VC unit. Of course, we agree provided the venture
IS PROFITABLE. THE NEW PIEDMONT CAMPS AND THE INTELLIGENCE WE SHOULD GAIN FROM THEIR PATROLS SHOULD GIVE US THE PROPER STEPPING STONES.

B. HIS SECOND POINT CONCERNED THE ARVN EFFORT. HERE HE ASKED THAT WE ENCOURAGE THE ARVN TO USE THE TACR CONCEPT. THIS SOUNDS SOMEWHAT INCONSISTENT WITH HIS FIRST POINT (AND THE BASIC ARMY CONCEPT BEING EMPLOYED IN II AND III CORPS). APPARENTLY WHAT HE WAS ASKING FOR HERE, REALLY, WAS THAT MORE COHERENCE BE MANIFESTED BY THE ARVN EFFORT. WE POINTED OUT, HOW SUCCESSFULLY I AM NOT SURE, THAT THE ARVN WAS LEARNING THE IMPORTANCE OF GAINING AND MAINTAINING CONTROL OF PRESCRIBED AREAS AND NOT WASTING TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT BY MERELY SWEEPING AREAS WITH NO DEFINED PROGRAM TO EXPAND THEIR CONSTANT CONTROL OVER POPULACE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE ARVN IN THE 1ST DIVISION AREA AND IN QUANG NAM SPECIAL SECTOR ARE PURSUING OPERATIONS WITH REAL STRATEGIC PURPOSE.

C. HIS THIRD POINT CONCERNED THE US OBLIGATION FOR SECURITY OF AREAS UNCOVERED BY OUR OPERATIONS AND THAT WE NOT SWEEP AREAS AND THEN DEPART LEAVING THE POPULACE TO BE SUBJECTED TO HARASSMENT BY THE VC. HERE HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POPULAR FORCES AND ASKED THAT WE Undertake A Vigorous Training Program. In this case he was actually regurgitating our own Programs and Recommendations so we couldn't agree more. With this thought in mind, we are pursuing the Program of Having PF and RF Platoon Attached to USMC Companies. This procedure should enable PF and RF Units to receive Basic Training Without Diluting Our Own Units of Talent. The Alternative Proposed by Westmoreland was to Assign NCOs to PF and RF Units to Act as Advisor and Initially In A DE FACTO LEADERSHIP CAPACITY. AT PRESENT WE HAVE ONE RF COMPANY IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE 3RD MARINES AND ONE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF 9TH MARINES. OUR LIII HAP FACT SHEET FURNISHED TO YOU DURING YOUR LAST VISIT EXPLAINS THE PROGRAM IN MORE DETAIL.

8. ALL IN ALL, I BELIEVE THAT EVERYTHING THAT GEN WESTMORELAND ASKED FOR OR SUGGESTED WAS COMPLETELY IN COINCIDENCE WITH OUR PRESENT CONCEPTS AND PLANS.
9. He had one more surprise, more amusing than consequential. You will
recall that I was asked to consent on what the effects would be if I were to
lose my hat as senior advisor. My reply was that the title wasn't too im-
portant so long as OPCOM of the advisory group was retained. I fully expected
to be divested of the title so that my position would be consistent with that
established in II and III Corps areas. However, Gen Van Loc, G-2 II Corps,
took unexpected umbrage over the fact that Col Neltaxis was continuing as
senior advisor II Corps rather than Maj Gen Larsen. Apparently Van Loc con-
siders the senior advisor to be his counterpart and that if Col Neltaxis continued as
senior advisor, he, Van Loc, would somehow be subordinated to Larsen. Upshot
of this is that Larsen will be made senior advisor and I'll retain the title.

CP-4

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INST. 5514.45.

DECLASSIFIED
FROM: CG III MAF
TO: COMGHQ (COMMAND CIRCUIT)

//TOP SECRET//
PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM MAJGEN WALT

1. IF YOUR BUSY SCHEDULE WILL PERMIT, I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU COULD VISIT US HERE IN THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. WE WOULD LIKE TO BRIEF YOU ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

A. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION AND FORECAST. THIS IS THE BEST SITUATION AS WE SEE IT HERE, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON QUANG NAM PROVINCE WHICH WE CONSIDER TO OFFER SOME OF THE GREATEST PROBLEM AT PROMISE IN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

B. THE PHASED FORECAST OF FUTURE OPERATIONS. THIS IS OUR PROJECTION OF WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY III MAF THROUGHT 1 JULY 1966 UNDER TWO SETS OF CONDITIONS. THE FIRST SET PRESUMES THAT WE CONTINUE AT A FORCE LEVEL OF 12 BATTALIONS. THE SECOND SET PRESUMES THAT PHASE II FORCES ARE DEPLOYED AS RECOMMENDED AND WE GO TO 18 BATTALIONS.

C. OPERATION GOLDEN FLEECE. NOT ONLY DO WE THINK WE HAVE ACHIEVED OUR PRIME PURPOSE OF PROTECTING MUCH OF THE RICE CROP SOUTH AND WEST OF DANG RE AT ALSO WE HAVE SHARPENED OUR FIGHTING TECHNIQUES IN THIS DIFFICULT CHECKERBOARD OF RICE PADDIES AND VILLAGES. I PERSONALLY WOULD BE SURPRISING THE VC RATHER THAN HAVE HIM SURPRISE US. YOU HAVE NOTICED, I AM SURE, THAT OUR SITREPS REPORT A AVERAGE OF OVER 100 PATROLS AND ACTIONS DAILY—OR I SHOULD SAY NIGHTLY, AS AT LEAST HALF OF THESE ARE NIGHT ACTIONS. ABOUT ONE IN TEN OF THESE ACTIONS MAKE CONTACT WITH THE VC AT NIGHT IT IS USUALLY ON OUR TERMS.

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CIVIC ACTION. I WOULD LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL YOU AND
SHOW YOU WHAT IS BEING DONE IN CIVIC ACTION. III MAF IS MOVING
SUCCESSFULLY IN THE DIRECTION OF A TRULY INTEGRATED US COUNTRY TEAM
EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE RURAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS. A
NEW AWARENESS AND APPRECIATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE EFFORTS
ON THE PART OF GEN THI AND HIS SUBORDINATES HAS BEEN DETECTED.
3. YOU CAN BE RELIEVED ON ALL OF THE ABOVE IN SAIGON AND WE ARE
PREPARED TO DO SO. HOWEVER, IT IS PREFERABLE TO HAVE YOU VISIT
III MAF SO THAT YOU CAN SEE AS WELL AS BEING TOLD ABOUT THE PROGRESS
BEING MADE. ALSO, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR DESIRE TO SALUTE PERSONALLY
THOSE WHO HAVE MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN EFFORT
YOU ARE ASKED TO DO US THE HONOR OF PRESENTING A NUMBER OF AWARDS
TO PERSONS OF III MAF.

CP, A

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PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM MAJ GEN WALT
SUBJECT: USE OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING

A. COMESMACV 151 2450 LUG 65
B. CG 11TH MAF 171600Z LUG 65

1. REF C INDICATED RELEASE OF 20 BN. 7TH MARINES FROM QUINHON AFTER ARRIVAL OF ROK CONTINGENT THEN ENVISIONED AS 15 OTAS FOR 1ST OCT DATE.

2. SINC THE TIME WE HAVE BEEN USING 15 OTAS PLANNING DATE FOR RETURN OF 20 BN. TO TACON. IF MARS IS TO DECLARE THE FOLLOWING:

3. P RESUMING THAT IT WILL BE RELEASED AS ANTICIPATED, THE CONCEPT FOR ITS PRETET CRITICAL EMPLOYMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. EMBARK AND SAIL FROM QUINHON IN AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING.
B. EXECUTE 20TH BUS TO NORTH OF TAM KY AND SWEEP
C. EMBARK ONE BLT (PRESENTLY PLANNED AS 30 BN.) SOUTH OF HOI AN AND SWEEP
D. EXECUTE AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SOUTH OF HOI AN AND SWEEP

CATALOGUE BROADCASTING IN CO-ORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES

4. EXECUTION OF 20TH BUS WILL HAVE THE FOLLOWING BENEFITS:

A. IT WOULD COMPLEMENT PRESENT ARVN EFFORTS TO CLEAR AREA VICINITY OF HOI AN AND TAM KY.
B. 7TH MAF, IN FACT, HAS ASKED FOR AMPHIBIOUS LANDING BETWEEN HOI AN AND TAM KY AND HAS OFFERED PARTICIPATION OF 7TH MAF
C. IT WOULD MAXIMIZE USE OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING REQUIRED IN ANY CASE TO RETURN 20 BN., 7TH MARINES.
D. TO 1 CTZ.
E. RESULTING PO VSURE OF 12 IN COUNTRY USMC BATTALIONS WOULD BE OPTIMIZED
F. ONE AT HUE PHU B.

5. REF C INDICATES THAT THE ROK DIVISION WILL ARRIVE IN THREE INCREMENTS DURING PERIOD 40CT - 5PM; ALSO THAT THE SECOND INCREMENT WILL DEPLOY NOON ABT 22 OCT.

6. BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH MY PLANNING, AND THIS INCLUDES REQUESTING ALLOCATION OF SUFFICIENT AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING, A FIRM DATE ON RETURN OF 20 BN., 7TH MA

7. Necess is Required. I realize, of course, that there may be other considerations not known to us. But from our viewpoint it is desired release date on or about 15 NOV.

GP-1
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

O 061482Z
FM CG III MAF
INFO RUHPAC/CG FMFPAC
O 061150Z
FM CONUSMACV
TO RUNFPAC/GEN WALT III MAF DA NANG
RUNSAR/GEN LARSEN FFORCEV NHA TRANG CT

TOP SECRET 35169 WESTMORELAND SENDS FROM MACJOO
SUBJ: RELEASE OF 2D BN 7TH MARINES TO III MAF (U)
REL: WALT TO WESTMORELAND DTG 03046182 (NODAL)

1. THE ORIGINAL ASSIGNMENT OF THE 2D BN 7TH MARINES TO
OPCON OF CG, FFORCEV ENVISIONED RETURN OF THIS UNIT TO III MAF
AROUND 15 OCTOBER. BY THE REFERENCED MESSAGE, CG, III MAF OUT-
LINE: AN OPERATION PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE 2D BN 7TH MARINES
UPON ITS RETURN TO III MAF, URGES THAT IT BE RELEASED BY 15 OCT
AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, AND FURTHER REQUESTS THAT WE BE PROVIDED

PAGE 2 RUNSHA 35444 TOP SECRET
A FIRM DATE WHEN THE BATTALION WILL BE RELEASED BY FFORCEV.
2. IN VIEW OF THE FORCES WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE TO CG,
FFORCEV BY 30 OCT, THE 2D BN 7TH MARINES WILL BE RETURNED TO
III MAF NO LATER THAN 30 OCT. DURATION BETWEEN CG, III MAF AND
CG, FFORCEV.
GP-4
BT
TOD WW-2
06/2258H AES
DIST: COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES = FILE
COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES = MAF

61482/OCTOBER 1965

COPY 2 OF 2 COPIES TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

ACTIVITY LIII MAF COMM CENTER
ORIGINATOR C G II MAF

DTG 24/12/7
COPY OF COPIES

THE ATTACHED "TOP SECRET" MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH THE SECURITY ASPECT IS CONSIDERED PARAMOUNT. THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. THE SPECIAL HANDLING AND CUSTODY OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER - OPNAV INST. 5510.1B.

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ACTIVITY Command Center
SIGNATURE :

DATE 25 Sep 65

DECLASSIFIED
DAGGER THREAT (U)
A. CG FMFPAC 2121462

1. THIS TARDY REPLY IS DUE TO OUR CIRCUITS BEING DOWN. REF A WAS NOT RECEIVED UNTIL LATE ON 23 SEP.

2. I TOO WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEGREE OF DISSEMINATION GIVEN DAGGER THREAT. WHILE I WAS AWAITING AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC SITUATION WITH GEN THI, HE, GEN THI, WAS ADVISED OF THE FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS THROUGH ARVN CHANNELS. HIS CHIEF OF STAFF CAME TO US ASKING FOR FURTHER DETAILS. HOWEVER, I DID NOT KNOW MYSELF, UNTIL TODAY, THAT VUONG PHU HAD BEEN SELECTED AS THE TARGET. THUS ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL CONCEPT HAS BEEN WELL PUBLICIZED, I DON'T THINK THE PRECISE TARGET HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.

3. VUONG PHU IS JUST 20 KM SOUTH OF QUI Nhon. THIS THE OBVIOUS REINFORCEMENT SHOULD BE 2/7 OR ELEMENTS THEREOF. I THINK THE REQUIREMENT FOR THIS REINFORCEMENT IS REMOTE. NEVERTHELESS WE SHOULD BE READY. THEREFORE, I AM SENDING A PERSONAL TO WESTMORELAND AND LARSEN SUGGESTING THAT 2/7 BE USED IF REINFORCEMENT IS NEEDED AND INFORMING THEM THAT III MAF STANDS READY TO RECONSTITUTE THE SECURITY FORCES AT QUI Nhon BY MOVING TWO REINFORCED COMPANIES BY FIXED WING AIRLIFT FROM CHU Lai. THE DETACHMENT OF HM-161 AT CHU Lai AND einz HM-163 SHOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT LIFT FOR ANY NEEDED REINFORCEMENT INTO THE VUONG PHU AREA.
3. I am also informing MAGV and Seventh Flt in an open msg that III MAF stands ready to provide additional fixed wing close air support if required.

CP-4

RELEASED BY

TOD: 242358H/WW2/AA

DIST: COPY 1 OF 1 COPY MAF
TOP SECRET

ACTIVITY: CG TLM AF

ORIGINATOR: CG TLM AF

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

THE ATTACHED TOP SECRET MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF WHICH IS CONSIDERED CLASSIFIED. THE SECURITY ASPECT WHICH IS PARAMOUNT AND UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF WHICH COULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION. SPECIAL HANDLING, AND CUSTODY OF THE ATTACHED INFORMATION MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NAVAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR CLASSIFIED MATTER, OPNAV INST 5510.18.

RECORD OF DISCLOSURE

ACTIVITY

SIGNATURE

DATE

Crypto Center

James Leiding

03 Sep 65

CHQ

03 Sep 65

ONLY TWO COPIES INVADE - ALL RECIPIENTS BRACH AF

EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

SECRET

CCN: 099
IMMEDIATE SEP 65

FROM: CG III MAF
TO: CG FMPAC

AND EXCLUSIVE FOR
PERSONAL TO/GEN. KRULAK FROM NO. WALT

TOP SECRET SPECIFIC MARINE CORPS EYES ONLY

CONFERENCE HELD BETWEEN JOINT ARVN GENERAL STAFF AND COUNTER PARTS AT SAIGON
2 SEPTEMBER 1965

1. MOST OF THE CONFERENCE WAS MADE UP OF BRIEFINGS ON THE STATUS OF U.S.
FORCES IN COUNTRY UP TO 1 JANUARY 1966. THE ROLE AND COORDINATION OF
SUPPORTING ARMS WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. WESTY CAUTIONED ALL PRESENT THAT
ADDITIONAL FIRE POWER COMING INTO COUNTRY GREATER CAUTION MUST BE
OBSERVED RELATIVE TO FRIENDLY PEOPLE. CONFERENCE WAS TERMINATED BY
SHAKING OF OUR SARS FILM.

2. THE MATTER OF INTEGRATED INTERROGATION CENTERS WAS DISCUSSED AND IT WAS
AGREED THAT THE J-2'S OF THE TWO STAFFS WOULD WORK TOGETHER IN COMING UP WITH
A PLAN FOR THESE CENTERS.

3. WESTY STATED THAT HE HOPES TO HAVE AN AVERAGE OF ONE B-52 STRIKE PER DAY
AND WHEREVER POSSIBLE THESE STRIKES SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UP BY TROOP
OCCUPATION OF THE AREA EITHER IN LARGE NUMBERS OR BY PATROLS. HE ALSO
CAUTIONED ALL PRESENT THAT CONTINUED BUILD UP OF U.S. FORCES IN ARVN MAY
CREATE MORE PROBLEMS BETWEEN U.S. FORCES AND VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS. HE URGED
THAT THESE PROBLEMS BE SOLVED BY MUTUAL EFFORT ON THE LOW LEVEL WHenever
POSSIBLE. HE ALSO URGED AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CIVILIANS COMMUNITIES.

DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET PERSONAL AND EXCLUSIVE FOR LTGEN KRULAK

4. AFTER THE CONFERENCE I HAD A PERSONAL MEETING WITH WESTY IN WHICH WE TALKED OVER THE NCC MATTER. HE STATED THAT HE WAS MORE THAN SATISFIED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH I HAD BEEN FULFILLING THESE DUTIES, THAT MY LIAISON OFFICER, COLONEL STEINKRAUS, COULD OFFICIALLY REPRESENT ME AS NCC AT HIS STAFF CONFERENCES. HE STATED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN APPROACHED BY THE NAVY ON THE MATTER AND THAT HE WOULD LIKE FOR ME TO KEEP THE HAT. WE DISCUSSED TACTICAL OPERATIONS BOTH PAST AND FUTURE. HE AGAIN STATED HIS SATISFACTION IN THE MANNER IN WHICH WE ARE GOING ABOUT OUR WORK.

5. I ALSO TALKED TO WESTY ABOUT THE NCC. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD RESISTED EVERY EFFORT TO HAVE IT PUT ON HIM. THAT HE REALIZED WHERE THE NEEDLING WAS COMING FROM BUT HE FELT CINCPACFLT WOULDN'T GO ALONG WITH IT. HE SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION THE NCC JOB HAD BEEN HANDLED IN AN ADmirABLE MANNER. IT IS MY OPINION THAT WE NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT THIS AT THE PRESENT.

6. BILL ROSSON WAS MOST RECEPTIVE CONCERNING KEY PIO BILLET FOR MARINES. HE WASN'T COGNIZANT OF THE MANEUVERING GOING ON IN THAT AREA - HE ASSURED ME HE WOULD LOOK OUT FOR OUR INTEREST.

7. WESTY QUERIED ME ON BRICK'S BEHAVIOR. I ONLY ANSWERED HIS DIRECT QUESTIONS BUT HAD TO BE TRUTHFUL - I THINK HE IS SETTING HIS SIGHTS - I SUGGEST NAVY BETTER DO SOMETHING. VERY RESPECTFULLY, LEO WALT.

RELEASE DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

06/11/68

HAS BEEN SENT

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FM CG 111 MAF
TO CG FMFPAC
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T O P S E C R E T  S E C T I O N  O N E  O F  T W O
PERSONAL FOR GENERAL KRUHLAK FROM GENERAL WALT
1. PURSUANT TO OUR CONVERSATION TODAY AND YOUR REQUEST FOR ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE CAM NE OPERATION, QUOTED BELOW.
LESS ITS ENCLOSURES, IS A REPORT I RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON FROM
FRANK GARBERSON
QUOTE
FROM COMMANDING OFFICER
TO COMMANDING GENERAL, 3D MARINE DIVISION
SUBJ: HOA VANG LIAISON OFFICER REPORT OF SAUG65 ON CO "D"-1-9
OPERATION IN CAM NE HAMLET ON 3 AUG65
ENCL: (1) COPY OF HOA VANG LIAISON OFFICER REPORT TO C/S
3D MAR DIV DIK SAUG65
(2) COPY OF 2NDLT MAI-DUY THIEN'S REPORT TO CAPT.
HOA, DISTRICT CHIEF
(3) COPY OF CAPT. NGUYEN HOA, DISTRICT CHIEF REPORT TO
LT COL Q. NAM, PROVINCE CHIEF
1. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS AS TO THE PROPRIETY
OF ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS COVERED BY THE
SUBJECT REPORT, I HAVE THIS DATE ASSEMBLED LT COL LUDWIG, CO. 1-9;
CAPT WEST, CO. "D"-1-9; MAJOR FIRST, HOA VANG LIAISON OFFICER; AND
CAPT SHUBERT, S-3, 1-9, IN ORDER TO PRESENT THE FACTS AS I SEE THEM.
2. THE SUBJECT REPORT, (ENCL (1)), IS BASED UPON A REPORT (ENCL
(2)) SUBMITTED BY LT THIEN, ARVN, THE DISTRICT S-5 (PACIFICATION)
AND PRESENTS ONE SIDE OF A STORY WHICH CHARGES THAT THE MARINES
HAD INDISCRIMINATELY BURNED HUTS DURING THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS
IN CAM NE HAMLET. MAJOR FIRST PREPARED HIS REPORT BASED UPON
THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY LT THIEN AND AFTER TALKING WITH CAPT WEST.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT MAJOR FIRST HAD A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME IN
WHICH TO PREPARE HIS REPORT AND THAT HE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT
TIME TO CHECK LT THIEN'S REPORT FOR ACCURACY.
3. THE FIRST QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED INVOLVES THE ALLEGATION BY
LT THIEN THAT MARINES HAD BURNED PRIVATE DWELLINGS INDISCriminate-
LY. I HAVE CAREFULLY QUESTIONED CAPT WEST REGARDING THIS
ALLEGATION AND BELIEVE THAT LT THIEN WAS INCORRECT IN ARRIVING AT
SUCH A CONCLUSION. LT THIEN WAS 50-75 METERS BEHIND THE ASSAULT
ELEMENTS DURING MOST OF THE TIME THE OPERATION WAS IN PROGRESS AS
WAS CAPT GROSS. THE SENIOR US ARMY ADVISOR AND COULD NOT OBSERVE
CONDITIONS EXISTING DURING THE INITIAL ASSAULT PHASE OF THE OPERA-
TION. CAPT WEST STATED THAT AT ONE POINT IN THE OPERATION LT
THIEN CAME UP TO THE COMPANY OF (FWD), BUT THAT SUCH CONFUSION
RESULTED FROM THIEN, THE RVN FORCES AND CIVILIANS, THAT WEST
WAS FORCED TO ORDER THIEN TO THE REAR. CAPT WEST FURTHER STATED
THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE DESTRUCTION TOOK PLACE IN HIS RIGHT SECTOR
DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE RIGHT SECTOR PRESENTED THE HEAVIEST
RESISTANCE THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION. WEST FELT AND SO
STATED THAT THE LEFT AND MIDDLE SECTORS RECEIVED LESS DAMAGE DUE
TO THE LACK OF RESISTANCE IN THOSE AREAS. WEST FURTHER STATED
THAT SOME OF THE HUTS WERE BURNING PRIOR TO THE MARINES ENTERING
THE VILLAGE AS A RESULT OF PREPARATORY ARTILLERY SHOKE AND COUNTER
1. FIRED BY AMTRAC AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS DURING THE APPROACH TO THE VILLAGE, TRACER AMMO, 2.5 ROCKET LAUNCHER, M-79 GRENADES IN VARIOUSLY START FIRES IN DRY THATCH ROOFS.

2. I QUESTIONED CAPT WEST REGARDING THE POINT IN THE REPORT WHERE IN A PRIVATE STATED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO BURN THE HAMLET DOWN IF HE RECEIVED FIRE FROM IT, CAPT WEST STATED THAT HE HAD NO SUCH POLICY AND IN FACT HAD REPEATEDLY INSTRUCTED HIS COMMAND TO ONLY TAKE ACTION AGAINST POINTS OF RESISTANCE.


4. CAPT WEST WAS QUOTED CORRECTLY REGARDING THE FACT THAT HUTS WOULD BE DESTROYED IF FIRE WAS RECEIVED FROM THEM BUT IT WAS NOT MEANT THAT THEY WOULD BE BURNED AUTOMATICALLY. WESTS' POLICY WAS THAT SOURCES OF RESISTANCE WOULD BE BURNED BY WHATEVER MEANS WERE REQUIRED. CAPT WEST STATED THAT THERE WERE INSTANCES OF DELIVERATE BURNING OF HUTS BUT THIS WAS ONLY IN CASES WHERE FIRE WAS RECEIVED FROM A HUT OR WHERE PERSONNEL WITH WEAPONS WERE OBSERVED IN A HUT OR IN AN EMPLACEMENT BY A HUT, WHICH MADE THE HUT, IN FACT, A BUNKER. THIS IS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED THAT BURNING WAS INDISCRIMINATE.
TOP SECRET

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TO CG FMFPAC
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T O P S E C R E T  F I N A L  S E C T I O N  O F  T W O

7. MAJOR FIRST IS CORRECT IN SUMMARIZING THAT FIRE WAS RECEIVED
FROM THE HAMLET AND A NUMBER OF HUTS WERE DESTROYED. IT IS FURTHER
AGREED THAT OPINION VARIES AS TO THE NECESSITY FOR DESTROYING THE
HUTS. ON THE ONE HAND THERE IS THE OPINION OF LIAISON OFFICERS
WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE ASSAULT OPERATIONS AND ONLY SAW THE
AFTERMATH OF THE ASSAULT AND ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS THE OPINION
OF THE COMPANY COMMANDER CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CON-
DUCTING A SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION AND WHO SAW THINGS IN AN
ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT LIGHT. ANOTHER FACTOR IN THIS MATTER IS A
CHOICE OF WORDS IN THE RECOMMENDATION. MAJOR FIRST AGREES THAT
"REITERATION" OF DIVISION POLICY WOULD HAVE BEEN A BETTER CHOICE
OF WORDS INSTEAD OF "CLARIFYING" THE POLICY.

8. AFTER REVIEWING THE FACTS IN THIS MATTER I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT,
THERE WAS NO INDISCRIMINATE BURNING OF HUTS; THERE WERE HUTS
DESTROYED BUT ONLY AS NECESSARY IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS; THE
DIVISION POLICY REGARDING DESTROYING PRIVATE DWELLINGS IS
THOROUGHLY UNDERSTOOD BY ALL ECHELONS OF THIS REGIMENT.

9. THE AFTER ACTION REPORT WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FACTUAL
REPORT OF THE OPERATION IS ATTACHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F. F. GARRETSON

UNQUOTE.

268

TOP SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED
CGN: 

IMMEDIATE 061345Z AUG 66

FROM: CG III MAF/NCG
TO: COMUSMACV

//TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY//

REACTION OF CERTAIN ARVN GENERALS IN SAIGON TO MARINE VICTORY AT VAN TUONG

A. COMUSMACV MSG CITE 29713 DTC 240855Z
B. CG III MAF 151618Z
C. COMUSMACV MSG CITE 28665 DTC 160110Z

PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM MAJ GEN WALT

1. REF A AVERS THAT CERTAIN ARVN GENERAL OFFICERS INDICATE A SENSITIVITY TO EXTENSIVE PRESS COVERAGE OF THE RECENT HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL MARINE ASSAULT AT VAN TUONG. CONCLUSION IS THAT WE MUST INCLUDE IN EARLY STAGES OF ANY LARGE OPERATION SOME VIETNAMESE ELEMENTS TO WHICH A FAIR SHARE OF THE CREDIT CAN BE ATTRIBUTED IN ORDER TO MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO PORTRAY OUR OPERATIONS AS COMBINED IN NATURE.

2. REF B WAS THE INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR CONDUCT OF SUBJ OPN. IT RECOMMENDED TO ENSURE SURPRISE, THAT THE ARVN NOT BE MADE PRIVY TO THIS OPERATION OR POSSIBILITY THEREOF UNTIL LAST POSSIBLE MINUTES. BY REFERENCE C COMUSMACV APPROVED REF A FOR PLANNING AND EXECUTION, DIRECTING THIS HQ TO EFFECT COORDINATION WITH I CORPS COMMANDER IN AMPLE TIME TO PREVENT REPERCUSSIONS FROM LOCAL DIVISION AND SECTOR COMMANDERS TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF INTELLIGENCE INPUT FROM ARVN SOURCES AND TO ALLOW FRIENDLY FORCES TO MOVE OUT OF THE AREA. PURSUANT TO THE ABOVE I MET WITH GENERAL THI ON THE
AFTERNOON OF 17 AUGUST AND BRIEFED HIM ON THE OPERATION. THE NEED FOR
EARLY EXECUTION OF A COMPLEX HELICOPTER/AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AND A HIGH
DEGREE OF SECURITY TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE. AT THIS TIME HE STATED THAT
HE HAD NO INTENTIONS OF TELLING GENERAL LAM CG 2ND ARVN DIVISION, UNTIL
AFTER THE OPERATION HAD BEGUN. LATER, I WAS INFORMED THAT GENERAL THE
DID NOT INFORM GENERAL LAM UNTIL AFTER THE OPERATION BEGAN.

ON THE MORNING OF 18 AUG, THE OPERATION WAS EXECUTED, ACHIEVING COMPLETE
TACTICAL SURPRISE AND DESTROYING A LARGE FORCE, ELEMENTS OF WHICH, ACCORDING
TO POW REPORTS, WERE AT THAT MOMENT, PREPARING TO MOVE OUT TO LAUNCH AN
ATTACK ON CHU LAI. OUR SUCCESS WAS LARGELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO SURPRISE AND
SPEED OF ACTING UPON GOOD INTELLIGENCE. I DOUBT IF EITHER WOULD HAVE
BEEN GUARANTEED IF LARGE ARVN UNITS HAD BEEN INVOLVED OR CUT IN ON THE
PLANS, WITH REGARD TO SURPRISE (AND US HANDICAP, SECURITY OF PLANS)
MY EXPERIENCE IN CONDUCTING COMBINED OPS, DURING JULY, AND THE OPINION
OF EXPERIENCED ADVISORS, IS THAT SECURITY CANNOT BE GUARANTEED BELOW
THE GENERAL THI STAFF LEVEL. SECURITY WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE
SUCCESS OF THIS OPN. IT UNDOUBTEDLY SAVED LIVES. IT CERTAINLY CAUGHT THE ENEMY FLAT FOOTED. IN THIS REGARD GENERAL THI'S ACTION IN NOT TELLING LAM TENDS TO CONFIRM THAT HE TOO IS CONCERNED WITH SECURITY. WITH REGARD
TO TIMELY EXECUTION, IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS OPN BE LAUNCHED NO LATER
THAN THE 18TH, ON THE U.S. SIDE, THE PLANNING OF SUCH A COMPLEX OPN
INVOLVING BOTH AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FROM THE SEA AND A CONCOMITANT HELICOPTER
ASSAULT FROM LAND BASES WAS DIFFICULT ENOUGH. IF IT HAD ALSO INCLUDED
THE CONSUMING COORDINATIVE PROCESSES OF THE 2ND ARVN DIVISION WAS MIGHT NOT
HAVE MADE THE CRUCIAL DATE.

TOP SECRET

US EYES ONLY

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(INCLUDING 1 CORPS INF) AND RF AND FF UNITS PARTICIPATED FROM THE OUTSET.

AFTER THE OPERATION BEGAN, GEN LAM, ON THE NIGHT OF 19 AUG, OFFERED 2
MANEUVER BATTALIONS. THIS OFFER WAS ACCEPTED AND COMMENCING ON THE
MORNING OF 20 AUGUST THE FOLLOWING ARVN UNITS WERE INTRODUCED DURING
THE POP-UP PHASE WHICH CONTINUED THRU 26 AUGUST:

20 AUGUST
3D VN MARINES BN
2D BN 31ST REG

DEP 3D ARM PERS CARRIER TROOP

CO 3D BN 5TH REG 2D DIV

21ST ARTY BN 2D DIV

34TH ARTY BN 1 CORPS

4th DOG & HANDLERS 1ST INF SCOUT DOG PT

21 AUGUST

11TH RANGER BN

IN AT LEAST ONE INSTANCE THAT I PERSONALLY OBSERVED, ARVN UNIT ACTIONS WERE
NOT CHARACTERIZED BY ANY SINGULAR AGGRESSIVENESS.

5. WHILE I SUBSCRIBE TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT, WHEREVER CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE
TACTICAL SITUATION PERMIT, COMBINED OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED (AND
I HAVE AND SHALL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT SUCH OPNS), I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THIS
PARTICULAR OPN NECESSARILY VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE PARTICULARLY WHEN ONE
CONSIDERS THE FACTORS OF SURPRISE AND SPEED. I AM FURTHER INCLINED TO BELIEVE
THAT THE PRUDENCE AND SENSITIVITIES OF THE SAIGON GENERALS, WHILE CERTAINLY
A POLITICAL FACTOR IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE GVN, SHOULD NOT
DISPROPORTIONATELY INFLUENCE THE CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE WHEN SIGNIFICANT
NUMBERS OF U.S. LIVES ARE CONCERNED, AND WHEN THE RESPONSIBLE U.S. COMMANDER

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DETERMINES THAT A LARGER MEASURE OF SUCCESS CAN BE ACHIEVED BY UNILATERAL OPERATIONS. I HAVE TALKED WITH BOTH LAM AND TII IN THE PAST FEW DAYS ABOUT OPV "STAR LIGHT". BOTH ARE HIGH IN PRAISE OF OUR EFFORTS. BOTH CONFIRM THAT WE PRACTICALLY DESTROYED 1ST RECON BS, 60TH & 60TH BS AND BADLY HURT THE 400TH HEAVY WEAPONS BN. THE PROVINCE CHIEF STATED TODAY THAT IT WOULD TAKE THE VC IN HIS PROVINCE SIX MONTHS TO RECOVER FROM THE DEFEAT WE HANDED THEM. HE STATED HIS PEOPLE HAD FOUND OVER THREE HUNDRED BODIES STILL NOT BURIED AND ALSO HAD PICKED UP MANY WEAPONS. I CAN'T EXPLAIN THE ATTITUDE OF ARVN GENERALS ON THE GENERAL STAFF BUT FEEL CONFIDENT IT DID NOT ORIGINATE IN I CORPS.

OP-123

[Signature]

RELEASED BY [Signature]