Any analysis of Quang Nam PHUNG HOANG must begin with an estimate of how well it is fulfilling its mission. The mission, in words of the Prime Minister, is "to centralize and coordinate efforts of military and civilian intelligence agencies engaged in the elimination of the Viet Cong Infrastructure." In addition, SOP 3 also emphasizes the responsibility of the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCC) to "expeditiously exploit intelligence... to insure neutralization of VCI." Quang Nam PHUNG HOANG does coordinate the intelligence effort in the province. The Province and District Centers facilitate the flow of information in all directions. From previous experience as an intelligence advisor in pre-PHUNG HOANG Vietnam, I consider the improved flow of information and coordination between agencies to be the major achievement of the PHUNG HOANG program. To the extent that the PIOCC and DIOCC's are the largest repository of information concerning the VCI, PHUNG HOANG has also succeeded in centralizing the intelligence effort. Clouding these achievements, however, is the failure of the PHUNG HOANG apparatus to produce "intelligence." Much information is collected and filed with grim bureaucratic determination, with little apparent understanding of why the information is being collected. This has led to an "archive attitude" adopted by the PIOCC and DIOCC's, concomitant with a lack of concern to vigorously pursue the VCI. Every American Advisor to the program has felt and fought the frustration caused by this inertia. DIOCC's rise and fall in rhythm with the assignment of US Coordinators, and reflect the Coordinator's degree of aggressiveness. This is a disconcerting pattern, for it indicates the extent to which the program's success rests on continued American participation and encouragement. By 31 March 1972, or shortly thereafter, none of the districts in Quang Nam will have an advisory team. There is serious doubt if the District Chiefs will demonstrate a here-tofore unseen willingness to assume the responsibility for breathing life into the PHUNG HOANG bureaucracy. As US troop withdrawals continue, and VC/NVA military forces grow bolder, there will be an increase in the "live and let live" attitude held by so many Vietnamese. In short, I see the progress we have made, both in apparatus and methods, as temporary; being overshadowed by the adverse impact of the American withdrawal.
The foregoing analysis should not be construed to mean that the 
program is doomed. Many positive factors are in evidence in Quang Nam. 
The apparatus functions, the VCI threat is acknowledged, and GVN officials 
accept sound recommendations. The essential missing ingredient is financial 
Vietnamization of the PHERC MCMC program. If Province and District Chiefs 
direct some of their financial resources to the program, they will of 
necessity, monitor the program more closely and take a more active interest 
in seeing that the program succeeds. Other shortcomings, including the 
failure to connect operations and intelligence, are extremely complex, and 
may not be acceptable to ever eliminate. It should be recognized that we can 
ever achieve US objectives with US methods using Vietnamese personnel, but 
it is possible to achieve common goals with Vietnamese methods and Vietnamese 
personnel.
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GUANG NAM PROVINCE

PHOENIX PHUONG HOAI

BRIEFING

November 1970

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
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COMMENTS ON THE QUANG NAM PHUNG HOANG TO BE PRESENTED ORALLY BY THE PSA

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS BRIEFING IS ADDRESSED TOWARD THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE; ITS STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT. IN SUPPORT OF THIS BRIEFING, I HAVE FOR YOU TWO STAFF STUDIES CONCERNING THE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACK ON THE VCI FROM THE MILITARY TO THE POLICE, AND A SUMMATION OF THE STATUS OF THE VCI PROGRAM IN QUANG NAM. ONE OF THE STAFF STUDIES WAS PREPARED BY THE PROVINCE PHOENIX COORDINATOR, AND THE OTHER BY THE ADVISOR TO THE NATIONAL POLICE.

II. DISCUSSION

A. STATUS OF THE PHUNG HOANG

1. GENERAL

THE APPARATUS OF THE PHUNG HOANG (PIOCC AND DIOCC'S) HAS NOT ACHIEVED THE GOAL THAT ITS NAME IMPLIES, IE, TO BE AN INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATING CENTER FOR THE ATTACK ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE. IN MOST CASES, THE FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PHUNG HOANG HAVE BECOME REPOSITORIES OF INFORMATION, USEFUL FOR STUDIES, BUT MUCH LIKE AN ARCHIVE. OFTEN THERE IS A FAILURE TO REACT TO INTELLIGENCE, OR TO DEVELOP THE SYSTEMATIC PURSUIT OF THE VCI THAT THE PROGRAM INTENDS.

2. COMMAND EMPHASIS

THE HEADS OF VIETNAMESE AGENCIES AND MILITARY CHIEFS SEEM OFTEN NOT TO UNDERSTAND OR BE INTERESTED IN THE PROGRAM. THE LATTER IS NOT SURPRISING IN LIGHT OF RECENT DISCOVERIES OF FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL VC PENETRATION OF GVN AGENCIES. ASIDE FROM THAT, VIETNAMESE AGENCIES, PERHAPS AS A

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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LEGACY OF THE FRENCH, ARE ORGANIZED VERTICALLY WITH LITTLE IMPETUS TO COMMUNICATE LATERALLY AT THE LOWER LEVELS. IT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF PHUNG HOANG TO ESTABLISH LATERAL LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AT THE DISTRICT AND PROVINCE LEVEL, IN ORDER TO COORDINATE AND EXCHANGE INFORMATION WHILE IT IS STILL TIMELY. THIS RUNS CONTRARY TO THE GRAIN OF VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATIONS AND EXPERIENCE, AND IT IS LITTLE WONDER THAT THE PHUNG HOANG HAS NOT PERFORMED UP TO EXPECTATIONS IN THAT REGARD. OFFICIAL GVN DECLARATIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM ARE SINCERE, BUT FOLLOW-UP BY PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS AND HEADS OF AGENCIES IS SPOTTY. FORCEFUL LEADERSHIP IN THIS AMALGAMATED ORGANIZATION IS A BASIC NECESSITY, BUT TOO OFTEN STRONG LEADERS ARE LACKING THAT COULD MAKE THE SYSTEM WORK.

3. PERSONNEL

IN MOST CASES, THE VIETNAMESE AGENCIES HAVE ASSIGNED COMPETENT PERSONNEL TO WORK IN THE FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PHUNG HOANG, BUT THEY ARE IN NEED OF MORE INTENSIVE TRAINING. THE US OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO DISTRICTS AS PHOENIX COORDINATORS ARE YOUNG WITH LITTLE INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE. ONLY TWO OF THE EIGHT DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATING CENTER (DIOCC) COORDINATORS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE HAVE HAD AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT PRIOR TO THEIR ASSIGNMENT TO VIETNAM. MOST OF THEM CARRY AN MOS/930L, COMBAT INTELLIGENCE. SINCE THE TASK OF THE DIOCC COORDINATOR IS A DUAL ONE, IE, ASSISTING THE SUB-SECTOR S-2 IN BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORDER OF BATTLE, AN MOS/930L IS APPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, THE TASK OF TRACKING UCI INVOLVES AREAS NOT NORMALLY EXPECTED OF AN OFFICER TRAINED IN COMBAT INTELLIGENCE, AND
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APPROXIMATES THE TRAINING GIVEN TO A COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, MOS/9666. RECENT OFFICER REPLACEMENTS HAVE HAD LANGUAGE TRAINING, A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR ANY ADVISOR. WHAT THE JUNIOR OFFICERS AT DISTRICT LEVEL LACK IN EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING IS SOMEWHAT COMPENSATED FOR IN ENTHUSIASM AND INVENTIVENESS. THESE QUALITIES ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN VIETNAM WHERE CLOSE CONTROL AND UNIFORMITY OF ACTION IS NEITHER POSSIBLE NOR DESIRABLE. THE NEWLY ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE NCO'S ARE IN A WORD, OUTSTANDING. IN MOST CASES THEY TOO ARE YOUNG, WITH FEW OF THEM HAVING AN EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND IN INTELLIGENCE. LIKE THE OFFICER ASSIGNED AS DIOCC COORDINATOR, MOST OF THE NCO'S HAVE A COLLEGE EDUCATION, AND NEARLY ALL HAVE HAD A ONE YEAR COURSE IN THE VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE. THE NCO'S (MANY OF THEM ARE STILL E-4's) CARRY A 97B MOS, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST. THIS COMPLIMENTS THE TRAINING OF THE OFFICER ASSIGNED AS DIOCC COORDINATOR, THEREBY ADEQUATELY COVERING BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORDER OF BATTLE.

B. STRENGTHS:

1. MY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TELL ME THAT EVEN WITH THE OBVIOUS SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PHUNH HOANG PROGRAM, THAT LATERAL COMMUNICATIONS AT PROVINCE AND DISTRICT LEVEL HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE 1967. THERE IS A VASTLY IMPROVED FLOW OF INFORMATION, MUCH OF IT DUE TO THE PHUNH HOANG PROGRAM.

2. THE PHUNH HOANG HAS SUCCEEDED IN MONTILIZING A LARGE NUMBER OF AGENCIES IN THE ATTACK ON THE VCI, HERETOFORE INDIFFERENT TO THE THREAT, OR UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ATTACK.

3. THE PHUNH HOANG PROGRAM HAS ASSISTED IN AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE VCI THREAT AS A COMMON PROBLEM AND INITIATED THE BEGINNINGS OF A COORDINATED ATTACK ON IT.

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1. STATISTICALLY, AND VISIBLY, THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM HAS CONTRIBUTED TO REDUCING THE NUMBERS OF VCI AND IMPROVING SECURITY. OVER 5000 VCI HAVE BEEN NEUTRALIZED IN QUANG NAM SINCE THE PROGRAM'S BEGINNING IN 1968. VC RICE AND TAX COLLECTIONS ARE DOWN, VC PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES REDUCED, VC COMMUNICATIONS MADE MORE DIFFICULT, VC EDUCATION AND MEDICAL SERVICES REDUCED, AND THE VC LEGAL SYSTEM LARGELY CURTAILED.

5. RECENT SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF PHUNG HOANG SUCCESSES INCLUDE:

HIEU NHON DISTRICT DIOCC, 3 NOV 70, CAPTURED ONE PW, AND IN REACTING TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE PW, THE DIOCC CAPTURED 37 VCI IN CAM HA VILLAGE, THUS EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALIZING THE BULK OF THE VCI IN THAT VILLAGE.

HIEU DUOC DISTRICT DIOCC, 14-15 NOV 70, A DIOCC DIRECTED AMBUSH SUCCEEDED IN KILLING THE VC SECURITY CHIEF OF HOA LUONG VILLAGE AND A FEMALE COMMUNAL-LIAISON CADRE, AND WOUNDING ONE VC SECURITY CADRE. HIEU DUOC DISTRICT DIOCC, 17 NOV 70, A SECOND DIOCC DIRECTED AMBUSH SET UP NEAR THE HOME OF THE SECURITY CHIEF OF HOA HUNG VILLAGE WAS SUCCESSFUL IN KILLING THE SECURITY CHIEF AND A SUPPLY CADRE. DIEN BAN DISTRICT DIOCC, TWO SUCCESSFUL ROLL-UP OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS, HOWEVER BOTH WERE THE RESULT OF AN ORIGINAL CHANCE CAPTURE, AND NOT SPECIFIC TARGETING. QUANG NAM PROVINCE, JAN TO NOV 1970, AVERAGING OVER 220 VCI NEUTRALIZATIONS PER MONTH, THE HIGHEST IN THE COUNTRY, THE MAJORITY BEING CAPTURED AND RALLIED RATHER THAN KILLED. SPECIFIC TARGETING OPERATIONS ACCOUNT FOR APPROXIMATELY 30% OF ALL NEUTRALIZATIONS IN QUE SON DISTRICT.

C. WEAKNESSES

1. COOPERATION BETWEEN AGENCIES IN THE ATTACK ON THE VCI IS INCOMPLETE AND FORCED, AND COMPETITION BETWEEN AGENCIES IS OCCASIONALLY ENCOURAGED.
2. GVN COMMAND EMPHASIS GENERALLY LACKS FOLLOW-UP. THIS RESULTS IN INCONSISTENT AND SPOTTY PERFORMANCE, WITH HIGH POINTS OF ACTIVITY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE APPLICATION OF COMMAND EMPHASIS.

3. SPECIFIC TARGETING RANGES FROM FAIR TO POOR, WITH GENERAL TARGETING ACCOUNTING FOR MOST NEUTRALIZATIONS.

4. THERE IS A LACK OF AGGRESSIVENESS IN PURSUING LEADS, LETTING KEY (ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION), AND OPERATIONAL FOLLOW-UP ON GOOD INTELLIGENCE.

5. THERE IS A LACK OF AN AGGRESSIVE DIOCC REACTION ARM. NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE (NPFF) UNITS ARE LIMITED AS TO METHODS AND AREAS OF PERMISSABLE OPERATION BY GUARANTEES MADE TO FIELD FORCE MEMBERS ON RECRUITMENT.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. THAT GVN COMMAND EMPHASIS BE MANIFESTED BY ASSIGNING THE BEST POSSIBLE PEOPLE TO THE PHUNG HOANG ORGANIZATION.

2. THAT ONE RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL BE DESIGNATED TO RUN THE DIOCC/PICOC WITH SUFFICIENT RANK (EITHER POLICE OR MILITARY) TO INSURE COMPLIANCE TO ALL ORDERS WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF CHANNELLING ORDERS THROUGH AGENCY HEADS.

3. THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT (OFFICE SUPPLIES AND MONEY) NOW FURNISHED BY PHOENIX TO THE FORMAL PHUNG HOANG APPARATUS BE PHASED-OUT, AND AN EXISTING VIETNAMESE AGENCY BE TASKED WITH PROVIDING THAT SUPPORT.

4. THAT THE POLICE FIELD FORCE BE MODIFIED TO PROVIDE THE DISTRICT PHUNG HOANG APPARATUS WITH AN EFFECTIVE REACTION ARM;
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A. THE NPFF BE PLACED DIRECTLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE DAY-
TO-DAY CHIEF OF THE DI OCC (SEE RECOMMENDATION #2), WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT
TO CHANNEL ALL ORDERS THROUGH THE DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF.

B. REVISE THE RULES GOVERNING THE NPFF TO LIFT THE LIMITATIONS
ON THEIR USE.

C. INTERGRATE THE NPFF AND THE PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT.

D. EQUIP THE NPFF WITH THE HARDWARE (RADIOS TO NET WITH
MILITARY RADIOS, WEAPONS) LEADERSHIP, AND TRAINING (ESPECIALLY FOR HELI-
BORNE OPERATIONS) TO MAKE THEM CAPABLE OF OPERATING ANYWHERE IN THE PROVINCE.

III. SUMMARY
THAT CONCLUDES MY BRIEFING, THE QUESTION OF POLICE VS MILITARY CONTROL OF
THE PHUNG HOAND PROGRAM AND APPARATUS IS COVERED IN DETAIL IN THE TWO
STAFF STUDIES INCLUDED IN THE BRIEFING FOLDER.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
XXIV CORPS
CIVIL OPERATIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT
QUANG-NAM PROVINCE, TEAM 15
APG San Francisco 96349

QNAM-PHX 26 November 1970
SUBJECT: Responsibility for PHUNG-HOANG/PHOENIX

1. PROBLEM.

Whether the attack on the Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure (VCI) would gain in effectiveness by transferring the primary responsibility for the implementation of the PHUNG-HOANG/PHOENIX program (including PIOCC and DIOCC apparatus) from the military to the National Police.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. There are three possible future courses of the conflict in Vietnam; first, continuation of the war with or without US combat forces; second, a cease-fire with an anti-communist government in South Vietnam; and third, a cease-fire with a coalition government in South Vietnam.

b. In the event of a cease-fire with a coalition government in SOUTH VIETNAM, the government attack on the VCI would stop because of the likely amalgamation of substantial numbers of VCI into the legal machinery of government. This possibility is discounted since it makes further discussion of the PHUNG-HOANG/PHOENIX meaningless.

c. A cease-fire with an anti-communist government in South Vietnam will not remove the threat of invasion or continued insurgency (much as has been the case in South Korea). Military forces may be prohibited by terms of the agreement from actively and systematically eliminating VCI. The burden then would fall on the police to combat the threat to internal security posed by the VCI.

d. With either a continuation of the war or a cease-fire with an anti-communist government, the GVN will continue to maintain a large military force.

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QHAN-PHX

26 November 1970

SUBJECT: Responsibility for PHUNG-HOANG/PHOENIX

a. The probable existence of a large military establishment in the RVN, since a cease-fire with a coalition government is unlikely, will dictate that real political power will continue to be exercised by the military, with the military maintaining its grip on the bulk of the available leadership talent.

f. US combat forces will continue to be phased out, and the US advisory effort reduced in the next two years.

g. The National Police will become more effective.

h. The current regulations defining the methods for utilizing the police will not change. (Regulations further explained under paragraph 3.)

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. The primary responsibility, and therefore the impetus, for the elimination of the VCI has been the military, with the result that the PHUNG-HOANG/PHOENIX apparatus (PIOCC's and DIOCC's) have been controlled, if not dominated, by the military.

b. Political power in the RVN is in the hands of the military. This is evidenced by the positions of Province Chief and District Chief being held by ARVN officers.

c. Police participation in the attack on the VCI has been limited by a lack of resources (aggressive reaction forces and hardware) and leadership, in comparison to military resources and leadership.

d. Province and District Chiefs have shown a reluctance to aggressively employ National Police resources. This is due to the following reasons:

(1) The police maintain a separate and vertical chain of command, being paid by Saigon.

(2) Casualties among police forces are discouraged either officially or unofficially. This results in Province and District Chiefs looking first to their Regional and Popular Forces for reaction to intelligence.

(Continued)
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SUBJECT: Responsibility for PHUNG-HOANG/PHOENIX

26 November 1970

(3) Recruitment guarantees are made to regular and field force police which limits their use to relatively secure areas of operation.

(4) Military Province and District Chiefs, by training and experience, understand military men and methods better than they understand the police system.

e. The PHUNG-HOANG/PHOENIX apparatus in three districts in Quang Nam Province have already been made the primary responsibility of the National Police under the "Revitalization" program. These districts continue to place the police personnel in the PHUNG HOANG program under military control. Even with increased police participation, the effectiveness of the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX apparatus in these three districts has either stayed the same or decreased.

f. The withdrawal of US combat forces in the next year, with an accompanying drop in security, dictates that the attack on the VCI in the next two years will assume added importance if South Vietnam is to resist communist domination.

g. The PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program is a cooperative effort by numerous independent agencies with their own vertical lines of control and communications. It requires strong leadership and power to make the program function at all, since it establishes lateral lines of communications cutting across the vertical lines understood by the Vietnamese.

4. DISCUSSION.

a. Advantages of leaving the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX under military control.

(1) It is an established system that functions fairly well, though not as well as had been hoped by the original planners. There has been a noticeable improvement in the flow of information and reaction to intelligence in the last three years.

(2) The military has the money, equipment and leadership to continue to improve the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program.

(3) If the military is cut out of the program except for liaison, the military leaders at province and district level may let the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX die, or circumvent the new organiza-
tion and maintain military control, as has occurred in the three "revitalized" districts.

(4) The military has the political power to force lateral communications between competing agencies.

b. Disadvantages to leaving the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX under military control.

(1) Continued military dominance inhibits the growth and development of the police in the attack on the VCI.

(2) Military forces are geared to attack general rather than specific targets.

(3) Military forces do not have arrest powers (although they can and do detain communist suspects).

(4) The military may be prohibited from legally countering the VCI threat if a cease-fire agreement is reached. This, however, cannot be stated conclusively since in South Korea the military forces have been quite active in countering the threat of insurgency after the cease-fire.

e. ADVANTAGES of transferring the primary responsibility for PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX to the National Police.

(1) Added responsibility may aid in the development of an aggressive police force attracting competent leaders.

(2) It may be desirable to effect a shift in the balance of power within Vietnam from the military to the civilian, and continued encouragement and support to the police would help to accomplish this.

(3) The police are so organized and trained for small police operations, that specific targeting might improve under police control.

(4) Transferring the responsibility for the attack on the VCI at the present time will assist the police in effectively continuing the attack if a cease-fire agreement prohibits military action.

d. Disadvantages of transferring the primary responsibility for the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX to the National Police.

(Continued)
POLLICE STUDY

1. PROBLEM:
Should the National Police take control of the Mung-Hoang/Phoenix Program.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:
Ultimately the National Police will be responsible for security in Viet-Nam at the cessation of hostilities.

The National Police Program will continue to improve and will increase in size and manpower. According to the Vietnameseization Plan, the U.S. Military forces will continue to withdraw from Viet-Nam.

In the event of cease-fire, the Military forces of Viet-Nam will gradually be reduced.

The American Advisory Program will continue in Viet-Nam.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a) The National Police of Viet-Nam have almost 6 million fingerprints on file in Saigon.

b) The National Identification Registration Program will in the future have registered the total registrable population in Viet-Nam.

c) The Sub-Station Program has provided Police to Village/Hamlet areas
Thus providing Police presence in even remote hamlets and villages.
(There are 68 Sub-Stations in Quang-Nam Province).

d) The VNR and KP Telecom work closely with each other and this
provides fast communication to all areas.

e) The National Police have a strong chain of command and each year
the NGP in Saigon sets higher goals for a more effective and active
Police Program.

f) The National Police have the authority to make searches of civilian
homes to seize contraband, to check vehicle registration, driver's
licenses, identification and family census books.

g) The National Police maintain the Province Detention Center.

h) The Police Special Branch and the HPPF are now an important part
of the Phoenix Program.

4. DISCUSSION:

From the beginning of the Phoenix Program the primary role
belonged to the National Police. The HSB contributing intelligence
and the HPPF reacting to intelligence.

There appeared to be reticence on the part of HSB to share
intelligence.

The concept of National Police and particularly HPPF were
unknown to the military side of the program and this created mis-
understanding.
Some District Chiefs hesitated to use NHPF because they were not familiar with the NP concept and either did not care to learn this concept or were not given an opportunity.

The NP organization is a completely civilian organization and is by design not aside from all military organizations. They function with and for the civilian population of Viet-Nam and have only minimal control over any military forces.

The NP chain of command stretching from sub-Inspector daily hire to the Director General in Saigon is strictly a Police organization and operational control is delegated only to members of the National Police. This divergence between Military and NP may have affected the Phoenix Program. (It's understood however, that ranking ARVN officers have been detailed to duty with the National Police).

5. CONCLUSION:

The National Police could control the Phoenix Program effectively.

The Police Special Branch and NHPF have both received special training following the concepts of the Phoenix Program. They are new and will continue to be an integral part of the Phoenix Program. In addition, the NP have wide and extensive programs which would be of immeasurable benefit in the control of the Phoenix Program.

The National Identification Registration Program not only provides an ever expanding fingerprint identification source but also makes immediately available, resources where suspected UOI may be fingerprinted and identified, with greater speed and little or no duplication of effort.
The NP Sub-Station Program has disseminated National Police to some of the most remote villages and hamlets in Viet-Nam and with the continuation of pacification will provide information sources of immeasurable value and tremendous extent.

With the examination of the vast assets of the National Police it becomes more apparent that the Phoenix Program fits more naturally into the National Police structure than any other organization in Viet-Nam.

6. ACTION RECOMMENDED:

An immediate and extensive survey be made of all resources and assets of the NP, with the definite objective of placing the Phoenix Program within the NP structure.

This survey should be of wide scope encompassing not only the assets involved but also the problems encountered in the past.

Projections should be made of the NP program identifying the Phoenix Program within the NP structure.
SPECIAL STUDY
TO: Province Senior Advisor, Quang Nam Province
FROM: Special Police Advisor, Quang Nam Province
SUBJECT: Police Special Branch Participation in Phung Hoang/Phoenix Program

Responsibilities of PSB to Phung Hoang:

1. According to the Phung Hoang SOP 2, there are two basic functions for which the PSB is responsible to Phung Hoang. The first is to contribute information on the VCI to the Phung Hoang intelligence repository. In other words, the information that is collected by the PSB from agents, informants, raliers, prisoners, or whatever source, should funnel into Phung Hoang for appropriate exploitation by responsible operational units. The second function of the PSB is to have representatives on the Phung Hoang committees. On the province level the Section Chief of the Situation Section is to be a Special Police Redactor; on the district level, the Political Sub-Section Chief in the Situation Section is to be the District SP Chief.

Effectiveness of PSB's role in Phung Hoang--the strengths and weaknesses:

2. The question of SP effectiveness and relationship with Phung Hoang was asked of a knowledgeable SP official. According to him the PSB makes a significant contribution to Phung Hoang, not only with the two basic functions cited in paragraph 1, but also in administrating, collating, and processing the information on the district levels.

3. The official said that in general the SP relationship with other elements in the Program is good. He admitted, however, that the PSB does withhold information from central repository--as does other member units. The reason for withholding information is so the SP, NP, or NPPF can exploit information that might otherwise be used by another unit.

4. As the official explained it, on the district level the military influence is great. The district chiefs are militarily controlled; the S-2 officer, who is the individual who usually defines the targets and assigns the action unit, is military. Influenced as they are, they quite naturally favor military operational units so quotas can be met, rewards--both personal and unit recognition and monetary awards--can be merited, professional competition and/or jealousies can be appeased, and US advisors placated.
The civilian forces resent the military control because they lose on exactly what the military gains. They do not wish to be second-class citizens, especially when it hits the pocketbook as it frequently does when weapons and other material are captured.

Should Phung Hoang be changed from a military-controlled agency to a civilian-controlled agency? More specifically, should Phung Hoang be part of the civil police establishment?

5. The objective of US policy towards Vietnam is basically twofold: one, assist the South Vietnamese to defeat communism; two, assist South Vietnam to become a strong, viable nation politically, economically, and militarily in order to resist communist incursion. It is in this light--to achieve these goals--that our implementation efforts must be evaluated; and the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program is one of the more significant programs aimed at achieving the basic objective.

6. To answer the question posed above, there appears to be two choices: one, Phung Hoang should remain controlled and directed as it presently is--i.e., military control; or two, Phung Hoang should be transferred to the control of the National Police.

7. Phung Hoang as it is presently organized and operated has appreciably improved over the past several years to where, in many instances, it is a very productive SVN organ. Moreover, considering the military climate in Vietnam for past years, it has been reasonable and expedient for the Phung Hoang to be controlled by military elements. Having said this, we cannot overlook the obvious need for US guidance, advice, influence, and pressure to resolve the myriad problems still facing Phung Hoang. But at the very least, the organization has been established and has worked, and it may be more expedient to concentrate our advisory efforts on Phung Hoang as it presently stands.

8. If we speculate about transferring Phung Hoang to the National Police, there immediately appear two significant questions: Does the National Police have the capability to assume control? Is the political-military climate in Vietnam such that Phung Hoang should be taken from the military? The undersigned is hesitant about giving a definitive answer because he is not that familiar with the proficiency of the NP. Nor is he that familiar with the overall picture of the military situation. It would appear, however, that in view of US objectives, of the toning down of the military war, of the structure and responsibilities of the NP, that the Phung Hoang Program should be placed under NP auspices--that is, if the Phung Hoang Program is designed to collect information on the VCI and to target against specific VC targets (as contrasted with sweep operations or large-scale military operations).

9. This conclusion does not overlook the fact that Phung...
Hoang can be a very effective program as it presently stands. The conclusion does consider, however, that to maintain Phung Hoang under military control is to prolong the inevitable transfer. There will be obvious problems with such a transfer, but sooner or later they must be faced.

D. A. Scherman
Special Police Advisor
Quang Nam Province
STATUS OF THE PHUOC HOANG PROGRAM IN QUANG NAM
MEMORANDUM FOR: Province Senior Advisor, Quang-Nam Province, MR-1

SUBJECT: Status of PHOENIX/PHUNG-ROANG in Quang-Nam Province

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: The PHOENIX/PHUNG-ROANG (PHX/PH) Program in Quang-Nam Province is functioning and is effective. The VCI threat in the province is approximately 5,700, and PH neutralizes an average of 220 VCI per month. However, close examination reveals certain weaknesses in the program. The major shortcomings are: lack of effective command emphasis; lack of understanding of "specific targeting"; and lack of effective lines of command and communication between military and police. The following study explains these weaknesses and offers possible methods of improvement. It is based on the observations of the Province PHX Coordinator and the responses given by each of the nine DIOCC Coordinators in the province to the following questionnaires:

A. What is your evaluation of the major Vietnamese personal concerned with the DIOCC, to include the District Chief (DC), District National Police Chief (NPC), and Deputy DIOCC Center Chief (Day-to-Day Chief)?

B. What command emphasis is placed on the program?

C. What is level of effectiveness of major agencies participating in PH?

D. What is status of "specific targeting"?

E. What are your major problems and what do you suggest as possible solutions?

F. What training and experiences have you had to prepare you to be a DIOCC Coordinator?

G. What training and experiences has your Deputy DIOCC Coordinator had to prepare him for his job?

H. How effective is your Deputy DIOCC Coordinator and what is his value to the program?

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2. (C) COMMAND EMPHASIS AND EVALUATION OF PRINCIPLE VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL:

A. In all districts except three (Que-Son, Duy-Xuyen, & Dai-Loc), the DC provides little more than lip service support to PH. PH Committee meetings are not held in any district and the DC goes into the DIOC only to escort visiting US VIP’s who express an interest in PH/PH. This complacency appears to stem basically from two factors: (1) a lack of understanding and appreciation of the importance of neutralizing the VC; and (2) as military officers, a desire for clear cut military successes. The PH orientation course for DC’s conducted at Vung-Tau appears to be changing these attitudes slightly. Since his return from the course, the Dai-Loc DC has showed an increased interest in PH. He now holds weekly PH meetings with village officials to improve the quality of the VI/C’s. This is an excellent beginning. In Thong-Thu, the DC appears interested and concerned in PH, but does not seem to know what to do. A more effective advisory effort there should improve this situation, however, this situation emphasizes an unfortunate fact. The effectiveness of each DIOC is directly related to the quality of the advisory effort. The DIOC Coordinators in Que-Son and Duy-Xuyen report that their DC’s are highly competent and provide command emphasis to PH, but still not the kind of command emphasis and leadership that incites the DIOC members to excel. This essential command emphasis must begin at the highest levels.

B. The Province Chief appears genuinely concerned with the success of the PH Program in Quang-Nam. He seems to recognize the necessity for pushing a continuous attack on the VC as an important element of winning the war. At all general meetings, such as the monthly Pacification and Development Council Meetings, he stresses the importance of the program and has often publicly lambasted the chief of an agency for failing to adequately perform his PH mission. Although the Province Chief has never attended a regular weekly meeting of the Province PH Committee of which he is the Chairman, he has conducted several special PH conferences to discuss special campaigns or PH operations. This relatively strong command emphasis from the Province Chief is often ignored by various member agencies of the PH Committee. There is no follow-up to insure compliance with issued orders. This problem is magnified by the National Police who maintain a vertical chain of command from Saigon which can, and has, circumvented the Province Chief.

C. The NPC, at both Province and district level, is a key individual in the PH plan. The Province Chief actively supports PH to the extent he is able within the present organization of PH. He or his deputy attend most of the weekly PH Committee meetings, although, because of "other pressing commitments", he has not attended the past five meetings. In all districts except Duy-Xuyen, the NPC’s are a strong force influencing the
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conduct of the PH plan, but still subordinate to the military influences in the district. The big problem here is the basic differences in mission and tactics between the military forces and the police. Independent and uncoordinated operations often result. The DIDCC Coordinator in Dai-Lo is attempting to solve this problem by recommending a daily meeting between the Sub-Sector S2, Sub-Sector S3, and the District MPC to discuss PH...

D. In most cases, the Vietnamese agencies have assigned competent personnel to work in the DIDCC's and PIDCC, but they are in need of more intensive and meaningful training, and positive leadership.

3. (c) EFFECTIVENESS OF MAJOR AGENCIES PARTICIPATING IN PH:

A. Sub-Sector S2's: The Sub Sector S2's, in all districts except Hieu-Thuan and Hoa-Vang, control the operation of the DIDCC. In Hieu-Thuan and Hoa-Vang, the NPC is the Day-to-Day Chief of the DIDCC, but the Sub-Sector S2 shop remains the major influence in the DIDCC. The Sub-Sector S2 section provides the bulk of the man-power and information to the DIDCC. Subsequently, collection and reaction to military order of battle continues to be the most important function of the DIDCC. The S2's Reconnaissance and Intelligence Squad is an important element of the DIDCC.

B. National Police: National Police participation in PH varies from poor to excellent. Day-Nuyen reports little or no coordination between National Police and the DIDCC. On the other hand, Qua-Son reports the National Police as a highly effective, if not the most effective, element of the DIDCC.

1. Special Police Branch: The Special Police are reluctant to pass pertinent information to the DIDCC's primarily because of a lack of operational security in the DIDCC's. The result is a duplication of effort with the Special Police maintaining duplicate VC1 target dossiers to those kept in the DIDCC. The Special Police dossiers are in all cases more complete than those maintained in the DIDCC and the Special Police use their dossiers as targeting tools which the DIDCC does not do. The DIDCC's have more dossiers, many with only one information report in them.

2. National Police Field Forces (NPPF): The NPPF are an effective DIDCC reaction force when properly employed. All DIDCC's except Thuong-Duc have an NPPF platoon at their disposal. The biggest drawback to utilization of the NPPF is that they must be accompanied by other security elements such as Regional or Popular Forces which has presented problems of command and control in the field.

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C. Rural Development Cadre: This agency could provide a wealth of intelligence about VCI, but actually provide little. The attack on the VCI is definitely far down on their list of priorities.

D. Vietnamese Information Service (VIS): Dac-Dac and Que-Son report that the VIS there are performing an important function in the PH plan by effectively publicizing PH and the objectives of PH. However, the other districts indicated a definite lack of initiative on the part of VIS, which gives PH little or no support.

E. Chieu-Noi Service: Except in Que-Son, little is done to induce VCI to Chieu-Noi and Ho-Chanh are ineffectively exploited. However, due to recently applied pressure from the US side (PH1), Ho-Chanh exploitation has improved.

F. Military Security Service (MSS): The MSS does not actively participate in the PH Program.

G. Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU): The PRU are very effective where employed. They go only after specific targets and are successful about 98% of the time. They are particularly effective in Hieu-Dac, Que-Son, and Duy-Luyen.

4. (C) STATUS OF "SPECIFIC TARGETING": The Vietnamese still do not understand the concept of "specific targeting". The DIOCC's continue to function under the concept of "shotgun" or "general targeting". They classify a cordon, search and screen operation as a specific target operation. The DIOCC's and the PIOCC are repositories for information rather than places where intelligence is manufactured from information and then used to plan meaningful operations. Special Police Case Officers are working in each DIOCC and the PIOCC, but they are merely dossier clerks. Operations are not regularly recommended by them as the result of an intelligence collection effort. As information is received, it is neatly filed in the appropriate dossier and that is the end of it. Occasionally, at the prodding of the US advisor, requests for information are sent out, but there is no follow-up. This is a beginning however. The new VCI target folders and the assignment of a Deputy DIOCC Coordinator has resulted in great improvements. At least new folders are being reviewed and, in general, timely reaction to information has increased. The "Target Folders" remain though basically a repository for reports rather than a targeting tool. The general attitude of the Vietnamese seems to be: "We have had good results with general targeting techniques. Why change a winner?"

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5. (c) GENERAL PROBLEM AREAS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS:

A. VIOCC's, which could be the most productive element in the PH Plan, are not receiving the administrative, logistical, or operational guidance and support they require to function effectively.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION: Organize a PIOCC Inspection and Training Team to go down to VIOCC level to assist in implementing and improving PH, and recurring shortcomings be followed-up with appropriate support or orders from the District or Province Chief. Logistical support now provided to DIOCC's by the National Police, should be extended to include the VIOCC's.

B. Operational security is non-existent in all DIOCC's and the PIOCC. There is no visitor control system. Personnel come and go without question. Prisoners and Ho-Chi-Thanh are brought into the DIOCC's where dossiers, reports, charts, and maps are fully exposed.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION: Recommend PH SOP 3 be amended to include a chapter outlining operational security measures similar to those outlined in US Army Regulation 380-5.

C. VC utilize RVN district boundaries as safe haven areas because of poor coordination between the RVN elements, to include DIOCC elements, operating in these areas.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION: The PIOCC should become more operational and serve as a coordinating agency for the DIOCC's regarding VCI operating in RVN border areas. This suggested solution to one problem exposes another problem in that the PIOCC is now merely an administrative clearing house for reports and directives. The above suggested solution would also solve this problem area.

D. PH is a concept, rather than an organization, and as such, depends on many different agencies for its existence. In June of this year, the National Police became responsible for providing administrative supplies to the DIOCC's, but nothing was authorized for the PIOCC. If PH is ever to exist without the heavy financial support it now receives from PHU, an already existing Vietnamese agency must be given responsibility for its administration and logistical support.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION: Recommend PH be made the administrative

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officer accompanied, the same officer, as a result of the aforementioned incident, will be

The case officer, in the opinion of the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence, should be

Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 403, the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence, has determined that the.

SUSPENDED SERVICE OF FLY IN CHINA PRECEDENT, continued.

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military intelligence, but all their MOS's are 97B (Counterintelligence Specialist). Most of them have completed a one year Vietnamese language course which increases their potential tremendously. However, because the Vietnamese are by culture very rank conscious, their MOS ratings (many are still El's) does inhibit their relations with the Vietnamese military and police officers they must advise.

CHARLES O. PFLUGRAH

CPT, MI
Province PHOENIX Coordinator