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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE

With the interception of a second infiltration trawler in as many months, June proved to be the most active and successful month since the activation of Operation MARKET TIME. A steady increase occurred in the number of incidents involving MARKET TIME units as six additional PCFs joined the operation.¹ Activities continued to be varied as patrol units participated in a number of search and rescue and gunfire support missions. Forces were also bolstered by the activation of a second MIUWS.

POINT LEAGUE TRAWLER INCIDENT

The Cau Mau Peninsula, southern-most region of Vietnam, was the scene of two known infiltration attempts in the five month period from December 1965 to May 1966. Intelligence information indicated that this region had been used on previous occasions for infiltration of supplies to the Viet Cong.² With the exception of a few government controlled population centers the entire region is under Viet Cong control. Therefore, movement of supplies once offloaded from infiltrating vessels is relatively free. To carry out this movement the Viet Cong were reported to have a well developed transportation group operating in the Mekong Delta. All these factors combined to make this general area one of the most likely locations for infiltration attempts.

In anticipation of continuing infiltration attempts augmented MARKET TIME patrols were established in Areas Seven, Eight and Nine.

¹ See Appendix I for MARKET TIME Statistical Summary.
² See Appendix III for translation of the interrogation of a Chieu Hoi rallier, former Viet Cong political officer involved in infiltration.
USS FLOYD COUNTY (IGT-762) was detached from CTF 116 operational control on 9 June and ordered to report to CTF 115 as a support ship for this operation. Task Unit 115.3.9, consisting of WFBs and PCFs operating in Area 7D/7E/8C and 8D, was formed with Commanding Officer FLOYD COUNTY as CTU 115.3.9. Spare PCF crews, PCF maintenance personnel, and spare parts for the PCFs were embarked on FLOYD COUNTY.

The patrol was established with two PCFs and one WFB in Areas 7D/E and 8C/D, and one WFB each in Area 85, the southern half of Area 9A and the northern half of Area 9A. FLOYD COUNTY, two DERs, two MSCs and one MSO were given outer patrol tracks (see chart). In addition, MARKET TIME patrol aircraft were assigned a barrier patrol around the entire patrol area, with orders to report all trawlers and junks to task group commanders and the nearest surface ship.

On 19 June at 1545, an SP2H from WP-2 on a special barrier MARKET TIME flight, detected and photographed a trawler at a position eighty miles east of the Con Son Islands. The trawler, showing the side numbers 2135, was on a course of 210 degrees and at a speed of ten knots when first sighted; it soon altered course to 220 degrees. The aircraft remained in the area long enough to report the contact, then continued on patrol.1

The following morning was clear and calm with one foot seas. Patrol units in Areas Six and Seven had been alerted to the possi-

1 Narrative based on CTF 115 msg 271301Z, Trawler (contact 2002) final report and debriefing reports, Commanding Officer USCGC POINT LEAGUE and USCGC POINT HUDSON.
bility of a steel hull contact in their areas. At 0300, USCGC POINT LEAGUE, patrolling off the mouth of the Co Chien River, obtained a radar contact at a distance of 7.8 miles (see chart for positions). The contact was on a course of 010 degrees at a speed of ten knots, heading toward the mouth of the river. POINT LEAGUE reported the contact appeared to be a steel hull.

POINT LEAGUE closed to four miles and challenged by flashing light. There was no response. The contact soon altered course to the west and angled for the shore, stopping at a position approximately two miles offshore. POINT LEAGUE obtained a second small contact alongside the first and proceeded at maximum speed to close. At six hundred yards she illuminated them and discovered a forty foot, green-hulled junk alongside a steel hull trawler (which was later identified as the same trawler detected the previous afternoon by the MARKET TIME aircraft). Upon illumination the trawler got underway at approximately twelve knots, abandoning the junk and heading for the beach. The time was 0340.

POINT LEAGUE reacted with two warning shots across the bow but the trawler continued; simultaneously POINT LEAGUE went to general quarters. She fired a second burst across the bow which the trawler returned with intense .50 caliber machine gun fire. From the initial burst, POINT LEAGUE took two hits in the pilot house, one an incendiary round which exploded, knocking down the executive officer and temporarily blinding the commanding officer and the helmsman. POINT LEAGUE maintained heavy .50 caliber machine gun fire during the initial action; at 0350 the trawler went hard
aground. During the initial engagement, the junk which had been alongside the trawler may have been sunk by POINT LEAGUE's gunfire.

POINT LEAGUE took advantage of the trawler's inability to maneuver while beached and made a series of three firing runs, the first at 1000 yards and the next two at 1400 yards, using 81mm mortar flares to illuminate the area. On one run she fired 81mm HE mortar rounds at the vessel. She then stood off and awaited assistance. First to arrive was the helicopter fire team from Can Tho and a MARKET TIME VP-2 aircraft.

With the additional support in the area, POINT LEAGUE closed the trawler for closer investigation. At 0600 she came under automatic weapon fire from Viet Cong emplacements in sand dunes on the beach and was forced to withdraw to safer waters. Two USAF F-100s were called in to strafe and bomb the enemy positions.

At 0615 an explosion from an unknown cause was observed onboard the trawler. Fire then broke out, burning intensely in the vicinity of the after hold and the pilot house.

CTF 115 directed that all possible attempts be made to salvage the trawler, and as POINT LEAGUE moved out to replenish her ammunition, USCOC POINT SLOCUM moved in to attempt an approach. She came to within about 800 yards of the trawler, then rest to approximately 100 yards from the beach, and received automatic weapons fire from the shore positions. As POINT SLOCUM made several more passes, the helicopter fire teams moved in with suppression fire. POINT SLOCUM continued to fire on the beach, receiving heavy automatic weapons and recoilless rifle or mortar
fire in return. One small caliber round struck two 81mm mortar HE rounds on her forward mount, inflicting light shrapnel wounds upon one of the gunners. POINT SLOCUM ceased her firing runs as aircraft continued to saturate the beach positions. Light fire was received from the beach until about 0745. The fires on the trawler increased in intensity and ammunition in the holds started to cook off, resulting in numerous small explosions.

At 0715 USS HAVERFIELD (JER-393) (COMCORTRON FIVE embarked) arrived and assumed duties as USN on-scene commander. Also arriving on the scene during the morning hours were units from VNN Coastal Group 35; River Assault Group 23; USS JOHN A. BOLE (DD-755), then assigned as IV Corps Tactical Zone naval gunfire support ship; and USCOC POINT HUDSON. Surface and air attacks continued on the Viet Cong shore positions in an effort to eliminate enemy resistance.

At 1000, with the Viet Cong resistance apparently suppressed, a composite boarding and salvage team consisting of volunteer personnel from the WPEs, HAVERFIELD, and VNN units approached the burning trawler in two Coastal Group junks. Using portable fire fighting equipment they cooled the fire sufficiently to permit a boarding attempt. In defiance of the flames and exploding ammunition, the salvage team boarded the trawler and commenced removing cargo. While personnel continued to fight the fires on board the trawler, POINT LEAGUE made an attempt to tow the trawler free. The attempt was aborted by a broken tow line. VNN LSSL 225, the Vietnamese on-scene commander, assisted in the attempt.

USS TORTUGA (LSD-26) arrived on scene at 1020, assumed OTC
for salvage operations, and transferred a damage control team to the trawler by LCVP and LCM. At 1115 troops from the ARVN Twenty-first Division landed in the beach area via U.S. Army helicopters and established a defensive perimeter.

Throughout the morning and into the early afternoon U.S. and Vietnamese personnel continued to offload cargo and fight the fire.

By 1315 the fires were under control, and at 1400 all fires were out and salvage personnel commenced dewatering operations. At 1500 another abortive attempt to tow the trawler free was made by the boats in the area. The decision was then made to continue to dewater the trawler and offload cargo while awaiting the arrival of Harbor Clearance Teams One and Three aboard Light Lift Craft One. At 1655 the VNN Third Coastal Zone Commander arrived and assumed VNN on-scene commander; and at 1840 the MSTS contract tug WINQUAT arrived in the area.

While preparations were continued for towing the trawler free, night security was established aboard the trawler and in the adjacent area. A heavily armed party guarded the trawler. WPBs, VNN Fleet Command ships and Coastal Group junks patrolled the waters; ARVN troops on the beach maintained the defensive perimeter ashore; and USS HAVENFIELD, USS TORTUGA, USS JOHN A. BOLE, and a flare aircraft remained in the vicinity.

On 21 June at 0400, LLC-1 and HCT personnel arrived and commenced final salvage operations. They found the trawler listing about twenty degrees to port, with at least eight holes in the deck and starboard side from 81mm mortar rounds. Numerous smaller holes
were found in the underwater body from internal explosions. At 0615 divers inspected the underwater body and installed temporary plywood patches. A salvage pump and eductors were used to dewater the holds and the engineroom and unloading of cargo was expedited. These actions proved effective. At 1110, the trawler righted itself on the flooding tide, decreasing the twenty degree list to five degrees. This list remained constant during the subsequent tow to Saigon. At 1200 the trawler was pulled free.

The tow was then transferred to the NSTS tug WINQUAT. Escorted by USCGC POINT JEFFERSON and LLC-1, WINQUAT towed the trawler to Vung Tau, arriving there on 22 June at 0600. All other units returned to normal patrol. The trawler was then towed to Saigon by VNN LSSL 226 via the Suirap River, arriving at the VNN shipyard the morning of 23 June. All contraband from the trawler was transferred to VNN LSIL 328 for shipment to Can Tho. These actions were in accordance with orders from the Vietnamese Joint General Staff.

The trawler was 98 feet 11 inches long with a beam of 19 feet 4 inches, an estimated full load draft of 6 feet 7 inches and a displacement of 280 tons. The steel hull was green in color with an ivory superstructure and had two cargo holds. The only hull identification was the number 2135 on the bow. As in the case of the trawlers intercepted on 31 December 1965 and 10 May 1966, the numbers were on scoreboard-type removable plates with numbers on each side. The basic hull configuration was similar to the HISSEM.

1 COMNAVFORV msg 24013Z June 66, Report of Salvage of Enemy Infiltration Vessel
trawler of 31 December and the POINT GREY trawler of 10 May, the
major difference being that the superstructure was situated further
aft. The known armament consisted of single .50 caliber machine
gun mounts aft of the pilot house, on the forecastle and on the
port and starboard sides amidships. These guns were covered by
fishing nets when the trawler was first sighted by the patrol
aircraft (see photograph). In addition to the fishnets, the
trawler carried fishing buoys and buoy marking poles in the waist
as camouflage.

Non-technical equipment situated on top of the pilot house
and still intact included horns, voicetube, floodlight and flashing
light key. The compass was partially destroyed, and the wheel,
compass, engine order telegraph and navigation equipment was missing,
indicating emergency destruction procedures were at least partially
carried out. Partially destroyed communications equipment, consist-
ing of a transmitter, receiver, dynamotor and distribution box was
recovered as were two antenna bases.

The engine room was in excellent condition despite a coating
of oil from the flooding. The engineering equipment was in an
excellent state of repair and an ample supply of spare parts was
found. The main engine was a 225 HP four cycle, solid injection,
air starting diesel of East German manufacture.

Although the actual complement of the crew is not known,
berthing for fourteen persons was found. The initial photograph
showed a total of eleven persons visible. Following the action

1 NAVFORV msg 241059Z June 66, COMNAVFORV INTSUM 72-66
2 NAVFORV msg 211141Z June 66, COMNAVFORV INTSUM 69-66
of 20 June five bodies were discovered behind the beach and one body was found in the engineroom. Two wounded crewmen were captured by ARVN troops on the shore, one of whom subsequently died. The second prisoner underwent initial interrogation during June but revealed no information.

Approximately 100 tons of cargo were salvaged from the trawler. The weapons were predominately of Communist Chinese manufacture, with some Soviet weapons and a small number of North Korean rifles. This is the first known instance of North Korean manufactured arms in the IV CTZ. Some ammunition boxes were dated 1966, indicating a relatively rapid Chinese Communist distribution system from the factory to the port of origin of the trawler. A new type of 75mm spin-stabilized HEAT projectile recovered, believed compatible with CHICOM smooth-bore weapons, would increase the Viet Cong anti-tank and anti-patrol boat capability. The large quantity of sophisticated weapons on board indicated that the material was not intended solely for use in the IV CTZ but was probably destined for large main force units in the III CTZ.

Although some documents were destroyed in the fire or otherwise disposed of, several were recovered from the trawler and, later, from the vicinity of dead crewmen behind the beach. The engine log recovered indicated that the main machinery had been running constantly at various RPMs since 14 June, with intermittent operation prior to that date. Entries in the navigator's workbook

1 CTP 115 msg 271301Z June 66
2 See Appendix III for complete breakdown of material captured from trawler
3 NAVFORV msg 241059Z June 66. NAVFORV INTSUM 72-66.
and on charts indicated a track possibly initiating 100 miles southwest of Hong Kong and directly to seaward of the same area of the Chinese mainland finally approached by the trawler discovered by USS HISSEK on 31 December off the Ca Mau Peninsula. The track skirted east of the Macclesfield Bank on 16 June, then southeasterly on 17 and 18 June to 08-37 degrees north. It then proceeded westward toward the Conson Islands (Puolo Condore). A course alteration toward the northwest within an hour of the 19 June aircraft sighting would have allowed the trawler to penetrate to the point of discovery at a speed of advance of ten knots. This course would have taken it north of an MSO and south of a DER on barrier patrols, and outside the radar detection range of either unit at the probable passage time. A VP aircraft passed within ten nautical miles at 0300 on 20 June; and possibly passed the trawler at the same range at 2215 on 19 June. No contact was established on either occasion.

A captured chart suggested that the intended destination was possibly the Long Nuoc River mouth in Vinh Binh province. An alternate course was also plotted to the mouth of the Con Chung River. A review of the two known and one suspected infiltration attempts detected by MARKET TIME units revealed that all these entries into the coast were planned for a high tide at first light. In the IV Corps Tactical Zone coastal areas, trawlers of this type can only enter the numerous small rivers and canals at high tide. The lunar high tides average ten to twelve feet.

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FIREFIGHTING AND SALVAGE OPERATIONS
TRAWLER IN TOW TO VUNG TAU
The trawler had not made an attempt to offload the cargo prior to detection as the hatches were still covered and the holds were still full when the boarding party made its initial investigation. The loss of this trawler, combined with the loss of the trawler on 20 May, represented a serious blow to Viet Cong support. It is a loss felt not only in the IV CTZ where the ships were interdicted, but throughout other areas where the material might have been distributed.¹

**PATROL ACTIVITIES**

The steady increase in the number of MARKET TIME units in country and on patrol gave rise to a marked increase in incidents during June. Most of these incidents involved patrol units taking evading junks under fire after all efforts to bring the suspect junks alongside, including use of the siren, bullhorn and warning shots, had failed.

Almost all the evading junk incidents occurred in the First and Second Coastal Zones, with a suspect contact typically running close to the beach and evading as soon as the first warnings were signalled. Often the occupants managed to flee to safety on the beach or to jump overboard when the first shots were fired. In all instances the junks were either sunk, destroyed or damaged.

On several occasions enemy gunfire confirmed the suspicious junk activity. The night of 29 June, PCF 42 responded to an urgent request for gunfire support from Van Ninh subsector of Khanh Hoa Province. Upon delivering 81mm mortar fire, the PCF received

¹ COMNAVFORV msg 241059Z June 66. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 72-66.
small arms fire from the beach. Van Ninh subsector responded to
a reciprocal request from the PCF and delivered 105mm howitzer
fire at the Viet Cong shore positions. During the firing a junk
attempted to leave the beach. The PCF closed, illuminated and
attempted to hail the contact. The junk evaded back toward the
beach and was taken under fire by 81mm mortar. Two direct hits
were scored, sinking the junk and killing an estimated five Viet
Cong. During the action PCF 42 continued to receive fire from
the beach. After sinking the junk PCF 42 silenced the fire from
the beach with machine gun and mortar fire.

Also on the night of 29 June, USCG POINT LOMAS, operating
100 miles north of Qui Nhon off Quang Nhai Province, opened fire
on an evading junk. Simultaneously, automatic weapons fire was
received from a second junk 600 yards north of the first. As
POINT LOMAS took the junks under fire, USS ENGAGE (MSO-443),
operating nearby, was called in to assist. ENGAGE took the second
junk under fire with her 40mm gun and destroyed it. The first
junk managed to beach and the occupants fled. It was then taken
under fire and destroyed. This action took place during the execu-
tion of Plan END AROUND. (See Emergency Action Plans Section).

On the morning of 16 June, USCGC POINT CYPRESS detected a
contact moving north across the mouth of the Co Chien River.
POINT CYPRESS, then at a range of five miles, proceeded to inter-
cept the contact. Upon firing illumination rounds, she observed
three junks about 25 feet in length, and fired a series of warning
shots. The reply came in a burst of fire from all three junks,
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returned immediately by POINT CYPRESS's .50 caliber machine guns. Within minutes one junk disintegrated in a violent explosion. The other two junks were damaged but managed to evade to small canals at the north of the Co Chien River mouth. Three Viet Cong were confirmed killed, with at least two more possibly killed.

GUNFIRE SUPPORT

MARKET TIME units conducted pre-planned gunfire support missions during June. On 24 June from 1500 to 1530, USCGC POINT GLOVER fired a gunfire support mission at Viet Cong assembly points on Phu Quoc Island. She expended forty-two rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition, damaging one Viet Cong structure. On 27 June, USCGC POINT CLEAR, USCGC POINT GLOVER, PCF 3 and PCF 20 fired the second mission, also at targets on Phu Quoc Island. 140 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition were expended, resulting in destruction of two Viet Cong structures and damage to two others.

MARKET TIME units responded to seven requests for urgent gunfire support during the month. Most missions were fired at Viet Cong installations or troop concentrations. On 8 June, USCGC POINT GARNET and PCF 5 responded to a call for assistance from a Special Forces outpost under attack on Phu Quoc Island. Forty rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition were fired while assisting the outpost.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS

Three emergency action plans are available for MARKET TIME units to establish barriers or concentrated area inspections of junks and sampans to thwart the movement of contraband. They are
designed to be rapidly executed with minimum communications.

Plan LINE PILAGE establishes a barrier perpendicular to the shoreline to intercept traffic moving along the coast. Plan END AROUND establishes a barrier parallel to the coastline for intercepting suspect traffic moving from seaward toward the shore, or from the shore to the sea. Plan CORAL is set to establish a specific area of search where it is indicated that closer scrutiny of traffic, such as a large concentration of junks, is required.

Plan CORAL was executed twice during June, on both occasions in the Vung Tau area. Although nothing suspicious was detected, response was excellent in both instances. Plan END AROUND was executed once (results discussed previously).

SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

12-hour TIME units participated in four search and rescue operations during June. On 6 June, USS FORTEFY (KSO-446), USS DYNAMIC (KSO-432), PCF 45 and PCF 51 conducted SAR operations following a collision between two Vietnamese civilian junks off Ben Than Point just north of Nha Trang. Five survivors were recovered. On 17 June FORTEFY and PCF 46 conducted SAR operations at the scene of a Navy C-130 crash north of Cam Ranh Bay. No survivors were found. On 27 June PCFs and LCPLs from EUNAS 12 conducted an unsuccessful search for a man lost overboard from USS CHESSTERRFIELD COUNTY.

At 1800 on 26 June two junks from Vung Coastal Group 36 departed USS TORTUGA for their base at the entrance to the Bassac River.

At a point approximately fifteen miles from the entrance to the
Bassac River, one junk developed engine trouble and the second, with two U.S. advisors and six VNN sailors embarked, came alongside to assist. While alongside, the hull opened up on the second junk and it started taking on water rapidly. Weapons and other equipment were quickly transferred to the junk with engine trouble, but in the confusion it drifted away. All efforts to save the swamping junk failed. At 1900 the eight occupants were forced to take to the water, tying themselves together and using five life jackets and several crates to stay afloat. TORTUGA, who had maintained radio contact with the CG 36 advisors, immediately dispatched SAR units including an LCPL, LCVP, PACV, and fire team helos. MARKET TIME units dispatched to the scene included USS INFLICT (MSS-456), PCF 40, USCGC POINT LEAGUE and USCGC POINT HUDSON. A flare aircraft was also dispatched to assist. A creeping line search plan was executed throughout the night in spite of 25 to 40 knot winds and four to six foot swells. The disabled junk was recovered at 940 by an LCVP from TORTUGA with seven survivors embarked. They reported that the eight men from the second junk were still in the water. The search continued until the following morning at 0700 when POINT LEAGUE recovered the eight survivors in excellent condition.

MARKET TIME FORCES

An additional six PCFs arrived in-country during June, bringing the total boats to 54. All six units were assigned to PCF Division 105 at Qui Nhon.

On 10 June two PACVs moved to USS TOFUGA for assessment in
GAME WARDEN operations off the Mekong Delta in a continuation of their evaluation program. These operations included transits to and from the base at Cat Lo until 29 June, when the PACVs returned to Cat Lo to start undergoing modifications. In addition to night river patrols the PACVs evaluated their operational potential with an LSD type ship.

Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Surveillance Unit Eleven (MUWS 11) became operational at Cam Ranh Bay during June, bringing to two the number of operational MUWS units. MUWS 12 at Vung Tau received two additional Mark XI LCPL patrol boats to bring their total to four; and MUWS 11 received four Mark XI LCPLs. Personnel from MUWS 23 arrived in Qui Nhon during the month and started preparation of harbor defense facilities. Also, equipment for MUWS 22 arrived at Nha Trang.

On 20 June two WPBs from Coast Guard Squadron 11 at An Thoi underwent drydocking in Bangkok, Thailand. Lack of in-country drydocking facilities necessitated the use of the Thai shipyard facilities. Results of the docking were not completely satisfactory as both boats experienced bottom peeling. Re-docking was necessary.

In MARKET TIME air operations USS SALISBURY SOUND (AV-13) disestablished the seadrome at Cam Ranh Bay on 3 June. Patrol Squadron Two with a detachment of seven aircraft at Tan Son Nhut Airbase at Saigon continued daily surveillance flights in support of MARKET TIME operations. Patrol Squadrons Eight, Twenty-eight and forty-seven, flying P3A aircraft out of Sangley Point,
Philippine Islands, supported MARKET TIME operations in the northern area from Cam Ranh Bay to the Seventeenth Parallel.

The following Seventh Fleet units operated as a part of Task Force 115 during all or part of June:

USS SAVAGE (DER-386)
USS BRISTER (DER-327)
USS VANCE (DER-387)
USS FALGOUT (DER-324)
USS FORSLER (DER-334)
USS KOINER (DER-331)
USS HAVERFIELD (DER-393)
USS KRECHMER (DER-329)
USS WARBLER (MSC-206)
USS ALBATROSS (MSC-289)
USS DYNAMIC (MSC-432)
USS CONFLICT (MSC-426)
USS FORTIFY (MSC-446)
USS ENGAGE (MSC-443)
USS IMPERVIOUS (MSC-449)
USS INFLECT (MSC-456)
USS LOYALTY (MSC-457)
USS WIDGEON (MSC-208)

* * * * *
RIVER PATROL FORCE

The arrival of sixteen new PBRs and the movement of two additional River Patrol Sections into the Mekong Delta highlighted GAME WARDEN operations during June. Indicative of the increased patrol effort and its effect on the Viet Cong was the increased number of incidents involving GAME WARDEN units. In the Rung Sat Special Zone PBRs assumed the remaining stations occupied by PCFs, releasing them for MARKET TIME duties. An initial assessment of the fledgling stages of GAME WARDEN indicated that the operation was accomplishing its mission.

DELTA PATROL GROUP

The first test of the off-shore support ship concept in the Mekong Delta was initiated on 13 June. Intelligence indicated extensive Viet Cong movement of material in the vicinity of the mouths of the Co Chien and Bassac Rivers to Viet Cong secret zones known to exist along the Delta Coast (see chart). In an attempt to counter this, COMNAVFORV directed CTF 116 to deploy mobile units to the vicinity of the mouths of the Co Chien and Bassac Rivers, and to establish anti-infiltration and interdiction patrols. This was accomplished by deploying River Section 512, with ten PBRs, two PACVs and one helicopter fire team aboard USS TORTUGA (LSD-26) for operations in the designated area. At the same time, USS FLOYD COUNTY (LST-762) was chopped to CTF 115 and its helicopter fire team shifted to the airfield at Vung Tau.

1 See Appendix II for GAME WARDEN Statistical Summary
For the remainder of the month TORTUGA, with her embarked components, maintained a mobile station in the vicinity of the river mouths. Although operations were at times curtailed by sea conditions, the PBRs maintained frequent and aggressive patrols.

On 19 June, PBRs 55 and 60, on patrol in the northern reach of the Bassac River estuary, detected a single sampan crossing rapidly from south to north. Closing at high speed, the PBRs fired ten warning shots. The sampan failed to respond and was taken under fire by .50 caliber machine gun. After forty rounds had been fired, the sampan disintegrated from a secondary explosion. There were no survivors recovered, and no assessment of Viet Cong casualties. The sampan's movement was evaluated as a Viet Cong attempt to transport explosives across the river.

The heaviest action involving PBRs occurred the morning of 20 June at the mouth of the Bassac River near the small Cai Co River. PBRs 57 and 58 detected, then closed and illuminated a forty foot junk crossing the Bassac estuary at high tide. At a range of fifty yards the junk opened fire at PBR 57, the lead boat, using automatic weapons and an anti-tank rocket launcher. The initial round from the rocket launcher struck its mark on the PBR, but heavy .50 caliber and .30 caliber machine gun fire forced the junk to flee up the shallow Cai Co River. Of the estimated ten Viet Cong on board, at least two were killed or wounded. One was seen to fall overboard and the other fell back into the boat. The PBRs suffered two casualties; one the forward gunner and the second the Vietnamese Navy liaison petty officer from Coastal Group 35.
Both were evacuated by helicopter with shrapnel wounds. PBR 57 received a twelve inch by eight inch hole on the forward deck and a five inch hole on the starboard side above the waterline. The .50 caliber machine gun mount housing, the whip antenna, the radar antenna and the spotlight lens were damaged by shrapnel.

On two occasions armed helicopter fire teams from TORTUGA saw significant action on the Bassac River. On 19 June the helicopters fired on three camouflaged sampans near the mouth of the river in the same area as the PBR 57/58 incident. Automatic weapons fire was received in return. One Viet Cong was killed, one sampan destroyed and two sampans damaged. One man from the fire team was wounded when a round struck the flexible gun drive. On 21 June the fire team again came under automatic weapons attack. The fire was returned with machine gun and rocket fire. One hut was destroyed and an estimated five Viet Cong killed.

During early June, work neared completion on the interim GAME WARDEN facilities at My Tho on the northern branch of the Mekong River. On 20 June River Section 531, with Commander River Division 53, transited from Cat Lo to the mouth of the Cua Tieu River. There they were met by an escort of VNN River Assault Group craft and proceeded up the Cua Tieu River to My Tho. Area familiarization patrols were conducted and an intensive psychological warfare campaign administered, including leaflet drops and distribution of family comfort kits.

GAME WARDEN units at Can Tho completed their first full month of patrol in June. During the month stepped up harassment of...
patrol units indicated the patrols were starting to have some effect on Viet Cong movements. On the morning of 11 June, PBRs 38 and 39, patrolling ten miles northwest of Can Tho on the Bassac River, received a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire from positions on the bank. The fire was suppressed with 500 rounds of .50 caliber machine gun fire and seven M-79 grenades. The patrols observed one large secondary explosion during the action. There were no friendly casualties or damage. The PBRs maintained surveillance in the area for the remainder of the night, but no movement was detected. The action was later evaluated through ground reconnaissance as an attempted Viet Cong platoon crossing.

The same evening PBRs 36 and 37, patrolling in the Can Tho area, received .30 caliber machine gun and automatic rifle fire. Suppression fire consisting of 700 rounds of .50 caliber machine gun, five grenades and 260 rounds of small arms fire silenced the attack as the PBRs cleared the area. Again, there were no friendly casualties.

A sandbar fourteen miles southeast of Can Tho in the Bassac River provided the location for significant Viet Cong psychological warfare activity on 27 June. Here, at 2230, PBR 38 discovered a beached bamboo float. The float was a replica of a PBR, covered with haze-grey canvas and flying a Viet Cong flag. A sign on board – in Vietnamese – challenged the Americans to fight, and included the phrase "Sat My" – "Kill Americans". The float was taken under fire by .50 caliber machine guns, damaged and forced into the river. Cautious of possible booby traps, the PBR stayed
well clear and allowed it to float away with the current.

RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE PATROL GROUP

Early in June, reliable intelligence sources indicated that U.S. river patrol units, fixed wing air strikes, armed helicopter reconnaissance missions and PCF mortar harassing fire along the east bank of the Soirap River north of the Vam Sat River had forced the Viet Cong to abandon this crossing point. Other sources indicated that patrols on both the Long Tau and the Soirap Rivers had effectively curtailed Viet Cong night-time movement. Instead, crossings were being made around sunrise and sunset, using seemingly innocent sampans stationed in mid-stream at bends in the river to notify Viet Cong sampans of the passing of patrol units. In an attempt to counter this, special daytime patrols were established by PBRs on 8 June.

Lending support to this information, night-time interdiction of Viet Cong river movement in the Rung Sat Special Zone was almost nil for the first time in three months. In the one significant action, on 19 June at 2100, PBRs on station near the mouth of the Vam Sat River closed a contact moving from east to west across the Soirap River. As the PBRs closed to investigate, they found one swamped sampan and four to five people in the water. Two of the swimmers were floundering while the other two were swimming strongly toward the beach. The PBRs closed the two strong swimmers, hailed them with no response, then fired warning shots. They still refused

1 NAVFORV msg 131039Z June 66. COMNAVFORV INTSUM 62-66.
to be rescued. Wary of the danger of hand grenades, the boat captain ordered the swimmers taken under fire. They were shot, and subsequently sank beneath the surface. A search was then conducted for the other two swimmers, but no trace could be found and they were presumed drowned. The sampan was recovered and found to have a satchel containing a Viet Cong school transcript, maps, documents, personal letters, money and clothes. Approximately forty-five minutes later a second deserted sampan was recovered in the same area. Both sampans and the captured material were turned over to VNM authorities at Nha Be.

The helicopter fire teams continued their effective reconnaissance of the Rung Sat Special Zone, and on several occasions came to the assistance of beleaguered outposts. In the most significant incident, on the night of 9 June, U.S. Army advisors reported that the hamlet of Binh Thanh was under attack by an undetermined number of Viet Cong, and the fire team from TORTUGA was launched to the scene while PBRs on station stood by to assist. The helicopters made strikes to the south and east of the hamlet, suppressed the fire and thwarted the attack.

On 27 June at 1145, while on a routine daytime reconnaissance flight, the fire team spotted a supply cache on the east bank of the Soirap River at a large bend six miles south of Nha Be. The fire team was ordered by CTG 116.2 not to take the cache under fire, and a reaction force of two Regional Force companies embarked on boats from RAG 22 at Nha Be immediately proceeded to the scene. Prior to their arrival two large explosions were observed at the
cache, indicating that the Viet Cong had attempted to destroy the supplies to prevent capture. The explosions were evaluated as command detonated boxes of grenades. Upon arrival, the reaction force discovered 208 fragmentation grenades, three cans of explosives; 2000 brass casings; one tool kit for loading and fusing ammunition; four bags of sulphur, black powder and potassium nitrate; ten pounds of assorted small arms ammunition; one roll of wire and wire cutters; ten automatic weapons magazines; and one sampan. The cache was evaluated as being readied for movement out of the Rung Sat Special Zone.

The problem of civilian movement in prohibited areas was again brought to light during June. On 2 June at 1215, a spotter aircraft - Long Tao A10/FAC - observed an apparently deserted sampan on a small stream near the Long Tao River, in a region prohibited to civilian traffic. An outboard motor wrapped in plastic was in the boat. Soon afterward, a second sampan was observed approaching the first, then transferring goods from the deserted sampan. Seawolf 16, an armed helicopter on Long Tao River patrol, was authorized by Vietnamese Navy authorities at Nha Be to take the sampans under fire. The Long Tao FAC reported both sampans sunk and the three occupants killed. At 1358, the Long Tao Fire Team spotted a beached sampan in the vicinity of the earlier strike and obtained permission to destroy it. The following day Vietnamese personnel found one dead and two wounded in the vicinity of the strikes. The two survivors, 1

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1 See NAVFOHVS Historical Summary, April 1966, p. 23, for previous incident in RSSZ.
reported to be civilians, stated they had been fired on from a helicopter. Medical evacuation of the survivors was made.

One successful SEAL team ambush took place during the month. On 14 June, an ambush was set on the Co Gia River near the eastern edge of the Rung Sat Special Zone, with the SEAL team moved in to place by units of RAG 22. At 0030 on 15 June, a sampan was detected moving along the river and was taken under fire. One Viet Cong was killed, one wounded and a third escaped. In a simultaneous action, a Regional Force 999 Company ambush team killed three Viet Cong.

In mine countermeasures activity, Nha Be based NSBs continued their daily sweeps of the Long Tau River ship channel and the Nha Be anchorage. They were assisted by VNN NSBs. PBRs from Nha Be continued to assist U.S. Army patrol units in providing security at the Nha Be anchorage. In a significant mine discovery during the afternoon of 12 June, a friendly fisherman located one electrical wire leading from the bank down into the Long Tau River approximately five miles southeast of Nha Be. He reported the discovery to Nha Be and RAG units were dispatched to the scene. About five meters from the bank two poles, three meters apart, were found protruding about one half meter from the surface. At the bottom of the poles a mine was found. The mine was made from two oil cans fastened together by two wooden sticks.1 It was capable of remaining beneath the surface in wet storage, then being moved into any location in the channel by a sampan after the passage of the minesweepers.

1 This is the same type of mine found on 27 May under OUR LADY OF PEACE. See NAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, May 66, p. 26.
The addition of sixteen new PBRs during June bolstered GAME WARDEN forces, bringing the total boats in country to sixty-three. Eight PBRs arrived on 4 June aboard the SS CATAMBA VICTORY; three were assigned to RIVPATSECT 543, and five to RIVPATSECT 531. The second group arrived on 9 June aboard the CCNY VICTORY; five were assigned to RIVPATSECT 531, and three to RIVPATSECT 522.

In PBR movements not previously mentioned, RIVPATSECT 543 with seven PBRs shifted from USS TORTUGA to Cat Lo on 2 June. On 7 June, RIVPATSECT 531 and the remaining units of RIVPATSECT 543 shifted from USS TORTUGA to Cat Lo. On 8 June RIVPATSECT 543 completed operational checks and reported to CTF 116 for duty; and on 17 June RIVPATSECT 531 completed operational checks and reported for duty. On 10 June RIVPATSECT 512 and RIVPATSECT 542 shifted from Cat Lo to Nha Be.

During the month of June approximately 200 enlisted personnel reported to River Squadron Five. By the end of the month, all River Patrol Sections had at least fifty-five men assigned, and had extra boat crews and maintenance personnel.

The PBRs continued to experience extensive surface corrosion. Especially susceptible were the Jacuzzi pump grill inserts. Shaft casualties also continued to plague the PBRs. New type, stronger shafts had not yet been received by the end of the month. During June, RIVRONFIV commenced issuing Squadron Maintenance Bulletins covering maintenance problems encountered in the PBRs. These were
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sent to all River Divisions, River Patrol Sections, and Naval Support Activity, Saigon detachments that support PBRs.

INITIAL GAME WARDEN ASSESSMENT

An assessment of effectiveness of Operation GAME WARDEN since the arrival of the first PBRs in-country on 20 March was promulgated on 24 June. Based on intelligence reports from captive Viet Cong, Chieu Hoi ralliers and special agents as well as from evaluation of aerial surveillance, GAME WARDEN appeared to be effectively accomplishing its mission of interdicting Viet Cong movements on the major rivers of the Rung Sat Special Zone and on that portion of the Bassac River in the vicinity of Can Tho where the initial Delta patrols were being conducted.

Indications were that the Viet Cong were slowly being starved out of large areas of the Rung Sat Special Zone, a region which has traditionally been under enemy control. The employment of ground forces to strike at the heart of the Rung Sat Special Zone - Operations JACKSTAY, LEXINGTON III, and continuing VNW and Regional Force operations - destroyed large quantities of food, arms and ammunition, and numerous Viet Cong facilities. This necessitated enemy resupply, withdrawal or severe hardship. Continuous GAME WARDEN patrols in support of these operations contributed to the disruption of resupply routes from Long An and Go Cong provinces. A marked reduction in the number and scope of Viet Cong initiated incidents in the Rung Sat Special Zone since March was indicative of the enemy's loss of freedom of action. LSD/IST based UH-1E fire teams were effectively

1 COMMNAVFORV msg 240937Z June 1966, GAME WARDEN Operations

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employed in the Rung Sat Special Zone for direct PBR support, and for armed reconnaissance and preplanned strikes. These operations, conducted during the training phase off Vung Tau, substantiated predictions of similar effective support when the PBRs are deployed aboard LSTs in the ultimate GAME WARDEN stations off the Delta River mouths.

Although GAME WARDEN forces in the Delta were not yet at programmed strength, initial experience with the one section operating from the temporary base at Can Tho was noteworthy. On two known occasions attempted crossings by Viet Cong units were stopped by patrols. Reports from the IV Corps Tactical Zone indicated that Viet Cong commanders voiced concern at the presence of the U.S. craft on the river. Disruption of Viet Cong tax collectors on the Bassac River was confirmed by the Tre On Village Chief, who stated that the arrival of the PBRs enabled villagers for the first time to transport their produce to Can Tho without paying Viet Cong taxes. The VNN commander of the Fourth Riverine Area considered friendly river traffic of the Bassac to be markedly increased. In addition, the influence of PBR night patrols resulted in increased RAG 25 patrol activity during the daytime.

Based on this initial assessment, GAME WARDEN was considered to be an important deterrent to Viet Cong movements on and across the major rivers of the Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone. Increased effectiveness was anticipated as additional boats and bases become operational, and the crews gain familiarity and confidence and evolve tactics to counter Viet Cong efforts in their areas of responsibility.

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HARBOUR CLEARANCE

Since their arrival in country in April, personnel of Harbor Clearance Team One and Light Lift Craft One have made a series of important contributions to the maritime war effort. Both units participated in the salvage of cargo from the POINT GREY trawler in May (see May COMAURFORV Historical Summary), followed by clearance operations at My Tho. Augmented by personnel from Harbor Clearance Team Three, they played a vital role in the capture of the POINT LEAGUE trawler in June.

MY THO SUBMERGED WRECK REMOVAL

The establishment of a CONVOY WARDEN base at My Tho in the Mekong Delta brought with it the requirement for construction of a pontoon floating pier for use by the PEsUs. The base site was selected and approved, but removal of a wreck of approximately 520 tons displacement, located at the site where the pontoon floating pier facilities were to be situated, was required.

Positive identification of the wreck was not possible, but local information further substantiated by name plate data indicated that it was the wreck of the French cargo vessel FAULBERT, believed sunk by bombing in early 1945.¹

Although some initial difficulties were experienced, permission to move the wreck was obtained from the Province Chief of Dinh Tuong and the local My Tho District Chief; with further approval by the Director of the Vietnamese Bureau of Navigation, the Government of Vietnam Ministry of Transportation, and the GVN

¹ COMNAVFORV splitr ser 769 of 25 June 1966 summarizes.
Public Works Department. U.S. Navy salvage units were authorized to lift the wreck from its position adjacent to My Tho across the northern branch of the Mekong River to a position on the northwest tip of Cu Long Island.

On 20 May Harbor Clearance Team One arrived at My Tho embarked in Light Lift Craft One (LLC-1). The project was planned in two phases. The first, the preparatory phase, consisted of removing mud and sand from the inside of the hulk using air lifts; then tunneling under the hulk and passing messengers for subsequent reeling of heavy lift wires. The second phase was to effect the actual lift and movement of the hulk. To accomplish this, two Heavy Lift Craft (ALC-1 and ALC-2) were to be towed from Subic Bay, Philippines Islands, to My Tho.

On 20 May LLC-1 was positioned alongside the wreck and phase one commenced. Phase one was completed by 10 June despite some difficulties in tunneling caused by a hard clay bottom. ALC-1 and ALC-2 were towed by tug from Subic Bay to Vung Tau, where they were transferred to the MSTS tug KINQUAT for tow to My Tho. They arrived at My Tho on 4 June. Prior to positioning the ALCs in lifting position alongside the wreck, it was necessary to remove a small, ramshackle pier, apparently of World War II vintage, which extended from the river edge almost to the inboard end of the wreck. The pier, which was valueless except for scrap, was removed almost intact and delivered to local authorities upon completion of the job.

Twelve wires in all were passed through tunnels under the
wreck and made fast on the ALCs. At first high tide on 11 June
the wreck was lifted on the initial attempt and moved approximately
half way to the disposal site across the river. In sequence with
tidal movements during the next three days, the hulk was lifted
and moved to the final disposal site, well clear of the main ship
channel. A day marker with two black spherical shapes one meter
apart was installed on the exposed portion of the wreckage. The
job was completed on 14 June, six days ahead of schedule.

The wreck was 130 feet in length, with a beam amidships of
14 feet and a full load draft of 8 feet. The estimated full load
displacement was 520 tons. The difficult task of moving this hulk
was accomplished under adverse diving conditions in strong currents
and zero sub-surface visibility.

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NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY SAIGON

The activities of the U.S. Naval Support Activity, Saigon and its detachments increased in scope and intensity during June as the construction of new support bases continued. The progress at the detachments varied considerably depending on local conditions. Problems encountered in base construction continued to be numerous and varied. Typically, they included such items as negotiating for real estate; making local arrangements for joint U.S./Vietnamese utilization of interim facilities; constructing work shops, piers, and living quarters; stocking supplies and repair parts; organizing base defense; and repairing the boats. As the basic housekeeping needs of the bases became established, more attention was being directed toward such support items as engine and electronic repair.

Under the auspices of the Public Works Department, progress on base and headquarters completion continued during June. Work was started on the construction of interim GAME WARDEN base facilities at Sa Dec, Vinh Long, and Long Xuyen. All bases were to be ready to receive operational units during July. Work continued on the base at Nha Be, with drilling started on a water well at an approved location on the permanent GAME WARDEN base site. On 21 June, YNFB-16 arrived at Nha Be to provide additional interim berthing and repair facilities. A plan has been prepared for roofing over the top deck and providing a screened-in sleeping area.

In other construction work the renovation of spaces at NAVFORV headquarters progressed on schedule with some of the spaces in use.
by the end of the month. A contract was let for the leveling of the MARKET TIME P2V parking apron at Tan Son Nhut Airbase at Saigon. Daily rains, however, prevented any work by the contractor. This situation was expected to continue until September. Similar conditions delayed work on the NAVSUPPACT Air Division parking area. Arrangements were completed during the month with the Army Engineers for construction work on facilities for MIUWS units at Qui Nhon and Nha Trang.

Repair capabilities continued to improve as shops and personnel became available. The shop at the Cat Lo Support Facility was in full operation as of 30 June. Three PCF engines were replaced at Cat Lo during the month. An operational target date of 20 July was established for repair facilities at Ving Long, Sa Dec and Long Xuyen. At the NAVSUPPACT Detachment at Cam Ranh Bay, repair facilities were basically completed and equipment fifty percent installed by the end of June.

Additional steps toward achieving full operational capability were taken during the month. Equipment issue including weapons and personal gear was established from the NAVSUPPACT Armory. The assignment of one YFR was confirmed and the USS BLUEBIRD (formerly MSC-121) was assigned to NAVSUPPACT. This sea lift capability will provide an excellent resupply capability for MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN bases throughout the II, III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. In addition, eight LCMS were received by NAVSUPPACT during the month for use at GAME WARDEN bases.

The Supply Department was involved in numerous emergency
expedients including such items as machine guns for the My Tho base, equipment for outfitting of fire boats, office furniture and camouflage fatigues for the SACL team. During the month the field support team visited the various bases and assisted as needed in messing, laundry, miscellaneous supply problems, and establishing a mess at the K.USUPP.CT Detachment at Long Kuyen.

Quarterly schedules for USS MARK (LKA-12) and USS ENGLE (LKA-28), assigned to COMUS.PFORV for logistic support purposes, were firmed up. Also in the logistic area, action was taken to exploit air and overland lift capabilities with the objective of compressing transportation pipelines to a minimum. In the accounting area, a streamlined funding/accounting procedure was implemented at the detachment level to reduce paperwork in those areas by as much as fifty percent.

The personnel strength of the K.USUPP.CT Detachments increased rapidly during June, with the on-board percentage of allowance at about 75% for officer and 60% for enlisted by the end of the month. However, a serious shortfall continued to exist in the technical ratings. Also, in the personnel area, an instruction was issued to outline jurisdictional limitations and specific procedures for the administration of Article 15 Non-Judicial Punishment by Officers in Charge of K.USUPP.CT Saigon Detachments.

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MILITARY CIVIC ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

During June six PsyOps trained officers took up duties as PsyOps officers for M.I.A.E.T. T.I.M.E. and GAME W.I.S.E. units in the four Coastal Zones and the two riverine areas. With the growth of the U.S. Navy commitment, U.S. personnel became more involved in PsyOps and Civic Action programs, encouraging the Vietnamese to do the same.

The example of the effects of U.S. involvement came from PCF Division 104 at Can Kheo Bay. On occasions PCF and Support Activity personnel have taken injured fishermen to U.S. Medical facilities for treatment, effected emergency repairs to junks at sea and sponsored movies for local children - these among other civic action projects. The effectiveness of the program was emphasized when the Division Commander was invited to dinner by the Village Chief of Binh Ba Village. The Chief stated that when the PCFs first came the people had expressed apprehension about being mistreated, but that since then they had felt more secure than before. The Chief further stated that the respectful manner of the searchers, coordination between PCFs and Coastal Group units, and permission to fish in the patrol area had resulted in the best catch of fish in many years at his village.

In the Second Coastal Zone an initial experiment using portable loudspeakers aboard a PCF was conducted in the area north of Nha Trang. Chieu Bai broadcasts using tapes prepared by Second Coastal Zone PsyOps personnel were conducted for a period of ten hours with encouraging results. In one instance a group of fishermen put to sea from their village and reported that the Viet Cong, who
had been in the village, had departed; in a second instance, a group of fishermen applauded when they heard the tape and asked to have it played again.

A continuing advisory effort was started at the Vietnamese Naval Training Center, Nha Trang to inaugurate a program of study in psychological operations. Although there was one officer at the Center qualified to teach the course additional duties precluded his instructing the subject. Also, at the Recruit Training Center, Cam Ranh Bay, the advisor requested that recruit training in the subject be started when an instructor became available.

A unique Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCP) was established in the Third Coastal Zone. Volunteer doctors and nurses of the U.S. Army 96th Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau and VII personnel and advisors of Coastal Groups 32 and 33 on their days off have boarded Coastal Group junks and transited to coastal areas north of Vung Tau and to villages in the Long Set Special Zone to treat the villagers. This MEDCP action has been highly successful.

In the Fourth Coastal Zone a ten family housing unit was completed during the month for Vietnamese Navy dependents at An Thoi. This is the third such unit constructed in a program to replace those destroyed by fire on 30 April 1966.

Civic Action Summary:
1. Construction projects completed during report period. All were repaired or renovated and were joint projects with HCMF.
   a. Bridges 1
   b. Hospitals 1
   c. Market places 1
   d. Schools 1
2. Medical Treatments:
   a. General medical 13,155
   b. Dental 753
   c. Surgery 138
   d. Heirlip operations 6

Comment: The bulk of the medical and all dental work reported was accomplished aboard the Vietnamese Navy Hospital Ship (LSH 400) during its deployment in IV Corps area.

3. Health and sanitation:
   a. Physical examinations 64 (X-rays)

Comment: Conducted aboard LSH 400.

4. Distribution of commodities (pounds unless otherwise specified)
   a. Cement 1,200
   b. Clothing 13,945
   c. Children's Vitamins (Bottles) 328
   d. Family kits 60
   e. Food 115,550
   f. Lumber (board feet) 762
   g. Medical, non-prescription 628
   h. Soap 680
   i. Tin sheets 50
   j. Textile kits 885
   k. Wash bucket kits 985

5. Educational efforts:
   a. English classes: 4; attendance, 110.
   b. Carpentry classes: 1; attendance, 44.